Vda. De Consuegra v.

GSIS - Retirement Insurance Benefits 37 SCRA 315 Facts: > Jose Consuegra was employed as a shop foreman of the Office of the District Engineer in Surigao Del Norte. > When he was still alive, he contracted two marriages: o First Rosario Diaz; 2 children = Jose Consuegra Jr. and Pedro but both predeceased him o 2nd Basilia Berdin; 7 children. (this was contracted in GF while the first marriage subsisted) > Being a GSIS member when he died, the proceeds of his life insurance were paid by the GSIS to Berdin and her children who were the beneficiaries named in the policy. > Since he was in the govt service for 22.5028 years, he was entitled to retirement insurance benefits, for which no beneficiary was designated. > Both families filed their claims with the GSIS, which ruled that the legal heirs were Diaz who is entitled to one-half or 8/16 of the retirement benefits and Berdin and her children were entitled to the remaining half, each to receive an equal share of 1/16. > Berdin went to CFI on appeal. CFI affirmed GSIS decision. Issue: To whom should the retirement insurance benefits be paid? Held: Both families are entitled to half of the retirement benefits. The beneficiary named in the life insurance does NOT automatically become the beneficiary in the retirement insurance. When Consuegra, during the early part of 1943, or before 1943, designated his beneficiaries in his life insurance, he could NOT have intended those beneficiaries of his life insurance as also the beneficiaries of his retirement insurance because the provisions on retirement insurance under the GSIS came about only when CA 186 was amended by RA 660 on June 18, 1951. Sec. 11(b) clearly indicates that there is need for the employee to file an application for retirement insurance benefits when he becomes a GSIS member and to state his beneficiary. The life insurance and the retirement insurance are two separate and distinct systems of benefits paid out from 2 separate and distinct funds. In case of failure to name a beneficiary in an insurance policy, the proceeds will accrue to the estate of the insured. And when there exists two marriages, each family will be entitled to one-half of the estate.

HELD: No. The conviction of adultery does not carry the accessory of civil interdiction. Article 34 of the Revised Penal Code provides for the consequences of civil interdiction: Art. 34. Civil Interdiction. Civil interdiction shall deprive the offender during the time of his sentence of the rights of parental authority, or guardianship, either as to the person or property of any ward, of marital authority, of the right to manage his property and of the right to dispose of such property by any act or any conveyance inter vivos. Under Article 333 of the same Code, the penalty for adultery is prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods. Article 333 should be read with Article 43 of the same Code. The latter provides: Art. 43. Prision correccional Its accessory penalties. The penalty of prision correccional shall carry with it that of suspension from public office, from the right to follow a profession or calling, and that of perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage, if the duration of said imprisonment shall exceed eighteen months. The offender shall suffer the disqualification provided in this article although pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless the same shall have been expressly remitted in the pardon. It is clear, therefore, and as correctly held by the CA, that the crime of adultery does not carry the accessory penalty of civil interdiction which deprives the person of the rights to manage her property and to dispose of such property inter vivos. BETTY LACBAYAN v BAYANI S. SAMOY, JR. G.R. No. 165427 March 21, 2011 FACTS: Bayani S. Samoy, Jr., despite being married, managed to cohabit and have a child with Betty Lacbayan. During their cohabitation, Samoy and Lacbayan established a man power services and acquired five parcels of land. When theyseparated, they decided to terminate the business and execute a Partition Agreement. However, Lacbayan wantedadditional demands and filed for judicial partition in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Quezon City. Samoy, however denied Lacbayans claim of cohabitation and said that the properties were acquired out of his own personal funds without any contribution from Lacbayan. To add, it was alleged that the said properties were registered in Samoy and Lacbayansname to exclude and to prevent the possible dissipation of the said properties from Lacbayans property regime with his wife. ISSUES: I. Whether an action for partition precludes a settlement on the issue of ownershipII. Whether the Torrens title over the disputed properties can be collaterally attacked. HELD:I.An action for partition does not preclude a settlement on the issue of ownershipAs held in Municipality of Bian v. Garcia, the determination as to the existence of co ownership is necessary in theresolution of an action for partition. Thus, the first phase of a partition and/or accounting suit is taken up with the determination of whether or not a co-ownership in fact exists, and a partition is proper.While it is true that the complaint involved here is one for partition, the same is premised on the existence or non-existence of co-ownership between the parties. Lacbayan insists she is a coowner pro indiviso of the five real estate properties based on the transfer certificates of title (TCTs) covering the subject properties. Samoy maintains otherwise. Indubitably, therefore, until and unless this issue of co-ownership is definitely and finally resolved, it would be premature to effect a partition of the disputed properties. More importantly, the complaint will not even lie if Lacbayan, does noteven have any rightful interest over the subject properties. II.A Torrens certificate of title cannot be collaterally attacked A Torrens certificate of title cannot be collaterally attacked, but that rule is not material to the case at bar. What cannot be collaterally attacked is the certificate of title and not the title itself. The certificate referred to is that document issued by the Register of Deeds known as the TCT. In contrast, the title referred to by law means ownership which is, more oftenthan not, represented by that document. Lacbayan confuses title with the certificate of title.

MAQUILAN vs. MAQUILAN Case Digest VIRGILIO MAQUILAN vs. DITA MAQUILAN G.R. No. 155409 June 8, 2007 FACTS: Herein petitioner and herein private respondent are spouses who once had a blissful married life and out of which were blessed to have a son. However, their once sugar coated romance turned bitter when petitioner discovered that private respondent was having illicit sexual affair with her paramour, which thus, prompted the petitioner to file a case of adultery against private respondent and the latter's paramour. Consequently, both accused were convicted of the crime charged. Thereafter, private respondent, through counsel, filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, Dissolution and Liquidation of Conjugal Partnership of Gains and Damages imputing psychological incapacity on the part of the petitioner. During the pre-trial of the said case, petitioner and private respondent entered into a COMPROMISE AGREEMENT. Subsequently, petitioner filed a motion for the repudiation of the AGREEMENT. This motion was denied. Petitioner then filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with the Court of Appeals on the ground that the conviction of the respondent of the crime of adultery disqualify her from sharing in the conjugal property. The Petition was dismissed. ISSUE: Is the conviction of the respondent of the crime of adultery a disqualification for her to share in the conjugal property?

Title as a concept of ownership should not be confused with the certificate of title as evidence of such ownership although both are interchangeably used. Ownership is different from certificate of title, the latter only serving as the best proof of ownership over a piece of land. The certificate cannot always be considered as conclusive evidence of ownership. Needless to say, registration does not vest ownership over a property, but may be the best evidence thereof. ELNA MERCADO-FEHR vs. BRUNO FEHR [G.R. No. 152716. October 23, 2003] PUNO FACTS: A petition for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity for inability to comply with the essential marital obligations under Article 36 of the Family Code was filed by petitioner Elna Mercado-Fehr against respondent Bruno Fehr before the RTC. The RTC declared the marriage between petitioner and respondent void ab initio and ordered the dissolution of their conjugal partnership of property and in lieu thereof established a regime of complete separation of property between the said spouses in accordance with the pertinent provisions of the Family Code. As a consequence of which, an order was issued declaring a condominium unit as the exclusive property of the respondent considering that the same was purchased by respondent with his exclusive funds prior to his marriage. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of said order alleging that the condominium unit was purchased on installment basis at the time when petitioner and respondent were living exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, hence the rules on co-ownership should apply in accordance with Article 147 of the Family Code. Resolving said motion, the RTC held that since the marriage between petitioner and respondent was declared void ab initio, the rules on co-ownership should apply in the liquidation and partition of the properties they owned in common pursuant to Article 147 of the Family Code. The court, however, noted that the parties have already agreed in principle to divide the properties and/or proceeds from the sale thereof proportionately among them and their children as follows: 1/3 for petitioner, 1/3 for respondent and 1/3 for the children. It also affirmed its previous ruling that the condominium unit was acquired prior to the couple's cohabitation and therefore pertained solely to respondent. The CA dismissed the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner for lack of merit. Hence, this petition. Hontiveros vs. RTC, Br. 25, Iloilo City [June 29, 1999] Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo Facts: December 3, 1990 spouses Agusto and Maria Hontiveros (petitioners),filed a complaint for damages against Gregorio Hontiveros and Teodora Ayson. Petitioners alleged that they are the owners of a parcel of land, in the townof Jamindan, Province of Capiz by OCT No. 0-2124, issued pursuant to thedecision of the Intermediate Appelate Court which modified the decision of theCoFI of Capiz, in a land registration case filed by Gregorio Hontiveros. Petitioners were denied of income from the land as a result of the filing of the land registration case. Rentals lost: 1968-1987 66,000 per year; 595,000per year after 1987. Answer filed by the respondent denied that they were married and it alsoalleged the Gregorio Hontiveros was a widower and Ayson was single. Theyalleged that the possession of the property in question had already beentransferred to the petitioners on August 7, 1985 by virtue of a writ of possession dated July 18, 1985. Since then, the petitioners have beenreceiving rentals from the tenants of the land. The answer also alleged that thecomplaint failed to state a cause action since it did not allege that earnestefforts towards a compromise had been made, considering that the Agusto andGregorio are brothers.

Respondent also contends that the petitioners claim for damages wasbarred by prescription with respect to claims before 1984, that there were norentals due since Gregorio was a possessor in good faith and for value; and thatAyson had nothing to do with the case as she was not married to Gregorio anddid not have any proprietary interest in the subject property. May 16, 1991 petitioners filed an amended complaint to insert thereinthe allegation that earnest efforts towards a compromise have been madebetween the parties but the same were unsuccessful. Answer of the respondent: denied the earnest effort that had been made toreach a compromise agreement but the parties were unsuccessful. July 19, 1995 petitioners moved for a judgement on the pleadings on theground that Gregorios answer did not tender an issue or that it otherwiseadmitted the material allegations of the complaint. November 23, 1995 trial court denied petitioners motion and dismissedthe case on the ground that the complaint was not verified as required byarticle 51 of the FC /opt/scribd/conversion/tmp/scratch2558/4689982.doc \ 3 o Art. 151. No suit between members of the same family shallprosper unless it should appear from the verified complaint or petition thatearnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the samehave failed. If it is shown that no such efforts were in fact made, the samecase must be dismissed.This rules shall not apply to cases which may not be the subject of compromise under the Civil Code. (222a)Issues:1.WON the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to rule on the case2.WON after denying petitioners motion for judgement on the pleadings, thetrial court could dismiss their complaint motu proprio for failure to comply withArt. 151 of the Family Code.3.WON Article 151 of the Family Code applies in this case.Ratio1. Yes Petition was filed pursuant to Rule 45 of the Rules of Court Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development Corporation vs. Court of Appeals Supreme Court is vested with the power to review, revise, reverse,modify or affirm on appeal or certiorari as law or the Rules of Court mayprovide, final judgements and orders of lower court in all cases in which only anerror or question of law is involved. When the appeal would involve purely questions of law or any of the othercases specified in Article X of the Constitution, it should be taken to the SC bypetition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rules 42 and 45 of the Rulesof Court.2. No Baja vs. Macandong court cannot dismiss a case motu proprio withoutviolating the plaintiffs right to be heard, except in the following instances: oPlaintiff fails to appear at the time of the trial oFails to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time oHe fails to comply with rules or any order of the court oCourt finds that it has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit. None of these exceptions appears in this case The trial court found that judgement on the pleadings in inappropriate notonly for the fact that respondent in their answer specifically denied the claim of damages against them, but also because of the rule that the party claimingdamages must satisfactorily prove the amount thereof TRIAL MUST BE HELD It is improper for the judge to render judgement based on the pleadingsalone. Factual issues have to be resolved: oAysons participation and/or liability if any oNature, extent and duration of Gregorios possession of thesubject property Trial Court erred in dismissing the complaint on the ground that it was notverified for which reason the trial court could not believe the veracity of theallegation.

 Absence of verification required by Art. 151 does not affect the jurisdictionof the court. Verification is merely a formal requirement intended to secure anassurance that matters which are alleged are true and correct. The court couldhave ordered the petitioners to verify them.3. No Art 151 does not apply because the suit is not exclusively among familymembers. Ayson is a stranger to the Hontiveros family. The phrase members of the same family refers to husband and wife,parents and children, ascendants and descendants, and brothers and sisterwhether full or half blood. Guerrero v. RTC brothers and sisters does not comprehend sisters-in-law Ayson and Maria Hontiveros are considered strangers to the Hontiverosfamily for purposes of Article 151 Taneo, Jr. vs. CA [March 9, 1999] Petition for review on certiorari of a CA decision Petitioners: Pablito Taneo, Jr., Jose Taneo, Nena Catubig & husband, Cilia Moring & husband Respondents: Court of Appeals & Abdon Gilig Facts: Lazaro Ba-a owned a land w/c he sold to Pablo Taneo, dad of petitioners onSept 18, 41 by virtue of an Escritura de Venta. July 19, 1951: Gilig & wife filed case for recovery of prop against Pablo. March 7, 1964: Pablo constituted house in ques erected on land of Plutarco Vacalares as family home but notarized only on May 2, 1965 & registered w/Register of Deeds on June 24, 1966. June 24, 1964: Judgment in favor of Gilig, ordering Pablo to pay Gilig P5kfor damages. Nov. 22, 1965: writ of execution issued against Pablos properties. Dec.1, 1965: Notice of Levy executed wherein properties in dispute wereamong those levied. One land was about 5 hec while the other was a familyhome. Both are located at Igpit, Opol, Misamis Oriental. Feb. 12, 1966: lands were sold in pub bidding where Gilig was highest bidder. March 2, 1966: Certificate of Sale registered w/ Register of Deeds. April 20, 1966: Rufino Arriola filed case vs Gilig for recovery of prop and/orannulment of sale w/damages. RTC & CA dismissed case declaring alleged saleexecuted by Gilig in favor of Arriola as null & void for being fictitious & executedin fraud of creditors. Feb. 9, 1968: petitioners failed to redeem land so final deed of conveyancewas executed, definitely selling, transferring & conveying prop to Gilig. Oct. 13, 1973: Pablos application for free patent on land in ques wasapproved. Such was unknown to Gilig. Patent & title were issued on Dec. 10,1980. Nov. 5, 1985: petitioners filed action to declare deed of conveyance void & quiet title over land w/ prayer for writ of prelim injunction. They alleged that:1.They were children & heirs of Pablo Taneo & Narcisa Valaceras who died onFeb. 12, 77 & Sept 12, 84 respectively.2.Prop acquired thru free patent & as such, its inalienable & not subj to encumbrance for payment of debt pursuant to CA No. 141.3.They continuously, openly & peacefully possessed lands until Feb. 9, 68when Sheriff Yasay issued deed of conveyance in favor of Gilig, including their family home w/c was extrajudicially constituted in accordance w/law.4.Gilig was able to

obtain tax declaration & such cast doubt over their title & ownership. Respondents contentions:1.he lawfully acquired properties thru sheriffs sale on Feb. 12, 66.2.sale became final as no redemption was made w/in 1 yr fr registration of certificate of sale.3.CA confirmed validity of sale in case, Arriola v. Gilig.4.Lazaro Ba-a, original owner of land, sold land to Pablo Taneo on Sept. 18,41 proven by an Escritura de Venta. Even if it was a priv land, Taneo filedan application for free patent w/c became final only in 1979.5.He presented counterclaim that petitioners still possessed land & thus hehas been deprived of acts of ownership & possession & prayed for paymentof rentals. RTC: dismissed. Declared null & void OCT & Free Patent underPablo Taneos name & directed Register of Deeds to cancel such. Likewisedeclare Gilig as absolute & legal owner of land & house in ques & is entitled to possess same & ordering petitioners vacate house & to refrain from disturbing Giligs peaceful possession. Ordered petitioners to pay reasonable rental. CA affirmed in toto. Petitioners invoke Sec. 118, CA No. 141, claiming that land underfree patent, such as land in dispute, cant be alienated or encumbered. CitedOliveros vs. Porciongcola and Gonzaga vs. CA. Ratio of law: give homesteader or patentee every chance to preserve for himself & his family land w/c State had gratuitously given to him as reward for his labor in cleaning & cultivating it. Issues & Ratio:1. WON land in dispute cant be encumbered pursuant to Sec. 118 of CA No.141-NO Intent of the law is clear as SC has ruled in Republic vs. CA: Homesteadlaws were designed to distribute disposable agricultural lots of State to land-destitute citizens for their home & cultivation. State prohibits sale/encumbrances/in 5yrs after grant of patent. Alienation is impliedly permitted after that 5-yrperiod. But such is subj to rt of repurchase by homesteader, his widow/heirsw/in 5yrs. It aims to preserve & keep in family of homesteader that portion of pub land State had gratuitously given to him. Rt to repurchase exists even if conveyance is made by his widow/heirs. But the prohibition in the provision does not apply to petitioners w/c provides that alienation/encumbrance of lands acquired under free patent or homestead provisions will not be allowed from date of approval of application & for a term 5 yrs fr & after date of issuance of patent/grant except in favor of govt or any of its branches, units or institutions or legally constituted banking corporations nor shall they become liable to the satisfaction of debts contracted prior to expiration period but improvements/crops on land may bemortgaged/pledged to qualified persons, assoc, corp. Meaning, prohibition onalienation begins on date of approval of application and it will end 5 yrs after the issuance of the patent (affirmed in Amper v. Presiding Judge). Thus, conveyance thru sheriffs sale was not violative of law because the judgment obligation of petitioners against Gilig arose on JUNE 24, 1964,properties were levied & sold on FEB. 12, 1966 and final deed of conveyance was executed on FEB. 9, 1968. But the application for free patent was approved only on OCT. 19, 1973. Meaning, prohibition on alienation only began on OCT.19, 1973 and lasted until Dec. 10, 1985 or 5 yrs after free patent was issued onDec. 10, 80, all of these took place after property was sold. In fact, when application was approved, Pablo was no longer the lawful owner & he no longer had rts over the prop that he could transfer to petitioners. Debts contracted prior to the application are not covered by the prohibition. 2. WON the family home was constituted by Pablo & thus exempt frexecution-NO Family home: dwelling place of a person & his family. Its a real rt w/c isgratuitous, inalienable & free fr attachment, constituted over dwelling place & land on w/c its situated. It confers upon family the rt to enjoy prop w/c mustremain w/person constituting it & his heirs. It cant be seized by creditorsexcept in special cases. CC Art. 224-251: Family home may be constituted judicially (by filingpetition & w/ court approval) or extrajudicially (recording of

pub instrument inproper registry of prop declaring establishment of family home). FC Art. 153: Registration no longer needed. Family homes deemedconstituted on house & lot fr time its occupied in the family residence & continues as long as beneficiaries actually reside therein. Its exempt frexecution, forced sale/attachment, except as provided & to extent of valueallowed by law. Petitioners claim that dad constituted home as early as 1964. But SC ruled in Manacop vs. CA: doesnt mean that Art. 153 hasretroactive effect such that all existing family residences are deemed to havebeen constituted as family home at time of their occupation prior to effectivityof FC & are exempt from execution for payment of oblig incurred pre-FCeffectivity. Proper interpretation would be that all existing family residences atthe time of FC effectivity are considered family homes & are PROSPECTIVELYentitled to benefits accorded to family home under FC. Thus, for debts incurredpre-FC effectivity, prop is not exempt fr attachment. Applicable law would be CC w/c required registration. CC provides for someinstances when family homes NOT EXEMPTED fr execution, forcedsale/attachment & among these is for debts incurred before the declaration wasrecorded in the Registry of Prop. Since money judgment/debt wasrendered/incurred on JAN. 24, 1964 before the house was erected on MAR. 7,1964 and instrument constituting it as family home was registered on JAN. 24,1966, the family home is not exempted fr execution or forced sale. Besides, constitution was violative of law since it was erected not on theland of Pablo but on land of Plutarco Vacalares. House should be constructed ona land NOT belonging to another. Shows that constitution was just anafterthought to escape execution of prop but to no avail. Held: Petition denied for lack of merit.