SUSTAINMEKC I A SECONDARY ?I-!

FJTER:
N An Analysis of the Effect of Transportaticn on Campaign EXecuti.cn i n

North Africa, 1941-1942, and Its Pelevance ta Southwest Asia.

by
Major P h i l i p L Idiart
. Field A r t i l l e r y

School of Mvanced Military Studies

11.s. Army Comnand and General Staff College

F o r t Leavenworth, Kansas

4 May 1987

~pproved for public release: d i s t r i b u t i o n is

unlimited.

87- 304 3

Name of Student:

Fhilip L I d i a r t , .

Major,

Field A r t i l l e r y

T i t l e of Monqraph: SUSTAINMF" I N A SECONDARY 'IH!3ATER: An Analysis of the Effect o Ransportation on Campign Execution i n North f Africa 1941 1942 and Its Wevance to Southwest Asia.

Approved by:

Monograph Director

Colonel Richard Hart Sinnreich, M.A.

Director, School of Advanced Military Studies

Director, Graduate oegree

Fhilip J a h k e s , R . D . .
!?CqKimS

1987.

APPROVED FOR PUIiLIC RELEASE. DISTRIBUTION UNLlMl E D .

ABSTRAcr

SUSTAINMENT IN A SECONDARY '!HEATER: AN ANALYSIS OF '!HE EFFEcr OF TRANSroRTATION 00 CAMPAIGN EXECUTION IN NORTH AFRICA, 1941-1942, !\ND ITS RELEVANCE '10 SOUTHWEST ASIA, by Major Philip L. Idiart, WA, 61 pages:

This IlPnograph discusses q;>erational sustainment in a secondary theater of war. Essentially. this stUdy asks, given horizontal escalation in a global conflict where central Europe is the primary theater, \'hat is the effect of operational sustainment, specifically transportation, upon campaign execution in a secondary theater of war. This IlPnograph is a historical analysis of the German ~rld War II experience in the North African campaign. German operational sustainment, specifically theater infrastructure, sustainment base, lines of CCImIunication, transportation and interdiction are examined based on the available historical records and contemporary literature to isolate those essential sustainment conditions that impacted upon q;>erational execution. Having determined these, those elements that influenced execution are then isolated and a set of relevant principles that impact on campaign execution are derived. Subsequently. the ~rld War II secondary theater in North Africa is contrasted with a hypothetical yet potential secondary theater of war in Southwest Asia. Afterwhich, these sustainment effects are then compared with the evolving battlefield since ~rld War It to determine the effect this has on the historically derived principles. Finally, the conclusions of this analysis are compared to current sustainment doctrine to determine cperational and sustainment implications for Southwest Asia. Among the conclusions drawn fran this analysis as to the effect of transportation upon campaign execution are: First, as supply is dependent upon transport, transport shortfalls or failures hastened by exterxied depth and interdiction will precipitate one I s culminating point. second and IlPst L'lIportantly, in an OITerseas theater of significant depth mere IlPbility is paramount, transport becomes a decisive point at the operational level. Finally. this study concludes that current AirLand Battle doctrine concerning operational sustainment, transportation and culminating points is both adequate and sound.

-ii

TABLEcFammimS

............................. Abstract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Section I: Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Sustainment and the Operational Level of war . . . . Section 11: T e North African Campaign. 1941-1942 . . . . . . . . . . h Strategic Situation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Rcmnel's F i r s t Offensive . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B r i t i s h Counteroffensive . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Fonnel's Second Offensive . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Section 111: Gennan Operational Sustainment . . . . . . . . . . . . . "heater Infrastructure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Theater Sustainment Base . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Lines of Ccnmunication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Transportation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Interdiction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Sumnary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Section IV: Transportation - A Contemporary Analysis . . . . . . . . Southwest Asian Theater of W a r . . . . . . . . . . . Airland Battle B a t t t l e f i e l d . . . . . . . . . . . . . smry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Section v: Conclusions and Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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A
B C

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M r t h Africa . The S t r a t e g i c Situa tion . Cyrenaica Raid Operation Battleaxe Operation Crusader I Operation Crusader I1 Operation Crusader I11 kmnel's & t r e a t Ramel's Second Mvance GazalaLine

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58

Throughout m i l i t a r y h i s t o r y , logistics has influenced and i n =me cases determined not only the course of battles, operations ard campaigns, but the

out-

as w e l l .

Ncnnerous h i s t o r i a n s such as Martin van Creveld, b n a l d Lewin

f and Martin Blumenson have r e c e n t l y noted and examined the h p r t a n c e o lcgistics to operations.

Blumenson in a recent article noted, " I t is p r h a p s

The

a law of warfare t h a t armies usually f i g h t with inadequate supplies.

tyranny of logistics denies units h a t they deem to be enough resources to engage i n battle or a campaign."' Although it has influenced the conduct of

war throughout h i s t o r y , the i m p r t a n c e of lcgistics to success i n b a t t l e has s i g n i f i c a n t l y increased in the late 19th and 20th centuries. ever-increasing and
With

the

s i z e , technological m p h i s t i c a t i o n and canplexity of armies

the

battlefields,

role and

i m p r t a n c e of

logistics has

similarly

brodened.

Lcqistics influences i n varying dqree dl theaters of war.

However, its effect is e s p e c i a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t i n secondary t h e a t e r s of w r a where econany of forces and resources is Facticed i n order t concentrate i n o t h e primary t h e a t e r of war. Considering t h i s ad the ever-increasinq impact

of technology today, t h e i m p r t a n c e o s u s t a i m n t i secondary t h e a t e r s of f n

war is even rmre significant today than previously.

F o t e n t i a l confrontation between the Warsaw Fact ad NATO suggests that conventional ambat in the f u t u r e w i l l mst l i k e l y occur in Central Europe. However, c o n f l i c t i n g US and Soviet i n t e r e s t s in the bliddle East also suggest Southwest Asia as a p t e n t i a l ambat t h e a t e r . F u r t h e m r e , the likelihood of

h o r i z o n t a l escalation prmises t h a t Southwest Asia w i l l be a secondary theater o f war vhile Central Europe remains the primary theater of war.
As such,

-1-

Southwest Asia praises to challenge operational planners and practitioners a s

its inhospitable environment, austere sustainment infrastructure, minimal b s t

nation support and secondary resource p r i o r i t y will dramatically influence the

conduct of the campaign and operations. Considering these mnditions, an

imprtant question must he p s e d .

Given b r i z o n t a l escalation in a global

c o n f l i c t where Central Europe is the primary theater, h a t is the e f f e c t of operational sustaininent, s p e c i f i c a l l y transportation, u p n campaign execution i n a secondary theater of war?

In an attempt

answer t h i s question, this

paper w i l l examine in d e t a i l the mncept of t r a n s p r t a t i o n and its e f f e c t u p n campaign execution

-- what

it has m a n t h i s t o r i c a l l y and h a t it mans today.

In h i s h k C War, Clausewitz reminds us t h a t " h i s t o r i c a l examples n

c l a r i f y everything and also provide the best kids of proof in the empirical sciences.
%is is p a r t i c u l a r l y t r u e i n the a r t of wr."2

Clausewitz goes

on to state t h a t there are four levels of h i s t o r i c a l analysis characterized by

the d i f f e r e n t uses of h i s t o r i c a l examples. simply explain an idea. application o an idea. a statement. Secondly,
F i r s t , historical examples m y

they may serve to demonstrate

the

Third, one can appeal to h i s t o r i c a l f a c t s to s u p p r t

Finally, the detailed presentation of an historical event, and

t h e d i n a t i o n of several events, makes it possible to deduce a mnclusion

wherein

the proof

is i n the evidence i t s e l f .

Therefore,

a detailed

analysis and presentation of h i s t o r i c a l examples of rnajor operations and b a t t l e s where transprtation affected t h e i r execution should allow us to i s o l a t e those mnditions affecting campaign execution.

Given t h a t W r l d War I1 provides the mst c m m n l y knom examples of high i n t e n s i t y operations, we need to determine h i c h campaigns of t h a t conflict

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would provide us the mst relevant examples for analysis.

As the M r t h

African campaign was e s s e n t i a l l y a secondary theater conducted principally in

an austere desert environment, h i s t o r i c a l analysis of the German experience would be mst relevant to Southwest Asia today.4 German experiences during Ramnel's
This study examines the

f i r s t offensive to

include Operation

Battleaxe, the subsequent B r i t i s h counker-offensive keginning with *ration

Crusader, Rmml's second offensive ending i n the b a t t l e of Alam Halfa and f i n a l l y Mi's operational defeat during Operation Lightfoot b a t t l e of E l Alamein.

--

the second

These historical examples are then analyzed to uncover

those e s s e n t i a l sustainment conditions that impacted upon Axis operational execution. Having determined these, elements that influenced execution are impact on campaign

then isolated and a set of relevant principles t h a t execution are derived.

W w i l l then contrast the World War I1 dcondary e

theater i n North Africa with a hypothetical y e t p t e n t i a l secondary theater o f

war in Southwest Asia.

Having done so, ke w i l l then cunpare these sustainment

e f f o r t s with the evolving b a t t l e f i e l d since World War I1 to determine khat effect t h i s has on the h i s t o r i c a l l y derived principles. Finally, the

conclusions of t h i s analysis will be ampared to m r r e n t doctrine to determine operational and sustainment implications f o r Southwest Asia.

SUSTAINMEW AND 'IHE OPERATIONAL LEVEL CF WAR

To further narrow the

scope of t h i s paper and to provide a

cQrrm3n

understanding, m e explanation of terms is required.

F i r s t , we w i l l examine

what is meant by the tenns l o g i s t i c s and sustainment a t the operational level:

what they are theoretically and dcctrinally:

and hhy they are important. what

is

Having

done

so, we

will

continue

by

clarifying

meant

by

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transportation.

Finally, we w i l l define k a t is meant by distribution.

Historian lmrtin van Creveld defines l o g i s t i c s as the practical art of

mving armies and keeping them supplied.' s t a r t p i n t , but let us examine it further.
This definition provides u s a

rPgistics in a theoretical sense

encanpasses a l l activities to bring an m y k~ battle.

itself with maintenance, supply, l i n e s of

As such, it amcerns

camnunications

and bases of

operation.

In The &t of War, Jmini defined l o g i s t i c s as:

t h e a r t of inoving armies. i t comprises t h e o r d e r and d e t a i l s o f marches and camps, and of q u a r t e r i n g and s u p p l y i n g t r o o p s ; i n a word i t i s t h e e x e c u t i o n of s t r a t e g i c and t a c t i c a l enterprises. L o g i s t i c s comprises t h e means t n d arrangements which work out t h e p l a n s of s t r a t e g y and t a c t l c s .

...

Elaborating further, Janini wrote that l o g i s t i c s involved providing for

t h e successive a r r i v a l of

convoy of

supplies and the establishment and Having examined the

organization of

l i n e s of operations and supplies.'

theoretical d e f i n i t i o n of l o g i s t i c s , definition.

let us now proceed b its doctrinal

F 100-16 S u p p r t Operations: M

Echelons Above Corps defines -rational

l g i s t i c s a s an essential military operation k i c h takes the mans of wr frm a

the heart of the nation b the battle area i n the r i g h t quantity a t the r i g h t
the.

Explaining further FM 100-16

adds,

"it includes the reception of

material, p r t handling, storage, transportation, maintenance, d i s p s a l o

property, and related training."'
T h i s d e f i n i t i o n provides us a s t a r t p i n t .

However, it does m t take the operational level of wr for its perspective. a

f Rather its focus is on describing the organization and functions o canbat

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service s u p r t

(CSS) operations.

Brian Davenport

i h i s normgraph, n

"Operational Sustainment:

Defining the Realm of the mssible," p i n t s cut

that the critical shortfall of this m u a l is its f a i l u r e to address theater

supFort

within

the

operational

level

context

of

campaigns

or major

operat ions. operational

Therefore, we must still ask what is sustainment a t the

level of

war.

F 100-5, M

Operations which

established

the

operational level of war in cur AirLand Battle doctrine p m i d e s us a mre useful definition.
I t states:

O p e r a t i o n a l sustainment comprises those l o g i s t i c a l and support a c t i v i t i e s r e q u i r e d t o s u s t a i n campaigns and major o p e r a t i o n s . O p e r a t i o n a l sustalnment extends frcm t h e t h e a t e r sustainment base o r bases which l i n k s t r a t e g i c t o t h e a t e r support f u n c t i o n s , t o t h e forwaryo CSS u n i t s and f a c i l i t i e s o r g a n i c t o major t a c t i c a l units.

HOWVer,

i f t h i s defintion is to be of any u t i l i t y , let u further narrow its s -rational sustainrent is e s s e n t i a l l y sustainment &an the theater o f

focus.

operations

sustaimnt

base(s) i n t o

the

forward

area

of

operations.

P r a c t i c a l l y speaking, -rational

sustainrent occurs fran the VMOM t the o

CoscoM.
l e t us

Having established a mrking definition of cperational s u s t a i m n t ,

(x3w

examine d ~ y is imprtant. it

Simply, an army's

a b i l i t y to transport and d i s t r i b u t e material and

supplies

b~ major

operational m i t s can m k the decisive difference i n the ae

Our doctrinal capstone

f a i l u r e or success of major cperations or campaigns.

manual, EM 100-5, C$erations reccqnizes t h i s by stressing t h a t "today the US Amy's a b i l i t y to sustain its operations is mre i m p r t a n t as an element cd
canbat pwer than ever

Elaborating f u r t h e r ,

it s t a t e s that

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"sustainment is equally v i t a l to success a t b t h the operational and tactical

levels of war. cmpigns will often be limited in t h e i r design and execution

f by the support structure and resources of a theater o

Having examined the nature and hportance of l o g i s t i c s and operational sustainment i n the doctrinal and theoretical sense, let us
IY)W

poceed further

to narrow the focus of t h i s paper by defining h a t is want by transportation

ard d i s t r i b u t i o n .
E 100-10, M Combat Service Support defines transportation

as:

Those services r e l a t e d t o t h e mvement of personnel and m a t e r i a l t o meet t h e Army's requirements and commitments. Without adequate t r a n s p o r t a t i o n , t h e successful support of combat I t i s t h e means of d i s t r i b u t i n g o p e r a t i o n s i s imposslble. s u p p l i e s , evacuating daygged equipment, and m v i n g personnel t o where they a r e needed.

For the purpose of this study, t h i s d e f i n i t i o n serves as startpint.

However, we need to expand this definition to include mt only transportation

means and assets, but also systems as w e l l .

our d e f i n i t i o n the e s t a b l i s h n t ,

By this means, w will include i n e

d j u s t m e n t and management of

lines of

s u p p r t and m u n i c a t i o n s , and the transshipnent of mterial and supplies at

terminal

nodes.

ll~us, for

the

purpose

of

clarity

in

this

paper,

a transportation a t the operational level of wr consists of those services,

assets and systems involved i n the mvement of supplies and material to
support major operations and campaigns.

Hence, operational transportation

involves the mvement of mterial and supply &an the theater of wr through a
the theater of operations t the t a c t i c a l support bases. o

Finally, let us

examine Aat is want by the term distribution.

FM 100-16 defines it as:

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The f u n c t i o n a l phase o f l o g l s t l c s t h a t embraces t h e dispensing of m a t e r l a l s , s u p p l i e s , equlpment, products o r services, according etc. I t Includes t h e t o need, r e q u l s l t l o n , orders, p l f y s , a u t h o r l z e d d e l l v e r y o f such things.

11.

THE NDR!lli AFRICAN CAMPAI(N, 1941-1942

Prior to the Second World W a r ,

the Mediterranean ws a mixture o a

Further, both I t a l y and

canpeting French,

I t a l i a n and B r i t i s h interests.

B r i t a i n had m n f l i c t i n g interests in M r t h Africa.

Consequently,

Italy's

invasion of Ethiopia in 1935 caused grave m c e r n for the Dgyptians h o f e a t 4 f u r t h e r Italian expansion. With the Suez Canal and ultimately Mideast o i l a t

stake, British a t t e n t i o n s x n turned to North Africa.'

Thus, the stage was

set 60r a clash between I t a l y and Britain in the Mediterranean.

THE STRATEGIC SITUATION (Map A)

Following the cutbreak of the war, the Italian strategic aim i n t h i s arena
was daninance on the continent o Africa. f
Cbserving the direction o the f

German campaign in Western Europe, I t a l y declared w r on France and England on a

11 m e 1940. W i t h France defeated and -land
M

fighting for its wry

9 3 m ~ quick

existence, it seewd
conquests of

cpprtune m n t for W s s o l i n i to rake

h i s own, s p e c i f i c a l l y to seize B r i t i s h

interests b-~ the

Mediterranean area.l

By contrast, B r i t i s h strategic aims e r e defense o f

the home islands, preservation of the I n t e g r i t y of British t e r r i t o r y and the defense of v i t a l i n t e r e s t s . achieve these a h , British intent was to Inld against the Germans while concentrating to defeat the Italians. 3
'b I

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In August 1940, Nssolini ordered Marshal Graziani to advance into Eygpt.

A month later, the I t a l i a n 10th Anny crossed the kontier and contacted the

British.

Wwever, Graziani a n stopped h i s forces a t Sidi Barrani &rt o f

the British main body a t Mersa M a t r ~ h . ~While the Italians garrisoned S i d i Barrani, General Wave11 planned a counteroffensive.
01 9 Cecember 1940, the

western ksert

Force struck

the

Italians

and

in

the

ensuing

battle

precipitated their withdrawal.

In the subsequent p l r s u i t , the British quickly I n i t i a l l y the Germans

pushed the Italians snne 500 miles back to Beda Fanm.

had no intention of becaning involved i n I t a l y ' s m r t h African campaign. However, the I t a l i a n reversal concerned Hitler. Although he f e l t that wen

the loss of NDrth Africa was m i l i t a r i l y tolerable to the Axis, Hitler feared the political implications of
tp

such a developnent.

'

Thus,

he

found it

necessary bo cane

t h e i r relief and a Spernrerband (blocking detachment) was

s e n t to North Africa to stem the W i t i s h advance.6

ROMMEL'S FIRST OFFENSIVE

When the f i r s t German elements arrived a t W i p l i i n February 1941, the

operational aim ws e s s e n t i a l l y to defend miplitania. a

According to then

Lieutenant Colonel Westphal, "the intention was m r e l y to b l d an expaded bridgehead, a ring aruund W i p l i . " ' Deutsches Afrika

mwever, Rmnnel as camMnder o the f

After h i s

% (DAK)

had d i f f e r e n t and bioader aims.

a r r i v a l in theater, he h w d i a t e l y directed reconnaissance elements to the east in search of b e t t e r defensive terrain. Following the i n i t i a l clash

between B r i t i s h and German reconnaissance elements on 24 February, 1

directed elements of the 5th Light Division

to continue t h e i r mvement

eastward.

In l i t t l e mre than a mnth, Rmunel's eastward reconnaissance not

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o n l y extended the defensive l i n e mre than 300 miles east of 'IYipli, t h e Axis t h e a t e r sustainment base, h u t also extended h i s l i n e of mmnunications ( L K )

as well.*
corner

What began i n i t i a l l y as a reconnaissance

--

a look around the

-- s m n

turned i n t o a series of probing a t t a c k s . 9

On 23 March, reconnaissance elements of

I( w

were ordered to probe the

B r i t i s h p s i t i o n s a t El 8qheila.

Upon finding them a bllow shell, Fame1

b o l d l y ordered t h e M Reconnaissance B a t t a l i o n to a t t a c k the next day. a t t a c k in t u r n precipitated a B r i t i s h withdrawal to Mersa el Brega.

%is
Ilrrnnel

sensed t h a t t h e B r i t i s h had severely thinned t h e i r defenses. l o

Contrary

to a standing d i r e c t i v e to remain on t h e defensive, R m m l instead i n i t i a t e d

an a t t a c k by elements of the 5 t h Light Division toward ,%=a el mega. 11

Consequently,
Rmniel began h i s

f i r s t offensive to d r i v e t h e supply and 'Ihe B r i t i s h ,

equipnent constrained B r i t i s h forces eastward across Cyrenaica.

a l r e a d y werextended with t h e i r armored v e h i c l e s badly i n need of w e r h a u l ,

were pushed past t h e prts of Cerna and nObruk and eventually to the Egyptian

F r o n t i e r . 12

'Ihe a t t a c k on 31 March transitioned quickly into a plrsuit as the t h i n

B r i t i s h defenses d i s i n t e r g r a t e d . Immediately,
Ilrrnnel's

operational a h

s h i f t e d to securing not only Benghazi hut also a l l of Cyrenaica as the Benghazi area could not be held Sy i t s e l f . '3 "Cyrenaica Raid" (Map 6 ) .

began the so-called

In rapid succession, WK captured i%Ga el Rrqa

(31 March), Fgedabia and the p r t of Zuetina ( 2 April), Benghazi ( 3 April), El Mechili and Derna ( 8 A p r i l ) , and f i n a l l y reached 'lbbruk on 1 1 A p K i l . l 4
AS

t h e B r i t i s h wntinued their retreat, Rmwl canpleted the encirclement of

Tobruk and *netrated

inside the Egyptian f r o n t i e r t Sollum. o

Hence, the

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breakthrough a t Mersa el Brega had p r e c i p i t a t e d a week long 500 mile B r i t i s h

retreat.

Although t h e German-Italian p u r s u i t s u c c e s s f u l l y pushed t h e B r i t i s h

back inside Egypt, it f a i l e d to achieve a B c i s i v e v i c t o r y h i l e d d i n g 700

miles to t h e a l r e a d y extended
o f f e n s i v e culminating p i n t .

Lot."

Thereby,

Rmml w n to hasten h i s a

Arriving a t lbbruk, Ibmmel launched a series of unsuccessful a t t a c k s to c a pt ur e t h e Fort. Having f a i l e d to seize it q u i c k l y and with h i s forces

nearing culmination, Rmunel paused to g a t h e r s t r e n g t h and plan for 'Ibbruk's c a pt ur e .

H i s focus now on lbbruk, F t m m ~ l d i r e c t e d t h e establishment of

Bardia and Halfaya Pass to prevent 'Ibbruk's relief.

de fe ns e s a t Sollum,

Rmmel needed t h e p r t of Tbbruk h r several reasons.

F i r s t , the I t a l i a n

transprt f l e e t made l i t t l e use of Eienghazi and h i s Loc m s werextended = e m

1000 miles back

to Tripli. '6

AS

a result,

he needed

an intermediate harbor

s u s t a i m n t base.

MOreOver, lbbruk as a p r t ws t h e best a

in

Cyrenaica, p r h a p s i n a l l of Ebrth Africa.

lbbruk also blocked a 22 mile

s t r e t c h of t h e coastal highway, t h e only high sped avenue of approach and

major Loc to t h e Egyptian border.

As a r e s u l t , lbbruk t h u s forced Axis supply

convoys onto a 50 mile inland detour along a d e s e r t t r a c k here t h e desert

sand made t h e t r i p extremely d i f f i c u l t .

F i n a l l y , with Tbbruk in B r i t i s h

hands, Ibmmel dared not resume h i s o f f e n s i v e as t h e Au s t r a l i a n g a r r i s o n could

sever h i s LOC a t any time. l 7

'Ihus,

t h e Axis a p e r a t i o n a l aim, d r i v e n by
By c o n t r a s t t h e B r i t i s h

t h e problems of supply, kcam t h e s e i z u r e of lbbruk.

aim was to hold and deny t h e Germans t h e p r t .

down A i forces for xs

F u r t h e r , Wave11 needed to tie

two nunths to a l l o w reinforcements to be brought in to

augment t h e defenses of Qypt. 18

-10-

while elements of W were cverextended inside Wypt ad with Fmmnel's

a t t e n t i o n focused on Tbbruk, Wavell set in m t i o n a counterattack. As the

15th Panzer Division w u l d a r r i v e a m n in t h e a t e r , the B r i t i s h muld not wait. As a r e s u l t , *ration jumping-ff Brevity, a l i m i t e d spoiling attack designed to Secure

p s i t i o n s for the major counteroffensive to follow i n the sumner,

while the Germans were weak

was launched prematurely on 15 May. 19

at

Halfaya Pass and the Axis armor was close to 'Ibbruk, Wavell's plan called for

an attack along three axes: one toward S i d i Azeiz, one toward Capuzzo ad the
t h i r d f o r Halfaya Pass. 2o Although the B r i t i s h seized Capuzzo ad Halfaya

Pass quickly, t h e i r separate and u n m r d i n a t e d idvance p n n i t t e d Rmnel ta

mass h i s anwr and counterattack each colunm separately.

Realizing the

importance of Halfaya Pass, Rmnel dispatched a strong Gennan force t h a t drove the B r i t i s h cut of the pass. conclusion of Operation Brevity.
This f i n a l engabement signified the abortive

Following

the

unsuccessful

Operation Brevity,

Wavell,

under

extreme

p o l i t i c a l pressure frm Churchill, launched Operation Battleaxe (Map C) on 15

June. The operational concept was fundamentally the same as Brevity txlt on a
l a r g e r scale. Essentially, the intent was to defeat the Axis forces a t t h e

f r o n t i e r , relieve 'Ibbruk then exploit to Derna ad E l Mechili to cumplete the destruction of the Axis forces a x l thereby gain a decisive victory in North Africa " defense of

By

contrast,

the German defensive plan hinged Halfaya and Sollum.

cn a strong

the c r i t i c a l ,gasses,

Earlier during the

i l l - f a t e d Operation Brevity, Ibrmnel had grasped the significance of t h i s key

terrain to h i s p s i t i o n a t 'Ibbruk.22

Accordingly these psses, especially

Halfaya, had k e n converted into almost impregnable psitions.

-11-

'Ihe ensuing three-day battle was not a success for the B r i t i s h .

Air

reconnaissance reports a d radio intercepts alerted the Getmans. B r i t i s h d v a n c e a t Halfaya, 1 Panzer Divisions massed h i s armor

Stopping one

--

5th Light and 15th

--

i n t o one center of gravity to strike the B r i t i s h armor

Afterwards the 5th Light Division was to mve toward

south of Fort Capuzzo.

Halfaya Pass to sever the B r i t i s h IM3 and l i n e of

retreat.

Although

successful i n stopping the offensive and precipitating the B r i t i s h withdrawal,

Rarmnel

failed to t r a p the B r i t i s h force and m p l e t e its d e s t r ~ c t i o n . ~ ~

Thus ended a phase i n the campaign h e r e both mnbatants reached operational culmination. During the ensuing *rational pause h i c h lasted three mnths,

t h e B r i t i s h changed caRMnders h i l e both sides sought to improve their l o g i s t i c a l p s t u r e for future operations. 24

THE BRITISH CD-FFENSIVE

Throughout t h i s operational pause, Axis planning was conditioned by the problems of supply. 25

lannmel was concerned t h a t the interdiction o h i s f

sea l i n e s of mnmunication ( S W s ) and W muld allow the B r i t i s h h i l d - u p to overwhelm him eventually by its sheer weight. Moreover, to continue the

offensive i n t o FQypt, he needed the p r t f a c i l i t i e s a t 'Ibbruk and to eliminate

t h e B r i t i s h forces i n h i s rear.

Accordingly,
As

Ramnel

sought and received

becane Ramnel's

permission

to eliminate lbbruk.26

a result,

lbbruk

primary objective h i c h ws to be stormed a t the end of November. a

While Panzer Gruppe Afrika gathered its strength for the planned seizure
of lbbruk, Auchinleck launched Operation Crusader (Map D) on 18 Mvember.
Its

operational aim w s the d e s t r u c t i o n of Axis armor and secondarily, the r e l i e f a

-12-

of 'Ibbruk.

'b a c m p l i s h t h e s e I

aims, Auchinleck d i r e c t e d XXX Corps to swing

around the A i southern f l a n k to G b Saleh here h assuned Raronel m u l d xs ar e

mass h i s armor f o r the climactic b a t t l e . 27

Concurrently, X1 Corps m u l d I1 XXX Corps muld then

assault t h e A i l i n e in t h e north to tie down forces. xs

l i n k up with X I 1 1 Corps and both m u l d

relieve mbruk before the f i n a l

clearance of Cyrenaica. 28

I n i t i a l l y the B r i t i s h a t t a c k d i d not d i v e r t Tubruk.

Ramel's

attention fran

HOwever, convinced f i n a l l y that t h e B r i t i s h were involved in a

serious o f f e n s i v e , Rmnrel shelved h i s plan for 'Ibbruk and turned h i s attention

to t h i s threat.
S i d i Rezegh t h r e e days,

As t h e b a t t l e unfolded, the desert terrain m u t h of lbbruk

the decisive p i n e of the operation.
fed

--

-- became

In the ensuing

the British

their annored brigades piecemeal i n t o this

cauldron h e r e the massed armor o DAK under Cruewell destroyed them (Map E ) . f By 23 hbvember heavy

-- T o t e n s o m t a p - virtually
with

every B r i t i s h formation had taken

victor. 29
Gauging his

punishment

Emel

the

tactical

oppnent's frame of mind, Fmnwl m k h i s remaining armr and vent a l l cut for
the

Fgyptian

border

on 24 bvember
aim

i n h i s famous "dash to t h e wire"

the enemy

(Map F).30

RMmnel's

was

to

threaten

rear

and

force

Cunningham to give up the o f f e n s i v e and withdraw.

Altbugh h i s pnetration

-to

sane 15 miles

inside

Egypt

--

shook

Cunningham,

kmml's

attempt

concentrate on the frontier f a i l e d to shake Auchinleck.

Instead the B r i t i s h
( h

forces now i n Fanml's rear d i d not withdraw but continued their a t t a c k .

26 November, X I 1 1 Corps' New Zealand Division broke through to Ibbruk.

With
93

t h e r e l i e f of 'Ibbruk, Fmnwl s a w no inmdiate tope i n s e i z i n g t h e p r t and

fell back to S i d i Nzegh.

-1 3-

Returning to S i d i Rezeqh,

I;brranel

and h i s fuel-starved

xmr became

embroiled i n a b a t t l e t h a t w u l d l a s t 10 more days.

Although he succeeded i n

l a y i n g siege to Tbbruk, again on 30 Nmmber, the temp of operations ard degradation of h i s sustainment only hastened h i s culmination.

Wreover, A i xs

sustainment was exacerbated by the a i r i n t e r d i c t i o n of Locs and prts and a t t a c k s upon supply columns by B r i t i s h armored cars. 31 Because of these

r a i d i n g a c t i v i t i e s , Axis resupply and t r a n s p o r t was restricted to the hours of darkness.

This led ta a f i f t y prcent reduction i n sustainment c a p a b i l i t y .

xs By 6 December, Rmml had f i n a l l y reached h i s mlminating p i n t ard the A i f o r c e s began t h e i r withdrawal to Gazala h e r e t h e I t a l i a n s were strengthening its e x i s t i n g defenses.
QI 15 Cecember,

t h e B r i t i s h attacked these defenses

Despite the

p r e c i p i t a t i n g a f u r t h e r Axis withdrawal the next day ( N a p G ) .

B r i t i s h pursuit,

the Axis withdrawal w s orderly. a

Tnrough successive and

s k i l l f u l delaying actions, Ramel mnaged ta avoid encirclement and f u r t h e r damage h i l e exhausting h i s pursuers.
01 10

January 1942 Fcanmel reached E l

Agheila h e r e a coherent defensive l i n e ws e s t a b l i s h e d . a

RCMMEL'S SECOND OFFENSIVE

With h i s L C shortened and forces resupplied, C

I;brranel

was ready to strike

again.

Catching t h e B r i t i s h 8 t h Army cwerextended and deployed w i t h its

d i v i s i o n s beyord supporting distance of each o t h e r , the newly fotmed Panzer Arne -Mrika
attacked wrsa el Brqa on 21 January 1942 (Map ~ ) . 3 2
AS

in

t h e previous year, the a s s a u l t t r a n s i t i o n e d quickly into a p l r s u i t as the

a t t a c k rolled t h e 8 t h Amy back.

In rapid succession, Fcanmel recaptured

(29

Agedabia a d Beda Fomm (22 January), Mus (25 January) and Benghazi

January) as t h e B r i t i s h withdrew before him.

QI 30

January, Ritchie ordered

-14-

the 8 t h Atmy to f a l l back to a defensive l i n e a t Gazala to m e r T o b r ~ k . ~ ~

B 6 February, Fanzer Annee Afrika recaptured Derna and E l Mechili and plshed y
the Kritish

-- badly

h u r t i n g f o r mnt of supplies

-- back

to Gazala.

Here,

throughout t h e rest of the winter, an -rational

pause ensued. 34

bwever

b r i l l i a n t t h e advance was, Famwl had q a i n cwerextended h i s LCC fran Ripli

by 500 miles.

I n late May, Rmnnel was ready to resume t h e o f f e n s i v e .

T b a t t a c k the

B r i t i s h defensive line a t Gazala (Map I ) , h i s plan called f o r Group Cruewell

- X and X I Corps X

( 4 Italian i n f a n t r y d i v i s i o n s )

- to

conduct f e i n t s i n t h e

n o r t h to tie down and deceive B r i t i s h f o r c e s khile the DAK with t h e 90th Light, and t h e attached Ariete awl Trieste d i v i s i o n s enveloped t h e B r i t i s h southern f l a n k around B i r Hacheim with a t h r u s t north deep i n t o t h e B r i t i s h

elimination of B i r Hacheim along with a preconceived reaction by B r i t i s h armor. 36

Fundamentally t h e plan hinged on t h e rapid

rear. 35

The a t t a c k t h a t began on 26 May m d excellent i n i t i a l progress. ae heavy resistance awl attrition stop@

Wwever,

t h e Axis advance by the t h i r d day.

As

a r e s u l t , Famiel concluded that h i s Eorces must be redeployed and on 29 May he

ordered their withdrawal

to

a psition

west of

Knightsbridge.

After

organizing a defense of

a now-consolidated

pnetration,

t h e Axis forces

focused t h e i r e f f o r t s on t h e 150th Brigade b x awl by 2 Ane had destroyed it. w i t h Rmnel on t h e defensive, B r i t i s h armor assaulted t h e Axis p s i t i o n .

However, f o r t h e next 10 days t h e 8 t h Army s u f f e r e d heavy tank losses as

R i t c h i e cunmitted h i s arnror brigades piecemeal into t h e cauldron.

mile

t h e B r i t i s h hammered h i s p s i t i o n , Rmml a s s a u l t e d B i r Hacheim with t h e 90th Light and Trieste d i v i s i o n s . Under extreme pressure for

10 days,

the

-1 5-

defenders at B i r Hacheim broke c u t and withdrew on the night of 10-11 June.

W i t h t h i s p s i t i o n cleared and h i s armor resupplied, Rmml attacked cut of

the cauldron mving north along the Gazala line, defensive b x e s one by one (Map J ) .38

suhduing the remaining

By 15 June, Axis m r had reached

the mast and precipitated a British withdrawal the next day.

Determined not to be stopped by a t h r e a t to h i s flank, R m m l focused h i s a t t e n t i o n on Bardia and Tobruk.

Cn 18

June, the p r t was once mre under A i xs

Cn 21

siege and the 90th Light Division captured Bardia the next day. 39

June, the B r i t i s h forces i n Tbbruk surrendered and with its capture, 1 won a tremendous prize. Although the campaign had expended the last of the

Axis strength, the capture of vast supply stocks p r m i t t e d Fame1 to p s t p n e

h i s offensive culminating p i n t and continue the offensive. 40

As the B r i t i s h withdrew f i r s t to Mersa Matruh then ta E l Alamein, Fanzer

- Afrika Armee
assuming

continued its p l r s u i t .

bwever, after relieving Ritchie and turned the 8th Army

personal

m m ~ n d , Auchinleck

around

and

established a determined defense a t E l Alaiiin.

upon reaching the B r i t i s h

tam21

defense on 30 June, tam21 planned for an attack the next day.

directed 90th Light division w i t h Kampfgrupp Brie1 to p n e t r a t e the B r i t i s h defenses between El Alamein and Dier el Abyad, then swinq north to Sever the coastal road. penetrate, Concurrently, 'WK followed by the Italian XX Corps w u l d

then swing south thrusting into the B r i t i s h X I 1 1 Corps rear. 4 1

With the B r i t i s h s x t h e r n flank tied to the El Quattara depression ard their determined resistance, R m m l ' s forces were unable to pnetrate the defense.
After reverting to the defensive for 4 days, Rmml launched a new attack on 8

July.

Fame1 directed DAK t o penetrate the New Zealand Division's defenses,

-16-

then

to exploit to t h e a l t a . 42

However,

by a d e f t d i n a t i o n o f

o f f e n s i v e and defensive tactics Auchinleck kept t h e A i forces a t bay.43 xs Consequently, Panzer Armee Afrika throughout t h e m n t h of

J u l y hamnered

unsuccessfully a t the E r i t i s h line.

Exhausted by h i s unsuccessful a s s a u l t s and the i n t e r d i c t i o n of h i s

sLx)cs,

ports and overextended UX, Ramnel paused to gather h i s remaining s t r e n g t h for

a f i n a l a s s a u l t at t h e end of August.44

Meanwhile,

the B r i t i s h mnmmd

s t r u c t u r e changed and their forces continued a b i l d - u p of lren and material.

On 12 August, Alexander relieved Auchinleck h i l e mntgcmery a s s&
cmmarxl

o f the 8 t h Anny.

Since the B r i t i s h defense grew stronger each p s s i n g day

while the Axis f o r c e s grew eaker due to i n t e r d i c t i o n , an offensive had to be launched no later than 31 August.45 Essentially,
-1's

plan was a

r e p e t i t i o n of t h e one he enployed a t Gazala.

In the north, the Italian X and

XxI Corps with t h e 164th German I n f a n t r y Division attached w u l d attack tD

tie-down enemy forces bile Ramwl's Schwerpunkt

WK w i t h 90th Light,

Ariete and Littorio Armored d i v i s i o n s attached

B r i t i s h flank.46

-- t h r u s t

east around the the

ckl t h e n i g h t of 30 August, Ramnel launched h i s last attempt to smash the

8th Army and break through to b r i o and Alexandria (Map K).

Crucial to the continued

o p e r a t i o n was i n t e r d i c t i o n of t r a n s p o r t . 47

the

a v a i l a b i l i t y of

fuel

and

oil.

However,

t h e i r SLOCs,

p r t s and Loc exacerbated A i supply and xs

Although t h e Axis forces made initial Fogress, f u e l b e c m continued the

so Scarce on 1 September t h a t only 15th Panzer Division a t t a c k . 48

As a r e s u l t , h m e l rrodified h i s plan and d i r e c t e d h i s a t t a c k

However, kntqomery

a t a daninating terrain f e a t u r e , Alam Halfa ridge.

-17-

anticipated t h i s s h i f t and p s i t i o n e d h i s armor accordingly.

Hence, Rmmel

merely sent DAK on a death-ride against the strongest p s i t i o n of the B r i t i s h defense. 49 His fuel
and

m u n i t i o n stocks nearly depleted,

foiled

by

B r i t i s h anticipation and overwhelmed by the resistance encountered, abandoned h i s m t l y offensive. 50

Rmmel

Returning to h i s o r i g i n a l s t a r t l i n e , R m m l realized as did Iybntqcmry,

f t h a t Alam Halfa signaled the irrevocable t r a n s f e r o the i n i t i a t i v e to the

British.

As such, the Axis forces reverted to the defensive and awaited As an cperational pause ensued, Wntgmery

t h e inevitable B r i t i s h offensive.

continued h i s txild-up of mn and material to launch e r a t i o n Lightfoot, planned for 23 October. Fundamentally, the B r i t i s h plan was a simple one.

Taking advantage of a 3:l superiority i n men and mterial, .%ntgmery directed

XI11 Corps to conduct diversionary attacks i n the ssuth to f i x F a m e l s

attention Hhile XXX Corps with 4 infantry divisions followed by X Corps

a m r e d divisions

--

-- conducted
Ridge. 52

the min attack i n the north between T e l l e l

Eisa

and

Miteiriya the

By

contrast,

Famels German

plan

hinged

on

corseting

Italian

infantry divisions w i t h

formations

behind

extensive minefields.

!b the rear of t h i s defensive l

line, h n n e l grouped the

Littorio Armored Division w i t h the 15th Panzer Division i n the north and the

Ariete Armored Division w i t h the 21st Panzer Division i n the s s u t h as h i s

counterattack forces.53 tJowever, h i s supply situation was desperate.
For

t h e b a t t l e , Panzer Annee Afrika was down to 3 issues of fuel

was at Eenghazi

-- and 8-10

-- one

of Hhich

issues of m u n i t i o n . 54

Following an extensive a r t i l l e r y p e p a r a t i o n , the B r i t i s h offensive began on the night of 23-24 e t o b e r . M t i l the end of the mnth, the 8th Army

-18-

hamnered a t the A i defenses vhile the RAF attacked A i forces, fuel ad xs xs

m u n i t i o n dumps, supply colunms 4 the prts behind the front.

Although

Ramie1 held the B r i t i s h a t bay, continued attrition ad interdiction exhausted

t h e Axis forces and supply stocks. the Axis defense on 2 kvember.

After m i t t i n g X Corps, bbntgcmery broke

W days later, the 8th m y mnpleted its

breakthrough precipitating the Panzer Atmee's withdrawal on 4 ES3~ember.~~ The following day, Wntgcmery m i t t e d the X Corps i n the pursuit of Axis forces.

Thus, began the decisive A i retreat t h a t did not end until 4 xs

February 1943 a t the Mareth line

-- sane

1350 miles away.

The CLSrsert:

a M i c i a n I s prdise M a qmrtermasterls M i .

General von 2 a v e n s t e i n Commander, 2 1 s t P z D i v

I n studying Wmnel's campaigns i n North Africa, historians have suggested various reasons f o r h i s ultimate defeat.
Ramie1 himself,

However gome observers, to include

have a t t r i b u t e d supply f a i l u r e as the principal cause for h i s

failure.' analysis, supply."3

After the war, Field Marshal Kesselring wrote, "In the f i n a l

everything to include the pssession of

Africa, depended up3n

In h i s study of the Axis supply f a i l u r e , historian van Creveld

argued t h a t the problem o supplying an Axis force for an d v a n c e into the f

Middle East ws insolubler4 c i t i n g transportation s h o r t f a l l s as the Ffimary a reason. Ferhaps the best t e s t b n y came fran Rmnel's ex-chief of s t a f f .

After the war, Westphal offered the following reasons for the supply failure:

-19-

namely t h a t t h e s u p p l y l i n e had become i n t o l e r a b l y long. As a war h a r b o r , Tobruk had o n l y a v e r y smal I u n l o a d i n g c a p a c i t y , so t h a t we were s t i l I c h l e f l y dependent on Benghazi, indeed a l s o on T r i p o l i . There was no r a i l w a y l i n e a v a i l a b l e : therefore, t r a n s p o r t had t o be by l o r r y . L o r r i e s were, however, in extremely s h o r t supply. Even i f t h e y t r a v e l e d 40 m i l e per h o u r , t h e r e t u r n j o u r n e y f o r a column 'ran enghazi t o Alamein t o o k 7 days and d o u b l e t h e t i m e from T r i p o l i .

...

3 !

With

these

pints

i n mind,

let

us

explore

why

sustainment,

and

s p e c i f i c a l l y transportation,

failed.

'b do I

so,

will

examine tbse These

conditions t h a t impact on Operational sustainment and transportation.

are:

infrastructure, sustainment base, l i n e s of m u n i c a t i o n , intertheater

and intratheater t r a n s p x t a t i o n

ard f i n a l l y , the impact of interdiction u p n

transportation.

Having determined cur framework for analysis, l e t u s examine

t h e theater infrastructure.

THEATER INFRASTRUcRIFtE

The d i f f i c u l t y in establishing a theater sustainment base w i l l depend significantly upon

the

extent

and nature of

the

civil

and

military

i n f r a s t r u c t u r e within a theater.6
Africa.

Nowhere w s t h i s a

t r u e r than in M r t h

As a theater of Operations, Mrth Africa w s characterized by its a

v a s t expanses, inhospitable terrain and austere infrastructure. indigenous resources were v i r t u a l l y nonexistent. desolate t e r r a i n rendered supply fundamental. s u s t a i n canbat

Wreover,

Its vast distances and

Hence, everything required to

-- men,

material, fuel and m u n i t i o n

-- was

t r a n s p r t e d into
Thus the

the theater of qm=ations and then carried forward transport of supply became indespensible.

the front.

Wwever, the austere infrastructure

i n h i p o l i t a n i a and Cyrenaica, s p e c i f i c a l l y the inadequate p r t f a c i l i t i e s and

limited road and r a i l networks dramatically affected transportation.

-20-

North Africa as an w e r s e a s theater of operations depended heavily

M I

sea transpsrt for men, material ard supply ran the s t r a t e g i c s u s t a i m n t

base.
This being the case, the a v a i l a b i l i t y and adequacy o p r t f a c i l i t i e s f

t o transfer supplies was critical.

any value within the theater. Tbbruk.

Fiowever, there existed only a few p r t s of

mese were T r i p l i , Benghazi, Bardia, Derna ard

Of these psrts, only Tripsli, Benghazi a d Tbbruk were successfully r

and successively mployed.'

45,000 t o n s of cargo mnthly.

As a p r t , T r i w l i was capable of handling

By contrast, Benghazi as a prt was capable of

processing 81,000 tons mnthly, khereas lbbruk's capacity was only 45,000 tons monthly.8 Wide fran limited

prts,

Ai xs

sustaimnt

was

further

constrained throughout the campaign by the l i m i t e d road network in Lybia. Essentially, there existed only a single major paved road

-- t h e V i a Balbia -Moreover, as an

t h a t s p a ~ e dthe theater of operations to serve as an LCC.

Lcc the Via Balbia

interdiction.

was plagued by constant disrepair,

frequent flooding ard

?his s i t u a t i o n ws further exacerbated by the total lack of a

Consequently, the lack of rail transprt required truck or coastal

r a i l w i t h i n the theater.

t h e Germans and I t a l i a n s to t r a n s p r t a l l supplies by

shipping.
became

It was m t u n t i l Axis operations advanced well into Qypt that r a i l

to

available

supplement

the

LLX.

However,

as

this

Spartan

infrastructure affected transpsrtation,

the location of

the A i theater xs

s u s t a i m e n t base influenced t r a n s p r t a t i o n a s w e l l .

THEATER SUS'LaIEPIEW W E

The location of the theater s u p r t base is c r i t i c a l to the conduct of the

campaign, since a mlpssitioned support base may adversely influence the

course of operations and p r h a p s the e n t i r e campaign.

Although access to

-21-

s e a l i f t , transshipnent f a c i l i t i e s and multiple ILKS are indispensable, thus location must provide the operational cammander the greatest p s s i b l e freedan of ,action.

Such was the case for the B r i t i s h forces, W t not for the Axis.

Prior to the outbreak of the war, the B r i t i s h had planned, surveyed and begun the construction of major logistic f a c i l i t i e s i n EQypt capable of serving the Mediterranean fleet and a large army with a supporting a i r force. l o with

t h i s in mind, the B r i t i s h pssessed a sustainment base of considerable size i n

Egypt,

By mntrast, Italian logistic f a c i l i t i e s were nure l i m i t e d and the

A i forces were entirely dependent on sea transport even for their mst xs
elementary requirements. l 1 Following t h e i r retreat

frcm Cyrenaica,

the

Italians were reduced to a single prt, Tripoli, for unloading supplies.

xs Consequently, h e n kmel arrived in Mrth Africa, the A i forces pssessed

only a single support base. Because Fame1 had inadequate p x t f a c i l i t i e s i n

his theater support base, he was unable to maintain dequate stocks i n the
forward areas. Although Tripoli provided easy access to the S K s ,
its

transshipnent capability was limited.

&spite its capability of hardling

45,000 tons m n t h l y , the Axis forces i n February 1941 required 70,000 tons of

supplies p r mnth. l 2 the forces a t Sirte.

Further, the p r t was located sane 300 miles kan

As the campaign unfolded, Rmmsl required and A d d the

ports of Benghazi and mbruk as intermediate s u p p r t bases.

However, the

impact of Tripoli as a support base upon transportation was not as significant a s the ever-extending E.

LINES CF O~MMUNICATION (Map L)

The M r t h

African

campaign

illustrates

the

importance of

lines of the

camnunication to campaign execution. l 3

Due to the very nature of

-22-

i n f r a s t r u c t u r e , Axis sustairnnent was l i m i t e d t;o a single Loc throughout t h e campaign.

- Via

Balbia

-In

Further, operations conducted O e North Africa's vr

v a s t expanses c o n t i n u a l l y extended and strained t h i s l o g i s t i c t e t h e r .

Fehruary 1941, the f r o n t was s t a b i l i z e d a t Sirte hhich was 300 miles frm t h e
Axis s u p p r t base. Even by German d o c t r i n a l standards the Axis IIX was

a l r e a d y Overextended m e 100 miles s i n c e 200 miles was considered the l i m i t

for

effective

transprt

by

mtor

vehicle. l 4

As

Ramnel

began

his

o f f e n s i v e , h i s Loc was already considerably Overextended (see f i g u r e 1 ) .

As

t h e campaign m f o l d e d , only t h e capture and use o aellghazi and lbbruk as f

intermediate support bases eased the Overstrained L 2 and t r a n s p r t system. O

As Benghazi and Tbbruk became intermediate supprt bases, SLCcs o r i g i n a t i n g

f r a n I t a l y e r e s i m i l a r l y extended.

In i s o l a t i o n , this w e r e x t e n s i o n of the

ulc and Sulcs was m t as s i g n i f i c a n t as its e f f e c t on A i transprt vehicles xs

and shipping.

Tripoli
Sirte E l Agheila Benghaz i Gazaia Tobruk Sol I urn E l Alamein

A X I S SUSTAINMENT BASES Benq haz i Tobruk

300 470 700 900 1000 1100

280 300 400 800

I00
350

1350

f i g u r e 1 : Lo(: d i s t a n c e s 15

TRANSFORWiTION

a I n i t i a l l y , Axis transprt, both mtor vehicle and shipping ws s u f f i c i e n t

-23-

to meet requirements.

During t h e period

February-May 1941,

the I t a l i a n

merchant f l e e t succeeded i n t r an s p o r t i n g 325,000 t o n s of supply and mterial

against a mnthly requirement of 70,000 tons. l 6

w i t h the f r o n t a t S i r t e , b w e v e r , as

and then at E l Agheila, mtor t r a n s p o r t supply remained f e a s i b l e .

t h e depth of

operations increased mtor t r a n s p o r t becam strained.

In

November 1941, t h i s s i t u a t i o n was exacerbated f u r t h e r .

With forces a t 'Ibbruk, Of

Sollum and Halfaya Pass, Rmnnel extended h i s Loc to dangerous lengths.

c our s e , Fmmel realized t h i s and demanded a d d i t i o n a l mtor t r a n s p r t and pressed t h e I t a l i a n s to make greater use of E 3 e n g h a ~ i . l ~ However, Ihnmel f a i l e d to s e i z e 'Ibbruk and t h e Italians were r e l u c t a n t to use Benghazi as t h e i r larger s h i p s had d i f f i c u l t y i n e n t e r i n g t h e harbor.

Noreover, the sea

r o u t e to Benghazi was longer and mre vulnerable, and t h e I t a l i a n s possessed i n s u f f i c i e n t f u e l f o r t h e e x t r a escorts r e q u i r e d . Finally, the p r t i t s e l f

was badly damaged.'*

Its p r t c a p a c i t y was reduced to 24,000 tons per

Consequently,

month due to air a t t a c k s during February-March 1941.

the

Italians d i r e c t e d t h e h l k of t h e i r shipping to R i p l i .

With Benghazi

rendered useless, b n n e l w s forced to use coastal shipping to supplement h i s a

mtor t r a n s p r t .

Although coastal shipping was capable of t r a n s p r t i n g 29,000

tons pe r m n t h i n May 1941, its v u l n e r a b i l i t y to i n t e r d i c t i o n s o n reduced

t h i s c a p a c i t y to 15,000 t o n s. l 9 strained. Hence, mtor t r a n s p o r t continued to k

As we have j u s t seen, Axis o p e r a t i o n a l sustainment and transprt d e p n d e d

p r i n c i p a l l y on tne use of mtor m h i c l e s .

F r a t h e time of Operation Crusader

i n November 1941 u n t i l t h e second battle of E Alamein, t h e e f f e c t i v e n e s s of l

Axis m t o r t r a n s p o r t was degraded for a nunber o reasons. f
It was d i e f l y t h e

o v e r a l l result of i n s u f f i c i e n t coastal shipping, t h e Italian r e l u c t a n c e to

-24-

u t i l i z e Benghazi and TObruk f u l l y , B r i t i s h sea and a i r vehicles.

A t the

i n s u f f i c i e n t rail and r o l l i n g stock, transport

i n t e r d i c t i o n a d i n s u f f i c i e n t nunbers of n

same time Panzer

Crusader. 2o

Afrika lost half of

its mtor

t r a n s p o r t i n *ration

However, the impact of this s h o r t f a l l

withdrawal shortened the
KC.

was

not

readily

apparent

as the Axis

Consequently, h e n the second offensive m f o l d e d , the s h o r t f a l l i n t r a n s p o r t v e h i c l e s became increasingly apparent as the operation wre on. Alone, this

s h o r t f a l l m y have precipitated Rmnel's offensive culminating p i n t earlier

i f it had not been f o r the s e i z u r e of vast stocks of trucks a d f u e l stocks

with the capture of lbbruk.

Afrika captured
~ o m e 3900

In t h e i r advance to El Alamein, Wnzer Annee

t r u c k s and 1900 tons of urgently needed fuel."

As h i s t o r i a n I. S. 0. P l a y f a i r observed, it was the captured stocks that took

t h e army to A l m i n . 22 However, w e n t h e captured

u s e of v e h i c l e s to
N i t h 85%

supplement h i s mtor t r a n s p o r t f a i l e d to provide a f i n a l s o l u t i o n .

xs o f a l l A i mtor t r a n s p o r t consisting of

captured B r i t i s h and Anerican

f v e h i c l e s , t h e lack o repair parts coupled with t h e crrerexterded toc

1350

miles to T r i p o l i
Use.

--

r e s u l t e d i n only 65% of these v e h i c l e s a v a i l a b l e for stmrten the LK,

1

23

TO ease this s h o r t f a l l

continued t~ However,

p r e s s t h e Italians to increase the u s e of Benghazi and Tbbruk.

continued sea and air i n t e r d i c t i o n forced the I t a l i a n s b use primarily ~ i ~ ~BY .the battle of u n Halfa in &gust-September i . ~ ~ r 1942, the A i xs

t r a n s p o r t Crisis had becane critical.

TO i l l u s t r a t e t h i s s i t u a t i o n , David A.

Wood demnstrates t h a t Ibmnel's d a i l y t r a n s p o r t requirement was 2,264,500

tonmiles, yet h i s d a i l y transport c a p a b i l i t y was only 1,344,000 ton-miles.

T h i s 920,500 tonmile translated into a d a i l y s h o r t f a l l of 892 tons. 25

The c r i t i c a l i t y of t h i s s h o r t f a l l becanes apparent h e n contrasted with the d a i l y requirement of 350 t o n s for an Axis a m r e d d i v i s i o n .
MOreOver, stocks

-25-

of 5000 t o n s of fuel a t Benghazi and 7000 tons of m u n i t i o n a t Tobruk k i l e Panzer M e e M i r k a lacked fuel and m u n i t i o n a t El Alamein provides further evidence of the mgnitude of the transport f a i l u r e . 26 Of the s i t u a t i o n ,

a Field lhlarshal Kesselring noted t h a t in Ibmmel's r e a r area f u e l ws f r e e l y

issued i n any m u n t to colms on the road and that only at the f r o n t , vhere
it ws mst impxtant, w s it lacking. 27 a a

Having examined the mgnitude o f

t h e transport f a i l u r e , let us now turn cur a t t e n t i o n to the impact and e f f e c t

of B r i t i s h interdiction of A i transportation. xs

INTERDICPION

North Africa i l l u s t r a t e s the

importance of

uninterrupted

sustainment

throughout a l l phases of the campaign.

In concert w i t h the A i transport xs

xs s h o r t f a l l , B r i t i s h sea and a i r interdiction of A i S U X s and Loc played a

decisive role i n the interruption of sustainment.

B r i t i s h ULTRA intercepts

provided the mans with k i c h to develop an e f f e c t i v e interdiction plan.28

The i n t e r d i c t i o n of the SLOcs had two p i n c i p a l e f f e c t s .
First,

successful

shipping s t r i k e s during the p r i o d September-December 1941 and August-Mvember

1942 denied

the Axis forces urgently needed supplies.

With

a mnthly

requirement of 100,000-116,000

tons of supply, B r i t i s h interdiction resulted

i n a s h o r t f a l l of about 50,000 tons p r mnth during this pricd

f i g u r e 2 ) . 29

(see

Of p a r t i c u l a r note is the B r i t i s h interdiction p r f o n a n c e

during Operation Crusader, the battle of Alam Halfa and the second battle of
E l Mamein here an average of 44% of enemy tonnage was sunk.

Secondly, a s

the SLKs to Benghazi and Tobruk were mre vulnerable to Malta-based warships

n and a i r c r a f t a d land-based a i r c r a f t i n Egypt, interdiction forced the I t a l i a n

merchant f l e e t to u t i l i z e W i p l i .

In t u r n , the diversion o shipping to f

-26-

Month Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nav

Tonnage Disembarked

Tonnage Lost

Ton naye L o s t cg,

41
4 1

41
41

41 41 Dec 41 Jan 42

Feb- Mar 42 Apt- 42 May 42 Jun 42 Jul 42 Aug 42 Sep 42 OCt 42 Nov 42

125,076 62,700 83,900 67,400 73,600 30,000 39,000 66,000 107,000 150,000 86,000 32,300 91,500 51,600 77,200 46,000 94,000

5,695
15, I90

13,090 26,210 18,400 48,950 8,560

44 . 19.5 1. 35 28.0 20.0 62.0

IGSS

10,590 -

18.0 t h a n 1 .O

9.0
I O S S t h a n 1.0

6,470 9,130 5,830 25,360 19,300 36,I40 20,630

70 . 22.0 6.0 3. 3d 20.0 44.0

18.0

f i g u r e 2:

l n t e r d i c t l o n and SLOC peformance

30

Tripoli

only

exacerbated

the

already

overextended
British

Loc.

However,

as prt

s i g n i f i c a n t as t h e i r SLOC

interdiction,

a i r interdiction of

f a c i l i t i e s further contributed to the Axis transport and supply poblem.

I n addition to the Italian mrchant fleet, A i p r t s of d i s c h a q e became xs

t h e second of three decisive p i n t s that the B r i t i s h attacked to unhinge the enemy center of gravity. Relying c h i e f l y on a i r interdiction, the RAF

habitually attacked Benghazi, 'Ibbruk, & m a and Bardia.

As such, a i r attack

precluded Axis use of the smaller p r t s of Eerna and Bardia.

Moreover, the

air interdiction of Tobruk ard Benghazi caused such damage t h a t these p r t s

were s i g n i f i c a n t l y degraded.
Damage to Tobruk reduced its d a i l y c a w c i t y cam

1500 tons to only 600 tons and Benghazi was similarly reduced to 800 tons as
opposed to its capacity of 2700 tons. 31
As bottlenecks ensued the cargo

-27-

ships

waiting

to

unload

their

stocks

remained

vulnerable

to

further

interdiction.

Consequently, this interdiction diverted I t a l i a n cargo ships in

s m cases to Benghazi, as *ll as mward Tripli. o e

As interdiction increased the vulnerability of the

Loc, the supply colms

became a third decisive p i n t .

Throughout Operation Crusader and the battles

of Alam Halfa and E l Alamein, marauding B r i t i s h armred cars and l i g h t tanks

and constant air interdiction created havoc mg Axis transprt. n such heavy damage, a i r interdiction reduced Axis mvement darkness.
As the

Inflicting

the b u r s of

FAF was r o w concentrated i n EQypt, even resupply a t night

During July 1942, FCmnnel observed, " I t is hardly p s s i b l e

became precarious.

t o supply the army at night, as the roads are almost canpletely denied by enany a i r a c t i v i t y . ,132
Aside

the

35% non-availability

rate previously

cited, continued a i r attack of the Loc resulted i n a d a i l y loss r a t e o 30 f

vehicles. 33

Having

examined

the

infrastructure,

sustainment

'base,

lines

of

ccmmunication, t r a n s p r t a t i o n and interdiction u p n Axis sustainment, let us sunnnarize cur findings.

SUMMARY

The North Africa campaign p o v i d e s u s many insights i n t o operations within

a secondary and austere theater.

failed,
we

'b I

s m r i z e why the German-Italian campaign reasons.

First

can note

four principal

and foremost,

the

foundations of strategy and operational art are closely tied to lcqistics. North Africa was a theater of operations i n a secondary theater of mr.

-2a-

M r O e, Oe v r

it did not

have resourcing priority.

Consequently,

limited

resources necessitate l i m i t e d operational aims.

If operational aims and the

depth of the operations exceed the depth of resources, then resources must be

increased
accepted.

-- contrary to the

strategic concept --or an hmnse degree of r i s k

Rmwl's aims in the campaign and the depth o h i s qxrations f

Secondly as h n s t r a t e d i n

consistently exceeded h i s s u s t a i m n t capability.

North Africa, austere cperational s u s t a i m n t and limited resourcing are

inherent i n a secondary theater.

Accordingly if aims exceed the m n , as

sustainment shortfalls w i l l hasten and pcecipitate the operational offensive culminating point.
mird and critical to an cwerseas and austere theater,
AS

sustainment is chiefly dependent on transprt.

1899, "supply and

Winston C h u r c h i l l noted in

transport stand or f a l l together; h i s t o r y depends on such m s the case i n fibrth

AS demnstrated in cur analysis,

Africa.

me

ineffectiveness of

the SLOcs linking the theater of

wr a

sustainment base to the theater of operations contributed s i g n i f i c a n t l y to the

Axis failure.

Hence, the management, control and potection of S L E s had a Furthemre,

major impact on the effectiveness of operarational sustaimnt.

as in the case of the SLocs, the management, control and protection of m s

within the theater of operations impact u p n cperational s u s t a i m n t . Finally

and mst

s i g n i f i c a n t was

the

synergistic effect of

interdiction

upn

transportation

assets,

systems

and transshipnent nodes.

In

sumnation

operational aims beyod the depth of sustainment resourcing and transprt created preconditions such that

t r a n s p r t became a decisive p o i n t and

interdiction the means to unhinge the operational center of gravity.

Considering these conditions, l e t u s sunarize the effect of s u s t a i m n t and look qecifically at the impact of transprtation u p n campaign aecution

-29-

i n a secondary theater of war.

F i r s t , as supply is dependent u p n transport,

transprt shortfalls or failures w i l l hasten,

culminating p i n t .

if

not precipitate ones

Secondly, and mst importantly, in an cwerseas theater of

significant depth where m b i l i t y is paramount, transport becanes a decisive point a t the operational level. Winston Churchill s m r i z e d this m r e

eloquently when he mted, victory is the beautiful, bright-colored flower.

Transprt is the stem without which it could never

If our historically derived transportation

imperatives ckmnstrating the are

to

effect o f
to must

upn

campaign

execution

have

any

relevance
h e

contemprary application i n a p t e n t i a l Southwest Asia theaterof war,

contrast the two theaters and examine the AirLand battefield where campaigns
w i l l be waged.

TO

contrast, SOuthwest Asia as a theater o w r w i t h the World W r I1 f a a

F i r s t , l i k e the

theater in North Africa, certain assumptions must be made.

Mediterranean theater of war, Southwest Asia is presumably a secondary theater

a of wr canpared to the primary Central European theater.

Further, Iran is the

primary theater of operations within the Southwest Asia theater as mrth Africa was the primary theater of -rations within the Mediterranean. Having

determined o r parameters, l e t u s contrast Iran to North m i c a as theaters of u operations.

-30-

At

first glance several

both theaters

similarities and

parallels

cane to mind. vast desert

a

Geographically, environments. mountainous -try North Africa.

are principally
mrth

austere and Iran

mwever,

unlike

Africa,

is predaninently

here only its desert central plateau closely resembles

Further, operations in North Africa were conducted along its

m a s t Hhereas cperations in Iran are l i k e l y to be inland. diverge fran the coast rather than prallel it.

Hence, KXS w i l l

mwever, the cperational

depth of Iran suggests t h a t offensive operations conducted there w i l l s t r e t c h and tax Locs to the breaking p i n t .
let

Having quickly examined the geography, the theater

us now turn cur a t t e n t i o n to the infrastructure and

sustainment base.

As in North Africa, Iran possesses limited infrastructure.

Apart fran

Bandar &bas Hhich has a d a i l y capacity of 15,000 tons, m s ports along the ot gulf are mre limited and a s such w i l l mst l i k e l y require logistics-over-theshore (Urrs) to supplement them.
Further, as with the V i a Balbia in M r t h

Africa, paved m d surfaces m v i r q inland are also i n disrepair. a

Further,

rail i n I r a n is also l i m i t e d and in the same s t a t e of disrepair a s its roads.

Considering the infrastructure, the mst l i k e l y location for a theater s u p p r t base m u l d be Bandar Abbas due to its access to S e a l i f t , a i r l i f t and LCCs. Finally, as in North Rfrica, Iran w i l l be an inmature dlerseas theater and w i l l depend chiefly q n sea and a i r l i f t for everything required tD mnduct canbat.
%is leads us to the forces which w i l l

conduct

these

ambat

operations.

Given t h a t Central Europe w i l l require p i o r i t y of forces and resources, f o r Southwest Asia a 2 corps

5 division force is p s s i b l e , but a single

-31-

corps of 3 d i v i s i o n s is mre l i k e l y .

Cppsiq this force will be, for the

sake of t h i s analysis, 1-2 Soviet armies of perhaps 6-10 divisions.

However,

s i m i l a r to the B r i t i s h in North Africa, Soviet forces will enjoy c e r t a i n inherent advantages.

F i r s t , Soviet forces w i l l have s b r t e r LCCs canpared to

t h e extended SLocs and m

s of U forces. S

Secondly, the Soviet sustainment

bases will b mre extensive than the i n i t i a l theater sustainment base that U S
forces must huild up. I h i r d l y , Soviet forces muld l i k e l y operate on i n t e r i o r

lines.

Given these conditions, US forces l i k e the A i forces i n North Africa xs

w i l l be vulnerable to the interdiction of their s u s t a i m n t .

To illustrate the p t e n t i a l effect of

interdiction, let us examine the

l o g i s t i c a l requirement of a U hrce. S

Current l o g i s t i c plannicg factors

i d e n t i f y a d a i l y requirement of 5740 tons to s u p p r t a 3 d i v i s i o n force and 10,990 tons to supprt a 2 corps, 5 division force.

'

mese figures

t r a n s l a t e into a m n t h l y requirement of 172,110 and 329,000 tons respectively,

of & i c h
the port of Bandar Abbas can supply 450,000 tons.

Further,

to

transport this tonnage to the forward t a c t i c a l formations in one l i n e h a u l p r day, 11 and 21 truck canpanies muld be required respectively.

However, one

must consider the impact of interdiction on the p r t , LX and SLocs. f s

I n the case o hbrth Africa, both Beqhazi and Tbbruk were reduced b3 a f t h i r d of their capacity. delivery systems, Given t e c h n o l q i c a l advances i n munitions and t h e i r

a similar reduction a t Bandar Abbas is not unlikely.

n Accordingly, its capacity could be reduced t 150,000 tons and sustainment

s h o r t f a l l s muld follow. Interdiction of
the t K s by air or

special

operations forces (SOFs) a s in North Africa m u l d also exacerbate operational

sustainment.

Pdditionally, if LCC interdiction successfully reduced t r a n s p r t

-32-

to the hours of darkness, the c a p b i l i t y of

truck m p a n i e s to transprt
be at

supplies 420 miles

- one day's

l i n e haul

-- would

in half.

Finally,

as the B r i t i s h benefited fran ULTRA intercepts, Soviet intelligence satellites

a s w e l l as other SIGIEPT and ELI" and mst l i k e l y interdicted.

systems panise t h a t SLCCs w i l l be mnitored

I) XW

Having contrasted the two theaters, l e t us

turn cur a t t e n t i o n to the AirLand b a t t l e f i e l d conducted.

h e r e campaigns w i l l be

According t E 100-5, *rations, o M

the future b a t t l e f i e l d is l i k e l y to be Increased l e t h a l i t y coupled with the

chaotic, intense and highly destructive.

rapid massing of forces afforded by technological ldvancements in weapns, acquisition and m b i l i t y systems panises that units that are acquired and located
will
be

defeated.

Further,

lethality

and electronic jamming

developrents pranise to disrupt mmMnd, control and m u n i c a t i o n s

equipnent thereby g r e a t l y increasing friction and uncertainty.

(C3)

K m o v e r , the

n a t t a c k of CamMnd control d e s along with casualties m g leaders will

result in a confused and disordered environment.

w i l l also be characterized a s nonlinear.

Tnis p t e n t i a l b a t t l e f i e l d

Rapid mvement to m c e n t r a t e o r

f disperse pranises t h a t units w i l l becane islands o c o n f l i c t as engagements

and b a t t l e s deqenerate.

me u e of unconventional and spcial *rating s

forces coupled with the tremendous m b i l i t y of amventional forces and fluid

nature of canbat w i l l add to this condition. Further, this b a t t l e f i e l d w i l l

l i k e l y see the employment of nuclear and d-Iemical w a p n s 2dding tD its & a s

and destructiveness.
As mbile units f i g h t throughout t h e i r depth, l i n e s of

c m u n i c a t i o n w i l l becane arerextended and vulnerable to interdiction.

Ihe

-33-

prevalence of obstacles encountered throughout the battlefield w i l l also

impde the mvement of logistics.

Consequently, this battlefield w i l l be

characterized by its austere logistic s u p p r t . 2

Having contrasted the two theaters and examined the AirLand battlefield where campaigns w i l l be conducted,
be

mte several similarities between the

two theaters and hetween the AirLand battlefield and that of 1940-43 brth Africa.
Both

theaters are similar geographically as w e l l as in their Further, the size and depth of a Southwest Asian theater,

infrastructure.

specifically Iran, prmises to influence operational sustainment as brth &Erica did in W r l d War 11. Finally, as Mrth Africa was chiefly depended on
If we

SUXS, Southwest Asia also w i l l be dependent on sea and a i r l i f t .

contrast operations i n North Africa with the Airland battlefield, we also note similarities.
A i operations xs

i n mrth Africa were on mny occasions

Further, the Mrth African
The battles and

nonlinear and the temp characterized as fluid.

campaign witnessed integrated sea, a i r and land operations.

operations during the simmer-fall of 1942 typified AirLand operations.

The

use of Long-Range Desert Group8 and SAS forces with mrauding a m r e d vehicles added depth to the h t t l e .
W i t h regard to transportation, s b r t f a l l s hastened

by extended depth and interdiction w i l l precipitate one's culminating p i n t . secondly, and mst importantly in an cwerseas theater o significant depth, f

transprt b e m s a decisive p i n t a t the operational level.

-34-

V .

OKLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIohIs

Fmn cur h i s t o r i c a l and mntemprary analysis, w have seen the imprtance

of

operational

sustainment

and

specifically

transprtation

to

campaign

execution.

Essentially, in planning and executing a campaign, maneuvering units

operational/tactical

x nunber of miles to Secure an operational

objective requires Y n h r of tons of supply and 2 n u d e r of t r a n s p r t a t i o n assets. Clearly, the Mrth African campaign demnstrated the effect of

sustainment

ancl transprtation u p n campaign execution h e n supply and

K m o v e r , we

transport cannot s u p p r t the depth o q e r a t i o n a l objectives. f concluded

t h a t t r a n s p r a t i o n s h o r t f a l l s hastened by extended depth w i l l

p r e c i p i t a t e one's culminating p i n t and mre importantly in an austere and

irrPnature theater, as mst l i k e l y will be the case i n SOuthwest Asia, that

transprt becanes a decisive p i n t .

contrast cur conclusions to doctrine.

Considering these findings,

let us

Current l o g i s t i c doctrine as espused by EM 100-16 S u p r t *rations:

Echelons Above Corps is inadequate for a tuber of reasons.
F i r s t , it f a i l s

to zddress theater s u s t a i m n t within the operational level mntext of

cmpaigns and major -rations.
w i l l be r u l e of l o g i s t i c s ,

Secondly, although it states t h a t austerity the central framework o t h i s d c c t r i n a l mnual f

revolves principally around a mature theater here third party o r b s t nation

(HN) s u p p r t is p s s i b l e .

mre significantly, it assumes the m a i l a b i l i t y of

Therefore, w must question the e Thirdly, with respect only

a somewhat extensive theater infrastructure.

a p p l i c a b i l i t y of t h i s doctrine to an austere theater.

to

the

criticality

of

transprtation,

FN

100-16

recognizes

the

vulnerability of p r t s to enemy interdiction.

Wwever, it fails to caution

-35-

the reader a s to the e f f e c t of t r a n s p r t interdiction u p n operations ard

campaigns.

Rather, it stresses the imprtance of cur a b i l i t y tD conduct

LT. OS'

Moreover, it wades the impact of transport s h o r t f a l l s

-- l i k e l y

in

an austere theater nation rail

and

--

by stressing tranport w i l l be a c m p l i s h e d by b s t supprt

to

highway

the

mimum

pssible

extent. 2

Elaborating f u r t h e r , it adds:

D u r l n g t h e e a r l y s t a g e s of h o s t i l i t i e s t h e HN p r o v i d e s t h e b u l k o f the transportation services i n t h e COMMZ e x c e p t for t h e movement c o n t r o l and Army a i r l i f t . As t h e t h e a t e r matures, US m i l i t a r y transportation i s deployed t o augment HN or t h i r d c o u n t r y support. it i s e s s e n t l a l t h a t p r i o r arrangements be made t o e n s u r e c o m p a t i b i i i t y between HN and U S equlpment f o r d i s c h a r g e o f s u p p l i e s and equipment. Termlnal t r a n s f e r s e r v i c e s w i l l be p r o v i d e d by HN o r t h i r d c o u n t r y s u p p o r t t o t r a n s f e r c a r g o between 3 t r a n s p o r t nodes a t sea, r a i l , highway and i n l a n d water t e r m i n a l s .

Consequently,

we question the relevance of a doctrine that stresses

extensively the use of HN s u p r t i n an innnature and austere theater such as Southwest Asia. Clearly, M r t h Africa hasshown u s the consequence of limited Although of

infrastructure, p l r t i c u l a r l y limited rail and b s t nation supFort,

F M

100-16

proves

inadequate

with

respect

to

the

significance

t r a n s p r t a t i o n , E 100-5, M

*rations

on the other hand o f f e r s l o g i s t i c ard

operational planners and practitioners mny valuable insights.

With respect to operational sustainment, FM 100-5 regards t r a n s p r t a t i o n

as b t h a mjor sustaimnt system

as a key s u s t a i m n t function.

Further

it not only recognizes a u s t e r i t y but stresses that austere l o g i s t i c s w i l l be

the central d a r a c t e r i s t i c of addresses several critical

the AirLand b a t t l e f i e l d .
areas and their
impact

Consequently, with respect

it

to

transprtation.

Unlike F 100-16, F 100-5 recognizes that the continuity of M M

-36-

s u s t a i m n t is provided c h i e f l y by LEs.

Elaborating f u r t h e r , it emphasizes

and cautions t h a t t h e nunber, l o c a t i o n and q u a l i t y of W s m y w e l l determine t h e very s t r u c t u r e and tempo of addresses the necessity
and

t h e campaign.

w i t h this i n m i d ,

it

importance

of

altering

LCCs, e s t a b l i s h i n g

s u s t a i m n t priorities and forward staging i n the event of W overextension. With respect to extended LCCs, it states:

The l e n g t h o f t h e LOC d i r e c t l y a f f e c t s combat power. Longer LOC consume more r e s o u r c e s themselves, making fewer r e s o u r c e s a v a i l a b l e t o combat u n i t s . Long LOC a r e m r e s u s c e p t i b l e t o interdiction, need more t r a n s p o r t a t i o n and maintenance s u p p o r t , and r e q u i r e e a r l i e r f o r e c a s t i n g o f r e q u i r e m e n t s and l o n g e r lead t i m e for d e l i v e r y . Longer LOC a l s o r e q u i r e m r e e n g l n e e r e f f o r t , t r a f f i c c o n t r o l , and p r o t e c t i o n . The o p e r a t i o n a l commander must t h e r e f o r e seek t o s u p p o r t each phase of h i s campaign e f f i c i e n t l y , and as t h e campaign progresses, adJUSt h i s LOC and s u p p o r t bases. 5

I f w c o n t r a s t this passage t the previous one fran M 100-16, o

it is

c l e a r l y w i d e n t t h a t the authors of FM 100-5 recagnized t h e logistic lessons

of the North African campaign.

I n sunnnation, t h i s study concludes that c u r r e n t logistic d o c t r i n e as

espoused by E 100-16 w i t h respect to t r a n s p o r t a t i o n a t the operational l e v e l M o f war is inadequate.
By c o n t r a s t , operational sustainment doctrine as

a r t i c u l a t e d i n FM 100-5 is t o t h sound and adequate.

Historical evidence

presented i n this study does substantiate the m n u a l ' s d o c t r i n a l discussion

t h a t transprt s b r t f a l l s hastened by depth or i n t e r d i c t i o n w i l l p r e c i p i t a t e culmination.

-37-

MALTA

~ E D I T E R R A N E A N SEA

I I

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_ r _ _ .

AlexandriaEl Mersa

Slrte

--

:
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Pass

El

?*Herso Aghella

el B r e g a

,
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LIBYA

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100

200

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S E A

obruk

10 A p r

Axis 1 9 BritI s h e

I D

JMersa e l Brega
31 N o r

2 Apr

CYRENA ICA
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15 A p r

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24 Mar

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L I B Y A

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50

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of

S O l l U r n

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:> .

Axis

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EGYPT
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17 Jun

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AXIS
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r-!Y=-l
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S E A

Capuzzo
2 1 Dec

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OSaunno

Agedabla

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I

C Y R E N A I C A
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L I B Y A

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50

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FElWEKP, 6

1941

- 10 Jatllary 1942

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SEA

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12-15 J ~ r e 1942

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/ /

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AXIS

Brltlsh
Tral I
Road

Ral I

tl-H-+
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(NAPLES)

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Section I:
1. Martin Blunenson, "Constants in Warfare: Pass," (March 1987), p. 52.
2.
3.

The Relevance of Kasserine

Carl mn Clausewitz, 01 War, (Princeton, 19761, p 170. .

Ibid, p. 171.

4. North Africa as a secondary theater varied with the time frame of the campaign as w e l l as the p r s p e c t i v e o the Allies and the Axis. Throughout f the campaign, the I t a l i a n s viewed it as a primary theater of operations within a primary theater of war the Mediterranean. For the Germans the Mediterranean was their m l y active theater o w r u n t i l Operation Barbarossa. f a F u r t h e r , M r t h Africa as a primary theater of q x r a t i o n s fluctuated as the Gennans also conducted operations in Greece, Crete and Yugoslavia. However, from June 1941 on, the Germans & f i n i t e l y considered the Mediterranean a secondary theater of war to the Eastern Front. By contrast, Mrth Africa for t h e B r i t i s h ws me of many theaters of aperations a East Africa, Palestine, Syria, Greece and Iraq within their primary theater of war. I n i t i a l l y , E a s t Africa was the primary theater. After the Italian excursion into E m , North AErica &came the primary theater of operations and remained 90 m t i l the German intervention in Greece. F r the purp3se of .this paper, h w i l l use o e t h e German p x s p e c t i v e . It is recognized that M r t h Africa ws the only a a c t i v e theater of operations within a Mediterranean theater of war. Hower, a a f t e r June 1941 the Mediterranean became a secondary theater of w r contrasted t o the Eastern theater of war. As such, we will assume North Africa to be a secondary theater or the purpose of this study.

--

--

5. Martin van Creveld, Supplying War: (tondon, 1977), p. 1.

6.

istics from Wallenstein to Patton,

Baron de Jomini, The A r t of War, (Fhiladephia, 18621, p. 62. Ibid, p 233. . Echelons Above
Corps,

7.
8.

US Army, FM 100-16, S u p p r t Oper a t ions : (Washington, E, 1985 ), p Glossary-16. .

9. Brian W mvenport, "Operational Sustaiment: . Possible ," (Fort Leavenwrth , 1986), p. 2. 10.
11.
uS Army, FM 100-5, *rations,

&fining the Realm of the

(Washington, I ,1986), p. 65. X

Ibid, p. 59. Ibid, p 59. .

U Army, S

12. 13.

FM 100-10, Combat Service S u p p r t ,

(Washington, E,

19831,

p. a-2.

-50-

14.

us m y ,

FM 100-16, p. Glossary-8.

Section 11:
1. Thcmas E. Q-iess, The Second World War: (Wayne, 1984), p. 163.
Europe

and the Mediterranean,

a As 2. Richard Collier, Ihe Wr in the Desert, (Alexandria, 1977), p. 8. I t a l y already held Lybia, B i t l e a , Italian Scsnaliland and Ethiopia, Collier suggests t h a t Mussolini's intent was to t r i p l e h i s enpire i n Africa.
3. 4.

Griess, p. 163 and James L. Stokesbury, A short History of World Wr 11, a (New York, 19801, pp. 137, 139.

Griess, p. 165.

5. Martin van Creveld, "IiDnrmel's Supply problems, Aayal United Services I n s t i t u t e of Defense Studies, See also Siegfried Westphal, "Notes M the Cmpign of the b y a l United Services I n s t i t u t e for Defense p. 71.

Journal of the (September 1974 ) t P. 67. in North Africa," Journal Studies, (February1941-42,"

6.
7.

Ibid, p. 67.

Westphal, p. 73.

8. T. L. McMahon, "Gprational principles: The Operational A r t of Erwin Rannel and Bernard Montgomery," (Fort Leavenworth, 1985), pp. 38-39. See also van Creveld, Su 1 i n W a r , p. 184. &cording to van Creveld, the Germans considered 20 m i es as e t r a n s p r t a t i o n l i m i t for e f f e c t i v e supply by m t r oo transport.

9. Kazimierz Glabitz, "Rmnnel versus Montgomery," Military Review, (March 1951), p. 74. See also Donald E. Kirkland, "Ilommel's Desert k nw i g n I February 1941 - September 1942: A Study in Operational Weakness,'' (Fort Leavenmrth, 19861, p. 5. 10. A t t h i s t h , the primary EWitish theater of operations had switched fran North Africa to Greece. I n reaction to the German intervention i n the Balkans, Wave11 transfered forces frcm North Africa to Greece. As such, the B r i t i s h aim was t conduct an e c o m y of force defense in North Africa. o 11. m i n Rmmel, Rnmwl Pa r, (New York, 1982), pp. 105-106. k c o r d i n g to Ilommel, on 19 March d r a l Brauhitsch (chief OKW) informed him t h a t there was no intention of striking a decisive blow i n Africa. Hmever, Brauchitsch's d i r e c t i v e to Rmnnel allowed f o r a limited attack as f a r as El Agheila. B u t there was to te no general offensive. In e i t h e r case, Rmnel was to do nothing u n t i l May 1941, n r could he expct any reinforcements. o 12. Ward A. Miller, "The 9 t h Australian Division Versus the Africa Coprs: An infantry Division Against Tanks Tobruk, Libya, 1941," (Fort Leavenworth, 1986), p. 6.

-51-

13.
14.

-el,

p. 106.

See also Collier, p. 63.

McMahon, pp. 39-40. David I r v i n g , 'Ihe Trail of the Fox, (New York, 1978), p. 94.
See also

15.

van Creveld, Supplying War, p. 1%.

16. Fmml, p. 134. Discussing h i s p r supply s i t u a t i o n , Rmml ccmplained t h a t t h e Italian f a i l u r e to use Benghazi f u l l y placed a tremendous s t r a i n on t h e A i road t r a n s p o r t . See also Irving, p. 94. Despite t h e proximity of xs Benghazi to t h e front Over Tripli, Irving states t h a t the Italians refused to f send their supply s h i p s as the sea mute was longer and t h e danger o B r i t i s h interdiction geater. 17. Miller, p. 6. See also I r v i n g , p. 84 and F. W. von Mellethin, Panzer Battles, (New York, 1956), p. 67. 18. I b i d , p. 6.

19. I. S 0. P l a y f a i r , 'Ihe Mediterranean and Middle East, M l m 11, (London, . 1956), p. 160. See also C o l l i e r , p. 70 and Kenneth J. h c k s e y , Afrika Korps, (New York, 1968), p. 27. 20. C o l l i e r , p. 70.

Fame1 considered t h a t without p s s e s s i o n of Halfaya

Pass, h i s t en u r e of the p s i t i o n s o u t s i d e 'Ibbruk were a t r i s k . Therefore, the pass had t be retaken and p r m a n e n t l y held. See also Macksey, p. 27. o

21.

Ilrnranel, p. 141 and P l a y f a i r , p. 163.

See also Griess, p. 166.

22. I b i d , pp. 136-137. See also Macksey, p. 35. &cording to mnml, the Halfaya and Sollm passes were mints of great strategic importance for these passes were t h e o n l y places between t h e mast and H a b a t where it was pssible t o cross the escarpnent. I n any o f f e n s e fran Egypt; t h e r e f o r e , p s s e s s i o n of s t h e s e were bound to be of utmst value to t h e B r i t i s h a they offered a comparetively s a f e r o u t e for t h e i r s u p p l i e s . 23.
I b i d , pp. 141-148.

See also Macksey, pp. 35-37.

24. von Mellethin, p. 67. According ta u3n Mellethin all German planning during the late sPn e and f a l l of 1941 was m n d i t i o n e d by t h e problems of l l nr supply.

25.
26.

Ibid, p. 67.

R. E. FUgge, "Crusader Slow Step to Victory," A m (July-August n r 1984), p. 38 and Macksey, p. 43. 'JB illustrate t h e e f f e c t i v e n e s s of B r i t i s h n i n t e r d i c t i o n of h i s SLocs, a e n t i r e mnvoy of 5 merchant s h i p s t o t a l i n g some 39,000 tons was sunk t h e n i g h t of 8-9 November 1941 by Fbrce K and Malta based a i r c r a f t . See u3n Mellenthin, p. 68 and van Creveld Supplying War, p. 190.

--

27. 28.

I b i d , p. 39. I b i d , p. 39.

-52-

29. 30.

Collier, p. 85.

Rogge, p. 41.

31. Fbnmsl, p 169. See also Macksey, p. 56 and van Creveld, S p & . up y .p. 190. l highlight the e f f e c t o the interdiction of Ibnmel's b f , itish a i r c r a f t and marauding armored cars i n f l i c t e d such heavy lasses on the Axis supply mlumns traveling the LCC t h a t transport capacity was reduced by half a s mvement wis r e s t r i c t e d to night-time only. 32. 33. 34.
Collier, p. 89 and Griess, p.167.

E;,

Macksey, p. 67.
Collier, p. 89.

36. 37. 38. 39.

S. Cordier, "Rmnel's Greatest Triumph 35. SheA m r (MayJune 1963), p. 69 and Macksey, p. 71.

-- The Gazala campaign,"

Macksey, p. 73.
Cordier, p. 61.
Collier, p. 91.

See also Griess, p. 169.

Macksey, p. 83.

40. Feimel, p 233. See also Collier, p. 92 and van Creveld,

. p. 196. k c o r d i n g to IQmel, "In winning cur victory a t expended the last of cur strength, for the w e k s of very heavy fighting against an enemy superior in both men and material had l e f t their m r k on m y forces. k w ; however, with the vast h t y that had f a l l e n to us, including a m u n i t i o n , p t r o l , food and wr material of all kinds; a h i l d - u p for a f u r t h e r offensive was possible." &cording to van Creveld and Collier, t h i s booty included 2000 vehicles, 1400 tons of fuel enough to fill-up h i s panzers for the drive to Egypt, 5000 tons of general supplies and large q u a n t i t i e s of m u n i t i o n .

--

41. Correlli Barnett, "he Desert Generals, ( B l m i n g t o n , 19821, pp. 200-201. See also S e hS. Cordier, "Auchinleck Halts the A i Tide," Arrror xs (January-February 1965), p. 35.

42. 43. 44.

Ibid, p. 212.

Collier, p 93. .
I m , p. 243. b l

See also Griess, p. 167.

. . 45. I. S 0 (London. 19601. calculated that B r i t i s h could September --or

Playfair, ?he Mediterranean and Middle East, b l u m e 111, A h i s maswcts of reinforcement were s l i s h t , Itanme1 s he must either attack wior to the e d of August ---before the benefit f r a n Allied convoys expected to a r r i v e in e a r l y give up the i n i t i a t i v e altogether.
D 381. .

-53-

46. Sherwocd S. Cordier, "Rlam Halfa M i l i t a r y Review (November 1970), p. 68.

--

Last Chance i n Mrth Africa,"

47. P l a y f a i r , p. 382. As supply stocks here 95 low, Farmiel i n a report to Ccmando S u ~ d at ed 22 August 1942, s t a t e d t h a t i f Panzer m e Afrika were m to a t t a c k , it required imnediate shipments of 6000 t o n S ~ f ~ a n d 2 5 t0 n s o0 o f munition to-arrive 25-30 August;

f 48. Cordier, p. 69. See also Alan Kinghorn, '"Ihe Turn o t h e Tide in North Africa,'' (July-August 19671, p. 45.
49,
50.
51.

Macksey, p 107 . Cordier, p 74 . Macksey, p. 113. Barnett, p 270. . Macksey, p. 113.

See also Macksey, p. 113.

52. 53.

54. van Creveld, "Famelts Supply Froblems," p. 72. According to van Creveld, an issue of f u e l verbrauchssatze represented the m u n t re qui re d to d r i v e 100 k i l a n e t e r s and one i s s u e of m u n i t i o n ausstattun en See ao sl -a was t h a t amount required f o r one days combat. 304-305. k c o r d i n g t -el, o experience had shown t h a t t h e Panzar Am e r e consumed one issue of f u e l each day in &at. k m r d i n g l y , the p s s e s s i x o n l y 3 i s s u e s of f u e l d i s t r e s s e d Rnmel. Moreover, he f e l t that t h e Panzer Armee was crippled and could not react to t h e enemy.

--

--

55. Barett, p. 285. Following t h e i n i t i a l B r i t i s h breakthrough on 2 November, h m e l wanted to withdraw h i s forces to preclude t h e i r ultimate d e s t r u c t i o n . However, Hilter issued Rorrmel a stand and f i g h t d i r e c t i v e the next day. After t h e 8 t h Army m p l e t e d its breakthrough by X Corps w i t h its 3 armored d i v i s i o n s on 4 Mvember, Iomnel requested and received p r m i s s i o n to withdraw.

Section 111:

2.

Davenport, p. 18.

See also bnnnel, pp. 244, 328.

3. Albert Kesselring, " K esse l r i n g 's View of t h e African War, m r t I," k n a l d S. Btwelier, e d i t o r , M r l d War I1 German M i l i t a r y St u d i e s , Volume 14, (New York, 1979), p. 15. 4. 5. 6. van Creveld, Supplying War, p. 201. Westphal, p. 78.
US &TRY,

FM 100-5, p. 64.

-54-

7 .

Glabisz, p. 77.

8. van Creveld, Su l y i 184, 187 and Irving, p. 94. According to van Creveld, Trip0 i was the FPa r g e s t of the Lybian prts, capable of JF--==I l processing 5 cargo ships o r 4 troop transports simultaneously and handling 45,000 tons of cargo mnthly. Benghazi was capable of processing 2700 tons a day and 'Ibbruk was capable of 1500 tons a day. Assuming a 30 day m n t h , these figures t r a n s l a t e into a m n t h l y capacity of 81,000 tons and 45,000 tons respectively. 9.
AKIIIY, FM 100-5, p. 65.

10. Griess, p. 163 and van Creveld, Supply War, p. Western Desert 1941, p. 7.

182.

See also P i t t ,

1 1.

van Creveld, Supply War, p. 182.

12. Ibid, R. 184, 186. There appears to be a mntradiction of fiqures in van Creveld's thesis. k c o r d i n g to van Creveld, T r i p o l i ' s capability m s 45,000 tons: however, he also states that i n February 1941, the total supply requirement of the Axis forces in Libya ms 70,000 tons per mnth. H further a e states t h a t during the 4 month p r i o d February-May 1941, that the Axis forces received a t o t a l of 325,000 tons of supply o r a m n t h l y average of 81,250 tons. As such, t h i s m n t h l y average exceeds the F o r t ' s capability almost
thu-fold.

13.

US Atmy, EM 100-5, p. 65.

14. van Creveld, Supplying War, p. 184. 15. van Creveld, "Rmmiel"s Supply F'roblems," Mellethin, p. 67.
16.

w.

70 and 72.

See also mn

van Creveld, Supplying War, p. 186. Playfair, T e M i t e r r a n e a n and Middle East, Volume 11, p. 282. h Ibid, p. 282.
157.
See also van Creveld, "Rcmmel's Supply Problems,"

17. 18.

19. Ibid, p. 68-69. 20.

pp.

van Creveld, Supplying War, p. 190.

21. Irving, pp. 157 and 197; Illcas, p. 91; Lewin, p. 141; and van Creveld, Supplying W a r , p. 196. In t h e i r advance, Fanzer Armee Afrika capture 600 t r u c k s a t Msus (25 January 1942); 1300 trucks north of Mnghazi v i c i n i t y Ccefia (27 January) ; 2000 vehicles an3 1400 tons of fuel a t Tbbruk ( 22 June) ; and 500 t o n s of fuel a t Capuzzo (22 June).

22. 23.

Playfair, T e Mediterranean and Middle East, Volume 111, p. 331. h

I;bmnel,

p. 266 and van Creveld, Supplying War, p. 190.

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24.

Playfair, p. 190 and 331.

A Study in kqistics," Unpublished Study, 25. David A. kd, " E l Alamein (Fort Leavenworth, 1986), p. 8 . Using a ton-mile analysis ( a transportation planning fiqure t h a t measures transportation capacity by simply multiplying t h e tonnage to be mved by the distance it must t r a v e l ) , k c d ' s analysis provides the best friunemrk to i l l u s t r a t e the Axis s h o r t f a l l . Comparing p r t capacity, ILX: length and w a i l a b i l i t y / c a p a c i t y of mtor transport with the monthly supply requirement of 60,000 tons or 2000 tons p r day, the author dermnstrates a transprt s h o r f a l l of 920,500 ton-miles or 892 tons of supply. Given an a v a i l a b i l i t y of 1600 2-ton t r u c k s w i t h a d a i l y transport capability of 3200 tons and transport limited to 35mph for 12 hours p r day due to road condition and air interdiction, able to travel 420 miles each day:

--

Transport requirement:

-l m

Frm

i
=

Benghazi

680 miles

1350 t o n s
00 tons

=
=

442,000
1,822,500
1 , 2 6 4 , 0 0 0 ton-miles 1,344,000 ton-miles

Transprt capacity:
26.

3200 tons x 420 miles

Irving, pp. 238-239.

27. Kesselring, "Final Cnmnents on the Campaign in North Africa, 1941-1943," Historical Report M5 # C-075, (Werle, 1949), p. 46.

Lewin, Ultra Goes to War, (New York, 1978), pp. 196-197. 28. Wnald According to the author, the Exitish e r e able to m n i t o r the flow of supplies t o Fmnnel across the Mediterranean by sea o r air. As such, the B r i t i s h knew convoy routes, destination and the type and quantity of cargo carried. Further, Ultra e m i t t e d the British t keep abreast f Ebmel's l o g i s t i c o o s t a t e to include h i s fuel stocks.
29. Irving, p. 94 and van Creveld, Su 1 i 194. &cording to van Creveld, the Axis requirement was 1 i T J % & s F p By contrast, Irving lists requirements a 24,000 tons for DAK, 20,000 tons for future operations, 9000 tons for the Luftwaffe, and 63,000 tons for the I t a l i a n forces i n theater or a t o t a l m n t h l y requirement of 116,000 tons.
30. Playfair, The Mediterranean a d Middle East, Volume 11, p. 281 and Volume 111, pp. 107,
1 -

31. 32. 33.

van Creveld, Supplying War, p. 187.

P i t t , Year of Alamein, 1942, p. 145.

Palyfair, ?he M i t e r r a n e a n and Middle East, Volume 111, p. 339. Military and Naval Quotations,

34. W b e r t Debs Heinl, Jr, Dictionary of (Annapolis, 1965), p. 175. 35.

Ibid, p. 330.
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Section IV:
1 . US A n y , Student Text 101-1: Organizational and T a c t i c a l Reference Data for t h e Army in t h e Field, ( F o r t Leavenworth, 1986 ) t Pp- 5-8, 5-14 , 5-22,

-27, 7-10 and 7-15. See also US Army, Student Text 101-2: ( F o r t Leavenmrth, 1985), p. 2-9.

Planning F a c t o r s ,

S e c t i o n V: 1. 2.
3.

US A n y , EM 100-16, p. 6-74.
I b i d , p. 6-74. I b i d , p. 6-75.

4.
5.

US &myr
I b i d , p. 68.

100-5, p. 61.

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