WORLD WAR I

Organized Crime?
Part 2: Paris Peace Conference of 1919 & T e !sta"#is ment of a $e% Wor#d Order

By William P. Litynski

Paris Peace Conference of 1919

Edward M. House (standing, far left) appears with mem ers of the !ommission on League of "ations in #pril $%$%. &eated, left to right' (apanese #m assador to )reat Britain &utemi !hinda, (apanese diplomat "o uaki Makino, Leon Bourgeois (*ran+e), ,o ert !e+il (Mem er of British Parliament and mem er of the Milner )roup), -ittorio .rlando (Prime Minister of /taly), Epita+io Pessoa (later President of Bra0il)1 Eleftherios -eni0elos (Prime Minister of )ree+e). &tanding, left to right' !onstantine 2iamandy (,umania), 3!olonel4 Edward M. House, ,oman 2mowski (Poland), Milenko ,. -esnit+h (&er ia), )eneral (an !hristian &muts (future Prime Minister of &outh #fri+a), Woodrow Wilson (President of the 5nited &tates), 6aral 6ramar (!0e+hoslo7akia), Paul Hymans (*oreign Minister of Belgium), unidentified, !hinese diplomat 2r. -.6. Wellington 6oo, (aime Batalha8,eis (Portugal), -ittorio &+ialo9a (*oreign Minister of /taly), and unidentified. (Photo' Manus+ripts : #r+hi7es, ;ale 5ni7ersity)

Decisions made at the Paris Peace Conference or recognized before the Paris Peace Conference
Esta lishment of the League of "ations Esta lishment of the ,oyal /nstitute of /nternational #ffairs Esta lishment of the !oun+il on *oreign ,elations /ndependen+e of Poland, Hungary, *inland, Lithuania, Estonia, and Lat7ia !reation of !0e+hoslo7akia and ;ugosla7ia )erman Empire, ,ussian Empire, and #ustro8Hungarian Empire Partition and territorial o++upation (and later +ollapse) of the .ttoman Empire (<reaty of &e7res) !reation of Le anon, &yria, /ra=, and Palestine ( oth /srael and (ordan) Massi7e reparations payment against )ermany (Weimar ,epu li+)

#meri+an (ewish finan+ier Bernard Baru+h (far right) appears with (from left to right) Louis Lou+heur (*ren+h diplomat), Mem er of Parliament Winston !hur+hill (standing), and British Prime Minister 2a7id Lloyd )eorge at the Paris Pea+e !onferen+e in $%$%. 2a7id Lloyd )eorge was the Prime Minister of )reat Britain from 2e+em er >, $%$? to .+to er @@, $%@@.

Mem ers of 3<he /n=uiry4 appear together at the Paris Pea+e !onferen+e in $%$%. &eated, from left to right' !harles Homer Haskins, /saiah Bowman, &idney Me0es, (ames Brown &+ott, and 2a7id Hunter Miller. &tanding, from left to right' !harles &eymour, ,o ert H. Lord, William L. Westermann, Mark (efferson, Edward M. House, )eorge Louis Beer, 2ouglas W. (ohnson, !li7e 2ay, William Edward Lunt, (ames <. &hotwell, and #llyn #. ;oung. (Photo' Manus+ripts : #r+hi7es, ;ale 5ni7ersity Li rary) E7eryone in this photo eA+ept for Westermann, (efferson, Beer, Lunt, and &hotwell were mem ers of the !oun+il on *oreign ,elations in $%@@. (ames <. &hotwell was a mem er of the !oun+il on *oreign ,elations. Edward M. House was the head of 3<he /n=uiry4 and the founder of the !oun+il on *oreign ,elations. !harles Homer Haskins, (ames Brown &+ott, !harles &eymour, ,o ert H. Lord, Edward M. House, 2ouglas W. (ohnson, !li7e 2ay, and (ames <. &hotwell were mem ers of the #meri+an /nstitute of /nternational #ffairs.

*ront page photo' Mem ers of the /n=uiry appear together at the Paris Pea+e !onferen+e in $%$%. &eated, from left to right' !harles Homer Haskins, /saiah Bowman, &idney Me0es, (ames Brown &+ott, and 2a7id Hunter Miller. &tanding, from left to right' !harles &eymour, ,o ert H. Lord, W. L. Westermann, Mark (efferson, Edward M. House, )eorge Louis Beer, 2ouglas W. (ohnson, !li7e 2ay, W. E. Lunt, (ames <. &hotwell, and #llyn #. ;oung. E7eryone in that photo eA+ept for Westermann, (efferson, Beer, and Lunt were mem ers of the !oun+il on *oreign ,elations (!*,). Edward M. House was the founder of the !oun+il on *oreign ,elations, an internationalist organi0ation lo+ated in "ew ;ork !ity.

MEMBE,& .* <HE /"B5/,;

#< <HE P#,/& PE#!E !."*E,E"!E /" $%$%
Edward M. House Gen. Tasker Bliss Sidney Mezes Director of Division of Intelligence Isaia Bow!an " ief of Territorial Intelligence " arles Sey!our Territorial S#ecialist on $ustria%Hungary "live Day Territorial S#ecialist on t e Balkans &o'ert H. (ord Territorial S#ecialist on &ussia and )oland " arles Ho!er Haskins Territorial S#ecialist on *rance%Belgiu!%Sc leswig +. E. (unt Territorial S#ecialist on Italy +. (. +ester!ann Territorial S#ecialist on +estern $sia George (ouis Beer Territorial S#ecialist on $frica Stanley ,. Horn'eck Territorial S#ecialist on *ar East and )acific Mr. +illia!s Territorial S#ecialist on *ar East and )acific (t. D. T. -elson Territorial S#ecialist on England +. -otestein Territorial S#ecialist on Ger!any Dr. &oland B. Di.on Territorial S#ecialist on Inner $sia/ Et nogra# y S#ecialist Douglas +. 0o nson Boundary To#ogra# y S#ecialist 0a!es T. S otwell History S#ecialist/ (i'rary S#ecialist $llyn $. 1oung Econo!ic and Statistics S#ecialist "ol. (eonard $yres Econo!ic and Statistics S#ecialist Mark 0efferson Geogra# y and "artogra# y S#ecialist +illia! ". Bullitt "urrent Intelligence Su!!aries S#ecialist "a#t. *ara'ee Et nogra# y S#ecialist Ma2. 0a!es Brown Scott Tec nical $dviser David Hunter Miller Tec nical $dviser 0ose# ". Grew Secretary and Su#ervising Director "a#t. &ic ard ". )atterson 0r. E.ecutive 3fficer of t e E.ecutive 3ffice +. (. Blank4 "artogra# y D. ). *rary4 &eference (ouis H. Gray4 -ear East5"aucasus &o'ert 0. ,erner4 $ustrian -ationalis! $r!in ,. (o'eck4 "artogra# y $l'ert (y'yer4 History )arker T. Moon4 &esearc )reston Slossen4 History 3. G. Stratton4 (aw4 "artogra# y

T e 6SS George Washington )assenger (ist for Dece!'er 74 898:

2estination' Paris Pea+e !onferen+e

Dece!'er 74 898: T e 6SS George Washington #assenger list included t e In;uiry<

Beer4 George (.4 "olonies4 $frica Blank4 +.(.4 "artogra# y Bow!an4 Isaia 4 " ief of Territorial Intelligence Day4 "live4 Balkans Di.on4 &oland B.4 &ussia4 Inner $sia *rary4 D.).4 &eference Gray4 (ouis H.4 -ear East5"aucasus Haskins4 " arles H.4 *rance%Belgiu!%Sc leswig4 History Horn'eck4 Stanley ,.4 *ar East 0efferson4 Mark4 " ief "artogra# er ,erner4 &o'ert 0.4 $ustrian -ationalis! (o'eck4 $r!in ,.4 "artogra# y (ord4 &o'ert H.4 &ussia and )oland (unt4 +illia! E.4 Italy (y'yer4 $l'ert4 History Mezes4 Sidney E.4 Director Moon4 )arker T.4 &esearc Sey!our4 " arles4 $ustria%Hungary S otwell4 0a!es T.4 History Slossen4 )reston4 History Stratton4 3.G.4 (aw4 "artogra# y +ester!ann4 +.(.4 Turkey5-ear East5+estern $sia 1oung4 $.$.4 Econo!ics =Source< Gelfand4 T e In;uiry ##. 8>:%94 S otwell $t t e )aris )eace "onference?.

$lso on 'oard were )resident and Mrs. +ilson4 Sec. (ansing4 Henry + ite ="o!!issioner?4 0a!es Scott4 "ol. (eonard $yres =$r!y Statistician?4 George "reel =#u'licity5censors i#? 3t er geogra# ers and cartogra# ers of t e In;uiry not going to )aris included< " arles Besswerger 0o n +. Bra'eck +illia! Briese!eister4 "artogra# er Mary "arwood Eugene @an "leef4 &ainfall5te!#erature !a#s of (atin $!erica Stuart Davis -evin *enne!an4 Geology " arles ,irsc George McBride4 $GS (i'rarian +. *. Mat ews *rederick Morris4 "artogra# y Her!an -agel H.D. &al# s Ellen " urc ill Se!#le4 -ear East4 $ustro%Hungarian 'order Everett ,. Taidor &ussell (. +iget -otes< =Source< Gelfand4 The Inquiry?

$t )aris ot ers !e!'ers included< Douglas +. 0o nson4 Cartographer, Boundary topography, East Adriatic
Interestingly4 a young 0.,. +rig t was also in )aris at t is ti!e4 and dined wit AIsaia B Bow!an during t e )eace "onferenceC +rig t was later =89DE? ired 'y Bow!an as (i'rarian of t e $!erican Geogra# ical Society. Bow!an also !et (awrence of $ra'ia and *eisal4 S erif of Mecca.
&our+e' Papers of Mark (efferson, Eastern Mi+higan 5ni7ersity http'CCmonar+h.gsu.eduC9+ramptonCpoliti+sC

Mem ers of the ,eparations !ommission appear together at the Paris Pea+e !onferen+e in $%$%. &eated from left to right' Her ert Hoo7er, )en. <asker Bliss, W. &. Benson, Bernard Baru+h, and Henry M. ,o inson. &tanding from left to right' <homas W. Lamont, Whitney H. &hepardson, "orman H. 2a7is, Edward M. House, )ordon #u+hin+loss, and -an+e M+!ormi+k. E7eryone in this photo eA+ept for Bernard Baru+h and W. &. Benson were mem ers of the !oun+il on *oreign ,elations.

*rom left to right' British Prime Minister 2a7id Lloyd )eorge, /talian Prime Minister of /taly -ittorio .rlando, Prime Minister of *ran+e )eorges !lemen+eau, and #meri+an President Woodrow Wilson meet at the Paris Pea+e !onferen+e in -ersailles.

Heads of state appear at the Paris Pea+e !onferen+e of $%$% in -ersailles, *ran+e. *rom left to right' /talyDs Prime Minister -ittorio .rlando, British Prime Minister 2a7id Lloyd )eorge, Prime Minister of *ran+e )eorges !lemen+eau, and #meri+aDs President Woodrow Wilson. (BettmannC!.,B/&)

Lea7ing the Hall of Mirrors at -ersailles after signing the Pea+e <reaty on (une @E, $%$%, Prime Minister of *ran+e )eorges !lemen+eau, Woodrow Wilson, &onnino, and British Prime Minister 2a7id Lloyd )eorge tip their hats to the +heering +rowd. (BettmannC!.,B/&)

<his pi+ture was pu lished in Paris 1919: Six Months That Changed the World by Margaret MacMillan . <he )erman delegation would sign the -ersailles <reaty on (une @F, $%$%, eAa+tly fi7e years after the assassination of #ustrian #r+hduke *ran0 *erdinand in &ara9e7o.

<he seating plan at the Paris Pea+e !onferen+e in $%$%. <hirty8two +ountries, form elligerents to neutrals, were in7ited to send delegates to Paris. <he full Pea+e !onferen+e met only eight times.

FT ese territorial dis#utes are of i!#ortance 'ecause t ey continued to lacerate relations i#s 'etween neig 'oring states until well into t e #eriod of +orld +ar II and even later. T e na!es of *iu!e4 T race4 Bessara'ia4 E#irus4 Transylvania4 Me!el4 @ilna4 Tesc en4 t e Saar4 Danzig4 and Macedonia were still ec oing as 'attle%cries of over eated nationalists twenty years after t e )eace "onference asse!'led at )aris. T e work of t at conference ad undou'tedly reduced t e nu!'ers of !inority #eo#les4 'ut t is ad only served to increase t e intensity of feeling of t e !inorities re!aining. T e nu!'ers of t ese re!ained large. T ere were over 84EEE4EEE Ger!ans in )oland4 GGE4EEE in Hungary4 H48EE4EEE in "zec oslovakia4 a'out IEE4EEE in &o!ania4 GEE4EEE in 1ugoslavia4 and DGE4EEE in Italy. T ere were 7GE4EEE Magyars in 1ugoslavia4 IGE4EEE in "zec oslovakia4 and a'out 84GEE4EEE in &o!ania. T ere were a'out G4EEE4EEE + ite &ussians and 6krainians in )oland and a'out 848EE4EEE of t ese in &o!ania. To #rotect t ese !inorities t e $llied and $ssociated )owers forced t e new states of central and eastern Euro#e to sign !inority treaties4 'y w ic t ese !inorities were granted a certain !ini!u! of cultural and #olitical rig ts. T ese treaties were guaranteed 'y t e (eague of -ations4 'ut t ere was no #ower to enforce o'servation of t eir ter!s. T e !ost t at could 'e done was to issue a #u'lic re#ri!and against t e offending govern!ent4 as was done4 !ore t an once4 for e.a!#le4 against )oland.J Tragedy and Hope 'y "arroll Kuigley4 #. D:E%D:8 FT e disar!a!ent #rovisions of t e #eace treaties were !uc easier to draw u# t an to enforce. It was clearly understood t at t e disar!a!ent of t e defeated )owers was 'ut t e first ste# toward t e general disar!a!ent of t e victor nations as well. In t e case of t e Ger!ans t is connection was e.#licitly !ade in t e treaty so t at it was necessary4 in order to kee# Ger!any legally disar!ed4 for t e ot er signers of t e treaty to work constantly toward general disar!a!ent after 8989 lest t e Ger!ans clai! t at t ey were no longer 'ound to re!ain disar!ed. In all of t e treaties4 certain wea#ons like tanks4 #oisonous gas4 air#lanes4 eavy artillery4 and wars i#s over a certain size4 as well as all international trade in ar!s4 were for'idden. Ger!any was allowed a s!all navy fi.ed in nu!'er and size of vessels4 w ile $ustria4 Hungary4 and Bulgaria were allowed no navy wort y of t e na!e. Eac ar!y was restricted in size4 Ger!any to 8EE4EEE !en4 $ustria to HE4EEE4 Hungary to HG4EEE4 and Bulgaria to DE4EEE. Moreover4 t ese !en ad to 'e volunteers on twelve%year enlist!ents4 and all co!#ulsory !ilitary training4 general staffs4 or !o'ilization #lans were for'idden. T ese training #rovisions were a !istake4 forced t roug 'y t e $nglo%$!ericans over t e vigorous #rotests of t e *renc . T e $nglo%$!ericans regarded co!#ulsory !ilitary training as L!ilitaristicL/ t e *renc considered it t e natural conco!itant of universal !an ood suffrage and ad no o'2ections to its use in Ger!any4 since it would #rovide only a large nu!'er of #oorly trained !en/ t ey did4 owever4 o'2ect to t e twelve%year enlist!ent favored 'y t e Britis 4 since t is would #rovide Ger!any wit a large nu!'er of ig ly trained !en w o could 'e used as officers in any revived Ger!an $r!y. 3n t is4 as in so !any issues w ere t e *renc were overruled 'y t e $nglo%$!ericans4 ti!e was to #rove t at t e *renc #osition was correct.J Tragedy and Hope 'y "arroll Kuigley4 #. D:8 FT e re#arations #rovisions of t e treaties caused so!e of t e !ost violent argu!ents at t e )eace "onference and were a #rolific source of controversy for !ore t an a dozen years after t e conference ended. T e efforts of t e $!ericans to esta'lis so!e rational 'asis for re#arations4 eit er 'y an engineering survey of t e actual da!age to 'e re#aired or an econo!ic survey of Ger!anyMs ca#acity to #ay re#arations4 were s unted aside4 largely 'ecause of *renc o'2ections. $t t e sa!e ti!e4 $!erican efforts to restrict re#arations to war da!ages4 and not allow t e! to 'e e.tended to cover t e !uc larger total of war costs4 were 'locked 'y t e Britis 4 w o would ave o'tained !uc less under da!ages t an under costs. By #roving to t e *renc t at t e Ger!an ca#acity to #ay was4 in fact4 li!ited4 and t at t e *renc would get a !uc larger fraction of Ger!anyNs #ay!ents under Fda!agesJ t an under Fcosts4J t e $!ericans were a'le to cut down on t e Britis de!ands4 alt oug t e Sout $frican delegate4 General S!uts4 was a'le to get !ilitary #ensions inserted as one of t e categories for w ic Ger!any ad to #ay. T e *renc were torn 'etween a desire to o'tain as large a fraction as #ossi'le of Ger!anyNs #ay!ents and a desire to #ile on Ger!any suc a crus ing 'urden of inde'tedness t at Ger!any would 'e ruined 'eyond t e #oint w ere it could t reaten *renc security again. T e Britis delegation was s ar#ly divided. T e c ief Britis financial delegates4 (ords "unliffe and Su!ner4 were so astrono!ically unrealistic in t eir esti!ates of Ger!anyMs a'ility to #ay t at t ey were called t e F eavenly twins4J w ile !any younger !e!'ers of t e delegation led 'y 0o n Maynard =later (ord? ,eynes4 eit er saw i!#ortant econo!ic li!its on Ger!anyNs a'ility to #ay or felt t at a #olicy of fellows i# and fraternity s ould incline Britain toward a low esti!ate of Ger!anyNs o'ligations. *eeling was so ig on t is issue t at it #roved i!#ossi'le to set an e.act figure for Ger!anyNs re#arations in t e treaty itself. Instead a co!#ro!ise4 originally suggested 'y t e $!erican 0o n *oster Dulles4 was ado#ted. By t is4 Ger!any was forced to ad!it an unli!ited4 t eoretical o'ligation to #ay 'ut was actually 'ound to #ay for only a li!ited list of ten categories of o'ligations. T e for!er ad!ission as gone down in istory as t e Fwar%guilt clauseJ =$rticle DH8 of t e treaty?. By it Ger!any acce#ted Ft e res#onsi'ility of Ger!any and er allies for causing all t e loss and da!age to w ic t e $llied and $ssociated Govern!ents and t eir nationals ave 'een su'2ected as a conse;uence of t e war i!#osed u#on t e! 'y t e aggression of Ger!any and er allies.J T e following clause4 $rticle DHD4 was concerned wit t e re#arations o'ligation4 listing ten categories of da!ages of w ic t e tent 4 concerned wit #ensions and inserted 'y General S!uts4 re#resented a lia'ility larger t an t e aggregate of t e #receding nine categories toget er. Since a considera'le #eriod was needed for t e &e#arations "o!!ission to discover t e value of t ese categories4 t e Ger!ans were re;uired to 'egin i!!ediate delivery to t e victors of large ;uantities of #ro#erty4 c iefly coal and ti!'er. 3nly in May 89D8 was t e full re#arations o'ligation #resented to t e Ger!ans. $!ounting to 8HD t ousand !illion gold !arks =a'out HD.G 'illion dollars?4 t is 'ill was acce#ted 'y Ger!any under #ressure of a si.% day ulti!atu!4 w ic t reatened to occu#y t e &u r @alley. T e re#arations clauses of t e ot er treaties were of little significance. $ustria was una'le to #ay any re#arations 'ecause of t e weakened econo!ic condition of t at stu!# of t e Ha's'urg E!#ire. Bulgaria and Hungary #aid only s!all fractions of t eir o'ligations 'efore all re#arations were wi#ed out in t e financial de'acle of 89H8%89HD.J Tragedy and Hope 'y "arroll Kuigley4 #. D:8%D:H

FT e treaties !ade at )aris ad no enforce!ent #rovisions wort y of t e na!e e.ce#t for t e ig ly inade;uate & ineland clauses w ic we ave already !entioned. It is ;uite clear t at t e defeated )owers could 'e !ade to fulfill t e #rovisions of t ese treaties only if t e coalition w ic ad won t e war were to continue to work as a unit. T is did not occur. T e 6nited States left t e coalition as a result of t e &e#u'lican victory over +ilson in t e congressional elections of 898: and t e #residential election of 89DE. Italy was alienated 'y t e failure of t e treaty to satisfy er a!'itions in t e Mediterranean and $frica. But t ese were only details. If t e $nglo% *renc Entente ad 'een !aintained4 t e treaties could ave 'een enforced wit out eit er t e 6nited States or Italy. It was not !aintained. Britain and *rance saw t e world fro! #oints of view so different t at it was al!ost i!#ossi'le to 'elieve t at t ey were looking at t e sa!e world. T e reason for t is was si!#le4 alt oug it ad !any co!#le. conse;uences and i!#lications. Britain4 after 898:4 felt secure4 w ile *rance felt co!#letely insecure in t e face of Ger!any. $s a conse;uence of t e war4 even 'efore t e Treaty of @ersailles was signed4 Britain ad o'tained all er c ief a!'itions in res#ect to Ger!any. T e Ger!an -avy was at t e 'otto! of Sca#a *low4 scuttled 'y t e Ger!ans t e!selves/ t e Ger!an !erc ant fleet was scattered4 ca#tured4 and destroyed/ t e Ger!an colonial rivalry was ended and its areas occu#ied/ t e Ger!an co!!ercial rivalry was cri##led 'y t e loss of its #atents and industrial tec ni;ues4 t e destruction of all its co!!ercial outlets and 'anking connections t roug out t e world4 and t e loss of its ra#idly growing #rewar !arkets. Britain ad o'tained t ese ai!s 'y Dece!'er 898: and needed no treaty to retain t e!.J Tragedy and Hope 'y "arroll Kuigley4 #. D:H

Edward M. House and his entourage pose for a group photo en route to Europe on the && ,otterdam in $%$?. Left to right' 2udley *ield Malone, !lifford ". !ar7er, Edward Mandell House, &idney Edward Me0es, and !ary <. )rayson. (Photo' 5nderwood : 5nderwood, "ew ;orkCManus+ripts : #r+hi7es, ;ale 5ni7ersity Li rary)

Me!'ers of t e House Mission in -ove!'er%Dece!'er 898I4 led 'y F"olonelJ Edward Mandell House

F3n *riday4 7 0anuary 898:4 a s ort grey% aired Te.an walked into t e + ite House in +as ington D". Two t ings were on is !ind. In t e first #lace4 e was seeking a way of kee#ing t e new Bols evik regi!e in &ussia in t e +estern alliance. Second4 e o#ed t at is countryMs unrivalled econo!ic #ower would #rovide t e !eans of 'ringing t e war to a close. Edward M. House4 at fifty%nine4 'elonged to t e select clu' of Mt ose w o ave t e #ower to end itM. T ere was a lot of talk a'out #eace in t e first week of 0anuary 898:. T e Bols eviks4 on signing a ceasefire wit t e "entral )owers =Ger!any and $ustria%Hungary? on 8G Dece!'er4 ad #resented a si.%#oint #rogra!!e for a #eace wit out anne.ations or inde!nities/ it could a##eal to an $!erican #resident w o4 'efore going to war wit Ger!any t e #revious $#ril4 ad called for M#eace wit out victoryM. T e civilian aut orities in Berlin ad answered t e &ussians wit a M" rist!as DeclarationM t at a##eared to acce#t t e Bols evik ter!s. T ere was so!e dou't t at Ger!anyMs Su#re!e "o!!and % t e Oberste Heeresleitung =3H(? would go along wit t is4 'ut t e Eastern and "entral Euro#ean initiatives de!anded an i!!ediate res#onse fro! t e +est. $ #olitical deadlock of nearly four years see!ed to 'e 'reaking. House was a!ong t ose w o 'elieved4 like a soldier on t e front4 t at t e war ad created a totally novel situation4 an international configuration of forces t at ad no #recedent in istory. So t e res#onse ad to 'e radical. House4 w o served a !ost unusual #resident4 'elieved e ad t e w erewit al to give it. He was i!self no ordinary !an. Most citizen soldiers w o survived would s ed t eir !ilitary titles as soon as t ey re%entered civilian life. House4 on t e ot er and4 was a civilian w o delig ted in !ilitary title. He was addressed as M"olonelM4 t oug e ad never 'een a soldier and ad seen no 'attle/ t e onour ad 'een 'estowed on i! in Houston for is sage advice to four successive governors of Te.as. He was voted to no office4 e eld no #ost/ 'ut an in erited fortune ad given i! t e #ower of influence4 and a keen #olitical !ind did t e rest. His talents were a##reciated on t e two continents. "le!enceau would regard i! as a su#er%civilized !an out of t e wastes of Te.as4 w o saw everyt ing4 understood everyt ing and4 acting on is own sense4 knew ow to 'e eard and res#ected 'y every'odyM. T e young Englis di#lo!at Harold -icolson called i! Man affa'le $t enaM. +oodrow +ilson4 twenty%eig t )resident of t e 6nited States4 s#oke of i! as is M#rivy counsellorM4 and it was in t at ca#acity t at e ad 'een called to t e + ite House. +ilson wanted House to el# i! draft a s#eec on $!ericaMs war ai!s w ic would answer t e &ussians4 rally t e $llies and drive a wedge 'etween t e rulers and t e ruled of Ger!any. But a'ove all it ad to s ow t e world t at t e $!erican initiative t at 0anuary re#resented a co!#lete 'reak wit t e #ast. House ad co!e to +as ington e;ui##ed wit infor!ation and reco!!endations fro! a 'ody of sc olarly advisers known as MT e In;uiryM. =$ strange voca'ulary would 'e one of t e !arks of t e -ew Di#lo!acy.? 6nder HouseMs ai!ia'le c air!ans i#4 t is grou# of 8GE learned !en ad 'een !eeting4 in great secrecy4 wit in t e #re!ises of t e $!erican Geogra# ical Society of -ew 1ork since Se#te!'er. +ilsonMs instructions to t e! ad 'een to #re#are data for a Mdi#lo!atic offensiveM and for an eventual #eace conference structured in accordance wit t e new ideas. T at *riday4 House !anaged only to #resent t e !aterials gat ered/ t e drafting of t e s#eec 'egan t e ne.t !orning. M+e actually got down to work at alf%#ast ten4M House recorded in an i!#ecca'ly ke#t diary4 Mand finis ed re!aking t e !a# of t e world4 as we would ave it4 at alf%#ast twelve oMclock.M T ey la'oured alone4 'e ind closed doors. +ilson i!self ty#ed u# t e final version and read it aloud to House on t e Sunday afternoon. Bot !en were very !oved. House told +ilson4 M1ou will eit er 'e on t e crest of t e wave after itMs delivered or re#osing #eacefully in t e de#t s.N T is would 'e $!ericaMs entry into Euro#e.J 1 1!" War and #eace 'y Gregor Dallas4 #. D>%DI F-ow t e surrender docu!ent ad to 'e drafted. +it out House 'y is side4 +ilson was !ore isolated t an ever. He regarded is Secretary of State4 &o'ert (ansing4 as an idiot and went to t e foreign di#lo!ats for advice. In a conversation wit 0usserand e weig ed u# t e #ros and cons of a MBols evistM Ger!any over t e ,aiserMs Ger!any % t ey see!ed to i! e;ually evil. T ree weeks after receiving Ger!anyMs first note4 e at last called is "a'inet. 6nder t e #ressure of #u'lic o#inion4 t eir !ood was #itiless. T e Secretary of t e Interior wanted negotiations #ost#oned until Ger!an troo#s ad 'een #us ed across t e & ine. T e $griculture Secretary didnMt t ink Ger!anyMs constitutional refor!s were sincere. T e Secretary of t e Treasury said it was u# to t e !ilitary to set t e ter!s. T e )ost!aster General si!#ly de!anded unconditional surrender. +ilson said t at t e force of #u'lic o#inion !ig t take i! to a Mcyclone cellarM for forty%eig t ours. + en so!e'ody re!arked t at t e #u'lis ing of t e #eace notes wit out t e consent of t e $llies !ig t see! to t e! coercion4 +ilson re#lied t at t ey needed coercion. So4 incredi'ly4 +ilson wrote is t ird note to Ger!any alone. It was al!ost as long as is second4 and was even stronger in tone. T e ar!istice would ave Mto !ake a renewal of ostilities on t e #art of Ger!any i!#ossi'leM. Germany would also have to conform better to Wilsons vision of the new world order: if the United States 'must deal with the military masters and the monarchical autocrats of Germany now it must demand not !eace ne"otiations but surrender'# $hus Wilson sou"ht military ca!itulation and a transformation of Germanys institutions# Wilson wanted a revolution in Germany# His note also outlined t e course to follow to end t e ostilities. $ll is corres#ondence wit Ger!any would 'e #assed on to t e $llied govern!ents. If t ey were ready to negotiate #eace on t e 'asis of +ilsonian #rinci#les4 t en t eir !ilitary advisers would 'e asked to su'!it ter!s for an ar!istice t at would assure t eir #eo#le Munrestricted #ower to safeguard and enforce t e details of t e #eaceM. T us4 w ile t e 'asis of #eace negotiations was to 'e laid 'y t e $!ericans4 t e i!!ediate !ilitary ter!s of t e ar!istice were going to 'e set4 as a tec nical #reli!inary4 'y $llied !ilitary e.#erts. So!e ow +ilson i!agined t ere would 'e no conflict 'etween t e two. T e note was forwarded to Berlin on DH 3cto'er A898:B.J 1 1!" War and #eace 'y Gregor Dallas4 #. :9

6.S. )resident +oodrow +ilsonNs letter on 3cto'er 874 898:

Edward M. House attempted to ring the 5nited &tates of #meri+a into the League of "ations. Edward M. House and )eneral <asker Bliss would 9oin the !oun+il on *oreign ,elations. British Prime Minister 2a7id Lloyd )eorge would 9oin the ,oyal /nstitute of /nternational #ffairs.

Bernard Baru+h, "orman H. 2a7is, -an+e M+!ormi+k, and Her ert Hoo7er stand together in their top hats and formal suits. E7eryone eA+ept for Baru+h would 9oin the !oun+il on *oreign ,elations.

Edward M. House, &e+retary of &tate ,o ert Lansing, Woodrow Wilson, Henry White, and 5.&. #rmy )eneral <asker Bliss prepare for a meeting at the Paris Pea+e !onferen+e. House and Bliss were mem ers of the !oun+il on *oreign ,elations. (Photo' "ational #r+hi7es and ,e+ords #dministration)

Edward M. House (left) stands neAt to Prime Minister of *ran+e )eorges !lemen+eau (+enter) in Paris shortly after the end of World War /. <he man on the right is &tephen Bonsal. (Photo' Manus+ripts : #r+hi7es, ;ale 5ni7ersity Li rary)

<he #meri+an !ommission to "egotiation Pea+e

# group portrait of mem ers of the #meri+an !ommission to "egotiation Pea+e. &eated from left to right' 3!olonel4 Edward M. House, 5.&. &e+retary of &tate ,o ert Lansing, 5.&. President Woodrow Wilson, Henry White, )en. <asker H. Bliss. Bernard Baru+h is seen standing in the se+ond row, ehind Woodrow WilsonDs right shoulder. #llen 2ulles (later a !/# 2ire+tor) is seen standing in the a+k row on the left side, wearing a dark mousta+he. !harles &eymour (later President of ;ale 5ni7ersity) is seen
standing in the rear near the +enter, also wearing a dark mousta+he.

3!olonel4 Edward M. House and his wife Mrs. House lea7e -ersailles Pala+e near Paris, *ran+e on (une @F, $%$% after the signing of the pea+e with )ermany. *ashion for men and women +hanged +onsidera ly after World War /1 women egan wearing dresses with hem lines a o7e their ankles and slee7eless dresses. (Photo' Manus+ripts : #r+hi7es, ;ale 5ni7ersity)

T e signing of t e #eace treaty at t e )alace of @ersailles on 0une D:4 8989 =) oto< -ational $rc ives?

T e Signing of t e Treaty of @ersailles on 0une D:4 8989. "olonel Edward M. House =6.S. )resident +oodrow +ilsonNs advisor? and )ri!e Minister of *rance Georges "le!enceau are seated toward t e window in t e center. =) oto< 6llstein Bilderdienst4 Berlin?

T e +orld +ar I Institutions< (eague of -ations4 T e &oyal Institute of International $ffairs O "ouncil on *oreign &elations

The opening session of the League of Nations was held in Geneva, Switzerland on November 15, 1920. The United States of America was not a member of the League of Nations; members of U.S. Congress voted against Americas participation in the League of Nations following World War I. The League of Nations was the creation of President Woodrow Wilson and his advisor Colonel Edward M. House. (Photo: tt#<55www.glo'alautono!y.ca5glo'al85glossaryP#o#.2s#QidR3&.EEH7?

T e " at a! House in (ondon4 t e official ead;uarters of T e &oyal Institute of International $ffairs.

FTHE &31$( I-STIT6TE 3* I-TE&-$TI3-$( $**$I&S =&II$? is not ing 'ut t e Milner Grou# Fwrit large.J It was founded 'y t e Grou#4 as 'een consistently controlled 'y t e Grou#4 and to t is day is t e Milner Grou# in its widest as#ect. It is t e legiti!ate c ild of t e &ound Ta'le organization4 2ust as t e latter was t e legiti!ate c ild of t e F"loser 6nionJ !ove!ent organized in Sout $frica in 89EI. $ll t ree of t ese organizations were for!ed 'y t e sa!e s!all grou# of #ersons4 all t ree received t eir initial financial 'acking fro! Sir $'e Bailey4 and all t ree used t e sa!e !et ods for working out and #ro#agating t eir ideas =t e so%called &ound Ta'le !et od of discussion grou#s #lus a 2ournal?. T is si!ilarity is not an accident. T e new organization was intended to 'e a wider as#ect of t e Milner Grou#4 t e #lan 'eing to influence t e leaders of t oug t t roug The $ound Table and to influence a wider grou# t roug t e &II$. T e real founder of t e Institute was (ionel "urtis4 alt oug t is fact was concealed for !any years and e was #resented to t e #u'lic as !erely one a!ong a nu!'er of founders. In !ore recent years4 owever4 t e fact t at "urtis was t e real founder of t e Institute as 'een #u'licly stated 'y !e!'ers of t e Institute and 'y t e Institute itself on !any occasions4 and never denied. 3ne e.a!#le will suffice. In t e $nnual &e#ort of t e Institute for 897D%897H we read t e following sentence< F+ en t e Institute was founded t roug t e ins#iration of Mr. (ionel "urtis during t e )eace "onference of )aris in 89894 t ose associated wit i! in laying t e foundations were a grou# of co!#aratively young !en and wo!en.J "arroll Kuigley4 The Anglo%A&erican Establish&ent4 #. 8:D

<he Harold Pratt House, head=uarters of the !oun+il on *oreign ,elations, is lo+ated on the southwest +orner of Park #7enue and ?Fth &treet in midtown Manhattan orough in "ew ;ork !ity, one lo+k west of the ?F th &treet and Hunter !ollege su way station. <he !oun+il on *oreign ,elations was in+orporated on (uly @%, $%@$.

F$t t e end of t e war of 89874 it 'eca!e clear t at t e organization of t is syste! ad to 'e greatly e.tended. 3nce again t e task was entrusted to (ionel "urtis w o esta'lis ed4 in England and eac do!inion4 a front organization to t e e.isting local &ound Ta'le Grou#. T is front organization4 called t e &oyal Institute of International $ffairs4 ad as its nucleus in eac area t e e.isting su'!erged &ound Ta'le Grou#. In -ew 1ork it was known as t e "ouncil on *oreign &elations4 and was a front for 0. ). Morgan and "o!#any in association wit t e very s!all $!erican &ound Ta'le Grou#. T e $!erican organizers were do!inated 'y t e large nu!'er of Morgan Fe.#erts4J including (a!ont and Beer4 w o ad gone to t e )aris )eace "onference and t ere 'eca!e close friends wit t e si!ilar grou# of Englis Le.#ertsL w ic ad 'een recruited 'y t e Milner grou#. In fact4 t e original #lans for t e &oyal Institute of International $ffairs and t e "ouncil on *oreign &elations were drawn u# at )aris. T e "ouncil of t e &II$ =w ic 4 'y "urtisNs energy ca!e to 'e oused in " at a! House4 across St. 0a!esMs S;uare fro! t e $stors4 and was soon known 'y t e na!e of t is ead;uarters? and t e 'oard of t e "ouncil on *oreign &elations ave carried ever since t e !arks of t eir origin. 6ntil 89>E t e council at " at a! House was do!inated 'y t e dwindling grou# of MilnerMs associates4 w ile t e #aid staff !e!'ers were largely t e agents of (ionel "urtis. T e &ound Ta'le for years =until 89>8? was edited fro! t e 'ack door of " at a! House grounds in 3r!ond 1ard4 and its tele# one ca!e t roug t e " at a! House switc 'oard.J "arroll Kuigley4 Tragedy and Hope4 #. 9G8%9GD

Armistice and Revolution in Germany

Declaration of the German Republic: # +rowd gathers outside the ,ei+hstag in Berlin as )erman statesman Philipp &+heidemann pro+laims the )erman ,epu li+ outside the ,ei+hstag on "o7em er %, $%$F and for+es the a di+ation of the 6aiser Wilhelm //.

)erman delegates in *ran+e are es+orted to the Western front in *ran+e to sign the armisti+e on "o7em er $$, $%$F. Matthias Er0 erger (+enter) ser7ed as the )erman Minister of *inan+e from $%$% to $%@E. Er0 erger was assassinated in )ermany on #ugust @?, $%@$.

,aiser +il el! II of Ger!any =fourt fro! left? crosses t e Dutc 'order and goes into e.ile on -ove!'er 8E4 898:4 t e day after t e announce!ent of is a'dication. During an e.c ange of notes 'etween Ger!any and t e 6nited States on t e su'2ect of a ceasefire4 it 'eca!e clear t at t e $llies regarded t e a'dication of +il el! II as a #rere;uisite for t e sus#ension of ostilities. Internally4 t e Social De!ocrats w o were now #art of t e #arlia!entary govern!ent under &eic " ancellor Ma. von Baden de!anded +il el!Ns a'dication. T e c ancellor i!self4 *oreign Minister +il el! Solf4 and Kuarter!aster General +il el! Groener =Eric (udendorffNs successor in t e Su#re!e $r!y "o!!and? also urged +il el! to ste# down. In late 3cto'er 898:4 +il el! defiantly wit drew to t e ar!yNs !ain ead;uarters in S#a4 Belgiu!/ e refused to acce#t t e realities of t e situation until t e 'itter end. Instead4 e indulged in delusions< e t oug t of dying a eroNs deat w ile leading is troo#s into 'attle or of giving u# t e title of E!#eror and continuing is reign as ,ing of )russia Fonly.J *aced wit a !ass revolutionary !ove!ent and an ulti!atu! 'y *riedric E'ert4 Ma. von Baden took t e li'erty of announcing t e ,aiserNs a'dication on -ove!'er 94 898:. +il el! II was forced to go into e.ile in t e -et erlands t e ne.t !orning. T e # otogra# s ows +il el! II and is entourage waiting for t e royal train at t e station in t e Dutc 'order town of Ei2sden =# otogra# ed 'y an unknown Dutc student?. =Source< tt#<55ger!an istorydocs.g i%dc.org5su'Pi!age.cf!Qi!agePidRHIHI?

Ma# of t e +estern *ront in 898:4 including t e 3ccu#ation Sones and designated routes of Ger!an wit drawal

F%oo&in" bac& on the military history of the 'irst World War it is clear that the whole war was a sie"e o!eration a"ainst Germany# 3nce t e original Ger!an onslaug t was sto##ed on t e Marne4 victory for Ger!any 'eca!e i!#ossi'le 'ecause s e could not resu!e er advance. 3n t e ot er and4 t e Entente )owers could not e2ect t e Ger!an s#ear ead fro! *renc soil4 alt oug t ey sacrificed !illions of !en and 'illions of dollars in t e effort to do so. $ny effort to 'reak in on Ger!any fro! so!e ot er front was regarded as futile4 and was !ade difficult 'y t e continuing Ger!an #ressure in *rance. $ccordingly4 alt oug s#oradic attacks were !ade on t e Italian *ront4 in t e $ra' areas of t e 3tto!an E!#ire4 on t e Dardanelles directly in 898G4 against Bulgaria t roug Saloniki in 898G%898:4 and along t e w ole &ussian *ront4 'ot sides continued to regard nort eastern *rance as t e vital area. $nd in t at area4 clearly no decision could 'e reac ed. To weaken Ger!any t e Entente )owers 'egan a 'lockade of t e "entral )owers4 controlling t e sea directly4 in s#ite of t e indecisive Ger!an naval c allenge at 0utland in 898>4 and li!iting t e i!#orts of neutrals near Ger!any4 like t e -et erlands. To resist t is 'lockade4 Ger!any used a four%#ronged instru!ent. 3n t e o!e front every effort was !ade to control econo!ic life so t at all goods would 'e used in t e !ost effective fas ion #ossi'le and so t at food4 leat er4 and ot er necessities would 'e distri'uted fairly to all. T e success of t is struggle on t e o!e front was due to t e a'ility of two Ger!an 0ews. Ha'er4 t e c e!ist4 devised a !et od for e.tracting nitrogen fro! t e air4 and t us o'tained an ade;uate su##ly of t e !ost necessary constituent of all fertilizers and all e.#losives. Before 8987 t e c ief source of nitrogen ad 'een in t e guano de#osits of " ile4 and4 'ut for Ha'er4 t e Britis 'lockade would ave co!#elled a Ger!an defeat in 898G fro! lack of nitrates. +alter &at enau4 director of t e Ger!an Electric "o!#any and of so!e five dozen ot er enter#rises4 organized t e Ger!an econo!ic syste! in a !o'ilization w ic !ade it #ossi'le for Ger!any to fig t on wit slowly dwindling resources. 3n t e !ilitary side Ger!any !ade a t reefold re#ly to t e Britis 'lockade. It tried to o#en t e 'lockade 'y defeating its ene!ies to t e sout and east =&ussia4 &o!ania4 and Italy?. In 898I t is effort was largely successful4 'ut it was too late. Si!ultaneously4 Ger!any tried to wear down er +estern foes 'y a #olicy of attrition in t e trenc es and to force Britain out of t e war 'y a retaliatory su'!arine 'lockade directed at Britis s i##ing. T e su'!arine attack4 as a new !et od of naval warfare4 was a##lied wit esitation and ineffectiveness until 898I. $hen it was a!!lied with such ruthless efficiency that almost a million tons of shi!!in" was sun& in the month of (!ril 191) and *ritain was driven within three wee&s of e+haustion of her food su!!ly# $his dan"er of a *ritish defeat dressed in the !ro!a"anda clothin" of moral outra"e at the ini,uity of submarine attac&s brou"ht the United States into the war on the side of the -ntente in that critical month of (!ril 191)# In t e !eanti!e t e Ger!any #olicy of !ilitary attrition on t e +estern *ront worked well until 898:. By 0anuary of t at year Ger!any ad 'een losing !en at a'out alf er rate of re#lace!ent and at a'out alf t e rate at w ic s e was inflicting losses on t e Entente )owers. T us t e #eriod 8987% 898: saw a race 'etween t e econo!ic attrition of Ger!any 'y t e 'lockade and t e #ersonal attrition of t e Entente 'y !ilitary action. T is race was never settled on its !erits 'ecause t ree new factors entered t e #icture in 898I. T ese were t e Ger!an counter'lockade 'y su'!arines on Britain4 t e increase in Ger!an !an#ower in t e +est resulting fro! er victory in t e East4 and t e arrival on t e +estern *ront of new $!erican forces. T e first two of t ese factors were over'alanced in t e #eriod Marc %Se#te!'er4 898:4 'y t e t ird. By $ugust of 898: Ger!any ad given er 'est4 and it ad not 'een ade;uate. T e 'lockade and t e rising tide of $!erican !an#ower gave t e Ger!an leaders t e c oice of surrender or co!#lete econo!ic and social u# eaval. +it out e.ce#tion4 led 'y t e 0unker !ilitary co!!anders4 t ey c ose surrender.J Tragedy and Hope 'y "arroll Kuigley4 )art G4 " a#ter 8D =Military History4 8987%898:?

FT e !ost i!#ortant di#lo!atic event of t e latter #art of t e *irst +orld +ar was t e intervention of t e 6nited States on t e side of t e Entente )owers in $#ril 898I. T e causes of t is event ave 'een analyzed at great lengt . In general t ere ave 'een four c ief reasons given for t e intervention fro! four ;uite different #oints of view. T ese !ig t 'e su!!arized as follows< =8? T e Ger!an su'!arine attacks on neutral s i##ing !ade it necessary for t e 6nited States to go to war to secure Lfreedo! of t e seasL/ =D? t e 6nited States was influenced 'y su'tle Britis #ro#aganda conducted in drawing roo!s4 universities4 and t e #ress of t e eastern #art of t e country w ere $nglo# ilis! was ra!#ant a!ong t e !ore influential social grou#s/ =H? t e 6nited States was inveigled into t e war 'y a cons#iracy of international 'ankers and !unitions !anufacturers eager to #rotect t eir loans to t e Entente )owers or t eir warti!e #rofits fro! sales to t ese )owers/ and =7? Balance of )ower #rinci#les !ade it i!#ossi'le for t e 6nited States to allow Great Britain to 'e defeated 'y Ger!any. + atever t e weig t of t ese four in t e final decision4 it is ;uite clear t at neit er t e govern!ent nor t e #eo#le of t e 6nited States were #re#ared to acce#t a defeat of t e Entente at t e ands of t e "entral )owers. Indeed4 in s#ite of t e govern!entMs efforts to act wit a certain se!'lance of neutrality4 it was clear in 8987 t at t is was t e view of t e c ief leaders in t e govern!ent wit t e single e.ce#tion of Secretary of State +illia! 0ennings Bryan. +it out analyzing t e four factors !entioned a'ove4 it is ;uite clear t at t e 6nited States could not allow Britain to 'e defeated 'y any ot er )ower. Se#arated fro! all ot er Great )owers 'y t e $tlantic and )acific oceans4 t e security of $!erica re;uired eit er t at t e control of t ose oceans 'e in its own ands or in t e ands of a friendly )ower. *or al!ost a century 'efore 898I t e 6nited States ad 'een willing to allow Britis control of t e sea to go unc allenged4 'ecause it was clear t at Britis control of t e sea #rovided no t reat to t e 6nited States4 'ut on t e contrary4 #rovided security for t e 6nited States at a s!aller cost in wealt and res#onsi'ility t an security could ave 'een o'tained 'y any ot er !et od. T e #resence of "anada as a Britis territory ad2acent to t e 6nited States4 and e.#osed to invasion 'y land fro! t e 6nited States4 constituted a ostage for Britis naval 'e avior acce#ta'le to t e 6nited States. $he German submarine assault on *ritain early in 191) drove *ritain close to the door of starvation by its ruthless sin&in" of the merchant shi!!in" u!on which *ritain's e+istence de!ended# .efeat of *ritain could not be !ermitted because the United States was not !re!ared to ta&e over control of the sea itself and could not !ermit German control of the sea because it had no assurance re"ardin" the nature of such German control# $he fact that the German submarines were actin" in retaliation for the ille"al *ritish bloc&ade of the continent of -uro!e and *ritish violations of international law and neutral ri"hts on the hi"h seas the fact that the (n"lo/Sa+on herita"e of the United States and the (n"lo!hilism of its influential classes made it im!ossible for the avera"e (merican to see world events e+ce!t throu"h the s!ectacles made by *ritish !ro!a"anda0 the fact that (mericans had lent the -ntente billions of dollars which would be 1eo!ardi2ed by a German victory the fact that the enormous -ntente !urchases of war materiel had created a boom of !ros!erity and inflation which would colla!se the very day that the -ntente colla!sed3 all these factors were able to brin" wei"ht to bear on the (merican decision only because the balance/of/!ower issue laid a foundation on which they could wor&# $he im!ortant fact was that *ritain was close to defeat in (!ril 191) and on that basis the United States entered the war# T e unconscious assu!#tion 'y $!erican leaders t at an Entente victory was 'ot necessary and inevita'le was at t e 'otto! of t eir failure to enforce t e sa!e rules of neutrality and international law against Britain as against Ger!any. T ey constantly assu!ed t at Britis violations of t ese rules could 'e co!#ensated wit !onetary da!ages4 w ile Ger!an violations of t ese rules !ust 'e resisted4 'y force if necessary. Since t ey could not ad!it t is unconscious assu!#tion or #u'licly defend t e legiti!ate 'asis of international #ower #olitics on w ic it rested4 t ey finally went to war on an e.cuse w ic was legally weak4 alt oug e!otionally satisfying. $s 0o n Bassett Moore4 $!ericaMs !ost fa!ous international lawyer4 #ut it4 L+ at !ost decisively contri'uted to t e involve!ent of t e 6nited States in t e war was t e assertion of a rig t to #rotect 'elligerent s i#s on w ic $!ericans saw fit to travel and t e treat!ent of ar!ed 'elligerent !erc ant!en as #eaceful vessels. Bot assu!#tions were contrary to reason and to settled law4 and no ot er #rofessed neutral advanced t e!.JJ Tragedy and Hope 'y "arroll Kuigley4 )art G4 " a#ter 8H =Di#lo!atic History4 8987%898:?

FT e 6nited States #rotested violently against t e su'!arine warfare w ile 'rus ing aside Ger!an argu!ents 'ased on t e Britis 'lockade. It was so irreconcila'le in t ese #rotests t at Ger!any sent +ilson a note on May 74 898>4 in w ic it #ro!ised t at Fin t e future !erc ant vessels wit in and wit out t e war zone s all not 'e sunk wit out warning and wit out safeguarding u!an lives4 unless t ese s i#s atte!#t to esca#e or offer resistance.J In return t e Ger!an govern!ent o#ed t at t e 6nited States would #ut #ressure on Britain to follow t e esta'lis ed rules of international law in regard to 'lockade and freedo! of t e sea. +ilson refused to do so. $ccordingly4 it 'eca!e clear to t e Ger!ans t at t ey would 'e starved into defeat unless t ey could defeat Britain first 'y unrestricted su'!arine warfare. Since t ey were aware t at resort to t is !et od would #ro'a'ly 'ring t e 6nited States into t e war against t e!4 t ey !ade anot er effort to negotiate #eace 'efore resorting to it. + en t eir offer to negotiate4 !ade on Dece!'er 8D4 898>4 was re2ected 'y t e Entente )owers on Dece!'er DIt 4 t e grou# in t e Ger!an govern!ent w ic ad 'een advocating rut less su'!arine warfare ca!e into a #osition to control affairs4 and ordered t e resu!#tion of unrestricted su'!arine attacks on *e'ruary 84 898I. +ilson was notified of t is decision on 0anuary H8st. He 'roke off di#lo!atic relations wit Ger!any on *e'ruary Hrd4 and4 after two !ont s of indecision4 asked t e "ongress for a declaration of war $#ril H4 898I. T e final decision was influenced 'y t e constant #ressure of is closest associates4 the reali2ation that *ritain was reachin" the end of her resources of men money and shi!s 4 and t e knowledge t at Ger!any was #lanning to seek an alliance wit Me.ico if war 'egan.J Tragedy and Hope 'y "arroll Kuigley4 #. DG8 F+ ile t e di#lo!acy of neutrality and intervention was !oving along t e lines we ave descri'ed4 a #arallel di#lo!atic effort was 'eing directed toward efforts to negotiate #eace. T ese efforts were a failure 'ut are4 nonet eless4 of considera'le significance 'ecause t ey reveal t e !otivations and war ai!s of t e 'elligerents. T ey were a failure 'ecause any negotiated #eace re;uires a willingness on 'ot sides to !ake t ose concessions w ic will #er!it t e continued survival of t e ene!y. In 8987%898:4 owever4 in order to win #u'lic su##ort for total !o'ilization4 eac countryMs #ro#aganda ad 'een directed toward a total victory for itself and total defeat for t e ene!y. In ti!e4 'ot sides 'eca!e so en!es ed in t eir own #ro#aganda t at it 'eca!e i!#ossi'le to ad!it #u'licly oneMs readiness to acce#t suc lesser ai!s as any negotiated #eace would re;uire. Moreover4 as t e tide of 'attle wa.ed and waned4 giving alternate #eriods of elation and discourage!ent to 'ot sides4 t e side w ic was te!#orarily elated 'eca!e increasingly attac ed to t e fetis of total victory and unwilling to acce#t t e lesser ai! of a negotiated #eace. $ccordingly4 #eace 'eca!e #ossi'le only w en war weariness ad reac ed t e #oint w ere one side concluded t at even defeat was #refera'le to continuation of t e war. T is #oint was reac ed in &ussia in 898I and in Ger!any and $ustria in 898:. In Ger!any t is #oint of view was greatly reinforced 'y t e realization t at !ilitary defeat and #olitical c ange were #refera'le to t e econo!ic revolution and social u# eaval w ic would acco!#any any effort to continue t e war in #ursuit of an increasingly unattaina'le victory. *ro! t e various efforts to negotiate #eace it is clear t at Britain was unwilling to acce#t any #eace w ic would not include t e restoration of Belgiu! or w ic would leave Ger!any su#re!e on t e "ontinent or in a #osition to resu!e t e co!!ercial4 naval4 and colonial rivalry w ic ad e.isted 'efore 8987/ *rance was unwilling to acce#t any solution w ic did not restore $lsace%(orraine to er/ t e Ger!an Hig "o!!and and t e Ger!an industrialists were deter!ined not to give u# all t e occu#ied territory in t e west4 'ut were o#ing to retain (orraine4 #art of $lsace4 (u.e!'ourg4 #art of Belgiu!4 and (ongwy in *rance 'ecause of t e !ineral and industrial resources of t ese areas. T e fact t at Ger!any ad an e.cellent su##ly of coking coal wit an inade;uate su##ly of iron ore4 w ile t e occu#ied areas ad #lenty of t e latter 'ut an inade;uate su##ly of t e for!er4 ad a great deal to do wit t e Ger!an o'2ections to a negotiated #eace and t e a!'iguous ter!s in w ic t eir war ai!s were discussed. $ustria was4 until t e deat of E!#eror *rancis 0ose# in 898>4 unwilling to acce#t any #eace w ic would leave t e Slavs4 es#ecially t e Ser's4 free to continue t eir nationalistic agitations for t e disintegration of t e Ha's'urg E!#ire. 3n t e ot er and4 Italy was deter!ined to e.clude t e Ha's'urg E!#ire fro! t e s ores of t e $driatic Sea4 w ile t e Ser's were even !ore deter!ined to reac t ose s ores 'y t e ac;uisition of Ha's'urg%ruled Slav areas in t e +estern Balkans. $fter t e &ussian revolutions of 898I4 !any of t ese o'stacles to a negotiated #eace 'eca!e weaker. T e @atican4 working t roug "ardinal )acelli =later )o#e )ius TII? soug t a negotiated #eace w ic would #revent t e destruction of t e Ha's'urg E!#ire4 t e last "at olic Great )ower in Euro#e. )ro!inent !en in all countries4 like (ord (ansdowne =Britis foreign secretary 'efore 8987?4 'eca!e so alar!ed at t e s#read of Socialis! t at t ey were willing to !ake al!ost any concessions to sto# t e destruction of civilized ways of life 'y continued warfare. Hu!anitarians like Henry *ord or &o!ain &olland 'eca!e increasingly alar!ed at t e continued slaug ter. But4 for t e reasons we ave already !entioned4 #eace re!ained elusive until t e great Ger!an offensives of 898: ad 'een 'roken.J Tragedy and Hope 'y "arroll Kuigley4 #. DG8%DGH

F$fter w at (udendorff called Lt e 'lack day of t e Ger!an $r!yL =$ugust :4 898:?4 a Ger!an "rown "ouncil4 !eeting at S#a4 decided victory was no longer #ossi'le4 and decided to negotiate for an ar!istice. T is was not done 'ecause of a controversy 'etween t e crown #rince and (udendorff in w ic t e for!er advised an i!!ediate retreat to t e LHinden'urg (ineL twenty !iles to t e rear4 w ile t e latter wis ed to !ake a slow wit drawal so t at t e Entente could not organize an attack on t e Hinden'urg (ine 'efore winter. Two Entente victories4 at Saint%Kuentin =$ugust H8st? and in *landers =Se#te!'er Dnd? !ade t is dis#ute !oot. T e Ger!ans 'egan an involuntary retreat4 drenc ing t e ground t ey evacuated wit F!ustard gasJ in order to slow u# t e Entente #ursuit4 es#ecially t e tanks. T e Ger!an Hig "o!!and re!oved t e c ancellor4 Hertling4 and #ut in t e !ore de!ocratic )rince Ma. of Baden wit orders to !ake an i!!ediate ar!istice or face !ilitary disaster =Se#te!'er D9%3cto'er 84 898:?. 3n 3cto'er Gt a Ger!an note to )resident +ilson asked for an ar!istice on t e 'asis of t e *ourteen )oints of 0anuary :4 898:4 and is su'se;uent #rinci#les of Se#te!'er DI4 898:. T ese state!ents of +ilson ad ca#tured t e i!aginations of idealistic #ersons and su'2ect #eo#les everyw ere. T e *ourteen )oints #ro!ised t e end of secret di#lo!acy/ freedo! of t e seas/ freedo! of co!!erce/ disar!a!ent/ a fair settle!ent of colonial clai!s4 wit t e interests of t e native #eo#les receiving e;ual weig t wit t e titles of i!#erialist )owers/ t e evacuation of &ussia/ t e evacuation and restoration of Belgiu!/ t e evacuation of *rance and t e restoration to er of $lsace%(orraine as in 8:IE/ t e read2ust!ent of t e Italian frontiers on nationality lines/ free and autono!ous develo#!ent for t e #eo#les of t e Ha's'urg E!#ire/ t e evacuation4 restoration4 and guarantee of &o!ania4 Montenegro4 and Ser'ia4 wit t e last%na!ed securing free access to t e sea/ international guarantees to kee# t e Straits #er!anently o#ened to t e s i#s and co!!erce of all nations/ freedo! for t e autono!ous develo#!ent of t e non%Turkis nationalities of t e 3tto!an E!#ire4 along wit a secure sovereignty for t e Turks t e!selves/ an inde#endent )olis state wit free access to t e sea and wit international guarantees/ a (eague of -ations to afford F!utual guarantees of #olitical inde#endence and territorial integrity to great and s!all states alikeJ/ and no destruction of Ger!any or even any alteration of er institutions e.ce#t t ose necessary to !ake it clear w en er s#okes!en s#oke for t e &eic stag !a2ority and w en t ey Fs#eak for t e !ilitary #arty and t e !en w ose creed is i!#erial do!ination.J In a series of notes 'etween Ger!any and t e 6nited States4 +ilson !ade it clear t at e would grant an ar!istice only if Ger!any would wit draw fro! all occu#ied territory4 !ake an end to su'!arine attacks4 acce#t t e *ourteen )oints4 esta'lis a res#onsi'le govern!ent4 and acce#t ter!s w ic would #reserve t e e.isting Entente !ilitary su#eriority. He was !ost insistent on t e res#onsi'le govern!ent4 warning t at if e ad to deal Fwit !ilitary !asters or !onarc ical autocratsJ e would de!and Fnot negotiations 'ut surrender.J T e Ger!an constitution was c anged to give all #owers to t e &eic stag/ (udendorff was fired/ t e Ger!an -avy at ,iel !utinied4 and t e ,aiser fled fro! Berlin =3cto'er D:t ?. In t e !eanti!e4 t e Entente Su#re!e +ar "ouncil refused to acce#t t e *ourteen )oints as t e 'asis for #eace until "olonel House t reatened t at t e 6nited States would !akes a se#arate #eace wit Ger!any. T ey t en de!anded and received a definition of t e !eaning of eac ter!4 !ade a reservation on Ft e freedo! of t e seas4J and e.#anded t e !eaning of Frestoration of invaded territoryJ to include co!#ensation to t e civilian #o#ulation for t eir war losses. 3n t is 'asis an ar!istice co!!ission !et Ger!an negotiators on -ove!'er It . T e Ger!an &evolution was s#reading4 and t e ,aiser a'dicated on -ove!'er :t . T e Ger!an negotiators received t e Entente !ilitary ter!s and asked for an i!!ediate ending of ostilities and of t e econo!ic 'lockade and a reduction in t e Entente de!and for !ac ine guns fro! HE4EEE to DG4EEE on t e grounds t at t e difference of G4EEE was needed to su##ress t e Ger!an &evolution. T e last #oint was conceded4 'ut t e ot er two refused. T e ar!istice was signed on -ove!'er 884 898:4 at G<EE a.!. to take effect at 88<EE a.!. It #rovided t at t e Ger!ans !ust evacuate all occu#ied territory =including $lsace%(orraine? wit in fourteen days4 and t e left 'ank of t e & ine #lus t ree 'ridge eads on t e rig t 'ank wit in t irty%one days4 t at t ey surrender uge s#ecified a!ounts of war e;ui#!ent4 trucks4 loco!otives4 all su'!arines4 t e c ief naval vessels4 all #risoners of war4 and ca#tured !erc ant s i#s4 as w%ell as t e Baltic fortresses4 and all valua'les and securities taken in occu#ied territory4 including t e &ussian and &o!anian gold reserves. T e Ger!ans were also re;uired to renounce t e treaties of Brest%(itovsk and of Buc arest4 w ic t ey ad i!#osed on &ussia and on &o!ania4 and to #ro!ise to re#air t e da!age of occu#ied territories. T is last #oint was of considera'le i!#ortance4 as t e Ger!ans ad syste!atically looted or destroyed t e areas t ey evacuated in t e last few !ont s of t e war. T e negotiations wit +ilson leading u# to t e $r!istice of 898: are of great significance4 since t ey for!ed one of t e c ief factors in su'se;uent Ger!an resent!ent at t e Treaty of @ersailles. In t ese negotiations +ilson ad clearly #ro!ised t at t e #eace treaty wit Ger!any would 'e negotiated and would 'e 'ased on t e *ourteen )oints/ as we s all see4 t e Treaty of @ersailles was i!#osed wit out negotiation4 and t e *ourteen )oints fared very #oorly in its #rovisions. $n additional factor connected wit t ese events lies in t e su'se;uent clai! of t e Ger!an !ilitarists t at t e Ger!an $r!y was never defeated 'ut was Fsta''ed in t e 'ackJ 'y t e o!e front t roug a co!'ination of international "at olics4 international 0ews4 and international Socialists. T ere is no !erit w atever in t ese contentions. T e Ger!an $r!y was clearly 'eaten in t e field/ t e negotiations for an ar!istice were co!!enced 'y t e civilian govern!ent at t e insistence of t e Hig "o!!and4 and t e Treaty of @ersailles itself was su'se;uently signed4 rat er t an re2ected4 at t e insistence of t e sa!e Hig "o!!and in order to avoid a !ilitary occu#ation of Ger!any. By t ese tactics t e Ger!an $r!y was a'le to esca#e t e !ilitary occu#ation of Ger!any w ic t ey so dreaded. $lt oug t e last ene!y forces did not leave Ger!an soil until 89H84 no #ortions of Ger!any were occu#ied 'eyond t ose signified in t e ar!istice itself =t e & ineland and t e t ree 'ridge eads on t e rig t ank of t e & ine? e.ce#t for a 'rief occu#ation of t e &u r district in 89DH.J Tragedy and Hope 'y "arroll Kuigley4 #. DGH%DGG

F$ll t e original #eace treaties consisted of five c ief #arts< =a? t e "ovenant of t e (eague of -ations/ ='? t e territorial #rovisions/ =c? t e disar!a!ent #rovision/ =d? t e re#arations #rovisions/ and =e? #enalties and guarantees. T e first of t ese !ust 'e reserved until later4 'ut t e ot ers s ould 'e !entioned ere. In t eory4 t e territorial #rovisions of t e treaties were 'ased on Fself%deter!ination4J 'ut in fact t ey were usually 'ased on ot er considerations< strategic4 econo!ic4 #unitive4 legal #ower4 or co!#ensation. By Fself%deter!inationJ t e #eace!akers usually !eant Fnationality4J and 'y FnationalityJ t ey usually !eant Flanguage4J e.ce#t in t e 3tto!an E!#ire w ere LnationalityL usually !eant Freligion.J T e si. cases w ere self% deter!ination =t at is4 #le'iscites? was actually used s owed t at t e #eo#les of t ese areas were not so nationalistic as t e #eace!akers 'elieved. Because in $llenstein4 w ere )olis %s#eaking #eo#le were 7E #ercent of t e #o#ulation4 only D #ercent voted to 2oin )oland4 t e area was returned to Ger!any/ in 6##er Silesia4 w ere t e co!#ara'le figures were >G #ercent and 7E #ercent4 t e area was s#lit4 t e !ore industrial eastern #ortion going to )oland4 w ile t e !ore rural western #art was returned to Ger!any/ in ,lagenfurt4 w ere Slovene%s#eakers for!ed >: #ercent of t e #o#ulation4 only 7E #ercent wanted to 2oin 1ugoslavia4 so t e area was left in $ustria. So!ew at si!ilar results occurred in Marienwerder4 'ut not in nort ern Sc leswig4 w ic voted to 2oin Den!ark. In eac case4 t e voters4 #ro'a'ly for econo!ic reasons4 c ose to 2oin t e econo!ically !ore #ros#erous state rat er t an t e one s aring t e sa!e language. In addition to t e areas !entioned4 Ger!any ad to return $lsace and (orraine to *rance4 give t ree s!all districts to Belgiu!4 and a'andon t e nort ern edge of East )russia around Me!el to t e $llied )owers. T is last area was given to t e new state of (it uania in 89D7 'y t e "onference of $!'assadors. T e c ief territorial dis#utes arose over t e )olis "orridor4 t e & ineland4 and t e Saar. T e *ourteen )oints ad #ro!ised to esta'lis an inde#endent )oland wit access to t e Baltic Sea. It ad 'een *renc #olicy4 since a'out 8GEE4 to o##ose any strong state in central Euro#e 'y seeking allies in eastern Euro#e. +it t e colla#se of &ussia in 898I4 t e *renc soug t a su'stitute ally in )oland. $ccordingly4 *oc wanted to give all of East )russia to )oland. Instead4 t e e.#erts =w o were very #ro%)olis ? gave )oland access to t e sea 'y severing East )russia fro! t e rest of Ger!any 'y creating a )olis "orridor in t e valley of t e @istula. Most of t e area was )olis %s#eaking4 and Ger!an co!!erce wit East )russia was largely 'y sea. However4 t e city of Danzig4 at t e !out of t e @istula4 was clearly a Ger!an city. (loyd George refused to give it to )oland. Instead4 it was !ade a *ree "ity under t e #rotection of t e (eague of -ations. T e *renc wis ed to detac t e w ole of Ger!any west of t e & ine =t e so%called & ineland? to create a se#arate state and increase *renc security against Ger!any. T ey gave u# t eir se#aratist agitation in return for +ilsonMs #ro!ise of Marc 874 8989 to give a 2oint $nglo%$!erican guarantee against a Ger!an attack. T is #ro!ise was signed in treaty for! on 0une D:4 89894 'ut fell t roug w en t e 6nited States Senate did not ratify t e agree!ent. Since "le!enceau ad 'een a'le to #ersuade *oc and )oincarU to acce#t t e & ine settle!ent only 'ecause of t is guarantee4 its failure to !aterialize ended is #olitical career. T e & ineland settle!ent as it stood ad two ;uite se#arate #rovisions. 3n t e one and4 t e & ineland and t ree 'ridge eads on t e rig t 'ank of t e & ine were to 'e occu#ied 'y $llied troo#s for fro! five to fifteen years. 3n t e ot er and t e & ineland and a zone fifty kilo!eters wide along t e rig t 'ank were to 'e #er!anently de!ilitarized and any violation of t is could 'e regarded as a ostile act 'y t e signers of t e treaty. T is !eant t at any Ger!an troo#s or fortifications were e.cluded fro! t is area forever. This 'as the &ost i&portant clause o( the Treaty o( )ersailles* So long as it re!ained in effect4 t e great industrial region of t e &u r on t e rig t 'ank of t e & ine4 t e econo!ic 'ack'one of Ger!anyMs a'ility to wage warfare4 was e.#osed to a ;uick *renc !ilitary t rust fro! t e west4 and Ger!any could not t reaten *rance or !ove eastward against "zec oslovakia or )oland if *rance o'2ected. 3f t ese two clauses4 t e !ilitary occu#ation of t e & ineland and t e 'ridge eads was ended in 89HE4 five years a ead of sc edule. T is !ade it #ossi'le for Hitler to destroy t e second #rovision4 t e de!ilitarization of western Ger!any4 'y re!ilitarizing t e area in Marc 89H>. T e last dis#uted territorial c ange of t e Treaty of @ersailles was concerned wit t e Saar Basin4 ric in industry and coal. $lt oug its #o#ulation was clearly Ger!an4 t e *renc clai!ed !ost of it in 8989 on t e grounds t at two%t irds of it ad 'een inside t e *renc frontiers of 8:87 and t at t ey s ould o'tain t e coal !ines as co!#ensation for t e *renc !ines destroyed 'y t e Ger!ans in 898:. T ey did get t e !ines4 'ut t e area was se#arated #olitically fro! 'ot countries to 'e ruled 'y t e (eague of -ations for fifteen years and t en given a #le'iscite. + en t e #le'iscite was eld in 89HG4 after an ad!ira'le (eague ad!inistration4 only a'out D4EEE out of a'out GD:4EEE voted to 2oin *rance4 w ile a'out go #ercent wis ed to 2oin Ger!any4 t e re!ainder indicating t eir desire to continue under (eague rule.J Tragedy and Hope 'y "arroll Kuigley4 #. DI>%DI:

*renc officers4 including Mars al *oc 4 #ose for a grou# # otogra# 'efore receiving t e Ger!an $r!istice in *rance on -ove!'er 884 898:.

T e trains w ic 'roug t t e two sides toget er at "o!#iegne4 *rance for $r!istice negotiations on -ove!'er 884 898:.

&enior )erman and #llied +ommanders and politi+ians sign the #rmisti+e ending the war in a railway +ar near !ompiGgne, *ran+e, early on the morning of "o7em er $$, $%$F. *ield Marshal *erdinand *o+h, the #llied supreme +ommander (+enter), stands to a++ept the )erman surrender. #dolf Hitler demanded *ran+eHs surrender in the same railway +ar in $%IE. Behind the ta le, from right to left, *ren+h )eneral MaAime Weygand, *ren+h *ield Marshal *erdinand *o+h (standing), and British *irst &ea Lord &ir ,osslyn Wemyss. /n the foreground, Matthias Er0 erger, general ma9or 2etlof 7on Winterfeldt (with helmet), #lfred 7on . erndorff and Ernst -anselow.

*ro! left to rig t< *renc ar!y officer Mars al *erdinand *oc 4 )ri!e Minister of *rance Georges "le!enceau4 )ri!e Minister of Great Britain David (loyd George4 )ri!e Minister of Italy @ittorio 3rlando4 and *oreign Minister of Italy Baron Sidney "ostantino Sonnino !eet #rivately at 8E Downing Street in (ondon on Dece!'er D4 898:. =) oto< (i'rary of "ongress?

$llied occu#ied troo#s enter t e Ger!an city of Trier =Treves? in Dece!'er 898:.

T e Ger!an delegation #oses for a grou# #ortrait at t e )aris )eace "onference in @ersailles4 *rance on May I4 8989.

Georges "le!enceau4 t e )ri!e Minister of *rance4 delivers a s#eec to t e Ger!an delegates at t e Trianon )alace Hotel in @ersailles4 *rance on May I4 8989 during t e ongoing )aris )eace "onference.

Ger!an delegates attend t e )aris )eace "onference at t e @ersailles )alace in *rance in early 8989.

S#ectators watc t e Ger!an delegates sign t e @ersailles Treaty on 0une D:4 8989. =) oto< Hulton Getty )icture "ollection (i!ited?

Ma# of Ger!any =F+ei!ar &e#u'licJ? fro! 8989%89HI

Ma# of Ger!any and its territorial losses 8989%89D8

(eft< Delegates fro! around t e world watc Ger!an di#lo!ats sign t e Treaty of @ersailles at @ersailles )alace near )aris4 *rance on 0une D:4 8989. &ig t< $rticle DH8 of t e @ersailles Treaty =T e +ar Guilt "lause?

Ger!an troo#s utilize a converted Britis tank during t e failed "o!!unist S#artacist u#rising in Berlin in 0anuary 8989. =) oto< (i'rary of "ongress?

)erman soldiers guard an interse+tion with ar ed wires during the )erman ,e7olution of $%$%. (BettmannC!.,B/&)

<housands of )ermans protest against the -ersailles treaty on the 6oenigsplat0 in Berlin, )ermany on (une $@, $%$%. <his demonstration was made y the )ermans dri7en from #lsa+e Lorraine. (5nderwood : 5nderwoodC!.,B/&)

6aiser Wilhelm // of )ermany meets with *ield Marshal #ugust 7on Ma+kensen and other )erman offi+ers on #pril @@, $%$J (,ussian !ommunist -ladimir LeninDs IJth irthday). (Photo' )erman *ederal #r+hi7es)

The Partition of Eastern Europe

)o7ernment .ffi+ials draft the terms of the <reaty of -ersailles in -ersailles, *ran+e on 2e+em er @, $%$F. .n the left side of the ta le, from left to right' )eneral di ,o ilant, unidentified man, /talian Minister of *oreign #ffairs Baron )iorgio &onnino, 3!olonel4 Edward M. House, 5.&. #rmy )eneral <asker H. Bliss, unidentified man, )reek Prime Minister Eleutherios -eni0elos, and &er ian *oreign Minister Milenko ,. -esnit+h. .n the right side of the ta le, from left to right' #dmiral ,osslyn Wemyss1 *ield Marshal &ir 2ouglas Haig, British Prime Minister 2a7id Lloyd )eorge, *ren+h Prime Minister )eorges !lemen+eau, and *ren+h *oreign Minister &tephen Pi+hon. (/mage' BettmannC!.,B/&)

&oldiers surround the +ar of !0e+hoslo7akiaDs President <omas )arrigue Masaryk in the .ld <own &=uare in Prague on President MasarykDs return to !0e+hoslo7akia on 2e+em er @$, $%$F. *ighting against #ustriaHs allian+e with )ermany and its aggressi7e poli+y in the Balkans, Masaryk es+aped #ustria to /taly, &wit0erland and then London in the early stages of the *irst World War, where he organi0ed the !0e+hoslo7ak mo7ement for independen+e. When the ,epu li+ of !0e+hoslo7akia was esta lished in $%$F, he returned and was ele+ted its first president. (/mage' K &+heufler !olle+tionC!.,B/&)

Estonians +ele rate their de+laration of independen+e from ,ussia in PLrnu, Estonia on *e ruary @M, $%$F. <he &o7iet ,ussian !ommunists signed the <reaty of Brest8Lito7sk on Mar+h M, $%$F. Lat7ia de+lared its independen+e from ,ussia on "o7em er $F, $%$F, a week after )ermany de+lared an armisti+e ending World War /.

Mem ers of !oun+il of Lithuania in $%$>. Lithuania de+lared its independen+e from ,ussia on *e ruary $?, $%$F.

# huge +rowd turns out in a pu li+ s=uare in Budapest, Hungary for the pro+lamation of a new Bolshe7ik (!ommunist) go7ernment in Hungary on Mar+h @$, $%$%. (/mage' K !.,B/&)

Hungarian "o!!unist agent Bela ,un =for!erly BUla ,o n?4 t e *oreign Minister of t e Hungarian Soviet &e#u'lic4 delivers a s#eec in Buda#est4 Hungary in 8989. $he 4un"arian Soviet 5e!ublic lasted from 6arch 71 1919 to (u"ust 1 1919# Bela ,un ad launc ed a Fred terrorJ of secret #olice against Fene!iesJ of t e regi!e w ile in office. Bela ,un4 a 0ewis "o!!unist4 was a !e!'er of t e Soviet "o!!unist )arty/ Bela ,un was arrested 'y t e Soviet secret #olice and tried in Moscow in 89H:/ Bela ,un was e.ecuted in $ugust 89H:.

(ews in London protest against the reported massa+re of (ews in Poland on (uly >, $%$%. (Photo' K BettmannC!.,B/&)

<he Suojeluskunta, NProte+ting )uardN, of "ummi in *inland. &u+h paramilitary units were formed right efore the *innish !i7il War in $%$F, during whi+h they fought on the White (anti8!ommunist) side against the ,eds (!ommunists). *inland de+lared its independen+e from &o7iet ,ussia on 2e+em er ?, $%$>.

5nemployed men loiter in the streets of in -ienna, #ustria on 2e+em er $M, $%@E. 5nemployment in #ustria was widespread e+ause of the politi+al situation and the low eA+hange rates. (Photo' K BettmannC!.,B/&)

$ !a# of t e et nic grou#s of $ustria%Hungry in 898E

$ !a# of t e et nic grou#s of $ustria%Hungry in 898E

$ !a# of t e dissolution of $ustria%Hungary in 898:

<he negotiations o++ur efore the signing the <reaty of <rianon in -ersailles, *ran+e, near Paris, in $%@E. <he treaty fiAed the new +ommon orders of Hungary with #ustria, !0e+hoslo7akia, ,omania, and ;ugosla7ia. !ount #l ert #pponyi, a diplomat from Hungary, is standing (with long eard) in the middle.

FT e territorial #rovisions of t e treaties of Saint%Ger!ain and Trianon were suc as to destroy co!#letely t e $ustro% Hungarian E!#ire. $ustria was reduced fro! 88G4EEE s;uare !iles wit HE !illion in a'itants to HD4EEE s;uare !iles wit >.G !illion in a'itants. To "zec oslovakia went Bo e!ia4 Moravia4 #arts of (ower $ustria4 and $ustrian Silesia. To 1ugoslavia went Bosnia4 Herzegovina4 and Dal!atia. To &o!ania went Bukovina. To Italy went Sout Tyrol4 Trentino4 Istria4 and an e.tensive area nort of t e $driatic4 including Trieste. T e Treaty of Trianon reduced Hungary fro! 8DG4EEE s;uare !iles wit D8 !illion in a'itants to HG4EEE s;uare !iles wit : !illion in a'itants. To "zec oslovakia went Slovakia and &ut enia/ to &o!ania went Transylvania4 #art of t e Hungarian #lain4 and !ost of t e Banat/ to 1ugoslavia went t e rest of t e Banat4 "roatia%Slavonia4 and so!e ot er districts. T e treaties of #eace set t e 'oundaries of t e defeated states 'ut not t ose of t e new states. T ese latter were fi.ed 'y a nu!'er of treaties !ade in t e years following 898:. T e #rocess lcd to dis#utes and even to violent clas es of ar!s4 and so!e issues are still su'2ects of discord to t e #resent ti!e.J Tragedy and Hope 'y "arroll Kuigley4 #. DI:%DI9 FT e !ost violent controversies arose in regard to t e 'oundaries of )oland. 3f t ese4 only t at wit Ger!any was set 'y t e Treaty of @ersailles. T e )oles refused to acce#t t eir ot er frontiers as suggested 'y t e $llies at )aris4 and 'y 89DE were at war wit (it uania over @ilna4 wit &ussia over t e eastern 'order4 wit t e 6krainians over Galicia4 and wit "zec oslovakia over Tesc en. T e struggle over @ilna 'egan in 8989 w en t e )oles took t e district fro! t e &ussians 'ut soon lost it again. T e &ussians yielded it to t e (it uanians in 89DE4 and t is was acce#ted 'y )oland4 'ut wit in t ree !ont s it was seized 'y )olis free'ooters. $ #le'iscite4 ordered 'y t e (eague of -ations4 was eld in 0anuary 89DD under )olis control and gave a )olis !a2ority. T e (it uanians refused to acce#t t e validity of t is vote or a decision of t e "onference of $!'assadors of Marc 89DH4 giving t e area to )oland. Instead4 (it uania continued to consider itself at war wit )oland until Dece!'er 89DI. )oland did not fare so well at t e ot er end of its frontier. T ere fig ting 'roke out 'etween "zec and )olis forces over Tesc en in 0anuary 8989. T e "onference of $!'assadors divided t e area 'etween t e two clai!ants4 'ut gave t e valua'le coal !ines to "zec oslovakia =0uly ?. )olandNs eastern frontier was settled only after a 'loody war wit t e Soviet 6nion. T e Su#re!e "ouncil in Dece!'er 8989 ad laid down t e so%called F"urzon (ineJ as t e eastern 'oundary of )olis ad!inistration4 'ut wit in si. !ont s t e )olis ar!ies ad crossed t is and advanced 'eyond ,iev. $ &ussia n counterattack soon drove t e )oles 'ack4 and )olis territory was invaded in its turn. T e )oles a##ealed in #anic to t e Su#re!e "ouncil4 w ic was reluctant to intervene. T e *renc 4 owever4 did not esitate4 and sent General +eygand wit su##lies to defend +arsaw. T e &ussian offensive was 'roken on t e @istula4 and #eace negotiations 'egan. T e final settle!ent4 signed at &iga in Marc 89D84 gave )oland a frontier 8GE !iles fart er east t an t e "urzon (ine and 'roug t into )oland !any non%)olis #eo#les4 including one !illion + ite &ussians and four !illion 6krainians. &o!ania also ad a dis#ute wit &ussia arising fro! t e &o!anian occu#ation of Bessara'ia in 898:. In 3cto'er 89DE4 t e "onference of $!'assadors recognized Bessara'ia as #art of &o!ania. &ussia #rotested4 and t e 6nited States refused to acce#t t e transfer. In view of t ese distur'ances )oland and &o!ania signed a defensive alliance against &ussia in Marc 89D8.J Tragedy and Hope 'y "arroll Kuigley4 #. DI9 FT e !ost i!#ortant dis#ute of t is kind arose over t e dis#osition of *iu!e. T is #ro'le! was acute 'ecause one of t e Great )owers was involved. T e Italians ad yielded *iu!e to 1ugoslavia in t e Treaty of (ondon of 898G and ad #ro!ised4 in -ove!'er 898:4 to draw t e Italian%1ugoslav 'oundary on lines of nationality. T us t ey ad little clai! to *iu!e. -evert eless4 at )aris t ey insisted on it4 for #olitical and econo!ic reasons. Having 2ust e.cluded t e Ha's'urg E!#ire fro! t e $driatic Sea4 and not wis ing to see any new )ower rise in its #lace4 t ey did all t ey could to a!#er 1ugoslavia and to curtail its access to t e $driatic. Moreover4 t e Italian ac;uisition of Trieste gave t e! a great sea#ort wit no future4 since it was se#arated 'y a #olitical 'oundary fro! t e interland w ence it could draw its trade. To #rotect Trieste4 Italy wanted to control all t e #ossi'le co!#eting #orts in t e area. T e city of *iu!e itself was largely Italian4 'ut t e su'ur's and surrounding countryside were overw el!ingly Slav. T e e.#erts at )aris wis ed to give Italy neit er *iu!e nor Dal!atia4 'ut "olonel House tried to overrule t e e.#erts in order to o'tain Italian su##ort for t e (eague of -ations in return. +ilson overruled House and issued is fa!ous a##eal to t e Italian #eo#le w ic resulted in t e te!#orary wit drawal of t e Italian delegation fro! )aris. $fter t eir return4 t e issue was left unsettled. In Se#te!'er 8989 an erratic Italian #oet4 Ga'riele DN$nnunzio4 wit a 'and of free'ooters4 seized *iu!e and set u# an inde#endent govern!ent on a co!ic%o#era 'asis. T e dis#ute 'etween Italy and 1ugoslavia continued wit decreasing 'itterness until -ove!'er 89DE4 w en t ey signed a treaty at &a#allo dividing t e area 'ut leaving *iu!e itself a free city. T is settle!ent was not satisfactory. $ grou# of *ascists fro! Italy =w ere t is #arty was not yet in office? seized t e city in Marc 89DD and were re!oved 'y t e Italian $r!y t ree weeks later. T e #ro'le! was finally settled 'y t e Treaty of &o!e of 0anuary 89D74 'y w ic *iu!e was granted to Italy4 'ut t e su'ur' of )ort Baros and a fifty%year lease on one of t e t ree ar'or 'asins went to 1ugoslavia.J Tragedy and Hope 'y "arroll Kuigley4 #. DI9%D:E

# map of Europe in $%$I efore #ustriaDs #r+hduke *ran0 *erdinand was assassinated in &ara9e7o. <he ,ussian Empire, )erman Empire (&e+ond ,ei+h), #ustro8Hungarian Empire, and the .ttoman Empire (<urkey) would +ollapse y the end of World War /.

<he +ountries of #ustria, Hungary, !0e+hoslo7akia, ;ugosla7ia (6ingdom of &er s, !roats and &lo7enes), *inland, Estonia, Lat7ia, Lithuania, Poland, and 5kraine (until $%@E) were esta lished following the +ollapse of the ,ussian Empire, #ustro8Hungarian Empire, and )erman Empire. *ran+e re+ei7ed a 3mandate4 (prote+torate) o7er Le anon and &yria while )reat Britain re+ei7ed a 3mandate4 o7er Mesopotamia (/ra=) and Palestine ((ordan and /srael).

Re&i&a# of Po#and and '(raine

)eneral (osef Pilsudski re7iews his troops in Warsaw, Poland on #ugust $?, $%@E. Poland and &o7iet ,ussia fought o7er disputed territory of present8day 5kraine in $%@E. Poland regained its independen+e on "o7em er $$, $%$F, following the +apitulation of /mperial )ermany and the #ustro8Hungarian Empire. (Photo' K BettmannC!.,B/&)

)olis @oluntary II Deat S;uad soldiers dis#lay t eir unit flag in (viv4 )oland Alater 6kraineB in 89DE. =)olis $rc ives?

*rontlines (marked in red line) of the Polish8Bolshe7ik O,ussiaP War and Polish85krainian War in Mar+h $%$%. Postwar orders are marked in la+k. <he light lue area surrounding the +ity of Lwow (L7i7) represents the territory +ontrolled y the West 5krainian "ational ,epu li+.

*rontlines of t e )olis %Bols evik +ar in $ugust 89DE/ )ost%war 'orders !arked wit 'lack

M ars al 0ozef )ilsudski4 )resident of )oland =89DE%89HG?

F)olandNs resurrection as an inde#endent state after +orld +ar I was rendered #ossi'le as )ilsudski ad #ro# etically con2ectured on t e eve of t at conflict 'y t e tri#le defeat of all t ree of er #artitioning #owers in t e course of t e war. &ecovery 'y eit er Ger!any or &ussia =$ustria%Hungary aving disintegrated 'eyond re#air? and es#ecially an acco!!odation 'etween t e! would inevita'ly 'e dangerous to )oland and raise again t e s#ecter of er #artition. 1et )oland 'y erself was inca#a'le of #reventing eit er t e restoration of Ger!anyMs and &ussiaMs #ower or t e resu!#tion of t eir traditional #olicy of !utual colla'oration at )olandMs e.#ense and t is is #recisely w at #roceeded to occur. Des#ite #ost%898: differences in #u'lic ideologies and #olitical structures4 a ra#idly reviving Ger!any and a !ore slowly resuscitating &ussia coo#erated wit eac ot er and against )oland t roug out !ost of t e 89DEs. T e fact t at t ey were !ilitarily still too weak to truncate or #artition er at t at ti!e was of scant co!fort to )oland4 w ic could ardly fail to 'e aware of er neig 'orsM deter!ination to c ange t is !ilitary as#ect of t e #ower e;uation in due course. "onfronted 'y t e dual en!ity of er 'ig neig 'ors4 )oland was o'viously interested in ensuring t at any conflict 'etween erself and eit er or 'ot of t e! s ould not re!ain localized 'ut s ould 'ring #owerful friends%%e;ually unwilling to tolerate Ger!an and5or &ussian ege!ony over East "entral Euro#e%%to er own su##ort. It was for t is #ur#ose t at )oland concluded an alliance wit *rance on *e'ruary 894 89D8 =followed 'y a secret !ilitary convention two days later?4 and des#erately and for long vainly strove to interest Britain in er 'e alf as a factor of sta'ility in an area w ic in t e long run would 'e regarded as vital also to Britis interests. Here4 owever4 t e )oles constantly ca!e u# against a frustration w ic never ceased to e.as#erate t e!4 na!ely4 t at t ey could e.ercise no leverage on t e +estern #owers to o'lige t e! eit er to onor an o'ligation or to acknowledge a co!!it!ent to )oland. *renc and Britis #olicy toward )oland was to #rove si!#ly a function of t eir #olicy toward Ger!any or &ussia. T us4 w en *rance decided in t e !id%89DEs to atte!#t a ra##roc e!ent wit Ger!any4 t ere was not ing t at )oland could do to avert t is i!#licit 'ut definite desertion 'y er +estern ally. Two decades later4 er govern!ent%in%e.ile was once again #owerless to #revent a warti!e decision 'y Britain and t e 6nited States t at t eir alliance wit t e Soviet 6nion ad #riority over t eir co!!it!ents to t e )olis govern!ent and its eastern frontier clai!s. Meanw ile4 in t e !id%89DEs4 Britain viewed t e Euro#ean scene #ri!arily in ter!s of er desire to revive Ger!any and to reintegrate er into 'ot t e Euro#ean state syste! and t e #attern of world trade. Britain 'elieved erself to ave few or no vital interests in East "entral Euro#e and refused to guarantee t e areaMs #ost%@ersailles frontiers against Ger!an revisionist #ressure. To t e e.tent t at Britain s owed any #ositive interest in )oland during t e 89DEs4 it was largely as a #ossi'le foil against Soviet &ussia4 and t e occasions w en s e !anifested suc an interest generally coincided wit inter!ittent #eriods of Britis %Soviet tension. *ranceNs )olis #olicy during t e interwar #eriod4 w ile !ore tortured t an BritainMs4 was also ulti!ately unsatisfactory fro! )olandMs #oint of view4 for reasons to 'e analyzed #resently. +it in li!its4 )oland could seek to e.tricate erself fro! t is vise of ostile neig 'ors and unrelia'le friends 'y so develo#ing er own strengt as to render t e risks of an attack u#on er #ro i'itive to t e #otential aggressor=s?. Si!ultaneously4 s e could atte!#t to organize alliances and coalitions wit and a!ong ot er !ediu! and s!all #owers also t reatened 'y Ger!any or &ussia. T e first of t ese two strategies e.#lains t e unre!itting )olis efforts to develo# t e countryMs econo!ic4 de!ogra# ic4 and !ilitary #otential. It also e.#lains t e #o#ularity of t e ar!y and t e readiness to !ake sacrifices for its su##ort a!ong all sectors of )olis society. T e second strategy was di#lo!atically a!'itious 'ut 'roug t only !eager results. Ho#es of develo#ing a )olis %Baltic%Scandinavian or )olis %Baltic co!'ination were rendered a'ortive 'y Scandinavian and *innis #reference for neutrality and noninvolve!ent as well as 'y (it uaniaMs refusal encouraged 'y Ger!any and #articularly 'y &ussia to reconcile erself to )olandNs forci'le seizure in 89DE of +ilno =@ilnius4 @ilna?4 a city w ic (it uania regarded as er istoric ca#ital t oug er current et nic%de!ogra# ic clai!s to it were weak. Toward t e sout 4 )olis %"zec oslovak relations never develo#ed any real war!t or !utual confidence owing to t e two countriesN ;uarrel over t e econo!ically valua'le city and district of Tesc en ="ieszyn4 Tesln?4 t eir contrasting #erce#tions of &ussiaMs and HungaryMs #ro#er roles in Euro#e =eac regarding t e ot erNs 'ete noire wit so!e 'enevolence?4 and t eir contrasting social structures and reci#rocally irritating national #syc ologies. 3nly wit &u!ania did )oland conclude a #olitical alliance4 signed on Marc H4 89D84 and renewed #eriodically4 'ut t is4 on 'alance4 #roved to 'e !ore advantageous to t e &u!anian t an t e )olis #artner. /t #ertained e.clusively to !utual su##ort along t eir eastern frontiers4 t at is4 it was directed only at &ussia4 wit w ic &u!aniaMs relations were even worse t an )olandMs4 and #rovided no direct su##ort to )oland in relation to Ger!any. It was4 in s ort4 uni!#ressive. 3n t e w ole4 t erefore4 t e efforts to create a collective East "entral Euro#ean # alan. of security against Ger!any and &ussia #roved disa##ointing. Euro#ean di#lo!atic develo#!ents in t e !ont s #receding )ilsudskiMs cou# ad starkly e!# asized )olandMs vulnera'ilities in t e s# ere of foreign affairs. T e !ultilateral (ocarno Treaties of 3cto'er 8>4 89DG4 w ic #artially legiti!ated4 as it were4 Ger!anyNs anti%)olis revisionis! 'y acce#ting er legal%#olitical distinction 'etween t e validity of er western and er eastern frontiers4 ad 'roug t to t e fore *ranceMs unrelia'ility as )olandMs ally and BritainMs indifference to )olandMs security interests in relation to Ger!any. Half a year later4 Ger!any and &ussia reaffir!ed t eir L&a#allo #olicyL of close coo#eration i!#licitly 'ut categorically at )olandNs e.#ense wit t eir Berlin Treaty of -eutrality and -onaggression of $#ril D74 89D>. Si!ultaneously4 Ger!any was engaged in a !a2or effort to destroy )oland econo!ically t roug t e tariff war and t roug successful intrigues to #revent $!erican and Britis financial aid to er. It is not sur#rising t at t is deterioration in )olandMs international situation 'etween t e s#ring of 89DG and t at of 89D> s ould occasionally 'e cited as one of t e #reci#itating causes 'e ind )ilsudskiNs decision to resu!e #ower and stage is Far!ed de!onstrationJ in May4 89D>.J #ilsuds+i,s Coup -,Etat 'y 0ose# &ot sc ild =89>>?4 #. D9D%D9>

Signing of t e )eace Treaty 'etween 6kraine and t e "entral )owers in Brest%(itovsk on t e nig t of *e'ruary 94 898: =and 'eginning of *e'ruary 8E4 898:?. Sitting in t e !iddle fro! t e left< "ount 3ttokar "zernin =*oreign Minister of $ustria%Hungary?4 &ic ard von ,V l!ann =Ger!anyMs Secretary of State for *oreign $ffairs? and @asil &adoslavov =)ri!e Minister of Bulgaria?

Signing of t e )eace Treaty of Brest%(itovsk during t e nig t 'etween *e'ruary 9 and 8E4 898:. *ro! t e left< General Brink!ann4 Mykola (iu'ynsky4 Mykola (evytsky4 3leksandr Sevriuk4 General Ma. Hoff!ann and Ser iy 3sta#enko

General $ntoni (istowski =left? !eets wit 6krainian nationalist Sy!on )etliura =rig t?4 ead of t e govern!ent%in%e.ile of t e 6krainian )eo#leNs &e#u'lic4 during t e ,iev 3ffensive of t e )olis %Soviet +ar.in 89DE.

General 0Wzef )iXsudski of )oland =center? !eets wit 6krainian nationalist Sy!on )etliura =rig t and far rig t? in ,iev4 6kraine in May 89DE during t e ongoing )olis %Soviet +ar. T e )olis ar!y4 reinforced 'y )etliuraMs re!aining troo#s =an esti!ated two divisions?4 attacked ,iev on May I4 89DE. T e Soviet &ed $r!y ca#tured ,iev in 0une 89DE. ( 8lone "unman9 and 5ussian :ewish assassin named Sholom Schwart2bard assassinated Symon Petliura in Paris on 6ay 7; 197<#

FT e li!itation of 6krainian autono!y in t e Het!an state of eastern 6kraine was an o!inous sign for t e w ole country4 for t e cultural center ever since t e !iddle of t e seventeent century ad 'een at ,iev. *ro! ere education and culture ad gone out to su##ly t e needs of re!ote sections of 6kraine4 es#ecially t at #art w ic was under t e rule of )oland. $he !artitionin" of U&raine in 1<<) between Poland and 5ussia had dealt a deadly blow to U&rainian life by se!aratin" =iev from western U&raine and this act had !rovo&ed the U&rainians to fury a"ainst 5ussia for her betrayal in dividin" their country with Poland# $lt oug t ey atte!#ted 'y every !eans at t eir co!!and to #reserve t eir cultural and national life4 t ey found t is e.tre!ely difficult. >nce they were !olitically se!arated the two !arts of U&raine drifted further and further a!art the western section remainin" sub1ect to Polish influences while the eastern fell under the im!ress of 5ussia# $he sub1ection of the U&rainian Gree& >rthodo+ Church to the Patriarch of 6oscow which was accom!lished a"ainst the will of the U&rainian cler"y and !eo!le severed the connection between the dioceses of eastern and western U&raine and enabled Poland to force Catholicism u!on the U&rainians with "reater ease while the 5ussification of U&rainian schools and literature in eastern U&raine raised a barrier a"ainst the western !ortion of the country / in #ro#ortion as t e sources of cultural i!#ulse weakened and dried u# in western 6kraine4 its se#aration fro! ,iev led to a general cultural decline. It as 'een noted t at t e cultural center of western 6kraine at t e end of t e si.teent century was t e city of (viv wit its 'rot er ood4 w ic gat ered a'out itself and gave organization to not only t e 6krainian towns#eo#le of (viv 'ut to t e 6krainian in a'itants of all eastern Galicia as well. T ese #eo#le4 owever4 'eca!e )olonized4 as did t e towns#eo#le of (viv4 and all t eir efforts to gain #olitical e;uality and freedo! for e.#ression and develo#!ent #roved futile. )olis !unici#al govern!ent did not ad!it t e #artici#ation of 6krainians and a!#ered t eir econo!ic and co!!ercial freedo!4 and none of t e 6krainian co!#laints to t e central govern!ent 'roug t any relief. Moreover4 during t e seventeent century (viv was losing econo!ic ground 'ecause of s ort%sig ted )olis econo!ic #olicies4 and wit econo!ic decline t e energy of t e 6krainian #atriots was weakened. +it t e advent of de#ression4 t e !ore energetic and active 6krainians left (viv and Galicia and !oved into eastern 6kraine to 2oin t e ,ozaks. $s as 'een said4 t e cultural leaders of ,iev during t e t ird decade of t e seventeent century ca!e c iefly fro! (viv4 and it was t ey w o !ade ,iev t e center of 6krainian life4 w ile (viv and t e rest of Galicia4 a'andoned 'y t e !ost energetic #eo#le4 'egan to lose t eir for!er cultural significance. T e (viv 'rot er ood lost its i!#ortance/ and its c ief glory4 t e sc ool4 declined in t e !iddle decades of t e seventeent century4 after w ic t e !ain activity of t e 'rot er ood consisted in t e #u'lis ing of " urc 'ooks4 es#ecially liturgies4 w ic it #rovided to all eastern 6kraine. $s its #u'lications #rovided t e c ief source of inco!e for t e 'rot er ood4 w ic t erefore #laced a ig value u#on t is activity and es#ecially u#on its !ono#oly of #u'lication of 'ooks for t e " urc 4 it #er!itted no ot er 6krainian #resses to o#en in (viv. In t e second #art of t e seventeent century t e 6krainian national !ove!ent lost its significance even !ore ra#idly4 in #art 'ecause , !elnitsky te!#orarily i!#roved conditions in eastern 6kraine and attracted large nu!'ers of #eo#le to !ove t ere.J A History o( .+raine 'y Mic ael Hrus evsky =#u'lis ed in 8978?4 #. 7DD%7DH FThe $ussian $e/olution and the 0iberation o( .+raine" &ussian o##ression of 6kraine always reac ed a ig #oint during t e cele'ration of S evc enko Ms na!e day4 and #ersecutions were unusually severe w en t e revolution of *e'ruary DG =Marc 8E?4 898I4Lsuddenly 'roke out in )etrograd4 as St. )eters'urg ad 'een rena!ed. T e 6krainian co!!unity in )etrograd #layed an i!#ortant #art in t e u#rising. T ere were several 6krainians in contact wit t e co!!anding officers of one of t e regi!ents w ic took t e initiative4 and 6krainian soldiers and working!en #layed a leading #art in t e actual revolt. In 6kraine t e in a'itants received wit 2oy t e news of t e downfall of t e &o!anovs as tidings of an event destined to 'ring a'out t e e!anci#ation of t eir fat erland. $n old organization of 6krainian )rogressives4 w ic ad acted in secret 'efore t is ti!e4 now 'roug t its #rogra! into t e o#en and 'egan to organize a new 6krainian govern!ent in ,iev early in Marc . "o!!unications were esta'lis ed wit all t e #olitical grou#s in ,iev and a 6krainian national organ of govern!ent was set u# under t e na!e of Ft e 6krainian "entral "ouncilJ =6krainska "entralna &ada?. T e "entral &ada4 as it was co!!only known4 was an asse!'lyYJ A History o( .+raine 'y Mic ael Hrus evsky =#u'lis ed in 8978?4 " a#ter TTI@ =6krainian Inde#endence?4 #. GD8

FThe 1irst World War" T e !arked develo#!ent of 6krainian nationalis! in #rewar ti!es4 'ot in $ustrian and &ussian 6kraine4 e.as#erated t e )olis and &ussian ene!ies of 6kraine4 w o waited i!#atiently for an o##ortunity to #ut an end to t e !ove!ent. T ey e.#ected suc an o##ortunity to arise in t e event of war 'etween $ustria and &ussia4 ostile to eac ot er ever since $ustria ad anne.ed Bosnia in 89E:. In &ussia e.tre!e reactionaries4 intensely dis#leased 'y 6krainian #rogress4 t reatened t at in case of war t ey would ang every 6krainian4 !eanw ile a##ealing to t e govern!ent to su##ress t e advance of nationalis!. In Galicia4 w ere t e $ustrian govern!ent ad #ersecuted t e #ro%&ussian faction4 t e )oles saw an o##ortunity to accuse t e 6krainians of !any cri!es4 and w en ostilities actually 'egan t e )olis officials in Galicia took advantage of t e war e!ergency to attack t e 6krainian intellectuals. 6nder t e #retense of co!'ating t e &usso# iles4 t e )oles arrested ot er 6krainians as well4 i!#risoning and e.iling t e leaders4 es#ecially !en of #ro!inence4 on !ere sus#icion4 and even e.ecuting a few wit out trial. ?n 5ussian U&raine at the be"innin" of the war the 5ussian "overnment !re!ared and !ut into effect a !lan of systematic !ersecution of the U&rainian leaders its activity in this res!ect becomin" more drastic after 5ussia had ca!tured %viv the ca!ital of Galicia# (ll enemies of the U&rainians now had some assurance of bein" able to !ut an end to the U&rainian movement by destroyin" the source of its cultural "rowth in Galicia and the motto of the 5ussian administration became 8death to U&rainianism#9 )rior to t e war t e govern!ent ad not followed t e advice of t e o'scurantist anti%6krainian forces4 'ut it now took t e offensive. (t the very be"innin" of the war all U&rainian !ublications of a !olitical character were su!!ressed and lar"e numbers of U&rainian leaders arrested and sent into e+ile# T e censors i# in ,iev under t e direction of old ene!ies of t e 6krainians #roclai!ed t at it would #er!it no 6krainian #u'lications w atever unless t ey were written in t e &ussian ort ogra# y4 alt oug t is act was an illegal a##lication of t e law of 8:I>4 w ic ad su##ressed 6krainian news#a#ers only. (awsuits were instituted against innocent 6krainian aut ors in order co!#letely to su##ress t e 6krainian #u'lications in ,iev. To evade t e censors i# t ere4 editors4 aut ors4 and #u'lis ers atte!#ted to !ove to ot er cities4 'ut everyw ere !et wit t e o##osition of t e officials4 t eir #u'lications 'eing eit er #ro i'ited outrig t or #laced under restrictions4 t e censor in 3dessa4 for instance4 de!anding t at t e aut or su'!it t ree co#ies of t e !anuscri#t 'efore #rinting4 under t reat of confiscation of t e #rinted !atter and #adlocking of t e #ress/ t is #rocedure was even !ore ar!ful t an o#en censors i# 'ecause it wasted ti!e4 energy4 and !oney4 and in t e end ruined t e #u'lis er. )ro i'itive activity of t is kind reac ed its zenit early in 898I4 a few weeks 'efore t e Marc revolution and t e downfall of t e &o!anov dynasty4 w en t e &ussian govern!ent issued a secret order to t e #rinters in ,iev to #rint not ing in t e 6krainian language. While 5ussia was ma&in" deliberate and s&ilful attem!ts to stifle the U&rainian movement in 5ussian U&raine she was ma&in" efforts from the time of her invasion of the !rovince in 191@ to destroy the U&rainian culture in Galicia by sheer force# Several wee&s after the 5ussians ca!tured %viv they set u! a 5ussian administration under Count (# G# *obrins&y who be"an systematically to li,uidate all U&rainian "ains thus far made# (t the very outset he su!!ressed all U&rainian news!a!ers closed the libraries and readin" rooms and dissolved the U&rainian societies0 the ne+t ste! was to arrest and e+ile to Siberia all 8dan"erous9 and 8sus!ected9 authors# $he use of the U&rainian lan"ua"e was forbidden in schools and "overnment# Ste!s were ta&en to abolish the local Uniate Catholic Church and to force the acce!tance of the 5ussian >rthodo+ Church# + en 6krainian 6niate #riests could not 'e found4 !any 'eing in e.ile or in flig t4 3rt odo. #riests were sent to take t eir #laces4 w ile suc #riests as dared to face t e &ussian invasion were #ressed to acce#t t e 3rt odo. fait / t e officials also #ersuaded t e #eo#le to #etition for 3rt odo. #riests. T e &ussian ad!inistration in Galicia4 w ose official advisers were 6krainian renegades and w ose unofficial advisers were )oles4 !aintained t at t e )oles s ould ave s#ecial national rig ts in Galicia4 w ile t e 6krainians and t e 0ews s ould not 'e favored 'ut s ould 'e o'liged to acce#t t e &ussian language and culture4 a declaration to t is effect 'eing !ade 'y Bo'rinsky during is visit to &ussia in t e s#ring of 898G4 after t e last &ussian victory in Galicia and t e ca#ture of )ere!ys l4 w en it a##eared certain t at Galicia would 'e anne.ed to &ussia. $he 5ussian !lans for destruction were bad enou"h but the manner in which they were e+ecuted was even worse# 5ussian officials later admitted that durin" their occu!ation of Galicia the country had fallen into the hands of scoundrel officials sent in by the 5ussian "overnment who too& advanta"e of war conditions to conduct themselves lawlessly !lunderin" the homes of the inhabitants abusin" the U&rainian and :ewish !o!ulace and wrec&in" the U&rainian cultural or"ani2ations# ?n some !laces U&rainian cler"y scientists and other intellectuals were e+!elled from their homes and communities# $his was done in a ty!ically barbarous manner !eo!le bein" sei2ed as they were and wherever they were found with com!lete disre"ard for human ri"hts men and women children and invalids ali&e bein" e+iled to Siberia# T e lives of an incredi'le nu!'er of u!an 'eings were t us u#rooted4 one of t e relief co!!ittees in ,iev registering fifteen t ousand cases4 'ut a fraction of t e total. T ere were instances w ere insane and deaf !utes were seized4 F'roug t to account4J and e.iled to Si'eria in #lace of ot ers w o ad succeeded in 'ri'ing t e &ussian officials. 6krainian Galicia was co!#letely desolated 'y t e &ussian occu#ation of 8987%8G. + en t e &ussians were co!#elled to retreat fro! t e su'%"ar#at ian region4 t ey took wit t e! all t e in a'itants t ey could gat er/ and !any ot ers4 fearing )olis #ersecution4 also de#arted 'efore t e Hungarian and Ger!an ar!ies arrived. Many t ousands of #easants allured 'y t e glowing #ro!ises of t e &ussians voluntarily acco!#anied t e &ussian ar!y to &ussia. + en t e Ger!an ar!y later advanced toward t e &ussian 'order4 again it was 6krainians w o 'ore t e 'runt of t e suffering4 es#ecially in t e #rovinces of , ol!4 )idlias e4 @olynia4 and )odolia4 w ere t e &ussian !ilitary aut orities atte!#ted to re!ove t e 6krainian in a'itants 'y force into t e interior of &ussia. 6kraine ad not undergone suc a de#o#ulation since t e Fgreat evictionJ of t e 8>IENs. )eo#le and livestock died on t e way4 and trains were 2a!!ed wit innocent victi!s trans#orted to ,azan or )er!4 or 'eyond t e 6ral Mountains. *efore its downfall the 5ussian "overnment dis!layed its com!lete stu!idity its intention clearly bein" to destroy the U&rainians as a nation by destroyin" their culture and their educated leader shi! and by de!o!ulatin" their country and coloni2in" it with Poles throu"h whom it was to be controlled# J A History o( .+raine 'y Mic ael Hrus evsky =#u'lis ed in 8978?4 " a#ter TTI@ =6krainian Inde#endence?4 #. G87%G8I

FT e 6krainian e.iles were not #er!itted to organize t e!selves into war co!!ittees or to aid t e suffering4 nor was anyone #er!itted to 'ring assistance. T e &ussian govern!ent for'ade 6krainian c ildren to 'e ke#t a#art in se#arate grou#s and refused to #er!it t e esta'lis !ent of 6krainian sc ools4 alt oug suc a #rivilege was granted to t e )oles4 (etts4 (it uanians4 and ot er nationalities. Even in e.ile t e 6krainians fro! Galicia were left under t e control of )oles4 in order t at t ey !ig t feel t eir L'rot erly andL in distant Si'eria. T e 6krainians of &ussia w o ad coo#erated wit t e &ussian li'erals now soug t t eir el#4 'ut in vain4 and under t e #ressure of t e govern!ent t ere a##eared to 'e co!#lete Funity of t oug tJ in all &ussian circles. + en Sazonov4 t e !inister of foreign affairs4 declared 'efore t e &ussian du!a in 898G t at t e 6krainian !ove!ent was 'eing su##orted 'y Ger!an !oney4 none of t e 6krainian LalliesL #resent dared to raise a #rotest against t is #atent lie. $ll t e 6krainian #etitions in 'e alf of Galicia4 suffering under t e corru#t &ussian rule4 were filed away. Even friends of t e 6krainians eld t e o#inion t at under t e e.isting conditions it was not safe to o##ose &ussian autocracy 'ecause of suc FinsignificantJ acts as t e govern!entMs assault on t e 6krainians. Meanw ile4 t e li'eral leader Struve and ot er ene!ies astened to take advantage of t e war co!#letely to destroy t e 6krainians as a se#arate #eo#le. In t e dark our for &ussia w en er ar!y was co!#elled to evacuate Galicia a few &ussians realized t at t e acts of re#ression ad not succeeded in destroying t e 6krainian !ove!ent 'ut ad reacted against t e interests of &ussia erself4 and during t e s ort session of t e du!a on 0uly 894 898G4 t e govern!ent was severely criticized 'y Miliukov for its ars ness in Galicia and 'ecause it ad Fre2ected our native 6krainian #eo#le and 'roug t disgrace u#on t e idea t at t e war was foug t for freedo!.J T e govern!ent was asked for an e.#lanation. $he U&rainians in s!ite of the threat of !ersecution a"ain !resented as a minimum demand !ermission to use the U&rainian lan"ua"e in the schools# In 898G t e newly organized &ussian #olitical )rogressive 'loc4 alt oug fearing to include t ese 6krainian de!ands in its #rogra!4 recognized t e necessity of Fallowing 6krainian #u'licationsJ and of Finvestigating i!!ediately cases of t e in a'itants of Galicia w o ad 'een arrestedJ and were languis ing in &ussian #risons. T e du!a4 owever4 was dis!issed 'efore action could 'e taken4 and consideration of t e 6krainian #ro'le! was #ost#oned. (lthou"h the 5ussian "overnment continued its o!!ression of U&rainian nationalism for a year and a half lon"er even the 5ussian Pro"ressives never raised their voices in !rotest# While the 5ussian "overnment was ma&in" efforts to destroy the U&rainian movement in 5ussia 4 a new t reat a##eared to t e 6krainians in Galicia. $fter lengt y 'argaining 'etween $ustria and Ger!any regarding t e future status of )oland4 Ger!any gained a'solute control of t is country 'y e.#elling General Brusilov in t e su!!er of 898G4 and t e arrange!ent agreed u#on 'etween $ustria and Ger!any could 'e #ut into effect. It #rovided t at w ile Ger!any would dis#ose of t e for!er &ussian #rovinces of )oland4 $ustrian )oland would continue to re!ain in t e ands of $ustria. Galicia would not 'e divided4 as 6krainians ad o#ed4 into se#arate 6krainian =eastern? and )olis =western? #arts4 'ut would 'e governed as a unit4 w ic in #ractice !eant t at it would 'e ruled 'y )oles and t at t e 6krainian in a'itants would ave no direct recourse to t e $ustrian govern!ent. + en Ger!any and $ustria 2ointly declared t e inde#endence of )oland on 3cto'er DH =-ove!'er G?4 l98>4 t e $ustrian E!#eror *rancis 0ose# II instructed is c ancellor to #re#are a constitution for Galicia #roviding for t e 'roadest #ossi'le autono!y. It was officially e.#lained t at t e #rovince was to 'eco!e virtually as inde#endent as t e )olis kingdo! newly restored under Ger!an #rotection. T is arrange!ent dealt a deadly 'low to t e as#irations of t e 6krainians in Galicia4 es#ecially to t ose leaders w o ad re!ained loyal to $ustria during t e war and ad o#ed in t is !anner to dis#rove )olis accusations of treason and to 'e rewarded 'y freedo! fro! )olis control. (ocal 6krainian #atriots ad urged t eir followers to su##ort $ustria in er struggle against &ussia4 in t e o#e t at a victory over &ussian des#otis! would end in li'eration for 6kraine. T e 6krainian e!igrants fro! &ussia w o ad co!e to live in Galicia after t e unsuccessful &ussian revolution of 89EG were of t e sa!e o#inion and ad organized in8987 in @ienna a F6nion for t e (i'eration of 6kraineJ 23oyu4 )i4/olennia .+rainy5 wit t e intention of creating a 6krainian state out of t e 6krainian districts seized 'y t e Ger!an ar!ies/ t ey #lanned to give courses in 6krainian citizens i# to all 6krainian soldiers fro! t e &ussian ar!y w o were taken 'y $ustria. To a certain #oint t e 6krainians of Galicia ad followed t eir leaders i#4 es#ecially at t e o#ening of t e war. T ey ad for!ed 6krainian volunteer regi!ents4 known as 3icho/i 3triltsi, so!ew at on t e order of t e )olis legions4 w ic undertook to take c arge of organizing t e con;uered 6krainian districts. $ FGeneral 6krainian "ouncilJ = 6ahalna .+rains+a $ada5, organized in 898G4 and t e 6nion for t e (i'eration of 6kraine ad #resented to t e $ustrian govern!ent a de!and t at t e 6krainian districts con;uered fro! &ussia s ould 'e allowed to constitute a se#arate 6krainian state4 t at t e #rovince of ,'ol! s ould not 'e given to t e new )oland4 and t at a 6krainian stat s ould 'e created out of t e 6krainian districts of Galicia and Bukovina. Meeting wit strong o##osition fro! t e )oles4 w o 'ad great influence over t e !ilitary aut orities t ese de!ands ad 'roug t no results/ 'ut in s#ite of t is disa##oint!ent t e 6krainian states!en ad atte!#ted to encourage t eir #eo#le 'y assuring t e! t at 'etter arrange!ents would 'e !ade after t e war4 'asing t eir o#es on t e #ro!ises of t e #re!ier4 Sturgk 4 and t e !oderating influence of t e Ger!an govern!ent over $ustria. T e new $ustrian #olicy regarding Galicia o#ened t e eyes of 6krainian leaders4 owever4 and t ey finally realized t at $ustria ad again deceived t e!. Even t e deat of t e old $ustrian e!#eror and t e accession of anot er did not #ro!ise any relief for t e 6krainians in Galicia4 to w o! only t e &ussian revolution of 898I gave an indication of 'etter days to co!e.J A History o( .+raine 'y Mic ael Hrus evsky =#u'lis ed in 8978?4 " a#ter TTI@ =6krainian Inde#endence?4 #. G8:%GD8

FT e &ussian coalition govern!ent ad recognized 6krainian autono!y 'ecause of t e circu!stances at t e ti!e and 'ecause it feared t e antirevolutionary activity of General ,ornilov4 w ic ad al!ost overt rown t e govern!ent. *ut as soon as the dan"er !assed the =erens&y "overnment decided to withdraw U&rainian autonomy i"norin" the U&rainian administration and attem!tin" to rule U&raine without it# $he 5ussian Provisional Government a!!ointed hi"h commissioners for U&raine refused to "ive the U&rainian authorities material su!!ort i"nored their declarations and re!resentatives and ended by offerin" direct o!!osition to the wor& of the General Secretariat while the 5ussian senate a relic of the old autocracy desirin" to stress the fact that it still e+isted refused to !ublish the ?nstructions of the General Secretariat and thus de!rived them of le"al standin"# (t len"th =erens&ys cabinet itself turned com!letely a"ainst the U&rainian "overnment# It soug t to utilize t e co!ing )an%6krainian "ongress to indict t e General Secretariat and t e "entral &ada. T e &ussian #rosecutor at ,iev was instructed to investigate t ese two 'odies and to take #unitive !easures against t e!. In t e !eanti!e t e !e!'ers of t e General Secretariat were directed to a##ear at )etrograd to e.#lain t e #ur#ose of t e congress. T is action on t e #art of t e &ussians aroused t e 6krainians w ose o##osition was given e.#ression in t e T ird (egion "onvention4 w ic convened on 3cto'er DE4 and in t e autu!n session of t e "entral &ada. 6ne.#ectedly4 owever4 circu!stances again underwent a c ange. T e )rovisional Govern!ent fell as t e result of an u#rising in )etrograd led 'y t e Bols eviks4 w o in turn organized a new ad!inistration 'y F)eo#leMs "o!!issars4J w ic neit er t e #eo#le nor t e ar!y were #re#ared to su##ort. *or a long ti!e t e &ussian re#u'lic was in a state of anarc y4 t e #rovinces4 including *inland and 6kraine4 leading an inde#endent life and resisting t e Bols evik #ro#aganda w ic called for Fall #ower to t e soviets4J t at is4 to councils !ade u# of re#resentatives of la'or4 t e ar!y4 and t e #easants. T e re#resentatives of t e )rovisional Govern!ent #resent in ,iev accused t e "entral &ada of 'eing in alliance wit Bols evis! and took ste#s to destroy 'ot alike4 !aking use of ,ozaks4 "zec e.%#risoners of war4 students of t e !ilitary acade!ies4 and ot ers/ 'ut t ey failed co!#letely4 for t eir intrigues were disclosed and t e re#resentatives of t e old regi!e and t eir associates were forced out of ,iev and its vicinity. T e Bols eviks t en decided to disru#t t e 6krainian govern!ent4 w ic t ey accused of 'eing 'ourgeois4 and de!anded t e su'!ission of t e "entral &ada. $t t e close of 3cto'er t e govern!ent was in a des#erate situation4 caug t as it was 'etween two ostile ca!#s. In ,iev and t e ot er larger cities civil war 'roke out and t reatened to result in co!#lete anarc y. 6nder t ese circu!stances it was no easy task to create a single strong and aut oritative organ of govern!ent in t e country4 alt oug it was very necessary. &esolutions #roviding for suc an aut ority were ado#ted 'y t e "entral &ada4 'ut t ey were not enoug . T e only way to create it was to lay a strong foundation4 since t e General Secretariat could not re!ain sus#ended in air as t e organ of a govern!ent w ic did not e.ist and w ic ad no o#e of 'eing esta'lis ed. T e General Secretariat itself ad to 'eco!e t e govern!ent of t e 6krainian state4 a #lan w ic a (egion "onvention su##orted in 3cto'er and w ic was revolved in !any de'ates at t e !eetings of t e "entral &ada. T e &ada finally 'eca!e convinced t at t e #rocla!ation of t e inde#endence of a 6krainian re#u'lic !ust 'e !ade wit out delay 'ut t at it !ust disclose t e de!ocratic and socialist c aracter of t e resurrected 6krainian state. T e ca'inet esta'lis ed contacts wit t e re#resentatives of t e Social%De!ocrat and t e Social%&evolutionary #arties and wit t e! #re#ared t e T ird )rocla!ation to t e 6krainian #eo#le4 w ic was ado#ted 'y t e "entral &ada wit reservations4 and #u'lis ed on -ove!'er I =DE?4 898I. T e #rocla!ation announced t e for!ation of a new 6krainian -ational &e#u'lic4 #laced a few li!itations u#on t e #rivate owners i# of land4 introduced t e eig t% our day and control over t e !eans of #roduction4 and ai!ed at 'ringing a'out a conclusion of t e war4 a!nesty to #olitical #risoners4 t e a'olition of ca#ital #unis !ent4 court and ad!inistrative refor!s4 and #ersonal !inority rig ts for t e non%6krainian in a'itants of 6kraine. T is was a s#lendid #rogra!4 and t e "entral &ada and General Secretariat did t eir 'est to fulfill at least a #art of it4 t e first ste# 'eing to old elections of re#resentatives to a )an%6krainian "ongress4 w ic was to 'uild t e state not on a revolutionary 'ut on a constitutional 'asis. T is was a difficult task4 for t roug out t is #eriod 6kraine was in a state of anarc y. T e Bols evik govern!ent4 as soon as it ad assured itself of its #osition in &ussia4 dis#atc ed its ar!ies4 not to t e front to fig t against t e Ger!ans and $ustrians4 'ut to 6kraine to fig t against t e 6krainian govern!ent4 w ic was disar!ing all ostile forces and sending t e! out of t e country. Because t e 6krainian govern!ent would not #er!it t e #assage of Bols evik detac !ents across t e country to t e Don4 'ut allowed t e Don ,ozaks to return o!e fro! t e front t roug 6kraine4 the *olshevi& Peo!le's Commissars at the end of Aovember formally declared war on U&raine# $he *olshevi&s accused the U&rainian "overnment of counterrevolutionary activity of an alliance with General =aledin the head of the .on =o2a&s and of coo!eration with other reactionary factions and accordin"ly delivered an ultimatum demandin" !ermission from the U&rainian "overnment for their forces to march across the country 1oint action a"ainst the .on =o2a&s and reco"nition of the soviet form of "overnment B "overnment by councils of soldiers wor&ers and !easants B in U&raine# Since acce!tance of these demands would have destroyed all U&rainian autonomy and !laced the country in incom!etent hands the U&rainian "overnment refused to com!ly whereu!on the *olshevi&s !roclaimed the U&rainian 5ada an assembly of reactionary ca!italistic factions and swam!ed the country with *olshevi& a"itators who s!read all manner of lies about the U&rainian authorities# T e Bols eviks ne.t attacked t e govern!ent finances 'y #reventing t e sending of &ussian !oney to 6kraine4 t us forcing t e 6krainians to asten t e coinage of t eir own !oney. *inally t e Bols eviks collected &ussian troo#s fro! t e front and sent t e! into 6kraine to dis'and t e "entral &ada. Si!ultaneously a Bols evik convention was called to !eet in ,iev in t e <first days of Dece!'er wit t e o'2ect of overt rowing t e e.isting order4 a stroke w ic t e govern!ent warded off 'y calling a #easant convention for t e sa!e ti!e and #lace. T e #easant convention took a decided stand in su##ort of t e "entral &ada. T e eig t session of t e "entral &ada4 convoked in t e !iddle of Dece!'er4 revealed t e resolute will of t e #eo#le to defend t e aut ority of t e &ada and t e sovereignty of inde#endent 6kraine. T e earlier #lan of a federated &ussia was now co!#letely discarded. +it t e &ussian e!#ire in a state of anarc y4 t e su'2ect #eo#les were all declaring t eir inde#endence4 #artly 'ecause t ey could not for! a federation a#art fro! &ussia4 t e largest #otential !e!'er. 6kraine4 too4 was o'liged to safeguard er #olitical destiny4 and in suc a c aotic ti!e t e only safety lay in a strong and inde#endent state ood.J A History o( .+raine 'y Mic ael Hrus evsky =#u'lis ed in 8978?4 #. GHE%GHH

FIndependent .+raine< During t e last alf of Dece!'er 898I4 t e #osition of 6kraine 'eca!e even !ore critical. $s Bols evik agitation 'egan to take effect4 t e ar!y 'eca!e disorganized4 t e soldiers at t e front stole !ilitary su##lies4 deserted4 and on t eir way o!e #lundered everyt ing in t eir #at 4 w ile t e villages were occu#ied 'y anarc ist 'ands w ic gained t e su##ort of t e weak and terrorized t ose o##osed to t e!. T e #lundering and destruction of estates4 ware ouses4 and factories 'eca!e co!!on4 so t at t e wealt of t e country was dissi#ated and its #roductive forces weakened. To t e evils of econo!ic de#ression were added t ose of #olitical anarc y. $ grou# of Bols eviks w o ad failed in t eir atte!#t to old t e convention in ,iev called anot er !eeting in , arkiv4 w ere4 on Dece!'er 8H4 898I4 t ey set u# a Bols evik govern!ent for 6kraine in o##osition to t e e.isting national govern!ent. Declaring t at t e "entral &ada did not re#resent t e will of t e 6krainian working #eo#le4 t e convention a##ealed to t e !asses to o##ose it. T ese efforts would ave ad a !usical%co!edy ending4 'ut unfortunately 'ands of &ussian Bols eviks !ade u# of soldiers and sailors and vaga'onds 'roke into , arkiv on t e #retense of fig ting t eir way to t e Don and re!ained t ere. T eir co!ing furt er encouraged local grou#s already incited 'y #ro#agandists4 t e local #o#ulation was terrorized4 and alt oug t e 6krainian garrison eld out for two days4 it finally ad to give in. $fter t is4 'ands of Bols evik soldiers and &ed Guards4 consisting of ar!ed la'orers and ot ers in t e service of t e Bols eviks4 instead of going on to t e Don to fig t against t e counterrevolutionists as t ey ad said t ey would do4 'egan to advance along t e railroads into t e eart of 6kraine4 carrying t eir #oisonous #ro#aganda to t e #rovinces of )oltava and , erson. Events in , arkiv re#eated t e!selves in ot er cities/ as soon as t e Bols evik 'ands arrived4 various grou#s4 !ostly 0ewis and &ussian4 caused insurrections in t e cities and at stations along t e Z railroads. 6nder t e influence of t eir #ro#aganda revolts 'roke out in t e 6krainian regi!ents newly organized or taken over 'y #atriots/ t e soldiers were told t at t e struggle was against t e ca#italistic "entral &ada and for t e socialization of 6kraine. Many 6krainian soldiers4 or ,ozaks as t ey were called4 eit er 2oined t e Bols eviks4 declared t e!selves neutral4 or si!#ly deserted t eir regi!ents and went o!e4 as did a large nu!'er at " rist!as. T ese Bols evik successes caused even t e 6krainian leaders to waver as t e &ussian Bols eviks #ro#ounded t eir syste! to t e 6krainian radicals4 atte!#ting to #rove t at Bols evis! was t e logical develo#!ent of t e #rogra! of t e socialists4 w o !ust ado#t t e Bols evik slogans if t ey did not wis to 'e wi#ed out 'y Bols evis!. T ey furt er called for t e election of a new "entral &ada at a convention of soviets to consist of de#uties of soldiers and workers4 and t e transference to t e local soviets of all local aut ority. Bols evik #ro#aganda ad already 'een widely s#read since t e eig t session of t e "entral &ada4 at w ic t e e.tre!e Social &evolutionaries fro! , arkiv were #resent. &evolutionary grou#s also went to )etrograd to e.#lain to t e &ussian govern!ent t e #ro#osal for a )an%6krainian congress4 t e Bols eviks and e.tre!e Social &evolutionaries o#ing t at if t e 6krainian Social &evolutionaries gained control of t e govern!ent t ey would 'ring to a close t e &usso%6krainian war and #ut an end to anarc y in 6kraine. T ese events 'roug t uncertainty into 6krainian #olitics at a critical !o!ent. $t t e end of Dece!'er and early in 0anuary4 eastern 6kraine4 t e Black Sea region4 and suc cities as )oltava4 ,aterinoslav4 3dessa4 and ,re!enc uk were in t e ands of t e Bols eviks4 w o #revented delivery of coal su##lies to t e ,ievan region and advanced on 6kraine fro! sout 4 east4 and nort . In ,iev itself t ere was continuous #ro#aganda against t e 6krainian govern!ent and against t e 6krainians in general w ic al!ost co!#letely de!oralized t e local 6krainian regi!ents t at not so long 'efore ad arrived eager to defend t eir country. T e 6krainian aut orities realized t e difficulty of t eir #osition4 and t e "entral &ada o#ed to transfer its aut ority to t e new ca'inet to 'e for!ed 0anuary 94 898:4 in accordance wit a *ourt )rocla!ation. 1et 'ecause of t e war wit Bols evis! t e elections4 w ic were to ave 'een eld in Dece!'er 898I4 and decisions regarding all i!#ortant issues ad to 'e #ost#oned.J A History o( .+raine 'y Mic ael Hrus evsky =#u'lis ed in 8978?4 #. GHH%GH> FIn addition to t e 6krainian war wit Bols evis!4 6kraine continued to old t e front against t e "entral )owers. *ro! t e 'eginning of t e revolution t e 6krainian #eo#le in all t eir conventions ad e.#ressed a desire for an i!!ediate ter!ination of t e war4 into w ic t ey ad 'een drawn against t eir will 'y tsarist &ussia. 6ntil 6kraine #roclai!ed er inde#endence4 owever4 s e was una'le to !ake an a##earance in international #olitics as an inde#endent #olitical unit/ and !eanw ile t e &ussian govern!ent4 'ot under )rince (vov and under ,erensky4 ad not dared to !ake #eace wit t e "entral )owers4 'ut ad on t e contrary atte!#ted to assist t e $llies 'y olding t e eastern front. T is effort to continue t e war was a great !istake on its #art4 as it not only destroyed gains won 'y t e revolution 'ut also endangered 6kraine. $s soon as t e Bols eviks ad overt rown ,erenskyNs govern!ent4 t ey #ro!ised to 'ring t e war to a close4 and late in -ove!'er o#ened negotiations wit t e "entral )owers at Brest%(itovsk =Bereste?. T e "entral &ada of t e 6krainian govern!ent4 w ic since t e ti!e of t e #rocla!ation of 6krainian inde#endence ad ai!ed at ending t e war4 decided to take #art in t is #eace conference. T e $llied )owers%first *rance and t en England w ic ad astened to recognize t e 6krainian -ational &e#u'lic atte!#ted to #ersuade t e 6krainian govern!ent not to !ake #eace wit t e "entral )owers4 #ro!ising 6kraine generous assistance if s e would continue to fig t against t e "entral )owers and t reatening er wit !any ills if s e signed a se#arate treaty. But t e 6krainian govern!ent ad no !ilitary su##lies wit w ic to o##ose t e "entral )owers4 and furt er!ore t e country was e.#osed to invasion 'y t e Ger!ans and t e #eo#le were de!anding #eace. T e "entral &ada t erefore sent a delegation to Brest%(itovsk4 w ere it was to 2oin t e Soviet delegates in !aking a treaty of #eace. + en t e Soviet delegates 'egan to dis#lay t eir inconsistency4 first declaring t eir readiness to sue for #eace and t en retreating into Bols evik # raseology4 t e "entral &ada aut orized its delegates at Brest%(itovsk to !ake a se#arate #eace wit t e "entral )owers4 regardless of w at t e &ussians !ig t do.J A History o( .+raine 'y Mic ael Hrus evsky =#u'lis ed in 8978?4 #. GH>%GHI

F$!id t e endless factional and #arty discussions t at were eld in t e ;uarters of t e "entral &ada w ile ,iev was 'eing 'esieged 'y t e Bols eviks4 it was decided at lengt 'y a !a2ority of t e !e!'ers to take a definite stand against Bols evis!. >n :anuary 9 C77D 191E the date set for o!enin" the U&rainian Constitutional Convention the decision was ta&en to !roclaim the inde!endence of the U&rainian re!ublic in order to "ain a free hand in international and domestic affairs and to cut the "round from under 5ussian interference in the internal affairs of U&raine and ma&e it clear that the stru""le with the Council of Peo!les Commissars and the *olshevi& hands was a war a"ainst 5ussias attem!ts to destroy U&rainian inde!endence and not a conflict of !olitical ideas under cover of which real enemies could hide as neutrals# In t eory t e 6krainian grou#s still 'elieved t at federation was t e 'est for! of state life for t e future4 'ut the anti/ U&rainian forces were !reachin" federation with 5ussia merely in order to &ee! the 5ussian em!ire intact and to have an o!!ortunity to continue to o!!ress the non/5ussians as they had done in the !ast# $he su!!orters of federation were !romotin" moreover not only !olitical federation but com!lete unity of economy and all other functions B the same old 5ussian !olicy which had always ham!ered U&rainian !ro"ress# T e &ussian Soviet govern!ent ad dro##ed fro! its #rogra! t e slogan of Fself%deter!ination of nationalities4 even to co!#lete inde#endence4J and o#enly declared itself for a federation4 desiring on t is 'asis to unite t e 6krainian #roletariat wit t e &ussian. + en t e $llied )owers4 es#ecially t e *renc 4 sus#ected t at 6kraine !ig t 2oin Soviet &ussia4 t ey ad t reatened in case of se#arate #eace wit Ger!any to de#rive er of t e resources w ic t ey controlled wit in er 'orders. It was necessary4 t en4 for 6kraine to define er #olicy to t e foreign nations4 and t is was anot er reason for #roclai!ing t e inde#endence of t e 6krainian -ational &e#u'lic. ?n reality U&raine had been an inde!endent nation to some e+tent ever since the downfall of the =erens&y re"ime and more com!letely since the last session of the Central 5ada# $his inde!endence had been reco"ni2ed by the Central Powers and by the re!resentatives of the Council of Peo!le's Commissars at *rest/%itovs& on .ecember FG C:anuary 17D 191) but it re,uired formal confirmation which was !rovided by the 'ourth Proclamation decided u!on on :anuary 9# ?t !roclaimed the U&rainian 5e!ublic 8an inde!endent and soverei"n !ower of the U&rainian !eo!le sub1ect to no other authority#9 T e General Secretariat was rena!ed a F"ouncil of )eo#leNs Ministers4MM and its first duties were stated to 'e t e co!#letion of t e #eace negotiations wit t e "entral )owers4 regardless of any o'2ections on t e #art of any section of t e for!er &ussian e!#ire4 and decisive action toward defense and clearing 6kraine of Bols eviks. T e de!o'ilization of t e ar!y was ordered4 to 'e acco!#anied 'y reconstruction of t e devastated areas4 alteration of t e factories and s o#s fro! a war to a #eace 'asis4 and various !easures for satisfying t e returning soldiers as to t eir #olitical rig ts. $ nu!'er of social refor!s were ordered in t e interests of t e la'oring #o#ulation4 in accordance wit t e general #rinci#les set fort 'y t e T ird )rocla!ation 'y transfer of land to t e workers4 nationalization of t e forests4 waters4 and !ineral resources4 t e creation of work for t e une!#loyed4 t e introduction of !ono#olies in co!!erce in goods !ost needed 'y t e workers4 and control over 'ank credit. T e )rocla!ation was a##roved in its final for! and #u'lis ed 'y t e "entral &ada on 0anuary 88 =D7?4 898:4 alt oug t e date of 0anuary 9 =DD? was retained. T ere was so!e o##osition in 6kraine4 t ere 'eing a few 6krainians so enslaved to &ussian culture and govern!ent and so convinced of t e need of a united &ussia or t e traditional ty#e of federation t at t ey were dissatisfied 'y inde#endence even as a !et od of transition to federation. T is was even !ore true of t e un% 6krainian 6krainians4 w o ad torn t e!selves free fro! t e 6krainian soil and considered t e!selves F&ussians4J of t e &ussians t e!selves4 and #articularly of t e 0ews4 w o failed to realize w ere t e real interests of t e 0ewis #o#ulation of 6kraine lay4 'ut #rotested against 'eing se#arated fro! t e 0ewis organizations of &ussia. $nd t is ostile attitude toward 6kraine4 w ic ad already !ade its a##earance wit suc force in t e co!!ercial centers and es#ecially in t e 6krainian ca#ital of ,iev4 following t e declaration of 6krainian inde#endence cul!inated in an insurrection in ,iev at t is critical !o!ent in t e struggle for 6krainian freedo!.J A History o( .+raine 'y Mic ael Hrus evsky =#u'lis ed in 8978?4 #. GHI%GH9

FT e 'reak%u# of $ustria Hungary also li'erated fro! Ha#s'urg rule t e alf%!illion 6krainians of "ar#at o%6kraine4 w o 'eca!e incor#orated 'y "zec oslovakia. "onsent for t is action was o'tained 'y t e "zec s fro! t e $!erican &uska -ational &ada !eeting in Scranton4 )ennsylvania4 on -ove!'er 8:4 898:. T e 6krainians in "ar#at o%6kraine4 owever4 took a stand for union wit 6kraine and #u'lis ed a #rocla!ation to t is effect at &ust on 0anuary D84 8989/ 'ut on May G a -ational &ada of "ar#at o%6kraine declared itself in favor of incor#oration into "zec oslovakia w ic 'eca!e an acco!#lis ed fact in Se#te!'er 'y official action of t e "zec oslovak govern!ent4 "ar#at o%6kraine 'eing anne.ed as an MMautono!ous unit wit in t e "zec oslovak state.J #oland" By far t e !ost serious 6krainian #ro'le! aside fro! t at of Soviet 6kraine was t e ;uestion of t e relations i# of western 6kraine to )oland4 involving a struggle 'etween )oland and t e 6krainians in w ic t e Su#re!e "ouncil of t e $llies 'eca!e an inter!ediary 'ut wit little desire to act. $s early as *e'ruary D:4 89894 an $llied co!!ission under General Bert el!y unsuccessfully !ade an effort to end t e )olis %6krainian conflict 'y suggesting ter!s of #eace/ is efforts were resu!ed 'y an Inter%$llied $r!istice "o!!ission under t e #residency of General Bot a4 w ic on May 8H drafted a )olis %6krainian de!arcation line4 re2ected 'y t e )oles4 owever. Soon after4 General Haller arrived wit a )olis ar!y fro! *rance4 ar!ed and e;ui##ed 'y t e $llies4 su##osedly for use against t e Soviets4 'ut actually e!#loyed for an offensive against t e 6krainians. 3n 0une DG t e $llied Su#re!e "ouncil aut orized t e )oles to occu#y eastern Galicia as far as t e S'ruc &iver4 'ut on condition t at local autono!y and #olitical and religious freedo! 'e guaranteed t e in a'itants. T e 6krainian Galician ar!y t en wit drew east of t e S'ruc . In -ove!'er furt er atte!#ts at settle!ent were !ade 'y a #ro#osal of t e Su#re!e "ouncil t at )oland s ould e.ercise a !andate over eastern Galicia for a #eriod of twenty%five years4 at t e end of w ic ti!e a #le'iscite s ould 'e eld/ 'ut )oland flatly re2ected t is #ro#osal. S ortly after4 on Dece!'er :4 t e fa!ous F"urzon (ineJ was #ro#osed as t e eastern 'oundary of )oland4 w ic would ave granted )oland a s!all 6krainian area. $gain t e )oles refused to accede. Meanw ile t e )olis aut orities conducted !ass arrests and trials of 6krainian #artici#ants in t e )olis %6krainian war4 !any #ersons 'eing conde!ned to deat and large nu!'ers sent into concentration ca!#s at Sts alkova4 +adowice4 Brest%(itovsk4 Do!'ie4 and elsew ere. 3n 0anuary DE4 89DE4 )oland took a long ste# toward a'sor#tion 'y a'olis ing t e autono!y of 6krainian Galicia and t e 6krainian organizations w ic ad e.isted under $ustrian rule t ere. T e very na!e was c anged fro! Eastern Galicia to Eastern (ittle )oland. T e 'oundary esta'lis ed on t e S'ruc was 'roken 'y t e )olis %Soviet war of t e su!!er of 89DE4 'eing first overrun 'y t e )oles and t en 'y t e Bols eviks. In Se#te!'er and 3cto'er it was finally fi.ed 'y direct negotiations at &iga 'etween )oland4 Soviet &ussia4 and Soviet 6kraine. *or a ti!e t e $llies refused to recognize t is decision regarding western 6kraine taken wit out t eir !ediation4 t e "ouncil of t e (eague declaring on *e'ruary DH4 89D84 t at FGalicia is 'eyond t e 'orders of )olandJ and t at Factually )oland is t e !ilitary occu#ant of Galicia4J 'ut neit er #arty to t e agree!ent #aid any attention. T e only concession gained 'y t e 6krainians was a series of guarantees of !inority rig ts si!ilar to t ose given 'y &u!ania to t e 6krainians anne.ed 'y er4 and e;ually ineffective. T e nu!'er of 6krainians in )oland was su'2ect to wide variations in esti!ate4 de#ending u#on t e circu!stances under w ic t e count was !ade4 'eing #laced all t e way fro! four to seven !illions. T roug 89D8 and 89DD feeling a!ong t e 6krainians under )olis rule ran ig 4 t e s#ear ead of resistance 'eing t e 6krainian Military 3rganization =6+3?. +it t e aid of funds sent 'y 6krainian%$!ericans4 a 6krainian "itizensM "o!!ittee was founded in (viv in 89D8 to #rovide relief for 6krainians in intern!ent ca!#s4 'ut in t e autu!n it was dissolved and its !e!'ers #laced under arrest. 3n Se#te!'er DG a 6krainian student na!ed Ste# en *edak atte!#ted to assassinate Mars al )ilsudski and Governor Gra'ski4 and soon afterward )oles 'o!'ed suc 6krainian institutions as t e 6niversity Student Ho!e and t e ead;uarters of t e S evc enko Scientific Society. + en a )olis census was taken in -ove!'er it was 'oycotted 'y t e 6krainians4 as were elections to t e )olis c a!'er of de#uties =Se2!? and t e senate. &e#ressive !easures of retaliation were taken 'y )oles in t e for! of terroristic acts. In t e su!!er Metro#olitan $ndrew S e#titsky4 ead of t e 6krainian 6niate " urc 4 returned fro! a visit to t e 6nited States4 was #laced in confine!ent and eld fro! $ugust DD to 3cto'er G. 3n -ove!'er 8G t e e.ecutive co!!ittee of t e 6krainian -ational &ada4 eaded 'y Dr. Eugene )etrus evic 4 #rotested to t e $llied Su#re!e "ouncil4 t e "ouncil of t e (eague of -ations4 and t e #re!iers of t e $llied govern!ents against !ass arrests of 6krainians 'y )olis aut orities4 and issued an a##eal addressed to t e conscience of t e entire civilized world. T e introduction of !ilitary conscri#tion of 6krainian in a'itants 'y t e )olis govern!ent !et wit strong o##osition. *inally4 in order to o'tain t e consent of t e $llies for t e anne.ation of eastern Galicia4 w ic was still not fort co!ing4 t e )olis #arlia!ent #assed a law on 3cto'er D>4 89DD4 #roviding for li!ited autono!y for t e #rovinces =/oi/odates5 of (viv4 Terno#il4 and Stanislaviv4 a law w ic 4 owever4 was never really #ut into effect. T e 6krainian #olitical #arties4 wit ead;uarters in (viv4 refused to 'e !ollified4 and on $ugust D: unani!ously declared t eir su##ort of t e govern!ent%in%e.ile of t e +estern Division of t e 6krainian -ational &e#u'lic4 located in @ienna4 under Dr. )etrus evic . It was not until Marc 874 89DH4 t at t e "onference of $!'assadors re#resenting Great Britain4 *rance4 Italy4 and 0a#an !ade furt er resistance i!#ossi'le 'y recognizing t e frontiers of )oland as drawn u# in t e treaty of &iga and refusing to acce#t a #rotest 'y a delegation fro! t e 6krainian -ational &ada of western 6kraine w ic ad astened to )aris to register o'2ections. Poland was thus confirmed in !ossession of the U&rainian districts not only of eastern Galicia but of all northwestern U&raine includin" =holm Polisia and Holynia# (bout F; !er cent of Poland was com!osed of U&rainian territory# F)oland t us o'tained title to t is territory wit out aving to give anyt ing !ore t an a !oral #ledge in favor of autono!y. -o ste#s ave 'een taken to carry out t e unilateral #ro!ises !ade in t e autono!y law of Se#te!'er4 89DD4 and Eastern Galicia is still governed fro! +arsaw4J wrote &ay!ond (eslie Buell in 89H9. $ great 6krainian de!onstration against t e decision of t e "onference of $!'assadors was eld in St. GeorgeNs S;uare in (viv4 0ulian &o!anc uk4 t e dean of 6krainian leaders4 ad!inistering to t e asse!'ly an oat t at t e 6krainian #eo#le would never renounce t eir rig ts to t e inde#endence of t eir native land. $fter t e $llies ad given t eir a##roval to t e )olis anne.ation4 t e #osition of )etrus evic and t e govern!ent of western 6kraine 'eca!e untena'le in @ienna4 and 'ecause of )olis di#lo!atic #ressure4 t ey !oved first to )rague and t en to Berlin4 w ere t ey continued t eir activities c iefly in t e for! of #etitions addressed to t e (eague of -ations. Early in 89D7 )etlura !oved fro! )oland to *rance4 w ere e !ade is o!e until is assassination on May DG4 89D>4 w en is #lace as ead of t e 6krainian -ational &e#u'lic in e.ile was taken 'y $ndrew (evitsky. T e 6krainian *ree 6niversity was transferred fro! @ienna to )rague.J A History o( .+raine 'y Mic ael Hrus evsky =#u'lis ed in 8978?4 #. G>E%G>7

$ !a# of 6kraine fro! 898I%89DE. 6kraine -ational &e#u'lic was esta'lis ed 'efore t e end of +orld +ar I.

$ !a# of )oland4 (it uania4 (atvia =(ivonia?4 Estonia4 and F#le'isciteJ territories =including (eague of -ations Territory? in 89DE

Battle !a# of t e Estonian +ar of Inde#endence =Estonian%Soviet +ar? of 898:%89DE

Estonian soldiers defend t eir country against Soviet &ussian invaders during t e Estonian +ar of Inde#endence.

T e Partition of t e )idd#e !ast

6ing *eisal of &yria (originally from He9a0) appears with Lawren+e of #ra ia (se+ond from right) and "uri al8&aid (se+ond from left) at the Paris Pea+e !onferen+e in -ersailles, *ran+e in $%$%.

=Source< A #eace to End All #eace" Creating the 7odern 7iddle East, 1 18%1 99 'y David *ro!kin?

=Source< A #eace to End All #eace" Creating the 7odern 7iddle East 1 18%1 99 'y David *ro!kin?

=Source< A #eace to End All #eace" Creating the 7odern 7iddle East 1 18%1 99 'y David *ro!kin?

F6ndou'tedly4 t e !ost nu!erous di#lo!atic agree!ents of t e warti!e #eriod were concerned wit t e dis#osition of t e 3tto!an E!#ire. $s early as *e'ruary 898G4 &ussia and *rance signed an agree!ent 'y w ic &ussia was given a free and in t e East in return for giving *rance a free and in t e +est. T is !eant t at &ussia could anne. "onstantino#le and 'lock t e !ove!ent for an inde#endent )oland4 w ile *rance could take $lsace%(orraine fro! Ger!any and set u# a new4 inde#endent state under *renc influence in t e & ineland. $ !ont later4 in Marc 898G4 Britain and *rance agreed to allow &ussia to anne. t e Straits and "onstantino#le. T e i!!ediate activities of t e Entente )owers4 owever4 were devoted to #lans to encourage t e $ra's to re'el against t e sultanMs aut ority or at least a'stain fro! su##orting is war efforts. T e c ances of success in t ese activities were increased 'y t e fact t at t e $ra'ian #ortions of t e 3tto!an E!#ire4 w ile no!inally su'2ect to t e sultan4 were already 'reaking u# into nu!erous #etty s# eres of aut ority4 so!e virtually inde#endent. T e $ra's4 w o were a co!#letely se#arate #eo#le fro! t e Turks4 s#eaking a Se!itic rat er t an a 6ral%$ltaic language and w o ad re!ained largely no!adic in t eir !ode of life w ile t e Turks ad 'eco!e al!ost co!#letely a #easant #eo#le4 were united to t e 3tto!an #eo#les 'y little !ore t an t eir co!!on allegiance to t e Musli! religion. T is connection ad 'een weakened 'y t e efforts to secularize t e 3tto!an state and 'y t e growt of Turkis nationalis! w ic called fort a s#irit of $ra'ic nationalis! as a reaction to it. In 898G%898> t e Britis ig co!!issioner in Egy#t4 Sir Henry McMa on4 entered into corres#ondence wit t e S erif Hussein of Mecca. + ile no 'inding agree!ent was signed4 t e gist of t eir discussions was t at Britain would recognize t e inde#endence of t e $ra's if t ey revolted against Turkey. T e area covered 'y t e agree!ent included t ose #arts of t e 3tto!an E!#ire sout of t e HIt degree of latitude e.ce#t $dana4 $le.andretta4 and Lt ose #ortions of Syria lying to t e west of t e districts of Da!ascus4 Ho!s4 Ha!a4 and $le##o4 Aw ic B cannot 'e said to 'e #urely $ra'.L In addition4 $den was e.ce#ted4 w ile Bag dad and Basra were to ave a Ls#ecial ad!inistration.L T e rig ts of *rance in t e w ole area were reserved4 t e e.isting Britis agree!ents wit various local sultans along t e s ores of t e )ersian Gulf were to 'e !aintained4 and Hussein was to use Britis advisers e.clusively after t e war. E.tended controversy as risen fro! t is division of areas4 t e c ief #oint at issue 'eing w et er t e state!ent as worded included )alestine in t e area w ic was granted to t e $ra's or in t e area w ic was reserved. T e inter#retation of t ese ter!s to e.clude )alestine fro! $ra' ands was su'se;uently !ade 'y McMa on on several occasions after 89DD and !ost e.#licitly in 89HI. + ile McMa on was negotiating wit Hussein4 t e Govern!ent of India4 t roug )ercy "o.4 was negotiating wit I'n%Saud of -e2d4 and4 in an agree!ent of Dece!'er D>4 898G4 recognized is inde#endence in return for a #ro!ise of neutrality in t e war. S ortly afterward4 on May 8>4 898>4 an agree!ent4 known as t e Sykes%)icot agree!ent fro! t e na!es of t e c ief negotiators4 was signed 'etween &ussia4 *rance4 and Britain. Early in 898I Italy was added to t e settle!ent. It #artitioned t e 3tto!an E!#ire in suc a way t at little was left to t e Turks e.ce#t t e area wit in DEE or DGE !iles of $nkara. &ussia was to get "onstantino#le and t e Straits4 as well as nort eastern $natolia4 including t e Black Sea coast/ Italy was to get t e sout western coast of $natolia fro! S!yrna to $dalia/ *rance was to get !ost of eastern $natolia4 including Mersin4 $dana4 and "ilicia4 as well as ,urdistan4 $le.andretta4 Syria4 and nort ern Meso#ota!ia4 including Mosul/ Britain was to get t e (evant fro! Gaza sout to t e &ed Sea4 Trans2ordan4 !ost of t e Syrian Desert4 all of Meso#ota!ia sout of ,irkuk =including Bag dad and Basra?4 and !ost of t e )ersian Gulf coast of $ra'ia. It was also envisaged t at western $natolia around S!yrna would go to Greece. T e Holy (and itself was to 'e internationalized.J Tragedy and Hope 'y "arroll Kuigley4 #. D7G%D7> F$s a result of is understanding of t e negotiations wit McMa on4 Hussein 'egan an $ra' revolt against Turkey on 0une G4 898>. *ro! t at #oint on4 e received a su'sidy of [DDG4EEE a !ont fro! Britain. T e fa!ous T. E. (awrence4 known as F(awrence of $ra'ia4J w o ad 'een an arc aeologist in t e -ear East in 89874 ad not ing to do wit t e negotiations wit Hussein4 and did not 2oin t e revolt until 3cto'er 898>. + en Hussein did not o'tain t e concessions e e.#ected at t e )aris )eace "onference of 89894 (awrence sickened of t e w ole affair and eventually c anged is na!e to S aw and tried to vanis fro! #u'lic view. T e $ra' territories re!ained under !ilitary occu#ation until t e legal esta'lis !ent of #eace wit Turkey in 89DH. $ra'ia itself was under a nu!'er of s eiks4 of w ic t e c ief were Hussein in He2az and I'n%Saud in -e2d. )alestine and Meso#ota!ia =now called Ira;? were under Britis !ilitary occu#ation. T e coast of Syria was under *renc !ilitary occu#ation4 w ile t e interior of Syria =including t e $le##o%Da!ascus railway line? and Trans2ordan were under an $ra' force led 'y E!ir *eisal4 t ird son of Hussein of Mecca. $lt oug an $!erican co!!ission of in;uiry4 known as t e ,ing%"rane "o!!ission =8989?4 and a LGeneral Syrian "ongressL of $ra's fro! t e w ole *ertile "rescent reco!!ended t at *rance 'e e.cluded fro! t e area4 t at Syria%)alestine 'e 2oined to for! a single state wit *eisal as king4 t at t e Sionists 'e e.cluded fro! )alestine in any #olitical role4 as well as ot er #oints4 a !eeting of t e Great )owers at San &e!o in $#ril 89DE set u# two *renc and two Britis !andates. Syria and (e'anon went to *rance4 w ile Ira; and )alestine =including Trans2ordan? went to Britain. T ere were $ra' u#risings and great local unrest following t ese decisions. T e resistance in Syria was crus ed 'y t e *renc 4 w o t en advanced to occu#yM t e interior of Syria and sent *eisal into e.ile. T e Britis 4 w o 'y t is ti!e were engaged in a rivalry =over #etroleu! resources and ot er issues? wit t e *renc 4 set *eisal u# as king in Ira; under Britis #rotection =89D8? and #laced is 'rot er $'dulla in a si!ilar #osition as ,ing of Trans2ordan =89DH?. T e fat er of t e two new kings4 Hussein4 was attacked 'y I'n%Saud of -e2d and forced to a'dicate in 89D7. His kingdo! of He2az was anne.ed 'y I'n%Saud in 89D>. $fter 89HD t is w ole area was known as Saudi $ra'ia.J Tragedy and Hope 'y "arroll Kuigley4 #. D7:%D79

3T e ne.t docu!ent concerned wit t e dis#osition of t e 3tto!an E!#ire was t e fa!ous FBalfour DeclarationJ of -ove!'er

898I. )ro'a'ly no docu!ent of t e warti!e #eriod4 e.ce#t +ilsonMs *ourteen )oints4 as given rise to !ore dis#utes t an t is 'rief state!ent of less t an eleven lines. Muc of t e controversy arises fro! t e 'elief t at it #ro!ised so!et ing to so!e'ody and t at t is #ro!ise was in conflict wit ot er #ro!ises4 nota'ly wit t e FMcMa on )ledgeJ to S erif Hussein. T e Balfour Declaration took t e for! of a letter fro! Britis *oreign Secretary $rt ur 0a!es Balfour to (ord &ot sc ild4 one of t e leading figures in t e Britis Sionist !ove!ent. T is !ove!ent4 w ic was !uc stronger in $ustria and Ger!any t an in Britain4 ad as#irations for creating in )alestine4 or #er a#s elsew ere4 so!e territory to w ic refugees fro! anti%Se!itic #ersecution or ot er 0ews could go to find Fa national o!e.J BalfourNs letter said4 FHis Ma2estyNs Govern!ent view wit favor t e esta'lis !ent in )alestine of a national o!e for t e 0ewis #eo#le and will use t eir 'est endeavours to facilitate t e ac ieve!ent of t is o'2ect4 it 'eing clearly understood t at not ing s all 'e done w ic !ay #re2udice t e civil and religious rig ts of e.isting non%0ewis co!!unities in )alestine4 or t e rig ts and #olitical status en2oyed 'y 0ews in any ot er country.J It is to 'e noted t at t is was neit er an agree!ent nor a #ro!ise 'ut !erely a unilateral declaration4 t at it did not #ro!ise a 0ewis state in )alestine or even )alestine as a o!e for t e 0ews4 'ut !erely #ro#osed suc a o!e in )alestine4 and t at it reserved certain rig ts for t e e.isting grou#s in t e area. Hussein was so distressed w en e eard of it t at e asked for an e.#lanation4 and was assured 'y D. G. Hogart 4 on 'e alf of t e Britis govern!ent4 t at L0ewis settle!ent in )alestine would only 'e allowed in so far as would 'e consistent wit t e #olitical and econo!ic freedo! of t e $ra' #o#ulation.L T is reassurance a##arently was acce#ta'le to Hussein4 'ut dou'ts continued a!ong ot er $ra' leaders. In answer to a re;uest fro! seven suc leaders4 on 0une 8>4 898:4 Britain gave a #u'lic answer w ic divided t e $ra' territories into t ree #arts< =a? t e $ra'ian #eninsula fro! $den to $ka'a =at t e ead of t e &ed Sea?4 w ere t e Fco!#lete and sovereign inde#endence of t e $ra'sL was recognized/ ='? t e area under Britis !ilitary occu#ation4 covering sout ern )alestine and sout ern Meso#ota!ia4 w ere Britain acce#ted t e #rinci#le t at govern!ent s ould 'e 'ased Fon t e consent of t e governedJ/ and =c? t e area still under Turkis control4 including Syria and nort ern Meso#ota!ia4 w ere Britain assu!ed t e o'ligation to strive for Ffreedo! and inde#endence.J So!ew at si!ilar in tone was a 2oint $nglo%*renc Declaration of -ove!'er I4 898:4 2ust four days 'efore ostilities ended in t e war. It #ro!ised Ft e co!#lete and final li'eration of t e #eo#les w o ave for so long 'een o##ressed 'y t e Turk and t e setting u# of national govern!ents and ad!inistrations t at s all derive t eir aut ority fro! t e free e.ercise of t e initiative and c oice of t e indigenous #o#ulations.J T ere ave 'een e.tended discussions of t e co!#ati'ility of t e various agree!ents and state!ents !ade 'y t e Great )owers regarding t e dis#osition of t e 3tto!an E!#ire after t e war. T is is a difficult #ro'le! in view of t e inaccuracy and a!'iguity of t e wording of !ost of t ese docu!ents. 3n t e ot er and4 certain facts are ;uite evident. T ere is a s ar# contrast 'etween t e i!#erialist avarice to 'e found in t e secret agree!ents like Sykes%)icot and t e altruistic tone of t e #u'licly issued state!ents/ t ere is also a s ar# contrast 'etween t e tenor of t e Britis negotiations wit t e 0ews and t ose wit t e $ra's regarding t e dis#osition of )alestine4 wit t e result t at 0ews and $ra's were eac 2ustified in 'elieving t at Britain would #ro!ote t eir conflicting #olitical a!'itions in t at area< t ese 'eliefs4 w et er 'ased on !isunderstanding or deli'erate dece#tion4 su'se;uently served to reduce t e stature of Britain in t e eyes of 'ot grou#s4 alt oug 'ot ad #reviously eld a ig er o#inion of Britis fairness and generosity t an of any ot er )ower/ lastly4 t e raising of false $ra' o#es and t e failure to reac any clear and onest understanding regarding Syria led to a long #eriod of conflict 'etween t e Syrians and t e *renc govern!ent4 w ic eld t e area as a !andate of t e (eague of -ations after 89DH.J Tragedy and Hope 'y "arroll Kuigley4 #. D7>%D7:

#n #ra demonstration against British o++upation and (ewish8Qionist immigration o++urs outside the 2amas+us )ate on Mar+h F, $%@E as (ewish migrants near y wat+h the demonstration. (). Eri+ and Edith Matson Photograph !olle+tionCLi rary of !ongress) http'CCwww.lo+.go7Cpi+turesCitemCmp+@EEIEEE?$JCPPCRsidS%aa+$d %%e+$I>$I>%M?%@fe e%$fEJI

(eft to rig t< T.E. (awrence4 E!ir $'dulla 4 $ir Mars al Sir Geoffrey Sal!ond4 Sir Her'ert Sa!uel4 and Sir +ynd a! #ose for a grou# #ortrait at t e "airo "onference in 89D8.

Winston !hur+hill prepares to su 9ugate the Middle East on ehalf of the British Empire. )reat Britain su 9ugated the +rown +olonies of Egypt, Palestine (/srael), <rans9ordan ((ordan), Mesopotamia (/ra=), #den (;emen), 6uwait, and &udan. <he .ttoman Empire go7erned the Middle East, in+luding the territories of what are now /ra=, &yria, Le anon, (ordan, and /srael efore World War /. )reat Britain and *ran+e +on=uered the #ra i+ part of the Middle East from the .ttoman <urks during World War /. *ran+e su 9ugated Le anon and &yria while )reat Britain su 9ugated Mesopotamia (/ra=) and Palestine ((ordan and /srael). <he British go7ernment partitioned its +rown +olony of Palestine into two +olonies y $%@M1 the Palestine territory east of the (ordan ,i7er e+ame <rans9ordan while the Palestine territory west of the (ordan ,i7er remained Palestine. <he British go7ernment would install Emir # dullah as the figurehead of the 7assal state of <rans9ordan in $%@M.

&e7en European +ountries +on=uered and o++upied most of the #fri+an +ontinent y $%$I. )ermany would forfeit its #fri+an +olonies to Britain and *ran+e at the end of the Paris Pea+e !onferen+e. Britain a+=uired )erman East #fri+a (<anganyika, later <an0ania), )erman &outhwest #fri+a ("ami ia), and a portion of 6amerun (!ameroon) while Belgium a+=uired present8day ,wanda and Burundi.

*all of the .ttoman Empire, <he !reation of the ,epu li+ of <urkey, : <he <urkish War of /ndependen+e ($%$%8$%@@)

The Final Days of the Ottoman Empire: &ultan -ahideddin (Mehmed -/) depart from the a+kdoor of the 2olma ahTe Pala+e in /stan ul (!onstantinople), <urkey in "o7em er $%@@. # few days after this pi+ture was taken, the &ultan was deposed and eAiled (along with his son) on a British warship to Malta on "o7em er $>, $%@@, then to &an ,emo, /taly, where he e7entually died in $%@?. His ody was uried in 2amas+us at the +ourtyard of the <ekke of &ultan &uleiman the Magnifi+ent. <urkey was de+lared a ,epu li+ on .+to er @%, $%@M, and the new Head of &tate e+ame President Mustafa 6emal #taturk.

)reek refugees from &myrna (/0mir), <urkey flee the +ity in $%@@ as they attempt to e7a+uate to )ree+e.

T e Greek $r!y !arc in t e streets of S!yrna =Iz!ir? on May D4 8989

Mustafa ,e!al =Turkis ero of Galli#oli ca!#aign during +orld +ar I? reviews Turkis troo#s at t e out'reak of t e Greco% Turkis +ar =8989%89DD? in 8989.

Greeks living in western Turkey flee Turkey in 89DD.

<he #meri+an delegation prepares to negotiate a treaty with <urkey at Lausanne, &wit0erland in +ir+a $%@@8$%@M. &eated from left to right' #dmiral Mark Bristol, #m assador !hild, and Minister (oseph !. )rew. )rew and Bristol were mem ers of the !oun+il on *oreign ,elations.

T e delegation of Turks w ic was sent to (ausanne4 Switzerland in 89DH to #artici#ate in t e (ausanne "onference. Is!et )as a a##ears in t e center.

$ !a# of t e 3tto!an E!#ire and t e Middle East s ortly after t e FratificationJ of t e Treaty of Sevres

FT e Treaty of S\vres wit Turkey was t e last one !ade and t e only one never ratified. T ere were t ree reasons for t e delay< =8? t e uncertainty a'out t e role of t e 6nited States4 w ic was e.#ected to acce#t control of t e Straits and a !andate for $r!enia4 t us for!ing a 'uffer against Soviet &ussia/ =D? t e insta'ility of t e Turkis govern!ent4 w ic was t reatened 'y a nationalist u#rising led 'y Mustafa ,e!al/ and =H? t e scandal caused 'y t e Bols evik #u'lication of t e secret treaties regarding t e 3tto!an E!#ire4 since t ese treaties contrasted so s ar#ly wit t e e.#ressed war ai!s of t e $llies. T e news t at t e 6nited States refused to #artici#ate in t e -ear East settle!ent !ade it #ossi'le to draw u# a treaty. T is was 'egun 'y t e Su#re!e "ouncil at its (ondon "onference of *e'ruary 89DE4 and continued at San &e!o in $#ril. It was signed 'y t e sultanNs govern!ent on $ugust DE4 89DE4 'ut t e -ationalists under Mustafa ,e!al refused to acce#t it and set u# an insurgent govern!ent at $nkara. T e Greeks and Italians4 wit $llied su##ort4 invaded Turkey and atte!#ted to force t e treaty of t e -ationalists4 'ut t ey were !uc weakened 'y dissension 'e ind t e fa]ade of Entente solidarity. T e *renc 'elieved t at greater econo!ic concessions could 'e o'tained fro! t e ,e!alist govern!ent4 w ile t e Britis felt t at ric er #ros#ects were to 'e o'tained fro! t e sultan. ?n !articular the 'rench were !re!ared to su!!ort the claims of Standard >il to such concessions while the *ritish were !re!ared to su!!ort 5oyal/.utch Shell# T e -ationalist forces !ade good use of t ese dissensions. $fter 'uying off t e Italians and *renc wit econo!ic concessions4 t ey launc ed a counteroffensive against t e Greeks. $lt oug England ca!e to t e rescue of t e Greeks4 it received no su##ort fro! t e ot er )owers4 w ile t e Turks ad t e su##ort of Soviet &ussia. T e Turks destroyed t e Greeks4 'urned S!yrna and ca!e face%to%face wit t e Britis at " anak. $t t is critical !o!ent4 t e Do!inions4 in answer to "urzonNs telegra# ed a##eal4 refused to su##ort a war wit Turkey. $he $reaty of SIvres already in tatters had to be discarded# ( new conference at %ausanne in Aovember 1977 !roduced a moderate and ne"otiated treaty which was si"ned by the =emalist "overnment on :uly 7@ 197F# $his act ended in a formal way the 'irst World War# It also took a !ost vital ste# toward esta'lis ing a new Turkey w ic would serve as a #owerful force for #eace and sta'ility in t e -ear East. T e decline of Turkey4 w ic ad continued for four undred years4 was finally ended. By t is Treaty of (ausanne4 Turkey gave u# all non%Turkis territory e.ce#t ,urdistan4 losing $ra'ia4 Meso#ota!ia4 t e (evant4 western T race4 and so!e islands of t e $egean. T e ca#itulations were a'olis ed in return for a #ro!ise of 2udicial refor!. T ere were no re#arations and no disar!a!ent4 e.ce#t t at t e Straits were de!ilitarized and were to 'e o#en to all s i#s e.ce#t t ose of 'elligerents if Turkey was at war. Turkey acce#ted a !inorities treaty and agreed to a co!#ulsory e.c ange wit Greece of Greek and Turkis !inorities 2udged on t e 'asis of !e!'ers i# in t e Greek 3rt odo. or Musli! religions. 6nder t is last #rovision4 over 84DGE4EEE Greeks were re!oved fro! Turkey 'y 89HE. 6nfortunately4 !ost of t ese ad 'een ur'an s o#kee#ers in Turkey and were settled as far!ers on t e un% os#ita'le soil of Macedonia. T e Bulgarian #easants w o ad #reviously lived in Macedonia were uncere!oniously du!#ed into Bulgaria w ere t ey were tinder for t e s#arks of a revolutionary Bulgarian secret society called t e Internal Macedonian &evolutionary 3rganization =IM&3?4 w ose c ief !et od of #olitical action was assassination. $s a result of t e rising tide of aggression in t e 89HENs4 t e clause regarding t e de!ilitarization of t e Straits was revoked at t e Montreu. "onvention of 0uly 89H>. T is gave Turkey full sovereignty over t e Straits4 including t e rig t to fortify t e!.J Tragedy and Hope 'y "arroll Kuigley4 #. DIG%DI>

Mustafa ,e!al $taturk =rig t?4 t e )resident of t e &e#u'lic of Turkey4 delivers a s#eec in Turkey in circa 89D7. $taturk was t e founder and first )resident of t e &e#u'lic of Turkey fro! 3cto'er D94 89DH until is deat on -ove!'er 8E4 89H:. =) oto< Govern!ent of Turkey $rc ives?

Me !ed Talat )as a =left?4 one of t e FT ree )as asJ4 was t e Turkis Minister of t e Interior =898H%898I? and Grand @izier of t e 3tto!an E!#ire =898I%898:?/ Me !ed Talat )as a fled "onstantino#le in a Ger!an su'!arine on -ove!'er H4 898: and !oved to Berlin. Grand Hi2ier 6ehmed $alat Pasha was assassinated by a 8lone "unman9 Sog o!on Te lirian =rig t?4 an $r!enian revolutionary working on 'e alf of Britis intelligence in t e t e " arlotten'urg district of Berlin on Marc 8G4 89D8. Sog o!on Te lirian was ac;uitted of !urder in a Ger!an court in 89D8.

$ !a# of t e 3tto!an E!#ire

$ !a# of t e Middle East. Great Britain controlled ,uwait4 Ira;4 0ordan4 Israel4 Egy#t4 and Sudan w ile *rance controlled (e'anon4 Syria4 and $lgeria. 3il is t e largest natural resource in t e Middle East/ !a2or oil fields are located in Ira;4 Saudi $ra'ia4 )ersian Gulf4 and "as#ian Sea =including areas near t e city of Baku?.

Sykes%)icot $gree!ent of 898> was a secret agree!ent esta'lis ed 'etween t e Britis and *renc govern!ents during +orld +ar I. T e secret agree!ent was na!ed after Britis Me!'er of )arlia!ent "olonel Sir Mark Sykes and *renc di#lo!at *rancois Georges% )icot. *rancois Georges%)icot once served as t e *renc "onsul General in Beirut =ca#ital of #resent%day (e'anon?.

"olonel Sir Mark Sykes =left? and *rancois Georges%)icot

)artition of t e Britis Mandate ="olony? of )alestine4 a for!er #rovince of t e 3tto!an E!#ire

# 6urdish 7illage guard patrols on foot near 5ludere on .+to er @M, @EE> in the southeastern <urkish pro7in+e of &irnak at the <urkey8/ra= order, <urkey. <he 6urds were denied a nation of their own after *ran+e and the British Empire partitioned the .ttoman Empire at the end of World War /. ()etty /mages)

#ra terrorists su+h as the Hamas, He0 ollah, and the Palestine Li eration .rgani0ation (PL.) ha7e waged guerilla war against the &tate of /srael. (Photo' http'CChea7enawaits.files.wordpress.+omC@EEFCEIChamasUwarEIE@.9pg)

*a#(an +Po%der ,eg-: The Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia

8?m 1ust a !atsyJ9: 89%year%old Flone gun!anJ Gavrilo )rinci# =DG 0uly 8:97 D: $#ril 898:?4 a $ustro%Hungarian%'orn Ser'ian nationalist4 assassinates $rc duke *ranz *erdinand of $ustria and is wife "ountess So# ie in Sara2evo =ca#ital of t e $ustro%Hungarian #rovince of Bosnia? on Sunday !orning4 0une D:4 8987. $rc duke *ranz *erdinand of $ustria and is wife "ountess So# ie4 w o survived an assassination atte!#t earlier t at day w en a 89%year%old student na!ed -edel2ko ^a'rinovi_ t rew a and grenade into t eir car4 were traveling to a local os#ital in Sara2evo w en t ey were !ortally wounded 'y a Flone gun!anJ. T is assassination would 'e used as a #rete.t to start +orld +ar I.

Left' 2ragutin 2imitri9e7iV #pis, the &er ian mastermind ehind the assassination of #ustriaDs #r+hduke *ran0 *erdinand. !enter' <he seal of the Bla+k Hand (also known as 5nity or 2eath), a &er ian se+ret so+iety founded in May $%$$ ,ight' )a7rilo Prin+ip, the &er ian patsy who assassinated #ustriaDs #r+hduke *ran0 *erdinand and his wife in &ara9e7o.

#r+hduke *ran0 *erdinand of #ustria and his wife !ountess &ophie prepare to ride in a limousine in &ara9e7o moments efore they are mortally wounded.

)a7rilo Prin+ip is +aptured in &ara9e7o after assassinating #ustrian #r+hduke *ran+is *erdinand and his wife on (une @F, $%$I.

F3n H Marc 89884 t e seven founding !e!'ers of 6nification or Deat 4 known as t e Black Hand4 !et at an a#art!ent located a##ro#riately on Bosnia Street =since rena!ed Gavrilo )rinci# Street? in t e centre of Belgrade. T e May 89EH cons#irators4 t e !urderers of ,ing $leksandar 3'renovic and Kueen Draga4 !ade u# t e core of t e Black Hand. T eir organization was treasona'le4 as its oat contradicted t eir duty as !ilitary officers to serve t eir king. It was i!#erative to !aintain secrecy4 for t e May "ou# of 89EH ad ensured t at t e aut orities were sensitive to t e !erest w iff of cons#iracy inside t e ar!y. T e reigning ,arad2ord2evic dynasty en2oyed no s#ecial #rotection fro! any future regicide. T e e.istence of t e Black Hand was revealed wit in !ont s of its foundation4 'ut 'y t en its influence e.tended into !ost 'ranc es of t e !ilitary and into !any govern!ent de#art!ents4 nota'ly t e *oreign Ministry. So4 alt oug its !ission was co!#ro!ised4 t e Black HandMs leaders i# was a'le to e.ert #ressure t roug its ig %#laced sy!#at izers4 t ere'y !aintaining a certain !ystery a'out its nature and ai!s. "olonel Dragutin Di!itri2evic $#is ad agreed reluctantly to 2oin t e "entral E.ecutive "o!!ittee of t e Black Hand4 and it was not long 'efore e ad 'eco!e t e !otor of t e w ole o#eration. MHis reasoning was always e. austive and convincing. He could de!onstrate ow t e !ost insur!ounta'le task was in reality a s!all detail4 ow t e !ost dangerous undertaking was innocent and ar!lessM4 e.#lained Stano2e Stano2evic4 one of $#isMs 'oldest critics inside t e cons#iracy. But t e key to is !astery of cons#iracy and #olitical influence was is a'ility Mto old everyt ing in is ands w ile allowing even is !ost inti!ate friends to 'e infor!ed only of t at w ic affected t e! directlyM. $#is and is friends were eit er #oliticians or ar!y co!!anders. Intellectuals4 owever4 t ey were not % #atriotis! for t e! !eant t e e.#ansion and consolidation of t e Ser'ian state t roug t e agency of !ilitaris!. T ey relied on one !an4 (2u'o!ir "u#a%0ovanovic4 an ardent nationalist and co%founder of t e Black Hand4 to articulate any !ore literary version of t eir ideas. Gacinovic4 w o was usually s#aring in is #raise of ot ers4 eld "u#a in t e ig est estee!. E!# asizing "u#aMs e.e!#lary sense of self%sacrifice4 e called i! Mt e Mazzini of 1oung Ser'ia. E.tre!ely tall4 t in4 wit a ig fore ead4 e AwasB a tireless worker and a resolute ascetic ... "u#a%0ovanovic travelled t roug out all Ser'ian lands4 often on foot4 to learn !ore a'out t e regions and t eir #eo#le.M "u#aMs !ost i!#ortant role was as editor of t e Black HandMs #i:e&ont, w ose na!e underlined t e ideological de't t e organization owed to Italian nationalis!. $not er !odel its !e!'ers e.tolled was Ger!an !ilitaris!. T e Ger!an ar!y ad #layed t e crucial role in t e Mregeneration of t e Ger!an nationM4 as #i:e&ont;s Berlin corres#ondent #ut it. He advised t at Ser'ia follow Ger!anyMs e.a!#le in creating t e (eague of Ger!an 1out 2<ung -eutschland Bund5, founded4 ironically4 'y General von der Goltz4 t e !an w o would #re#are t e Turkis $r!y for its war against t e Balkan $lliance in 898D%8H. T e corres#ondent even went so far as to advocate4 as $#isMs 'iogra# er says4 Mt at Ser'ia ado#t t e (eagueMs racist and !ilitarist a##roac 4 redolent of t e later Hitler 1out 4 to ac ieve its goal of national unificationM. *ro! a #ractical #oint of view4 owever4 t e Black Hand could ardly woo Ger!any as a #otential ally 'ecause of BerlinMs relations i# wit @ienna4 t e scourge of Belgrade. Since Ser'ian national interests coincided wit &ussian i!#erial interests after 89E:4 $#is forged close links wit &ussian consular staff4 in #articular t e !ilitary attac es. $lt oug "u#a and Ga"inovic toget er for!ed a rickety 'ridge 'etween t e Black Hand and 1oung Bosnia4 t e !otives4 !et ods and !e!'ers of t e two organizations were very different. T e Black Hand ad t e resources and t e a'ility to !eddle in ig #olitics. Its nationalis! was free fro! ideological 'aggage4 wedded instead to a !ilitaristic conce#t of t e state. Its !e!'ers were disci#lined4 untrou'led 'y ;uestions of !orality4 and !any were rut less4 acco!#lis ed soldiers. Its ulti!ate goal was t e creation of a greater Ser'ia4 w ic would include Macedonia4 Bosnia and "roatia and all t e Slavs w o lived t ere. $lt oug 1oung BosniaMs !e!'ers i# was #redo!inantly Ser'4 it also attracted an i!#ortant !inority of "roats and so!e Musli!s. $nd w ile t e 1oung Bosnians regarded Ser'ia as t e #illar w ic eld u# t eir as#irations4 t ey recognized t e contri'ution w ic "roat students and Musli! sy!#at izers in Bosnia could !ake to t e !ove!ent for national li'eration. T e 1oung Bosnians were4 owever4 less successful in s#ecifying w at t e relations i# 'etween Ser'ia4 Ser's and ot er sout Slavs s ould 'e if Bosnia and "roatia were a'le to detac t e!selves fro! t e Ha's'urg E!#ire. E!otionally 'ound to t e #easantry4 t e 1oung Bosnians considered social revolution a necessary corollary of national li'eration. In 898E4 a #easant revolt in a "roat village of t e Bosanska ,ra2ina s#read t roug out !ost of t e Ser' villages of t e region. $n $ustrian force confronted t e disorganized #easant re'els near t e town of Do'o2 as t ey fled towards t e Ser'ian 'order. T e ar!y t en launc ed retaliatory raids t roug out t e region. T is s ort u#rising in t e ,ra2ina occurred 2ust 'efore t e o#ening of t e new Bosnian Sa'or in Sara2evo4 an institution w ic for t e first ti!e would allow Musli!s4 Ser's and "roats so!e influence on t e decision% !aking #rocess in Bosnia. T e $ustrian aut orities under t e relatively li'eral *inance Minister4 von Burian4 ad o'served t e growing loyalty of t e !erc ant class and townsfolk towards t e E!#ire. @on Burian regarded !odest de!ocratic refor! as a way of integrating and e!'racing t e Ser' and Musli! elites. General Mari2an @ardanin4 t e Military Governor of Bosnia4 was given t e onour of o#ening t e new Sa'or on 8G 0une. $s e eaded across t e ,aiserMs 'ridge in Sara2evo on t e way 'ack to is official residence4 Bogdan Sera2ic4 a twenty%four%year%old Ser'4 fired five s ots at i! =all of t e! wide of t eir target? 'efore turning is gun on i!self. Sera2ic 'eca!e t e cult figure for all 1oung Bosnians. $s a student in Switzerland4 e ad co!e under t e influence of &ussian Social &evolutionaries w o ad encouraged is o'session wit individual terror and !artyrdo! as #olitical instru!ents. He too was raised in a Ser' #easant fa!ily in Eastern Hercegovina and ad studied in t e Mostar Gy&nasiu&* Gacinovic4 w o knew i! well4 wrote a fa!ous o'ituary of t e assassin4 3&rt :ednog hero:a =Deat of t e Hero?. He descri'ed Sera2ic as Myoung4 lit e and #ri!itive. He ad drea!y eyes w ic stared far into t e distance. His look was fiery4 nervous ... 'ut e was ;uiet and !elanc olic4 alone and free of #ersonal ca#rice ... He was divorced fro! us4 living contentedly in is own world ... (ife aunted i!4 'ringing fog into is war!4 sunny soul.M T e assassination atte!#t4 Gacinovic concluded o!inously4 was a ar'inger of Mnew #eo#le4 new Ser's w o will arise after t e great sins of t eir fat ersM. In deat 4 Sera2ic ins#ired would%'e assassins in "roatia4 Bosnia and Ser'ia. Gavrilo )rinci# was a regular visitor at is grave to lay

flowers. He4 along wit "a'rinovic4 Me !ed Me !ed'asic4 Danilo Ilic4 Gacinovic and ot ers w o were involved in t e assassination of *ranz *erdinand in 89874 all co!!itted t e!selves at different ti!es to avenging Sera2icMs deat . + en war 'roke out 'etween t e Balkan $lliance and Turkey in 3cto'er 898D4 t e co!!unity of 1oung Bosnians strea!ed into Ser'ia to volunteer t eir services to t e Ser'ian ar!y and cetni+ 'ands. So!e like Gacinovic4 w o #artici#ated in t e Montenegrin siege of Skutari4 saw sustained !ilitary action. But !ost4 like )rinci#4 were re2ected as 'eing too young or #uny. Several ca!e into contact wit t e Black Hand for t e first ti!e and two !e!'ers of its central e.ecutive co!!ittee4 @o2in Tankosic4 t e guerrilla leader4 and &ade Malo'a'ic4 $#isMs #ersonal s#y in "roatia4 Bosnia and Montenegro4 cultivated friends i#s wit t ese ent usiastic revolutionaries fro! Mt e occu#ied Ser'ian landsM. $hese tenuous lin&s were renewed over a year later when $rif&o Grabe2 a youn" Serb from Pale near Sara1evo visited $an&osic and as&ed him to su!!ly some bombs and "uns for a secret o!eration in the *osnian ca!ital# (fter clearin" the matter with (!is $an&osic handed over four *rownin" revolvers and si+ bombs to the Koun" *osnian cons!irators# ?n the final fourteen years of the nineteenth century assassins around the world claimed the lives of ma1or !ublic fi"ures at an avera"e rate of one a year# $he victims included the President of 'rance the 6ayor of Chica"o the Prime 6inister of *ul"aria and the -m!ress of (ustria# (t the turn of the century however successful !olitical murders suddenly increased heraldin" the a"e of the assassin# 'rom 19GG to 191F forty heads of state !oliticians and di!lomats fell victim to the terrorist's bullet or bomb# (mon" the victims were four &in"s Ctwo from the *al&ans two from the %atin 6editerraneanD si+ !rime ministers three !residents Call from the (merican continent includin" William 6c=inley of the United StatesD and a host of ministers military "overnors and senior !olicemen# $wenty/ei"ht of the &illin"s were carried out in -uro!e# MT e entire series of assassinations and terrorist actsM4 reflected one 1ugoslav co!!unist during t e interwar #eriod4 Mfor!ed a #art4 al'eit an inevita'le one4 of t e #olitical reaction to t e i!#erialist #olicies of great #owers in t e colonies.M With a mildly e+a""erated re!utation as the ca!ital of !olitical murder C5ussia was in fact the most dan"erous !lace to be a !olice or "overnment leaderD the *al&ans recorded ei"ht successful assassinations0 includin" two &in"s one ,ueen two !rime ministers and the commander in chief of the $ur&ish (rmy# Successful murders were dwarfed by the number of attem!ted assassinations# ?n retros!ect each individual act of terrorism seems to ta&e its !lace in the !attern of !olitical violence leadin" u! to 'ran2 'erdinand's assassination a &ind of crescendo# Ao other murder in history is !erceived to have tri""ered such calamitous events B world war im!erial colla!se socialist revolution# In t e interwar years alone4 one Ser'ian istorian clai!ed4 so!e H4EEE works were #u'lis ed around t e glo'e de'ating t e issue of war guilt4 starting wit t e assassination. 0ust under t irty years later4 $dolf Hitler and t e Ger!an govern!ent used t e events of D: 0une 8987 as a 2ustification for t e +e r!ac tMs attack on Belgrade. Ket des!ite all the scholarshi! and considerable detective wor& the words of -dward Grey the *ritish 'orei"n Secretary in 191@ still hold true: 8$he world will !resumably never be told all that was behind the murder of the (rchdu&e 'ran2 'erdinand# Probably there is not and never was any one !erson who &new all there was to &now#9 ?t is &nown however that the si+ cons!irators L6ehmedbasic Cubrilovic Cabrinovic Cv1et&o Po!ovic Princi! and Grabe2 in that orderM who were lined u! alon" Sara1evo's (!!el Nuay by the 6il1ac&a river on 7E :une 191@ formed one of the most disor"ani2ed and ine+!erienced s,uadrons of assassins ever assembled# $he most endurin" mystery surroundin" the assassination is not who did it or why but how they ever succeeded# $he *al&ans had re"istered an astonishin" number of assassinations which failed because the !er!etrators either lost their nerve or !roved to be !oor shots# $he mornin" which culminated in 'ran2 'erdinand's death was littered with misha!s# $he si+ cons!irators were e+citable teena"ers with no !ractical e+!erience of handlin" arms# 'our of the assassins were either too scared or too incom!etent to use their wea!ons# >ne Cabrinovic threw a bomb which missed its tar"et bouncin" off the bac& of 'ran2 'erdinand's car and woundin" a member of the entoura"e and !assers/by# Princi! himself had a clear shot at the (rchdu&e only because 'ran2 'erdinand's C2ech chauffeur who had never been to Sara1evo before missed the turnin" from (!!el Nuay and had to sto! and reverse ma&in" the (rchdu&e a sittin" tar"et for twenty seconds# $hat Princi! actually succeeded in shootin" 'ran2 'erdinand dead was nothin" short of a miracle# $fter firing t at s ot4 )rinci# let off a second4 w ic fatally wounded t e $rc dukeMs wife. He ad 'een ai!ing at t e Military Governor4 General 3skar )otiorek4 'ut a 'ystander ad tried to knock t e gun out of is and and t e 'ullet it t e Duc ess instead. Bot "a'rinovic and )rinci# swallowed t e cyanide t ey ad 'een given 'y Ma2or Tankosic in Belgrade4 'ut t e #oison ad o.idized4 causing t e! 'ot e.cruciating #ain 'ut leaving t e! alive and fully conscious for t e relentless 'eatings t ey received at t e ands of t e soldiers and #olice!en w o arrested t e!. In 898I4 ene!ies of $#is in Ser'iaMs govern!ent in e.ile in Salonika #ut i! on trial for !urder and treason. During t e #roceedings4 e said e ad a##roved t e 1oung BosniansM #lan 'ecause e 'elieved *ranz *erdinand to 'e t e !oving s#irit 'e ind t e Military )arty in @ienna. *ranz *erdinandMs deat 4 $#is argued4 would ave reduced t e risk of $ustria declaring war on Ser'ia. 3f course t e assassination ad #recisely t e o##osite effect fro! t at w ic $#is intended as Malive4 *ranz *erdinand ad acted as a 'rake u#on t e #ressures Ain $ustriaB for !ilitary action/ dead4 e 'eca!e t e #rete.t for war. In is a'sence4 "onrad AHotzendorfB4 ,ro'atin AMinister of +arB4 and even *ranz 0ose# could give full rein to t eir conservative realis!.M By killing *ranz *erdinand4 t e 1oung Bosnians signed Ser'iaMs deat warrant. Gavrilo )rinci# was also orrified 'y t e outco!e of is deed. T e Ha's'urg E!#ire did colla#se4 alt oug )rinci# did not live to see itYJ The Bal+ans" =ationalis&, War and the Great #o'ers, 1!>8%1 'y Mis a Glenny4 #. D99%HEG

F*osnia had a re!utation for violence# MIt was always our S#ainM4 la!ented 0ovan Skerlic4 Ser'iaMs leading turn%of%t e%century literary critic and a significant influence on t e 1oung Bosnians4 Mt e S#ain w ic was torn a#art 'y Moors4 0ews and #a#ists.M 1et t is #essi!istic vision of a #rovince trau!atized 'y relentless4 irrational violence was as inaccurate at t e 'eginning of t e twentiet century as it would 'e at t e end. It assu!ed t e t ree Bosnian fait s were engaged in a Ho''esian struggle wit one anot er. T ere were in fact two distinct causes of violence in Bosnia fro! t e !id%nineteent century onwards % t e #easant revolt4 and t e resistance of t e elite to i!#erial centralization4 3tto!an or Ha's'urg. In 89E:4 neit er t e #easantry nor t e landowners and t e !erc ants of Bosnia were sufficiently disadvantaged 'y t e anne.ation =very little was c anged 'y it inside t e #rovinces? to risk t eir liveli oods for a futile adventure. Indeed4 a!ong t e strongest 'ackers of anne.ation was t e increasingly influential elite of Ser'ian traders in t e towns4 es#ecially in Sara2evo4 'ut also in Ban2a (uka and Mostar. Evgeni2e (etica4 t e Metro#olitan of t e Ser'ian 3rt odo. " urc in Sara2evo4 even eld a s#ecial service to cele'rate t e event4 and asked Mall t e wors i##ers to kneel down and #ray for divine 'lessings for t e E!#eror *ranz 0osef and t e Ha's'urg dynasty. $ll went down e.ce#t a grou# of 'oys fro! t e ig sc ool. T ey stood fir!ly u#rig t a!ong t eir kneeling elders.M T is was t e first #u'lic #rotest of t e young intellectuals4 alt oug t e event was e;ually striking as a !anifestation of support for t e anne.ation a!ong t e Ser' elite. T e 1oung Bosnians denounced t eir elders as colla'orators 'oug t off 'y t e colonial #ower. 3ne student4 -edel2ko "a'rinovic4 was in a #eculiarly awkward #osition as is fat er was a #rofessional s#y for t e $ustro%Hungarian #olice. "a'rinovicMs need to cleanse t e stain of is co!#ro!ised fat er was is #ri!ary !otive for #artici#ating in t e assassination of *ranz *erdinand. During is interrogation after t e assassination4 "a'rinovic revealed t at is grou# ad not intended to sto# wit t e !urders of *ranz *erdinand and General 3skar )otiorek4 t e !ilitary governor of Bosnia. T e cons#iracy ad also sentenced to deat Metro#olitan (etica and t ree leading Ser' 'usiness!en and #oliticians fro! Sara2evo.J The Bal+ans" =ationalis&, War and the Great #o'ers, 1!>8%1 'y Mis a Glenny4 #. D9I

FBaron von $e rent al4 t e $ustrian *oreign Minister4 2ustified is decision to anne. Bosnia and Hercegovina wit t e clai! t at Ser'ia was already using its network of secret agents and cons#iratorial cells to desta'ilize t e #rovinces. 3n t e day in $ugust 89E: t at $e rent al announced in ca'inet is intention to anne. Bosnia and Hercegovina4 Hungarian #olice arrested leading Ser's in "roatia w o stood accused of 'eing in t e #ay of 3lo/ens+i:ug =Slav Sout ?4 a nationalist organization founded in Belgrade in 89EH. &elying on t e testi!ony of an e.#erienced #olice agent4 t e state #rosecutor de!anded deat 'y anging for fifty%t ree !en accused of co!!itting ig treason. T e evidence was ri##ed to s reds 'y t e 'rilliant Sagre' lawyer4 Dr Hinkovic4 aided 'y an invalua'le intervention fro! T.G. Masaryk. MSo scandalous were t e #roceedingsM4 +ick a! Steed re#orted4 Mt at an outcry arose t roug out Euro#e ... T e 2udges4 w o ad 'een c osen for t eir su'servience to t e Magyar #olitical aut orities4 eventually feared to #ronounce any deat sentence4 and inflicted only long ter!s of #enal servitude.M T e Ser's were eventually released. T en4 as if t e Ha's'urg aut orities ad not yet sufficiently u!iliated t e!selves4 in Dece!'er 89E94 $e rent al #ersuaded a istorian attac ed to t e *oreign Ministry4 Dr. Heinric *ried2ung4 to #u'lis a series of docu!ents w ic de!onstrated t at several #oliticians in "roatia4 including *rano Su#ilo4 ad 'een in recei#t of large su!s of !oney fro! t e Ser'ian govern!ent. + en t e Ser'%"roat "oalition sued for li'el4 Dr. *ried2ung was forced to retract t e allegations. It e!erged t at t e docu!ents ad 'een forged 'y !e!'ers of t e Ha's'urg consular !ission in Belgrade. $#art fro! leaving a #oor i!#ression on international #u'lic o#inion4 t e colla#se of t e two trials #roved 'eyond dou't t at4 contrary to $e rent alMs clai!s4 t ere was no Ser'ian%'acked cons#iracy in eit er "roatia or Bosnia. $e rent al 2ustified. T e anne.ation of Bosnia as a !eans to t rottle e!'ryonic terroris!4 In fact4 it created t e #ro'le!. I!!ediately after t e anne.ation4 nationalists in Belgrade founded =arodna Odbrana =-3/ -ational Defence? to tre!endous #u'lic acclai!. $nd alt oug t e leading Ser's4 Musli!s and "roats of Bosnia rat er welco!ed anne.ation4 it turned t e drea!y students of Sara2evo into a grou# of self%sacrificing fanatics. T e u!iliating ulti!atu!4 w ic t e Ser'ian govern!ent was forced to acce#t under &ussian #ressure in Marc 89E94 included a #aragra# insisting t at t e -3 'e transfor!ed into a ar!less cultural organization4 w ic !ust cut its links to Ser's in Macedonia4 Bosnia and "roatia. True to its word4 t e Ser'ian govern!ent ad soon all 'ut e.tinguis ed t e fire w ic t e -3 ad generated in t e early days of its e.istence. T e volunteer 'rigades were dis'anded4 and #lanned cetnik raids into Bosnia cancelled. -ationalist r etoric cla!ouring for war wit $ustria disa##eared fro! !ost news#a#ers. But so!e of t e -3Ns !e!'ers4 es#ecially a s!all 'ut influential grou# of officers in t e !ilitary4 dee#ly resented w at t ey regarded as t e govern!entMs cowardice. -onet eless4 it would 'e anot er two years 'efore t ese !en decided to take #olicy into t eir own ands.J The Bal+ans" =ationalis&, War and the Great #o'ers, 1!>8%1 'y Mis a Glenny4 #. D9:%D99

#r+hduke *ran0 *erdinand of #ustria and his wife were assassinated on this street +orner in &ara9e7o, Bosnia, in front of the 3Mu0e94 side of the museum uilding, on (une @F, $%$I.

6oso7o Li eration #rmy

*ren+h poli+e offi+ers apprehend the assassin of 6ing #leAander / of ;ugosla7ia after 6ing #leAander / of ;ugosla7ia was fatally wounded during a state 7isit to Marseille, *ran+e on .+to er %, $%MI. 6ingdom of &er s, !roats and &lo7enes was renamed 3;ugosla7ia4 in $%@%. Bulgarian terrorist -lado !herno0emski was the 3lone gunman4 who shot to death 6ing #leAander / of ;ugosla7ia1 -lado !herno0emski was killed y a *ren+h poli+e offi+er shortly after the assassination. (/mage' K Hulton82euts+h !olle+tionC!.,B/&)

Prin+e Paul of ;ugosla7ia (left) rides with "a0i )ermanyDs di+tator #dolf Hitler in )ermany in $%M%. (Photo' http'CCen.a+ademi+.ruCdi+.nsfCenwikiCME>MIM)

/n ;ugosla7ia for the first time, 5nited &tates &e+retary of &tate (ohn *oster 2ulles, (,), is wel+omed with a smile and a handshake y ;ugosla7iaDs !ommunist di+tator (osip Bro0 <ito on 2ullesD arri7al on (uly $$, $%JJ at Brioni, ;ugosla7ia for a one day offi+ial 7isit. (BettmannC!.,B/&)

President 2wight 2. Eisenhower (left) and ;ugosla7iaDs !ommunist di+tator Marshal (osip Bro0 <ito laugh together as they meet at the formerHs suite at the Waldorf8#storia Hotel in "ew ;ork !ity on &eptem er @@, $%?E. Earlier, oth men addressed the 5nited "ations )eneral #ssem ly. (BettmannC!.,B/&)

President ,i+hard "iAon is es+orted y ;ugosla7iaDs !ommunist di+tator (osip Bro0 <ito as "iAon re7iews the honor guard upon arri7al in Belgrade, ;ugosla7ia on &eptem er ME, $%>E. (BettmannC!.,B/&)

President )erald *ord leans o7er to +hat with ;ugosla7iaDs !ommunist di+tator (osip Bro0 <ito during &tate 2inner held in Belgrade, ;ugosla7ia on #ugust M, $%>J. (BettmannC!.,B/&)

President (immy !arter and his wife ,osalyn !arter go to a party with ;ugosla7iaDs di+tator (osip Bro0 <ito.

#meri+an 5.&. &enator <ed 6ennedy listens to ;ugosla7iaDs di+tator (osip Bro0 <ito.

President (osip Bro0 <ito with Prime Minister Winston !hur+hill and #nthony Eden in London in the $%JEs. (Photo' )o7ernment of ;ugosla7iaC&er ia)

Eleanor ,oose7elt 7isits ;ugosla7iaDs !ommunist di+tator (osip Bro0 <ito in the Bri9uni islands, !roatia, ;ugosla7ia on (uly $?, $%JM. (*ranklin 2. ,oose7elt Li raryC"ational #r+hi7es)

#meri+an pea+e negotiator and Wall &treet lawyer !yrus -an+e (right) meets with ;ugosla7iaDs President &lo odan Milose7i+ (left) in Paris on Mar+h $$, $%%M. (!.,B/& &;)M#)

5.&. !ongressman Bill ,i+hardson walks with ;ugosla7iaDs President &lo odan Milose7i+ in ;ugosla7ia. (&our+e' Between Worlds: The Making o !n !"erican #i e y Bill ,i+hardson)

5.&. &e+retary of &tate Madeline #l right appears with ;ugosla7iaDs di+tator &lo odan Milose7i+.

Left photo' 5nited &tates &e+retary of &tate Warren !hristopher (left) shakes hands with ;ugosla7iaDs di+tator &lo odan Milose7i+ in )ene7a, &wit0erland on (une @, $%%?. ,ight photo' # histori+al meeting in Belgrade. *rom right to left' )eneral 6laus "aumann as !hairman "#<. Military !ommittee, with "#<.8 &#!E5, (5.&. #rmy) )eneral Wesley !lark, (a7ier &olana, E5 High ,epresentati7e, &lo odan Milose7i+, President of ;ugosla7ia and Milan Milutino7i+, President of &er ia.

#meri+an en7oy ,i+hard Hol rooke meets with ;ugosla7iaDs di+tator &lo odan Milose7i+.

*osnian War C6arch 1 1997B.ecember 1@ 199;D

Bosnia-Herzegovina declared political independence through a referendum on February 29, 1992; however, the Bosnian Serbs rejected the decision. The other two ethnic groups in Bosnia, the Muslims and the Croats, supported the government's decision. (AP/Santiago Lyon) http://www.businessinsider.com/amazing-pictures-from-the-bosnian-war-20-years-later-2012-4?op=1

T e E.ecutive "ouncil Building in Sara2evo4 Bosnia 'urns after s elling in t e s#ring of 899D. =) oto 'y Mik ail Evstafiev?

$ view of Gr'avica4 a neig 'or ood in Sara2evo4 Bosnia on Marc 94 899> a##ro.i!ately four !ont s after t e signing of t e Dayton )eace $ccord t at officially ended t e war in Bosnia. =6.S. De#art!ent of Defense # oto?

-orwegian 6- troo#s a##roac Sni#er $lley in Sara2evo4 Bosnia in -ove!'er 899G.

&e!ains of victi!s of t e Sre'renica Massacre =0uly 899G? w o died at t e ands of t e Ser'ian ar!y led 'y 1ugoslaviaNs )resident Slo'odan Milosevic =8978%DEE>?.

An estimated 8,000 Muslim men and boys were massacred by Bosnian Serb army, and an estimated 20,000 Muslim women, children, and elderly were expelled to Tuzla during the Srebrenica Massacre.

A war crimes tribunal indicted Radovan Karadzic (left) and Ratko Mladic (right), the main Serbian instigators, of genocide and crimes against humanity.

Ma# of !ilitary o#erations during t e Sre'renica Massacre in 0uly 899G. Green arrow !arks route of t e Bosnian colu!n

5.&. #ssistant &e+retary of &tate ,i+hard Hol rooke (left) and European en7oy !arl Bildt dis+uss up+oming e7ents on .+to er M, $%%J while waiting for a !8$ME Her+ules air+raft whi+h will fly the diplomats into &ara9e7o, Bosnia8Her0ego7ina, for pea+e talks. ,i+hard Hol rooke attended the $%%J Bilder erg Meetings in Quri+h, &wit0erland in (une $%%J. (Photo' 5.&. 2epartment of 2efense)

&lo odan Milose7i+ (L), President of the ,epu li+ of &er ia, #li9a /0et ego7i+ (!), President of the ,epu li+ of Bosnia8Her0ego7ina, and *ran9o <ud9man (,), President of the ,epu li+ of !roatia, initialing a pea+e a++ord among their +ountries, wat+hed y 5.&. &e+retary of &tate Warren !hristopher (@nd right, rear) at Wright8Patterson #ir *or+e Base near 2ayton, .hio on "o7em er @$, $%%J.

President &lo odan Milose7i+ of the *ederal ,epu li+ of ;ugosla7ia, President #li9a /0et ego7i+ of the ,epu li+ of Bosnia and Her0ego7ina, and President *ran9o <ud9man of the ,epu li+ of !roatia sign the 2ayton Pea+e #++ords at Wright8Patterson #ir *or+e Base near 2ayton, .hio, 5.&.#. on "o7em er @$, $%%J1 &wedish en7oy !arl Bildt, a regular Bilder erg Meetings parti+ipant, is seated third from right. <he Balkan ProAimity Pea+e <alks were +ondu+ted at Wright8Patterson #ir *or+e Base "o7. $8@$, $%%J. <he talks ended the +onfli+t arising from the reakup of the ,epu li+ of ;ugosla7ia. <he 2ayton #++ords pa7ed the way for the signing of the final 3)eneral *ramework #greement for Pea+e in Bosnia and Her0ego7ina4 at the Elysee Pala+e in Paris on 2e+em er $I, $%%J. <he )eneral *ramework #greement for Pea+e in Bosnia and Her0ego7ina, informally known as the 2ayton Pea+e #++ords, is a pea+e agreement that was +on+luded at Wright8Patterson #ir *or+e Base near 2ayton, .hio, 5.&.#. on "o7em er @$, $%%J and formally signed in Paris, *ran+e on 2e+em er $I, $%%J. <he 2ayton Pea+e #++ords ended the Bosnian War ($%%@8$%%J). (Photo' 5.&. #ir *or+e)

Ser'iaNs )resident Slo'odan Milosevic =left? is greeted 'y 6.S. $ssistant Secretary of State &ic ard Hol'rooke after arriving at +rig t%)atterson $ir *orce Base near Dayton4 3 io4 on 3cto'er H84 899G.

President )eorge W. Bush speaks to #meri+an soldiers and troops from other "#<. nations at !amp Bondsteel in the dispute territory of 6oso7o on (uly @I, @EE$. Bush 7isited the <ask *or+e *al+on soldiers to show support for the troops in 6oso7o. <he president signed the fis+al year @EE$ Emergen+y &upplemental #ppropriations legislation whi+h +ontains W$.% illion for military pay, enefits and health +are among other +ategories during his 7isit. (5.&. 2epartment of 2efense photo y &taff &gt. !linton (. E7ans, 5.&. #rmy)

5.&. President )eorge W. Bush (,) shakes hands with President of 6oso7o *atmir &e9diu (+enter) and Prime Minister of 6oso7o Hashim <ha+i (left) during a meeting in the .7al .ffi+e of the White House in Washington, 2.!., 5.&.#. on (uly @$, @EEF. <his was the first offi+ial 7isit of &e9diu and <ha+i to Washington after 6oso7o de+lared its independen+e. )eorge W. Bush is a mem er of &kull : Bones, a se+ret so+iety at ;ale 5ni7ersity. (Photo' #leA WongC)etty /mages "orth #meri+a)

=osovo War C'ebruary 7E 199EB:une 71 1999D

$ genocide occurs in Ser'ia%ad!inistered ,osovo in early 8999 as DH et nic $l'anians are found dead.

Et nic co!#osition of ,osovo in DEEG

#meri+an spe+ial en7oy ,i+hard Hol rooke (left), "#<. &e+retary )eneral (a7ier &olana (+enter), and 5.&. #rmy )en. Wesley !lark (right), the &upreme #llied !ommander of Europe, meet together at "#<. head=uarters in Brussels, Belgium on Mar+h @@, $%%% to dis+uss the +risis situation in 6oso7o. ("#<. photo)

Ministry of the /nterior is om ed in Belgrade, ;ugosla7ia on #pril @, $%%% following a "#<. air raid. (/mage' K ;annis 6ontosC&ygmaC!or is)

British and *ren+h soldiers se+ure their position in Pristina, 6oso7o, ;ugosla7ia on (une $@, $%%%. (/mage' K Patri+k ,o ertC&ygmaC!.,B/&)

)resident Bill "linton =center? and 6.S. $r!y Gen. +esley "lark =left?4 t e Su#re!e $llied "o!!ander of Euro#e4 !eet wit -$T3 Secretary General 0avier Solana =rig t? at t e -$T3 ead;uarters in Brussels4 Belgiu! on May G4 8999. =) oto< -$T3?

)resident Bill "linton =Dnd rig t?4 6.S. Secretary of State Madeleine $l'rig t =rig t?4 6.S. Secretary of Defense +illia! S. "o en =7 t rig t?4 and 6.S. $r!y Gen. Henry H. S elton4 t e " air!an of t e 0oint " iefs of Staff4 !eet wit -$T3 Secretary General 0avier Solana =Hrd left? at t e -$T3 ead;uarters in Brussels4 Belgiu! on May G4 8999. =) oto< -$T3?

5.&. President Bill !linton (left), "#<. &e+retary8)eneral (a7ier &olana (+enter), and 5.&. &e+retary of &tate Madeleine #l right laugh pri7ately. 6oso7o War lasted from *e ruary @F, $%%F to (une @$, $%%%.

5.&. #rmy )en. Wesley 6. !lark (from left), &upreme #llied !ommander of Europe, "#<. &e+retary8)eneral Lord ()eorge) ,o ertson and 5.&. #ir *or+e )en. (oseph W. ,alston lea7e the &upreme Head=uarters #llied Powers Europe in Mons, Belgium on May M, @EEE, for the +eremony where ,alston su++eeded !lark as "#<.Hs top military +ommander in Europe. (Photo y Linda 2. 6o0aryn)

5.&. &e+retary of &tate Madeleine #l right (left) greets 6oso7o Li eration #rmy (6L#) leader Hashim <ha+i (right) in $%%%.

&e+retary of 2efense ,o ert M. )ates (+enter) es+orts 6oso7ar President *atmir &e9diu (left) and 6oso7ar Prime Minister Hashim <ha+i through an honor +ordon and into the Pentagon near Washington, 2.!. on (uly $F, @EEF. )ates and his senior ad7isors met with the 6oso7ar leadership to dis+uss the new nationsH se+urity re=uirements. (5.&. 2epartment of 2efense photo y ,. 2. Ward)

5.&. &e+retary of &tate !ondolee00a ,i+e (+enter) pose in front of flags after holding a 9oint press a7aila ility with 6oso7o President *atmir &e9diu (left) and 6oso7o Prime Minister Hashim <ha+i (right) at the &tate 2epartment in Washington, 2.!. on *riday, (uly $F, @EEF. (#P PhotoC)erald Her ert)

President of 6oso7o *atmir &e9diu (right) hands #rti+les of #greement of /nternational Monetary *und (/M*) to 5.&. 2eputy &e+retary of &tate (ames &tein erg (left) as Prime Minister of 6oso7o Hashim <ha+i (+enter) looks on during a signing +eremony at the &tate 2epartment in Washington, 2.!., 5.&.#. on (une @%, @EE%. By signing the agreement, 6oso7o offi+ially e+ame a mem er of the /M* and the World Bank. (Photo' #leA WongC)etty /mages "orth #meri+a)

&e#ort identifies Has i! T aci as M'ig fis M in organised cri!e

,osovoMs #ri!e !inister accused of cri!inal connections in secret -ato docu!ents leaked to t e Guardian By )aul (ewis T e Guardian4 Monday D7 0anuary DE88 8H.H7 EST

,osovoMs )ri!e Minister Has i! T aci identified in secret -$T3 re#orts as aving involve!ent in cri!inal underworld. ) otogra# < @aldrin T e!a25E)$

,osovoMs #ri!e !inister4 Has i! T a]i4 as 'een identified as one of t e L'iggest fis L in organised cri!e in is country4 according to western !ilitary intelligence re#orts leaked to t e Guardian. T e -ato docu!ents4 w ic are !arked LSecretL4 indicate t at t e 6S and ot er western #owers 'acking ,osovoMs govern!ent ave ad e.tensive knowledge of its cri!inal connections for several years. T ey also identify anot er senior ruling #olitician in ,osovo as aving links to t e $l'anian !afia4 stating t at e e.erts considera'le control over T a]i4 a for!er guerrilla leader. Marked L6S$ ,*3&L4 t ey #rovide detailed infor!ation a'out organised cri!inal networks in ,osovo 'ased on re#orts 'y western intelligence agencies and infor!ants. T e geogra# ical s#read of ,osovoMs cri!inal gangs is set out4 alongside details of alleged fa!ilial and 'usiness links. T e "ouncil of Euro#e is to!orrow e.#ected to for!ally de!and an investigation into clai!s t at T a]i was t e ead of a L!afia%likeL network res#onsi'le for s!uggling wea#ons4 drugs and u!an organs during and after t e 899:%99 ,osovo war. T e organ trafficking allegations were contained in an official in;uiry #u'lis ed last !ont 'y t e u!an rig ts ra##orteur Dick Marty. His re#ort accused T a]i and several ot er senior figures w o o#erated in t e ,osovo (i'eration $r!y =,($? of links to organised cri!e4 #ro!#ting a !a2or di#lo!atic crisis w en it was leaked to t e Guardian last !ont . T e re#ort also na!ed T a]i as aving e.erted Lviolent controlL over t e eroin trade4 and a##eared to confir! concerns t at after t e conflict wit Ser'ia ended4 is inner circle oversaw a gang t at !urdered Ser' ca#tives to sell t eir kidneys on t e 'lack !arket. T e "ouncilMs of Euro#eMs #arlia!entary asse!'ly in Stras'ourg will de'ate MartyMs findings and vote on a resolution calling for cri!inal investigations. T e vote is widely e.#ected to 'e #assed.

,osovo functioned as a 6- #rotectorate fro! t e end of t e ,osovo war until DEE:4 w en it for!ally declared inde#endence fro! Ser'ia. T a]i4 w o was re%elected #ri!e !inister last !ont 4 as 'een strongly 'acked 'y -ato #owers. His govern!ent as dis!issed t e Marty re#ort as #art of a Ser'ian and &ussian cons#iracy to desta'ilise t e fledgling state. However4 t e latest leaked docu!ents were #roduced 'y ,*3&4 t e -ato%led #eacekee#ing force res#onsi'le for security in ,osovo. It was ,*3& !ilitary forces t at intervened in t e ,osovo war in 89994 el#ing to #ut an end to a ca!#aign of et nic cleansing 'y Slo'odan MilosevicMs Ser'ian forces. -ato said in a state!ent tonig t t at it ad instigated an Linternal investigationL into t e leaked docu!ents4 w ic are intelligence assess!ents #roduced around DEE74 s ortly 'efore tensions wit et nic Ser's fuelled riots in ,osovo. In t e docu!ents4 T a]i is identified as one of a triu!virate of L'iggest fis L in organised cri!inal circles. So too is T avit Haliti4 a for!er ead of logistics for t e ,($ w o is now a close ally of t e #ri!e !inister and a senior #arlia!entarian in is ruling )D, #arty. Haliti is e.#ected to 'e a!ong ,osovoMs official delegation to Stras'ourg to!orrow and as #layed a leading role in seeking to under!ine t e Marty re#ort in #u'lic. However4 t e -ato intelligence re#orts suggest t at 'e ind is role as a #ro!inent #olitician4 Haliti is also a senior organised cri!inal w o carries a "zec 9!! #istol and olds considera'le sway over t e #ri!e !inister. Descri'ing i! as Lt e #ower 'e ind Has i! T a]iL4 one re#ort states t at Haliti as strong ties wit t e $l'anian !afia and ,osovoMs secret service4 known as ,S i,. It suggests t at Haliti L!ore or less ranL a fund for t e ,osovo war in t e late 899Es4 #rofiting fro! t e fund #ersonally 'efore t e !oney dried u#. L$s a result4 Haliti turned to organised cri!e on a grand scale4L t e re#orts state. T ey state t at e is L ig ly involved in #rostitution4 wea#ons and drugs s!ugglingL and used a otel in t e ca#ital4 )ristina4 as an o#erational 'ase. Haliti also serves as a #olitical and financial adviser to t e #ri!e !inister 'ut4 according to t e docu!ents4 is argua'ly Lt e real 'ossL in t e relations i#. Haliti uses a fake #ass#ort to travel a'road 'ecause e is 'lack%listed in several countries4 including t e 6S4 one re#ort states. Haliti is linked to t e alleged inti!idation of #olitical o##onents in ,osovo and two sus#ected !urders dating 'ack to t e late 899Es4 w en ,($ infig ting is said to ave resulted in nu!erous killings. 3ne was a #olitical adversary w o was found Ldead 'y t e ,osovo 'orderL4 a##arently following a dis#ute wit Haliti. $ descri#tion of t e ot er sus#ected !urder of a young 2ournalist in Tirana4 t e $l'anian ca#ital also contains a reference to t e #ri!e !inister 'y na!e4 'ut does not ascri'e 'la!e. "iting 6S and -ato intelligence4 t e entry states Haliti is LlinkedL t e grisly !urder4 going on to state< L$li 6ka4 a re#orter in Tirana4 w o su##orted t e inde#endence !ove!ent 'ut criticised it in #rint. 6ka was 'rutally disfigured wit a 'ottle and screwdriver in 899I. His roo!!ate at t e ti!e was Has i! T a]i.L Haliti is also na!ed in t e re#ort 'y Marty4 w ic is understood to ave drawn on -ato intelligence assess!ents along wit re#orts fro! t e *BI and MIG. MartyMs re#ort includes Haliti a!ong a list of close allies of T a]i said to ave ordered and in so!e cases #ersonally overseen Lassassinations4 detentions4 'eatings and interrogationsL during and i!!ediately after t e war. Haliti was unavaila'le for co!!ent. However4 in an interview wit t e !edia outlet Balkan Insig t last week e dis!issed t e Marty re#ort as L#oliticalL and designed to Ldiscredit t e ,($L. LI was not sur#rised 'y t e re#ort. I ave followed t is issue for years and t e content of t e re#ort is #olitical4L e said. But e acce#ted t at t e "ouncil of Euro#e was likely to #ass a resolution triggering investigations 'y t e E6%'acked 2ustice !ission in t e country4 known as E6(ET. LI t ink itMs a co!#etent investigating 'ody4L e said4 LItMs a Euro#ean investigation 'ody. I t ink t at t ere is no #ossi'ility t at E6(ET investigation unit to 'e affected 'y ,osovo or $l'anian #olitics.L

&es#onding to t e allegations in t e -$T3 intelligence re#orts tonig t4 a ,osovo govern!ent s#okes!an said< LT ese are allegations t at ave circulated for over a decade4 !ost recently recycled in t e Dick Marty re#ort. T ey are 'ased on earsay and intentional false Ser'ian intelligence. L-evert eless4 t e #ri!e !inister as called for an investigation 'y E6(ET and as re#eatedly #ledged is full coo#eration to law enforce!ent aut orities on t ese scandalous and slanderous allegations. LT e govern!ent of ,osovo continues to su##ort t e strengt ening of t e rule of law in ,osovo4 and we look forward to t e coo#eration of our international #artners in ensuring t at cri!inality as no #lace in ,osovoMs develo#!ent.L 5oad to Strasbour" It as taken !ore t an two years for an in;uiry into organ trafficking in ,osovo to reac t e )alace of Euro#e4 a grand 'uilding in Stras'ourg t at serves as t e ead;uarters of t e "ouncil of Euro#e. T e for!al in;uiry into organ trafficking in ,osovo was #ro!#ted 'y revelations 'y t e for!er c ief war cri!es #rosecutor at T e Hague4 "arla Del )onte4 w o said s e ad 'een #revented fro! #ro#erly investigating alleged atrocities co!!itted 'y t e ,osovo (i'eration $r!y. Her !ost s ocking disclosure unconfir!ed re#orts t e ,($ killed ca#tives for t eir organs #ro!#ted t e for!al in;uiry 'y u!an rig ts ra##orteur Dick Marty. His re#ort4 #u'lis ed last !ont 4 suggested t ere was evidence t at ,($ co!!anders s!uggled ca#tives across t e 'order into ,osovo and arvested t e organs of a L andfulL of Ser's. His findings4 w ic will 'e su'2ect to a #arlia!entary asse!'ly vote to!orrow4 went furt er4 accusing ,osovoMs #ri!e !inister and several ot er senior figures of involve!ent in organised cri!e over t e last decade. Source< tt#<55www.guardian.co.uk5world5DE8852an5D75 as i!%t aci%kosovo%organised%cri!e

#meri+an President )eorge W. Bush shakes hands with 6oso7o President *atmir &e9diu, +enter, and 6oso7o Prime Minister Hashim <ha+i, left, during a meeting Monday, (uly @$, @EEF. <he ,epu li+ of 6oso7o e+ame an independent state on *e ruary $>, @EEF. (White House photo y Eri+ 2raper)

F3n t e evening of Monday DD $#ril 899>4 a s!all grou# of Ser's were en2oying a drink at t e "akor cafU in Decani in western ,osovoY$t :<DG #!4 a grou# of !asked !en walked into t e cafU and o#ened fire indiscri!inately wit se!i%auto!atic wea#ons4 t rowing a grenade as t ey wit drew. T ree Ser's lay dead4 t e first !urder victi!s of t e .shtria Cli&itare e ?oso/es t e ,osovo (i'eration $r!y =,($?. In t e ne.t our4 t ere were t ree !ore attacks in a different #art of ,osovo resulting in two furt er deat s one of a #olice!an4 t e second of a fe!ale #risoner 'eing transferred to )ristinaMs !ain gaol. During t e following !ont s4 t e BB" $l'anian service in (ondon received several fa.es fro! t e ,($ clai!ing res#onsi'ility for t e attacks. T ese ad 'een sent fro! Tirana4 t e $l'anian ca#ital. T e !oderate $l'anian leader in ,osovo4 I'ra i! &ugova4 ;uestioned t e aut enticity of t e clai!4 suggesting t at Ser'ian e.tre!ists !ig t ave carried out t e s ootings to ratc et u# t e tension and worsen t e at!os# ere of fear in t e #rovince. T e ,($Ms first !urders were not4 owever4 a Ser'%ins#ired #rovocation. $ section of t e $l'anian co!!unity in ,osovo ad finally decided t at enoug was enoug . &ugova and is )arty4 t e De!ocratic (eague of ,osovo =(D,? ad #ursued a #at of #eaceful resistance to t e rule of Belgrade since t e #rovinceMs autono!y ad 'een rescinded in 89:9. &ugovaMs #olicy of restraint ensured t at ,osovo re!ained #eaceful t roug out t e "roatian and Bosnian wars. But #eace was acco!#anied 'y #olitical stagnation and t e continuing syste!atic re#ression of $l'anians. &ugovaMs !ove!ent 'oycotted all Ser'ian institutions. Ser'ian o##osition #arties argued t at t e 'oycott of Ser'ian elections el#ed Milosevic !aintain is gri# on t e country as t e Ser'ian !inority in ,osovo4 8E #er cent of t e #rovinceMs #o#ulation4 delivered all t e #arlia!entary seats to Milosevic and is allies. 1ounger4 less #atient $l'anians 'eca!e frustrated wit t e &ugova strategy and i!!ediately after t e events of DD $#ril 899>4 one of &ugovaMs ars est critics in ,osovo4 t e !averick #olitician4 $de! De!a;i4 noted t at t e ,osovo $l'anians were Mincreasingly vociferously accusing t eir leaders of 'etraying national interestsM. $he =%( attac&s occurred five months after the si"nature of the .ayton ("reement# $he =osovo (lbanians loo&ed northwards to Croatia and *osnia with envy# $hey observed that with the hel! of the international community the Serbs had been defeated com!letely in the former and !artially in the latter# ?n *osnia/ 4erce"ovina the international community had !led"ed O; billion to aid reconstruction# .es!ite bein" 6ilosevic's first victims the (lbanians had received nothin"# (s lon" as they remained !assive the more radical (lbanians reasoned the outside world would i"nore them and the 6ilosevic re"ime could continue to deny (lbanian ri"hts and his shabby re"ime of re!ression would continue undisturbed# ?n s!rin" 199< the =%( was not an or"ani2ed force# ?ts members belon"ed to small cells and were drawn from the lar"e rural !o!ulation that had little !olitical influence in =osovo0 but by ta&in" u! terrorist methods the =%( laid down a challen"e to 5u"ova's leadershi!# $he tactics of armed confrontation would inevitably lead to re!risals by the Serbian security forces which in turn would boost su!!ort for the =%(# $ired of 5u"ova's a!!arent inaction many youn" (lbanians switched their alle"iance to the men with the "uns# .urin" the first year of its e+istence the =%( failed to attract much attention outside =osovo and Serbia# With the su!!ort of the United Aations and 5ussia the West was en"a"ed in !uttin" the *osnian 1i"saw bac& to"ether a"ain# $his was difficult and e+as!eratin" wor&# (fter five years of vicious conflict in the former Ku"oslavia the West had tired of the *al&an tra"edy# $he death of a few Serbs in =osovo barely re"istered in di!lomatic cables and no "overnment was interested in !ursuin" the matter# $he !eace in *osnia de!ended on the "oodwill and coo!eration of Slobodan 6ilosevic# $his was not the time Western !oliticians thou"ht to o!en a Pandora's bo+ li&e =osovo# Ket the clash between (lbanian and Serb in =osovo should not have come as a sur!rise# (ll intelli"ence su""ested that at some !oint there would be a serious escalation of violence# (!ril 199< was that turnin" !oint# (nd true to form the international community turned a blind eye# In t e su!!er of 899I4 neig 'ouring $l'ania descended into c aos. T e govern!ent of t e rig t%wing )resident4 Sali Beris a4 colla#sed after t e failure of several uge #yra!id invest!ent sc e!es. *ig ting 'roke out 'etween su##orters of Beris aMs De!ocratic )arty and t ose of t e Socialist )arty4 led 'y *atos -ano. "ri!inal gangs filled t e #ower vacuu!4 unleas ing a reign of terror on t e civilian #o#ulation and looting t e wea#ons facilities of t e de!oralized $l'anian ar!y. Muc of t is ardware found its way into ,osovo via t e western4 $l'anian areas of neig 'ouring Macedonia4 w ere su##ort for t e ,($ was growing. 1et anot er develo#!ent s#urred t e conflict in ,osovo. T roug out t e 1ugoslav crisis4 Milosevic ad counted on unswerving su##ort fro! Montenegro4 Ser'iaMs tiny sister re#u'lic in t e ru!# 1ugoslavia4 t e *&1. Many Montenegrins4 owever4 considered t e wars in "roatia and Bosnia to 'e #urely Ser'ian affairs. 1et 'ecause of t e federation wit Ser'ia4 t e Montenegrins ad to endure sanctions and isolation in t e sa!e !easure as t e Ser's. T e Slavs of Montenegro4 w o s#eak a variant of Ser'o%"roat4 are divided 'etween t ose w o 'elieve t e!selves 'ound to Ser's et nically and istorically4 and t ose w o regard Montenegrin identity as se#arate. T e )ri!e Minister4 a young refor!er4 Milo D2ukanovic4 'uilt a 'road coalition #owered 'y t e growing resent!ent felt towards Milosevic and t e *ederal govern!ent. In 3cto'er 899I4 D2ukanovic was elected )resident of Montenegro. *or t e first ti!e since 89:94 Milosevic was faced wit an o##onent w o could actually li!it is roo! for !anoeuvre. D2ukanovicMs outs#oken criticis! of Milosevic and is war! relations wit t e +est irritated t e Ser'ian leader4 w o toyed wit t e idea of #rovoking civil war in t e re#u'lic to 'ring is rival down. In ,osovo4 t e deat toll !ounted on 'ot t e Ser'ian and $l'anian sides. T e Euro#ean 6nion and t e 6nited States were awakening to t e #ossi'ility of war in t e #rovince. T ey sent delegations to investigate t e situation 'ut di#lo!acy consisted in warning 'ot sides against t e use of violence. &ugovaMs su##ort was e''ing away in favour of t e ,($ w ose o#erations were concentrated on its strong old in west central ,osovo4 t e Drenica valley. 3n T ursday G Marc 899:4 a large force of Ser'ian #olice launc ed an offensive in Drenica4 killing DD $l'anian fig ters and triggering a flig t of t e civilian #o#ulation towards @ucitrn. T e assault occurred t ree weeks 'efore elections called 'y &ugova to ,osovoMs unofficial govern!ent. T e Ser' offensive in Drenica ad t ree conse;uences t at Milosevic ad al!ost certainly antici#ated. *irst4 t e ,($ 'eca!e stronger 'y t e day4 as t ousands of young $l'anian !en swelled its ranks. Second4 +estern Euro#e and t e 6nited States ste##ed u# t eir involve!ent in t e conflict. T ird4 regional sta'ility was unsettled 'y #olarizing Montenegrin society and increasing tension in neig 'ouring countries4 es#ecially $l'ania and Macedonia. 6acedonia was the most fra"ile of the new states to emer"e from the former Ku"oslavia less secure even than *osnia/4erce"ovina# Si+ty/five !er cent of its two million inhabitants are Slavs who are &nown to everybody e+ce!t the *ul"arians and Gree&s as 6acedonians# T e

Bulgarian govern!ent refuses to recognise t e !odern identity of t e Macedonians4 insisting t at t ey are western Bulgarians. + en Macedonia 'eca!e inde#endent in 899D4 t e Greek govern!ent clai!ed t at t e very na!e4 Macedonia4 ad a Hellenic #edigree stretc ing 'ack to $le.ander t e Great. T e Macedonians4 Greece warned4 ar'oured territorial as#irations on $egean Macedonia and its #ort of T essaloniki. How t is tiny4 i!#overis ed and effectively unar!ed nation intended to invade Greece4 a !e!'er of 'ot -$T3 and t e E64 was never e.#lained. Macedonians t e!selves also feared t at Ser'ia and Milosevic would never reconcile t e!selves to losing t eir influence over Macedonia. So!e worried t at w en Milosevic ad finis ed in Bosnia4 e would turn is attentions to Macedonia. MacedoniaMs greatest #ro'le! was its large $l'anian !inority4 accounting for roug ly DG #er cent of t e #o#ulation. (iving in t e co!#act territory of western Macedonia and in t e ca#ital Sko#2e4 t e $l'anians of Macedonia ad suffered worse treat!ent at t e ands of t e Macedonian co!!unist aut orities in t e 89IEs and 89:Es t an t e ,osovo $l'anians in Ser'ia. T ey e.#ected t e new govern!ent in Macedonia to de!onstrate greater res#ect for t eir rig ts. T e Macedonian state was weak and defenceless/ successive govern!ents ad no o#tion 'ut to coo#erate wit t e $l'anians to avoid re'ellion. To t e credit of !ost $l'anian and Macedonian #oliticians4 t e two elites worked ard to find a !odus vivendi t at was not always to t e liking of t eir constituents. ?f the (lbanians and 6acedonians were to be"in fi"htin" the security interests of the country's four nei"hbours B (lbania Serbia *ul"aria and Greece B would be directly affected# War in 6acedonia would destabilise the southern *al&ans and ris& s!readin" conflict beyond the borders of the former Ku"oslavia# A($> Cthe United States in !articularD with its vital interests in the eastern 6editerranean could not tolerate this# $he conflict in =osovo threatened 6acedonia in two ways# $he =%('s !ro"ramme sou"ht inde!endence for =osovo / nothin" else would now satisfy the (lbanians# *ut an inde!endent =osovo would act as a !owerful ma"net on the 6acedonian (lbanians B throu"h the fo" (lbanians could for the first time ma&e out the contours of a Greater (lbania# 6ore immediate however was the effect that a lar"e e+odus of refu"ees from =osovo into 6acedonia would have on the country's fra"ile balance# 'or this reason Western "overnments refused to su!!ort the =%('s "oal of inde!endence# E.tensive autono!y fro! Belgrade was t e !ost t at t e international co!!unity would sanction for t e ,osovars. But it did agree to guarantee t is autono!y wit t e #resence of a -$T3 #eace%kee#ing force. 'rom the summer of 199E a variety of Western re!resentatives ho!ed to !ersuade the =%( to dro! its demand for inde!endence# $hey also had to convince 6ilosevic to acce!t the !resence of a A($> force in =osovo# Until the very last minute in 6arch 1999 they failed on both counts# (s Western di!lomacy faced total defeat the =%( chan"ed its mind at the Paris !eace tal&s acce!tin" autonomy in !lace of inde!endence# $he Serbian authorities a"reed with most of the !olitical !lan for autonomy but refused cate"orically to countenance a A($> !resence in their hallowed territory of =osovo# 6ilosevic had called A($>'s bluff# (s the Western defensive alliance a!!roached its ;Gth birthday celebrations in (!ril 1999 it was confronted with a distasteful dilemma# ?t must embar& u!on a war a"ainst a country of E million inhabitants or rene"e on its !ublic commitment to do so in the event of 6ilosevic refusin" what came to be &nown as the 5ambouillet a"reement# ?f A($> bac&ed down it would lose its vaunted 'credibility'# ?t had announced the bombin" and so it must "o ahead re"ardless of the conse,uences# $he Penta"on however advised a"ainst an o!en/ended bombin" cam!ai"n without !ro!erly/defined war aims# So did senior -uro!ean di!lomats involved in *al&an affairs '$he only alternative to shootin" yourself in the foot ' Carl *ildt told White 4ouse staff ten days before the bombin" started 'is not to do it#' $he re!ly came bac&: 'Credibility#' Soon after the bombin" started on the evenin" of 7@ 6arch 1999 it became evident that the !osture of 'credibility' did not amount to a clear war aim# -$T3 leaders ad assu!ed t at Milosevic would ca#itulate wit in days of t e start of an air ca!#aign. His resolve to stand fir! e.#osed t e uncertainty of +estern strategy. In t e first week of t e 'o!'ing4 -$T3 leaders offered a string of !ore #recise goals t at left no'ody any wiser. T e ca!#aign ai!ed variously to force Milosevic to acce#t t e )aris #eace deal/ to #revent a u!anitarian catastro# e in ,osovo/ to degrade and destroy t e 1ugoslav ar!y/ to weaken MilosevicNs gri# on #ower/ and to sto# t e s#reading of conflict 'eyond ,osovo. 1ugoslav air defences were no !atc for -$T3 'o!'ers and cruise !issiles. But -$T3Ms astonis ing #u'lic ad!ission #rior to t e ca!#aign t at ground troo#s would 'e e.cluded fro! t e o#eration gave Milosevic an enor!ous tactical advantage. His only wea#on of war was t e two !illion $l'anians in ,osovo. He lost no ti!e in directing undreds of t ousands of refugees into $l'ania4 Macedonia and Montenegro. Instead of #reventing a u!anitarian catastro# e4 -$T3Ms decision ad contri'uted !assively to a gat ering disaster. $ flood of 'i'lical #ro#ortions t reatened to drown Macedonia and $l'ania. T e Ser's also c annelled tens of t ousands into Montenegro to encourage t e desta'ilization of MilosevicMs rival4 D2ukanovic. T e influ. of so !any $l'anians into Macedonia ad t e !ost severe conse;uences. It was as t oug t e #o#ulation of (ondon or -ew 1ork ad 'een increased 'y a ;uarter overnig t/ as t oug over a ;uarter of a !illion #eo#le ad 'een du!#ed on a region t e size of Tuscany. 1et -$T3 ad !ade no #rovisions for t is outco!e and soug t instead to #lace t e 'urden of co#ing wit a uge refugee #ro'le! entirely on Macedonia. It will 'e !any years 'efore Macedonia !ay again 'e considered a sta'le country. *ar fro! deserting Milosevic4 as t e +est ad o#ed4 Ser's initially rallied 'e ind t eir #resident4 ena'ling i! to destroy !ost inde#endent !edia overnig t. T e ca!#aign severely under!ined Mile D2ukanovicMs old on #ower in Montenegro4 es#ecially since -$T3 li'erally 'o!'ed t e re#u'lic in an effort to destroy federal !ilitary installations. Inas!uc as Milosevic ad any war ai!s4 t e su'version of D2ukanovic was #ro'a'ly t e !ost i!#ortant of t e!. Bot D2ukanovic and Ser'iaMs de!ocratic o##osition4 w ic ad 'een gaining in strengt in t e two years #rior to t e ,osovo crisis4 ave 'een weakened 'y t e -$T3 ca!#aign. 'rom the start of the cam!ai"n A($> leaders re!eatedly "ave assurances that it was fi"htin" 6ilosevic and his re"ime not the Serbian !eo!le# Ket their refusal to ris& their own troo!s in a "round war !referrin" instead to !ummel Serbia's economic infrastructure from the air and thereby causin" 'collateral dama"e' B that is civilian casualties B loo&ed to many li&e an act of "eneral !unishment# J The Bal+ans" =ationalis&, War and the Great #o'ers, 1!>8%1 'y Mis a Glenny4 #. >GD%>G9

$ !a# of for!er 1ugoslavia

F$fter a long s#ell in os#ital4 A0osi# BrozB Tito finally died in t e Slovene ca#ital4 (2u'l2ana on 7 May 89:E4 at t e age of eig ty%seven. 1ugoslavs of all nationalities went into de!onstrative !ourning4 'arely a'le to conceive ow t e country could govern itself wit out t eir stern grandfat er at t e el!. His funeral attracted govern!ent leaders fro! I DD states4 t e only a'sentee 'eing t e new $!erican )resident4 &onald &eagan. T e asse!'led dignitaries used t e occasion for intense negotiations. Since t e Soviet invasion of $fg anistan t e #revious Dece!'er4 t e world ad 'een in t e gri# of a Second "old +ar. $fter t e #urges in Ser'ia and "roatia in t e early I9IEs4 Tito and ,ardel2 ad rei!#osed conservative #olicies at o!e and a'road. T e Soviet intervention4 owever4 led to an i!#rove!ent in 1ugoslaviaMs relations wit t e +est. MIf Soviet troo#s could !ove across t eir 'order wit out international consultation or sanction4M an $!erican istorian as noted4 Mw at would #rotect 1ugoslavia if relations Awit t e SovietsB soured again so!e day QM +ar!er relations wit +estern Euro#e and t e 6nited States were also i!#ortant given 1ugoslaviaMs #arlous econo!ic situation. In 89ID4 Tito and ,ardel2 ad 'roug t t e econo!ic refor!s 'egun in 89>> to a alt. T e s!all #rivate industries encouraged during t e refor! were cut 'ack in favour of t e large4 loss%!aking industial enter#rises c aracteristic of #lanned econo!ies. But t e earlier rationalization #rogra!!e ad increased une!#loy!ent levels t roug out t e country. T is was now co!#ounded 'y t e return of undreds of t ousands of guest workers4 victi!s of t e recession of t e early 89IEs in +estern Euro#e. In t e less develo#ed #arts of 1ugoslavia% ,osovo4 Macedonia4 Bosnia and sout ern Ser'ia t e nu!'er of t ose wit out 2o's !ade u# DE #er cent of t e workforce. To co!'at t is #ro'le! and in order to !eet t e !aterial e.#ectations #rovoked 'y t e refor!4 1ugoslavia followed t e sa!e #at as )oland4 Hungary and &o!ania it 'orrowed eavily on t e international !oney !arkets. By 89:D4 1ugoslaviaMs de't stood at `8:.G 'illion. Eac year4 t e govern!ent ad to find new loans !erely to finance t e interest re#ay!ents. $ t ird talking #oint at TitoMs funeral was 1ugoslaviaMs own #olitical sta'ility. $rticles in t e western #ress #redicted t e i!!inent de!ise of 1ugoslavia and even a civil war 'etween its constituent nations. Suc alar!ist views overlooked 1ugoslaviaMs geo%strategic #osition in t e early 89:Es/ t ey also assu!ed t at Tito was t e sole su##ort of 1ugoslaviaMs !ulti%et nic unity. Aeither A($> nor the Soviet Union were interested in the destabili2ation of Ku"oslavia and the most !owerful domestic institution holdin" the country to"ether was the 'ederal (rmy which althou"h dominated by Serbs in the officer cor!s had not yet been infected by Serbian nationalism# ?n the absence of overt nationalist a"itation the ma1ority of Slovenes Serbs and Croats had no reason to brin" down the federation# $hey did however face enormous !roblems in inter!retin" $ito's confused !olitical le"acy# + ile e and ,ardel2 =w o died in 89I9? were still alive4 t e !ec anis!s of t e 89I7 "onstitution were little !ore t an window dressing. )olicy was !ade 'y t e two elderly leaders. -o'ody felt t ey needed to esta'lis in detail ow t e new syste! was su##osed to work. It was 'ased on a syste! of #olitical !usical c airs senior #ositions would 'e rotated every year to #revent any single re#u'lic or #olitician fro! accu!ulating too !uc #ower. It succeeded in doing so for little !ore t an five years and even t en it was at t e e.#ense of #ro#er continuity in govern!ent. T e constitution in #rinci#le devolved #owers to t e federal units 'ut t e e.act relations i# 'etween t e centre of t e re#u'lics was o#a;ue % leading eventually to terri'le confusion and corru#tion. Initially t is #ro'le! was not so significant as t e leaders i# of t e eig t co!!unist #arties =fro! t e si. re#u'lics and Ser'iaMs two autono!ous #rovinces4 ,osovo and @o2vodina? were do!inated 'y conservatives4 united in t e fig t against li'eralis!. T ey also lacked t e i!agination re;uired to deal wit a nu!'er of crises w ic rocked t e country in t e early 89:os. T e first s ock to t e syste! ca!e in Marc 89:8 w en $l'anian students in )ristina rioted over #oor food at t eir university canteen. T is distur'ance s#read t roug !any #arts of ,osovo and assu!ed an o#enly #olitical c aracter. T e e.#losion in ,osovo was not caused 'y Ser'ian re#ression< under t e 89I7 "onstitution ,osovo ad gained an un#recedented !easure of self%govern!ent. *or t e first ti!e since t e war4 t e 1ugoslav aut orities granted ,osovoMs $l'anians t e rig t to travel to $l'ania #ro#er. -ews#a#ers4 acade!ic te.ts and sc ool'ooks #rinted in Tirana also 'eca!e availa'le in ,osovo. + at t e ,osovars wanted was e;uality wit t e ot er nationalities in 1ugoslavia4 and t eir !ove!ent was4 in effect4 a late%flowering national revival. $hey did not demand self/determination for the !rovince but they did call for the Socialist (utonomous Province of =osovo to become a re!ublic# $he disturbances were !ut down by the army and the !olice but this was a !roblem which could not be swe!t under the car!et usin" stron"arm tactics alone# $he federal authorities were now faced with a very delicate situation# $he call for a =osovo re!ublic set alarm bells rin"in" !articularly in Serbia and in 6acedonia where there was also a lar"e (lbanian minority# Grantin" =osovo re!ublican status would mean detachin" it from Serbia and concedin" that it had the ri"ht to secede from the federation# $he s!ecial !osition that =osovo held in Serbian mytholo"y meant that any move towards a re!ublican status for =osovo mi"ht tri""er a bac&lash of Serbian nationalism# T e federal aut orities decided to 'lock contacts 'etween t e ,osovo $l'anians and $l'ania #ro#er4 'ut t ey also ruled out t e rei!#osition of central control fro! Belgrade4 w ic so!e Ser' co!!unists were de!anding. Instead4 t e ,osovo #arty =led after I9:> 'y a young $l'anian co!!unist4 $ze! @llasi? agreed to stifle any !anifestation of $l'anian nationalis! in t e #rovince. T e at!os# ere in ,osovo in t e early eig ties was eavy wit tension/ secret #olice!en were u'i;uitous. -onet eless4 t e local state a##aratus4 including t e #olice force4 was staffed !ainly 'y $l'anians4 and t ey ad no interest in #rovoking t e ,osovars. (ife was not easy4 'ut it was free fro! nationalist violence. $ !inority of co!!unists in Ser'ia4 aided at ti!es 'y t e Belgrade !edia4 clai!ed t at t e Ser' and Montenegrin !inority in ,osovo =roug ly 8E #er cent of t e #o#ulation? were su'2ected to syste!atic terroris! at t e ands of $l'anian MirredentistsM. T ey 'ased t ese clai!s on t e nu!'ers of Ser's !oving fro! t e #rovince to Ser'ia #ro#er. T ere was indeed an e.odus of Ser's in t e early eig ties4 'ut t ey were econo!ic !igrants4 not refugees. T e stories of ra#e4 !urder and inti!idation were wit out foundation. T e #olitical #ro'le! of ,osovo coincided wit dee#ening econo!ic #ro'le!s in t e country as a w ole. Slovenia and "roatia renewed t eir criticis! of a syste! w ic saw a dis#ro#ortionate a!ount of t eir foreign earnings directed

into a Solidarity *und for t e develo#!ent of t e #oorer4 sout ern regions. T e de't crisis was e.acer'ated 'y 1ugoslaviaMs i!#enetra'le 'anking syste!. *oreign loans were contracted not only 'y t e 1ugoslav -ational Bank 'ut 'y t e re#u'lican 'anks as well so t at 1ugoslaviaMs inde'tedness was invaria'ly ig er t an official figures ad!itted. In for!ulating !acroecono!ic #olicy4 t e federal govern!ent ad to negotiate 'ot wit t e western 'anks and wit t e 'anks of t e si. re#u'lics. T e devolved 'anking syste! also encouraged corru#tion wit in t e re#u'lics4 on a uge scale. $ny atte!#t 'y t e federal aut orities to interfere wit re#u'lican financial arrange!ents was fiercely resisted. )o#ular !istrust of t e federal and re#u'lican aut orities 'egan to grow 'y 89:>/ une!#loy!ent and strikes ad 'eco!e ende!ic. *or different #olitical and econo!ic reasons4 t en4 1ugoslaviaMs govern!ent was under siege in t e !id%89:Es fro! its constituent #arts. Su##orted 'y t e +est4 t e !ilitary and4 wit growing reluctance4 'y #u'lic o#inion4 it continued its #recarious e.istence4 'ased on TitoMs for!ula of M'rot er ood and unityM.J The Bal+ans" =ationalis&, War and the Great #o'ers, 1!>8%1 'y Mis a Glenny4 #. >DD%>DG

F*or t e Bosnian Musli!s4 AreligiousB conversions touc ed t e very eart of t eir identity. T is ad little to do wit #iety and everyt ing to do wit #olitics. 6ntil 8:I:4 t e Musli!s were t e ruling class of Bosnia%Hercegovina4 controlling t e #rovincesN feudal econo!y and sclerotic ad!inistration. T eir #rivileges were guaranteed 'y t e #ri!acy of Isla! wit in t e 3tto!an E!#ire. BosniaMs feudal structures furt er e!# asized t e i!#ortance of t e c urc es as ar'iters of !oral and social ;uestions. So w en t e $ustro%Hungarian occu#iers !arc ed into Bosnia to announce t at all religious fait s would encefort 'e treated as e;ual4 t e Musli! landowners4 t e agas4 feared t at t eir #ower and indeed t eir cultural world were a'out to disa##ear. T e agas re#resented 'ut a tiny !inority4 8.G #er cent4 of t e Musli! #o#ulation. But t eir fears were s ared 'y t e !a2ority of Musli!s4 classed as free #easants. T ey warned t at t e arrival of t e $ustro%Hungarians would swiftly 'e followed 'y t e li'eration of t e " ristian #easants4 t e last serfs in Euro#e4 w o would t en 'e at li'erty to co!#ete wit t eir Musli! counter#arts for land. T e s#eed and zeal wit w ic t e new rulers set a'out !odernizing t e govern!ent of Bosnia confir!ed t ese fears. T e Musli!s4 w o under 3tto!an rules were solely res#onsi'le for governing Bosnia4 were o'liged to yield t eir gri# on t e ad!inistration straig taway. $t t e ti!e of occu#ation in 8:I:4 2ust 8DE Musli!s ad!inistered Bosnia and Hercegovina. T irty years later4 w en $ustria turned its occu#ation into anne.ation4 a grand total of 94GHH 'ureaucrats were running t e two #rovinces. &elin;uis ing control of govern!ent was no great loss in itself and t e c ange undou'tedly 'enefited Bosnia 'y 8:I: !eaningful ad!inistrative life ad all 'ut e.#ired in t e #rovince. But t e Dou'le Eagle 'uilt its nest in every town and in every village. T e sudden invasion of undreds u#on undreds of Ha's'urg 'ureaucrats ad a severe #syc ological i!#act on t e Musli!s. Men in neatly cut Euro#ean unifor!s 'randis ed t eir ink and sta!#s4 de!anding endless infor!ation a'out t e E!#ireNs new su'2ects/ #oking t eir noses into t e #rivate lives and a'its of fa!ilies w ose word until a few !ont s earlier ad 'een !ore #owerful ! Bosnia t an even t e SultanMs. Sna##ing orders in strange tongues4 t ey counted ouses and !easured roads4 or !ore fre;uently land u#on w ic roads and railways would soon 'e 'uilt/ t ey #ut u# signs on 'uildings and signs on streets in foreign languages. T ey anded out letters telling young !en to re#ort for !ilitary service/ t ey indulged in futile ad!inistrative rituals a'out w ic w ole novels ave 'een written/ and everyw ere t ey ung #ortraits of His I!#erial and &oyal Hig ness4 *ranz 0ose# I. $ll t is contri'uted to w at a distinguis ed istorian of Bosnia as called a Mwides#read sense of alienation and fear a!ong t e Bosnian Musli!sM. T e #syc ological distress occasioned 'y t ese c anges was Ma !a2or cause of Musli! e!igration to Istan'ul and ot er #arts of t e 3tto!an E!#ire ... during t e era of t e Dou'le EagleM. $ large nu!'er of t e new clerks4 #ost!en and station!asters ca!e fro! neig 'ouring "roatia. T is el#ed to overco!e t e language 'arrier4 'ut it 'olstered t e "at olic #resence in Bosnia. T e Ha's'urg aut orities were alert to t e i!#ortance of religion in Bosnia and4 wit in weeks of t e occu#ation4 tried to i!#ose tig t #olitical control on t e t ree c urc es. T e @atican willingly gave its #er!ission for t e esta'lis !ent of an arc 'is o#ric in Bosnia4 and so in t e wake of t e 'ureaucrats t ere followed a crusading #riest ood ty#ified 'y t e leading cleric4 0osi# Stadler4 w o 'eca!e t e first $rc 'is o# of @r 'osna Aold "roat na!e for Sara2evoB. Stadler ca!e wit t e e.#ress intention of ending t e #astoral !ono#oly of t e *ranciscan !onks in favour of t e !ore energetic 0esuits/ of enlisting t e clerical ierarc y in t e active service of @atican #olicy/ and of gat ering t e souls of a#ostates. In a nu!'er of t e !ore dra!atic cases of conversion4 Stadler i!self gave sanctuary to Musli!s fleeing t eir co!!unity4 !ainly wo!en w o wis ed to !arry non%Musli!s. + en t e Ha's'urg aut orities atte!#ted to intervene wit t e $rc 'is o# on 'e alf of t e Musli!s4 Stadler re!ained stu''orn. To t e Musli!s it si!#ly looked as if t e govern!ent was turning a 'lind eye to t e "at olic " urc Ms #roselytizing activities. T e case of *ata 3!anovic #roved one conversion too !any. T e Musli!s of Mostar ad watc ed cultural centres4 sc ools and c urc es serving t e "at olic and 3rt odo. co!!unities increasing in t eir city. During t e 8:9Es4 a war of words 'roke out in Hercegovina 'etween t e #ro#agandists of Greater "roatia and Greater Ser'ia.J The Bal+ans" =ationalis&, War and the Great #o'ers, 1!>8%1 'y Mis a Glenny4 #. D>:%D>9

(anguages4 #eo#les4 and #olitical divisions of Euro#e4 8:8G%8987

Ger!an and Italian occu#ation of 1ugoslavia during +orld +ar II

FIn 89874 i!#erialist rivalry cele'rated its zenit 'y #ersuading all t e Eurasian e!#ires to divert t eir enor!ous econo!ic and tec nological resources into one vast industrial conglo!erate of deat . During t e five !ont s of t e 'attle of @erdun in 898>4 for e.a!#le4 M!ore t an twenty%t ree !illion s ells were fired 'y t e two contending ar!ies A*renc and Ger!anB...on average !ore t an a undred s ells a !inuteM. T is was war 'eyond all co!#re ension or recognition. T e generals w o !ars alled gigantic ar!ies ad never conceived of !ilitary action on t is scale/ undreds of t ousands of young !en #aid for t e ine.#erience of t eir !ilitary c iefs. &educing t e events of t e *irst +orld +ar to an inevita'le conse;uence of i!#erialist co!#etition is neit er original nor es#ecially revealing. -ot only4 Mis t is insufficientM4 as one 1ugoslav istorian as noted4 Mit is a truis! w ic offers no clues as to w y #easants4 'elonging to different c urc es4 were fig ting one anot er !any !iles fro! t e front line on so!e Balkan ills as t oug it was t eir warM? It is an e.#lanation t at as !asked t e co!#le. we' of relations i#s 'etween and wit in t e two 'locs4 t e Entente and t e "entral )owers. Most Balkan countries4 es#ecially Ser'ia4 Turkey4 Bulgaria and &o!ania4 were o#elessly tangled in t e we'. ,aiser +il el! IIMs ent usias! for war was fired 'y a ig ly c arged nationalis! and facilitated 'y an i!!ense econo!ic #otential. Ger!any 'elonged4 wit Italy4 to t e so%called /erspdtete =ationen =late%co!ing nations?4 w ic soug t to co!#ensate for t eir delayed arrival in t e ga!e of i!#erialis!. *ro! t e 8:9Es4 Ger!any develo#ed its Weltpoliti+, a deter!ined atte!#t to esta'lis itself at t e very least as an i!#erial #ower and4 if #ossi'le4 t e leading great #ower. T e #o#ulation of Mt e young Ger!an E!#ire ... grows annually 'y :EE4EEE%9EE4EEE #eo#leM4 argued ,urt &iezler4 " ancellor Bet !ann%HollwegMs senior adviser4M and for t ese new !asses food !ust 'e found4 or4 w at a!ounts to t e sa!e4 work ... T e de!ands of t e Ger!an nation for #ower and #restige4 not only in Euro#e4 'ut t roug out t e world4 ave increased ra#idly.M It was t is #us for glo'al influence w ic turned Bis!arckMs cautious foreign #olicy on its ead. By 8987 t e Ger!an &eic was #re#ared to sacrifice t e 'ones of any nu!'er of )o!eranian grenadiers for its Macedonian and Turkis #olicies. Ger!anyMs Weltpoliti+ was an i!#licit t reat to t e ege!ony of Great Britain4 w ic at t e turn of t e century was still t e #re%e!inent i!#erial #ower. Suc was t e danger #osed 'y Ger!anyMs growing a!'ition t at (ondon eventually concluded agree!ents wit *rance and &ussia4 its traditional i!#erialist ene!y4 des#ite t e fact t at Britain was still involved in serious dis#utes wit t e two =es#ecially &ussia? in various #arts of t e world. S#eaking wit t e $!erican a!'assador to (ondon at t e very 'eginning of t e war4 Sir Edward Grey4 t e *oreign Secretary4 s#elt out t e c allenge t at Ger!any #osed< MT e issue for us is t at4 if Ger!any wins4 s e will do!inate *rance/ t e inde#endence of Belgiu!4 Holland4 Den!ark4 and #er a#s of -orway and Sweden4 will 'e a !ere s adow/ t eir se#arate e.istence as nations will 'e a fiction/ all t eir ar'ours will 'e at Ger!anyMs dis#osal/ s e will do!inate t e w ole of +estern Euro#e4 and t is will !ake our #osition ;uite i!#ossi'le. +e could not e.ist as a first class State under suc circu!stances.M $he 'irst World War went on so lon" because of this central contest between *ritain and Germany# + et er Britain 'ears greater res#onsi'ility for t e conflict 'ecause it atte!#ted to e.clude Ger!any syste!atically fro! all i!#erial s#oils4 or w et er t e cause of war lay #ri!arily wit Ger!anyMs 'rutis a!'ition4 re!ains o#en to dis#ute. But t at t e $nglo%Ger!an conflict was at t e eart of t e *irst +orld +ar is no longer an issue. T e ot er great #owers w o went to war in 8987 did so for very different reasons< $ustria%Hungary 'elieved it necessary in order to survive as a great #ower/ *rance went to war 'ecause it was attacked 'y Ger!any =once at war4 *rance naturally o#ed to avenge its defeat at Ger!an ands in 8:IE and restore t e territories of $lsace%(orraine4 'ut )aris would never ave initiated a war for t is?/ &ussia went to war #ri!arily in t e o#e of e.tending its influence in t e Balkans 'y s!as ing $ustria% Hungary and taking Istan'ul. Strategic issues everyw ere took #recedence over ideological affinities in defining t e relations i#s 'etween t e ot er !a2or co!'atants and Britain and Ger!any. +il el! II and *ranz 0ose# I were4 it is true4 'ot dee#ly conservative and ostile to de!ocracy4 'ut as a zealous nationalist +il el! looked u#on $ustria%HungaryMs cos!o#olitan !i. of #eo#les wit disdain. $nd yet t e survival of t e Ha's'urg E!#ire was crucial for Ger!anyMs Weltpoliti+ 'ecause it was t e strategic ste##ing stone to BerlinMs #ri!ary i!#erialist goals4 Turkey4 Meso#ota!ia and Bag dad. Tsar -ic olas II was united wit +il el! and *ranz 0ose# ! is love of autocracy and is loat ing of #arlia!ents. 1et &ussia allied itself wit re#u'lican *rance and li'eral Britain wit out esitation. St. )eters'urgMs need to control t e Straits directly contradicted Ger!anyMs ai! of do!inating Turkey. T e !istrust of de!ocracy s ared 'y Ho enzollern and &o!anov was not sufficient to overco!e t e conflict of interest over t e Straits. Initially4 'ot t e Entente and t e "entral )owers a##eared reluctant to o#en a new front in t e sout ern Balkans. But 'y late 3cto'er 89874 t e Ger!an !ilitary ad decided t at #rovoking &ussia in t e sout would cause &ussia logistical #ro'le!s on t e Eastern *ront w ere4 after early losses4 t e Tsarist forces were now driving t e Ha's'urg ar!y dee# into $ustrian territory. Sailing under a Turkis flag 'ut co!!anded 'y Ger!ans4 t e 'attle cruiser Goeben and t e lig t cruiser Breslau received t e order fro! Enver )as a4 t e #ro%Ger!an Minister of Defence4 to 'o!'ard &ussian s i#s ar'oured in t e "ri!ea. T e Sout ern *ront ad o#ened. Istan'ul and t e Straits eld t e key to do!ination of t e Middle East4 t e region full of oil fields and strategic waterways4 'ut t e course of t e war in t e Balkans was dictated 'y t e great #owersM !uc narrower struggle for control of t e Straits. T e Entente and t e "entral )owers insisted t at t eir res#ective allies in t e Balkans would ave to tailor t eir local war ai!s to t ese i!#erial goals. T e fate of t e sout Slavs4 t e relations i# 'etween Transylvania and &o!ania4 t e ulti!ate size of Bulgaria4 t e Macedonian Kuestion and finally Greek%Turkis relations were all #rofoundly influenced 'y t e need of Britain4 Ger!any and &ussia to control access to t e Black Sea fro! t e Mediterranean. Ser'ia was t e only ostile territory 'locking t e Ger!ansM rail route fro! Berlin to Bag dad. T e $ustrian attack on Ser'ia in late 0uly 8987 served two #ur#oses. T e Ha's'urgs intended to eli!inate Ser'ia as a desta'ilizing influence on t e Slavs of t e E!#ire w ile Ger!any was keen to see t e country su'dued for strategic reasons. &o!ania and Bulgaria allowed t e #assage of Ger!an war !aterials for Turkey at t e 'eginning of t e conflict. -onet eless4 control of t e rail route t roug Ser'ia was of e.ce#tional i!#ortance to t e Ger!an !ilitary. T is was underlined in Se#te!'er I987 w en t e &o!anian govern!ent e!# asized its neutral status 'y 'locking Ger!an trans#orts across its territory. T e road to Turkey was 'locked/ t e Ger!an ig co!!and now devoted considera'le attention to t e esta'lis !ent of a land link wit Turkey. T e Turkis relations i# wit Ger!any4 w ic +il el! II ad diligently nurtured in t e 8:9Es4 ad 'een furt ered 'y t e coo#eration 'etween senior $eichs'ehr officers and t e Turkis general staff during t e Balkan +ars. In late 898H and early 89874 owever4 t e leaders i# in t e 3tto!an E!#ire sent several

clear signals to Britain and *rance t at it was eager to coo#erate and o#ed to avoid closer ties wit t e "entral )owers. But at t e out'reak of war4 Britain did not consider t e Balkans or t e Straits to 'e a t eatre of war and4 in any case4 its co!!it!ent in t at #art of t e world was to &ussia4 #resu!ed to 'e TurkeyMs i!#laca'le foe. *rance was at t is stage too #reoccu#ied wit defending its own territory to worry unduly a'out a t eatre of war w ic ad not o#ened as yet. To 'egin wit 4 Bulgaria4 &o!ania and Greece were content to sit on t e fence and o'serve t e fortunes of war 'efore deciding w et er to declare t eir sy!#at ies. T e issue of t e Straits did not feature #ro!inently in t e di#lo!acy w ic led to t e war4 'ut as soon as t e fig ting ad 'egun in Belgiu!4 *rance and )oland t e strategic focus of t e struggle in sout ern Euro#e s ifted ;uickly to Istan'ul and t e Straits and ence t e Balkans as a w ole. Bot t e Entente and t e "entral )owers 'egan to e.ert #ressure on Sofia4 Buc arest and $t ens to enter t e war. Meso#ota!ia4 t e $ra' region of t e cru!'ling 3tto!an E!#ire4 was t e only !ain 'attlefront in t e *irst +orld +ar w ic was geogra# ically clearly outside Euro#e. T e c ief co!'atants ere4 owever4 foug t under Euro#ean flags% Britis 4 Turkis and Ger!an. +it in Euro#e troo#s of different nationalities fig ting under t e flags of !ultinational e!#ires so!eti!es ca!ouflaged t e force of nationalis! w ic lay 'e ind !uc of t e fig ting. (arge nu!'ers of Ser's and Italians served under t e Ha's'urg colours against t e ar!ies of Ser'ia and Italy4 w ile &o!anians fro! Transylvania #artici#ated in t e 2oint Ger!an%$ustro%Hungarian offensive against &o!ania. T e &ussian !ilitary was not as cos!o#olitan as t e $ustrian 'ut it included large nu!'ers of non% &ussians fro! Euro#e4 t e "aucasus and $sia. ?t may not have been the first world war des!ite the !resence of colonials in the *ritish and 'rench armies0 and indeed at the start when (ustria bombarded *el"rade and launched its invasion of Serbia it was &nown briefly as the $hird *al&an War# T is conflict was soon swallowed 'y t e wider war on t e +estern and Eastern *ronts 'ut t e war in t e Balkans re!ained an awkward ano!aly. $s t e crisis dee#ened4 'ot t e Entente and t e "entral )owers diverted ever greater resources to #ersuading t e young Balkan #owers to 2oin t eir alliances. +it t e e.ce#tion of Ser'ia4 w ose very e.istence was t reatened 'y Ger!any and $ustria4 no Balkan country ad an o'vious ally. 0oining eit er of t e great%#ower syste!s ad its disadvantages4 and fortunes on t e 'attlefield !eant t at t e gravitational force of 'ot 'locs c anged daily. T e attraction for a s!all Balkan country in declaring war lay in t e #ossi'ility of furt ering its regional goals4 not in t e fact t at it #articularly sy!#at ized wit its ally. T ese regional goals4 owever4 often clas ed wit t e overarc ing tactics of a great%#ower ally. Ser'ia was t e first to discover t is4 as soon as war ad 'roken out/ Turkey4 Bulgaria and &o!ania were to learn t e sa!e lesson.J The Bal+ans" =ationalis&, War and the Great #o'ers, 1!>8%1 'y Mis a Glenny4 #. HE:%H8D

FIn 3cto'er 898G4 t e Bulgarians #re#ared to avenge t e!selves for t e #erceived 'etrayal 'y t e Ser's during t e Second Balkan +ar. $lt oug Bulgaria was t us inclined to alliance wit Ger!any4 Berlin ad to e.#end considera'le di#lo!atic effort to secure t e agree!ent. But once Sofia was #ersuaded4 t e Ger!an Hig "o!!and was deter!ined t at $ustriaMs !ilitary inco!#etence would not foul u# t eir #lans again. To ensure t at Ser'ian defences could 'e 'reac ed4 t e Ger!ans #laced one of t eir a'lest co!!anders4 *ield Mars al $ugust von Mackensen4 in co!!and of an e.#anded Ger!an and $ustro%Hungarian force w ic renewed t e 'o!'ard!ent of Belgrade on > 3cto'er 898G. +it in t ree days4 Belgrade was taken and t e Ser'ian ar!y was strea!ing sout wards towards ,ragu2evac and -is. *ive days later4 t e Bulgarian ar!y crossed into Macedonia and sout ern Ser'ia w ile $ustrian troo#s started !arc ing fro! Dal!atia. In early -ove!'er4 t e Ser'ian ar!y successfully retreated to ,osovo. )rince &egent $leksandar ad to decide u#on a course of action in consultation wit a trio of se#tuagenarians is fat er e.%,ing )etar4 w o ad foug t in t e Bosnian 6#rising of 8:IG &ado!ir )utnik4 t e des#erately ill co!!ander in c ief4 and t e )ri!e Minister4 -ikola )asic. S ould t e Ser'ian ar!y esta'lis a !odern istorical !yt 'y !aking a last stand against t e ene!y coalition on ,osovo )ol2e4 t e *ield of Black'irds4 w ere t e Ser'ian !edieval kingdo! ad colla#sed in 8H:9 in t e central event of Ser'ian national !yt ologyQ &ecognizing t is as a gesture of #oetic futility4 t e four Ser' leaders ordered undreds of t ousands of soldiers and refugees to destroy all eavy wea#onry and !unitions4 gat er u# t ousands of $ustrian #risoners4 and undreds of orse and o.en4 'efore setting off on a terri'le trek across #ro+leti:e, t e $ccursed Mountains4 t at se#arate ,osovo and $l'ania4 as t e snow 'egan to fall. Herois! and fortitude are c ea# words in t e Balkans and t e Ser's are #rone to e.cessive usage of 'ot . But t e soldiers w o atte!#ted to reac t e island refuge of "orfu fro! ,osovo deserve great res#ect4 even in t is century of suffering. Besides t e ferocity of t e weat er4 t e Ser's faced arass!ent fro! $l'anian raiders. T is frozen Mar!y of wrat sM4 as one of its soldiers du''ed it4 was of course easy #rey for t e $l'anian villagers w o #arado.ically en2oyed one of t eir !ost co!forta'le winters t at year. *ut the (lbanians were also ta&in" their reven"e on the Serbs for the atrocities committed a"ainst the =osovar and 6acedonian (lbanians durin" the 'irst *al&an War# 'ratricidal war between the offs!rin" states of the >ttoman -m!ire had be"un in earnest only three years !rior to these "hastly events# Ket it had set in motion a series of disturbin" conflicts between *ul"ar Serb (lbanian Gree& and $ur& in which demo"ra!hic historical confessional racist and economic claims were mercilessly !itted a"ainst one another# J The Bal+ans" =ationalis&, War and the Great #o'ers, 1!>8%1 'y Mis a Glenny4 #. HH7%HHG

+orld +ar I< Euro#ean4 Turkis 4 O $frican T eaters

# British tren+h near the #l ert8Bapaume road at .7illers8la8Boisselle, (uly $%$? during the Battle of the &omme. (Photo' /mperial War Museum, )reat Britain)

# British armored tank appears in the Western *ront during World War /. <he use of armored tanks and +hemi+al weapons egan during World War /. .7er $? million soldiers and +i7ilians died during World War /.

Harle! Hellfig ters Grou# )ortrait. $!erican soldiers of t e H>9t Infantry &egi!ent =8Gt -ew 1ork -ational Guard &egi!ent4 infor!ally known as FHarle! Hellfig tersJ? w o won t e "roi. de Guerre for t eir gallantry in action #ose for a grou# #ortrait in 8989. =) oto< tt#<55www.!i.ed!artialarts.co!5!!a.cf!QgoRforu!.#ostsOforu!RDOt readRDEG8ED>O#ageRI?

T e Martyrs of Musa Dag . During t e $r!enian Genocide4 several undred $r!enian villagers !ade refuge on t e Musa Mountain4 and resisted a DE4EEE strong Turkis ar!y for GE days in 898G.

Senegalese soldiers fro! t e *renc colony of Senegal #ose for a # otogra# at Saint%6lric 4 Haut%& in4 *rance on 0une 8>4 898I. Saint%6lric 4 Haut%& in4 *rance is located 8G !iles west of Basel4 Switzerland and Mul ouse4 *rance.

*renc soldiers stand in a trenc near front%line o'servation #ost at Hirtz'ac 4 Haut%& in4 *rance4 located 8E !iles west of Basel4 Switzerland4 on 0une 8>4 898I.

)erman +iti0ens, in+luding #ustrian8 orn artist and +ommunity organi0er #dolf Hitler, +ele rate in Muni+h, )ermany on #ugust @, $%$I after the /mperial )erman go7ernment in Berlin de+lared war on ,ussia the pre7ious day.

Left photo' !0ar "i+holas // of ,ussia (right) re+ei7es *ren+h President ,aymond Poin+arX during a offi+ial meeting in &t. Peters urg, ,ussia on (uly @$, $%$I. (&our+e' *rom Paul EttighoferDs ook Tannenberg$ %ine !r"ee wird &u Tode "arschiert ()Ytersloh, $%M%)) ,ight' Emperor *ran0 (oseph / of #ustria8Hungary, who egan World War / y issuing an ultimatum and later de+lared war on &er ia on (uly @F, $%$I, ruled #ustria8Hungary from 2e+em er @, $FIF until his death in -ienna on "o7em er @$, $%$?.

T e Ger!an 6%9 su'!arine =a'ove? sank H Britis cruisers = Abou+ir4 Cressy and Hogue? in t e -ort Sea on Se#te!'er DD4 8987. $ total of 847G9 Britis sailors were killed in action t at day. =Bain -ews Service?

Ger!an soldiers !arc t roug )lace &ogier in Brussels4 Belgiu! in 8987.

Britis and *renc #olitical and !ilitary leaders confer during +orld +ar I. (eft to rig t< Mars al 0ose# 0offre of t e *renc ar!y4 &ay!ond )oincare =)resident of *rance4 898H%89DE?4 ,ing George @ of Great Britain4 Mars al *erdinand *oc of t e *renc ar!y4 and *ield Mars al Sir Douglas Haig of t e Britis ar!y. =T e I!#erial +ar Museu!?

T e 'irst *attle of the 6arne occurred at t e Marne &iver near )aris4 *rance fro! Se#te!'er G%8D4 8987. T e $llied victory at t e *irst Battle of t e Marne would force t e I!#erial Ger!an ar!y to a'andon t e Sc lieffen )lan and settle for a virtual stale!ate via trenc warfare.

,ing George @ of Great Britain ins#ects troo#s of t e Britis E.#editionary *orce during +orld +ar I.

Britis @ickers !ac ine gun crew wears )H%ty#e anti%gas el!ets near 3villers during t e Battle of t e So!!e in 0uly 898>.

*renc officers review t eir 'attle #lans in an underground 'unker in nort ern *rance during +orld +ar I.

#ustralian infantrymen wear &mall BoA ,espirators (&B,), also known as a gas mask, during the <hird Battle of ;pres in Belgium on &eptem er @>, $%$>. <he soldiers are from the IJth Battalion, #ustralian Ith 2i7ision at )arter Point near Qonne eke, ;pres se+tor. (Photo y !aptain *rank Hurley)

Ger!an infantry!en attack t e *renc ar!y at t e Battle of @erdun on Marc 8G4 898>. Battle of @erdun in *rance lasted fro! *e'ruary D84 898> until Dece!'er 8:4 898>. =) oto< tt#<55www.!i.ed!artialarts.co!5!!a.cf!QgoRforu!.#ostsOforu!RDOt readRDEG8ED>O#ageRD?

$ *renc assault on Ger!an #ositions in " a!#agne4 *rance in 898I. =) oto< -ational $rc ives56.S. De#art!ent of Defense4 De#art!ent of t e $r!y4 3ffice of t e " ief Signal 3fficer?

Britis 'atteries #ound t e Ger!an lines in t e +estern *ront in 898I =International *il! Service?

Britis troo#s 'linded 'y tear gas await treat!ent at an $dvanced Dressing Station near Bet une during t e Battle of Estaires on 8E $#ril 898:4 #art of t e Ger!an offensive in *landers. =I!#erial +ar Museu!?

#meri+an soldiers fire their ma+hine guns in the #rgonne *orest during the Meuse8#rgonne .ffensi7e, a series of attles that lasted from &eptem er @?, $%$F until "o7em er $$, $%$F. (Photo' "ational #r+hi7es)

Left photo' #n airplane dogfight takes pla+e in Belgium during World War /. ,ight photo' # +olonial *ren+h #fri+an soldier (+enter) appears with a group of *ren+h soldiers in a tren+h during World War /.

$llied soldiers4 including Britis and $!erican soldiers4 e.a!ine t e wounds of a Ger!an soldier at a first%aid station in t e +estern *ront in *rance on Se#te!'er 8D4 898:.

Ger!an artillery unit taking a direct it during +orld +ar I. =6)I ) oto?

+ounded $!erican soldiers on a truck watc Ger!an #risoners%of%war !arc in a single file so!ew ere in t e +estern *ront in 898:. =-ational $rc ives?

1oung Ger!an #risoners%of%war are seen rela.ing and t inking a'out t eir future. =) oto< I!#erial +ar Museu!4 (ondon?

$ long line of Ger!an #risoners near $!iens are escorted 'y a andful of $ustralian guards in $ugust 898:4 s ortly after t e conclusion of t e Battle of $!iens =:8D $ugust 898:?. =) oto< I!#erial +ar Museu!4 (ondon?

Benito Mussolini wears #a2a!as and leans on crutc es after getting wounded during is service as a cor#oral in t e 87t Bersaglieri &egi!ent of t e Italian ar!y during +orld +ar I. =Ti!e (ife # oto?

Mussolini #aid well as Britis agent in ++I

Future fascist dictator reportedly ra ed in !"#$$$ a %ee as a spy
3cto'er 874 DEE9 =$ssociated )ress? (3-D3- =$ssociated )ress? $ istorian says Benito Mussolini4 w o declared war on Britain at t e start of +orld +ar II4 was well #aid as a Britis agent during +orld +ar I. T e Guardian news#a#er re#orted +ednesday t at )eter Martland of "a!'ridge 6niversity discovered t at Mussolini was #aid 8EE #ounds a week 'y Britain in 898I a e;ual to a'out `94>EE today. T e late Sa!uel Hoare4 in c arge of Britis agents in &o!e at t at ti!e4 revealed in is !e!oirs GG years go t at Mussolini was a #aid agent. Martland found !ore details in HoareMs #a#ers4 including t at Mussolini also sent Italian ar!y veterans to 'eat u# #eace #rotesters in Milan4 a dry run for is fascist 'lacks irt units. LT e last t ing Britain wanted were #ro%#eace strikes 'ringing t e factories in Milan to a alt. It was a lot of !oney to #ay a !an w o was a 2ournalist at t e ti!e4 'ut co!#ared to t e 7 !illion #ounds Britain was s#ending on t e war every day4 it was #etty cas 4L T e Guardian ;uoted Martland as saying. T e salary detail also was in istorian " risto# er $ndrewMs newly #u'lis ed istory of t e Britis intelligence agency MIG4 to w ic Martland contri'uted. In 898I4 t e future Italian dictator was editor of t e Il )o#olo dMItalia news#a#er4 w ic ca!#aigned to kee# Italy on t e $llied side in t e war. Mussolini 'eca!e #ri!e !inister in 89DD and led Italy into +orld +ar II 'y declaring war on Britain and *rance in 0une 897E. Source< tt#<55www.!sn'c.!sn.co!5id5HHH8D79H5ns5worldPnews%euro#e5

<op #llied +ommanders in World War / meet in *ran+e in $%$>. *rom left to right, *ren+h )eneral Henri Petain, British )eneral 2ouglas Haig, o7erall #llied +ommander )eneral *erdinand *o+h of *ran+e, and #meri+an #rmy )eneral (ohn (. Pershing. (Photo' MansellC<ime : Life Pi+turesC)etty /mages)

*lags of t e "entral )owers4 left to rig t< *lag of t e $ustro%Hungarian E!#ire4 +ar Ensign of t e Ger!an E!#ire fro! 89EH to 89894 and *lag of t e 3tto!an E!#ire

*lags of Euro#ean !onarc ies in 89874 left to rig t< ,ingdo! of Ser'ia4 Ger!an E!#ire4 and &ussian E!#ire

Ma# of t e +estern *ront in 8987

Ti!eline of declarations of war in 8987 and 898G< 0uly D:4 8987< $ustria%Hungary declares war against Ser'ia $ugust 84 8987< Ger!any declares war against &ussia $ugust H4 8987< Ger!any declares war against *rance/ *rance declares war against Ger!any $ugust 74 8987< Ger!any declares war against Belgiu!/ Great Britain declares war against Ger!any $ugust >4 8987< $ustria%Hungary declares war against &ussia/ Ser'ia declares war against Ger!any $ugust I4 8987< &ussia declares war against Ger!any $ugust :4 8987< Montenegro declares war against $ustria%Hungary $ugust 94 8987< $ustria%Hungary declares war against Montenegro/ Montenegro declares against Ger!any $ugust 8H4 8987< Great Britain declares war against $ustria/ *rance declares war against $ustria $ugust DH4 8987< 0a#an declares war against Ger!any $ugust DI4 8987< $ustria%Hungary declares war against 0a#an $ugust D:4 8987< $ustria%Hungary declares war against Belgiu! Se#te!'er G%8D4 8987< *irst Battle of t e Marne =*rance? -ove!'er H4 8987< &ussia declares war against Turkey -ove!'er G4 8987< Great Britain declares war against Turkey/ *rance declares war against Turkey -ove!'er DH4 8987< Turkey A3tto!an E!#ireB declares war A2i adB against $llies Dece!'er D4 8987< Ser'ia declares war against Turkey May DH4 898G< Italy declares war on $ustria%Hungary. 3cto'er 874 898G< Bulgaria declares war on Ser'ia 3cto'er 8G4 898G< T e 6nited ,ingdo! of Great Britain declares war on Bulgaria. 3cto'er 8>4 898G< *rance declares war on Bulgaria. 3cto'er 894 898G< Italy and &ussia declare war on Bulgaria.

Ma# of t e +estern *ront in 898G%898>

&a'or E(ents in )*)+: (anuary @, $%$J' <he ,ussian offensi7e in the !arpathians egins. /t will +ontinue until #pril $@. (anuary $%, $%$J' *irst Qeppelin raid on )reat Britain. (anuary @FZ*e ruary M, $%$J' <he .ttomans fail to +apture the &ue0 !anal. (anuary M$, $%$J' Battle of Bolimo7. *irst )erman use of +hemi+al weapons. *e ruary I, $%$J' )ermany egins su marine warfare against mer+hant 7essels. *e ruary >Z*e ruary @@, $%$J' &e+ond Battle of the Masurian Lakes. <he ,ussian [ #rmy is defeated. *e ruary $%, $%$J' British and *ren+h na7al atta+k on the 2ardanelles. <he )allipoli !ampaign egins. #pril @@ZMay @J, $%$J' <he &e+ond Battle of ;pres in Belgium ends in a stalemate. #pril @J, $%$J' #llied for+es land on )allipoli. London Pa+t etween the Entente and /taly May >, $%$J' <he British liner #usitania is sunk y a )erman 58 oat. May $E, $%$J' <roops from Hungary rout the ,ussians at (aros\aw. L7i7 is again in #ustrian hands. May $@, $%$J' Windhoek, +apital of )erman &outh8West #fri+a, is o++upied y &outh #fri+an troops. (une @@, $%$J' Ma+kensen reaks again through the ,ussian lines in the L7i7 area. (une @>, $%$J' <he #ustro8Hungarians re8enter L7i7 (5kraine). (uly %, $%$J' <he )erman for+es in &outh8West #fri+a surrender. #ugust J, $%$J' <he )ermans o++upy Warsaw (Poland). #ugust ?Z#ugust @%, $%$J' Battle of &ari Bair, also known as the #ugust .ffensi7e. Last and unsu++essful attempt y the British army to sei0e the )allipoli peninsula (<urkey). &eptem er F, $%$J' !0ar "i+holas // of ,ussia remo7es )rand 2uke "i+holas "ikolaye7i+h as !ommander8in8!hief of the ,ussian #rmy, personally assuming that position. &eptem er $%, $%$J' <he )ermans o++upy -ilnius. <he )orli+e8<arn]w .ffensi7e ends. .+to er ?, $%$J' &er ia is in7aded y )ermany, #ustria8Hungary and Bulgaria. .+to er @>, $%$J' # *ren+h army lands in &alonika ()ree+e) and, with the help of British and /talian troops, sets up a Balkan *ront. "o7em er @>, $%$J' <he &er ian army +ollapses and retreats to #driati+ &ea, where they are e7a+uated y /talian and *ren+h "a7ies. 2e+em er >, $%$J' <he &iege of 6ut, Mesopotamia (/ra=) y the .ttomans egins.

Ma# of t e +estern *ront in 898I

&a'or E(ents in )*)": (anuary FZ(anuary $?, $%$?' #ustro8Hungarian offensi7e against Montenegro, whi+h +apitulates. (anuary %, $%$?' <he )allipoli !ampaign ends in an #llied defeat and an .ttoman <urkish 7i+tory. (anuary @>, $%$?' !ons+ription introdu+ed in the 5nited 6ingdom y the Military &er7i+e #+t. *e ruary @$, $%$?' <he Battle of -erdun egins. *e ruary @F, $%$?' )erman 'a"erun (!ameroon) surrenders. Mar+h $, $%$?' )ermany resumes unrestri+ted su marine warfare. #pril @M, $%$?' Easter ,ising y /rish re els against the 5nited 6ingdom. #pril @%, $%$?' <he British for+es under siege at 6ut surrender to the .ttomans. May $JZ(une $E, $%$?' #ustro8Hungarian Stra ex(edition in <rentino. May M$Z(une $, $%$?' Battle of (utland etween BritainHs )rand *leet and )ermanyHs +ochsee lotte. (une I, $%$?' <he Brusilo7 .ffensi7e in ,ussia egins. (une J, $%$?' <he #ra ,e7olt in He9a0 (pro7in+e of Me++a and Medina) egins. (uly $, $%$?' <he Battle of the &omme egins. #ugust MZ#ugust J, $%$?' Battle of ,omani. .ttoman atta+k on the British in the &inai peninsula fails. #ugust @>, $%$?' /taly de+lares war on )ermany. ,omania enters the war on the EntenteHs side. Her army is defeated in a few weeks. #ugust @%, $%$?' Paul 7on Hinden urg repla+es Eri+h 7on *alkenhayn as )erman !hief of &taff. &eptem er ?, $%$?' <he !entral Powers +reate a unified +ommand. &eptem er $J, $%$?' Battle of *lers8!our+elette (last offensi7e of Battle of the &omme). British use armored tanks for the first time in history. &eptem er @E, $%$?' <he Brusilo7 .ffensi7e ends with a su stantial ,ussian su++ess. "o7em er $F, $%$?' <he Battle of the &omme ends with enormous +asualties and no winner. "o7em er @$, $%$?' *ran+is (oseph /, Emperor of #ustria and 6ing of Hungary, dies and is su++eeded y !harles /. 2e+em er JZ2e+em er >, $%$?' 5nited 6ingdom' Prime Minister Henry #s=uith resigns and is su++eeded y 2a7id Lloyd )eorge. 2e+em er ?, $%$?' <he )ermans o++upy Bu+harest, ,omania. 2e+em er @%, $%$?' )rigori ,asputin, ,ussiaHs Xminen+e grise, is assassinated.

Ma# of t e +estern *ront in 898:

&a'or E(ents in )*),: (anuary F, $%$F' 5.&. President Woodrow Wilson outlines his *ourteen Points. *e ruary @$, $%$F' <he British army +aptures (eri+ho (Palestine) from the .ttoman Empire. Mar+h M, $%$F' ,ussian +ommunist Leon <rotsky signs the pea+e treaty with )ermany at Brest8Lito7sk. Mar+h @?, $%$F' *ren+h Marshall *erdinand *o+h is appointed &upreme !ommander of all #llied for+es. May >, $%$F' <reaty of Bu+harest etween ,omania and the !entral Powers1 the treaty was ne7er ratified. (uly $>, $%$F' !0ar "i+holas // of ,ussia and his family are eAe+uted y the Bolshe7iks in ,ussia. &eptem er @?Z"o7em er $$, $%$F' Meuse8#rgonne .ffensi7e, the final phase of the Hundred 2ays .ffensi7e and of World War /. &eptem er ME, $%$F' Bulgaria signs an armisti+e with the #llies. .+to er $, $%$F' <he British army enters 2amas+us (&yria). .+to er @E, $%$F' )ermany suspends su marine warfare. .+to er @IZ"o7em er I, $%$F' <he /talian army routs the #ustro8Hungarian army at the Battle of -ittorio -eneto. .+to er @%, $%$F' Wilhelm )roener repla+es Eri+h Ludendorff as Hinden urgHs deputy. )erman sailors of +ochsee lotte mutiny. .+to er ME, $%$F' <he .ttoman Empire signs the #rmisti+e of Mudros. "o7em er M, $%$F' #ustria8Hungary signs the armisti+e with /taly, effe+ti7e "o7em er I, $%$F. "o7em er %, $%$F' 6aiser Wilhelm // of )ermany a di+ates his throne1 )erman repu li+ is pro+laimed. "o7em er $E, $%$F' Emperor !harles / of #ustria8Hungary a di+ates his throne. "o7em er $$, $%$F' )ermany signs the #rmisti+e of !ompiGgne, *ran+e at ? a.m. *ighting ends at $$ a.m. "o7em er $@, $%$F' #ustria pro+laimed a repu li+. "o7em er $I, $%$F' !0e+hoslo7akia pro+laimed a repu li+. *ighting ends in the East #fri+an <heater when )eneral 7on Lettow8 -or e+k agrees a +ease8fire on hearing of )ermanyHs surrender. 2e+em er I, $%$F' ;ugosla7 independen+e pro+laimed.

$ustro%Hungarian troo#s e.ecuting Ser'ian #easants. T e war in t e Balkans was #articularly savage owing to age%old rivalries 'etween t e Balkan countries. Ser'ia alone ad foug t two wars i!!ediately #rior to t e Great +ar. In 898G4 after so!e costly skir!is es4 t e $ustro%Hungarian ar!y4 su##orted 'y Ger!any and Bulgaria !anaged to occu#y Ser'ia and e.act its revenge against t e Ser's for t e eavy losses t e Ser'ian ar!y inflicted t e #revious year. In t e $ustro%Hungarian $r!y4 ru!ors were a'ound of atrocities co!!itted 'y civilians and civilian irregulars on soldiers< !utilations of t e wounded and attacks fro! a!'us 'y civilians4 including wo!en. In turn4 t e $ustro%Hungarians retaliated in !uc t e sa!e fas ion4 only wit a defeated ar!y4 it was t e Ser'ian civilians w o 'ore t e 'runt of t eir re#risals. =) oto< *lickr?

T e &ussian "ossacks lea# out of a trenc and attack t e Ger!an ar!y during +orld +ar I.

&ussian soldiers surrender to t e Ger!an ar!y at Tannen'erg in $ugust 8987.

3rtels'urg4 East )russia was 'urned 'y t e &ussian ar!y in 8987.

# group of )erman soldiers, in+luding #dolf Hitler (seated, right, wearing a mousta+he), pose for a group portrait during World War /. #dolf Hitler was gassed y the British army in the tren+hes of Belgium near ;pres on the night of .+to er $M, $%$F. (Photo' )erman *ederal #r+hi7es)

Blindfolded and in a kneeling position, patrioti+ &er s in &er ia near the #ustrian lines were arranged in a semi8+ir+le and ruthlessly shot at a +ommand y soldiers of the #ustro8Hungarian army in +ir+a $%$>. (Photo' 5nderwood : 5nderwoodC"ational #r+hi7es)

Polish guerilla fighter (]0ef Pilsudski ($F?>8$%MJ, fifth from left), who would later ser7e as Prime Minister and President of Poland, appears with &upreme !ommand of Polish Military .rgani0ation in $%$>.

)erman army offi+ers +ele rate in ,iga, Lat7ia (part of ,ussian Empire) on &eptem er M, $%$> after +apturing the +ity of ,iga from the ,ussian army. <he /mperial )erman army o++upied ,iga (Lat7ia) and Warsaw (Poland) during World War /.

Eastern *ront in Se#te!'er 8987

Eastern *ront =&ussian *ront? in 898I

Ger!an Military "a!#aigns in "olonial $frica during +orld +ar I

$frican%'orn I!#erial Ger!an $r!y soldier Elo Sa!'o =center? #oses for a grou# #ortrait wit is fellow Ger!an soldiers. Elo Sa!'o served in t e 'and of t e (ife Guard Hussar &egi!enti and later in t e 7t "avalry &egi!ent of t e &eic swe r and was awarded t e Ger!an Iron "ross 8st "lass and Ger!an Iron "ross Dnd "lass. =) oto< tt#<55www.!ilitary# otos.net5foru!s5s owt read.# #Q8G>9:H%I!#erial%Ger!an%ar!y%in%East%$frica%=early%DEt % century?5#age>?

# )erman army offi+er (left) appears with a group of )erman8trained +olonial #fri+an soldiers (askaris) in eastern #fri+a during World War /. (Photo' http'CCwww.militaryphotos.netCforumsCshowthread.phpR$J?%FM8/mperial8)erman8army8in8East8#fri+a8(early8@Eth8+entury)CpageJ)

!olonial )erman soldiers in #fri+a, in+luding a nati7e #fri+an soldier (standing, se+ond from left) pose for a group portrait during World War /. (Photo' http'CCwww.militaryphotos.netCforumsCshowthread.phpR$J?%FM8/mperial8)erman8army8in8East8#fri+a8(early8@Eth8+entury)Cpage?)

)erman +olonial soldiers engage in re+onnaissan+e in eastern #fri+a during World War /. (Photo' http'CCwww.militaryphotos.netCforumsCshowthread.phpR$J?%FM8/mperial8)erman8army8in8East8#fri+a8(early8@Eth8+entury)CpageJ)

I!#erial Ger!any $r!y General )aul E!il von (ettow%@or'eck surrenders is forces to t e Britis at $'ercon =#resent%day M'ala? in -ort ern & odesia in -ove!'er 898:. =)ainting< -ational Museu! of Tanzania?

$ !a# of t e East $frican T eater during +orld +ar I

Me!orial of $nzac "ove4 co!!e!orating t e loss of t ousands of 3tto!an Turkis and $-S$" =$ustralian%-ew Sealand%"anada? soldiers in t e Galli#oli "a!#aign in 898G.

Turkis $r!y "olonel Mustafa ,e!al =later $taturk4 fourt fro! left? a##ears wit officers of t e $nafarta Grou#4 of w ic e was given co!!and at Galli#oli =a #eninsula near "onstantino#le? in $ugust 898G. Mustafa ,e!al $taturk was t e founder and first )resident of t e &e#u'lic of Turkey fro! 3cto'er D94 89DH until is deat on -ove!'er 8E4 89H:. =) oto< tt#<55www.anzacsite.gov.au5Dvisiting5touranzac88. t!l?

$!erican soldiers of t e 0ewis fait in t e $!erican E.#editionary *orces cele'rate )assover Seder in )aris4 *rance in $#ril 8989.

$ Britis ar!y !edic looks for !edicine and 'andages fro! a kit attac ed to a Britis dog in circa 898> during +orld +ar I.

#rlington "ational !emetery in #rlington, -irginia .7er $$?,>EE #meri+an soldiers and millions of soldiers of 7arious nationalities died during World War /1 may they rest in pea+e.

To!' of t e 6nknown Soldier

F$he 'irst World War was a catastro!he of such ma"nitude that even today the ima"ination has some difficulty "ras!in" it# In t e year 898>4 in two 'attles =@erdun and t e So!!e? casualties of over 84IEE4EEE were suffered 'y 'ot sides. In t e artillery 'arrage w ic o#ened t e *renc attack on " e!in des Da!es in $#ril 898I4 884EEE4EEE s ells were fired on a HE%!ile front in 8E days. T ree !ont s later4 on an 88%!ile front at )assc endaele4 t e Britis fired 74DGE4EEE s ells costing [DD4EEE4EEE in a #reli!inary 'arrage4 and lost 7EE4EEE !en in t e ensuing infantry assault. In t e Ger!an attack of Marc 898:4 >D divisions wit 74GEE eavy guns and 84EEE #lanes were urled on a front only 7G !iles wide. 3n all fronts in t e w ole war al!ost 8H4EEE4EEE !en in t e various ar!ed forces died fro! wounds and disease. It as 'een esti!ated 'y t e "arnegie Endow!ent for International )eace t at t e war destroyed over `7EE4EEE4EEE4EEE of #ro#erty at a ti!e w en t e value of every o'2ect in *rance and Belgiu! was not wort over `IG4EEE4EEE4EEE. 3'viously4 e.#enditures of !en and wealt at rates like t ese re;uired a tre!endous !o'ilization of resources t roug out t e world4 and could not fail to ave far%reac ing effects on t e #atterns of t oug t and !odes of action of #eo#le forced to undergo suc a strain. Some states were destroyed or !ermanently cri!!led# $here were !rofound modifications in finance in economic life in social relations in intellectual outloo& and in emotional !atterns# Aevertheless two facts should be reco"ni2ed# $he war brou"ht nothin" really new into the world0 rat er it s#ed u# #rocesses of c ange w ic ad 'een going on for a considera'le #eriod and would ave continued anyway4 wit t e result t at c anges w ic would ave taken #lace over a #eriod of t irty or even fifty years in #eaceti!e were 'roug t a'out in five years during t e war. $lso4 t e c anges were !uc greater in o'2ective facts and in t e organization of society t an t ey were in !enMs ideas of t ese facts or organization. It was as if t e c anges were too ra#id for !enMs !inds to acce#t t e!4 or4 w at is !ore likely4 t at !en4 seeing t e great c anges w ic were occurring on all sides4 recognized t e!4 'ut assu!ed t at t ey were !erely te!#orary warti!e a'errations4 and t at4 w en #eace ca!e4 t ey would #ass away and everyone could go 'ack to t e slow4 #leasant world of 898H. T is #oint of view4 w ic do!inated t e t inking of t e 89DEMs4 was wides#read and very dangerous. In t eir efforts to go 'ack to 898H4 !en refused to recognize t at t e warti!e c anges were !ore or less #er!anent4 and4 instead of trying to solve t e #ro'le!s arising fro! t ese c anges4 set u# a false facade of #retense4 #ainted to look like 898H4 to cover u# t e great c anges w ic ad taken #lace. T en4 'y acting as if t is facade were reality4 and 'y neglecting t e !alad2usted reality w ic was !oving 'eneat it4 t e #eo#le of t e 89DENs drifted in a ectic world of unreality until t e world de#ression of 89D9%89HG4 and t e international crises w ic followed4 tore away t e facade and s owed t e orri'le4 long%neglected reality 'eneat it. T e !agnitude of t e war and t e fact t at it !ig t last for !ore t an si. !ont s were ;uite une.#ected for 'ot sides and were i!#ressed u#on t e! only gradually. It first 'eca!e clear in regard to consu!#tion of su##lies4 es#ecially a!!unition4 and in t e #ro'le! of ow to #ay for t ese su##lies. In 0uly 89874 t e !ilitary !en were confident t at a decision would 'e reac ed in si. !ont s 'ecause t eir !ilitary #lans and t e e.a!#les of 8:>> and 8:IE indicated an i!!ediate decision. T is 'elief was su##orted 'y t e financial e.#erts w o4 w ile greatly underesti!ating t e cost of fig ting4 were confident t at t e financial resources of all states would 'e e. austed in si. !ont s. By Lfinancial resourcesL t ey !eant t e gold reserves of t e various nations. $hese were clearly limited0 all the Great Powers were on the "old standard under which ban& notes and !a!er money could be converted into "old on demand# 4owever each country sus!ended the "old standard at the outbrea& of war# $his removed the automatic limitation on the su!!ly of !a!er money# $hen each country !roceeded to !ay for the war by borrowin" from the ban&s# $he ban&s created the money which they lent by merely "ivin" the "overnment a de!osit of any si2e a"ainst which the "overnment could draw chec&s# $he ban&s were no lon"er limited in the amount of credit they could create because they no lon"er had to !ay out "old for chec&s on demand# $hus the creation of money in the form of credit by the ban&s was limited only by the demands of its borrowers# Aaturally as "overnments borrowed to !ay for their needs !rivate businesses borrowed in order to be able to fill the "overnment's orders# $he "old which could no lon"er be demanded merely rested in the vaults e+ce!t where some of it was e+!orted to !ay for su!!lies from neutral countries or from fellow belli"erents# (s a result the !ercenta"e of outstandin" ban& notes covered by "old reserves steadily fell and the !ercenta"e of ban& credit covered by either "old or ban& notes fell even further# Aaturally when the su!!ly of money was increased in this fashion faster than the su!!ly of "oods !rices rose because a lar"er su!!ly of money was com!etin" for a smaller su!!ly of "oods# $his effect was made worse by the fact that the su!!ly of "oods tended to be reduced by wartime destruction# )eo#le received !oney for !aking ca#ital goods4 consu!ersM goods4 and !unitions4 'ut t ey could s#end t eir !oney only to 'uy consu!ersM goods4 since ca#ital goods and !unitions were not offered for sale. Since govern!ents tried to reduce t e su##ly of consu!ersM goods w ile increasing t e su##ly of t e ot er two #roducts4 t e #ro'le! of rising #rices =inflation? 'eca!e acute. $t t e sa!e ti!e t e #ro'le! of #u'lic de't 'eca!e steadily worse 'ecause govern!ents were financing suc a large #art of t eir activities 'y 'ank credit. T ese two #ro'le!s4 inflation and #u'lic de't4 continued to grow4 even after t e fig ting sto##ed4 'ecause of t e continued disru#tion of econo!ic life and t e need to #ay for #ast activities. 3nly in t e #eriod 89DE%89DG did t ese two sto# increasing in !ost countries4 and t ey re!ained #ro'le!s long after t at. Inflation indicates not only an increase in t e #rices of goods 'ut also a decrease in t e value of !oney =since it will 'uy less goods?. $ccordingly4 #eo#le in an inflation seek to get goods and to get rid of !oney. T us inflation increases #roduction and #urc ases for consu!#tion or oarding4 'ut it reduces saving or creation of ca#ital. It 'enefits de'tors ='y !aking a fi.ed%!oney de't less of a 'urden? 'ut in2ures creditors ='y reducing t e value of t eir savings and credits?. Since the middle classes of -uro!ean society with their ban& savin"s chec&in" de!osits mort"a"es insurance and bond holdin"s were the creditor class they were in1ured and even ruined by the wartime inflation# ?n Germany Poland 4un"ary and 5ussia where the inflation went so far that the monetary unit became com!letely valueless by 197@ the middle classes were lar"ely destroyed and their members were driven to

des!eration or at least to an almost !sycho!athic hatred of the form of "overnment or the social class that they believed to be res!onsible for their !li"ht# Since t e last stages of inflation w ic dealt t e fatal 'low to t e !iddle classes occurred after t e war rat er t an during it =in 89DH in Ger!any?4 t is atred was directed against t e #arlia!entary govern!ents w ic were functioning after 898: rat er t an against t e !onarc ical govern!ents w ic functioned in 8987%898:. In *rance and Italy4 w ere t e inflation went so far t at t e franc or fire was reduced #er!anently to one%fift of its #rewar value4 t e atred of t e in2ured !iddle classes was directed against t e #arlia!entary regi!e w ic ad functioned 'ot during and after t e war and against t e working class w ic t ey felt ad #rofited 'y t eir !isfortunes. T ese t ings were not true in Britain or t e 6nited States4 w ere t e inflation was 'roug t under control and t e !onetary unit restored to !ost of its #rewar value. Even in t ese countries4 #rices rose 'y DEE to HEE #ercent4 w ile #u'lic de'ts rose a'out 84EEE #ercent. T e econo!ic effects of t e war were !ore co!#licated. 5esources of all &inds includin" land labor and raw materials had to be diverted from !eacetime !ur!oses to wartime !roduction0 or in some cases resources !reviously not used at all had to be brou"ht into the !roductive system# Before t e war4 t e allot!ent of resources to #roduction ad 'een !ade 'y t e auto!atic #rocesses of t e #rice syste!/ la'or and raw !aterials going4 for e.a!#le4 to !anufacture t ose goods w ic were !ost #rofita'le rat er t an to t ose goods w ic were !ost servicea'le or socially 'eneficial4 or in 'est taste. In warti!e4 owever4 govern!ents ad to ave certain s#ecific goods for !ilitary #ur#oses/ t ey tried to get t ese goods #roduced 'y !aking t e! !ore #rofita'le t an non!ilitary goods using t e sa!e resources4 'ut t ey were not always successful. T e e.cess of #urc asing #ower in t e ands of consu!ers caused a great rise in de!and for goods of a se!i%lu.ury nature4 like w ite cotton s irts for la'orers. T is fre;uently !ade it !ore #rofita'le for !anufacturers to use cotton for !aking s irts to sell at ig #rices t an to use it to !ake e.#losives. Situations such as these made it necessary for "overnments to intervene directly in the economic !rocess to secure those results which could not be obtained by the free !rice system or to reduce those evil effects which emer"ed from wartime disru!tion# $hey a!!ealed to the !atriotism of manufacturers to ma&e thin"s that were needed rather than thin"s which were !rofitable or to the !atriotism of consumers to !ut their money into "overnment bonds rather than into "oods in short su!!ly# $hey be"an to build "overnment/owned !lants for war !roduction either usin" them for such !ur!oses themselves or leasin" them out to !rivate manufacturers at attractive terms# $hey be"an to ration consumers' "oods which were in short su!!ly li&e articles of food# $hey be"an to mono!oli2e essential raw materials and allot them to manufacturers who had war contracts rather than allow them to flow where !rices were hi"hest# $he materials so treated were "enerally fuels steel rubber co!!er wool cotton nitrates and such althou"h they varied from country to country de!endin" u!on the su!!ly# Governments be"an to re"ulate im!orts and e+!orts in order to ensure that necessary materials stayed in the country and above all did not "o to enemy states# $his led to the *ritish bloc&ade of -uro!e the rationin" of e+!orts to neutrals and com!licated ne"otiations to see that "oods in neutral countries were not re/e+!orted to enemy countries# *ribery bar"ainin" and even force came into these ne"otiations as w en t e Britis set ;uotas on t e i!#orts of Holland 'ased on t e figures for #rewar years or cut down necessary s i#!ents of Britis coal to Sweden until t ey o'tained t e concessions t ey wis ed regarding sales of Swedis goods to Ger!any. Shi!!in" and railroad trans!ortation had to be ta&en over almost com!letely in most countries in order to ensure that the inade,uate s!ace for car"o and frei"ht would be used as effectively as !ossible that loadin" and unloadin" would be s!eeded u! and that "oods essential to the war effort would be shi!!ed earlier and faster than less essential "oods# %abor had to be re"ulated and directed into essential activities# $he ra!id rise in !rices led to demands for raises in wa"es# $his led to a "rowth and stren"thenin" of labor unions and increasin" threats of stri&es# $here was no "uarantee that the wa"es of essential wor&ers would "o u! faster than the wa"es of nonessential wor&ers# Certainly the wa"es of soldiers who were the most essential of all went u! very little# T us t ere was no guarantee t at la'or4 if left solely to t e influence of wage levels4 as was usual 'efore 89874 would flow to t e occu#ations w ere it was !ost urgently needed. $ccordingly4 t e govern!ents 'egan to intervene in la'or #ro'le!s4 seeking to avoid strikes 'ut also to direct t e flow of la'or to !ore essential activities. T ere were general registrations of !en in !ost countries4 at first as #art of t e draft of !en for !ilitary service4 'ut later to control services in essential activities. Generally4 t e rig t to leave an essential 2o' was restricted4 and eventually #eo#le were directed into essential 2o's fro! nonessential activities. T e ig wages and s ortage of la'or 'roug t into t e la'or !arket !any #ersons w o would not ave 'een in it in #eaceti!e4 suc as old #ersons4 yout s4 clergy4 and4 a'ove all4 wo!en. T is flow of wo!en fro! o!es into factories or ot er services ad t e !ost #rofound effects on social life and !odes of living4 revolutionizing t e relations of t e se.es4 'ringing wo!en u# to a level of social4 legal4 and #olitical e;uality closer t an #reviously to t at of !en4 o'taining for t e! t e rig t to vote in so!e countries4 t e rig t to own or dis#ose of #ro#erty in ot er !ore 'ackward ones4 c anging t e a##earance and costu!e of wo!en 'y suc innovations as s orter skirts4 s orter air4 less frills4 and generally a drastic reduction in t e a!ount of clot ing t ey wore.J Tragedy and Hope 'y "arroll Kuigley4 )art G4 " a#ter 87 =T e Ho!e *ront4 8987%898:?

+$& IS $ &$",ET
By S!edley Darlington Butler4 Ma2or General of t e 6nited States Marine "or#s =&etired?
Chapter One: -.R /0 . R.C1ET W#, is a ra+ket. /t always has een. /t is possi ly the oldest, easily the most profita le, surely the most 7i+ious. /t is the only one international in s+ope. /t is the only one in whi+h the profits are re+koned in dollars and the losses in li7es. # ra+ket is est des+ri ed, / elie7e, as something that is not what it seems to the ma9ority of the people. .nly a small NinsideN group knows what it is a out. /t is +ondu+ted for the enefit of the 7ery few, at the eApense of the 7ery many. .ut of war a few people make huge fortunes. /n the World War O/P a mere handful garnered the profits of the +onfli+t. #t least @$,EEE new millionaires and illionaires were made in the 5nited &tates during the World War. <hat many admitted their huge lood gains in their in+ome taA returns. How many other war millionaires falsified their taA returns no one knows. How many of these war millionaires shouldered a rifleR How many of them dug a tren+hR How many of them knew what it meant to go hungry in a rat8infested dug8outR How many of them spent sleepless, frightened nights, du+king shells and shrapnel and ma+hine gun ulletsR How many of them parried a ayonet thrust of an enemyR How many of them were wounded or killed in attleR .ut of war nations a+=uire additional territory, if they are 7i+torious. <hey 9ust take it. <his newly a+=uired territory promptly is eAploited y the few Z the selfsame few who wrung dollars out of lood in the war. <he general pu li+ shoulders the ill. #nd what is this illR <his ill renders a horri le a++ounting. "ewly pla+ed gra7estones. Mangled odies. &hattered minds. Broken hearts and homes. E+onomi+ insta ility. 2epression and all its attendant miseries. Ba+k8 reaking taAation for generations and generations. *or a great many years, as a soldier, / had a suspi+ion that war was a ra+ket1 not until / retired to +i7il life did / fully reali0e it. "ow that / see the international war +louds gathering, as they are today, / must fa+e it and speak out. #gain they are +hoosing sides. *ran+e and ,ussia met and agreed to stand side y side. /taly and #ustria hurried to make a similar agreement. Poland and )ermany +ast sheepHs eyes at ea+h other, forgetting for the non+e Oone uni=ue o++asionP, their dispute o7er the Polish !orridor. <he assassination of 6ing #leAander of (ugosla7ia O;ugosla7iaP +ompli+ated matters. (ugosla7ia and Hungary, long itter enemies, were almost at ea+h otherHs throats. /taly was ready to 9ump in. But *ran+e was waiting. &o was !0e+hoslo7akia. #ll of them are looking ahead to war. "ot the people Z not those who fight and pay and die Z only those who foment wars and remain safely at home to profit. <here are IE,EEE,EEE men under arms in the world today, and our statesmen and diplomats ha7e the temerity to say that war is not in the making. HellHs ells^ #re these IE,EEE,EEE men eing trained to e dan+ersR "ot in /taly, to e sure. Premier Mussolini knows what they are eing trained for. He, at least, is frank enough to speak out. .nly the other day, /l 2u+e in N/nternational !on+iliation,N the pu li+ation of the !arnegie Endowment for /nternational Pea+e, said' 2.nd abo(e all# Fascism# the more it considers and obser(es the future and the de(elopment of humanity 3uite apart from political considerations of the moment# belie(es neither in the possibility nor the utility of perpetual peace444 -ar alone brings up to its highest tension all human energy and puts the stamp of nobility upon the people %ho ha(e the courage to meet it42 5ndou tedly Mussolini means eAa+tly what he says. His well8trained army, his great fleet of planes, and e7en his na7y are ready for war Z anAious for it, apparently. His re+ent stand at the side of Hungary in the latterHs dispute with (ugosla7ia showed that. #nd the hurried mo ili0ation of his troops on the #ustrian order after the assassination of 2ollfuss showed it too. <here are others in Europe too whose sa re rattling presages war, sooner or later. Herr Hitler, with his rearming )ermany and his +onstant demands for more and more arms, is an e=ual if not greater mena+e to pea+e. *ran+e only re+ently in+reased the term of military ser7i+e for its youth from a year to eighteen months. ;es, all o7er, nations are +amping in their arms. <he mad dogs of Europe are on the loose. /n the .rient the maneu7ering is more adroit. Ba+k in $%EI, when ,ussia and (apan fought, we ki+ked out our old friends the ,ussians and a+ked (apan. <hen our 7ery generous international ankers were finan+ing (apan. "ow the trend is to poison us against the (apanese. What does

the Nopen doorN poli+y to !hina mean to usR .ur trade with !hina is a out W%E,EEE,EEE a year. .r the Philippine /slandsR We ha7e spent a out W?EE,EEE,EEE in the Philippines in thirty8fi7e years and we (our ankers and industrialists and spe+ulators) ha7e pri7ate in7estments there of less than W@EE,EEE,EEE. <hen, to sa7e that !hina trade of a out W%E,EEE,EEE, or to prote+t these pri7ate in7estments of less than W@EE,EEE,EEE in the Philippines, we would e all stirred up to hate (apan and go to war Z a war that might well +ost us tens of illions of dollars, hundreds of thousands of li7es of #meri+ans, and many more hundreds of thousands of physi+ally maimed and mentally un alan+ed men. .f +ourse, for this loss, there would e a +ompensating profit Z fortunes would e made. Millions and illions of dollars would e piled up. By a few. Munitions makers. Bankers. &hip uilders. Manufa+turers. Meat pa+kers. &pe+ulators. <hey would fare well. ;es, they are getting ready for another war. Why shouldnHt theyR /t pays high di7idends. But what does it profit the men who are killedR What does it profit their mothers and sisters, their wi7es and their sweetheartsR What does it profit their +hildrenR What does it profit anyone eA+ept the 7ery few to whom war means huge profitsR ;es, and what does it profit the nationR <ake our own +ase. 5ntil $F%F we didnHt own a it of territory outside the mainland of "orth #meri+a. #t that time our national de t was a little more than W$,EEE,EEE,EEE. <hen we e+ame Ninternationally minded.N We forgot, or shunted aside, the ad7i+e of the *ather of our +ountry. We forgot )eorge WashingtonHs warning a out Nentangling allian+es.N We went to war. We a+=uired outside territory. #t the end of the World War period, as a dire+t result of our fiddling in international affairs, our national de t had 9umped to o7er W@J,EEE,EEE,EEE. .ur total fa7ora le trade alan+e during the twenty8fi7e8year period was a out W@I,EEE,EEE,EEE. <herefore, on a purely ookkeeping asis, we ran a little ehind year for year, and that foreign trade might well ha7e een ours without the wars. /t would ha7e een far +heaper (not to say safer) for the a7erage #meri+an who pays the ills to stay out of foreign entanglements. *or a 7ery few this ra+ket, like ootlegging and other underworld ra+kets, rings fan+y profits, ut the +ost of operations is always transferred to the people Z who do not profit. C5.PTER T-O: -5O &.1E0 T5E PROF/T06 <he World War, rather our rief parti+ipation in it, has +ost the 5nited &tates some WJ@,EEE,EEE,EEE. *igure it out. <hat means WIEE to e7ery #meri+an man, woman, and +hild. #nd we ha7enHt paid the de t yet. We are paying it, our +hildren will pay it, and our +hildrenHs +hildren pro a ly still will e paying the +ost of that war. <he normal profits of a usiness +on+ern in the 5nited &tates are siA, eight, ten, and sometimes twel7e per+ent. But war8time profits Z ah^ that is another matter Z twenty, siAty, one hundred, three hundred, and e7en eighteen hundred per +ent Z the sky is the limit. #ll that traffi+ will ear. 5n+le &am has the money. LetHs get it. .f +ourse, it isnHt put that +rudely in war time. /t is dressed into spee+hes a out patriotism, lo7e of +ountry, and Nwe must all put our shoulders to the wheel,N ut the profits 9ump and leap and skyro+ket Z and are safely po+keted. LetHs 9ust take a few eAamples' <ake our friends the du Ponts, the powder people Z didnHt one of them testify efore a &enate +ommittee re+ently that their powder won the warR .r sa7ed the world for demo+ra+yR .r somethingR How did they do in the warR <hey were a patrioti+ +orporation. Well, the a7erage earnings of the du Ponts for the period $%$E to $%$I were W?,EEE,EEE a year. /t wasnHt mu+h, ut the du Ponts managed to get along on it. "ow letHs look at their a7erage yearly profit during the war years, $%$I to $%$F. *ifty8 eight million dollars a year profit we find^ "early ten times that of normal times, and the profits of normal times were pretty good. #n in+rease in profits of more than %JE per +ent. <ake one of our little steel +ompanies that patrioti+ally shunted aside the making of rails and girders and ridges to manufa+ture war materials. Well, their $%$E8$%$I yearly earnings a7eraged W?,EEE,EEE. <hen +ame the war. #nd, like loyal +iti0ens, Bethlehem &teel promptly turned to munitions making. 2id their profits 9ump Z or did they let 5n+le &am in for a argainR Well, their $%$I8$%$F a7erage was WI%,EEE,EEE a year^

.r, letHs take 5nited &tates &teel. <he normal earnings during the fi7e8year period prior to the war were W$EJ,EEE,EEE a year. "ot ad. <hen along +ame the war and up went the profits. <he a7erage yearly profit for the period $%$I8$%$F was W@IE,EEE,EEE. "ot ad. <here you ha7e some of the steel and powder earnings. LetHs look at something else. # little +opper, perhaps. <hat always does well in war times. #na+onda, for instan+e. #7erage yearly earnings during the pre8war years $%$E8$%$I of W$E,EEE,EEE. 2uring the war years $%$I8$%$F profits leaped to WMI,EEE,EEE per year. .r 5tah !opper. #7erage of WJ,EEE,EEE per year during the $%$E8$%$I period. (umped to an a7erage of W@$,EEE,EEE yearly profits for the war period. LetHs group these fi7e, with three smaller +ompanies. <he total yearly a7erage profits of the pre8war period $%$E8$%$I were W$M>,IFE,EEE. <hen along +ame the war. <he a7erage yearly profits for this group skyro+keted to WIEF,MEE,EEE. # little in+rease in profits of approAimately @EE per +ent. 2oes war payR /t paid them. But they arenHt the only ones. <here are still others. LetHs take leather. *or the three8year period efore the war the total profits of !entral Leather !ompany were WM,JEE,EEE. <hat was approAimately W$,$?>,EEE a year. Well, in $%$? !entral Leather returned a profit of W$J,EEE,EEE, a small in+rease of $,$EE per +ent. <hatHs all. <he )eneral !hemi+al !ompany a7eraged a profit for the three years efore the war of a little o7er WFEE,EEE a year. !ame the war, and the profits 9umped to W$@,EEE,EEE. a leap of $,IEE per +ent. /nternational "i+kel !ompany Z and you +anHt ha7e a war without ni+kel Z showed an in+rease in profits from a mere a7erage of WI,EEE,EEE a year to W>M,EEE,EEE yearly. "ot adR #n in+rease of more than $,>EE per +ent. #meri+an &ugar ,efining !ompany a7eraged W@,EEE,EEE a year for the three years efore the war. /n $%$? a profit of W?,EEE,EEE was re+orded. Listen to &enate 2o+ument "o. @J%. <he &iAty8*ifth !ongress, reporting on +orporate earnings and go7ernment re7enues. !onsidering the profits of $@@ meat pa+kers, $JM +otton manufa+turers, @%% garment makers, I% steel plants, and MIE +oal produ+ers during the war. Profits under @J per +ent were eA+eptional. *or instan+e the +oal +ompanies made etween $EE per +ent and >,FJ? per +ent on their +apital sto+k during the war. <he !hi+ago pa+kers dou led and tripled their earnings. #nd let us not forget the ankers who finan+ed the great war. /f anyone had the +ream of the profits it was the ankers. Being partnerships rather than in+orporated organi0ations, they do not ha7e to report to sto+kholders. #nd their profits were as se+ret as they were immense. How the ankers made their millions and their illions / do not know, e+ause those little se+rets ne7er e+ome pu li+ Z e7en efore a &enate in7estigatory ody. But hereHs how some of the other patrioti+ industrialists and spe+ulators +hiseled their way into war profits. <ake the shoe people. <hey like war. /t rings usiness with a normal profits. <hey made huge profits on sales a road to our allies. Perhaps, like the munitions manufa+turers and armament makers, they also sold to the enemy. *or a dollar is a dollar whether it +omes from )ermany or from *ran+e. But they did well y 5n+le &am too. *or instan+e, they sold 5n+le &am MJ,EEE,EEE pairs of ho nailed ser7i+e shoes. <here were I,EEE,EEE soldiers. Eight pairs, and more, to a soldier. My regiment during the war had only one pair to a soldier. &ome of these shoes pro a ly are still in eAisten+e. <hey were good shoes. But when the war was o7er 5n+le &am has a matter of @J,EEE,EEE pairs left o7er. Bought Z and paid for. Profits re+orded and po+keted. <here was still lots of leather left. &o the leather people sold your 5n+le &am hundreds of thousands of M+!lellan saddles for the +a7alry. But there wasnHt any #meri+an +a7alry o7erseas^ &ome ody had to get rid of this leather, howe7er. &ome ody had to make a profit in it Z so we had a lot of M+!lellan saddles. #nd we pro a ly ha7e those yet. #lso some ody had a lot of mos=uito netting. <hey sold your 5n+le &am @E,EEE,EEE mos=uito nets for the use of the soldiers o7erseas. / suppose the oys were eApe+ted to put it o7er them as they tried to sleep in muddy tren+hes Z one hand s+rat+hing +ooties on their a+ks and the other making passes at s+urrying rats. Well, not one of these mos=uito nets e7er got to *ran+e^ #nyhow, these thoughtful manufa+turers wanted to make sure that no soldier would e without his mos=uito net, so IE,EEE,EEE additional yards of mos=uito netting were sold to 5n+le &am.

<here were pretty good profits in mos=uito netting in those days, e7en if there were no mos=uitoes in *ran+e. / suppose, if the war had lasted 9ust a little longer, the enterprising mos=uito netting manufa+turers would ha7e sold your 5n+le &am a +ouple of +onsignments of mos=uitoes to plant in *ran+e so that more mos=uito netting would e in order. #irplane and engine manufa+turers felt they, too, should get their 9ust profits out of this war. Why notR E7ery ody else was getting theirs. &o W$,EEE,EEE,EEE Z +ount them if you li7e long enough Z was spent y 5n+le &am in uilding airplane engines that ne7er left the ground^ "ot one plane, or motor, out of the illion dollars worth ordered, e7er got into a attle in *ran+e. (ust the same the manufa+turers made their little profit of ME, $EE, or perhaps MEE per +ent. 5ndershirts for soldiers +ost $I_ O+entsP to make and un+le &am paid ME_ to IE_ ea+h for them Z a ni+e little profit for the undershirt manufa+turer. #nd the sto+king manufa+turer and the uniform manufa+turers and the +ap manufa+turers and the steel helmet manufa+turers Z all got theirs. Why, when the war was o7er some I,EEE,EEE sets of e=uipment Z knapsa+ks and the things that go to fill them Z +rammed warehouses on this side. "ow they are eing s+rapped e+ause the regulations ha7e +hanged the +ontents. But the manufa+turers +olle+ted their wartime profits on them Z and they will do it all o7er again the neAt time. <here were lots of rilliant ideas for profit making during the war. .ne 7ery 7ersatile patriot sold 5n+le &am twel7e do0en IF8in+h wren+hes. .h, they were 7ery ni+e wren+hes. <he only trou le was that there was only one nut e7er made that was large enough for these wren+hes. <hat is the one that holds the tur ines at "iagara *alls. Well, after 5n+le &am had ought them and the manufa+turer had po+keted the profit, the wren+hes were put on freight +ars and shunted all around the 5nited &tates in an effort to find a use for them. When the #rmisti+e was signed it was indeed a sad low to the wren+h manufa+turer. He was 9ust a out to make some nuts to fit the wren+hes. <hen he planned to sell these, too, to your 5n+le &am. &till another had the rilliant idea that +olonels shouldnHt ride in automo iles, nor should they e7en ride on horse a+k. .ne has pro a ly seen a pi+ture of #ndy (a+kson riding in a u+k oard. Well, some ?,EEE u+k oards were sold to 5n+le &am for the use of +olonels^ "ot one of them was used. But the u+k oard manufa+turer got his war profit. <he ship uilders felt they should +ome in on some of it, too. <hey uilt a lot of ships that made a lot of profit. More than WM,EEE,EEE,EEE worth. &ome of the ships were all right. But W?MJ,EEE,EEE worth of them were made of wood and wouldnHt float^ <he seams opened up Z and they sank. We paid for them, though. #nd some ody po+keted the profits. /t has een estimated y statisti+ians and e+onomists and resear+hers that the war +ost your 5n+le &am WJ@,EEE,EEE,EEE. .f this sum, WM%,EEE,EEE,EEE was eApended in the a+tual war itself. <his eApenditure yielded W$?,EEE,EEE,EEE in profits. <hat is how the @$,EEE illionaires and millionaires got that way. <his W$?,EEE,EEE,EEE profits is not to e snee0ed at. /t is =uite a tidy sum. #nd it went to a 7ery few. <he &enate ("ye) +ommittee pro e of the munitions industry and its wartime profits, despite its sensational dis+losures, hardly has s+rat+hed the surfa+e. E7en so, it has had some effe+t. <he &tate 2epartment has een studying Nfor some timeN methods of keeping out of war. <he War 2epartment suddenly de+ides it has a wonderful plan to spring. <he #dministration names a +ommittee Z with the War and "a7y 2epartments a ly represented under the +hairmanship of a Wall &treet spe+ulator Z to limit profits in war time. <o what eAtent isnHt suggested. Hmmm. Possi ly the profits of MEE and ?EE and $,?EE per +ent of those who turned lood into gold in the World War would e limited to some smaller figure. #pparently, howe7er, the plan does not +all for any limitation of losses Z that is, the losses of those who fight the war. #s far as / ha7e een a le to as+ertain there is nothing in the s+heme to limit a soldier to the loss of ut one eye, or one arm, or to limit his wounds to one or two or three. .r to limit the loss of life. <here is nothing in this s+heme, apparently, that says not more than $@ per +ent of a regiment shall e wounded in attle, or that not more than > per +ent in a di7ision shall e killed. .f +ourse, the +ommittee +annot e othered with su+h trifling matters. C5.PTER T5REE: -5O P.70 T5E 8/9906 Who pro7ides the profits Z these ni+e little profits of @E, $EE, MEE, $,JEE and $,FEE per +entR We all pay them Z in taAation. We paid the ankers their profits when we ought Li erty Bonds at W$EE.EE and sold them a+k at WFI or WF? to the ankers. <hese

ankers +olle+ted W$EE plus. /t was a simple manipulation. <he ankers +ontrol the se+urity marts. /t was easy for them to depress the pri+e of these onds. <hen all of us Z the people Z got frightened and sold the onds at WFI or WF?. <he ankers ought them. <hen these same ankers stimulated a oom and go7ernment onds went to par Z and a o7e. <hen the ankers +olle+ted their profits. But the soldier pays the iggest part of the ill. /f you donHt elie7e this, 7isit the #meri+an +emeteries on the attlefields a road. .r 7isit any of the 7eteranHs hospitals in the 5nited &tates. .n a tour of the +ountry, in the midst of whi+h / am at the time of this writing, / ha7e 7isited eighteen go7ernment hospitals for 7eterans. /n them are a total of a out JE,EEE destroyed men Z men who were the pi+k of the nation eighteen years ago. <he 7ery a le +hief surgeon at the go7ernment hospital1 at Milwaukee, where there are M,FEE of the li7ing dead, told me that mortality among 7eterans is three times as great as among those who stayed at home. Boys with a normal 7iewpoint were taken out of the fields and offi+es and fa+tories and +lassrooms and put into the ranks. <here they were remolded1 they were made o7er1 they were made to Na out fa+eN1 to regard murder as the order of the day. <hey were put shoulder to shoulder and, through mass psy+hology, they were entirely +hanged. We used them for a +ouple of years and trained them to think nothing at all of killing or of eing killed. <hen, suddenly, we dis+harged them and told them to make another Na out fa+eN ^ <his time they had to do their own read9ustment, sans OwithoutP mass psy+hology, sans offi+ersH aid and ad7i+e and sans nation8wide propaganda. We didnHt need them any more. &o we s+attered them a out without any Nthree8minuteN or NLi erty LoanN spee+hes or parades. Many, too many, of these fine young oys are e7entually destroyed, mentally, e+ause they +ould not make that final Na out fa+eN alone. /n the go7ernment hospital in Marion, /ndiana, $,FEE of these oys are in pens^ *i7e hundred of them in a arra+ks with steel ars and wires all around outside the uildings and on the por+hes. <hese already ha7e een mentally destroyed. <hese oys donHt e7en look like human eings. .h, the looks on their fa+es^ Physi+ally, they are in good shape1 mentally, they are gone. <here are thousands and thousands of these +ases, and more and more are +oming in all the time. <he tremendous eA+itement of the war, the sudden +utting off of that eA+itement Z the young oys +ouldnHt stand it. <hatHs a part of the ill. &o mu+h for the dead Z they ha7e paid their part of the war profits. &o mu+h for the mentally and physi+ally wounded Z they are paying now their share of the war profits. But the others paid, too Z they paid with heart reaks when they tore themsel7es away from their firesides and their families to don the uniform of 5n+le &am Z on whi+h a profit had een made. <hey paid another part in the training +amps where they were regimented and drilled while others took their 9o s and their pla+es in the li7es of their +ommunities. <he paid for it in the tren+hes where they shot and were shot1 where they were hungry for days at a time1 where they slept in the mud and the +old and in the rain Z with the moans and shrieks of the dying for a horri le lulla y. But donHt forget Z the soldier paid part of the dollars and +ents ill too. 5p to and in+luding the &panish8#meri+an War, we had a pri0e system, and soldiers and sailors fought for money. 2uring the !i7il War they were paid onuses, in many instan+es, efore they went into ser7i+e. <he go7ernment, or states, paid as high as W$,@EE for an enlistment. /n the &panish8#meri+an War they ga7e pri0e money. When we +aptured any 7essels, the soldiers all got their share Z at least, they were supposed to. <hen it was found that we +ould redu+e the +ost of wars y taking all the pri0e money and keeping it, ut +ons+ripting OdraftingP the soldier anyway. <hen soldiers +ouldnHt argain for their la or, E7eryone else +ould argain, ut the soldier +ouldnHt. "apoleon on+e said, N#ll men are enamored of de+orations...they positi7ely hunger for them.N &o y de7eloping the "apoleoni+ system Z the medal usiness Z the go7ernment learned it +ould get soldiers for less money, e+ause the oys liked to e de+orated. 5ntil the !i7il War there were no medals. <hen the !ongressional Medal of Honor was handed out. /t made enlistments easier. #fter the !i7il War no new medals were issued until the &panish8#meri+an War. /n the World War, we used propaganda to make the oys a++ept +ons+ription. <hey were made to feel ashamed if they didnHt 9oin the army. &o 7i+ious was this war propaganda that e7en )od was rought into it. With few eA+eptions our +lergymen 9oined in the +lamor to kill, kill, kill. <o kill the )ermans. )od is on our side...it is His will that the )ermans e killed. #nd in )ermany, the good pastors +alled upon the )ermans to kill the allies...to please the same )od. <hat was a part of the general propaganda, uilt up to make people war +ons+ious and murder +ons+ious. Beautiful ideals were painted for our oys who were sent out to die. <his was the Nwar to end all wars.N <his was the Nwar to make the world safe for demo+ra+y.N "o one mentioned to them, as they mar+hed away, that their going and their dying would

mean huge war profits. "o one told these #meri+an soldiers that they might e shot down y ullets made y their own rothers here. "o one told them that the ships on whi+h they were going to +ross might e torpedoed y su marines uilt with 5nited &tates patents. <hey were 9ust told it was to e a Nglorious ad7enture.N <hus, ha7ing stuffed patriotism down their throats, it was de+ided to make them help pay for the war, too. &o, we ga7e them the large salary of WME a month. #ll they had to do for this munifi+ent sum was to lea7e their dear ones ehind, gi7e up their 9o s, lie in swampy tren+hes, eat +anned willy (when they +ould get it) and kill and kill and kill...and e killed. But wait^ Half of that wage (9ust a little more than a ri7eter in a shipyard or a la orer in a munitions fa+tory safe at home made in a day) was promptly taken from him to support his dependents, so that they would not e+ome a +harge upon his +ommunity. <hen we made him pay what amounted to a++ident insuran+e Z something the employer pays for in an enlightened state Z and that +ost him W? a month. He had less than W% a month left. <hen, the most +rowning insolen+e of all Z he was 7irtually la+k9a+ked into paying for his own ammunition, +lothing, and food y eing made to uy Li erty Bonds. Most soldiers got no money at all on pay days. We made them uy Li erty Bonds at W$EE and then we ought them a+k Z when they +ame a+k from the war and +ouldnHt find work Z at WFI and WF?. #nd the soldiers ought a out W@,EEE,EEE,EEE worth of these onds^ ;es, the soldier pays the greater part of the ill. His family pays too. <hey pay it in the same heart8 reak that he does. #s he suffers, they suffer. #t nights, as he lay in the tren+hes and wat+hed shrapnel urst a out him, they lay home in their eds and tossed sleeplessly Z his father, his mother, his wife, his sisters, his rothers, his sons, and his daughters. When he returned home minus an eye, or minus a leg or with his mind roken, they suffered too Z as mu+h as and e7en sometimes more than he. ;es, and they, too, +ontri uted their dollars to the profits of the munitions makers and ankers and ship uilders and the manufa+turers and the spe+ulators made. <hey, too, ought Li erty Bonds and +ontri uted to the profit of the ankers after the #rmisti+e in the ho+us8po+us of manipulated Li erty Bond pri+es. #nd e7en now the families of the wounded men and of the mentally roken and those who ne7er were a le to read9ust themsel7es are still suffering and still paying. C5.PTER FO:R: 5O- TO 0&.05 T5/0 R.C1ET; WELL, itHs a ra+ket, all right. # few profit Z and the many pay. But there is a way to stop it. ;ou +anHt end it y disarmament +onferen+es. ;ou +anHt eliminate it y pea+e parleys at )ene7a. Well8meaning ut impra+ti+al groups +anHt wipe it out y resolutions. /t +an e smashed effe+ti7ely only y taking the profit out of war. <he only way to smash this ra+ket is to +ons+ript +apital and industry and la or efore the nations manhood +an e +ons+ripted. .ne month efore the )o7ernment +an +ons+ript the young men of the nation Z it must +ons+ript +apital and industry and la or. Let the offi+ers and the dire+tors and the high8powered eAe+uti7es of our armament fa+tories and our munitions makers and our ship uilders and our airplane uilders and the manufa+turers of all the other things that pro7ide profit in war time as well as the ankers and the spe+ulators, e +ons+ripted Z to get WME a month, the same wage as the lads in the tren+hes get. Let the workers in these plants get the same wages Z all the workers, all presidents, all eAe+uti7es, all dire+tors, all managers, all ankers Z yes, and all generals and all admirals and all offi+ers and all politi+ians and all go7ernment offi+e holders Z e7eryone in the nation e restri+ted to a total monthly in+ome not to eA+eed that paid to the soldier in the tren+hes^ Let all these kings and ty+oons and masters of usiness and all those workers in industry and all our senators and go7ernors and ma9ors pay half of their monthly WME wage to their families and pay war risk insuran+e and uy Li erty Bonds. Why shouldnHt theyR <hey arenHt running any risk of eing killed or of ha7ing their odies mangled or their minds shattered. <hey arenHt sleeping in muddy tren+hes. <hey arenHt hungry. <he soldiers are^ )i7e +apital and industry and la or thirty days to think it o7er and you will find, y that time, there will e no war. <hat will smash the war ra+ket Z that and nothing else.

May e / am a little too optimisti+. !apital still has some say. &o +apital wonHt permit the taking of the profit out of war until the people Z those who do the suffering and still pay the pri+e Z make up their minds that those they ele+t to offi+e shall do their idding, and not that of the profiteers. #nother step ne+essary in this fight to smash the war ra+ket is the limited ple is+ite to determine whether a war should e de+lared. # ple is+ite not of all the 7oters ut merely of those who would e +alled upon to do the fighting and dying. <here wouldnHt e 7ery mu+h sense in ha7ing a >?8year8old president of a munitions fa+tory or the flat8footed head of an international anking firm or the +ross8eyed manager of a uniform manufa+turing plant Z all of whom see 7isions of tremendous profits in the e7ent of war Z 7oting on whether the nation should go to war or not. <hey ne7er would e +alled upon to shoulder arms Z to sleep in a tren+h and to e shot. .nly those who would e +alled upon to risk their li7es for their +ountry should ha7e the pri7ilege of 7oting to determine whether the nation should go to war. <here is ample pre+edent for restri+ting the 7oting to those affe+ted. Many of our states ha7e restri+tions on those permitted to 7ote. /n most, it is ne+essary to e a le to read and write efore you may 7ote. /n some, you must own property. /t would e a simple matter ea+h year for the men +oming of military age to register in their +ommunities as they did in the draft during the World War and e eAamined physi+ally. <hose who +ould pass and who would therefore e +alled upon to ear arms in the e7ent of war would e eligi le to 7ote in a limited ple is+ite. <hey should e the ones to ha7e the power to de+ide Z and not a !ongress few of whose mem ers are within the age limit and fewer still of whom are in physi+al +ondition to ear arms. .nly those who must suffer should ha7e the right to 7ote. # third step in this usiness of smashing the war ra+ket is to make +ertain that our military for+es are truly for+es for defense only. #t ea+h session of !ongress the =uestion of further na7al appropriations +omes up. <he swi7el8+hair admirals of Washington (and there are always a lot of them) are 7ery adroit lo yists. #nd they are smart. <hey donHt shout that NWe need a lot of attleships to war on this nation or that nation.N .h no. *irst of all, they let it e known that #meri+a is mena+ed y a great na7al power. #lmost any day, these admirals will tell you, the great fleet of this supposed enemy will strike suddenly and annihilate $@J,EEE,EEE people. (ust like that. <hen they egin to +ry for a larger na7y. *or whatR <o fight the enemyR .h my, no. .h, no. *or defense purposes only. <hen, in+identally, they announ+e maneu7ers in the Pa+ifi+. *or defense. 5h, huh. <he Pa+ifi+ is a great ig o+ean. We ha7e a tremendous +oastline on the Pa+ifi+. Will the maneu7ers e off the +oast, two or three hundred milesR .h, no. <he maneu7ers will e two thousand, yes, perhaps e7en thirty8fi7e hundred miles, off the +oast. <he (apanese, a proud people, of +ourse will e pleased eyond eApression to see the united &tates fleet so +lose to "ipponHs shores. E7en as pleased as would e the residents of !alifornia were they to dimly dis+ern through the morning mist, the (apanese fleet playing at war games off Los #ngeles. <he ships of our na7y, it +an e seen, should e spe+ifi+ally limited, y law, to within @EE miles of our +oastline. Had that een the law in $F%F the Maine would ne7er ha7e gone to Ha7ana Har or. &he ne7er would ha7e een lown up. <here would ha7e een no war with &pain with its attendant loss of life. <wo hundred miles is ample, in the opinion of eAperts, for defense purposes. .ur nation +annot start an offensi7e war if its ships +anHt go further than @EE miles from the +oastline. Planes might e permitted to go as far as JEE miles from the +oast for purposes of re+onnaissan+e. #nd the army should ne7er lea7e the territorial limits of our nation. <o summari0e' <hree steps must e taken to smash the war ra+ket. We must take the profit out of war. We must permit the youth of the land who would ear arms to de+ide whether or not there should e war. We must limit our military for+es to home defense purposes. C5.PTER F/<E: TO 5E99 -/T5 -.R; / am not a fool as to elie7e that war is a thing of the past. / know the people do not want war, ut there is no use in saying we +annot e pushed into another war. Looking a+k, Woodrow Wilson was re8ele+ted president in $%$? on a platform that he had Nkept us out of warN and on the implied promise that he would Nkeep us out of war.N ;et, fi7e months later he asked !ongress to de+lare war on )ermany.

/n that fi7e8month inter7al the people had not een asked whether they had +hanged their minds. <he I,EEE,EEE young men who put on uniforms and mar+hed or sailed away were not asked whether they wanted to go forth to suffer and die. <hen what +aused our go7ernment to +hange its mind so suddenlyR Money. #n allied +ommission, it may e re+alled, +ame o7er shortly efore the war de+laration and +alled on the President. <he President summoned a group of ad7isers. <he head of the +ommission spoke. &tripped of its diplomati+ language, this is what he told the President and his group' N<here is no use kidding oursel7es any longer. <he +ause of the allies is lost. We now owe you (#meri+an ankers, #meri+an munitions makers, #meri+an manufa+turers, #meri+an spe+ulators, #meri+an eAporters) fi7e or siA illion dollars. /f we lose (and without the help of the 5nited &tates we must lose) we, England, *ran+e and /taly, +annot pay a+k this money...and )ermany wonHt. &o...N Had se+re+y een outlawed as far as war negotiations were +on+erned, and had the press een in7ited to e present at that +onferen+e, or had radio een a7aila le to road+ast the pro+eedings, #meri+a ne7er would ha7e entered the World War. But this +onferen+e, like all war dis+ussions, was shrouded in utmost se+re+y. When our oys were sent off to war they were told it was a Nwar to make the world safe for demo+ra+yN and a Nwar to end all wars.N Well, eighteen years after, the world has less of demo+ra+y than it had then. Besides, what usiness is it of ours whether ,ussia or )ermany or England or *ran+e or /taly or #ustria li7e under demo+ra+ies or monar+hiesR Whether they are *as+ists or !ommunistsR .ur pro lem is to preser7e our own demo+ra+y. #nd 7ery little, if anything, has een a++omplished to assure us that the World War was really the war to end all wars. ;es, we ha7e had disarmament +onferen+es and limitations of arms +onferen+es. <hey donHt mean a thing. .ne has 9ust failed1 the results of another ha7e een nullified. We send our professional soldiers and our sailors and our politi+ians and our diplomats to these +onferen+es. #nd what happensR <he professional soldiers and sailors donHt want to disarm. "o admiral wants to e without a ship. "o general wants to e without a +ommand. Both mean men without 9o s. <hey are not for disarmament. <hey +annot e for limitations of arms. #nd at all these +onferen+es, lurking in the a+kground ut all8powerful, 9ust the same, are the sinister agents of those who profit y war. <hey see to it that these +onferen+es do not disarm or seriously limit armaments. <he +hief aim of any power at any of these +onferen+es has not een to a+hie7e disarmament to pre7ent war ut rather to get more armament for itself and less for any potential foe. <here is only one way to disarm with any sem lan+e of pra+ti+a ility. <hat is for all nations to get together and s+rap e7ery ship, e7ery gun, e7ery rifle, e7ery tank, e7ery war plane. E7en this, if it were possi le, would not e enough. <he neAt war, a++ording to eAperts, will e fought not with attleships, not y artillery, not with rifles and not with ma+hine guns. /t will e fought with deadly +hemi+als and gases. &e+retly ea+h nation is studying and perfe+ting newer and ghastlier means of annihilating its foes wholesale. ;es, ships will +ontinue to e uilt, for the ship uilders must make their profits. #nd guns still will e manufa+tured and powder and rifles will e made, for the munitions makers must make their huge profits. #nd the soldiers, of +ourse, must wear uniforms, for the manufa+turer must make their war profits too. But 7i+tory or defeat will e determined y the skill and ingenuity of our s+ientists. /f we put them to work making poison gas and more and more fiendish me+hani+al and eAplosi7e instruments of destru+tion, they will ha7e no time for the +onstru+ti7e 9o of uilding greater prosperity for all peoples. By putting them to this useful 9o , we +an all make more money out of pea+e than we +an out of war Z e7en the munitions makers. &o.../ say, TO HELL WITH WAR!

````````

E.cer#t in 89HH 'y Gen. S!edley Butler +ar is 2ust a racket. $ racket is 'est descri'ed4 I 'elieve4 as so!et ing t at is not w at it see!s to t e !a2ority of #eo#le. 3nly a s!all inside grou# knows w at it is a'out. It is conducted for t e 'enefit of t e very few at t e e.#ense of t e !asses. I 'elieve in ade;uate defense at t e coastline and not ing else. If a nation co!es over ere to fig t4 t en weMll fig t. T e trou'le wit $!erica is t at w en t e dollar only earns > #ercent over ere4 t en it gets restless and goes overseas to get 8EE #ercent. T en t e flag follows t e dollar and t e soldiers follow t e flag. I wouldnMt go to war again as I ave done to #rotect so!e lousy invest!ent of t e 'ankers. T ere are only two t ings we s ould fig t for. 3ne is t e defense of our o!es and t e ot er is t e Bill of &ig ts. +ar for any ot er reason is si!#ly a racket. T ere isnMt a trick in t e racketeering 'ag t at t e !ilitary gang is 'lind to. It as its Lfinger !enL to #oint out ene!ies4 its L!uscle !enL to destroy ene!ies4 its L'rain !enL to #lan war #re#arations4 and a LBig BossL Su#er%-ationalistic%"a#italis!. It !ay see! odd for !e4 a !ilitary !an to ado#t suc a co!#arison. Trut fulness co!#els !e to. I s#ent t irty% t ree years and four !ont s in active !ilitary service as a !e!'er of t is countryMs !ost agile !ilitary force4 t e Marine "or#s. I served in all co!!issioned ranks fro! Second (ieutenant to Ma2or%General. $nd during t at #eriod4 I s#ent !ost of !y ti!e 'eing a ig class !uscle% !an for Big Business4 for +all Street and for t e Bankers. In s ort4 I was a racketeer4 a gangster for ca#italis!. I sus#ected I was 2ust #art of a racket at t e ti!e. -ow I a! sure of it. (ike all t e !e!'ers of t e !ilitary #rofession4 I never ad a t oug t of !y own until I left t e service. My !ental faculties re!ained in sus#ended ani!ation w ile I o'eyed t e orders of ig er%u#s. T is is ty#ical wit everyone in t e !ilitary service. I el#ed !ake Me.ico4 es#ecially Ta!#ico4 safe for $!erican oil interests in 8987. I el#ed !ake Haiti and "u'a a decent #lace for t e -ational "ity Bank 'oys to collect revenues in. I el#ed in t e ra#ing of alf a dozen "entral $!erican re#u'lics for t e 'enefits of +all Street. T e record of racketeering is long. I el#ed #urify -icaragua for t e international 'anking ouse of Brown Brot ers in 89E9%898D. I 'roug t lig t to t e Do!inican &e#u'lic for $!erican sugar interests in 898>. In " ina I el#ed to see to it t at Standard 3il went its way un!olested. During t ose years4 I ad4 as t e 'oys in t e 'ack roo! would say4 a swell racket. (ooking 'ack on it4 I feel t at I could ave given $l "a#one a few ints. T e 'est e could do was to o#erate is racket in t ree districts. I o#erated on t ree continents.

Ma2. Gen. S!edley D. Butler4 6SM" =retired? *io"ra!hical Summary of Smedley .arlin"ton *utler: Ma2or General 6nited States Marine "or#s A&etiredB $warded two "ongressional !edals of Honor4 for ca#ture of @era "ruz4 Me.ico4 89874 and for ca#ture of *t. &iviere4 Haiti4 898I Distinguis ed service !edal4 89894 &etired 3ct. 84 89H8 3n leave of a'sence to act as director of De#art!ent of Safety4 ) iladel# ia4 89HD/ (ecturer 89HENs4 &e#u'lican "andidate for Senate4 89HD Born +est " ester4 )a.4 0uly HE4 8::8/ Died at -aval Hos#ital4 ) iladel# ia4 0une D84 897E

+illia! ). (itynski

$B36T THE $6TH3&< +illia! ). (itynski served in t e 6.S. $r!y fro! DEE8 to DEE7 as a soldier in t e *irst $r!ored Division in Ger!any =8%8 "$@4 Budingen?/ +illia! ). (itynski was de#loyed to Ira; =near Bag dad? fro! $#ril DEEH to 0uly DEE7. He as traveled to !any cities and #laces4 including Tokyo4 (ondon4 )aris4 &o!e4 Berlin4 @ienna4 Munic 4 "ologne4 *rankfurt4 Milan4 @enice4 (u.e!'ourg "ity4 Boston4 ) iladel# ia4 -ew 1ork "ity4 +as ington D.".4 Balti!ore4 " icago4 San *rancisco4 San Diego4 Seattle4 Denver4 Dallas4 -ew Haven ="onnecticut?4 1ale 6niversity4 Harvard 6niversity4 )rinceton 6niversity4 "olu!'ia 6niversity4 Bucking a! )alace4 Britis )arlia!ent4 &eic stag4 Grand "anyon4 Swiss $l#s4 and t e & ine &iver valley. He lived in "restview4 *lorida for several years and lived at 1okota $ir Base4 0a#an near Tokyo fro! 89:I to 899H. E%!ail< w#lH87bya oo.co!