Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila FIRST DIVISION G.R. No.

106440 January 29, 1996

would have been deposited with the Municipal Treasurer of Taguig, Metro Manila. Petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint on the main thesis that the intended expropriation was not for a public purpose and, incidentally, that the act would constitute an application of public funds, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of Iglesia ni Cristo, a religious entity, contrary to the provision of Section 29(2), Article VI, of the 1987 Constitution.5 Petitioners sought, in the meanwhile, a suspension in the implementation of the 03rd August 1989 order of the trial court. On 15 February 1990, following the filing by respondent Republic of its reply to petitioners' motion seeking the dismissal of the case, the trial court issued its denial of said motion to dismiss.6 Five (5) days later, or on 20 February 1990,7 another order was issued by the trial court, declaring moot and academic the motion for reconsideration and/or suspension of the order of 03 August 1989 with the rejection of petitioners' motion to dismiss. Petitioners' motion for the reconsideration of the 20th February 1990 order was likewise denied by the trial court in its 16th April 1991 order.8 Petitioners then lodged a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals. In its now disputed 15th January 1992 decision, the appellate court dismissed the petition on the ground that the remedy of appeal in the ordinary course of law was an adequate remedy and that the petition itself, in any case, had failed to show any grave abuse of discretion or lack of jurisdictional competence on the part of the trial court. A motion for the reconsideration of the decision was denied in the 23rd July 1992 resolution of the appellate court. We begin, in this present recourse of petitioners, with a few known postulates. Eminent domain, also often referred to as expropriation and, with less frequency, as condemnation, is, like police power and taxation, an inherent power of sovereignty. It need not be clothed with any constitutional gear to exist; instead, provisions in our Constitution on the subject are meant more to regulate, rather than to grant, the exercise of the power. Eminent domain is generally so described as "the highest and most exact idea of property remaining in the government" that may be acquired for some public purpose through a method in the nature of a forced purchase by the State.9 It is a right to take or reassert dominion over property within the state for public use or to meet a public exigency. It is said to be an essential part of governance even in its most primitive form and thus inseparable from sovereignty. 10 The only direct constitutional qualification is that "private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation." 11 This proscription is intended to provide a safeguard against possible abuse and so to protect as well the individual against whose property the power is sought to be enforced. Petitioners assert that the expropriation has failed to meet the guidelines set by this Court in the case of Guido v.Rural Progress Administration, 12 to wit: (a) the size of the land expropriated; (b) the large number of people benefited; and, (c) the extent of social and economic reform.13 Petitioners suggest that we confine the concept of expropriation only to the following public uses, 14 i.e., the . . . taking of property for military posts, roads, streets, sidewalks, bridges, ferries, levees, wharves, piers, public buildings including schoolhouses, parks, playgrounds, plazas, market places, artesian wells, water supply and sewerage systems, cemeteries, crematories, and railroads. This view of petitioners is much too limitative and restrictive.

ALEJANDRO MANOSCA, ASUNCION MANOSCA and LEONICA MANOSCA, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. BENJAMIN V. PELAYO, Presiding Judge, RTC-Pasig, Metro Manila, Branch 168, HON. GRADUACION A. REYES CLARAVAL, Presiding Judge, RTC-Pasig, Metro Manila, Branch 71, and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. DECISION VITUG, J.: In this appeal, via a petition for review on certiorari, from the decision of the Court of Appeals, dated 15 January 1992, in CA-G.R. SP No. 24969 (entitled "Alejandro Manosca, et al. v. Hon. Benjamin V. Pelayo, et al."), this Court is asked to resolve whether or not the "public use" requirement of Eminent Domain is extant in the attempted expropriation by the Republic of a 492square-meter parcel of land so declared by the National Historical Institute ("NHI") as a national historical landmark. The facts of the case are not in dispute. Petitioners inherited a piece of land located at P. Burgos Street, Calzada, Taguig. Metro Manila, with an area of about four hundred ninety-two (492) square meters. When the parcel was ascertained by the NHI to have been the birthsite of Felix Y. Manalo, the founder of Iglesia Ni Cristo, it passed Resolution No. 1, Series of 1986, pursuant to Section 42 of Presidential Decree No. 260, declaring the land to be a national historical landmark. The resolution was, on 06 January 1986, approved by the Minister of Education, Culture and Sports. Later, the opinion of the Secretary of Justice was asked on the legality of the measure. In his Opinion No. 133, Series of 1987, the Secretary of Justice replied in the affirmative; he explained: According to your guidelines, national landmarks are places or objects that are associated with an event, achievement, characteristic, or modification that makes a turning point or stage in Philippine history. Thus, the birthsite of the founder of the Iglesia ni Cristo, the late Felix Y. Manalo, who, admittedly, had made contributions to Philippine history and culture has been declared as a national landmark. It has been held that places invested with unusual historical interest is a public use for which the power of eminent domain may be authorized . . . . In view thereof, it is believed that the National Historical Institute as an agency of the Government charged with the maintenance and care of national shrines, monuments and landmarks and the development of historical sites that may be declared as national shrines, monuments and/or landmarks, may initiate the institution of condemnation proceedings for the purpose of acquiring the lot in question in accordance with the procedure provided for in Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court. The proceedings should be instituted by the Office of the Solicitor General in behalf of the Republic. Accordingly, on 29 May 1989, the Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor-General, instituted a complaint for expropriation3 before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig for and in behalf of the NHI alleging, inter alia, that: Pursuant to Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 260, the National Historical Institute issued Resolution No. 1, Series of 1986, which was approved on January, 1986 by the then Minister of Education, Culture and Sports, declaring the above described parcel of land which is the birthsite of Felix Y. Manalo, founder of the "Iglesia ni Cristo," as a National Historical Landrnark. The plaintiff perforce needs the land as such national historical landmark which is a public purpose. At the same time, respondent Republic filed an urgent motion for the issuance of an order to permit it to take immediate possession of the property. The motion was opposed by petitioners. After a hearing, the trial court issued, on 03 August 1989,4 an order fixing the provisional market (P54,120.00) and assessed (P16,236.00) values of the property and authorizing the Republic to take over the property once the required sum
1

The court, in Guido, merely passed upon the issue of the extent of the President's power under Commonwealth Act No. 539 to, specifically, acquire private lands for subdivision into smaller home lots or farms for resale to bona fide tenants or occupants. It was in this particular context of the statute that the Court had made the pronouncement. The guidelines in Guido were not meant to be preclusive in nature and, most certainly, the power of eminent domain should not now be understood as being confined only to the expropriation of vast tracts of land and landed estates. 15 The term "public use," not having been otherwise defined by the constitution, must be considered in its general concept of meeting a public need or a public exigency. 16 Black summarizes the characterization given by various courts to the term; thus: Public Use. Eminent domain. The constitutional and statutory basis for taking property by eminent domain. For condemnation purposes, "public use" is one which confers same benefit or advantage to the public; it is not confined to actual use by public. It is measured in terms of right of public to use proposed facilities

for which condemnation is sought and, as long as public has right of use, whether exercised by one or many members of public, a "public advantage" or "public benefit" accrues sufficient to constitute a public use. Montana Power Co. vs. Bokma, Mont. 457 P. 2d 769, 772, 773. Public use, in constitutional provisions restricting the exercise of the right to take private property in virtue of eminent domain, means a use concerning the whole community as distinguished from particular individuals. But each and every member of society need not be equally interested in such use, or be personally and directly affected by it; if the object is to satisfy a great public want or exigency, that is sufficient. Rindge Co. vs. Los Angeles County, 262 U.S. 700, 43 S.Ct. 689, 692, 67 L.Ed. 1186. The term may be said to mean public usefulness, utility, or advantage, or what is productive of general benefit. It may be limited to the inhabitants of a small or restricted locality, but must be in common, and not for a particular individual. The use must be a needful one for the public, which cannot be surrendered without obvious general loss and inconvenience. A "public use" for which land may be taken defies absolute definition for it changes with varying conditions of society, new appliances in the sciences, changing conceptions of scope and functions of government, and other differing circumstances brought about by an increase in population and new modes of communication and transportation. Katz v. Brandon, 156 Conn., 521, 245 A.2d 579,586. 17 The validity of the exercise of the power of eminent domain for traditional purposes is beyond question; it is not at all to be said, however, that public use should thereby be restricted to such traditional uses. The idea that "public use" is strictly limited to clear cases of "use by the public" has long been discarded. This Court in Heirs of Juancho Ardona v. Reyes,18 quoting from Berman v. Parker (348 U.S. 25; 99 L. ed. 27), held: We do not sit to determine whether a particular housing project is or is not desirable. The concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive. See DayBrite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 US 421, 424, 96 L. Ed. 469, 472, 72 S Ct 405. The values it represents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as monetary. It is within the power of the legislature to determine that the community should be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled. In the present case, the Congress and its authorized agencies have made determinations that take into account a wide variety of values. It is no for us to reappraise them. If those who govern the District of Columbia decide that the Nation's Capital should be beautiful as well as sanitary, there is nothing in the Fifth Amendment that stands in the way. Once the object is within the authority of Congress, the right to realize it through the exercise of eminent domain is clear. For the power of eminent domain is merely the means to the end. See Luxton v. North River Bridge Co. 153 US 525, 529, 530, 38 L. ed. 808, 810, 14 S Ct 891; United States v. Gettysburg Electric R. Co. 160 US 668, 679, 40 L. ed. 576, 580, 16 S Ct 427. It has been explained as early as Sea v. Manila Railroad Co., 19 that: . . . A historical research discloses the meaning of the term "public use" to be one of constant growth. As society advances, its demands upon the individual increase and each demand is a new use to which the resources of the individual may be devoted. . . . for "whatever is beneficially employed for the community is a public use. Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando states: The taking to be valid must be for public use. There was a time when it was felt that a literal meaning should be attached to such a requirement. Whatever project is undertaken must be for the public to enjoy, as in the case of streets or parks. Otherwise, expropriation is not allowable. It is not so any more. As long as the purpose of the taking is public, then the power of eminent domain comes into play. As just noted, the constitution in at least two cases, to remove any doubt, determines what is public use. One is the expropriation of lands to be subdivided into small lots for resale at cost to individuals. The other is the transfer, through the exercise of this power, of utilities and other private enterprise to the government. It is accurate to state then that at present whatever may be beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirement of public use. 20 Chief Justice Fernando, writing the ponencia in J.M. Tuason & Co. vs. Land Tenure Administration, 21 has viewed the Constitution a dynamic instrument

and one that "is not to be construed narrowly or pedantically" so as to enable it "to meet adequately whatever problems the future has in store." Fr. Joaquin Bernas, a noted constitutionalist himself, has aptly observed that what, in fact, has ultimately emerged is a concept of public use which is just as broad as "public welfare." 22 Petitioners ask: But "(w)hat is the so-called unusual interest that the expropriation of (Felix Manalo's) birthplace become so vital as to be a public use appropriate for the exercise of the power of eminent domain" when only members of the Iglesia ni Cristo would benefit? This attempt to give some religious perspective to the case deserves little consideration, for what should be significant is the principal objective of, not the casual consequences that might follow from, the exercise of the power. The purpose in setting up the marker is essentially to recognize the distinctive contribution of the late Felix Manalo to the culture of the Philippines, rather than to commemorate his founding and leadership of the Iglesia ni Cristo. The practical reality that greater benefit may be derived by members of the Iglesia ni Cristo than by most others could well be true but such a peculiar advantage still remains to be merely incidental and secondary in nature. Indeed, that only a few would actually benefit from the expropriation of property does not necessarily diminish the essence and character of public use. 23 Petitioners contend that they have been denied due process in the fixing of the provisional value of their property. Petitioners need merely to be reminded that what the law prohibits is the lack of opportunity to be heard;24contrary to petitioners' argument, the records of this case are replete with pleadings 25 that could have dealt, directly or indirectly, with the provisional value of the property. Petitioners, finally, would fault respondent appellate court in sustaining the trial court's order which considered inapplicable the case of Noble v. City of Manila. 26 Both courts held correctly. The Republic was not a party to the alleged contract of exchange between the Iglesia ni Cristo and petitioners which (the contracting parties) alone, not the Republic, could properly be bound. All considered, the Court finds the assailed decision to be in accord with law and jurisprudence. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. No costs. SO ORDERED. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-45459 March 13, 1937

GREGORIO AGLIPAY, petitioner, vs. JUAN RUIZ, respondent. Vicente Sotto for petitioner. Office of the Solicitor-General Tuason for respondent. LAUREL, J.: The petitioner, Mons. Gregorio Aglipay, Supreme Head of the Philippine Independent Church, seeks the issuance from this court of a writ of prohibition to prevent the respondent Director of Posts from issuing and selling postage stamps commemorative of the Thirty-third International Eucharistic Congress. In May, 1936, the Director of Posts announced in the dailies of Manila that he would order the issues of postage stamps commemorating the celebration in the City of Manila of the Thirty-third international Eucharistic Congress, organized by the Roman Catholic Church. The petitioner, in the fulfillment of what he considers to be a civic duty, requested Vicente Sotto, Esq., member of the Philippine Bar, to denounce the matter to the President of the Philippines. In spite of the protest of the petitioner's attorney, the respondent publicly announced having sent to the United States the designs of the postage stamps for printing as follows: "In the center is chalice, with grape vine and stalks of wheat as border design. The stamps are blue, green, brown, cardinal red, violet and orange, 1 inch by 1,094 inches. The denominations are for 2, 6, 16, 20, 36 and 50 centavos."

The said stamps were actually issued and sold though the greater part thereof, to this day, remains unsold. The further sale of the stamps is sought to be prevented by the petitioner herein. The Solicitor-General contends that the writ of prohibition is not the proper legal remedy in the instant case, although he admits that the writ may properly restrain ministerial functions. While, generally, prohibition as an extraordinary legal writ will not issue to restrain or control the performance of other than judicial or quasi-judicial functions (50 C. J., 6580, its issuance and enforcement are regulated by statute and in this jurisdiction may issue to . . . inferior tribunals, corporations, boards, or persons, whether excercising functions judicial or ministerial, which are without or in excess of the jurisdiction of such tribunal, corporation, board, or person, . . . ." (Secs. 516 and 226, Code of Civil Procedure.) The terms "judicial" and "ministerial" used with reference to "functions" in the statute are undoubtedly comprehensive and include the challenged act of the respondent Director of Posts in the present case, which act because alleged to be violative of the Constitution is a fortiorari "without or in excess of . . . jurisdiction." The statutory rule, therefore, in the jurisdiction is that the writ of prohibition is not confined exclusively to courts or tribunals to keep them within the limits of their own jurisdiction and to prevent them from encroaching upon the jurisdiction of other tribunals, but will issue, in appropriate cases, to an officer or person whose acts are without or in excess of his authority. Not infrequently, "the writ is granted, where it is necessary for the orderly administration of justice, or to prevent the use of the strong arm of the law in an oppressive or vindictive manner, or a multiplicity of actions." (Dimayuga and Fajardo vs. Fernandez [1923], 43 Phil., 304, 307.) The more important question raised refers to the alleged violation of the Constitution by the respondent in issuing and selling postage stamps commemorative of the Thirty-third International Eucharistic Congress. It is alleged that this action of the respondent is violative of the provisions of section 23, subsection 3, Article VI, of the Constitution of the Philippines, which provides as follows: No public money or property shall ever be appropriated, applied, or used, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination, secretarian, institution, or system of religion, or for the use, benefit, or support of any priest, preacher, minister, or other religious teacher or dignitary as such, except when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces or to any penal institution, orphanage, or leprosarium. The prohibition herein expressed is a direct corollary of the principle of separation of church and state. Without the necessity of adverting to the historical background of this principle in our country, it is sufficient to say that our history, not to speak of the history of mankind, has taught us that the union of church and state is prejudicial to both, for ocassions might arise when the estate will use the church, and the church the state, as a weapon in the furtherance of their recognized this principle of separation of church and state in the early stages of our constitutional development; it was inserted in the Treaty of Paris between the United States and Spain of December 10, 1898, reiterated in President McKinley's Instructions of the Philippine Commission, reaffirmed in the Philippine Bill of 1902 and in the autonomy Act of August 29, 1916, and finally embodied in the constitution of the Philippines as the supreme expression of the Filipino people. It is almost trite to say now that in this country we enjoy both religious and civil freedom. All the officers of the Government, from the highest to the lowest, in taking their oath to support and defend the constitution, bind themselves to recognize and respect the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom, with its inherent limitations and recognized implications. It should be stated that what is guaranteed by our Constitution is religious liberty, not mere religious toleration. Religious freedom, however, as a constitutional mandate is not inhibition of profound reverence for religion and is not denial of its influence in human affairs. Religion as a profession of faith to an active power that binds and elevates man to his Creator is recognized. And, in so far as it instills into the minds the purest principles of morality, its influence is deeply felt and highly appreciated. When the Filipino people, in the preamble of their Constitution, implored "the aid of Divine Providence, in order to establish a government that shall embody their ideals, conserve and develop the patrimony of the nation, promote the general welfare, and secure to themselves and their posterity the blessings of independence under a regime of justice, liberty and democracy," they thereby manifested reliance upon Him who guides the destinies of men and nations. The elevating influence of religion in human society is recognized here as elsewhere. In fact, certain general concessions are indiscriminately accorded to religious sects and denominations. Our Constitution and laws exempt from taxation properties devoted exclusively to religious purposes (sec. 14, subsec. 3, Art. VI, Constitution of the Philippines and sec. 1, subsec. 4, Ordinance appended thereto; Assessment Law, sec. 344, par. [c]. Adm. Code). Sectarian aid is not prohibited when a priest, preacher, minister or other religious teacher or dignitary as such is assigned to the armed forces or to any penal institution, orphanage or leprosarium 9 sec. 13, subsec. 3, Art. VI, Constitution of the Philippines).

Optional religious instruction in the public schools is by constitutional mandate allowed (sec. 5, Art. XIII, Constitution of the Philippines, in relation to sec. 928, Adm. Code). Thursday and Friday of Holy Week, Thanksgiving Day, Christmas Day, and Sundays and made legal holidays (sec. 29, Adm. Code) because of the secular idea that their observance is conclusive to beneficial moral results. The law allows divorce but punishes polygamy and bigamy; and certain crimes against religious worship are considered crimes against the fundamental laws of the state (see arts. 132 and 133, Revised Penal Code). In the case at bar, it appears that the respondent Director of Posts issued the postage stamps in question under the provisions of Act No. 4052 of the Philippine Legislature. This Act is as follows: No. 4052. AN ACT APPROPRIATING THE SUM OF SIXTY THOUSAND PESOS AND MAKING THE SAME AVAILABLE OUT OF ANY FUNDS IN THE INSULAR TREASURY NOT OTHERWISE APPROPRIATED FOR THE COST OF PLATES AND PRINTING OF POSTAGE STAMPS WITH NEW DESIGNS, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Legislature assembled and by the authority of the same: SECTION 1. The sum of sixty thousand pesos is hereby appropriated and made immediately available out of any funds in the Insular Treasury not otherwise appropriated, for the costs of plates and printing of postage stamps with new designs, and other expenses incident thereto. SEC. 2. The Director of Posts, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, is hereby authorized to dispose of the whole or any portion of the amount herein appropriated in the manner indicated and as often as may be deemed advantageous to the Government. SEC. 3. This amount or any portion thereof not otherwise expended shall not revert to the Treasury. SEC. 4. This act shall take effect on its approval. Approved, February 21, 1933. It will be seen that the Act appropriates the sum of sixty thousand pesos for the costs of plates and printing of postage stamps with new designs and other expenses incident thereto, and authorizes the Director of Posts, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, to dispose of the amount appropriated in the manner indicated and "as often as may be deemed advantageous to the Government". The printing and issuance of the postage stamps in question appears to have been approved by authority of the President of the Philippines in a letter dated September 1, 1936, made part of the respondent's memorandum as Exhibit A. The respondent alleges that the Government of the Philippines would suffer losses if the writ prayed for is granted. He estimates the revenue to be derived from the sale of the postage stamps in question at P1,618,17.10 and states that there still remain to be sold stamps worth P1,402,279.02. Act No. 4052 contemplates no religious purpose in view. What it gives the Director of Posts is the discretionary power to determine when the issuance of special postage stamps would be "advantageous to the Government." Of course, the phrase "advantageous to the Government" does not authorize the violation of the Constitution. It does not authorize the appropriation, use or application of public money or property for the use, benefit or support of a particular sect or church. In the present case, however, the issuance of the postage stamps in question by the Director of Posts and the Secretary of Public Works and Communications was not inspired by any sectarian denomination. The stamps were not issue and sold for the benefit of the Roman Catholic Church. Nor were money derived from the sale of the stamps given to that church. On the contrary, it appears from the latter of the Director of Posts of June 5, 1936, incorporated on page 2 of the petitioner's complaint, that the only purpose in issuing and selling the stamps was "to advertise the Philippines and attract more tourist to this country." The officials concerned merely, took advantage of an event considered of international importance "to give publicity to the Philippines and its people" (Letter of the Undersecretary of Public Works and Communications to the President of the Philippines, June 9, 1936; p. 3, petitioner's complaint). It is significant to note that the stamps as actually designed and printed (Exhibit 2), instead of showing a Catholic Church chalice as originally planned, contains a map of the Philippines and the location of the City of Manila, and an inscription as follows: "Seat XXXIII International Eucharistic Congress, Feb. 3-7,1937." What is emphasized is not the Eucharistic Congress itself but Manila, the capital of the Philippines, as the seat of that congress. It is obvious that while the issuance and sale of the stamps in question may be said to be inseparably linked with an event of a religious character, the resulting propaganda, if any, received by the Roman Catholic Church, was not

the aim and purpose of the Government. We are of the opinion that the Government should not be embarassed in its activities simply because of incidental results, more or less religious in character, if the purpose had in view is one which could legitimately be undertaken by appropriate legislation. The main purpose should not be frustrated by its subordinate to mere incidental results not contemplated. (Vide Bradfield vs. Roberts, 175 U. S., 295; 20 Sup. Ct. Rep., 121; 44 Law. ed., 168.) We are much impressed with the vehement appeal of counsel for the petitioner to maintain inviolate the complete separation of church and state and curb any attempt to infringe by indirection a constitutional inhibition. Indeed, in the Philippines, once the scene of religious intolerance and prescription, care should be taken that at this stage of our political development nothing is done by the Government or its officials that may lead to the belief that the Government is taking sides or favoring a particular religious sect or institution. But, upon very serious reflection, examination of Act No. 4052, and scrutiny of the attending circumstances, we have come to the conclusion that there has been no constitutional infraction in the case at bar, Act No. 4052 grants the Director of Posts, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, discretion to misuse postage stamps with new designs "as often as may be deemed advantageous to the Government." Even if we were to assume that these officials made use of a poor judgment in issuing and selling the postage stamps in question still, the case of the petitioner would fail to take in weight. Between the exercise of a poor judgment and the unconstitutionality of the step taken, a gap exists which is yet to be filled to justify the court in setting aside the official act assailed as coming within a constitutional inhibition. The petition for a writ of prohibition is hereby denied, without pronouncement as to costs. So ordered. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-53487 May 25, 1981 ANDRES GARCES, Reverend Father SERGIO MARILAO OSMEA, NICETAS DAGAR and JESUS EDULLANTES, petitioners, vs. Hon. NUMERIANO G. ESTENZO, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Leyte, Ormoc City Branch V, BARANGAY COUNCIL of Valencia, Ormoc City, Barangay Captain MANUEL C. VELOSO, Councilmen GAUDENCIO LAVEZARES, TOMAS CABATINGAN and MAXIMINO NAVARRO, Barangay Secretary CONCHITA MARAYA and Barangay Treasurer LUCENA BALTAZAR, respondents.

Resolutions Nos. 5 and 6 were submitted to a plebiscite and were duly ratified by the barangay general assembly on March 26, 1976. Two hundred seventy-two voters ratified the two resolutions (Exh. 2 and 5). Funds were raised by means of solicitations0 and cash donations of the barangay residents and those of the neighboring places of Valencia. With those funds, the waiting shed was constructed and the wooden image of San Vicente Ferrer was acquired in Cebu City by the barangay council for four hundred pesos (Exh. F-l, 3 and 4). On April 5, 1976, the image was temporarily placed in the altar of the Catholic church of Barangay Valencia so that the devotees could worship the saint during the mass for the fiesta. A controversy arose after the mass when the parish priest, Father Sergio Marilao Osmea refused to return that image to the barangay council on the pretext that it was the property of the church because church funds were used for its acquisition. Several days after the fiesta or on April 11, 1976, on the occasion of his sermon during a mass, Father Osmea allegedly uttered defamatory remarks against the barangay captain, Manuel C. Veloso, apparently in connection with the disputed image. That incident provoked Veloso to file against Father Osmea in the city court of Ormoc City a charge for grave oral defamation. Father Osmea retaliated by filing administrative complaints against Veloso with the city mayor's office and the Department of Local Government and Community Development on the grounds of immorality, grave abuse of authority, acts unbecoming a public official and ignorance of the law. Meanwhile, the image of San Vicente Ferrer remained in the Catholic church of Valencia. Because Father Osmea did not accede to the request of Cabatingan to have custody of the image and "maliciously ignored" the council's Resolution No. 6, the council enacted on May 12, 1976 Resolution No. 10, authorizing the hiring of a lawyer to file a replevin case against Father Osmea for the recovery of the image (Exh. C or 8). On June 14, 1976, the barangay council passed Resolution No. 12, appointing Veloso as its representative in the replevin case (Exh. D or 9). The replevin case was filed in the city court of Ormoc City against Father Osmea and Bishop Cipriano Urgel (Exh. F). After the barangay council had posted a cash bond of eight hundred pesos, Father Osmea turned over the image to the council (p. 10, Rollo). ln his answer to the complaint for replevin, he assailed the constitutionality of the said resolutions (Exh. F-1). Later, he and three other persons, Andres Garces, a member of the Aglipayan Church, and two Catholic laymen, Jesus Edullantes and Nicetas Dagar, filed against the barangay council and its members (excluding two members) a complaint in the Court of First Instance at Ormoc City, praying for the annulment of the said resolutions (Civil Case No. 1680-0). The lower court dismissed the complaint. lt upheld the validity of the resolutions. The petitioners appealed under Republic Act No. 5440. The petitioners contend that the barangay council was not duly constituted because lsidoro M. Maago, Jr., the chairman of the kabataang barangay, was not allowed to participate in its sessions. Barangays used to be known as citizens assemblies (Presidential Decrees Nos. 86 and 86-A). Presidential Decree No. 557, which took effect on September 21, 1974, 70 O.G. 8450-L, directed that all barrios should be known as barangays and adopted the Revised Barrio Charter as the Barangay Charter. Barrios are units of municipalities or municipal districts in which they are situated. They are quasi-municipal corporations endowed with such powers" as are provided by law "for the performance of particular government functions, to be exercised by and through their respective barrio governments in conformity with law" (Sec. 2, Revised Barrio Charter, R.A. No. 3590). The barrio assembly consists of all persons who are residents of the barrio for at least six months, eighteen years of age or over and Filipino citizens duly registered in the list kept by the barrio secretary (Sec. 4, Ibid). The barrio council, now barangay council, is composed of the barangay captain and six councilmen (Sec. 7, Ibid). Section 3 of Presidential Decree No. 684, which took effect on April 15, 1975, provides that "the barangay youth chairman shall be an ex-officio member of the barangay council", having the same powers and functions as a barangay councilman. In this case, Maago, the barangay youth chairman, was notified of the sessions of the barangay council to be held on March 23 and 26, 1976 but he

AQUINO, J.:1wph1.t This case is about the constitutionality of four resolutions of the barangay council of Valencia, Ormoc City, regarding the acquisition of the wooden image of San Vicente Ferrer to be used in the celebration of his annual feast day. That issue was spawned by the controversy as to whether the parish priest or a layman should have the custody of the image. On March 23, 1976, the said barangay council adopted Resolution No. 5, "reviving the traditional socio-religious celebration" every fifth day of April "of the feast day of Seor San Vicente Ferrer, the patron saint of Valencia". That resolution designated the members of nine committees who would take charge of the 1976 festivity. lt provided for (1) the acquisition of the image of San Vicente Ferrer and (2) the construction of a waiting shed as the barangay's projects. Funds for the two projects would be obtained through the selling of tickets and cash donations " (Exh A or 6). On March 26, 1976, the barangay council passed Resolution No. 6 which specified that, in accordance with the practice in Eastern Leyte, Councilman Tomas Cabatingan, the Chairman or hermano mayor of the fiesta, would be the caretaker of the image of San Vicente Ferrer and that the image would remain in his residence for one year and until the election of his successor as chairman of the next feast day. It was further provided in the resolution that the image would be made available to the Catholic parish church during the celebration of the saint's feast day (Exh. B or 7).

was not able to attend those sessions because he was working with a construction company based at Ipil, Ormoc City (Par. 2[d] Exh. 1). Maago's absence from the sessions of the barangay council did not render the said resolutions void. There was a quorum when the said resolutions were passed. The other contention of the petitioners is that the resolutions contravene the constitutional provisions that "no law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion" and that "no public money or property shall ever be appropriated, applied, paid, or used, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution, or system of religion, or for the use, benefit, or support of any priest, preacher, minister, or other religious teacher or dignitary as such. except when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces, or to any penal institution, or government orphanage or leprosarium (Sec. 8, Article IV and sec. 18[2], Article VIII, Constitution). That contention is glaringly devoid of merit. The questioned resolutions do not directly or indirectly establish any religion, nor abridge religious liberty, nor appropriate public money or property for the benefit of any sect, priest or clergyman. The image was purchased with private funds, not with tax money. The construction of a waiting shed is entirely a secular matter. Manifestly puerile and flimsy is Petitioners argument that the barangay council favored the Catholic religion by using the funds raised by solicitations and donations for the purchase of the patron saint's wooden image and making the image available to the Catholic church. The preposterousness of that argument is rendered more evident by the fact that counsel advanced that argument in behalf of the petitioner, Father Osmea the parish priest. The wooden image was purchased in connection with the celebration of the barrio fiesta honoring the patron saint, San Vicente Ferrer, and not for the purpose of favoring any religion nor interfering with religious matters or the religious beliefs of the barrio residents. One of the highlights of the fiesta was the mass. Consequently, the image of the patron saint had to be placed in the church when the mass was celebrated. If there is nothing unconstitutional or illegal in holding a fiesta and having a patron saint for the barrio, then any activity intended to facilitate the worship of the patron saint (such as the acquisition and display of his image) cannot be branded as illegal. As noted in the first resolution, the barrio fiesta is a socio-religious affair. Its celebration is an ingrained tradition in rural communities. The fiesta relieves the monotony and drudgery of the lives of the masses. The barangay council designated a layman as the custodian of the wooden image in order to forestall any suspicion that it is favoring the Catholic church. A more practical reason for that arrangement would be that the image, if placed in a layman's custody, could easily be made available to any family desiring to borrow the image in connection with prayers and novenas. The contradictory positions of the petitioners are shown in their affidavits. Petitioner Garces swore that the said resolutions favored the Catholic church. On the other hand, petitioners Dagar and Edullantes swore that the resolutions prejudiced the Catholics because they could see the image in the church only once a year or during the fiesta (Exh. H and J). We find that the momentous issues of separation of church and state, freedom of religion annd the use of public money to favor any sect or church are not involved at all in this case even remotely or indirectly. lt is not a microcosmic test case on those issues. This case is a petty quarrel over the custody of a saint's image. lt would never have arisen if the parties had been more diplomatic and tactful and if Father Osmea had taken the trouble of causing contributions to be solicited from his own parishioners for the purchase of another image of San Vicente Ferrer to be installed in his church. There can be no question that the image in question belongs to the barangay council. Father Osmea claim that it belongs to his church is wrong. The barangay council, as owner of the image, has the right to determine who should have custody thereof. If it chooses to change its mind and decides to give the image to the Catholic church. that action would not violate the Constitution because the image was acquired with private funds and is its private property.

The council has the right to take measures to recover possession of the image by enacting Resolutions Nos. 10 and 12. Not every governmental activity which involves the expenditure of public funds and which has some religious tint is violative of the constitutional provisions regarding separation of church and state, freedom of worship and banning the use of public money or property. In Aglipay vs. Ruiz, 64 Phil. 201, what was involved was Act No. 4052 which appropriated sixty thousand pesos for the cost of plates and the printing of postage stamps with new designs. Under the law, the Director of Posts, with the approval of the Department Head and the President of the Philippines, issued in 1936 postage stamps to commemorate the celebration in Manila of the 33rd International Eucharistic Congress sponsored by the Catholic Church. The purpose of the stamps was to raise revenue and advertise the Philippines. The design of the stamps showed a map of the Philippines and nothing about the Catholic Church. No religious purpose was intended. Monsignor Gregorio Aglipay, the founder and head of the Philippine Independent Church, sought to enjoin the sale of those commemorative postage stamps. It was held that the issuance of the stamps, while linked inseparably with an event of a religious character, was not designed as a propaganda for the Catholic Church. Aglipay's prohibition suit was dismissed. The instant case is easily distinguishable from Verzosa vs. Fernandez, 49 Phil., 627 and 55 Phil. 307, where a religious brotherhood, La Archicofradia del Santisimo Sacramento, organized for the purpose of raising funds to meet the expenses for the annual fiesta in honor of the Most Holy Sacrament and the Virgin Lady of Guadalupe, was held accountable for the funds which it held as trustee. 0 Finding that the petitioners have no cause of action for the annulment of the barangay resolutions, the lower court's judgment dismissing their amended petition is affirmed. No costs. SO ORDERED. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC

G.R. No. 119673 July 26, 1996 IGLESIA NI CRISTO, (INC.), petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, BOARD OF REVIEW FOR MOVING PICTURES AND TELEVISION and HONORABLE HENRIETTA S. MENDOZA, respondents.

PUNO, J.:p This is a petition for review of the Decision dated March 24, 1995 of the respondent Court of Appeals affirming the action of the respondent Board of Review for Moving Pictures and Television which x-rated the TV Program "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo." Petitioner Iglesia ni Cristo, a duly organized religious organization, has a television program entitled "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo" aired on Channel 2 every Saturday and on Channel 13 every Sunday. The program presents and propagates petitioner's religious beliefs, doctrines and practices often times in comparative studies with other religions. Sometime in the months of September, October and November 1992 petitioner submitted to the respondent Board of Review for Moving Pictures and Television the VTR tapes of its TV program Series Nos. 116, 119, 121 and 128. The Board classified the series as "X" or not for public viewing on the ground that they "offend and constitute an attack against other religions which is expressly prohibited by law." Petitioner pursued two (2) courses of action against the respondent Board. On November 28, 1992, it appealed to the Office of the President the

classification of its TV Series No. 128. It succeeded in its appeal for on December 18, 1992, the Office of the President reversed the decision of the respondent Board. Forthwith, the Board allowed Series No. 128 to be publicly telecast. On December 14, 1992, petitioner also filed against the respondent Board Civil Case No. Q-92-14280, with the RTC, NCR Quezon City. 1 Petitioner alleged that the respondent Board acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in requiring petitioner to submit the VTR tapes of its TV program and in x-rating them. It cited its TV Program Series Nos. 115, 119, 121 and 128. In their Answer, respondent Board invoked its power under PD No. 1986 in relation to Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code. On January 4, 1993, the trial court held a hearing on petitioner's prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. The parties orally argued and then marked their documentary evidence. Petitioner submitted the following as its exhibits, viz.: (1) Exhibit "A," respondent Board's Voting Slip for Television showing its September 9, 1992 action on petitioner's Series No. 115 as follows: 2 REMARKS: There are some inconsistencies in the particular program as it is very surprising for this program to show series of Catholic ceremonies and also some religious sects and using it in their discussion about the bible. There are remarks which are direct criticism which affect other religions. Need more opinions for this particular program. Please subject to more opinions. (2) Exhibit "A-1," respondent Board's Voting Slip for Television showing its September 11, 1992 subsequent action on petitioner's Series No. 115 as follows: 3 REMARKS: This program is criticizing different religions, based on their own interpretation of the Bible. We suggest that the program should delve on explaining their own faith and beliefs and avoid attacks on other faith. (3) Exhibit "B," respondent Board's Voting Slip for Television showing its October 9, 1992 action on petitioner's Series No. 119, as follows: 4 REMARKS:

REMARKS: The episode presented criticizes the religious beliefs of the Catholic and Protestant's beliefs. We suggest a second review. (6) Exhibits "E," "E-1," petitioner's block time contract with ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation dated September 1, 1992. 7 (7) Exhibit "F," petitioner's Airtime Contract with Island Broadcasting Corporation. 8 (8) Exhibit "G," letter dated December 18, 1992 of former Executive Secretary Edelmiro A. Amante, Sr., addressed for Henrietta S. Mendez reversing the decision of the respondent Board which x-rated the showing of petitioner's Series No. 129. The letter reads in part: xxx xxx xxx The television episode in question is protected by the constitutional guarantee of free speech and expression under Article III, section 4 of the 1987 Constitution. We have viewed a tape of the television episode in question, as well as studied the passages found by MTRCB to be objectionable and we find no indication that the episode poses any clear and present danger sufficient to limit the said constitutional guarantee. (9) Exhibits "H," "H-1," letter dated November 26, 1992 of Teofilo C. Ramos, Sr., addressed to President Fidel V. Ramos appealing the action of the respondent Board xrating petitioner's Series No. 128. On its part, respondent Board submitted the following exhibits, viz.: (1) Exhibit "1," Permit Certificate for Television Exhibition No. 15181 dated December 18, 1992 allowing the showing of Series No. 128 under parental guidance. (2) Exhibit "2," which is Exhibit "G" of petitioner.

The Iglesia ni Cristo insists on the literal translation of the bible and says that our (Catholic) veneration of the Virgin Mary is not to be condoned because nowhere it is found in the bible that we should do so. This is intolerance and robs off all sects of freedom of choice, worship and decision. (4) Exhibit "C," respondent Board's Voting Slip for Television showing its October 20, 1992 action on petitioner's Series No. 121 as follows: 5 REMARKS: I refuse to approve the telecast of this episode for reasons of the attacks, they do on, specifically, the Catholic religion. I refuse to admit that they can tell, dictate any other religion that they are right and the rest are wrong, which they clearly present in this episode. (5) Exhibit "D," respondent Board's Voting Slip for Television showing its November 20, 1992 action on petitioner's Series No. 128 as follows: 6

(3) Exhibit "3," letter dated October 12, 1992 of Henrietta S. Mendez, addressed to the Christian Era Broadcasting Service which reads in part: xxx xxx xxx In the matter of your television show "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo" Series No. 119, please be informed that the Board was constrained to deny your show a permit to exhibit. The material involved constitute an attack against another religion which is expressly prohibited by law. Please be guided in the submission of future shows. After evaluating the evidence of the parties, the trial court issued a writ of preliminary injunction on petitioner's bond o P10,000.00. The trial court set the pre-trial of the case and the parties submitted their pre-trial briefs. 9 The pre-trial briefs show that the parties' evidence is basically the evidence they submitted in the hearing of the issue of preliminary injunction. The trial of the case was set and reset several times as the parties tried to reach an amicable accord. Their efforts failed and the

records show that after submission of memoranda, the trial court rendered a Judgment,10 on December 15, 1993, the dispositive portion of which reads: xxx xxx xxx WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering respondent Board of Review for Moving Pictures and Television (BRMPT) to grant petitioner Iglesia ni Cristo the necessary permit for all the series of "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo" program. Petitioner Iglesia ni Cristo, however, is directed to refrain from offending and attacking other existing religions in showing "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo" program. SO ORDERED. Petitioner moved for reconsideration 11 praying: (a) for the deletion of the second paragraph of the dispositive portion of the Decision, and (b) for the Board to be perpetually enjoined from requiring petitioner to submit for review the tapes of its program. The respondent Board opposed the motion. 12 On March 7, 1993, the trial court granted petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration. It ordered: 13 xxx xxx xxx WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is granted. The second portion of the Court's Order dated December 15, 1993, directing petitioner to refrain from offending and attacking other existing religions in showing "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo" program is hereby deleted and set aside. Respondents are further prohibited from requiring petitioner Iglesia ni Cristo to submit for review VTR tapes of its religious program "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo." Respondent Board appealed to the Court of Appeals after its motion for reconsideration was denied. 14 On March 5, 1995, the respondent Court of Appeals 15 reversed the trial court. It ruled that: (1) the respondent board has jurisdiction and power to review the TV program "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo," and (2) the respondent Board did not act with grave abuse of discretion when it denied permit for the exhibition on TV of the three series of "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo" on the ground that the materials constitute an attack against another religion. It also found the series "indecent, contrary to law and contrary to good customs. In this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, petitioner raises the following issues: I WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE "ANG IGLESIA NI CRISTO" PROGRAM IS NOT CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED AS A FORM OF RELIGIOUS EXERCISE AND EXPRESSION. II WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT BEING AN EXERCISE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, THE "ANG IGLESIA NI CRISTO" PROGRAM IS SUBJECT TO THE POLICE POWER OF THE STATE ONLY IN THE EXTREME CASE THAT IT POSES A CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER. III WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE MTRCB IS VESTED WITH THE POWER TO CENSOR RELIGIOUS PROGRAMS. IV WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE "ANG IGLESIA NI CRISTO," A PURELY RELIGIOUS PROGRAM IS

INDECENT AND CONTRARY TO LAW AND GOOD CUSTOMS. The basic issues can be reduced into two: (1) first, whether the respondent Board has the power to review petitioner's TV program "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo," and (2) second, assuming it has the power, whether it gravely abused its discretion when it prohibited the airing of petitioner's religious program, series Nos. 115, 119 and 121, for the reason that they constitute an attack against other religions and that they are indecent, contrary to law and good customs. The first issue can be resolved by examining the powers of the Board under PD No. 1986. Its section 3 pertinently provides: Sec. 3 Powers and Functions. -- The BOARD shall have the following functions, powers and duties: xxx xxx xxx b) To screen, review and examine all motion pictures as herein defined, television programs, including publicity materials such as advertisements, trailers and stills, whether such motion pictures and publicity materials be for theatrical or non-theatrical distribution for television broadcast or for general viewing, imported or produced in the Philippines and in the latter case, whether they be for local viewing or for export. c) To approve, delete objectionable portion from and/or prohibit the importation, exportation, production, copying, distribution, sale, lease, exhibition and/or television broadcast of the motion pictures, television programs and publicity materials, subject of the preceding paragraph, which, in the judgment of the BOARD applying contemporary Filipino cultural values as standard, are objectionable for being immoral, indecent, contrary to law and/or good customs, injurious to the prestige of the Republic of the Philippines and its people, or with a dangerous tendency to encourage the commission of violence or of a wrong or crime, such as but not limited to: i) Those which tend to incite subversion, insurrection, rebellion or sedition against the State, or otherwise threaten the economic and/or political stability of the State; ii) Those which tend to undermine the faith and confidence of the people, their government and/or duly constituted authorities; iii) Those which glorify criminals or condone crimes; iv) Those which serve no other purpose but to satisfy the market for violence or pornography; v) Those which tend to abet the traffic in and use of prohibited drugs; vi) Those which are libelous or defamatory to the good name and reputation of any person, whether living or dead; vii) Those which may constitute contempt of court or of any quasi-judicial tribunal, or pertain to matters which are subjudice in nature (emphasis ours). The law gives the Board the power to screen, review and examine all "television programs." By the clear terms of the law, the Board

has the power to "approve, delete . . . and/or prohibit the . . . exhibition and/or television broadcast of . . . television programs . . ." The law also directs the Board to apply "contemporary Filipino cultural values as standard" to determine those which are objectionable for being "immoral, indecent, contrary to law and/or good customs, injurious to the prestige of the Republic of the Philippines and its people, or with a dangerous tendency to encourage the commission of violence or of a wrong or crime." Petitioner contends that the term "television program" should not include religious programs like its program "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo." A contrary interpretation, it is urged, will contravene section 5, Article III of the Constitution which guarantees that "no law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed." We reject petitioner's submission which need not set us adrift in a constitutional voyage towards an uncharted sea. Freedom of religion has been accorded a preferred status by the framers of our fundamental laws, past and present. We have affirmed this preferred status well aware that it is "designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to believe as his conscience directs, to profess his beliefs, and to live as he believes he ought to live, consistent with the liberty of others and with the common good." 16 We have also laboriously defined in our jurisprudence the intersecting umbras and penumbras of the right to religious profession and worship. To quote the summation of Mr. Justice Isagani Cruz, our well-known constitutionalist: 17 Religious Profession and Worship The right to religious profession and worship has a two-fold aspect, viz., freedom to believe and freedom to act on one's beliefs. The first is absolute as long as the belief is confined within the realm of thought. The second is subject to regulation where the belief is translated into external acts that affect the public welfare. (1) Freedom to Believe The individual is free to believe (or disbelieve) as he pleases concerning the hereafter. He may indulge his own theories about life and death; worship any god he chooses, or none at all; embrace or reject any religion; acknowledge the divinity of God or of any being that appeals to his reverence; recognize or deny the immortality of his soul -- in fact, cherish any religious conviction as he and he alone sees fit. However absurd his beliefs may be to others, even if they be hostile and heretical to the majority, he has full freedom to believe as he pleases. He may not be required to prove his beliefs. He may not be punished for his inability to do so. Religion, after all, is a matter of faith. "Men may believe what they cannot prove." Every one has a right to his beliefs and he may not be called to account because he cannot prove what he believes. (2) Freedom to Act on One's Beliefs But where the individual externalizes his beliefs in acts or omissions that affect the public, his freedom to do so becomes subject to the authority of the State. As great as this liberty may be, religious freedom, like all the other rights guaranteed in the Constitution, can be enjoyed only with a proper regard for the rights of others. It is error to think that the mere invocation of religious freedom will stalemate the State and render it impotent in protecting the general welfare. The inherent police power can be exercised to prevent religious practices inimical to society. And this is true even if such practices are pursued out of sincere religious conviction and not merely for the purpose of evading the reasonable requirements or prohibitions of the law. Justice Frankfurter put it succinctly: "The constitutional provision on religious freedom terminated disabilities, it did not create new privileges. It gave religious liberty, not civil immunity. Its essence is freedom from conformity to religious dogma, not freedom from conformity to law because of religious dogma.

Accordingly, while one has lull freedom to believe in Satan, he may not offer the object of his piety a human sacrifice, as this would be murder. Those who literally interpret the Biblical command to "go forth and multiply" are nevertheless not allowed to contract plural marriages in violation of the laws against bigamy. A person cannot refuse to pay taxes on the ground that it would be against his religious tenets to recognize any authority except that of God alone. An atheist cannot express in his disbelief in act of derision that wound the feelings of the faithful. The police power can validly asserted against the Indian practice of the suttee, born of deep religious conviction, that calls on the widow to immolate herself at the funeral pile of her husband. We thus reject petitioner's postulate that its religious program is per se beyond review by the respondent Board. Its public broadcast on TV of its religious program brings it out of the bosom of internal belief. Television is a medium that reaches even the eyes and ears of children. The Court iterates the rule that the exercise of religious freedom can be regulated by the State when it will bring about the clear and present danger of some substantive evil which the State is duty bound to prevent, i.e., serious detriment to the more overriding interest of public health, public morals, or public welfare. A laissez faire policy on the exercise of religion can be seductive to the liberal mind but history counsels the Court against its blind adoption as religion is and continues to be a volatile area of concern in our country today. Across the sea and in our shore, the bloodiest and bitterest wars fought by men were caused by irreconcilable religious differences. Our country is still not safe from the recurrence of this stultifying strife considering our warring religious beliefs and the fanaticism with which some of us cling and claw to these beliefs. Even now, we have yet to settle the near century old strife in Mindanao, the roots of which have been nourished by the mistrust and misunderstanding between our Christian and Muslim brothers and sisters. The bewildering rise of weird religious cults espousing violence as an article of faith also proves the wisdom of our rule rejecting a strict let alone policy on the exercise of religion. For sure, we shall continue to subject any act pinching the space for the free exercise of religion to a heightened scrutiny but we shall not leave its rational exercise to the irrationality of man. For when religion divides and its exercise destroys, the State should not stand still. It is also petitioner's submission that the respondent appellate court gravely erred when it affirmed the ruling of the respondent Board x-rating its TV Program Series Nos. 115, 119, 121 and 128. The records show that the respondent Board disallowed the program series for "attacking" other religions. Thus, Exhibits "A," "A-1," (respondent Board's Voting Slip for Television) reveal that its reviewing members x-rated Series 115 for ". . . criticizing different religions, based on their own interpretation of the Bible." They suggested that the program should only explain petitioner's ". . . own faith and beliefs and avoid attacks on other faiths." Exhibit "B" shows that Series No. 119 was x-rated because "the Iglesia ni Cristo insists on the literal translation of the bible and says that our Catholic veneration of the Virgin Mary is not to be condoned because nowhere it is found in the bible that we should do so. This is intolerance . . ." Exhibit "C" shows that Series No. 121 was x-rated ". . . for reasons of the attacks, they do on, specifically, the Catholic religion. . . . (T)hey can not tell, dictate any other religion that they are right and the rest are wrong . . ." Exhibit "D" also shows that Series No. 128 was not favorably recommended because it ". . . outrages Catholic and Protestant's beliefs." On second review, it was x-rated because of its "unbalanced interpretations of some parts of the bible." 18 In sum, the respondent Board x-rated petitioner's TV program series Nos. 115, 119, 121 and 128 because of petitioner's controversial biblical interpretations and its "attacks" against contrary religious beliefs. The respondent appellate court agreed and even held that the said "attacks" are indecent, contrary to law and good customs. We reverse the ruling of the appellate court. First. Deeply ensconced in our fundamental law is its hostility against all prior restraints on speech, including religious speech. Hence, any act that restrains speech is hobbled by the presumption of invalidity and should be greeted with furrowed brows. 19 It is the burden of the respondent Board to overthrow this presumption. If it fails to discharge this burden, its act of censorship will be struck down. It failed in the case at bar. Second. The evidence shows that the respondent Board x-rated petitioners TV series for "attacking" either religions, especially the Catholic church. An examination of the evidence, especially Exhibits "A," "A-1," "B," "C," and "D" will show that the so-called "attacks" are mere criticisms of some of the deeply held dogmas and tenets of other religions. The videotapes were not viewed by the respondent court as they were not presented as evidence. Yet they were considered by the respondent court as indecent, contrary to law and good customs, hence, can be prohibited from public viewing under section 3(c) of PD 1986. This ruling clearly suppresses petitioner's freedom of speech and interferes with its right to free exercise of religion. It misappreciates the essence of freedom to differ as delineated in the benchmark case of Cantwell v. Connecticut, so viz.: 20

xxx xxx xxx In the realm of religious faith, and in that of political belief, sharp differences arise. In both fields, the tenets of one man may seem the rankest error to his neighbor. To persuade others to his own point of view, the pleader, as we know, at times, resorts to exaggeration, to vilification of men who have been, or are prominent in church or state or even to false statements. But the people of this nation have ordained in the light of history that inspite of the probability of excesses and abuses, these liberties are, in the long view, essential to enlightened opinion and right conduct on the part of the citizens of democracy. The respondent Board may disagree with the criticisms of other religions by petitioner but that gives it no excuse to interdict such criticisms, however, unclean they may be. Under our constitutional scheme, it is not the task of the State to favor any religion by protecting it against an attack by another religion. Religious dogmas and beliefs are often at war and to preserve peace among their followers, especially the fanatics, the establishment clause of freedom of religion prohibits the State from leaning towards any religion. Vis-a-vis religious differences, the State enjoys no banquet of options. Neutrality alone is its fixed and immovable stance. In fine, respondent board cannot squelch the speech of petitioner Iglesia ni Cristo simply because it attacks other religions, even if said religion happens to be the most numerous church in our country. In a State where there ought to be no difference between the appearance and the reality of freedom of religion, the remedy against bad theology is better theology. The bedrock of freedom of religion is freedom of thought and it is best served by encouraging the marketplace of dueling ideas. When the luxury of time permits, the marketplace of ideas demands that speech should be met by more speech for it is the spark of opposite speech, the heat of colliding ideas that can fan the embers of truth. Third. The respondents cannot also rely on the ground "attacks against another religion" in x-rating the religious program of petitioner. Even a sideglance at section 3 of PD No. 1986 will reveal that it is not among the grounds to justify an order prohibiting the broadcast of petitioner's television program. The ground "attack against another religion" was merely added by the respondent Board in its Rules. 21 This rule is void for it runs smack against the hoary doctrine that administrative rules and regulations cannot expand the letter and spirit of the law they seek to enforce. It is opined that the respondent board can still utilize" attack against any religion" as a ground allegedly ". . . because section 3 (c) of PD No. 1986 prohibits the showing of motion pictures, television programs and publicity materials which are contrary to law and Article 201 (2) (b) (3) of the Revised Penal Code punishes anyone who exhibits "shows which offend any race or religion." We respectfully disagree for it is plain that the word "attack" is not synonymous with the word "offend." Moreover, Article 201 (2) (b) (3) of the Revised Penal Code should be invoked to justify the subsequent punishment of a show which offends any religion. It cannot be utilized to justifyprior censorship of speech. It must be emphasized that E.O. 876, the law prior to PD 1986, included "attack against any religion" as a ground for censorship. The ground was not, however, carried over by PD 1986. Its deletion is a decree to disuse it. There can be no other intent. Indeed, even the Executive Department espouses this view. Thus, in an Opinion dated November 28, 1985 then Minister of Justice, now President of the Senate, Neptali Gonzales explained: xxx xxx xxx However, the question whether the BRMPT (now MTRCB) may preview and censor the subject television program of INC should be viewed in the light of the provision of Section 3, paragraph (c) of PD 1986, which is substantially the same as the provision of Section 3, paragraph (c) of E.O. No. 876-A, which prescribes the standards of censorship, to wit: "immoral, indecent, contrary to law and/or good customs, injurious to the prestige of the Republic of the Philippines or its people or with dangerous tendency to encourage the commission of violence, or of a wrong" as determined by the Board, "applying contemporary Filipino cultural values as standard." As stated, the intention of the Board to subject the INC's television program to "previewing and censorship is prompted by the fact that its religious program makes mention of beliefs and practices of other religion." On the face of the law itself, there can conceivably be no basis for censorship of said

program by the Board as much as the alleged reason cited by the Board does not appear to he within the contemplation of the standards of censorship set by law. (Emphasis supplied). Fourth. In x-rating the TV program of the petitioner, the respondents failed to apply the clear and present danger rule. In American Bible Society v. City of Manila, 22 this Court held: "The constitutional guaranty of free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship carries with it the right to disseminate religious information. Any restraint of such right can be justified like other restraints on freedom of expression on the ground that there is aclear and present danger of any substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent." In Victoriano vs. Elizalde Rope Workers Union, 23 we further ruled that ". . . it is only where it is unavoidably necessary to prevent animmediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the community that infringement of religious freedom may be justified, and only to the smallest extent necessary to avoid the danger." The records show that the decision of the respondent Board, affirmed by the respondent appellate court, is completely bereft of findings of facts to justify the conclusion that the subject video tapes constitute impermissible attacks against another religion. There is no showing whatsoever of the type of harm the tapes will bring about especially the gravity and imminence of the threatened harm. Prior restraint on speech, including religious speech, cannot be justified by hypothetical fears but only by the showing of a substantive and imminent evil which has taken the life of a reality already on ground. It is suggested that we re-examine the application of clear and present danger rule to the case at bar. In the United States, it is true that the clear and present danger test has undergone permutations. It was Mr. Justice Holmes who formulated the test in Schenck v. US, 24 as follows: ". . . the question in every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent." Admittedly, the test was originally designed to determine the latitude which should be given to speech that espouses anti-government action. Bannered by Justices Holmes and Brandeis, the test attained its full flowering in the decade of the forties, when its umbrella was used to protect speech other than subversive speech. 25 Thus, for instance, the test was applied to annul a total ban on labor picketing. 26 The use of the test took a downswing in the 1950's when the US Supreme Court decided Dennis v. United States involving communist conspiracy. 27 In Dennis, the components of the test were altered as the High Court adopted Judge Learned Hand's formulation that ". . . in each case [courts] must ask whether the gravity of the 'evil,' discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger." The imminence requirement of the test was thus diminished and to that extent, the protection of the rule was weakened. In 1969, however, the strength of the test was reinstated in Brandenburg v. Ohio, 28 when the High Court restored in the test the imminence requirement, and even added an intent requirement which according to a noted commentator ensured that only speech directed at inciting lawlessness could be punished. 29 Presently in the United States, the clear and present danger test is not applied to protectlow value speeches such as obscene speech, commercial speech and defamation. Be that as it may, the test is still applied to four types of speech: speech that advocates dangerous ideas, speech that provokes a hostile audience reaction, out of court contempt and release of information that endangers a fair trial. 30 Hence, even following the drift of American jurisprudence, there is reason to apply the clear and present danger test to the case at bar which concerns speech that attacks other religions and could readily provoke hostile audience reaction. It cannot be doubted that religious truths disturb and disturb tenribly. It is also opined that it is inappropriate to apply the clear and present danger test to the case at bar because the issue involves the content of speech and not the time, place or manner of speech. Allegedly, unless the speech is first allowed, its impact cannot be measured, and the causal connection between the speech and the evil apprehended cannot be established. The contention overlooks the fact that the case at bar involves videotapes that are pretaped and hence, their speech content is known and not an X quantity. Given the specific content of the speech, it is not unreasonable to assume that the respondent Board, with its expertise, can determine whether its sulphur will bring about the substantive evil feared by the law. Finally, it is also opined by Mr. Justice Kapunan that ". . . the determination of the question as to whether or not such vilification, exaggeration or fabrication falls within or lies outside the boundaries of protected speech or expression is a judicial function which cannot be arrogated by an administrative body such as a Board of Censors." He submits that a "system of prior restraint may only be validly administered by judges and not left to administrative agencies. "The same submission is made by Mr. Justice Mendoza. This thoughtful thesis is an attempt to transplant another American rule in our jurisdiction. Its seedbed was laid down by Mr. Justice Brennan in his

concurring opinion in the 1962 case of Manual Enterprise v. Day 31 By 1965, the US Supreme Court in Freedman v. Maryland 32 was ready to hold that "the teaching of cases is that, becauseonly a judicial determination in an adversary proceeding ensures the necessary sensitivity to freedom of expression only a procedure requiring a judicial determination suffices to impose a valid final restraint." 33 While the thesis has a lot to commend itself, we are not ready to hold that it is unconstitutional for Congress to grant an administrative body quasijudicial power to preview and classify TV programs and enforce its decisionsubject to review by our courts. As far back as 1921, we upheld this set-up in Sotto vs. Ruiz, 34 viz.: The use of the mails by private persons is in the nature of a privilege which can be regulated in order to avoid its abuse. Persons posses no absolute right to put into the mail anything they please, regardless of its character. On the other hand, the exclusion of newspaper and other publications from the mails, in the exercise of executive power, is extremely delicate in nature and can only be justified where the statute is unequivocably applicable to the supposed objectionable publication. In excluding any publication for the mails, the object should be not to interfere with the freedom of the press or with any other fundamental right of the people. This is the more true with reference to articles supposedly libelous than to other particulars of the law, since whether an article is or is not libelous, is fundamentally a legal question. In order for there to be due process of law, the action of the Director of Posts must be subject to revision by the courts in case he had abused his discretion or exceeded his authority. (Ex parte Jackson [1878], 96 U.S., 727; Public Cleaning House vs. Coyne [1903], 194 U.S., 497; Post Publishing Co. vs. Murray [1916]. 23 - Fed., 773) As has been said, the performance of the duty of determining whether a publication contains printed matter of a libelous character rests with the Director of Posts and involves the exercise of his judgment and discretion. Every intendment of the law is in favor of the correctness of his action. The rule is (and we go only to those cases coming from the United States Supreme Court and pertaining to the United States Postmaster-General), that the courts will not interfere with the decision of the Director of Posts unless clearly of opinion that it was wrong. (Bates & Guilid Co. vs. Payne [1904], 194 U.S., 106; Smith vs. Hitchcock [1912], 226 U.S., 63; Masses Pub. Co. vs. Patten [1917], 246 Fed., 24. But see David vs. Brown [1900], 103 Fed., 909, announcing a somewhat different doctrine and relied upon by the Attorney-General). To be sure, legal scholars in the United States are still debating the proposition whether or not courts aloneare competent to decide whether speech is constitutionally protected. 35 The issue involves highly arguable policy considerations and can be better addressed by our legislators. IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Decision of the respondent Court of Appeals dated March 24, 1995 is affirmed insofar as it sustained the jurisdiction of the respondent MTRCB to review petitioner's TV program entitled "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo," and is reversed and set aside insofar as it sustained the action of the respondent MTRCB x-rating petitioner's TV Program Series Nos. 115, 119, and 121. No costs. SO ORDERED.

ISLAMIC DA'WAH COUNCIL OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., herein represented by PROF. ABDULRAFIH H. SAYEDY, petitioner, vs. OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY of the Office of the President of the Philippines, herein represented by HON. ALBERTO G. ROMULO, Executive Secretary, and the OFFICE ON MUSLIM AFFAIRS, herein represented by its Executive Director, HABIB MUJAHAB HASHIM, respondents. CORONA, J.: Before us is a petition for prohibition filed by petitioner Islamic Da'wah Council of the Philippines, Inc. (IDCP) praying for the declaration of nullity of Executive Order (EO) 46, s. 2001 and the prohibition of herein respondents Office of the Executive Secretary and Office of Muslim Affairs (OMA) from implementing the subject EO. Petitioner IDCP, a corporation that operates under Department of Social Welfare and Development License No. SB-01-085, is a non-governmental organization that extends voluntary services to the Filipino people, especially to Muslim communities. It claims to be a federation of national Islamic organizations and an active member of international organizations such as the Regional Islamic Da'wah Council of Southeast Asia and the Pacific (RISEAP)1 and The World Assembly of Muslim Youth. The RISEAP accredited petitioner to issue halal2certifications in the Philippines. Thus, among the functions petitioner carries out is to conduct seminars, orient manufacturers on halal food and issue halal certifications to qualified products and manufacturers. Petitioner alleges that, on account of the actual need to certify food products as halal and also due to halal food producers' request, petitioner formulated in 1995 internal rules and procedures based on the Qur'an3 and the Sunnah4 for the analysis of food, inspection thereof and issuance of halal certifications. In that same year, petitioner began to issue, for a fee, certifications to qualified products and food manufacturers. Petitioner even adopted for use on its halal certificates a distinct sign or logo registered in the Philippine Patent Office under Patent No. 4-2000-03664. On October 26, 2001, respondent Office of the Executive Secretary issued EO 465 creating the Philippine Halal Certification Scheme and designating respondent OMA to oversee its implementation. Under the EO, respondent OMA has the exclusive authority to issue halal certificates and perform other related regulatory activities. On May 8, 2002, a news article entitled "OMA Warns NGOs Issuing Illegal 'Halal' Certification" was published in the Manila Bulletin, a newspaper of general circulation. In said article, OMA warned Muslim consumers to buy only products with its official halal certification since those without said certification had not been subjected to careful analysis and therefore could contain pork or its derivatives. Respondent OMA also sent letters to food manufacturers asking them to secure the halal certification only from OMA lest they violate EO 46 and RA 4109.6As a result, petitioner lost revenues after food manufacturers stopped securing certifications from it. Hence, this petition for prohibition. Petitioner contends that the subject EO violates the constitutional provision on the separation of Church and State.7 It is unconstitutional for the government to formulate policies and guidelines on the halal certification scheme because said scheme is a function only religious organizations, entity or scholars can lawfully and validly perform for the Muslims. According to petitioner, a food product becomes halal only after the performance of Islamic religious ritual and prayer. Thus, only practicing Muslims are qualified to slaughter animals for food. A government agency like herein respondent OMA cannot therefore perform a religious function like certifying qualified food products as halal. Petitioner also maintains that the respondents violated Section 10, Article III of the 1987 Constitution which provides that "(n)o law impairing the obligation of contracts, shall be passed." After the subject EO was implemented, food manufacturers with existing contracts with petitioner ceased to obtain certifications from the latter. Moreover, petitioner argues that the subject EO violates Sections 15 and 16 of Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution which respectively provide:

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. 153888 July 9, 2003

ROLE AND RIGHTS OF PEOPLE'S ORGANIZATIONS Sec. 15. The State shall respect the role of independent people's organizations to enable the people to pursue and protect, within the democratic framework, their legitimate and collective interests and aspirations through peaceful and lawful means.

People's organizations are bona fide associations of citizens with demonstrated capacity to promote the public interest and with identifiable leadership, membership, and structure. Sec. 16. The rights of the people and their organizations to effective and reasonable participation at all levels of social, political, and economic decision-making shall not be abridged. The State shall, by law, facilitate, the establishment of adequate consultation mechanisms. According to petitioner, the subject EO was issued with utter haste and without even consulting Muslim people's organizations like petitioner before it became effective. We grant the petition. OMA was created in 1981 through Executive Order No. 697 (EO 697) "to ensure the integration of Muslim Filipinos into the mainstream of Filipino society with due regard to their beliefs, customs, traditions, and institutions."8 OMA deals with the societal, legal, political and economic concerns of the Muslim community as a "national cultural community" and not as a religious group. Thus, bearing in mind the constitutional barrier between the Church and State, the latter must make sure that OMA does not intrude into purely religious matters lest it violate the non-establishment clause and the "free exercise of religion" provision found in Article III, Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution.9 Freedom of religion was accorded preferred status by the framers of our fundamental law. And this Court has consistently affirmed this preferred status, well aware that it is "designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to believe as his conscience directs, to profess his beliefs, and to live as he believes he ought to live, consistent with the liberty of others and with the common good."10 Without doubt, classifying a food product as halal is a religious function because the standards used are drawn from the Qur'an and Islamic beliefs. By giving OMA the exclusive power to classify food products as halal, EO 46 encroached on the religious freedom of Muslim organizations like herein petitioner to interpret for Filipino Muslims what food products are fit for Muslim consumption. Also, by arrogating to itself the task of issuing halal certifications, the State has in effect forced Muslims to accept its own interpretation of the Qur'an and Sunnah on halal food. To justify EO 46's intrusion into the subject religious activity, the Solicitor General argues that the freedom of religion is subservient to the police power of the State. By delegating to OMA the authority to issue halal certifications, the government allegedly seeks to protect and promote the muslim Filipinos' right to health, and to instill health consciousness in them. We disagree.

One such government agency designated by RA 7394 is the Bureau of Food and Drugs (BFD) of the Department of Health (DOH). Under Article 22 of said law, BFD has the duty to promulgate and enforce rules and regulations fixing and establishing a reasonable definition and standard of identity, a standard of quality and a standard of fill of containers for food. The BFD also ensures that food products released in the market are not adulterated.14 Furthermore, under Article 48 of RA 7394, the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) is tasked to protect the consumer against deceptive, unfair and unconscionable sales acts or practices as defined in Article 50.15 DTI also enforces compulsory labeling and fair packaging to enable the consumer to obtain accurate information as to the nature, quality and quantity of the contents of consumer products and to facilitate his comparison of the value of such products.16 With these regulatory bodies given detailed functions on how to screen and check the quality and safety of food products, the perceived danger against the health of muslim and non-muslim Filipinos alike is totally avoided. Of great help are the provisions on labeling of food products (Articles 74 to 85)17 of RA 7394. In fact, through these labeling provisions, the State ably informs the consuming public of the contents of food products released in the market. Stiff sanctions are imposed on violators of said labeling requirements. Through the laws on food safety and quality, therefore, the State indirectly aids muslim consumers in differentiating food from non-food products. The NMIC guarantees that the meat sold in the market has been thoroughly inspected and fit for consumption. Meanwhile, BFD ensures that food products are properly categorized and have passed safety and quality standards. Then, through the labeling provisions enforced by the DTI, muslim consumers are adequately apprised of the products that contain substances or ingredients that, according to their Islamic beliefs, are not fit for human intake. These are the non-secular steps put in place by the State to ensure that the muslim consumers' right to health is protected. The halal certifications issued by petitioner and similar organizations come forward as the official religious approval of a food product fit for muslim consumption. We do not share respondents' apprehension that the absence of a central administrative body to regulate halal certifications might give rise to schemers who, for profit, will issue certifications for products that are not actually halal. Aside from the fact that muslim consumers can actually verify through the labels whether a product contains non-food substances, we believe that they are discerning enough to know who the reliable and competent certifying organizations in their community are. Before purchasing a product, they can easily avert this perceived evil by a diligent inquiry on the reliability of the concerned certifying organization. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Executive Order 46, s. 2000, is hereby declared NULL AND VOID. Consequently, respondents are prohibited from enforcing the same. SO ORDERED.

Only the prevention of an immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the community can justify the infringement of religious freedom.11 If the government fails to show the seriousness and immediacy of the threat, State intrusion is constitutionally unacceptable. In a society with a democratic framework like ours, the State must minimize its interference with the affairs of its citizens and instead allow them to exercise reasonable freedom of personal and religious activity. In the case at bar, we find no compelling justification for the government to deprive muslim organizations, like herein petitioner, of their religious right to classify a product as halal, even on the premise that the health of muslim Filipinos can be effectively protected by assigning to OMA the exclusive power to issue halal certifications. The protection and promotion of the muslim Filipinos' right to health are already provided for in existing laws and ministered to by government agencies charged with ensuring that food products released in the market are fit for human consumption, properly labeled and safe. Unlike EO 46, these laws do not encroach on the religious freedom of muslims. Section 48(4) of the Administrative Code of 1987 gives to the National Meat Inspection Commission (NMIC) of the Department of Agriculture (DOA) the power to inspect slaughtered animals intended for human consumption to ensure the safety of the meat released in the market. Another law, RA 7394, otherwise known as "The Consumer Act of 1992," gives to certain government departments the duty to protect the interests of the consumer, promote his general welfare and to establish standards of conduct for business and industry.12 To this end, a food product, before its distribution to the market, is required to secure the Philippine Standard Certification Mark after the concerned department inspects and certifies its compliance with quality and safety standards.13 G.R. No. L-13954

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC August 12, 1959

GENARO GERONA, ET AL., petitioners-appellants, vs. THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF EDUCATION, ET AL., respondents-appellees. K.V. Felon and Hayed C. Cavington for appellant. Office of the Solicitor General Edilberto Barot and Solicitor Conrado T. Limcaoco for appellees. MONTEMAYOR, J.: Petitioners are Appealing the decision of the Court of First Instance of Masbate dismissing their complaint. Acting upon the "Urgent Motion for Writ of Preliminary Injunction" filed on behalf of petitioners of December 12, 1958, and without objection on the part of the Solicitor General, by resolution of this Court of December 16, we issued the corresponding writ of preliminary injunction restraining respondents from excluding or banning petitionersappellants, their children and all other of Jehovah's Witnesses for whom this action has been brought, from admission to public schools, particularly the Buenavista Community School, solely on account of their refusal to salute the flag or preventing their return to school should they have already been banned, until further orders from this Court.

The facts involved are not disputed. On June 11, 1955, Republic Act No. 1265 was approved and went into effect. Acting upon section 2 of said Act authorizing and directing the Secretary of Education to issue or cause to be issued rules and regulations for the proper conduct of the flag ceremony, said Secretary issued Department Order No. 8, series of 1955 on July 21, 1955 which Department Order quoting Republic Act No. 1265 in its entirety, we reproduce below for purpose of reference: "Republic of the Philippines Department of Education Office of the Secretary Manila Department Order No. 8, s. 1955

1. The Filipino Flag shall be displayed by all educational institutions, public and private, every school day throughout the year. It shall be raised at sunrise and lowered at sunset. The flag staff must be straight, slightly and gently tapering at the end, and of such height as would give the Flag a commanding position in front of the building or within the compound. 2. Every public and private educational institution shall hold a flag-raising ceremony every morning except when it is raining, in which event the ceremony may be conducted indoors in the best way possible. A retreat shall be held in the afternoon of the same day. The flag-raising ceremony in the morning shall be conducted in the following manner: a. Pupils and teachers or students and faculty members who are in school and its premises shall assemble in formation facing the flag. At command, books shall be put away or held in the left hand and everybody shall come to attention. Those with hats shall uncover. No one shall enter or leave the school grounds during the ceremony. b. The assembly shall sing the Philippine National Anthem accompanied by the school band or without the accompaniment if it has none; or the anthem may be played by the school band alone. At the first note of the Anthem, the flag shall be raised briskly. While the flag is being raised, all persons present shall stand at attention and execute a salute. Boys and men with hats shall salute by placing that hat over the heart. Those without hats may stand with their arms and hands downed and straight at the sides. Those in military or Boy Scout uniform shall give the salute prescribed by their regulations. The salute shall be started as the Flag rises, and completed upon last note of the anthem. c. Immediately following the singing of the Anthem, the assembly shall recite in unison of following patriotic pledge (English or vernacular version 0, which may bring the ceremony to a close. This is required of all public schools and of private schools which are intended for Filipino students or whose population is predominantly Filipino. ENGLISH VERSION I Love the Philippines. It is the land of my birth, It is the home of my people. It protects me and helps me to be strong, happy and useful. In return, I will heed the counsel of my parents; I will obey the rules of my school; I will perform the duties of a patriotic, law-abiding citizen; I will serve my country unselfishly and faithfully; I will be a true Filipino in thought, in word, in deed. 3. The retreat shall be observed as follows: a. Teachers and pupils or faculty members and students whose classes and after the last school period in the afternoon before sun down shall assemble facing the flag. At command, the Philippine National Anthem shall be sung with accompaniment of the school band. If the school has no band, the assembly will only sing the Anthem. Boys who have been taking part in preparatory military training or Boy Scout activities shall attend the retreat in formation and execute the salute prescribed for them. Others shall execute the same salute and observe the same deportment as required of them in the flag-raising ceremony. The flag should be lowered slowly so that it will be in the hands of the color detail at the sound of the last note of the Anthem. b. If the school so prefers, it may have its bugle corp play "To the Colors", instead of the singing of the National Anthem, for the retreat. At the sound of the first note, the assembly shall stand at attention facing the flag and observe the same deportment as required in the flag-raising ceremony. Or, it may have its bugle corp play "To the Colors" and at the sound of the first note everybody within hearing distance shall stand at attention, face the flag, and observe the same deportment as required in the flag-raising ceremony. 4. The flag should be handled reverently in raising or lowering it and not allowed to touch the ground. This can be insured by having one pupil hold the flag while another pupil fastening it to or unfasten it from the halyard.

July 21, 1955

COMPULSORY DAILY FLAG CEREMONY IN ALL PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SCHOOLS To the Director of Public Schools and the Director of Private Schools: 1. Quoted below is Republic Act No. 1265 entitled "An Act making Flag Ceremony Compulsory in all Educational Institutions," which is self-explanatory. SECTION 1. All educational institutions henceforth observe daily flag ceremony, which shall be simple and dignified and shall include the playing or singing of the Philippine National Anthem. SECTION 2. The Secretary of Education is hereby authorized and directed to issue or cause to be issued rules and regulations for the proper conduct of the flag ceremony herein provided. SECTION 3. Failure of refusal to observe the flag ceremony provided by this Act and in accordance with rules and regulations issued by the Secretary of Education, after proper notice and hearing, shall subject the educational institution concerned and its head to public censure as an administrative punishment which shall be published at least once in a newspaper of general circulation. In case of failure to observe for the second time the flag ceremony provided by this Act, the Secretary of Education, after proper notice and hearing, shall cause the cancellation of the recognition or permit of the private educational institution responsible for such failure. SECTION 4. This Act shall take effect upon its approval. Approved, June 11, 1955. 2. As provided in Section 2 of the Act, the rules and regulations governing the proper conduct of the required flag ceremony, given in the in closure to this Order, are hereby promulgated. These rules and regulations should be made known to all teachers and school officials, public and private. The patriotic objective or significance of the Act should be explained to all pupils and students in the schools and to all communities through the purok organizations and community assemblies.

(Sgd.) G. HERNANDEZ, JR. Secretary of Education

Incl.: As stated (Inclosure of Department order No. 8, s. 1955) RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR CONDUCTING THE FLAG CEREMONY IN ALL EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS

5. To display the National Flag at half-mast when necessary, it must be hoisted to full-mast, allowing it to fly there for a moment, and then brought down to half-mast. To lower the flag, it must again be hoisted to full-mast before bringing it down." In his turn the Director of Public Schools issued Circular No. 22, series of 1955, on July 30, 1955 addressed to Division Superintendents of Schools, enclosing a copy of Department Order No. 8, series of 1955 and enjoining strict compliance therewith. It would appear that pursuant to the Department Order in question, the flag ceremony contemplated therein was held daily in every school, public and private. Petitioners' children attending the Buenavista Community School, Uson, Masbate, refused to salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge contrary to the requirement of Department Order No. 8; as a result they were expelled from school sometime in September, 1955. It is said that other children similarly situated who refused or failed to comply with the requirement about saluting the flag are under threats of being also expelled from all public schools in the Philippines. Petitioners thru counsel wrote to the Secretary of Education petitioning that in the implementation of this flag ceremony, they and their children attending school be allowed to remain silent and stand at attention with their arms and hands down and straight at the sides and that they be exempted from executing the formal salute, singing of the National Anthem and the reciting of the patriotic pledge, giving their reason for the same. On December 16, 1955 the Secretary of Education wrote to counsel for petitioner denying the petition, making it clear that the denial was the final and absolute stand of the Department of Education on the matter and that counsel may thereafter feel free to seek a judicial determination of the constitutionality or interpretation of Republic Act No. 1265 as construed and applied to Jehovah's Witnesses. The letter also informed petitioners' counsel that with reference to his letter of December 1, 1955 relative to the request for reinstatement of petitioners' children who had been expelled from school for non-compliance with Department Order No. 8, no favorable action could be taken thereon. So, on March 27, 1957 petitioners commenced the present action asking that a writ of preliminary injunction issue to restrain the Secretary of Education and the Director of Public Schools from enforcing Department Order No. 8 "as applied to petitioners and all others of Jehovah's Witnesses for whom this action is brought and to restrain them from excluding from the public schools the children of the petitioners on account of their refusal to execute a formal salute to the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge, and that after hearing, the trial court declare Department Order No. 8 invalid and contrary to the Bill of Rights and that the preliminary injunction prayed for be made permanent. Petitioners-appellants belong to what is called the JEHOVAH'S WITNESS, an unincorporated body teaching that the obligation imposed by law of God is superior to that of laws enacted by the State. Their religious beliefs include a literal version of Exodus, Chapter 20, verses 4 and 5, which say: "Thou shalt not make unto thee any graven image, or any likeness of anything that is in heaven above, or that is in the earth beneath, or that is in the water under the earth; thou shalt not bow down thyself to them, nor serve them." They consider that the flag is an "image within this command. For this reason they refuse to salute it. To further make clear the stand of petitioners as to the relative position and priority of religious teaching on the one hand and laws promulgated by the State on the other, we quote from appellant's brief on page 50 thereof: In Halter vs. Nebraska, 205 U.S. 34, 41, 27 S. Ct. 419, 51 L. Ed. 696 (1907), the United States Supreme Court held that the flag `is an emblem of National sovereignty, To many persons the saluting of a national flag means nothing. To a sincere person who believed in God and the Bible as his Word, and who is in a covenant with Almighty God to do his will exclusively, it means much. To such person "sovereignty" means the supreme authority or power. Many believe that "the higher powers," mentioned in the Bible at Romans 13:1, means the "sovereign state"; but to the Christian this means Jehovah God and his son, Christ Jesus, Jehovah's anointed King. They, Father and Son are the higher powers, to whom all must be subject and joyfully obey. (Emphasis supplied) The question involved in this appeal is a highly important one. We are called upon to determine the right of a citizen as guaranteed by the Constitution about freedom of religious belief and the right to practice it as against the power and authority of the State to limit or restrain the same. Our task is lessened by the fact that petitioners do not challenge the legality or constitutionality of Republic Act 1265. All that they question is the legality or constitutionality of Department Order No. 8, series of 1955 of the Department of Education implementing said Republic Act.

The realm of belief and creed is infinitive and limitless bounded only by one's imagination and though. So is the freedom of belief, including religious belief, limitless and without bounds. One may believe in most anything, however strange, bizarre and unreasonable the same may appear to others, even heretical when weighed in the scales of orthodoxy or doctrinal standards. But between the freedom of belief and the exercise of said belief, there is quite a stretch of road to travel. If the exercise of said religious belief clashes with the established institutions of society and with the law, then the former must yield and give way to the latter. The Government steps in and either restrains said exercise or even prosecutes the one exercising it. One may believe in polygamy because it is permitted by his religious, but the moment he translates said religious belief into an overt act, such as engaging or practising plural marriages, he may be prosecuted for bigamy and he may not plead or involve his religious belief as a defense or as matter of exemption from the operation of the law. In the case of Reynolds vs. U.S. (98 U.S. 145) the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the validity of a law prohibiting and punishing polygamy even as against the claim of religious belief of the Mormons. Said the Court: So here, as a law of the organization of society under the exclusive dominion of the United States, it is provided that plural marriages shall not be allowed. Can a man excuse his practices to the contrary because of his religious belief? To permit this would be to make the professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of the land, and in effect to permit every citizen to become a law unto himself. Government could exist only in name under such circumstance. (emphasis supplied) Again, one may not believe in the payment of taxes because he may claim that according to his religious belief, the payment of taxes means service to one other than God. As long as he confines himself to mere belief, well and good. But when he puts said belief into practice and he actually refuses to pay taxes on his property or on his business, then the States steps in, compels payment, and enforces it either by court action or levy and distraint. One of the important questions to determine here is the true meaning and significance of the Filipino flag. Petitioners believe and maintain that it is an image and therefore to salute the same is to go against their religious belief. "Thou shalt not make unto thee any graven . . . thou shalt not bow down thyself to them or serve them." They also claim that the flag salute is a religious ceremony, participation in which is forbidden by their religious belief. We disagree. Appellants themselves (page 51 of their brief) concede that the flag is a symbol of the State. They give the meaning of the word "image" on page 51 of their brief as follows: Under the word "image" this comment is given by Webster: "Image, in modern usage, commonly suggestsreligious veneration." (Emphasis supplied) The flag is not an image but a symbol of the Republic of the Philippines, an emblem of national sovereignty, of national unity and cohesion and of freedom and liberty which it and the Constitution guarantee and protect. Considering the complete separation of church and state in our system of governments, the flag is utterly devoid of any religious significance. Saluting the flag consequently does not involve any religious ceremony. The flag salute, particularly the recital of the pledge of loyalty is no more a religious ceremony than the taking of an oath of office by a public official or by a candidate for admission to the bar. In said oath, taken while his right hand is raised, he swears allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, promise to defend the Constitution and even invokes the help of God; and it is to be doubted whether a member of Jehovah's Witness who is a candidate for admission to the Philippine Bar would object to taking the oath on the ground that is religious ceremony. After all, the determination of whether a certain ritual is or is not a religious ceremony must rest with the courts. It cannot be left to a a religious group or sect, much less to a follower of said group or sect; otherwise, there would be confusion and misunderstanding for there might be as many interpretations and meaning to be given to a certain ritual or ceremony as there are religious groups or sects or followers, all depending upon the meaning which they, though in all sincerity and good faith, may want to give to such ritual or ceremony. We understand that petitioners, during the flag ceremony, are willing to remain silent and stand at attention with their arms and hands down straight at the sides, and they agree that boys, members of Jehovah's Witness who have been taking part in military training or Boy Scout activities, and are in uniform, may execute the salute to the flag prescribed by the Circular for them. So, the requirement contained in Department Order No. 8 that during the flag ceremony those without hats may stand with their arms and hands down and straight at the sides, including the formal salute by boys in military and boy Scout uniform, meets with the conformity of petitioners. Of course,

there is the other requirement that boys and men with hats shall salute the flag by placing their hats over the heart, but petitioners and other members of the Jehovah's Witness could well solve this requirements or avoid it by putting away their hats just as pupils books, may put them away, at command (Rules and Regulations, Sec. 2, par. [a]). Consequently, the opposition of petitioners to the flag salute may be reduced to their objection to singing the National Anthem and reciting the patriotic pledge. After a careful and conscientious examination of the patriotic pledge as reproduced at the beginning of this decision, frankly we find nothing, absolutely nothing, objectionable, even from the point of view of religious belief. The school child or student is simply made to say that he loves the Philippines because it is the land of his birth and the home of his people; that because it protects him, in return he will heed the counsel of his parents, obey the rules and regulations of his school, perform the duties of a patriotic and law-abiding citizen; and serve his country unselfishly and faithly, and that he would be a true Filipino in thought, in word, and in deed. He is not even made to pledge allegiance to the flag or to the Republic for which it stands. So that even if we assume for a moment that the flag were an image, connoting religious and veneration instead of a mere symbol of the State and of national unity, the religious scruples of appellants against bowing to and venerating an image are not interfered with or otherwise jeopardized. And as to the singing of the National Anthem, which we reproduce below: Land of the morning, Child of the sun returning. With fervor burning, Thee do our souls adore. Land dear and holy, Cradle of noble heroes, Ne'er shall invaders, Trample thy sacred shores. Ever within thy skies and thy clouds, and o'er thy hills and sea, Do we behold the radiance, feel the throb of glorious liberty. Thy banner, dear to all our hearts, Its sun and stars alight. Onever shall its shining field Be dimmed by tyrant's might. Beautiful land of love, Olandoflight, In thine embrace `tis rapture to lie. But is glory ever, when thou art wronged, For us, they sons to suffer and die. the same thing may be said; that it speaks only of love of country, of patriotism, liberty and the glory of suffering and dying for it. It does not even speak of resorting to force and engaging in military service or duty to defend the country, which service might meet with objection on the part of conscientious objectors. Surely, petitioners do not disclaim or disavow these noble and sacred feelings of patriotism, respect, even veneration for the flag and love of coutnry for which the flag stands. Men may differ and do differ on religous beliefs and creeds, government policies, the wisdom and legality of laws, even the correctness of judicial decisions and decrees; but in the field of love of country, reverence for the flag, national unity and patriotism, they can hardly afford to differ, for these are matters in which they are mutually and viatlly interested, for to them, they mean national existence and survival as a nation or national extinction. In enforcing the flag salute on the petitioners, there was absolutely no compulsion involved, and for their failure or refusal to obey school regulations about the flag salute they were not being persecuted. Neither were they being criminally prosecuted under threat of penal sacntion. If they chose not to obey the flag salute regulation, they merely lost the benefits of public education being maintained at the expense of their fellow citizens, nothing more. According to a popular expression, they could take it or leave it. Having elected not to comply with the regulations about the flag salute, they forfeited their right to attend public schools. In the case of Hamilton vs. University of California, 293 U.S. 243, 79 L. ed. 343, quite similar to the present case, appellants therein were taxpayers and citizens of the United States and of California. The University of California received endowment and support from the State legislature under certain conditions such as that any resident of California of the age of 14 years or upward of approved moral character shall have the right to enter the University as a student and receive instructions therein. The University as part of its cirriculum and instruction required military science and tactics in the Reserve Officers Training Corps. Appellants conformed to all requirements of the University except taking the course in military science and tactics and for this the regents of the University suspended them. Appellants were members of the Methodist Espiscopal Church and of the Epworth League. For many years their fathers have been ordained ministers

of that church. They believed that war and preparation for war is a violation of their religious belief. In other words, they were conscientious objectors to war. They believed that war, training for war, and military training were immoral, wrong and contrary to the letter and spirit of the teaching of God and precepts of the Christian religion. They petitioned for exemption from the military science and tactics course but the regents refused to make military training optional or to exempt them and they were suspended. So they initiated court action with a California Supreme Court to compel the regents of the University to admit them. In that action they assailed the validity of the State law providing for military training in the University. The petition was denied by the State Supreme Court. In affirming the decision of the State Supreme Court, the Supreme Court of the United States held that: . . . California has not drafted or called them to attend the University. They are seeking education offered by the State and at the same time insisting that they be excluded from the prescribed course solely upon grounds of their religious beliefs and consicientious objections to war, preparation for war and military education. Taken on the basis of the facts alleged in the petition, appellants' contentions amount to no more than an assertion that the due process clause of the Fourtheenth Amendment as a safeguard of liberty' confers the right to be students in the state university free from obligation to take military training as one of the conditions of attendance. Viewed in the light of our decisions that proposition must at once be put aside as untenable . . . In United States vs. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 75 L. ed. 1302, 51 S. Ct. 570, a later naturalization case, the applicant was unwilling, because of conscientious objections, to take unqualifiedly the statutory oath of allegiance which contains this statement: "That he will support and defend the constitution and laws of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic, and bear true faith and allegiance to the same." U.S.C. title 8, Sec. 381. His petition stated that he was willing if necessary to take up arms in defense of this country, "but I should want to be free to judge of the necessity." In amplification he said: "I do not undertake to support "my country, right or wrong" in any dispute which may arise, and I am not willing to poromise beforehand, and without knowing the cause for which my country may go to war, either that I will or that I will not "take up arms in defense of this country," however "necessary" the war may seem to be to the government of the day." The opinion of this court quotes from petitioner's brief a statement to the effect that it is a fixed principle of our Constitution, zealously guarded by our laws, that a citizen cannot be forced and need not bear arms in a war if he has conscientious religious scruples against doing so." And, referring to that part of the argument in behalf of the applicant this court said (p. 623): "This, if it means what it seems to say, is an astonishing statement. Of course, there is no such principle of the Constitution, fixed or otherwise. The conscientious objector is relieved from the obligation to bear arms in obedience to no constitutional provision, express or implied; but because, and only because, it has accorded with the policy of Congress thus to relieve him . . . The previlege of the native-born conscientious objector to avoid bearing arms comes not from the Constitution but from the acts of Congress. That body may grant or withhold the exemption as in its wisdom it sees fit; and if it be withheld, the native-born conscientious objector cannot successfully assert the privilege. No other conclusion is compatible with the well-nigh limitless extent of the war power as above illustrated, which include by necessary implication, the power, inthe last extremity, to compel armed serviced of any citizen in the land, without regard to his objections or his views in respect of the justice or morality of the particular war or of war in general. In Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 29, 49 L. ed. 643, 651, 25 S. Ct. 358, 3 Ann. Cas, 765, this Court (upholding a state compulsory vaccination law) speaking of the liberties guaranteed to the individual by the Fourteenth Amendment, said: "... and yet he may be compelled, by force if need be, against his will and without regard to his personal wishes or his pecuniary intersts, or even his religious or political convictions, to take his place in the ranks of the army of his country and risk the chance of being shot down in its defense. And see University of Maryland v. Coale, 165 Md. 224, 167 A. 54, a case, similar to that now before us, decided against the contention of a student in the University of Maryland who on conscientious grounds objected to military training there required. His appeal to this Court was dismissed for the want of a substantial federal questions. 290 U.S. 597, 78 L. ed. 525, 54 S. Ct. 131. Plainly there is no ground for the contention that the regents' order, requiring able-bodied male students under the age of

twenty-four as a condition of their enrollment to take the prescribed instruction in military science and tactics, transgresses any constitutional right asserted by these appellants. Mr. Justice Cardozo in his concurring opinion said: I assume for present purposes that religious liberty protected by the First Amendment against invasion by the nation is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment against invasion by the states. Accepting that premise, I cannot find in the respondents' ordinance an obstruction by the state to "the free exercise" of religion as the phrase was understood by the foundrs of hte nation, and by the generations that have followed. Davis vs. Beasin, 133 U.S. 333, 342, 33 L. ed. 637, 10 s.Ct. 299. There is no occasion at this time to mark the limits of governmental power in the exaction of military service when the nation is at peace. The petitioners have not been required to bear arms for any hostile purpose, offensive or defensive, either now or in the future. They have not even been required in any absolute or peremptory way to join courses of instruction that will fit them to bear arms. If they elect to resort to an institution for higher education maintained with the state's moneys, then they are comanded to follow courses of instruction believed by the state to be vital to its welfare. This may be condemned by some unwise or illiberal or unfair when there is violence to conscientious scruples, either religious or merely ethical. More must be shown to set the ordinance at naught. In controversies of this order courts do not concern themselves with matters of legislative policy, unrelated to privileges or liberties secured by the organic law. The first Amendment, if it be read into the Fourteenth, makes invalid any state law `respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.' Instruction in military science is not instruction in the practice or tenets of a religion. Neither directly nor indirectly is government establishing a state religion when it insists upon such training. Instruction in military science, unaccompanied here by any pledge of military service, is not an interference by the state with the free exercise of religion when the liberties of the constitution are read in the light of a century and a half of history during days of peace and war . . . Manifestly a different doctrine would carry us to lengths that have never yet been dreamed of. The conscientious objector, if his liberties were to be thus extended, might refuse to contribute taxes in furtherance of a war, whether for attack or for defense, or in furtherance of any other end, condemned by his conscience as irreligious or immoral. The right of private judgment has never yet been so exalted above the powers and the compulsion of the agencies of government. One who is a martyr to a principle which may turn out in the end to be a delusion or an errordoes not prove by his martyrdom that he has kept within the law." We are not unmindful of the decision of the United States Federal Supreme Court on similar set of facts. In the case of Minersville School District vs. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 84 L. ed. 1375, two Jehovah Witnesses children were expelled from the public school of Minersville for refusing to salute the national flag in accordance with the regulations poromulgated by the school board for the daily flag ceremony. Their father Gobitsi on behalf of his two children and in his own behalf brought suit to enjoin the school authorities from continuing to exact the execution of the flag ceremony as a condition of his children's admittance in school. After trial, the District Court gave him relief and this decree was affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals. On appeal to the Federal Supreme Court, the decrees of both the District Court and the Circuit Court of Appeals were reversed with the lone dissent of Chief Justice Stone, on the ground that the requirement of participation of all pupils in the public schools in the flag ceremony did not infringe the due process law and liberty guaranteed by the Constitution, particularly the one referring to religious freedom and belief. Three years later, that is, on June 14, 1943, the ruling laid down in the Minersville School District vs. Gobitis case, was in the case of West Virginia State Board of Education vs. Bernette, 319 U.S. 624-671 reversed by a sharply divided court, the majority opinion being penned by Mr. Justice Jackson in which Justice Black, Douglas and Murphy concurred; while Mr. Justice Frankfurter who wrote the opinion in the Gobitis case, filed a long dissenting opinion, and Justices Roberts and Reed adhered to the views expressed in the Gobitis case. Neither attempting to justify the ruling laid down in the Minersville vs. Gobitis case nor desiring to criticize the doctrine of the West Virginia vs. Barnette case, frankly, we are more inclined to favor the former as more in keeping with the spirit of our Constitution and the government policy as laid down in Republic Act No. 1265 entitles "An Act Making Flag Ceremony Compulsory In All Educational Institutions".

We cannot help thinking that one reason that may have possibly influenced the decision in the West Virginia State Board of Education vs. Barnette case, was that the children involved in said case and their parents found themselves in a serious dilemma for refusing to salute the flag as required by the regulations of the School Board. They were expelled by the School Board and their absence was considered unlawful and because of the law of compulsory school atendance of all children of school age, they were considered as truants and the school officials threatened to send them to reformatories maintained for criminially inclinded juveniles. Parents of such children have been prosecuted or were threatened with prosecution for cause such as alleged delinquency and if convicted, were subject to fine not exceeding $50.00 and a jail term not exceeding 30 days. That is why in the majority opinion it was stated: . . . The sole conflict is between authority and rights of the individual. The state asserts power to conditions access to public education on making a prescribed sign and profession and at the same time to coerce attendance by punishing both parent and child . . . Such a grave and embarrassing situation, however, does not obtain in the Philippines. True, we have a law (Republic Act 896) requiring compulsory enrollment of children of shcool age, but said law contains so many exceptions and exemptions that it can be said that a child of school age is very seldom compelled to attend school, let alone the fact that almost invariably, there is school crisis every year wherein the pupils applying for admission in public schools could not be accommodated, and what is equally important is that there is no punishment or penal sanction either for the pupil who fail to attend school or is expelled for failure to comply with school regulations such as the compulsory flag salute ceremony, or his parents. In the case of re Summers, 325 U.S. 561-578, decided on June 11, 1945, that is, two years after the decision in the case of West Virginia, the Supreme Court of the United States affirmed a decision of the Illinois Supreme Court refusing admission of petitioner Clyde Wilson Summers to the Illinois Bar. Summers had complied with tall the prerequisites to admission to the Bar of that state, but he was a conscientious objector who did not believe in the use of force or war because of his religious belief. He described this attitude of his as follows: The so-called "misconduct" for which petitioner could be reproached for is his taking the New Testament too seriously. Instead of merely reading or preaching the Sermon on the Mount, he tries to practice it. The only fault of the petitioner consists in his attempt to act as a good Christian in accordance with his interpreation of the Bible, and according to the dictates of his conscience. We respectfully submit that the profession of law does nt shut its gates to persons who have qualified in all other respects even when they follow in the footsteps of that Great Teacher of mankind who delivered the Sermon on the Mount. We respectfully submit that under our Constitutional guarantees even good Christians who have met all the requirements for the admission to the bar may be admitted to practice law The Constitution of Illinois required service in the militia in time of war of men of petitioner's age group. The Federal Supreme Court defined the position of Summers as a conscientious objector in the following words: . . . without detailing petitioner's testimony before the Committee or his subsequent statments in the record, his position may be compendiously stated as one of non-violence. Petitioner will not serve in the armed forces. While he recognizes a difference between the military and police forces, he would not act in the latter to coerce threatened violations. Petitioner would not use force to meet aggression against himself or his family, no matter how aggravated or whether or not carrying a danger of bodily harm to himself or others. He is a believer in passive resistance. We need to consider only his attitude toward service in the armed forces. It was not denied that Summers was unwilling to serve in the militia of Illinois because of his religious belief. In affirming the decision of the Illinois Supreme Court excluding Summers from the practice of law in that state, the Federal Supreme Court held that the action of the State Supreme Court did not violate the principle of religious freedom contained in the Constitution. If a man lived, say on an island, alone and all by himself without neighbors, he would normally have complete and absolute rights as to the way he lives, his religion, incuding the manners he practices his religious beliefs. There would be no laws to obey, no rules and regulations to follow. He would be subject only to Nature's physical laws. But man iis gregarious by nature and instinct and he gravitates toward community life, to receive and enjoy the benefits of society and of social and political organization. The moment he does this and he becomes a member of a community or nation, he has to give rights for the benefit of his fellow citizens and for the general welfare,

just as his fellow men and companions also agree to a limitation of their rights in his favor. So, with his religion. He may retain retain his freedom or religious belief, but as to practising the same, he would have to give up some of those practices repugnant to the general welfare and subordinate them to the laws and sovereignty of the State. In order words, the practice of religion or religious belief is subject to reasonable and non-discrminatory laws and regulations by the state. In the case of Prince vs. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 88 L. ed. 645, the United States Supreme Court affirmed a decision convicting Sarah Prince of a violation of the Child Labor Law of Massachusetts. Mr. Justice Rutledge who wrote the opinion tersely described the case thus: The case brings for review another episode in the conflict between Jehovah's Witneses and state authority. This time Sarah Prince appeals from convictions for violating Massachusetts' child labor laws, by acts said to be a rightful exercise of her religious convictions. When the offenses where committed she was the aunt and custodian of Betty M. Simmons, a girl nine years of age. . . . (Emphasis supplied) The defendant in this case allowed Betty, under here legal cutody who was at the same time niece, to distribute religious pamphlets intended to propagate the religion of Johovah Wiitness. The question involved was whether or not the law in question contravened the Fourtheenth Amendment by denying appellant freedom of religion and denying to her the equal protection of the law. Defendant claimed that the child was exercising her God given right and her constitutional right to preach the gospel and that no preacher of God's commands shold be interfered with. She rested her case squarely on freedom of religion. In affirming the judgment of conviction and upholding the law as agains the claiim of relgion and the exercise of religious belief, the court said: . . . And neither rights of religion nor lights of parenthood are beyond limitation. Acting to guard the general interest in youth's well-being, the state as parens patriae may restrict the parent's control by requiring shcool attendance, regulating or prohibiting the child's labor, and in many other ways. Its authority is not nullified merely because the parent grounds his claim to control the child's course of conduct on religion or conscience. Thus, he cannot claim freedom from compulsory vaccination for the child more than for himself on relgious grounds. The right to practice religion freely does not include liberty to expose the community or the child to communicable disease or the latter to ill health or death. . . . It is too late now to doubt that legislation appropriately designed to reach such evils is withinthe state's police power, whether against the parent's claim to control of the child or one that religious scruples dictate contrary action. Incidentally, it must be noted that this case was decided after that of West Virginia vs. Barnette, supra. In requiring school pupils to participate in the flag salute, the State thru the Secretary of Education was not imposing a religion or religious belief or a religious test on said students. It was merely enforcing a non-discriminatory school regulation applicable to all alike whether Christian, Moslem, Protestant or Jehovah's Witness. The State was merely carrying out the duty imposed upon it by the Constitution which charges it with supervision over and regulation of all educational institutions, to establish and maintain a complete and adequate system of public education, and see to it that all schools aim to develop among other things, civic conscience and teach the duties of citizenship. (Art. XIV, section 5 of the Constitution). It does nothing more than try to inculcate in the minds of the school population during the formative period of their life, love of country and love of the flag, all of which make for united and patriotic citizenry, so that later in after years they may be ready and willing to serve, fight, even die for it. It is well known that whatever is taught to the youth during this period, such as love of God, of parents, respect for elders, love of the truth, loyalty, honoring one's word and respecting the rights of other, becomes a habit or second nature that will remain with them always. School children of kingdoms and empires are taught early to respect and love the king or the emperor for these rulers and sovereigns symbolize the nation, and the children as future citizens or subjects will come to love their country. Petitioners do not question the right of public schools to conduct the flag salute ceremony regularly but they do "question the attempt to compel conscientious objectors guided by the word of God to salute the flag or participate in the ceremony to specific commandment of Jehovah God. It is perfectly proper and lawful for one nt bound by a covenant with Jehovah to salute the flag when that person desires to salute it. It is entirely wrong to interfere with that right or prevent such one from saluting the flag. Conversely, it is also true that it is wrong and illegal to compel one who, for concience' sake, cannot participate in the ceremony." (p. 85, Appellant's Brief)

The trouble with exempting petitioners from participation in the flag ceremony aside from the fact that they have no valid right to such exemption is that the latter would disrupt shcool discipline and demoralize the rest of the school population which by far constitutes the great majority. If the children of Jehovah Witnesses are exempted, then the other pupils, especially the young ones seeing no reason for such exemption, would naturlly ask for the same privilege because they might want to do something else such as play or study, instead of standing at attention saluting the flag and singing the national anthem and reciting the patriotic pledge, all of which consume considerable time; and if to avoid odions discrimination this exemption is extended to others, then the flag ceremony would soon be a thing of the past or perhaps conducted with very few participants, and the time will come when we would have citizens untaught and uninculcated in and not imbued with reverence for the flag and love of country, admiration for national heroes, and patriotism a pathetic, even tragic situation, and all because a small portion of the shcool population imposed its will, demanded and was granted an exemption. In a way that might be regarded as tyranny of the minority, and a small minority at that. In a few cases, such exemptions in a limited way have been afforded members of a religious group. Conscientious objectors in the United States who because of their religion were unwilling to serve in the war particularly as regards actual fighting or field duty, were allowed to do some work in relation to the war, but not involving combat duty or the use of force. But that was by special legislation. If that is possible here as regards exemption from participation in the flag ceremony, then petitioners would have to look to the Legislature, not the courts for relief. The freedom of religious belief guaranteed by the Constitution does not and cannot mean exemption form or non-compliance with reasonable and nondiscriminatory laws, rules and regulations promulgated by competent authority. As was said by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in h is dissent in West Virginia vs. Barnette, supra: The constitutional protection of religious freedom ... gave religious equality, not civil immunity. Its essence is freedom from conformity to religious dogma, not freedom from conformity to law because of religious dogma. Religious loyalties may be exercised without hindrance from the State, not the State may not exercise that which except by leave of religious loyalties is within the domain of temporal power. Otherwise, each individual could set up his own censor against obedience to laws conscientiously deemed for the public good by those whose business it is to make laws. (West Virginia State Board vs. Barnette, supra, at p. 653; emphasis supplied) In conclusion we find and hold that the Filipino flag is not an image that requires religious veneration; rather it is symbol of the Republic of the Philippines, of sovereignty, an emblem of freedom, liberty and national unity; that the flag salute is nt a religious ceremony but an act and profession of love and allegiance and pledge of loyalty to the fatherland which the flag stands for; that by authority of the legislature, the Secretary of Education was duly authorized to promulgate Department Order No. 8, series of 1955; that the requirement of observance of the flag ceremony or salute provided for in said Department Order No. 8, does not violate the Constitutional provision about freedom of religion and exercise of religion; that compliance with the non-discriminatory and reasonable rules and regulations and school disicipline, including observance of the flag ceremony is a prerequisite to attendance in public schools; and that for failure and refusal to participate in the flag ceremony, petitioners were properly excluded and dismissed from the public shcool they were attending. In view of the foregoing, the appealed decision is affirmed. The writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued is ordered dissolved. No costs. EBRALINAG v Division Superintendent Facts: Two special civil actions for certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition were filed and consolidated for raising same issue. Petitioners allege that the public respondents acted without or in excess of their jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion. Respondents ordered expulsion of 68 HS and GS students of Bantayan, Pinamungajan, Caracar, Taburan and Asturias in Cebu. Public school authorities expelled these students for refusing to salute the flag, singthe national anthem and recite the Panatang Makabayan required by RA1265. They are Jehovahs Witnesses believing that by doing these is religious worship/devotion akin to idolatry against their teachings. They contend that to compel transcends constitutional limits and invades protection against official control and religious freedom. The respondents relied on the precedence of Gerona et al v. Secretary of Education. Gerona doctrine provides that we are a system of separation of the church and state and the flag is devoid of religious significance and it doesnt involve any religious ceremony. The freedom of religious belief guaranteed by the Constitution does not mean exception from non-discriminatory laws like the saluting of flag and singing national anthem. This exemption disrupts school discipline and demoralizes the teachings of civic consciousness and duties of

citizenship.

WHEREFORE, defendant shall return to plaintiff the sum of P5,891.45 unduly collected from it. Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance Facts: These are motions seeking reconsideration of our decision dismissing the petitions filed in these cases for the declaration of unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 7716, otherwise known as the Expanded Value-Added Tax Law. Now it is contended by the PPI that by removing the exemption of the press from the VAT while maintaining those granted to others, the law discriminates against the press. At any rate, it is averred, "even nondiscriminatory taxation of constitutionally guaranteed freedom is unconstitutional."

Issue: Whether or Not religious freedom has been violated.

Held: Religious freedom is a fundamental right of highest priority. The 2 fold aspect of right to religious worship is: 1.) Freedom to believe which is an absolute act within the realm of thought. 2.) Freedom to act on ones belief regulated and translated to external acts. The only limitation to religious freedom is the existence of grave and present danger to public safety, morals, health and interests where State has right to prevent. The expulsion of the petitioners from the school is not justified. The 30 yr old previous GERONA decision of expelling and dismissing students and teachers who refuse to obey RA1265 is violates exerciseof freedom of speech and religious profession and worship. Jehovahs Witnesses may be exempted from observing the flag ceremony but this right does not give them the right to disrupt such ceremonies. In the case at bar, the Students expelled were only standing quietly during ceremonies. By observing the ceremonies quietly, it doesnt present any danger so evil and imminent to justify their expulsion. What the petitioners request is exemption from flag ceremonies and not exclusion from public schools. The expulsion of the students by reason of their religious beliefs is also a violation of a citizens right tofree education. The non-observance of the flag ceremony does not totally constitute ignorance of patriotism and civic consciousness. Love for country and admiration for national heroes, civic consciousness and form of government are part of the school curricula. Therefore, expulsion due to religious beliefs is unjustified. Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition is GRANTED. Expulsion is ANNULLED. AMERICAN BIBLE SOCIETY VS. CITY OF MANILA [101PHIL 386; G.R. NO. 9637; 30 APR 1957] Saturday, February 07, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes Labels: Case Digests, Political Law Facts: New Yorks Education Law requires local public schoolauthorities to lend textbooks free of charge to all students in grade 7 to 12, including those in private schools. The Board of Educationcontended that said statute was invalid and violative of the State and Federal Constitutions. An order barring the Commissioner of Education (Allen) from removing appellants members from office for failure to comply with the requirement and an order preventing the use of state funds for the purchase of textbooks to be lent to parochial schools were sought for. The trial court held the statute unconstitutional. The Appellate Division reversed the decision and dismissed the complaint since the appellant have no standing. The New York Court of Appeals, ruled that the appellants have standing but the law is not unconstitutional.

Issue: Does sales tax on bible sales violative of religious freedom?

Held: No. The Court was speaking in that case of a license tax, which, unlike an ordinary tax, is mainly for regulation. Its imposition on the press is unconstitutional because it lays a prior restraint on the exercise of its right. Hence, although its application to others, such those selling goods, is valid, its application to the press or to religious groups, such as the Jehovah's Witnesses, in connection with the latter's sale of religious books and pamphlets, is unconstitutional. As the U.S. Supreme Court put it, "it is one thing to impose a tax on income or property of a preacher. It is quite another thing to exact a tax on him for delivering a sermon." The VAT is, however, different. It is not a license tax. It is not a tax on the exercise of a privilege, much less a constitutional right. It is imposed on the sale, barter, lease or exchange of goods or properties or the sale or exchange of services and the lease of properties purely for revenue purposes. To subject the press to its payment is not to burden the exercise of its right any more than to make the press pay income tax or subject it to general regulation is not to violate its freedom under the Constitution Estrada vs. Escritor? Facts: Alejandro Estrada wrote to Judge Caoibes, Jr., requesting for an investigation of rumors that respondent Soledad Escritor, court interpreter in said court, is living with a man not her husband. They allegedly have a child of eighteen to twenty years old. He filed the charge against Escritor as he believes that she is committing an immoral act that tarnishes the image of the court, thus she should not be allowed to remain employed therein as it might appear that the court condones her act.

Issue: Whether or Not the said ordinances are constitutional and valid (contention: it restrains the free exercise and enjoyment of the religious profession and worship of appellant).

Issue: What is the doctrine of benevolent neutrality? Is respondent entitled thereto? Is the doctrine of benevolent neutrality consistent with the free exercise clause?

Held: Section 1, subsection (7) of Article III of the Constitution, provides that: (7) No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, and the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discriminationor preference, shall forever be allowed. No religion test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights. The provision aforequoted is a constitutional guaranty of the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, which carries with it the right to disseminate religious information. It may be true that in the case at bar the price asked for the bibles and other religious pamphlets was in some instances a little bit higher than the actual cost of the same but this cannot mean that appellant was engaged in the business or occupation of selling said "merchandise" for profit. For this reason. The Court believe that the provisions of City of Manila Ordinance No. 2529, as amended, cannot be applied to appellant, for in doing so it would impair its free exercise and enjoyment of its religious profession and worship as well as its rights of dissemination of religious beliefs. With respect to Ordinance No. 3000, as amended, the Court do not find that it imposes any charge upon the enjoyment of a right granted by the Constitution, nor tax the exercise of religious practices. It seems clear, therefore, that Ordinance No. 3000 cannot be considered unconstitutional, however inapplicable to said business,trade or occupation of the plaintiff. As to Ordinance No. 2529 of the City of Manila, as amended, is also not applicable, so defendant is powerless to license or tax the business of plaintiff Society.

Held: Benevolent neutrality recognizes that government must pursue its secular goals and interests but at the same time strives to uphold religious liberty to the greatest extent possible within flexible constitutional limits. Thus, although the morality contemplated by laws is secular, benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does not offend compelling state interests. It still remains to be seen if respondent is entitled to such doctrine as the state has not been afforded the chance has demonstrate the compelling state interest of prohibiting the act of respondent, thus the case is remanded to the RTC.

Benevolent neutrality is inconsistent with the Free Exercise Clause as far as it prohibits such exercise given a compelling state interest. It is the respondents stance that her conjugal arrangement is not immoral and punishable as it comes within the scope of free exercise protection. Should the Court prohibit and punish her conduct where it is protected by the Free Exercise Clause, the Courts action would be an unconstitutional encroachment of her right to religious freedom. We cannot therefore simply take a passing look at respondents claim of religious freedom, but must instead apply the compelling state interest test. The government must be heard on the issue as it has not been given an opportunity to discharge its burden of demonstrating the states compelling interest which can override respondents religious belief and practice.