In Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, the German philosopher Immanuel Kant explores and discusses fundamental concepts

related to morality and ethics. He describes the central aim of Groundwork as nothing more than the investigation and establishment of the supreme moral principle (AK 392 par 1), and Kants arguments and theses focus on this goal. The basic question that he seeks to address is, essentially, what constitutes morally praiseworthy action? The result of Kants investigation is the concept that genuinely moral actions are those that are performed solely out of respect for rational moral precepts and laws rather than personal benefit, instinct or other motivating factors. As such, Kant divorces the effects of an action from its moral content, since the morality of an action is grounded exclusively in an agents intention rather than the actions results. At first glance, I find this argument counterintuitive his thesis implies that actions done out of motivations such as sympathy, love or friendship have no moral worth, and that only the recognition of abstract and vague concepts of moral obligation is praiseworthy. Furthermore, we generally judge the moral content of an action by the results it produces rather than the impetus: if two people perform the same action and obtain the same result, I would regard their actions as equally moral. It is impossible for us to gauge the true motivations of any person except ourselves, and even if we believe that we are acting out of a sense of duty, our actual maxim may be some ulterior motive or inclination. However, a thorough examination of Kants arguments and investigation into morals provides a deeper understanding of his thesis that allows us to reconcile his views with these apparent inconsistencies in his argument. Kant invites us to consider the concept of the will, in order to begin developing his conception of morality. He defines the will as the capacity to act in accordance with the representation of laws that is, according to principles (AK 412 par 2). The will is an exclusive privilege of rational agents, since they alone are able to reason that certain courses of action based around moral precepts supersede

decisions that are dictated by instinct, self-interest and other motivations (AK 428 par 2). While all rational agents have the capacity to recognize the existence of moral laws, they can still act selfishly and ignore their moral obligations. Those rational beings that consciously base their actions on principles and morals are said to possess a good will, which is a fundamental element of Kants discussion of morality. In Kants view, nothing can be conceived of in the world, or even out of it, which can be called well without qualification except a good will (AK 393 par 1). In certain contexts, any other human faculty or gifts of fortune (such as riches, power and health) can be abused or directed towards amoral ends; a good will, by contrast, is inherently good. This is due to the fact that its ethical character can never be dampened by limitation or qualification, since there is no plausible context where a commitment to moral actions could produce unethical results. A good will gives value and purpose to other aims: qualities such as happiness, moderation and self-control are all undesirable or dangerous without the corrective moral influence of a good will (AK 393 par 2). Since a good will is not valued for the effects it elicits and cannot conceivably be amoral, it is, as Kant states, good in itself (AK 394 par 1). This idea of a good will is one of the most basic components of Kants ideas of morality, and central to his exploration of morally praiseworthy actions. Since rational beings in possession of a good will prioritize actions based on principles and moral laws above all other selfish or instinctual actions, there must be some universal body of specific moral obligations that rational agents are compelled to fulfill. Kant refers to these obligations as duties, stating that duty is the necessity of acting from respect for the [moral] law (AK 400 par 1). Moral actions, thus, stem from recognizing and basing decisions around the duties that make up moral laws. Kant explicitly states that the pre-eminent good which we call moral can consist in nothing else than the representation of the law in itself [] insofar as this representation, and not the expected effect, determines the will (AK 401 par 1). Possessing a good will means that an agent has consciously identified actions that are motivated through duty as ethically superior to those driven by all other 2

impetuses. Consequently, morally praiseworthy actions must be done solely from duty no other factors (such as love, friendship or self-interest) can influence a genuinely moral action. The logical conclusion of this argument is that the results of actions have no relevance towards their moral content. Kant summarizes this by declaring that an action derives its moral worth () from the maxim by which it is determined (AK 399 par 3). If two rational agents perform the same action (the first acting out of duty and the second out of self-interest) and obtain the same results, only the agent that acted from duty would have carried out a morally praiseworthy action. To clarify this argument, Kant provides several examples of actions that vary in their motivations and ethical character. A merchant may fulfil his duty of honestly serving his customers by keeping a fixed price, but his only motivation for not overcharging customers is the threat of competition from other tradesman. While the results of his decision accord with duty, the merchant is motivated by narrow self-interest instead of a genuine recognition of his moral obligations: he acts in conformity with duty, but not from duty (AK 397 par 3), and so his actions cannot be considered morally praiseworthy. Similarly, everyone has a duty to preserve their own life, but most people fulfil this responsibility for motivations beyond moral compulsions, such as instinctual self-preservation and self-interest; like the merchant, they are acting in conformity with duty. The only time that preserving ones life has concrete moral worth is when a person that genuinely wishes for death, with no interest or desire for life, continues living solely out of respect for the moral law that compels him to preserve his life (AK 397 par 3). A philanthropist whose motive for beneficence is the pleasure he gains from spreading joy acts in conformity with duty since he acts based on inclination rather than moral law. (AK 399) Kant uses these examples to illustrate the idea that actions must have no motivating influences besides duty in order to be moral, and to establish the distinction between actions that conform to duty and those that are done from duty. While each agent in Kants examples produces results consistent with their moral responsibilities, their myriad motivations (self-interest, love for life and sympathy for others) negate the moral worth of their actions.

These actions are not wrong or prohibited, but rather lack moral content due to the nature of their motivations; to put it concisely, those agents did the right thing for the wrong reasons. A clear thesis emerges out of Kants discussion of morality: truly moral actions are those that are done from duty alone. This idea is a crucial element in Kants overall aim in Groundwork, which is the establishment of the supreme moral principle - the fundamental moral law that outlines ethically praiseworthy, neutral or prohibited courses of action. The concepts of duty and the nature of moral worth have clear implications for this overall aim. Kants thesis directly implies the necessity of some kind of framework or methodology that rational beings can use to identify the duties that they are responsible for fulfilling, without which his thesis holds no practical merit. Kant begins developing this framework by stating that [nothing] could be more fatal to morality than that we should wish to derive it from examples (AK 408 par 2). We can never use empirical evidence to ascertain moral truths because we can only evaluate the moral worth of examples if we have some pre-conceived concepts of morality to judge them against (AK 408 par 2). Since this framework has to be applicable in all contexts, it must be divorced from the subjective constraints of human nature and empiricism. As such, moral principles must be found a priori, or through pure reason alone. Kant is thus able to construct a universal law or methodology through which any rational agent, in any circumstance, can gauge whether their actions are morally praiseworthy, permitted or prohibited. Kant concisely expresses his guideline for appraising the morality of actions as act as if the maxim of your action were to become by your will a universal law of nature (AK 421 par 3), which Kant refers to as the categorical imperative. If an individuals maxim could never conceivably exist as a law of nature, then that action violates the principles of duty and so could never be a moral obligation (AK 423 par 1). If it could exist as a law of nature, then the final step is whether the agent could rationally condone that maxim being made into a universal law. This categorical imperative, along with Kants thesis, has several secondary implications

for ethics. If we accept the fact that only actions done out of duty have moral worth, then acting based on any other motivating factors (such as love, altruism, friendship) are essentially morally bankrupt. Examining Kants arguments and their implications in detail provides a comprehensive answer to the initial question that his investigation seeks to answer regarding what constitutes morally praiseworthy actions. Kants thesis is that only actions performed out of a sense of duty have moral worth. The logical implications of this thesis, however, highlight critical flaws in Kants argument. Duties, as discussed earlier, are ethical obligations that rational, moral agents have a responsibility to fulfil. Thus, actions that have moral worth can be considered morally compulsory if a rational agent desires to be moral, he must always act according to whatever course of action accords with duty. Take, for example, Kants statement that to be beneficent when one can is a duty (AK 398 par 1). As such, a rational agent is morally compelled to be beneficent in whatever circumstances allow for that particular course of action. Using Kants thesis, the moral precept I ought to be beneficent can be revised to I ought to be beneficent from my sense of duty since Kant posits that my motivating factor is my sense of duty to be beneficent. My sense of duty to be beneficent is equivalent to the moral compulsion that I have to be beneficent, or rather, the sense that I must be beneficent. This implies that our principle that I ought to beneficent from my sense of duty can be rewritten to I ought to be beneficent from the sense that I must be beneficent. Being beneficent is a moral imperative, compulsory under Kants thesis, and so there is no meaningful difference between the statements I ought to be beneficent and I must be beneficent, since a moral agent must always obey the course of action dictated by that moral precept. Thus the final revision to our moral principle gives us the statement I ought to be beneficent from the sense that I ought to be beneficent, which (though logically consistent with Kants argument) is clearly fallacious, since Kant effectively uses circular reasoning. Pointing out the inconsistencies in Kants argument is particularly important because it undermines the rest of his investigation into morals and the establishment of the supreme moral principle. If his basic thesis 5

concerning the moral worth of actions done from duty is flawed, then the entire premise behind the categorical imperatives and all other major ideas in Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals hold little merit. Kants investigation provides several key insights into the nature of moral action and the relationship between ethics, reason and maxims. Since rational agents are able to recognize that certain fundamental precepts dictate courses of action that are inherently superior to all other motivating factors, genuinely ethical actions are those that are done out of respect for the moral law. Consequently, Kant determines a framework that can be used to determine our ethical obligations so that we can act from duty, which carries important implications. Lastly, examining Kants argument from a logical, critical perspective illuminates potential flaws in his argument that, if true, effectively undermine the entire aim of Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals. Despite this, Kants treatise on moral actions is an insightful and genuinely thought-provoking perspective on morality, rationalism and action.