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LESSONS
LEARNED
IN
EACEKEEPING
OPERATIONS
LESSONS
LEARNED
IN
EACEKEEPING
OPERATIONS
Foreword
to AHG Lessons Learned in
Peacekeeping operations
As witnessed by the NATO-led IFOR and SFOR operations in Bosnia, peacekeeping has
assumed a prominent place among NATOs new missions after the end of the Cold War. Since
1992, peacekeeping has also been a subject for consultations with Partners in the Ad Hoc Group on
Cooperation in Peacekeeping. Indeed, the Ad Hoc Group has become the principal forum for ex-
changing views and sharing experiences among Allies and Partners in the feld of peacekeeping.
In the course of its work, the Group has produced two detailed special reports on cooperation
in peacekeeping, which are a unique example of a coherent and successful regional effort to develop
common concepts of peacekeeping. The frst report from 1993 - known as the Athens Report -
dealt with conceptual approaches to peacekeeping. A second report, the Follow-On to the Athens
Report of 1995, revisited these issues in the light of experiences gained since 1993.

Drawing on the extensive peacekeeping experience of Group members, including in the
former Yugoslavia, the members of the Ad Hoc Group have completed the present compendium
of Lessons Learned in Peacekeeping Operations. The paper refects national experiences gained
by Allied and Partner countries in areas such as the preparation, implementation and operations
aspects of such operations. By exchanging national experiences, Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council
(EAPC) members aim to develop further common practical approaches to peacekeeping.
The common understanding and valuable lessons contained in the report bears witness to
the utility of cooperation activities taking place within the framework of the EAPC. It also offers
useful substance to our regular interchanges and cooperation with the UN, OSCE and other rele-
vant organisations in the feld of peacekeeping.
AmbassadorS.Balanzino
DeputySecretaryGeneral
ChairmanoftheAdHocGrouponCooperationinPeacekeeping
LESSONS
LEARNED
IN
PEACEKEEPING
OPERATIONS
LESSONS
LEARNED
IN
PEACEKEEPING
OPERATIONS
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION 1 - 3
PRACTICALLESSONSLEARNED
GroupI:Preparation
A. Planning 4 - 18
B. CoordinationAmongTroopContributingNations 19 - 21
andWithImplementingOrganisation
C. CoordinationAmongInstitutions 22 - 24
(includingHumanitarianAspectsandRefugees)
D. RoleofNeighbouringCountries 25 - 29
GroupII:Implementation
E. Civil-MilitaryRelations 30 - 35
F. PublicRelations 36 - 42
G. CommandandControl 43 - 46
GroupIII:Operations
H. CommunicationandInformationSystems 47 - 48
I. InformationandIntelligence 49 - 52
J. Logistics 53 - 61
K. MedicalSupport 62 - 71
L. Training 72 - 80
M. PersonnelandAdministration 81
N. FinancialAspects 82 - 87
LESSONS LEARNED IN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS S
INTRODUCTION
1
TheAdHocGrouponCooperationinPeacekee-
pingwasestablishedwithintheframeworkofNACCin1993.TheaimoftheGroupistodevelop
acommonunderstandingofthepoliticalprinciplesofandthetoolsforpeacekeeping,andto
shareexperienceandtherebydevelopcommonpracticalapproachesandcooperationinsup-
portofpeacekeepingundertheresponsibilityoftheUNortheOSCE.Sinceitsinception,the
Grouphasprovidedavaluableforumforcomparingnationalexperiencesandlearninglessons
arising from our participation in peacekeeping operations. The Group presented Ministers
withaninitialreportattheirAthensMeetingon11thJune1993,andsupplementedthiswitha
Follow-Onreport,refectinglessonslearnedinmorerecentoperations,inDecember1995.
2
TheAthensReportanditsFollow-Oncollectively
provideagoodbasisforacommonunderstandingofthepoliticalprinciplesinvolvedinpea-
cekeeping.TheAdHocGrouponCooperationinPeacekeepinghasnowtakenitsworkone
stepfurther,withtheaimofdevelopingcommonpracticalapproachestopeacekeeping,which
wasalsoidentifedasanobjectiveinthe1993AthensReport.Thiscurrentpaperrepresentsa
compendiumofpracticalnationalexperiencesinrecentpeacekeepingoperations,principally
(butnotexclusively)intheformerYugoslavia.
3
In carrying out this exercise, theAd Hoc Group
onCooperationinPeacekeepingnotedtheimportanceofcontinuingclosecooperationand
regularinterchangeswiththerelevantelementsoftheUNandtheOSCE,toensurethatlessons
learnedaregiventhewidestpossibledistribution.
LESSONS LEARNED IN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS 7
PRACTICALLESSONSLEARNED
GROUP I
Preparation
A. Planning
GENERALEXPERIENCES
4
Unityofeffortofallcomponentsofanoperation,
aswellascooperationamongallrelevantbodiesinthefeld,mustbeestablishedfromthe
beginningofamissionandmustbeforeseenintheplanningprocess.ThestrategiclevelHea-
dquarters(HQ)shoulddevelopthedirectionandconceptofoperations,andcoordinatethe
initialgenerationofforces.Inparallel,acoordinatedmissionplanshouldbepreparedatthe
operationallevel.ThisshouldideallybecoordinatedunderaMissionHeaddrawingtogether
allmissioncomponents,includingallocationoftasksandprioritiesandlogisticaspects.Time
mustbeallowedfortheproperformationofthemissionHQbeforedeployment.
5
Planningapeacekeepingoperationshouldnotbe
conductedinisolation,andplannersshouldinparticularbeawareofthepossibleimpactof
theiractivityonpublicopinion.Planningforaworst-casescenariohasproventobethe
bestprerequisiteforasuccessfulpeacekeepingoperation.Plannersmusttakeintoaccountand
coordinateallelementsofthemissionwithaviewtoachievingitsoverallobjective.Allrelevant
actors,includingtheForceCommander,mustbeinvolvedinthejointandcombinedmilitary
andcivilianplanningprocessfromtheearlieststage.Reinforcedandimprovedmechanisms
ofcoordinationshouldbedevelopedbetweentheinternationalorganisationimplementing
theoperationandallpotentialcontributors.Forexample,allpotentialcontributorsshouldbe
informedoftheexpectedforcerequirementsatanearlystage.Moreover,theconceptofope-
rationsshouldrefecttothemaximumpossibleextenttheviewsofpotentialcontributors.To
thisend,earlyconsultationswithcontributors,andwheneverpossible,theiractiveparticipation
indevelopingtheconceptoftheoperation,isdesirable.Planningshouldalsocoverrotation
(amaximumofsixmonthshasbeensuggested),reinforcement,redeploymentandwithdrawal
oftheforces.Acomprehensiveexitstrategyisanimportantaspectofthisplanning.
8 LESSONS LEARNED IN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS
6
Itisimportanttopursueeffortstoinitiatetheplan-
ningprocessinatimelyfashionandtodevelopitonthebasisofastep-by-stepapproach.
Inthisregard,plannersalwayshavetokeepinmindthatthepoliticaldecisiontocontribute
maycomelate;therefore,contingencyplanningmustbeinitiatedlongbeforethisdecisionis
taken.Inviewofthis,itisalsoessentialtodevelopacapacitytoreactquickly.Accordingly,
somefeelthatitmaybeusefulfornationstoworkonthebasisofstandbyforces,including
preparedunitsformedwithpre-selectedpersonnel.
7
SomenationsfeelthatUNstandbyarrangements
constituteakeytoenhancedeffciencyofpeacekeepingandamoreexpedientdeploymentof
multifunctionaloperations.InthiscontextsomenationsnotedthattheStandbyForcePlanning
Initiativeisavaluablestrategicplanningtool,providingtheUNwithasoundknowledgeof
militarycapabilitiesandasanindicatorofthepotentialavailabilityofforces.Anotherpro-
posalistoplanandpreparedifferentpackagesofpossiblenationaltroopcontributionsand
establishandupdateadatabaseasapossiblesupportforfuturemissions,bypreparingsome
kindofstandardcontributionplan.Thenextstepwouldbetodevelopanunderstandingof
thepoliticalcriteriaappliedbypotentialcontributorsbeforecontributingpersonnel.
8
A frequently neglected aspect of the operational
conceptrelatestohumanitarianassistanceanditsimplications.Especiallyinrecentpeacekee-
pingoperationsofamultifunctionalnature,themilitarycomponenthasoftenbeenrequested
toprovideadditionalprotectionandcarryoutpeace-buildingactivitiesotherthanthoseexpli-
citlydesignatedinthemandate.Themorenon-militaryservicesanticipatedbythemilitary,
themoreadditionalresourcesarenecessarybeyondatraditionalTableofOrganisationand
Equipment(TOE).SomefeelthatUNmultifunctionalpeacekeepingoperationsareparticularly
well-suitedtoensureafexibleresponsetothechangingsituationwithinaconfictarea,to
ensureeven-handednessindealingwiththepartiestotheconfictand,aboveall,tominimise,
ifnottoavert,thethreatofciviliancasualties,destructionofinfrastructureofacorresponding
stateandemergenceofaconsiderablenumberofattendantproblems(includingrefugees,
provisionofhumanitarianandtechnicalassistanceandde-mining).
9
Theconceptoftheleadnation,wherebyonena-
tionestablishestheorganisationalcoreoftheoperationuntilotherforcesbecomeavailable,
hasproventobefeasibleforcontributorsofsmallercontingentsandseemstobeapractical
arrangementforthefuture.ThecaseoftheBELUGAformationwithinIFOR,isoneexam-
pleofthesuccessfulapplicationoftheleadnationconcept.Onlythroughrapidreaction
fromnationsthatarewillingtoprovidethenecessaryresources,cantheleadnationconcept
beeffcient.Nationsprovidingforcesattheearlystagesofamission(socalledvanguard
forces)maywishforearlywithdrawaloftheseforcesoncethemainbodyisinplace.One
possibilitywouldbetosendthepreliminaryandpreformedHQtotheprospectivemissionarea
inadvanceoftheactualmandatingoftheoperation,inordertoensurespeedyandrealistic
planningandtofacilitateaneffcientdeploymentoftheforcesintheareaofoperation.In
general,unitsassignedtothemissionshouldbeequippedfromthebeginningsoastoensure
thesafetyandeffectivenessofpersonnel.Whenappropriate,personnelandkeyequipment
shouldbedeployedbyair,ifpossibleusingstrategicairliftcapabilities.Tacticalairliftcapability
mustalsobemaintainedin-theatre.
10
Ifacompositenationalormultinationalunitisto
bedeployed,thedesignatedcommandershouldtakepartintheplanningforandformationof
theunit.Itwouldalsobeusefultoestablishacoordinatinggroup,comprisingrepresentatives
fromthenationsinvolved,todeveloptheorganisationandoverseetheformationoftheunit,
coordinateplanningandpolicyandsolveanyproblemsthatmayariseduringdeployment.
Suchacoordinatinggroupshouldmeetatregularintervals.
LESSONS LEARNED IN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS 9
11
Itisimportantthatunitsinthefeldbeatthere-
quired level of interoperability; as an important precondition, national Crisis Management
Centres,andthatoftheimplementingorganisation,shoulddevelopacapabilityofoperating
together,onthebasisofcommonstandardstobedevelopedinthelightofexperienceina
mission.OperationJointEndeavouroffersusefulmaterialonwhichtodrawtoimproveinte-
roperabilityatthislevel.
12
Planninghastocontinueinthemissionarea.The
Force Commander should take account of signifcant political, humanitarian, military and
environmentalconsiderationsinselectinglocationsforunits.Theresultsofeachphaseofan
operationshouldbeevaluatedinlightoftheoperationsoverallpolitical-militaryplan.Each
successivephaseshouldonlybestartedwhenthesuccessfulimplementationofthepreceding
stageisachieved,asthiswillhaveanimportantimpactonthecontinuedsuccessofthemis-
sion.Allplanningmustbedirectedtowardsachievingthefnalgoalofthemissionasdefned
intheMandate.
13
Thesafetyandsecurityofpeacekeepingpersonnel
continuestobeofseriousconcern.Inrecentyearstheinternationalcommunityhaswitnessed
dangerousactsofviolenceagainstpeacekeepersbeingtakenhostageandusedasahuman
shield.Thecontinuinguseoffrearms,inparticularsnipersbythepartiestoaconfictagainst
thepersonnelofapeacekeepingforceremainsamatterofseriousconcern.Thewidespreaduse
ofmines,inparticularanti-personnelmines,inareasofpeacekeepingoperationsalsoposes
impedimentstothesafetyofpeacekeepingpersonnel.
14
Therefore the security of personnel must be an
integral part of the planning of any peacekeeping operation. All appropriate measures, in
conformitywiththeUNCharterandwithintheagreedmandate,shouldbetakenbytherelevant
internationalorganisationsandtheirMemberStatestoensurethesecurityofpeacekeepers.
SomedelegationsnotedthattheearlyentryintoforceoftheConventionontheSafetyofUN
PeacekeepingandAssociatedPersonneladoptedbytheGeneralAssemblyResolution49/59
of9thDecember1994wouldbeastepforwardinthisdirection.
15
De-miningoperationsshouldbe,wheneverappro-
priate,animportantelementandanintegralpartofpeacekeepingoperations.
IFOR-SPECIFICEXPERIENCES
16
IFOR experience has shown that the planners
ability to infuence events during early preparation of the mission, through direct contacts
withnegotiatorsinvolvedinthePeacePlanprocess,helpedtoavoidproblemsencountered
byUNPROFOR(mainlybecausethiswasnotbasedonapeaceagreement)andtoensurea
cleardefnitionofmilitarytasksunderaunifedchainofcommand.Theintegrationof15PfP
andfourothernon-NATOnationsunderaunifedcommandandcontrolhasbeenamajor
success,buildingonexperiencefromthePfPprogrammeandbasedoninnovativecommand
andcontrolarrangementsatalllevels.Moreover,mostnationsbelievethatIFORsmilitary
success derived to a large extent from preformed, proven command structures and logistic
systemsandfromlong-termcontingencyplanningcarriedoutatNATO.
10 LESSONS LEARNED IN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS
17
InthecaseofIFOR,militaryplanninghadtotake
placeaheadofcivilianplanning,sincethesamedegreeofadvanceplanningandorganisation
didnotexistonthecivilside.ItwasthereforediffcultforIFORtoplaninatimelyfashionits
secondarytasksofsupportingcivilimplementation.Thereisaneed,priortopeacekeeping
operations,toensureabetterunderstandingoftheroles,operationalconceptsandcapabilities
ofthecivilorganisationslikelytobeparticipating.Atthesametimecontactsandexercises
involvingboththemilitaryandcivilorganisationsshouldbeencouraged.
18
TheIFORoperationhasshowedtheneedtoaddress
theissuesofimprovedmechanismsfortheearlyinvolvementofTroopContributingNations
(TCNs)intheplanning,preparation,commandstructure,aswellastheirparticipationinthe
politicaloversightanddecision-makingproceduresinoperationstowhichtheycontribute.
ThereisroomforimprovingtheamountofinformationprovidedbytheTCNsincertainareas.
Forinstance,ithasbeenpointedoutthattherecouldhavebeenabettercoordinationwithin
IFORconcerningevacuationplans.Thesameapplieswithregardtodecisionstakenbythe
implementingorganisation,whichcouldhaveanimpactonthesecurityofcontingentspro-
videdbyTCNs.
B. Coordination Among Troop-Contributing Nations and
With Mandating and Implementing Organisations
19
Nationsconfrmtheimportancetheyattachtode-
velopingmechanismsforholdingconsultationsandexchanginginformationwithTCNs.The
UNSecurityCouncil,inparticular,hasconvenedmeetingsofitsmembers,TCNsandtheUN
Secretariattofacilitateexchangeofinformationandviewsbeforedecidingtoextend,termi-
nate,orsubstantiallymodifythemandateofspecifcpeacekeepingoperations.Meetingswith
TCNsareplannedandheldbothonaregularandanadhocbasiswhentheSecurityCouncil
envisagestheestablishmentofanewpeacekeepingoperation.Severalcountriesargueformore
effectivearrangementsandmechanismsforconsultationbetweentheUNSecurityCouncil,
the Secretariat andTCNs in planning as well as in command and control of peacekeeping
operations.Theypointoutthatconfusionandseriousproblemscouldoccurwhenforcesact
onnationalcommand.Nationshavehighlightedtheneedforintensiveconsultations,before
theadoptionofamandate,withallcountriescapableofandwillingtocontributetoparticular
operations.Asafrststep,itwouldbeimportanttodevelopamorestructuredinvolvementof
TCNsintheprocessofformulationofmandatesbytheUNSecurityCouncil(UNSC).Infact,
thereisaneedtofurtherinstitutionalisetheconsultationsbetweentheUNSCandTCNson
peacekeepingmandates.Inthecaseofapeacekeepingoperationwhereconsentofthehost
countryisrequired,itmayalsobebenefcialtoinvolvethehostcountryinthepreliminary
stageofconsultations.Withinamultinationaloperation,contributorsshouldhavetheoppor-
tunitytoparticipateintheprimarydecision-makingprocess,thuscontributingtothepolitical
guidanceforthemilitarycommandoftheoperation.
20
As a second step, Memoranda of Understanding
(MoUs)shouldideallybeconcludedamongTCNsinthepreparatoryphaseoftheoperation.
Where appropriate,TCN liaison offcers should be sent to the staff planning an operation
and, as appropriate, to other troop-contributing nations. It is also necessary to implement
a standardised planning process (phased and timed, including fact-fnding and advanced
partymechanisms)involvingnationalstaffoffcerstobeassignedtothefuturePeacekeeping
Headquarters.ThispreliminaryHQstaffcanserveasareferenceteamfortroop-contributing
nationsinthenationalplanningprocess.
LESSONS LEARNED IN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS 11
21
TCNsshouldbeconsultedpriortochangesinthe
mandatecausedbyasignifcantevolutionofthesituationinthefeld.Theyshouldbeoffered
achoicebetweenreconsideringtheirparticipationandroleintheupdatedmissionandrea-
djustingthecomposition,equipmentandleveloftrainingoftheirforces,forthemtobeable
tocontinuetocarryouttheirmissioneffectively.Somebelievethatchangestothemandates
andtothesubsequentroleofthedeployedtroopsshouldnotbecarriedoutuntilthetroops
arereadytoadjusttheirroleonthegroundinthemissionarea.Insomecases,ashappened
withBosnia-Herzegovina,itmaybenecessarytomodifythenatureandtheobjectivesofan
operation:ifthechangeissignifcantenough,amodifcationofthemandatewouldnotbe
suffcient,butanentirelynewoperationshouldbedeployed,onthebasisofacompletely
newmandate.
C. Coordination Among Institutions
(Including Humanitarian Aspects and Refugees)
22
Asanimportantpreconditionforeffectivecoope-
ration,thereis,inthefrstplace,aneedforaclearandeffcientallocationoftasksamong
thevariousorganisationsinvolvedintheimplementationofdifferentaspectsofapeaceplan.
Mostoftodaysconfictsareinternal,foughtnotonlybyregulararmiesbutalsobyirregular
forces.Civiliansarethemainvictims,andhumanitarianemergenciesarecommonplace.State
institutionshaveoftencollapsed.Thismeansthatinternationalinvolvementmustoftenextend
beyondtraditionalpeacekeeping.Therefore,cooperationbetweenthemandatingorganisation,
regionalandcivilianorganisations,troop-contributingnationsandnon-governmentalagencies
(NGOs)shouldbeinitiatedattheearliestpossiblemomentofthemissionplanningstageand
maintainedthroughoutthedurationofthemission.Thisdoesnotmeanthatapeacekeeping
operationcanreplacestateinstitutions.Incomplex,multi-dimensionalpeacekeepingopera-
tions,theassistanceprovidedtothepopulationbyinternationalandnon-governmentalhuma-
nitarianorganisationssuchastheRedCrossisakeyelementtothesettlementoftheconfict.
Successofthemissionoftenhingesontheabilitytofulflnon-militarytasks.Internationaland
non-governmentalorganisationsshouldcooperatewithinanagreedcoordinationarrangement.
Ataminimum,closeliaisonbetweenthevariousorganisationsshouldbeassuredwiththe
maintenanceofcoordination-liaisoncells.
23
Particularlyinthecaseofpeacekeepingoperations
ofamultifunctionalnature,itisessentialtodefnefromtheoutsetthevariousagenciesand
organisations involved in the implementation of elements of the mandate and to establish
appropriateworkingrelationshipswiththem.Relationsbetweenthepeacekeepingforceand
theUN,inthecaseofoperationscarriedoutunderaUNSCResolution,areofspecialim-
portance.RelationswiththeUNandotherorganisationsshouldideallycoverthefollowing
areas:coordinationandcooperation,suchassupportandresourcesharingandassistance;
proceduresforreimbursementandpropertytransfers;informationexchange,liaison,mediation
andnegotiation;andcommonplanningandintegratedexecution.Intheviewofsomenations,
experiencesinUNPROFORandinSomaliasuggestthatthehumanitariantaskswithinamulti-
functionalpeacekeepingoperationshouldbeprimarilycarriedoutbyspecialisedhumanitarian
organisations (including WHO, UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP, ICRC), operationally autonomous
fromthemilitary,undergeneralpoliticalguidanceand,whenevernecessary,coordinationby
theUN.Inthiscontext,thedevelopmentofaninternationalarrangementgoverningbasic
principlesofcooperationandinteractionbetweentheUNandregionalorganisationsinvolved
inpeacekeepinghasbeensuggested.
12 LESSONS LEARNED IN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS
24
An important lesson learned from IFOR is that
permanent liaison arrangements should be established with other international bodies in
theatre,includingrepresentativesofthemandatingbodyandotherorganisationschargedwith
implementingvariousaspectsofthemandate.
D. Role of Neighbouring Countries
25
A country neighbouring a crisis area has a vital
interestintheearliestpossibleeffectivesolutionofthecrisisandintherestorationofpeace.
Therefore,neighbouringcountriesshouldfacilitatethesuccessfulconductofpeacekeeping
operationsandrefrainfromkindlinginter-ethnic,inter-confessionalandotherdifferencesin
thecrisisareaaswellasfromencouragingseparatistandnationalistgroups,movementsand
opposition factions striving to provoke a split in society and the breakdown of the state.A
particularlydelicatesituationarisesforaneighbouringcountrywhichhasasignifcantnational
minorityinthecrisisareaitself.Suchasituationmightservetolimititsfreedomofaction,in
viewoftheimpactthatcertaindecisionsmighthaveonthenationalminorityinquestion.
26
Countriesneighbouringareasofcrisisplayanim-
portantroleinpeacekeepingoperations,beyondservingaszonesoftransitforpersonneland
material.IncomplexoperationssuchasDenyFlight,SharpGuardandJointEndeavour,
andforactioninvolvingtheuseofpower,neighbouringcountriesfunctionasadvancedbases
ofoperationalandlogisticstructures.Theyalsoprovideservices,withoutwhichtheoperations
wouldbeexcessivelycostlyorevenimpossibletocarryout.Theycanalsoprovidetemporary
supportandaccommodationforrefugees.OnelessonfromtheformerYugoslaviaisthatabroa-
derareacouldbeaffectedbyacrisis.Inparticular,theeconomiesofneighbouringcountries
canbenegativelyaffectedbytheimplementationofUN-mandatedsanctions.
27
InthecaseoftheIFORoperationtheavailability
ofportsandairportsnearthecrisisareaprovedtobeofcrucialimportanceinmaintaining
constant,precisecontroloverairandmaritimespace,whetheritbeforbanningfightsorenfor-
cinganarmsembargo,orforairoperationsinsupportoftheunitsonthegroundandensuring
compliancewithaheavyweapons-exclusionzone.Theuseofportsandairportsnecessitates
aseriesofstructuresandserviceswhichinturnrequirestheuseoflocalinfrastructure.The
useofthesestructurescanhaveaconsiderableandlastingimpactonsocialandeconomic
conditions,withresultingburdensofvarioustypesfortheneighbouringcountry.
28
Inaddition,theneighbouringcountrysresponsibi-
litiessometimesinvolvetheadoptionoftechnicalandlegalmeasuresrelatedtothetransitand
stationingonitsterritoryofarmedpersonnel,aswellasadministrativemeasuresformanaging
theservicesrequiredforthepresenceofforeignforces,theprovisionofinformationactivity
andtheavailabilityofliaisonpersonnel.Therecouldalsobevariousburdensderivingfrom
theexposuretopossibleretaliatoryactionsbythewarringfactions.
29
InthecaseofthecrisisintheformerYugoslavia,
neighbouringcountriessufferedconsiderableburdens.Duringtheperiodofarmedconfict,
neighbouringcountrieshadtomakeeveryeffortpossibleinordertoisolateandcontainthe
war,andhadtoreckonwitharmedgroupsandairstrikesspillingover.Thus,theyhadtoput
theirarmedforcesonacertainstateofalert.
LESSONS LEARNED IN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS 13
GROUP II
Implementation

E. Civil-Military Relations
GENERALEXPERIENCES
30
Fullintegrationofallthoseinvolvedinanoperation
withmultifunctionalaspectsisoftendiffculttoachieveduetothemanyplayersinanytheatre
ofoperations,althoughaMissionHeadattunedtobothcivilandmilitarycultureswouldgreatly
assistincoordinationandintegration.Intheviewofsomenations,aCivil-MilitaryOperations
Centreisthebestwaytoensurecoordinationandintegration.Interdisciplinarycooperation
andahierarchicalstructurearenotmutuallyexclusive.Forinstance,thereshouldbevery
close cooperation between the military and civilian police components of a peacekeeping
operation.Moreover,themilitaryshouldnotbegivenpolicetasksforwhichtheyhavenot
beentrained.
31
Also important is coordination at the level of
missionheadquarters.Thiscoordinationshouldideallyberegulatedintheframeworkofa
relationmanagementplan,whichmaybecoordinatedbytheoffceoftheMissionHeador
theForceCommanderand/orfacilitatedbyanad-hocworkinggroupcomprisingthevarious
componentsinthemissionarea.Itcouldbeadvantageoustodespatchanationalliaisonteam
totheUNHeadquartersinthemissionareaatanearlystageinordertopreparethedeployment
andfacilitatethearrivalofthetroops.
32
Non-governmentalorganisations(NGOs)canoffer
apositiveandimportantcontributiontopeacekeepingoperations;however,theirpresencecan
alsomakeoperationsmorecomplex.Inprinciple,theconsentofthepartiestotheiractivities
isdesirable.Non-governmentalorganisationsvaryfromthelargerinternationalagenciesand
associationsdowntosmallcharities,othergroupsorevenindividualswhomaylackexpe-
rience,preparationandorganisation.Civiliansmaylackunderstandingofwhatthemilitary
isdoing,andvice-versa.Bothmilitaryandcivilianorganisationsshouldconsiderhowbestto
avoidmisunderstandingsandhowtoestablishaworkablestructurecapableofcoordinating
therequirementsbothofmilitaryandNGOstomutualadvantage.ACivil-MilitaryOperations
Centreshouldhandlein-theatrecoordinationandsupportissueswithnon-governmentaland
privatevoluntaryorganisations.
IFOR-SPECIFICEXPERIENCES
33
Experiences within UNPROFOR and IFOR have
shownthateffectivecooperationintheatrebetweenthemandatingorganisationandimplemen-
tingnations/authoritiesiscrucial,butthatitisdiffculttomakeitaspermanentandsystematic
asitshouldbe.Infact,itisnotalwayseasytoestablisheffectivemechanismsofcooperation
andcoordination,partlyinviewofthedifferentrolesandperceptionsoftheissuesandthe
tasks,partlybecauseofthedifferentproceduresadopted.
34
SomeaspectsoftherelationshipbetweentheUN
andIFORworkedbetterthanothers.Relationsattheseniorlevelhavebeendescribedbythe
14 LESSONS LEARNED IN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS
UNasverygoodandsupportprovidedtotheUNthroughcivil-militarycooperation(CIMIC)
hasbeendeemedexcellent.AnexcellentrelationshiphasalsodevelopedbetweenIFORand
theOSCEmission,aswellaswiththeInternationalPoliceTaskForce(IPTF).Butinthelatter
case,ithasbeennotedthatthereisroomforimprovingcommunications(compatibleequip-
mentislacking)andcollaboration,especiallyinhigh-riskareas.
35
Onelessonlearnedfrompeacekeepingexperience
isthatcivilianpolicehavefrequentlyplayedanimportantrole.Thereis,therefore,aneedto
ensure close coordination between military peacekeeping forces and unarmed civil police
advisors. This refects the fact that some of the most diffcult problems faced by IFOR, for
example,relatednottoitsprimarytaskofensuringmilitarycompliance,buttodealingwith
civildisturbances.Thiswasparticularlytrueduringelections.TheexperienceofIFORindealing
withpublicdisturbancesishighlyrelevantandmeritsfurtherconsideration.
F. Public Relations
36
Inaddressinglessonslearnedfrompeacekeeping
operations,oneshouldnotunderestimatetheimportanceofrelationswithlocalauthorities
andthelocalpopulation,aswellaswiththemedia,whichallrequirecarefulyetdifferentia-
tedhandling.Jointcommissions,whichincludepartiestotheconfict,governmentoffcials,
representativesfromthepeacekeepingforceand,asrequired,non-governmentalorganisations
operatingintheareaofconfict,areusefulbodiesinthisrespect.
37
Bearing in mind the large interest shown by the
media in recent peacekeeping operations, relations with media representatives, as well as
asound,pro-activepublicinformationpolicy,areofcrucialimportance.Suchapolicyhas
twokeyaudiences:thefrstiseitheratroop-contributingstateoranotherstateclosetothe
missionareaorwithaspecifcinterest,suchassharedethnicorculturalroots;thesecondis
thecountryreceivingthemission.Themessagebeinggiventobothaudiencesmustbeclear
andconsistentandlinkedtothemissionsobjectives.Aninformationpolicymaybereinforced
in-theatrebyaheartsandmindscampaign.InoperationJointEndeavour,thePsychological
OperationsTaskForcewasassignedprimaryresponsibilityforcommunicatingwiththeBosnian
people,whilethePublicInformationTeamcommunicatedwiththemassmedia-domestic
andinternational.TheroleofpsychologicaloperationsintheIFORandSFORoperationsis
todevelopandmaintaintheconsentofthelocalpopulationtothepresenceoftheForce,to
discourageinterferencewiththepeacekeepingoperation,andtoassess,reportandcounter
propagandadirectedtowardstheforce.
38
In course of preparations for the operation, it is
highlyadvisabletoworkout-onthebasisofthemandate-aplanofinformationalcoverage,
atleastingeneralterms,aswellastoformulatemethodologyforitsimplementation,inclu-
ding:
- personnelrequired;
- informationmaterials;
- independentchannelsfordistribution.
Theneedforfexibilitytoadjustplanstoeventsshouldberecognised.
39
TheinformationsupportofPKOsshouldbebased
onaninformationpolicyofthehigheststandardsofconsistency,honestyandtransparency.The
LESSONS LEARNED IN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS 1S
specialnatureofactivitiesconductedwhenpreparingtheoperation,andtheneedtopreventthe
leakageofsensitiveinformationthroughthemassmedia,shouldbetakenintoaccount.Even-
handedandnon-provocativepresentationandinterpretationofeventswillbeimportant.
40
ThelessonslearnedfromIFORsinformationpolicy
suggestthatearlydeploymentofresourcesinthisrespectwouldbeverybenefcial.When
thepersonnelinchargeofrelationswiththepressactuallyarrivedin-theatre,theabilityof
Commanderstoconveytothepressanaccurateappreciationoftheobjectivesandtasksofthe
missionwasimproved.Mediaunderstandingofthechallengesofmissionimplementationrose
aswell.Furthermore,theuseofmasscommunicationsmediabythepeacekeepingforcecan
signifcantlycontributetocounteringfactionalpropagandaandprovidingthepopulationwith
asourceofunbiasednews.Theuseofradiocommunicationcanbeparticularlyimportantin
securingthesuccessfuloutcomeofapeacekeepingoperation.Theadvantageoftheradiois
thatitcanreachalargeraudiencethananyothermedia.Inaddition,itdoesnotdependon
electricitysupplies,itcannotbecensored,anditisimmediateandprecise.
41
Electronic information exchange and handling,
both internal and external, directed towards the public and international media must be
organised, institutionalised, and prepared. Personnel must be properly trained. Computer
equipment,networklinkageandhandlingskills,aswellasdatamanagement,willberequired
tomeetagrowingdemandforinformation.
42
Relationswiththelocalpopulationareparticularly
importantforthesuccessofapeacekeepingmission.Theserelationsshouldbebasedonthe
impartialityoftheforces,even-handednessindealingwiththelocalpopulation,onagood
knowledgeoftheculture,localcircumstancesandthepoliticalandeconomicsituationofthe
region,aswellasontheabilitytocommunicatedirectly.Beyondthenormalstabilisingeffect
ofestablishedpeacekeepingtasks,arethosesuchasthedistributionofhumanitarianaidand
thecontributiontotherestorationofthecountrysinfrastructure,whichmayinthemselvesbe
apartofthemission.Theuseofmissionassets(suchasconstructionengineersormedical
resources)forappropriatelocalprojectswillalsocontributetobuildinggoodrelationswith
thelocalpopulationandauthorities.
G. Command and Control
43
An important prerequisite for successful peace-
keeping operations, in the view of some nations, lies in the provision of strategic political
leadershipin,andcontrolover,operationsonthepartoftheSecurityCouncil.TheForce
Commandershouldbecarefultoobservethegenerallyacceptedprinciplesofpeacekeeping,
includingthoserelatingtocommandandcontrol.
44
Command and control arrangements should be
clearlydefnedandagreedbeforethedeployment.Itisnecessarytoestablishresponsibilities
atalllevelsinthecommandstructure;toclarifyproceduresandworkingrelationswithinthe
mission;andtoestablishcommunicationsproceduresandotherlogisticsupportcompatible
withtheneedsofthemission.Commandandcontrolarrangementsshouldincludethemeans
for communicating with liaison teams the organisation of such teams, and the selection of
headquarterselementswithwhichliaisonisrequired.
16 LESSONS LEARNED IN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS
45
Duringthemission,theForceCommandershould
makethemosteffectiveuseoftheinternationalunitsathisdisposal,withinthelimitsofthe
missionsmandate.Boththecivilandmilitaryelementsoftheoperationmustbecoordinated
throughoutthecommandstructure,andcommandandcontrolmustberesponsiveandfexible,
withauthoritydelegatedtothemostappropriatecommandlevel.Provisionsshouldbemade
toallownon-governmentalandprivateorganisationsaccesstocommunications.
46
Animportantlessonlearnedfrompeacekeepingis
that,forUN-ledoperations,theUNchainofcommandmustberespectedbyTCNs.Ifnatio-
naldirectivesmakeitnecessaryforacontingentcommandertodeviatefromthisprinciple,
hissuperiorintheUNchainofcommandshouldbeinformedimmediately.Foritspart,the
UNshouldkeepTNCsthoroughlyandpromptlyinformedaboutthesituationinthemission
area.
LESSONS LEARNED IN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS 17
GROUP III
Operations

H. Communication and Information Systems

47
Communication and Information Systems (CIS)
support within the area of operation and from the Mission Headquarters to higher levels
of commands needs to be carefully planned prior to deployment of forces. The objective
shouldbetoachieveinteroperabilityofCISusedbytheorganisationleadingtheoperation
andbetweenthoseusedbyTCNs.Thereisarequirementforstandardisationpertainingtothe
leveloftechnicalinteroperabilityandtothelevelofcommonalityofoperatingandreporting
proceduresused.
48
CoordinationwithTCNs,interoperabilitytestingof
CISandtrainingofoperatingprocedurespriortodeploymentwillassistseamlessinformation
fowduringtheoperation.Regardingspecifclessons,somenationsfeelthat:
- In-theatreCISshouldbecentrallymanagedbytheTheatreHQCISSupportCell;
- CivilandmilitaryelementsoftheForceshouldnotusetheHostNationstelecom-
municationsinfrastructureasaprimarymeansofcommunication;
- TheForcemustcontrolitsownCIS;
- ThetacticalcommunicationsshouldbebasedonVHFCombatNetRadiosasprimary
meansofthegeographicareatobecoverediftheterraindoesnotdictatetheuseof
othermeanssuchasTacticalSATCOM(TACSAT);
- HF Combat Net Radios may be used as back-up systems. The links to the home
countriesofTCNsmaybebasedonINMARSAT;
- Encryptionequipmentwouldbeuseful;
- Diplomaticmailshouldbeusedtotheextentpossible;
- TheGlobalPositioningSystem(GPS)isaveryusefultooltoestablishcommunica-
tions with itinerant elements in areas with insuffcient roads and communication
facilities.
I. Information and Intelligence
49
Historical, political, and ethnographic factors
shouldbetakenintoaccountbeforethedeploymentofpeacekeepingforcesfromonenation
intoanother.Inthiscontext,recentdevelopmentswithintheUNareinstructive.ASituation
Centre was established under the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) in
1993.WithintheSituationCentre,aninformationandresearchunitreceives,processesand
analysesinformationgatheredfromcurrentfeldoperations.Inaddition,theUnitmonitors
developmentsinotherareaswithaviewtopossiblefuturedeployments.Oneusefulmeans
ofobtaininginformationaboutacrisisareapriortotheagreementonamandateforapea-
cekeepingoperationisthedispatchoffact-fndingmissionsandcommissionstoinvestigate
disputesandsituations,aswellasmissionsofaspecialenvoyoftheUNSecretaryGeneral
forthesepurposes.Thesearesentattherequestorbyagreementoftheparties.Theoutcome
oftheiractivitiesistobereportedtotheUNSecurityCouncilandtakenintoaccountinthe
courseofpreparationandplanningofmultifunctionalpeacekeepingoperations.Thus,theUN
seekstoraiseitslevelofpreparednessforfuturepeacekeepingoperations.
18 LESSONS LEARNED IN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS
50
In the course of multifunctional peacekeeping
operations it becomes very important to obtain timely, reliable and full information on the
situationinaconfictregion,changesinthepositionsofthepartiesandanycircumstances
thatcannegativelyinfuenceorimpedetheimplemetationoftheoperation.Informationor
intelligenceaboutlocalconditionsisthereforeessentialtoallpeacekeeping.Onesourceof
informationistheUnitedNationswhichgathersandanalysesinformationreceivedfromthe
UNmemberstates,differentUN-familyagencies,thepartiestoaconfictthemselvesaswellas
frommediareportsandmembersofdiplomaticcorps.Bearinginmindtheneedtomaintainthe
highstandingofthepeacekeepingmission,intelligencegatheringshouldbeclearlycontrolled
andconductedsolelyforthepurposesofthepeacekeepingmissionandonlyatthedirectionof
theForceCommander.Covertintelligenceoperationsunrelatedtothesafetyofpeacekeepers
andthesuccessofthemissionareinappropriatetopeacekeepingenvironments.
51
Experience shows that identification of actual
factors of a dispute or confict constitutes an indispensable prerequisite for initiating and
conductingamultifunctionalpeacekeepingoperation.Reconnaissanceofaprospectivemis-
sionareaisanessentialprerequisiteforaneffectiveconceptofoperations,asisthecasefor
anymilitaryoperation.Reconnaissancepartiesshouldincluderepresentativesofallelements
ofthemission.Intelligenceisalsoavitalelementintheanalysis,planningandconductof
anyoperationanditisimportantthatindevelopinganassessmentofasituationallavailable
sourcesareused.Thisincludesacademicexperts,in-theatrenon-governmentalorganisations
(NGOs)andotherbodies.
52
It would be desirable to adopt uniform military
symbolsandabbreviations-forinstance,usingthoseemployedbytheimplementingorga-
nisation-aswellasUniversalTransverseMercatorProjection(UTM)maps,thedevelopment
ofIdentifyFriendorFoe(IFF)systemsandtheadoptionofcommonrescuestandards.Inthe
contextoftheIFORoperation,unitsfromdifferentnationshaveactivelycooperatedinthefeld
oftopographicpreparation,successfullyadoptingunifedmapsymbolsandmapformatsfor
useatthevariouslevelsofcommandandbythedifferentnationalcontingents.
J. Logistics
53
The logistic aspects of operations, and in parti-
cularthefnancialquestions,mustbeconsideredearlybyallmissionplanners.Thereisa
needtoclarifyatanearlystagethechannelsthroughwhichthesequestionsaretobeinitially
discussed. In fact, logistic and operational planning are inextricably linked. It is essential
thatbothlogisticsandoperationsstaffhaveaclearunderstandingofeachothersaimsand
requirements.Itisimportanttoclearlyidentifywhatisexpectedofnationalcontingents,to
confrmthefeasibilityoftheseexpectationsortomakeandconfrmalternativearrangements
asrequiredinadvanceofdeployment.
54
Thereisaneedforincreasedattentiontologistic
requirementsintheplanningphase,suchastheworkrequiredforthepreparationofdeployment
camps(suchasde-mining,clearingthearea,settingupfences,organisingguardanddefence
systems,settingupthecamp,installingequipment,creatingaccessroads).Selectionofin-
frastructureinregardtolocationandcapacitymustpermitadditionalroomforpeace-building
worksuchashousingforrefugees,storageoffood,orcontributiontopublicinfrastructure.
LESSONS LEARNED IN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS 19
55
ManyUNoperationshavebenefttedfromlogistic
supportbeingprovidedcentrallybytheUnitedNations.However,theIFORoperationde-
monstratedthatanexcellentwayofproceedingistotaskonecontributorwiththeprovisionof
logisticsupport(e.g.,alogisticbattalion).Inanycase,detaileddeterminationofnationaland
non-nationalresponsibilitiesmustbedefnedintheconceptofoperationsandguidelinesfor
troop-contributingnations.ATableofOrganisationandEquipment(TOE)ofcontributingunits
shouldbecollectedandmaintainedinaccessibledatabasesformodellingthecompatibility
andinterfacepossibilities.Hostnationssupportshouldbepoliticallyagreed,clearlystated
inaStatusofForceAgreement(SOFA)whereappropriate,andutilisedwhereverpossiblein
ordertokeeplogisticcostslow.
56
In the frst period of a new mission, there is an
increasedrequirementforspecialistunitsandpersonnel.Asimilarrequirementexistsatthe
endofamission.Duringthestart-upphase,thereisanincreasedrequirementforconstruction
engineers, legal experts and other specialists. Engineers and additional medical resources
forhelpingthelocalpopulationinthecaseofemergenciesarevaluabletoolsforconfdence
buildingatthelocallevel.Specialistsarealsoneededtoconductmineclearance,establish
camps,observationposts,shelters,instalutilities,conductroadrepairs,andestablishcom-
munications.Legal,contractingandfnancialexpertsareneededtonegotiateanddrawup
leaseagreements,hirelocalemployeesandsoon.Duringthedraw-downphase,thereisan
increasedrequirementforsupplyexpertstopackupandregistersuppliesandequipmentfor
shipmentandforlegalandfnancialexpertstoterminateagreementsandcontracts.
57
Movementbybothairandsurfacecanbediffcult;
carefuldecision-makinginrespectofhighvaluetransportationassetsisrequiredtoavoidun-
necessaryadditionalexpense.Accordingly,itisessentialthatmovementplansarelinkedto
themissionplanandfnalisedbeforethesubmissionofcosts,keepinginmindthatfreedom
ofmovementisimperative.Themethodoftransportationmustbedecidedatanearlystage
toallowfordetailedplanning.Cargocontainersshouldbestandardisedandreportedtothe
shippingorganisation.Availabilityofunloadingcapacities,transportandstoragefortheport
ofdisembarkationinthemissionareaisalsoimportant.
58
There can be a signifcant shortfall between the
logisticsupportintendedin-theatreandwhatisactuallyprovided.Whenfrstdeployed,units
shouldbeself-suffcient,withsuppliescommensuratetothetask.Stockmanagementbased
onconsumerstatisticsmustbeforeseen,withaminimumstocklevelof60days.Equipment
mustbeadaptedtoenvironmentalconditionsandshouldenabletroopstolivecomfortablyin
apotentiallydiffcultenvironmentforprolongedperiods.Asaprinciple,equipmentshouldnot
bedeployedunlessthenecessarymaintenancecapacityandlogisticback-upisathandinthe
missionarea.Equipmentrenderedunserviceableduetonon-availabilityofbasicmaintenance
orsparepartswillunderminetheeffectivenessofthemission.Inspectionbeforeshipping,
andtransportsupervisionbytherecipient,shouldbeanormtoensurethatequipmentarrives
inuseablecondition.
59
Insomemissionsitmaybeappropriateforacom-
mercialcontractortoprovidecorelogistics.Suchcontractorsshouldbeidentifedbyopen
competitionandmeetanyrequiredperformancecriteriainadvance,andideallyshouldhave
demonstratedaprovenperformancestandard.Contractadministrationandmonitoringshould
bestrengthenedtoensurestandardsaremet,andcontractsbesecuredinsuffcienttimefor
thecontractortobeabletoprovideeffectivesupporttothemission.
20 LESSONS LEARNED IN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS
60
Fornavaloperations,aforwardlogisticssiteshould
beestablishedneartheareaofoperations,comprisingpersonnelfromallparticipatingnations.A
suffcientnumberofhelicoptersshouldbeavailablefortransportbetweenshipsandthelogistic
site.Iffreespaceonboardtheshipsislimited,depots(e.g.,forspareparts)canbeestablished
atthelogisticssite.Intheareaofoperation,thereshouldbeanareafordegaussingships.
61
The Compendium of Lessons Observed During
LogisticSupportofPeacekeepingOperationsproducedbytheLogisticsDirectorateofthe
NATO Infrastructure, Logistics and Civil Emergency Planning Division provides additional
materialinrelationtologisticsupportofpeacekeepingoperations.
K. Medical Support
62
Peacekeeping operations are complicated by a
numberofpeculiarcharacteristics,whichimpactfundamentallyupontheprovisionofmedical
support.Medicalsupportplansthereforemustbepurpose-builtforeachoperation.Plans
mustbecapableofspeedyinitialreactionandfexibleenoughtomanagerapidlychanging
demands.MedicalsupportplanningandmanagementmustbeacceptabletoNATO/United
NationsHeadquartersandtoparticipatingnationsaswell.
63
Theoverallobjectiveofmedicalsupportmustbe
physicalandmentalwell-beingofthedeployedpersonnel,theconservationofmanpower,
preservationoflifeandthelimitationofresidualphysicalandmentaldisabilities.Operational
medicalsupportthereforerequiresclearlydefnedanddistinctiveguidance.Thetaskofplan-
ning,executingandcontrollingoperationalmedicalsupportmustlieproperlywithamedically
trainedplanningstaffwhomusthaveanestablishedorganizationofsuffcient,experienced
manpower,communicationsandinformation.
64
ThemedicalC3Iorganizationmustbecapableof
planning,executing,controlling,supportingandauditingthefullrangeofmedicalsupport
functions.Itmustbecapableofprovidingaseamlesssystemofcontroloftreatment,evacuation
andtransferofinformationfrominitialpointofinjuryorsicknessthroughouttheevacuation
chaintodefnitivetreatment.EachlevelofoperationalcommandthereforehastohaveaSenior
MedicalOffcer,directlyaccountabletotheoperationalcommander.
- TheForceMedicalOffcer(FMEDO)ofaFieldMissionplans,directs,advisesand
supervises all activities related to the medical support plan. He/she is the Senior
MedicalAdvisertotheForceCommander(FC)andtoallcontingentSeniorMedical
Offcers(SMEDOS)ofthemission.
- TheSeniorMedialOffcers(SMedOs)areFMedOspointofcontactoncontingent
(national) level. He/she is the Senior clinician for his/her national unit(s) and the
SeniorMedicalAdvisertothenationalContingentCommander.
65
Preventive health measures involve every indivi-
dualintheoperationaltheatre.Theorganizationtoundertakethem,itsstructureandsizewill
bemission-dependant,andmustbebasedonbestavailablemedicalintelligenceevaluationof
LESSONS LEARNED IN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS 21
theareaofoperations,butwillincludeatleastindividualadvisersateachlevelofoperational
command.Itisanationalresponsibilityatnationalexpensetoensurethatpersonnelispre-
paredandappropriatelytrainedinfeldpreventivemedicinemeasurespriortodeploymentto
apeacekeepingoperation.Thismustincludethenecessaryvaccinationandimmunization.
EducationforthepreventionofmedicaldiseasesmustincludethepreventionagainstAIDS/HIV.
Eachparticipant,militaryleadersateachlevelinparticular,musthavebasictraininginthe
preventionofsexuallytransmitteddiseasesandHIV/AIDS.
66
All personnel being deployed on peacekeeping
operationsmustbemedicallyanddentallyftfordutyandmustmeetatleastUNmedical
standardsforpeace-keepingmissions.UNmedicalstandards,however,donotprecludena-
tionalcontingents/militaryservicesfromestablishinghigherqualifyingmedicalstandards.In
nocase,however,shouldanindividual,unacceptablefornationalmilitaryduties,beincluded
inthepeacekeepingmilitarycontingentforce.
67
Nationsretainultimateaccountabilityforthehealth
oftheirforcesbut,ontheassumptionofauthority,thePeacekeepingForceCommanderwill
sharetheresponsibilityforthehealthofassignedforces.Tomeetthisrequirement,theForce
Commanderneedsappropriatemedicalstaff.Theyshallplanandexecutethemedicalsupport
plan.
68
Medical information, particularly regarding pa-
tients,isavitalelementofcompetentmedicalsupportplanning.Theinformationmustbe
managedeffcientlyanddistributedrapidlywithoutviolatingmedicalprofessionalsecrecy.The
abilitytotrackindividualpatientsthroughthetreatmentandevacuationchainisparamount.
69
Policy and planning for the resupply of medical
material is a medical matter and is inter-related directly with patient treatment. Medical
planningstaffmustaimtoachieveasmuchstandardizationaspossibleandestablisheffective
meansofauditingusageandresupply.Aneffcient,well-regulatedandcost-effectivemedical
logisticssystemisfundamentaltomissionmedicalsupport.Medicallogisticsmustbeableto
respondrapidlytourgentclinicaldemands.
70
From the outset of an operation, a theatre eva-
cuationpolicymustbeestablishedbytheoperationalandmedicalplanningstaffworkingin
concertwiththeForceCommander(FC)andFMedO(FMedO).Dedicatedandfullyequipped
MEDEVAC helicopters with appropriate medical staff shall be allocated whenever possible
andshallbemarkedwiththedistinctiveemblems.
71
Therulesforentitlementtomedicalcaremustbe
establishedearlyintheplanningprocess.Plannersmustconsider,butnotbesidetrackedby,
legalissuesofcompensationandclaims.Thedegreeofsupporttobegiventolocalorhuma-
nitarianaidpersonnelmustbeclearlydelineatedintheoperationsorder.Ifcareistobegiven
tocivilians,considerationmustbegiventomodifyingthestaffngandequippingofmedical
units.Veryfewpediatricorgynaecologicmedicationsarenormallystockedinfeldmedical
units,andtheconditionofthelocalpopulacemaymandateadditionofmedicalspecialists
whodonotnormallyaccompanymilitarypeacekeepingforces.
22 LESSONS LEARNED IN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS
L. Training
72
Military or other specific skills, together with
appropriate training, are the fundamental basis for successfully meeting the peacekeeping
challenges. Special peacekeeping training is needed particularly in relation to operations
ofamultifunctionalnature,sincebehavioursandtechniquesrequiredarenotnecessarilyin
linewith-andsometimesevencontradict-acquiredmilitaryskills,ormayneedanadequate
complement,forinstanceinthediplomatic,civilorpolicefelds.Acommontacticallevel
doctrineisrequiredfortroopcontributorstoanoperation,aswellasacommonunderstanding
amongthemilitaryandotherelementsofapeacekeepingoperation-thepolice,civilians,
NGOs,humanitarianorganisations.
73
Reliance on the use of highly and professionally
trainedunits,showsofforceanddetermination,andtherespectbythelocalpartieswhichis
gainedbyactingfrmlycanimprovethecredibilityoftheforceandinfactreducetheneedto
useforce,thusretainingthemainaccentonconsentandcooperationwiththeparties.
74
Eachnationshouldberesponsiblefortrainingits
owntroops;however,therearebeneftsinmultinationaldevelopmentofminimumtraining
standards.TheUNplaysausefulsupportingrolebyestablishingguidelines,preparingcom-
montrainingmodulesandpublishingaregisterofmemberstatestrainingfacilities.However,
somenationssaytheyhaveexperienceddiffcultiesinensuringtheiroffcersparticipationin
UNtrainingcoursespriortoassignmentstoservewithinapeacekeepingoperation.
75
Pre-deployment orientation training ensures that
troopsunderstandhowtheirroleaspeacekeepersdiffersfromthatascombatforces.During
the orientation period, special attention should be drawn to recent political developments
andotherissuesrelatedtotheconfict,inordertocreatethenecessaryawarenessandun-
derstandingbytheforcesinvolved.Personnelshouldunderstandtheorganisation,structure
andobjectivesofthemissionandthenatureoftheconditionsinwhichtheywillbeworking.
Thisincludesthenatureofthesocietyofthemissionarea,itsnational,factional,culturaland
religiouscharacteristics,aswellasphysicalsecurityandclimaticissues.Commontraining
activitiesareanimportantprerequisiteformultinationaloperations.Theuseofmultinational
exercises,bringingtogetherdiplomatic,militaryandciviliancomponents,hasbeensuggested
inthisregard.Commontrainingstandardshelpdevelopthecohesivenessofmultinational
formations.
76
Realistic simulation is equally important, and
shouldinvolvetrainerswithrecentexperience.Realisticstafftrainingalsorequiressimulationof
themultinationalcompositionofaHQ.Inter-linkagesbetweenthevariouscomponentsshould
besimulatedbyamixtureofinternationalpersonnelalreadyinthetrainingphase.Where
appropriate,trainingshouldcontinueinthemissionareaasitwillnotalwaysbepossibleto
replicatethefeldconditionsinhometrainingareas.
77
PfPprovidesausefulsourceoftrainingexperiences.
AveryeffectiveinstrumenttohelppreparationsofstaffandoperationalforcesareNATO/PfP
exercisesfocusingonpeacekeepingand/orhumanitarianoperations.APfPcourseforplatoon
commandersinpeacekeepingoperationsorganisedinthepastbytheCzechRepublicplayed
a useful role in this context. Courses organised in a number of training centres in various
NACC/PfPcountriesarealsoconsideredtobeextremelyvaluable.
LESSONS LEARNED IN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS 23
78
However,somefeelthattheexperiencegathered
sofarsuggeststhatthenumberofinternationaltrainingexercisesshouldbeincreasedandthe
scopeoftopicscoveredinPfPtrainingandexercisesexpanded.Thechangingnatureofpea-
cekeepingoperations,especiallyinthelightoflessonslearnedinBosnia-Herzegovina,clearly
showstheneedtocarryouttrainingandexerciseactivitiesatanoperationallevel.Exercises
shouldbroadenthescopeofthoseactivitiestoincludestandardcombatactivitiesortraining
intheareasofsmallgroupindependentactionandminecounter-measures.
79
Thereisaneedforacommonlanguagecapability
amongunitsdeployedonmissions.Thisisessentialtoboththeexecutionofthemissionand
the day-to-day administration of deployed forces. Foreign language training for the forces
shouldthereforebeintensifed.Withregardtolocallanguagecapability,accesstocompetent
interpretersandtranslatorsisrequiredasanintegralpartofthemission,sinceitmaynotbe
possible,ordesirable,torelyentirelyonlocally-recruitedstafffortheseroles.
80
Thefollowingelementswereconsideredtobeof
particularimportanceintrainingforcesfordeploymentwithIFOR:abackgroundofexperien-
cesgainedinpreviousmissionsandspecifcpeacekeepingtrainingforforcestobeusedinthe
mission;andplanningandarrangementofadditionaltraining.Moreover,certainnationshave
pointedtotheusefulnessofextendedtrainingofpersonnelexpectingtohavedualfunctions
(e.g.,driver/mechanic) andofdirectselectionofpersonnelwithspecialskills,inparticular
logisticsexpertsorspecialistsinmaintenance.
M. Personnel and Administration
81
Somenationsfeelthattrainingshouldbecomple-
mentedbyapersonnelselectionprocesswhichshouldtakeintoaccountpreviousexperiences
acquiredinthefeldandincludeapsychologicalscanning.Inthislight,itmaybeusefulto
includeasapartofthepreparatoryactivitiesstresspreventiontrainingandaregulardebriefng
aftereachmissiontodiagnosethepossibledangerofpost-traumaticstressdisorder.
N. Financial Aspects
82
The success of peacekeeping operations is often
conditionedbytheavailabilityoffunds.Theconductofpeacekeepingoperationsunderthe
auspicesoftheUN,i.e.,cost-sharingamongUNmembers,improvesthesenseofresponsibility
andtheinvolvementoftheworldcommunity.
83
Thebudgetaryprocedureapplyingtothemission
andthetroopcontributionsshouldbeclearlyspecifedinallbasicandframeworkplanning
documents:Ifapplicable,rulesforcost-sharingshouldbeclearlyspelledoutandtermsof
depreciationofequipmentshouldbespecifed.Thefnancialquestionsraisedbythelogistic
aspectsofoperationsshouldbeconsideredearlybyallmissionplanners.Finally,therewould
beaneedtoidentifyproceduresforreimbursementofanylogisticsupportrenderedbyTCNs,
andforpropertytransfers.
24 LESSONS LEARNED IN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS
84
Thereisacommoninterestthatthefnancialme-
chanismsforpeacekeepingoperationsworkaseffcientlyaspossible.Thisproducesaneedto
drawupfnancialrulesandregulationstomakethemcompatiblewiththeoperationalneeds
ofcomplexandlarge-scalemissions.Toensuresuffcientexpertiseisavailabletothem,troop-
contributingnationsshouldconsiderappointingabudgetexperttoworkin-theatrewithChief
AdministrativeOffcers(CAO)andChiefLogisticsOffcers.
85
Oneshouldalsoconsiderincreasingthedelegation
offnancialauthoritytoandwithinmissions,intheinterestsofbothmissioneffciencyand
responsivenesstotheneedsoftroopcontributorsandoftheForceCommander.Inanycase,
alltroopcontributorsinvolvedintheoperationshouldapplythesamerulesvis--visthelocal
authorities.Inthisregard,asingleclaimspolicy(aspractisedbyIFOR)hasproveduseful.
86
ChiefAdministrative Offcers should continue to
retainauthorityforexpenditurebutmissionbudgetsmustbedrawnupinconsultationwith
civil and military elements and encompass all the declared mission aims, while refecting
budgetaryrealities.CAOrecommendationsmustgoforwardaccompaniedbycertifcation
fromForceCommandersandMissionHeadsthattheproposalshavebeenfullydiscusseddown
totheloweroperationallevelandendorsedasrealisticandachievable.Areservecadreof
administrativeoffcerscouldensuretheoptimaluseofresources.
87
Aspecifcaspectofrelationsamongorganisationsis
thereimbursementofcostsincurredbycontributingnations.Inthisregard,experienceshows
thatreimbursementsfromtheUNareseldomtimelyandthatforcecontributorsneedtobe
abletobridgethedelayinreimbursementthroughnationalfunding.Onlyself-sustainingand
supportableforcesshouldbecommitted.