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Index
Index ......................................................................................................................... 1 ***1AC*** ............................................................................................................... 2 South Korea 1AC Inherency [1/2] ......................................................................... 3 South Korea 1AC Inherency [2/2] ......................................................................... 4 South Korea 1AC North Korea [1/6] ..................................................................... 5 South Korea 1AC North Korea [2/6] ..................................................................... 6 South Korea 1AC North Korea [3/6] ..................................................................... 7 South Korea 1AC North Korea [4/6] ..................................................................... 8 South Korea 1AC North Korea [5/6] ..................................................................... 9 South Korea 1AC North Korea [6/6] ................................................................... 10 South Korea 1AC Plan Text [1/1] ........................................................................ 11 South Korea 1AC Regionalism [1/6] ................................................................... 12 South Korea 1AC Regionalism [2/6] ................................................................... 13 South Korea 1AC Regionalism [3/6] ................................................................... 14 South Korea 1AC Regionalism [4/6] ................................................................... 15 South Korea 1AC Regionalism [5/6] ................................................................... 16 South Korea 1AC Regionalism [6/6] ................................................................... 17 South Korea 1AC Solvency [1/4] ........................................................................ 18 South Korea 1AC Solvency [2/4] ........................................................................ 19 South Korea 1AC Solvency [3/4] ........................................................................ 20 South Korea 1AC Solvency [4/4] ........................................................................ 21

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***1AC***

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South Korea 1AC Inherency [1/2]

Contention One Inherency

The United States has 28,500 troops in South Korea, and Obama is committed to keeping the military presence there. AP 5/24/10, U.S. backs South Korea in punishing North, MSNBC, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/37309788/ The Obama administration endorsed Lee's demand that "North Korea immediately apologize and punish those responsible for the attack, and, most importantly, stop its belligerent and threatening behavior." Seoul can continue to count on the full backing of the United States, it said. "U.S. support for South Korea's
defense is unequivocal, and the president has directed his military commanders to coordinate closely with their Republic of Korea counterparts to ensure readiness and to deter future aggression," the White House said. Pentagon

The U.S. has 28,500 troops in South Korea a major sore point for the North as
spokesman Bryan Whitman did not give a date for the exercises but said they will be in the "near future." well as 47,000 troops in Japan.

Recent North Korean attacks show the instability and willingness to start conflict. Scott Snyder is Director of The Asia Foundations Center for US-Korea Policy, Adjunct Senior Fellow for Korean Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, and author of Chinas Rise and the Two Koreas: Politics, Economic, Security. June 2010, http://www.cfr.org/publication/22363/cheonan_reckoning.html#) The verdict by an international team of investigators that it was a North Korean torpedo that sank South Koreas corvette, the Cheonan, on March 26 in waters near South Koreas Northern Limit Line (NLL) has become the catalyst for a worrisome near-term escalation of inter-Korean tensions, and has stimulated
closer international scrutiny regarding North Koreas internal stability. It has also become a litmus test of Chinese policy that will require a judgment at the UN Security Council. The initial

announcement of the investigation result triggered a rhetorical spiral that rolled back almost every reconciliatory measure that had taken place during ten years of inter-Korean rapprochement, with the notable exception of the Kaesong Industrial Zone, a zone in North Korea that hosts South Korean manufacturing plants and employees. A spokesman for North Koreas National Defense Commission (NDC) immediately and strongly denied any culpability, offering to send its own investigation team to review the
evidence, and threatening all out war in response to unspecified retaliatory measures by South Korea.

Seouls response South Korean President Lee Myung-Bak announced on May 24 a wide range of countermeasures, including: the curtailment of inter-Korean trade and exchanges; resumption of anti-North Korea propaganda activities along the DMZ (demilitarized zone); a halt to the transit of North Korean ships through South Korean waters that had been allowed for
almost a decade as part of the Sunshine Policy of previous South Korean administrations; pledges to pursue proactive deterrence in response to future North Korean provocations; and, an effort to obtain the censure of

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South Korea 1AC Inherency [2/2]

North Korea at the UN Security Council. The

North Korean counter- response branded Lee a traitor and criticized him for undermining the interKorean summit agreements made under former South Korean Presidents Kim Dae Jung and Roh
Moo-hyun. The North also threatened to shoot at South Korean loudspeakers and kicked out eight South Korean officials resident at the Kaesong Industrial Zone. Inter-Korean relations are now back to where they stood in the mid-1990s prior to the initiation of Kim Dae Jungs Sunshine Policy, with the ironic exception of the Kaesong Industrial Zone. The establishment of the Kaesong Industrial Zone had been a target of criticism among some South Koreans on the grounds that it provided the regime cash. Ironically, these critiques also explain Kaesongs survival to date: North Korea needs the estimated $30-40 million per year that it earns from a 40,000 person workforce for which there are no equivalent replacement jobs in the North, while the South Korea would have to pay out millions of dollars in damages to South Korean companies in the event of closure. These

factors raise the cost to both sides of further escalatory measures involving Kaesong, including the possibility that the North might close the zone and hold hundreds of South Korean managers there hostage. The next test
will be if North Korea follows through on threats to close down the complex if South Korea resumes transmission of propaganda via loudspeakers along the DMZ. The

effects of the escalatory measures taken thus far are equivalent to the removal of the guardrails from a twisting mountain highway: the road itself is actually no more dangerous than before (i.e., both Koreas are equally committed to avoiding a full-scale military
conflict, since North Korea knows that full-scale escalation would be suicidal while South Korea cannot afford the devastation), but

the probability and potential costs that might occur in the event of miscalculation or risk-taking are considerably higher. Is the
Pyongyang regime stable? The incident has fed a steady stream of speculation regarding North Koreas internal stability and the potential internal challenges to managing a leadership succession from Kim Jong-Il to his third son, Kim Jung-Un. It is plausible to imagine a link between the sinking of the Cheonan and the succession, but such a connection will be impossible to prove given the limits of our knowledge of Pyongyangs court politics. More importantly, the Cheonan incident provides an opportunity for deeper evaluation of North Koreas increasingly bleak mid-to-long-term prospects. The

near-universal perception of Kim Jong Il as representing an unstable, unpredictable, financiallytroubled leadership focused short-term survival measures further tilts the focus of discussion toward crisis management and away from diplomacy, despite the reluctance of Beijing in particular to take up instability issues as an agenda item for
official discussion with the US, Japan and South Korea. The gap between simple leadership succession difficulties and a full-scale collapse of the North Korean system may be bigger than many analysts have anticipated. The temporary uncertainties surrounding succession are difficult to differentiate from early signs of instability that might affect regime viability. More importantly, North Koreas neighbors are likely to have differing views regarding regime stability and the potential thresholds for intervention to stabilize the situation. For

instance, if one views signs of instability in the context of a leadership succession as temporary and manageable, one might be more likely to emphasize a passive response, but signs of a prolonged and contested leadership succession might suggest to some the need for proactive efforts to restore stability or to actively pursue Korean reunification.

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South Korea 1AC North Korea [1/6]

Contention Two North Korea The status quo in the Korean peninsula is inherently unstable the region is on the brink of war. Doug Bandow, 4/6/10 senior fellow at the Cato Institute. A former special assistant to President Reagan, he is the author of Foreign Follies: America's New Global Empire (Doug,An Unstable Rogue, http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=23144) In late March an explosion sunk a South Korean warship in the Yellow Sea.
After his government downplayed the likelihood of North Korean involvement, the Souths defense minister now says a mine or torpedo might have been involved. A torpedo would mean a North Korean submarine actively targeted Seouls aging corvette. The Republic of Koreas president, Lee Myung-bak, has attempted to dampen speculation by announcing his intention to look into the case in a calm manner. But the

possibility that Pyongyang committed a flagrant and bloody act of war has sent tremors through the ROK. Seoul could ill afford not to react strongly, both to protect its international reputation
and prevent a domestic political upheaval. All economic aid to and investment in the North would end. Diplomatic talks would be halted. Prospects for reconvening the Six-Party Talks would disappear. Moreover,

Seoul might feel the need to respond with force. Even if justified, such action would risk a retaliatory spiral. Where it would end no one could say. No one wants to play out that scenario to its ugly conclusion. The Yellow Sea incident reemphasizes the fact that North Korean irresponsibility could lead to war. Tensions on the Korean peninsula have risen after President Lee ended the ROKs Sunshine Policywhich essentially provided bountiful subsidies irrespective of Pyongyangs behavior. Nevertheless,
the threat of war seemingly remained low. Thankfully, the prospect of conflict had dramatically diminished over the last couple of decades. After intermittently engaging in bloody terrorist and military provocations, the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea seemed to have largely abandoned direct attacks on South Korea and the United States. Now we are no longer sure. Even

if the DPRK was not involved in the sinking, only prudence, not principle, prevents the North from engaging in armed instances of brinkmanship. And with Pyongyang in the midst of a leadership transition of undetermined length, where the factions are unclear, different family members could reach for power, and the military might become the final arbiter, the possibility of violence occurring in the North and spilling outward seems real. Such an outcome would be in no ones interest, including that of
China. So far the Peoples Republic of China has taken a largely hands-off attitude towards the North. Beijing has pushed the DPRK to negotiate and backed limited United Nations sanctions. But the PRC has refused to support a potentially economy-wrecking embargo or end its own food and energy subsidies to North Korea. There are several reasons for Chinas stance. At base, Beijing is happier with the status quo than with risking North Koreas economic stability or the two nations political relationship. Washington doesnt like that judgment. However, changing the PRCs policy requires convincing Beijing to assess its interest differently. The Yellow Sea incident could help. Apparently North Korean leader Kim Jong-il is planning to visit China. Speculation is rife about the reason: to request more food aid, promote investment in the North, respond to Beijings insistence that the DPRK rejoin the Six-Party Talks or something else? South Korea should propose its own high level visit to the PRC. The foreign ministers of both nations met in Beijing in mid-March and issued a standard call for resumption of the Six-Party Talks. But the ROK should press further, backed by the United States. Despite Chinas preference for

the status quo is inherently unstable. Doing nothing is worse than attempting to force a change in the Norths nuclear policies or ruling elites. Even under the best of circumstances there is no certainty about what is likely to occur in North Korea.
avoiding controversy,

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South Korea 1AC North Korea [2/6]

Politics in Pyongyang resembles succession in the Ottoman court, involving not only varying factions but different family members. A weaker Kim Jong-il is less able to impose his will on the military or hand over power to his youngest son, as he apparently desires. Although the DPRKs governing

its impossible to ignore the possibility of an implosion, military coup or messy succession fight. If North Korea continues to develop nuclear weapons, its actions could trigger two equally explosive responses: a military attack by the United States or decisions by South Korea and Japan to build nuclear weapons in response.
structures so far have proven surprisingly resilient,

War is coming now there have been two violent exchanges within a week the North is increasing provocations. Burton 11/4/10, Benjamin S., Increasing Tension on the Korean Peninsula, AllVoices, Nov. 3, 2010, http://www.allvoices.com/contributed-news/7222538-increasing-tensionson-the-korean-peninsula Nerves are on edge as reports are coming in of a violent exchange between the two rival nations, the second in less than a week. The South Korean military has reportedly fired on a North Korean fishing vessel that crossed the Northern Limit Line, prompting S. Korean state officials to tighten security in Seoul. This incident, unlike the previous engagement, involved an apparently civilian N. Korean vessel. S. Korean officials report that the N. Korean boat was
most likely in the area fishing for crab and other seafood mainstays in the regions abundantly populated western waters. An unnamed S. Korean military official says that 10 shots were fired at the fishing boat in the early morning hours on Wednesday; none intended to harm the ships crew. According to the same official, the shots

There is understandable concern from both the United States as well as South Korea in terms of the exchange, as the G20 summit, to be held in Seoul, is less than a week away. S. Korean President Lee Myung-bak addressed the state press briefly, in an attempt to assuage growing anxieties. "I don't think the North will try to do anything when leaders of the international community are meeting to discuss the world economy," he said. "I trust the North won't do anything but still we are fully prepared." The President said Wednesday. Expert on North Korean affairs at Seouls Dongguk Univeristy, Kim Yong-hyun, sees things slightly differently. "The North wants to show the world that military tension grips the Korean peninsula," he said in response to questions about the reportedly accidental exchange of land fire at the Demilitarized Zone last week. There is merit to what Yong-hyun says, as the land exchange was the first of its kind in nearly
were fired only after repeated warnings via loudspeaker were ignored. four years. The sea exchange marked the first time in nearly a decade that the South has fired on a North Korean

Relations have been cool at best in recent months, hindered greatly by the Souths accusation that the North is responsible for the sinking of the Cheonan, a military vessel on patrol in the Korean sea, in mid-March. The North denies responsibility for the attack and the deaths of the 46 sailors on board. The North has accused the South of psychological warfare, a claim made in response to the thousands of pamphlets pushed across the border aimed at destabilizing the communist regime by persuading the people of the North to overthrow perennial Glorious Leader, Kim Jong-Il.
maritime vessel.

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South Korea 1AC North Korea [3/6]

Although the North has a history of petty instances of provocation during times of global and/or regional paradigm shifts, these most recent incidents are particularly concerning. Only a few months ago, in an apparent show of force, both the US and South Korean navies conducted war games exercises in the Korean Sea. The North is also a known ally of Iran, and provided nuclear material along with
Russia, to aid in Irans nuclear ambitions.

North Korea will continue provocations, with the US being drawn into a nuclear war deterrence fails. Hayes 06, Peter, Professor of International Relations, RMIT University, Melbourne; and Director, Nautilus Institute, San Francisco, 10/4, The Stalker State: North Korean Proliferation and the End of American Nuclear Hegemony http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/0682Hayes.html
If as I have suggested, the DPRK has become a nuclear stalker state that seeks to redress past wrongs and use nuclear leverage to force the United States to treat it in a less hostile and more respectful manner, then the United States will have to ask itself whether continued isolation and pressure on the regime is more likely, or less so, to ameliorate stalking behaviours in time of crisis, when the risk of nuclear next-use becomes urgent. Like a repeat

the DPRK is likely to continue to use nuclear threat to stalk the United States until it achieves what it perceives to be a genuine shift in Washingtons attitude. Unlike an individual who stalks, there is no simple way to lock up a state that
offender, stalks another with nuclear threat. Currently, the United States has no common language for discussing nuclear weapons with the North Korean military in the context of the insecurities that bind the two sides together at the

Continued rebuffing of Pyongyangs overtures may lead to more nuclear stalking that is, the development of creative and unanticipated ways of using nuclear threats, deployments, and actual use in times of crisis or war. There are no grounds to believe that the DPRK will employ a US or Western conceptual framework of nuclear deterrence and crisis management in developing its own nuclear doctrine and use options. Indeed, US efforts to use clear and classical deterrent threats to communicate to North Koreans that if they do acquire WMD, their weapons will be unusable because any attempt to use them will bring national obliteration as Condoleezza Rice put it in her Foreign Affairs essay in 2000 serve to incite the DPRK to exploit this very threat as a way to engage the United States, with terrible risks of miscalculation and first-use on both sides.
Demilitarized Zone.

The sub incident proves that hardliners are in the drivers seat of North Koreas power transition this crisis uniquely risks nuclear conflict hardliners cannot be deterred. Chung Chong Wook, Prof at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, 6-1-2010, The Korean Crisis: Going Beyond the Cheonan Incident, http://www.rsis.edu.sg/publications/Perspective/RSIS0582010.pdf Sharply rising military tensions following the sinking of a South Korean naval corvette are creating a crisis in the Korean peninsula. It is not the first time that the Korean peninsula is engulfed in a crisis, but this one is different. There are good reasons to view the current crisis with grave concern. One is the nature of the crisis. 7

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South Korea 1AC North Korea [4/6]

The current imbroglio is not an unintended consequence of an accident. Nor was it an act of terrorism. It was what could be a carefully planned and well-executed act of war where a 1,200-tonne naval ship, the Cheonan, was blown into half, killing 46 soldiers at least that is the conclusion in South Korea. The Nuclear Factor After a month-long investigation, the
Seoul government announced that the ship was hit by a torpedo launched from a North Korean submarine. The evidence it produced included the tail part of the torpedo recovered from the bottom of the sea where the ship

President Lee Myung-bak, demand the Norths apology, announced a series of measures suspending all inter-Korea cooperation except in the humanitarian area. North Korea, which earlier denied its involvement, immediately cut off almost all land, air and sea lines of communications with the South. It warned that any violation was to be dealt with by the wartime laws. It also placed its armed forces on special alert. The two Koreas appear to be heading for a serious military confrontation. Another factor that adds to the severity of the current crisis is the nuclear capability of the North. Pyongyang is believed to have fissionable materials enough for up to ten plutonium bombs. Its two nuclear tests so far reinforced the possibility of all-out military flareup involving nuclear weapons. The nuclear logic could certainly apply for deterring a war, but North Korea has proven that the rational logic of deterrence may not necessarily hold. Such is the risk of dealing with a desperate country whose brinksmanship tactics often defy
sank. the strategic calculus of its neighbors. The drastic decline in the South Korean stock market is indicative of how the situation is perceived. Despite all these ominous developments, however, premature pessimism is not advisable. The China Factor The key in assessing the security dynamics in the Korean peninsula is China whose policy has consistently been to avoid any serious military conflict there. What China fears is the prospect of serious social and political upheavals, even short of an open war between the two Koreas which could trigger a massive inflow of refugees, mostly poor and potentially violent, into Chinas northeastern territory. Such a contingency might not only disrupt Chinas economic growth but could result in the emergence of a unified Korea under the auspices of the South and the expansion of the military presence of its ally, the United States, right on its border. This strategic value of North Korea as a buffer as well as the political and economic consequences of the loss of this buffer has been at the heart of the Chinese strategic thinking toward the Korean peninsula. Recently the Chinese government has accorded an even higher priority to this strategy as the political and economic situation in North Korea seemed to be headed toward a critical point. Kim Jong-Ils bout with a stroke last August and his poor health since then led to the abrupt efforts in Pyongyang to arrange power succession by his third son, Kim Jong-un, who at 27 years old, has little experience in running the country. The timing could not have been worse. A series of economic mismanagement including the failure of the currency reform last November made the government lose control over the market. This rising inflation led to incidences of open Power Struggle? Experts in Seoul now pay close attention to signs of power struggle in Pyongyang that is usual during a power transition and extreme economic deprivation. They are very sensitive to the report that the military, particularly the hardliners in it, have gained a predominant position and are pushing for a confrontational policy toward the South. Many of them speculate that these hardliners were behind the Cheonan incident as they had been behind the nuclear tests in 2006 and 2009. They point out to the recent reshuffle in the Norths military leadership which removed the moderates like Kim Il-Chul and promoted the hawkish generals. One of them was in charge of the naval revolts. fleet that the South believed was responsible for the torpedo attack on the Cheonan.

North Korean nuclear use triggers every impact it destroys the ozone layer, global agriculture, the economy, and the global nonproliferation regime. Peter Hayes and Michael Green, 10 - *Victoria University AND **Executive Director of the Nautilus Institute , -The Path Not Taken, the 8

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South Korea 1AC North Korea [5/6]

Way Still Open: Denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia, 1/5/10, http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/10001HayesHamalGreen.pdf) The consequences of failing to address the proliferation threat posed by the North Korea developments, and related political and economic issues, are serious, not only for the Northeast Asian region but for the whole international community. At worst, there is the possibility of nuclear attack1, whether by intention, miscalculation, or merely accident, leading to the resumption of Korean War hostilities. On the Korean Peninsula itself, key population
centres are well within short or medium range missiles. The whole of Japan is likely to come within North Korean missile range. Pyongyang has a population of over 2 million, Seoul (close to the North Korean border) 11 million, and Tokyo over 20 million. Even

a limited nuclear exchange would result in a holocaust of unprecedented proportions. But the catastrophe within the region would not be the only outcome. New research indicates that even a limited nuclear war in the region would rearrange our global climate far more quickly than global warming. Westberg draws attention to new studies modelling the effects of even a limited nuclear exchange
involving approximately 100 Hiroshima-sized 15 kt bombs2 (by comparison it should be noted that the United States currently deploys warheads in the range 100 to 477 kt, that is, individual warheads equivalent in yield to a range of 6 to 32 Hiroshimas).The

studies indicate that the soot from the fires produced would lead to a decrease in global temperature by 1.25 degrees Celsius for a period of 6-8 years.3 In Westbergs view: That is not global winter, but the nuclear darkness will cause a deeper drop in temperature than at any time during the last 1000 years. The temperature over the continents would decrease substantially more than the global
average. A decrease in rainfall over the continents would also follow...The period of nuclear darkness will cause much greater decrease in grain production than 5% and it will continue for many years... hundreds

of millions of people will die from hunger...To make matters even worse, such amounts of smoke injected into the stratosphere would cause a huge reduction in the Earths protective ozone.4 These, of course, are not the only consequences. Reactors might also be
targeted, causing further mayhem and downwind radiation effects, superimposed on a smoking, radiating ruin left by nuclear next-use. Millions of refugees would flee the affected regions. The

direct impacts, and the follow-on impacts on the global economy via ecological and food insecurity, could make the present global financial crisis pale by comparison. How the great powers, especially the nuclear weapons states respond to such a crisis, and in particular, whether nuclear weapons are used in response to nuclear first-use, could make or break the global non proliferation and disarmament regimes. There could be many unanticipated impacts on regional and global security relationships5, with subsequent nuclear breakout and geopolitical turbulence, including possible loss-of-control over fissile material or warheads in the chaos of nuclear war, and aftermath chain-reaction affects involving other potential proliferant states. The Korean nuclear proliferation issue is not just a regional threat but a global one that
warrants priority consideration from the international community.

The plan will give US leverage to force Chinese engagement. Emilson M, Espiritu. Commander, United States Navy, 3/15/2006, THE EAGLE HEADS HOME: RETHINKING NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY FOR THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION, submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree

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South Korea 1AC North Korea [6/6]

One of the challenges the current Administration faces according to Park, is the lack of strong policy coordination with China, in jointly leading the multinational diplomatic effort38 The U.S. might use their withdrawal from South Korea as leverage for China to pursue a more strategic role in the Asia Pacific theater. According to the 2006 QDR, the U.S. is in a favor of China playing a more
strategic role in the Asia-Pacific Theater. For China, The United States remains focused on encouraging China to play a constructive, peaceful role in the Asia-Pacific region and to serve as partner in addressing common security challenges, including terrorism, proliferation, narcotics and piracy. 39

China is uniquely key to North Korean denuclearization. Michael E. Hanlon, Senior Fellow at Brookings, and Stephen J. Solarz, Former Congressman, New York, 6/24/09 (A New North Korea Strategy,
http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2009/0624_north_korea_ohanlon.aspx

If there is hope of a more effective strategy, it must center on China, North Korea's only ally by treaty. Beijing has also become Pyongyang's major economic partner, accounting for three-quarters of trade with the impoverished country and providing its main supplies of petroleum. China enjoys unrivaled leverage in pressuring North Korea to desist from its recent provocations. But how
to rein in Pyongyang? It's a question that has bedeviled Presidents Clinton, Bush and now Obama. We have a fundamental problem. Like us, China is worried about a nuclear North Korea, concerned about the leadership succession process there and unhappy with the provocative actions of its troublesome ally. But it probably worries even more about the potential for North Korean collapse. It much prefers a buffer between its borders and American allies as well as U.S. military forces. And it abhors the idea of regional instability. North Korea's choic

The only real hope of getting North Korea to relinquish its nuclear weapons is to apply such significant economic pressure that the regime is forced to make a choice between economic collapse and the verifiable dismantling of its nuclear weapons and facilities. Such pressure would need to be accompanied by an offer of full political and economic normalization if Pyongyang agreed to abandon its nuclear program. The only country capable of applying such pressure is China.

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South Korea 1AC Plan Text [1/1]

Thus, the plan: the United States federal government should remove all its ground troops from South Korea.

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Contention Three Regionalism

US bilateral alliances are unsustainableAsian multilateralism is critical to regional stability Francis 06, Neil, former Australian Ambassador to Croatia and fellow at the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs Harvard University from 05-06, Fall 2006, Harvard International Review, For an East Asian Union: Rethinking Asia's Cold War Alliances, http://hir.harvard.edu/index.php?page=article&id=1586 the United States established bilateral military alliances in the Asia-Pacific intended to contain Soviet and Chinese communist expansion in the region. US security strategy now focuses largely on combating terrorism and denying weapons of mass destruction to so-called rogue states. It is a strategy that cannot be implemented with geographic mutual defense treaties formed to address conventional military threats. Furthermore, the United States has demonstrated in Afghanistan and Iraq that it is prepared to pursue its global security interests unilaterally, even at the risk of its political relations with traditional alliance partners. What happened over Iraq between the United States and its European allies could equally happen between the United States and its Asian allies over Taiwan or North Korea with serious consequences for the interests of countries in that region. East Asian powers need to develop a collective security strategy for the region that does not rely on the United States participation. Prudence suggests that East Asian countries need to take the opportunity offered by the recently inaugurated East Asian Summit (EAS) to begin the process of developing an East Asian community as the first step toward the realization of an East Asian Union. This will occur only if led by
At the conclusion of the Second World War, a strong, proactive Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). China is now the worlds second-largest economy, almost two-thirds as large as the United States in terms of domestic purchasing power. In 2005 China overtook Japan to become the worlds third-largest exporter of goods and services. In 2004 it was the third-largest trading partner with ASEAN; the second largest with Japan, Australia, and India; and the largest with the Republic of Korea. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) has estimated that in 2004, in purchasing power parity dollar terms, Chinas military expenditure was US$161.1 billion, the second highest in the world. The Pentagon has estimated that in 2005 Chinas military expenditure was two to three times larger than its official figure of US$29.9 billion. Chinas growing economic and military strength along with the United States preoccupation with its new security

since September 11, bilateral military alliances have become less relevant to US security interests, and the United States will likely reduce its military presence in the East Asian region. Parts of Asia believe that Chinese hegemonic aspirations for East Asia could emerge if the United States were to disengage from the region. Fear of China and the possibility that it harbors hegemonic aspirations were among the factors that led to the creation of ASEAN in 1967 and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in 1993. Engaging China in an East Asian union in the
agenda has made some East Asian countries increasingly apprehensive. Particularly

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future would ensure it will pay a high price in loss of trade and investment if it acts against the interests of the unions other members.
Prospects for an East Asian CommunityIn December 2005 ASEAN hosted an inaugural East Asian Summit in Kuala Lumpur. The summit involved the 10 ASEAN countries; the ASEAN+3 countries of China, Japan, and South Korea; as well as Australia, New Zealand, and India. The summit declaration of December 14, 2005, described the meeting as a forum for dialogue on broad strategic, political and economic issues of common interest and concern with the aim of promoting peace, stability and economic prosperity in East Asia. The declaration also noted that the summit could play a significant role in community building in this region.ASEAN would work in partnership with the other participants of the East Asian Summit, but ASEAN was to retain leadership, preventing control of East Asian community building by either the ASEAN+3 countries, which China could dominate, or the 16 EAS countries, which some felt could steer the EAS toward what would be an unwelcome Western agenda. It remains to be seen whether an East Asian community can emerge under ASEAN leadership. ASEAN is an association: it is not a strong regional institution with common interests and objectives. It reflects the diversity of its membership, which has traditionally preferred an unstructured organization, a consensus approach to decision making, and avoidance of controversial issues or intervention in the affairs of its members.The ASEAN Way under ChallengeASEANs ways, however, may be changing. Since the late 1990s ASEANs non-intervention principle has come under challenge. In 1997 ASEAN was faced with an Asian economic crisis triggered by currency speculators and in 1997 to 1998 with a regional pollution haze problem caused by illegal land-clearance fires in Indonesia. ASEANs ineffectiveness in these crises brought internal scrutiny to bear on ASEANs policy of non-intervention in domestic affairs. As a result, since 1999 ASEAN foreign ministers have discussed these and other transnational problemsillegal migration, terrorism, and the drug tradethat call for collective responses. They have also considered allowing ASEAN to oversee electoral and governance processes within member states.In 1999 a number of ASEAN countries defied the long-standing ASEAN position that East Timor was an internal matter for Indonesia and sent peace-keeping forces to the island to help quell the violence instigated there by anti-independence militia backed by Indonesian armed forces. In 2005 ASEAN placed public pressure on the government of Myanmar to allow an ASEAN delegation to visit Myanmar and assess what progress had been made in human rights and democratization. With the aid of the United States and European Union, ASEAN also persuaded Myanmar to relinquish its role as ASEAN chair. ASEANs actions in the 1990s suggest increased sensitivity to the negative effects of individual member nations on the organizations international standing as well as the beginning of openness toward intervention in the domestic affairs of its members.Toward RealizationAt its December 2005 summit, ASEAN agreed to institute an ASEAN Charter by 2020 to provide what Malaysian Prime Minister Badawi has called a mini-constitution, a document that will establish an institutional framework for ASEAN as well as a legal identity recognized by the United Nations. The older membersBrunei Darussalam, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailandwant ASEAN to become something more than an association. Institutionally strong and mostly democratic, they might more readily welcome a rulesgoverned organization similar to the European Union. Others with institutionally weak, authoritarian governments, such as Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam, are wary of placing their domestic policies under greater international scrutiny and favor the status quo. If the former nations prevail it will augur well for the realization of an East Asian community with the potential to evolve into an East Asian Union.

An East Asian

community composed of the 16 EAS participants would represent more than 60 percent of the worlds population and possess a combined GDP greater than the European Union. It could provide significantly increased trade benefits to its members, help dampen SinoJapanese rivalry, ease the present tensions in the region over Japans Pacific War, encourage more cooperative attitudes toward the issue of natural resource exploitation in East Asia, promote engagement over containment, and prevent domination of the region by any major power. The determining factor will be ASEANs ability to provide the leadership necessary to create a strong,
independent East Asian Union.

Regionalism is low now because countries rely on the US only a decisive U.S. withdrawal can motivate sustainable regional security cooperation. Carpenter and Bandow 4 - * Vice President of Defense and Foreign Studies at the Cato
Institute, AND ** Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute (Ted Galen Carpenter, 12/2004, The Korean Conundrum: Americas Troubled Relations With North and South Korea, pg 160-161)DR

The security treaties with the United States and the U.S. troop presence allow the diversion of financial resources to domestic priorities. And relying on the United States for security avoids painful debates about what kind of policy those countries need to pursue. The U.S. security blanket is entirely too comfortable for Washingtons clients. Without a decisive move by the United States to take away that security blanket by a certain date, changes in the security posture of South Korea and Japan will be very slow to occur. Second, the United States should encourage the various nations of East Asia to take greater responsibility for the security and stability of their region. In limited and at times hesitant ways that process is taking place even without U.S. encouragement. ASEAN has begun to address security issues, most notably taking
an interest in the disorders in Indonesia that threatened to spiral out of control in the late 1990s and that continue

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to pose a problem. Australia assumed a leadership role in helping to resolve the East Timor crisis. It was revealing that Canberra became more proactive after the United States declined to send peacekeeping troops or otherwise become deeply involved in that situation. 37 According

to the conventional wisdom that U.S. leadership is imperative lest allies and client states despair and fail to deal with regional security problems, Australias actions suggest just the opposite. When countries in a region facing a security problem cannot offload that problem onto the United States, they take action to contain a crisis and defend their own interests. More recently, Australia has developed a more defined
and robust regional strategy. In a June 2003 speech, Foreign Minister Alexander Downer stated that Australia would not necessarily turn to the United Nations before acting in crises that could affect its security. Instead, Canberra was prepared to join and sometimes even lead coalitions of the willing to address urgent regional challenges. Downer spoke as Australia prepared to send 2,000 police officers and supporting military personnel to the Solomon Islands, which had experienced such an epidemic of violence and corruption that it verged on being a failed state. Earlier, Prime Minister John Howard had told Australian lawmakers that having failed states in its neighborhood threatened Australias interests, because such states could become havens for criminals and political extremists. 38 Perhaps most revealing, the Australian government plans to double its defense spending over the next three years with the intent of becoming a much more serious military player. 39 Third, Washington should indicate to Tokyo that it no longer objects to Japans assuming a more active political and military posture in East Asia. Quite the contrary, U.S. officials ought to adopt the position that, as the principal indigenous great power, Japan will be expected to help stabilize East Asia, contribute to the resolution of disputes, and contain disruptive or expansionist threats that might emerge. Washington also should use its diplomatic influence to encourage political and security cooperation between Japan and its neighbors, but U.S.

policymakers must not let East Asian apprehension about a more assertive Japan dictate American policy and keep the United States in its role as regional policeman. It is reasonable to explore with Tokyo avenues of cooperation in those areas where there is a sufficient convergence of interests. That cooperation should not, however, take the form of a new alliance. Proposals to reform and strengthen the alliance are unwise. 40 They will perpetuate Japans unhealthy dependence on the United States even as they arouse Chinas suspicions of a U.S.Japanese attempt to contain the Peoples Republic. An ongoing security dialogue and occasional joint
military exercises would be more appropriate than a formal alliance for East Asias security needs in the twentyfirst century. Elaborate, formal treaty commitments are a bad idea in general. They are excessively rigid and can lock the United States into commitments that may make sense under one set of conditions but become ill-advised or even counterproductive when conditions change. Beyond that general objection, a U.S.Japanese alliance would be likely to create special problems in the future. Such an alliance would provide tangible evidence to those in the Peoples Republic who contend that Washington is intent on adopting a containment policy directed against China. 41 The

United States should retain the ability to work with Japan and other powers if Beijings ambitions threaten to lead to Chinese dominance of the region, but Washington must be wary of creating a self-fulfilling prophecy. An informal security relationship with Japan would preserve the flexibility to block Chinas hegemony, if that danger emerges, without needlessly antagonizing Beijing. America still can have a potent power projection capability with a reduced military presence based in Guam and other U.S. territories in the central and west-central Pacific.

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American forces based in South Korea mean the US will always control South Korean foreign policy that makes regionalism impossible. Bandow and Carpenter 2004 *JD from Stanford, senior fellow at Cato, former special assistant to
Reagan, writes for Fortune, National Interest, WSJ, Washington Times, **PhD in diplomatic history from Texas, vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at Cato, contributing editor to the National Interest, editorial board of the Journal of Strategic Studies (Ted Galen and Doug, The Korean conundrum, Google Books, page 135, WEA)

So long as American forces are based in the South, Washington will seek to dominate and control the alliance. And for good reason: the United States has never and should
never promise to go to war on someone elses terms. If South Korea wants Americas aid, it must accept the conditions under which such assistance is offered. Real equality is simply impossible. Moreover, Seoul

cannot escape being tied to U.S. policy even if it is carried out beyond the Souths borders. Imagine the imposition of sanctions, enforcement of a blockade, or military strikes on the Northconducted by American forces located beyond South Koreas borders and acting outside of South Koreas borders over the objections of the ROK. North Korea is unlikely to distinguish the positions of the two members of the mutual defense pact and is likely to view the South as an appropriate target of retaliation. Specially, withdrawal will reduce Koreas veto of multilateral security mechanisms yielding a peace system on the peninsula that prevents great power war. Lee, 09 Seoul National University (December 2009, Geun, The Nexus between Koreas Regional Security
Options and Domestic Politics, www.cfr.org, JMP) Koreas Option of Multilateral Security Cooperation in Northeast Asia The idea of multilateral security cooperation in Northeast Asia is not a recent one. Since 1988, Korea

has advocated regional security cooperation, and in 1994, Korea officially proposed the Northeast Asia Security Dialogue (NEASED) at the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). Serious discussion of multilateral security cooperation in Northeast Asia started
in 2005 during the Six Party Talks to resolve the nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula. In fact, the Six Party Talks have been an important generator of innovative ideas, and participants in the Six Party Talks have gradually realized the importance of a multilateral security mechanism in Northeast Asia, even if they do not share identical interests in such a mechanism.6 From Koreas perspective, a semi-regional arrangement like the Six Party Talks produces five main benefits.7 First, a multilateral security arrangement in Northeast Asia composed of the United States, China, Japan, Russia, North Korea, and South Korea will provide insurance to the concerned parties that the agreements struck at the Six Party Talks will not be violated by the participants. Cheating and lack of trust are among the fundamental problems in solving the Korean nuclear crisis, and a multilateral binding of agreements can help solve the problems by increasing transparency and the transaction costs of violating the agreements.Second, a

multilateral security arrangement in Northeast Asia is fundamentally a global security arrangement, as it includes all the global powers except the E uropean U nion. The United States and China unofficially form the Group of Two (G2), Japan is an economic superpower, and Russia used to be the leader of the Eastern bloc. The high concentration of superpowers in Northeast Asia poses a threat to Korea because an outbreak of great-power conflict in the region will definitely devastate Korea, if not the world. Therefore, Korea has reason to promote a multilateral security mechanism that increases transparency among global powers and functions 15

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as a confidence-building measure. Third, voluntary or involuntary betrayal by the U nited S tates has preoccupied many Koreans and security experts. Some
Koreans felt betrayed when the United States agreed to the division of the Korean peninsula. The Park Chung-hee government felt abandoned when the United States withdrew a significant portion of U.S. soldiers from Korea, and was taken aback by rapprochement between the United States and China. Many Koreans got upset when the United States supported the authoritarian Korean government and kept silent during the Kwangju massacre in 1980. They again felt betrayed when it was rumored that the Clinton administration planned air strikes against North Korea without informing South Korea. And they were upset with the unilateral foreign policy stance of the

A multilateral security arrangement in Northeast Asia will mitigate the security concern of Korea when the U nited S tates either voluntarily or involuntarily defects from its commitment to Korea.Fourth, multilateral security cooperation in Northeast Asia is necessary to establish a peace system on the Korean peninsula and ultimately unify Korea. Many Korean people doubt that the major powers, including the United States, want the unification of the Korean peninsula. Korea wants to deal with these powers transparently through a multilateral security cooperation mechanism.Fifth, seeing the latest global financial crisis and the rise of China, many Koreans recognize the need to adjust Koreas external strategy to the changing geoeconomic world. Making exclusive ties with the U nited S tates may be a high-risk investment in a past hegemon, while exclusive ties with China would be a high-risk investment in an uncertain future. In this transitional period for geoeconomics, multilateral security cooperation is an attractive partial exit option for Korea. A multilateral security mechanism in Northeast Asia appeals to Korea, so if voice and loyalty in the U.S.-Korea relationship do not reveal positive correlations, then Korea will pay more attention to multilateral regional options. Moreover, if the U.S. capability and credibility in delivering its security promises to alliance partners are questioned, there will be fewer veto powers in Korean politics against a multilateral security mechanism in Northeast Asia, particularly when such an option still maintains a loose form of the U.S.-Korea alliance.
George W. Bush administration, including its decision to pull the second infantry division out of Korea.

Asian instability causes global nuclear war Landay 2k, Jonathan S., National Security and Intelligence Correspondent, Knight Ridder/Tribune News Service, 3-10, Lexis Few if any experts think China and Taiwan, North Korea and South Korea, or India and Pakistan are spoiling to fight. But even a minor miscalculation by any of them could destabilize Asia, jolt the global economy and even start a nuclear war. India, Pakistan and China all have nuclear weapons, and North Korea may have a few, too. Asia lacks the kinds of organizations, negotiations and diplomatic relationships that helped keep an uneasy peace for five decades in Cold War Europe. Nowhere else on Earth are the stakes as high and relationships so fragile, said Bates Gill, director of northeast Asian policy studies at the Brookings Institution, a Washington think tank. We see the convergence of great power interest overlaid with lingering confrontations with no institutionalized security mechanism in place. There are elements for potential disaster. In an effort to cool the regions tempers, President Clinton, 16

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Defense Secretary William S. Cohen and National Security Adviser Samuel R. Berger all will hopscotch Asias capitals this month. For America, the stakes could hardly be higher. There are 100,000 U.S. troops in Asia

the United States would instantly become embroiled if Beijing moved against Taiwan or North Korea attacked South Korea. While Washington has no defense commitments to either India or Pakistan, a conflict between the two could end the global taboo against using nuclear weapons and demolish the already shaky international nonproliferation regime. In addition, globalization has made a stable Asia, with its massive markets, cheap labor, exports and resources, indispensable to the U.S. economy. Numerous U.S. firms and millions of American jobs depend on trade with Asia that totaled
committed to defending Taiwan, Japan and South Korea, and $600 billion last year, according to the Commerce Department.

Strengthening the East Asian regional security architectureis key to solve terrorism, territorial disputes, disease, environmental degradation, and maritime security Nanto, 08 Specialist in Industry and Trade Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division for Congressional
Research Services (1/4, East Asian Regional Architecture: New Economic and Security Arrangements and U.S. Policy, www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33653.pdf)

A stronger regional security organization in East Asia could play a role in quelling terrorism by violent extremists. Since terrorism is a transnational problem, the U nited S tates relies on international cooperation to counter it. Without close multilateral cooperation, there are simply too many nooks and crannies for violent extremists to exploit.101 Currently, most of that cooperation is bilateral or between the United States
and its traditional allies. While the ASEAN Regional Forum and ASEAN + 3, for example, have addressed the issue of terrorism, neither has conducted joint counter-terrorism exercises as has the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Neither organization as a group, moreover, has joined U.S. initiatives aimed at North Korean nuclear weapons (e.g., the Proliferation Security Initiative). Meanwhile, tensions

continue across the Taiwan Strait, and disputes over territory and drilling rights have flared up between China and Japan and between Japan and South Korea. (For the United States, there is a growing possibility of nationalist territorial conflicts between two or more U.S. allies.102) The North Korean nuclear issue remains unresolved; North Korea has conducted tests of ballistic missiles and a nuclear weapon; and the oppressive military rule in Burma/Myanmar continues. Added to these concerns are several regional issues: diseases (such as avian flu, SARS, and AIDS), environmental degradation, disaster mitigation and prevention, high seas piracy, and weapons proliferation. Memories of the 1997-99 Asian financial crisis still haunt
policy makers in Asian countries. #These are some of the major U.S. interests and issues as the United States proceeds with its policy toward a regional architecture in East Asia. Since this policy is aimed at the long-term structure of East Asian nations, it can be separated, somewhat, from current pressing problems. A metric by which any architecture can be evaluated, however, is how well it contributes to a resolution of problems as they now exist or will exist in the future.

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Contention Four Solvency South Korea can defend itself US troops only act as a tripwire forcing the US to intervene, triggering nuclear war withdrawal solves. Doug Bandow, 1996, Robert A. Taft Fellow at the American Conservative Defense Alliance and a Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute, TRIPWIRE; Korea and U.S. Foreign Policy in a Changed World, pg. 8-10)
Military Dangers More important is the military risk of U.S. security ties. Although the

American commitment probably helps deter North Korean aggression, it ensures that the United States will be involved if hostilities should recur. Indeed, the 37,000 U.S. soldiers are a tripwire that makes intervention automatic. Although the risk of war seems slight at the momentin late 1995 famine in the North and political scandal in the South did raise tensionsthe consequences would be horrific. And the possible acquisition by North Korea of atomic weapons increases the potential costs exponentially. If a conflict erupted, perhaps over the nuclear issue should the current agreement with Pyongyang break down, the American troops would become nuclear hostages. There are obviously times when the
nation must risk war. But this is not one. There are no vital American interests at stake that warrant such a risk. The mere fact that the United States fought in Korea nearly 50 years ago does not mean it should prepare to do so again; the best way of honoring the sacrifice of so many soldiers in that war is to ensure that no Americans will be forced to fight and die in a similar future conflict. That is not to say that Washington has no interests at stake on the peninsulathe U.S.-South Korean cultural and economic ties are real, though modestbut they do not warrant a security guarantee and troop presence. In any case, America

no longer needs to provide a military commitment to secure its interests. South Korea is now fully capable of defending itself. So, why is Washington risking the lives of U.S. soldiers in
Korea? Put bluntly, would it dramatically affect American interests if war broke out on the peninsula and produced the worst-case scenario a North Korean conquest of the ROK? Since the Korean War killed an estimated 1 million Koreans and Kim Jong Il's regime is the last best replica of Stalinist totalitarianism, such a conflict and outcome would obviously be tragic.21 But

tragedy alone is not sufficient to warrant U.S. intervention, otherwise America would have invaded the USSR and, later, China to stop mass murder greater than that which occurred in Nazi Germany. America
would also have occupied Angola, Bosnia, Burundi, Liberia, Sudan, and a host of other smaller hellholes around the globe. While

moral concerns tug at our hearts, they are not enough to warrant committing 260 million Americans to war, risking unknown amounts of treasure and numbers of lives. In the case of Korea, we should ask, would U.S. security be seriously affected by a war (assuming no American tripwire was present to automatically trigger U.S. involvement)? No Threat to America The answer is no. Kim Jong Il's forces would pose no credible military threat to the United States. And, unlike the situation in 1950, a successful North Korean attack, highly unlikely given the South's capabilities, would be unconnected to a larger, hegemonic international threat to America. A united communist Korea
would lack the wherewithal even to threaten its closest neighbors, China and Russia. Given the low quality of the North's military, and Pyongyang's economic travails, as well as the intensified international isolation that would greet the DPRK as a result of renewed aggression, even

the unlikely worst-case scenario would be a tragedy confined to the Korean peninsula. A victorious North Korea would
face insurmountable difficulty developing the military capability to intervene overseas, against, say, Japan. Pyongyang's possible possession of nuclear weapons would rightly frighten Tokyo, but the lat-ter's development of a countervailing weapon, while unsettling to its neighbors, would deter any adventurism.

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Unilateral US withdrawal would reduce tensions with North Korea and trigger regional cooperation on denuclearization. David Lai, 2009, Prof of Asian Security Studies at the Strategic Studies Institute, Army War College, Obama's Policy Option on North Korea, http://www.chinasecurity.us/index.php?option=com_content&view=article &id=286
President Obama should see that the shortest route to the solution of the North Korean nuclear issue is the direct one between Washington and Pyongyang. Yet given the unending confrontations with North Korea, the United States also has to make a stop in Beijing. In addition, Obama should see that the reasons for the 6-PT still hold, and it is necessary to get the 6-PT back to work. Finally, the

president needs a realistic,

workable approach to North Korea.

China and Russia have long maintained that the North Korea problem is a remnant of the Cold War. They claim that it is a result of North Korea and the United States failing to make timely adjustments in their relations at the end of the Cold War (Russia and China normalized their relations with their Cold War opponent South Korea in 1991 and 1992 respectively). Thus, it follows that

North Koreas quest for nuclear weapons is an answer to its perceived security threat from the United States. Washington holds the key to the North Korean
issue, and it is time the United States stops letting emotions dictate its foreign policy and should deal with North Korea pragmatically. That being said, it is unrealistic to propose change to the US approach toward North Korea at the height of the current confrontation. But the time will come when the United States has to sit down with North Korea to find a way out.4 In the next round of negotiations, President Obama should offer North Korea a pragmatic approach to get the two nations out of this senseless agony. Here are the key elements of this new potential approach: First, we know that North Korea wants to settle its problems with the United States directly. However, North Koreas problems are ultimately Northeast Asian regional problems. Thus, the United States should deal with North Korea directly in the context of the 6-PT. That is, much like what former Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Christopher Hill did during the previous 6-PT, the United States can reach tentative agreements directly with North Korea in separate meetings and then bring in the other four parties to endorse these agreements and commit to their respective responsibilities. The United States should also
take a new action-for-action approach with North Korea. Unlike the previous approach, which required North Korea to freeze its

, the United States should take the initiative and ease North Koreas security concerns in return for North Korea freezing its nuclear weapons program. The US initiatives should include a peace treaty to conclude the Korean War, which would entail the withdrawal of US combat troops from South Korea and diplomatic recognition as part of normalizing
nuclear facilities first

relations with North Korea. Along with the normalization of relations, the United States should promote fullfledged exchanges with North Korea, most notably, economic trade and development, education and cultural exchanges. These are not revolutionary ideas. The

United States has reassured North Korea many times, verbally and in written form, in the Agreed Framework of 1994 and the 6-PT statements, that the United States respects North Koreas sovereignty, the United States has no intention of invading North Korea and the United States will normalize relations with North Korea when the time is right. All of these promises were made on the condition that North Korea abandoned its nuclear program first. The key this time is for the United States to be willing to make the first move. The United States should make no secret about
this pragmatic approach and what to expect from it. This would be an adjustment based on the reality that the United States has refused to face for a long time and not another concession. This

new approach

would fundamentally change the nature of the game and US-North Korea relations. By extricating itself from direct conflict in Northeast Asia, the United States would expect the nations in this region to take full responsibility in pursuing the goal of a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula. The United States would be declaring its
commitment to this goal and working with the involved parties to bring the nuclear weapon issue to a satisfactory conclusion. The United States came to the Korean Peninsula 60 years ago with the good intention of helping the Koreans; however, the situation has changed over time. The US military presence is now increasingly perceived as an obstacle to the Korean unification process. The withdrawal of US combat troops from South Korea is meant to remove this obstacle. Although the United States surely wishes the Koreans all the best in their unification efforts, at the same time, it wants to see this unification take place through peaceful means, not through war.

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Troop pullout is necessary to send a credible signal to the DPRK KIM JOHNG SOHN, 9. Tongail Korea Net, US Should Terminate Military Presence in S Korea As Early As Possible, 9-8, http://tongilkorea.net/2009/09/08/us-should-terminate-military-presence-in-skorea-as-early-as-possible/.
Pyongyang It has passed 64 years since the U.S. imperialists occupation of south Korea. If the United States persistently enforces its policy of military presence in south Korea, lending a deaf ear to the voices of the peoples of Korea and other countries of the world demanding the earliest withdrawal of the U.S. forces from south Korea, it will face bitterer rebuff and denunciation at home and abroad. The U.S. forces landing in south Korea was aimed at keeping it under its occupation and turning it into its colony, dividing Korea into two parts and using its southern half as a military appendage

The U.S. moves to seek its forces permanent presence in south Korea and bolster up its combat capability are a challenge to the demand of the times for the withdrawal of foreign troops and their trend. The U.S. should pull its forces out of South Korea as early as possible as demanded by international law and the times. The termination of the U.S. forces presence in South Korea would remove the basic factor of threatening the peace in Korea and the biggest hurdle lying in the way of national reunification. The pullback of the U.S. forces from south Korea would result in eliminating the most dangerous hotbed of war in the world and thus help create environment favorable for ensuring peace and security on the Korean peninsula and the rest of Asia and the world. How to approach the issue of the U.S. forces withdrawal from south Korea serves as a barometer judging whether the U.S. has a will to rectify its hostile policy towards the DPRK or not and whether it wishes to see Koreas reunification and peace or not. The world is waiting for the U.S. to make a
for executing its policy of aggression. switchover in its attitude.

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The plan empowers North Korean reformers and makes space for regionalism and denuclearization. Yasuhiro Izumikawa, 2004, PhD and candidate for the Keidanren Chair in Japanese Research, Miyazaki International College, Miyazaki, Japan, Fall 2004, The Korean Endgame, Pacific Affairs: Volume 77, No. 3 Among the few Westerners who have visited North Korea, Selig Harrison stands out for his intensive contacts with North Korean leaders, and he is one of the Western intellectuals most informed of the inner workings of North Korean politics. Based on his rich experiences, the author puts forward a provocative argument about how the United States can promote stability and peace in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia. This
book provides an insightful alternative strategy for US policy toward the region, although his opponents will remain unconvinced. The authors core argument is straightforward and controversial: the

United States should gradually disengage itself from the Korean Peninsula. According to the author, the current US policy that is designed to maintain a permanent US military presence in the Korean Peninsula is counter- productive to the stability of the region. Instead, he argues, the US military in South Korea should gradually withdraw from the peninsula in order to promote the reconciliation of the two Koreas and to solicit cooperation from the regional powers for the creation of a nuclear-free neutral Korea. The assumption that underlies the authors argument, although it remains implicit, is that domestic politics in North Korea play an equal or more important role in determining its external behaviour than international environments. In particular, he emphasizes the importance of nationalism in both Koreas. He points out that nationalism in North Korea remains strong despite economic hardships, and that perceived US military threats help North Korean hardliners exploit this nationalism to defend their preferred policies. In South Korea, on the other hand, the continuing US military presence is the source of rising anti-US nationalism, he argues. It follows that US disengagement would enable North Korean reformers to pursue more cooperative relations with the West, while alleviating anti-US sentiment in the South.

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