BLAS F. OPLE v. RUBEN D. TORRES etc.

, and CHAIRMAN OF THE COA Facts: The petition at bar is a commendable effort on the part of Senator Blas F. Ople to prevent the shrinking of the right to privacy, which the revered Mr. Justice Brandeis considered as "the most comprehensive of rights and the rightmost valued by civilized men." Petitioner Ople prays that we invalidate Administrative Order No. 308 entitled" Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference System" on two important constitutional grounds, viz :(1)it is a usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate, and(2)it impermissibly intrudes on our citizenry's protected zone of privacy. We grant the petition for the rights sought to be vindicated by the petitioner need stronger barriers against further erosion. A.O. No. 308 was published in four newspapers of general circulation on January 22, 1997 and January 23, 1997. On January 24, 1997, petitioner filed the instant petition against respondents, then Executive Secretary Ruben Torres and the heads of the government agencies, who as members of the Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee, are charged with the implementation of A.O. No. 308. On April 8, 1997, we issued a temporary restraining order enjoining its implementation. Issue: WON the petitioner has the stand to assail the validity of A.O. No. 308 Ruling: YES Rationale: As is usual in constitutional litigation, respondents raise the threshold issues relating to the standing to sue of the petitioner and the justiciability of the case at bar. More specifically, respondents aver that petitioner has no legal interest to uphold and that the implementing rules of A.O. No. 308 have yet to be promulgated. These submissions do not deserve our sympathetic ear. Petitioner Ople is a distinguished member of our Senate. As a Senator, petitioner is possessed of the requisite standing to bring suit raising the issue that the issuance of A.O.No. 308 is a usurpation of legislative power. 4 As taxpayer and member of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), petitioner can also impugn the legality of the misalignment of public funds and the misuse of GSIS funds to implement A.O. No. 308. The ripeness for adjudication of the Petition at bar is not affected by the fact that the implementing rules of A.O. No. 308 have yet to be promulgated. Petitioner Ople assails A.O. No. 308 as invalid per se and as infirmed on its face. His action is not premature for the rules yet to be promulgated cannot cure its fatal defects. Moreover, the respondents themselves have started the implementation of A.O. No. 308 without waiting for the rules. As early as January 19, 1997, respondent Social Security System (SSS) caused the publication of a notice to bid for the manufacture of the National Identification (ID) card. Respondent Executive Secretary Torres has publicly announced that representatives from the GSIS and the SSS have completed the guidelines for the national identification system. All signals from the respondents show their unswerving will to implement A.O. No. 308 and we need not wait for the formality of the rules to pass judgment on its constitutionality. In this light, the dissenters insistence that we tighten the rule on standing is not a commendable stance as its result would be to throttle an important constitutional principle and a fundamental right. 1 fshn bag---------------------------41.00 1 fshn bag---------------------------46.00 1 btr bag-----------------------------54.00 1 fshn bag---------------------------43.00 1 bernini bag------------------------51.00 3 wallets-----------------------------24.00 each 3 aero wallets------------------------8.00 6 aero spag---------------------------6.50 each aero shirts----------------------------6.00 each 1 cropped aero shirt-----------------9.00 1 tote aero bag---------------------12.00 1 bag white--------------------------80.00 1 bag---------------------------------49.00 1 bag---------------------------------44.00 1 juicy couture sunglass------------25.00 1 purple bag------------------------- 5.00 3 raglan------------------------------ 8.00 each 3 logo-------------------------------- 8.00 each Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB vs Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora

360 SCRA 718 Law on Public Officers Security of Tenure in a Public Office No Vested Right to a Public Office Power to Create and Destroy Public Office During the time of President Corazon Aquino, she created the Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau (EIIB) to primarily conduct anti-smuggling operations in areas outside the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs. In the year 2000, President Estrada issued an order deactivating the EIIB. He subsequently ordered the employees of EIIB to be separated from the service. Thereafter, he created the Presidential AntiSmuggling Task Force Aduana, which EIIB employees claim to be essentially the same as EIIB. The employees of EIIB, through the Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB, invoked the Supreme Courts power of judicial review in questioning the said orders. EIIB employees maintained that the president has no power to abolish a public office, as that is a power solely lodged in the legislature; and that the abolition violates their constitutional right to security of tenure. ISSUE: Whether or not the petition has merit. HELD: No. It is a general rule that the power to abolish a public office is lodged with the legislature. The exception is when it comes to agencies, bureaus, and other offices under the executive department, the president may deactivate them pursuant to control power over such offices, unless such office is created by the Constitution. This is also germane to the presidents power to reorganize the Office of the President. Basis of such power also has its roots in two laws i.e., PD 1772 and PD 1416. These decrees expressly grant the President of the Philippines the continuing authority to reorganize the national government, which includes the power to group, consolidate bureaus and agencies, to abolish offices, to transfer functions, to create and classify functions, services and activities and to standardize salaries and materials. Also, it cannot be said that there is bad faith in the abolition of EIIB. EIIB allocations has always exceeded P100 million per year. To save the government some money, it needed to abolish it and replace it with TF Aduana which has for its allocation just P50 million. Further, TYF Aduana is invested more power that EIIB never had, i.e., search and seizure and arrest. Lastly, EEIB employees right to security of tenure is not violated. Since there is no bad faith in the abolition of EIIB, such abolition is not infirm. Valid abolition of offices is neither removal nor separation of the incumbents. If the public office ceases to exist, there is no separation or dismissal to speak of. Indeed, there is no such thing as an absolute right to hold office. Except constitutional offices which provide for special immunity as regards salary and tenure, no one can be said to have any vested right in an office or its salary. NATIONAL ELECTRIFICATION ADMINISTRATION vs. VICTORIANO B. GONZAGA G.R. No. 158761 | December 4, 2007 Issue: Validity of Electric Cooperative Election Code. Ruling: T h e E C E C i s i n v a l i d . T h e E C E C a p p l i e s t o a l l e l e c t r i c cooperatives in the country. It is n o t a m e r e i n t e r n a l memorandum, interpretative regulation, or instruction tosubordinates. No proof was presented to show that it was published in OG or other newspaper of general circulation. Article 2 of the New Civil Code provides that laws shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, unless it is otherwise provided. E x e c u t i v e O r d e r N o . 2 9 2 , o t h e r w i s e k n o w n a s t h e Administrative Code of 1987 , reinforced the requirement of publication and outlined the procedure, as follows: Sec. 3.Filing. (1) Every Agency shall file with t h e U n i v e r s i t y o f the Philippines Law Center three (3) Certified copies of every rule adopted by it. R ules in force on the date of effectivity of this Code which are not filed within three (3) months from that date shall not thereafter be the basis of any sanction against any party or persons. (2) The Records Officer of the agency, or his equivalent functionary, shall carry out the requirements of this section under pain of disciplinary action. (3) A permanent register of all rules shall be k e p t b y t h e i s s u i n g a g e n c y a n d s h a l l b e open to public inspection. Sec. 4.Effectivity In addition to other rule-making requirements provided by law not inconsistent with this Book, each rule shall become effective fifteen (15) days from the date of filing as above provided unless a different date is fixed by law, or specified in this rule. Sec. 18.When Laws Take Effect Laws shall take effect after Fifteen (15) days following the completion of their publication in the O f f i c i a l G a z e t t e o r i n a n e ws p a p e r o f general circulation, unless it is otherwiseprovided.

Cario v. CHR, 204 SCRA 483 (1991) FACTS: On September 17, 1990, a Monday and a class day, some 800 public school teacher, among them the 8 herein private respondents who were members of the Manila Public School Teachers Association (MPSTA) and Alliance of Concerned Teachers (ACT) undertook mass concerted actions to dramatize and highlight their plight resulting from the alleged failure of the public authorities to act upon grievances that had time and again been brought to the latters attention. The respondents were preventively suspended by the Secretary of Education. They complained to CHR. ISSUE: WON CHR has the power to adjudicate alleged human rights violations RULING: No. The Commission evidently intends to itself adjudicate, that is to say, determine with the character of finality and definiteness, the same issues which have been passed upon and decided by the Secretary of Education and subject to appeal to CSC, this Court having in fact, as aforementioned, declared that the teachers affected may take appeals to the CSC on said matter, if still timely. The threshold question is whether or not the CHR has the power under the constitution to do so; whether or not, like a court of justice or even a quasi-judicial agency, it has jurisdiction or adjudicatory powers over, or the power to try and decide, or dear and determine, certain specific type of cases, like alleged human rights violations involving civil or political rights. The Court declares that the CHR to have no such power, and it was not meant by the fundamental law to be another court or quasi-judicial agency in this country, or duplicate much less take over the functions of the latter. The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e. receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and political rights. But fact-finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi judicial agency or official. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function, properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions to the end that the controversy be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and definitely, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law. This function, to repeat, the Commission does not have. Hence it is that the CHR having merely the power to investigate, cannot and not try and resolve on the merits (adjudicate) the matters involved in Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775, as it has announced it means to do; and cannot do so even if there be a claim that in the administrative disciplinary proceedings against the teachers in question, initiated and conducted by the DECS, their human rights, or civil or political rights had been transgressed. Case Digest on Secretary of Justice v. Hon. Lantion and Mark Jimenez G.R. No. 139465, October 17, 2000 November 10, 2010 overturning 322 SCRA 160 (Jan. 18, 2000) By virtue of an extradition treaty between the US and the Philippines, the US requested for the extradition of Mark Jimenez for violations of US tax and election laws. Pending evaluation of the extradition documents by the Philippine government, Jimenez requested for copies of the US extradition request. The Secetary of Justice denied that request. ISSUE: During the evaluation stage of the extradition proceedings, is private respondent entitled to the two basic due process rights of notice and hearing? HELD: Private respondent is bereft of the right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process. Extradition is a proceeding sui generis. It is not a criminal proceeding which will call into operation all the rights of an accused guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. The process of extradition does not involve the determination of the guilt or innocence of an accused. His guilt or innocence will be adjudged in the court of the state where he will be extradited. Dissent (original decision): Under the extradition treaty, the prospective extraditee may be provisionally arrested pending the submission of the request. Because of this possible consequence, the evaluation process is akin to an administrative agency conducting an investigative proceeding, and partakes of the nature of a criminal investigation. Thus, the basic due process rights of notice and hearing are indispensable. Assuming that the extradition treaty does not allow for such rights, the Constitutional right to procedural due process must override treaty obligations. When there is a conflict between international law obligations and the Constitution, the Constitution must prevail.

DELEGATION OF POWERS SOUTHERN CROSS CEMENT CORP. V.CEMENT MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATIONOF THE PHILS., G.R. NO. 158540, AUG. 3,2005 (HOLY CRAP, CHECK OUT THE INTRO!!!! ^.^) C e m e n t i s h a r d l y a n e x c i t i n g s u b j e c t f o r litigation. Still, the parties in this case havedone their best to put up a spirited advocacy of t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e p o s i t i o n s , t h r o w i n g i n everything including the proverbial kitchensi nk. At present, the burden of passion, if notp r o o f , h a s s h i f t e d t o p u b l i c r e s p o n d e n t s Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) andp r i v a t e r e s p o n d e n t P h i l i p p i n e C e m e n t Manufacturers Corporation (Philcemcor),[1] who now seek reconsideration of our Decision dated 8 July 2004 (Decision), which granted the petition of petitioner Southern Cross Cement Corporation (Southern Cross). This case, of course, is ultimately not just about cement. For respondents, it is about love of country and the future of the domestic industryi n t h e f a c e o f f o r e i g n c o m p e t i t i o n . F o r t h i s C o u r t , i t i s a b o u t e l e m e n t a r y s t a t u t o r y construction, constitutional limitations on theexecutive power to impose tariffs and similar measures, and obedience to the law. Just as much was asserted in the Decision, and the same holds true with this present Resolution. POWER OF PRESIDENT TO IMPOSE TARIFFRATES: Without Section 28(2), Article VI, the executive branch has no authority to impose tariffs and other similar tax levies involving theimportation of foreign goods. Assuming thatS e c t i o n 2 8 ( 2 ) A r t i c l e V I d i d n o t e x i s t , t h e en actment of the SMA by Congress would be voided on the ground that it would constitute an undue delegation of the legislative power to tax. The constitutional provision shields suchdelegation from constitutional infirmity, andshould be recognized as an exceptional grant of legislative po wer to the President, rather than the affirmation of an inherent executive power. QUALIFIERS: This being the case, the qualifiersm a n d a t e d b y t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n o n t h i s p r e s i d e n t i a l a u t h o r i t y a t t a i n p r i m o r d i a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n : ( 1 ) t h e r e m u s t b e a l a w; ( 2 ) t h e r e m u s t b e s p e c i f i e d l i m i t s ; a n d ( 3 ) C o n g r e s s m a y i m p o s e l i m i t a t i o n s a n d restrictions on this presidential authority. POWER EXERCISED BY ALTER EGOS OF PRES: T h e C o u r t r e c o g n i z e s t h a t t h e a u t h o r i t y delegated to the President under Section 28(2),Article VI may be exercised, in accordance with legislative sanction, by the alter egos of the P r e s i d e n t , s u c h a s d e p a r t m e n t s e c r e t a r i e s . Indeed, for purposes of the Presidents exercise o f p o we r t o i m p o s e t a r i f f s u n d e r A r t i c l e V I , Section 28(2), it is generally the Secretary of Finance who acts as alter ego of the President. T h e S M A p r o v i d e s a n e x c e p t i o n a l i n s t a n c e wherein it is the DTI or Agriculture Secretary who is tasked by Congress, in their capacities as alter egos of the President, to impose such measures. Certainly, the DTI Secretary has no i n h e r e n t p o w e r , e v e n a s a l t e r e g o o f t h e President, to levy tariffs and imports. T A R I F F C O M M I S S I O N A N D D T I S E C A R E AGENTS: Concurrently, the tasking of the Tariff Commission under the SMA should be likewise construed within the same context as part and p a r c e l o f t h e l e g i s l a t i v e d e l e g a t i o n o f i t s inherent power to impose tariffs and imposts tothe executive branch, subject to limitations andr e s t r i c t i o n s . I n t h a t r e g a r d , b o t h t h e T a r i f f C o m m i s s i o n a n d t h e D T I S e c r e t a r y m a y b e re garded as agents of Congress within theirlimited respective spheres, as ordained in the S M A , i n t h e i m p l e m e n t a t i o n o f t h e s a i d l a w which significantly draws its strength from the plenary legislative power of taxation. Indeed, even the President may be considered as an agent of Congress for the purpose of imposing safeguard measures. It is Congress, not the President, which possesses inherent powers to impose tariffs and imposts. Without legislative authorization through statute, the President has no power, authority or right to impose such s a f e g u a r d m e a s u r e s b e c a u s e t a x a t i o n i s inherently legislative, not executive. When Congress tasks the President or his/her alter egos to impose safeguard measures under the delineated conditions, the President or the alter egos may be properly deemed as agents of Congress to perform an act that inherently belongs as a matter of right to the legislature. It is basic agency law that the agent may notact beyond the specifically delegated powers or d i s r e g a r d s t h e r e s t r i c t i o n s i m p o s e d b y t h e principal. In short, Congress may establish

thep r o c e d u r a l f r a m e w o r k u n d e r w h i c h s u c h s a f e g u a r d m e a s u r e s m a y b e i m p o s e d , a n d as sign the various offices in the government bureaucracy respective tasks pursuant to the i m p o s i t i o n o f s u c h m e a s u r e s , t h e t a s k assignment including the factual determination of whether the necessary conditions exists to wa r r a n t s u c h i m p o s i t i o n s . U n d e r t h e S M A , Congress assigned the DTI Secretary and the Tariff Commission their respective functions in the legislatures scheme of things. There is only one viable ground for challenging the legality of the limitations and restrictionsi m p o s e d b y C o n g r e s s u n d e r S e c t i o n 2 8 ( 2 ) A r t i c l e V I , a n d t h a t i s s u c h l i m i t a t i o n s a n d r e s t r i c t i o n s a r e t h e m s e l v e s v i o l a t i v e o f t h e Constitution. Thus, no matter how distasteful ornoxious these limitations and restrictions may seem, the Court has no choice but to uphold their validity unless their constitutional infirmity can be demonstrated. What are these limitations and restrictions that are material to the present case? The entireSMA provides for a limited framework underw h i c h t h e P r e s i d e n t , t h r o u g h t h e D T I a n d Agriculture Secretaries, may impose safeguardm e a s u r e s i n t h e f o r m o f t a r i f f s a n d s i m i l a r imposts.POWER BELONGS TO CONGRESS: the citedpassage from Fr. Bernas actually states, Sincethe Constitution has given the President the p o w e r o f c o n t r o l , w i t h a l l i t s a w e s o m e implications, it is the Constitution alone which can curtail such power. Does the President have such tariff powers under the Constitution in the first place which may be curtailed by the e x e c u t i v e p o w e r o f c o n t r o l ? A t t h e r i s k o f redundancy, we quote Section 28(2), Article VI: T h e C o n g r e s s m a y , b y l a w, a u t h o r i z e t h e P r e s i d e n t t o f i x wi t h i n s p e c i f i e d l i m i t s , a n d sub ject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of then a t i o n a l d e v e l o p m e n t p r o g r a m o f t h e G o v e r n m e n t . C l e a r l y t h e p o we r t o i m p o s e t a r i f f s b e l o n g s t o C o n g r e s s a n d n o t t o t h e President. Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines vs. Duque III (Austria-Martinez, October 9, 2007) Nature: Special Civil Action in the Supreme Court. Certiorari Petitioner: Pharmaceutical and Healthcare Association of the Philippines Respondents: DOH Sec. Francisco Duque III, DOH Undersecretaries Dr. Ethelyn Nieto,Dr. Margarita Galon, Atty. Alexander Padilla and Dr. Jade Del Mundo; and Asst.Secretaries Dr. Mario Villaverde, Dr. David Lozada and Dr. Nemesio Gako Facts: Executive Order No. 51 (The Milk Code - TMC) was issued by Pres. Aquino on Oct.28, 1986 by virtue of the legislative powers granted to her under the FreedomConstitution. (1) One of the preambular clauses of TMC the law seeks to give effect to Article11 of the International Code of Marketing of Breastmilk Substitutes (ICMBS),a code adopted by the WHA (World Health Assembly) in 1981. In 1990, the Philippine ratified the International Convention on the Rights of the Child. Art. 24 of the instrument mandates that States should take measure to diminish infant mortality and should ensure that all segments of society are informed of the advantages of breastfeeding.- F r o m 1 9 8 2 2 0 0 6 , t h e W H A a d o p t e d s e v e r a l r e s o l u t i o n s t o t h e e f f e c t t h a t breastfeeding should be supported, promoted and protected, hence, it should beensured that nutrition and health claims are not permitted for breastmilksubstitutes. May 15, 2006 DOH issues the assailed RIRR (Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations of E.O. 51 or A.O. No. 2006-0012) which was to take effect on July 7,2006. The RIRR imposes a ban on all advertisements of breastmilk substitutes-June 28, 2006 Petitioner filed the present Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of a TRO or Writ of Preliminary injunction.-August 15, 2006 the Court issued a Resolution granting the TRO, enjoining the respondents from implementing the assailed RIRR.-

P e t i t i o n e r a s s a i l s t h e R I R R f o r g o i n g b e y o n d t h e p r o v i s i o n s o f T M C t h e r e b y amending and expanding the coverage of the said law. DOH meanwhile contends that the RIRR implements not only TMC but also various international instruments regarding infant and young child nutrition. They posit that the said international instruments are deemed part of the law of the land and therefore may be implemented by the DOH in the RIRR. Issue: W/n the RIRR is unconstitutional? Sub-issue(s): W/n the RIRR is in accord with TMC? W/n pertinent international agreements entered into by the Philippines are part of the law of the land and may thus be implemented through an RIRR, if so, are the RIRR in accord with such international agreements? Note: I focused on the parts on international law. The other matters (in case maamasks) are at the bottom of the digest. Held: No. However what may be implemented is the RIRR based on the Milk Code which in turn is based on the ICMBS as this is deemed part of the law of the land. The other WHA Resolutions however cannot be imposed as they are not deemed part of the law of the land. Ratio: 1.Are the international instruments referred to by the respondents part of the law of the land?-The various international instruments invoked by respondents are:(1)The UN Conventions on the Rights of the Child (2) The International Convenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (3)Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women These instruments only provide general terms of the steps that States must take to prevent child mortality. Hence, they do not have anything about the use and marketing of breastmilk substitutes The ICMBS and other WHA Resolutions however, are the international instrumentswhich have specific provisions on breastmilk substitutes-Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of domestic lawin 2 ways:(1)Transformation an international law is transformed into a domestic lawthrough a constitutional mechanism such as local legislation Treaties become part of law of the land through this method, pursuant to Art 7, Sec 21 wherein no treaty or international agreement shall be valid.. unless concurred by at least 2/3 of Senate The ICMBS and WHA Resolutions are NOT treaties as they havent been concurred in by the required 2/3 vote. HOWEVER, the ICMBS has been transformed into domestic law through local legislation that is TMC. Therefore, it is not the ICMBS per se that has the force of law but its TMC. o While TMC is almost a verbatim reproduction of the ICMBS, it did not adopt the latters provision on the absolute prohibition on advertising of products within the scope of the ICMBS. Instead the MC provides that advertising promotion or other marketing materials may be allowed if such materials are approved by acommittee. (2) Incorporation by mere constitutional declaration, international law is deemed to have the force of domestic law This is found under Art 2, Sec 2 The Philippines adopts generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land

In Mihares v. Ranada: International law becomes customary rulesaccepted as binding as a result of two elements:

1.) Established, widespread, and consistent practice on part of the state 2.) Opinion juris sive necessitates (opinion as to law or necessity. Generally accepted principles of international law refer to norms of general or customary international law which are binding on all states, valid through all kinds of human societies, and basic to legal systems generally Fr. Bernas has a definition similar to the one above. Customary international law has two factors:1.)Material factor how states behave The consistency and the generality of the practice2.)Psychological or subjective factor why they behave the way theydo Once state practice has been established, now determine why they behave they do. Is it our of courtesy or opinio juris (the belief that a certain type of behavior is obligatory) When a law satisfies the two factors it becomes part of customary international law which is then incorporated into our domestic system2.Since the WHA Resolutions have not been embodied in any local legislation, havethey attained the status of customary law and hence part of our law of the land?-The World Health Organization (WHO) is one of the international specialized agencies of the UN.-According to the WHO Constitution, its the WHA which determines the policies of the WHO, the former also has the power to adopt regulations concerning advertising and labeling of pharmaceutical and similar products and to makerecommendations to members on any matter within the Organizationscompetence Note that the legal effect of a regulation as opposed to recommendation is quite different (1)Regulations which are duly adopted by the WHA are binding on member states (2)On the other hand, recommendations of the WHA do not come into force for its members unlike regulations. Rather, they carry moral and political weight as they constitute the judgment on a health issue of the collective membership of the highest body in the field of health.-The WHA resolution adopting the ICMBS and the subsequent WHA resolution surging states to implement the ICMBS are merely recommendatory and legally non-binding.Hence, unlike the ICMBS which has become TMC through legislative enactment, the subsequent WHA Resolutions, which provide for exclusive breastfeeding and prohibition on advertisements and promotions of breastmilk have not been adopted as domestic law.-WHA Resolutions have been viewed to constitute soft law or non-binding norms, which influence state behavior. Soft law has been noted to be a rapid means of norm creation, in order to reflect and respond to the changing needs and demands of constituents (of the UN.)-As previously discussed, for an international rule to be considered customary law, it must be established that such rule is followed by states because it is considered obligatory (opinio juris).-In the case at bar, respondents have not presented any evidence to prove that the WHA Resolutions are in fact enforced or practice by member states. Further, they failed to establish that provisions of pertinent WHA Resolutions arecustomary international law that may be deemed part of law of the land.-Hence, legislation is necessary to transfor m the WHA resolutions into domestic law. They cannot thus be implemented by executive agencies without the need of a law to be enacted by legislature. On other issues: W/n the petitioner is the real party in interest? Yes. An association has standing to file suit for its workers despite its lack of direct interest of its members are affected by the action. An organization has standing to assert the concerns of its constituents. (Exec Sec vs CA ) -The Court has rules that an association has the legal personality to represent itsmembers because the results of the case will affect their vital interests. (PurokBagong Silang Association Inc. vs. Yuipco)-In the petitioners Amended Articles of Incorpora tion, it states that the associationis formed to represent directly or through approved representatives thepharmaceutical and health care industry before the Philippine Government and any of its agencies, the medical professions and the general public.-Therefore, the petitioner, as an organization, has an interest in fulfilling its avowed purpose of representing members who are part of the pharmaceutical and healthcare industry. Petitioner is duly

authorized to bring to the attention of the government agencies and courts any grievance suffered by its members which are directly affected by the assailed RIRR.-The petitioner, whose legal identity is deemed fused with its members, should be considered as a legal party-in-interest which stands to be benefited or injured by any judgment in the case. W/n the DOH has the power to implement the WHA Resolutions under the Revised Administrative Code even in the absence of a domestic law? Only the provisions of the Milk Code. (as per the discussion above)-Section 3, Chapter 1, Title IX of the RAC of 1987 provides that the DOH shall define the national health policy and can issue orders and regulations concerning the implementation of established health policies.-A.O. No 2005 -0014 which provides the national policy on infant and young child feeding, does not declare that as part of its policy, the advertisement or promotion of breastmilk substitutes should be absolutely prohibited.

- O n l y t h e p r o v i s i o n s o f t h e M i l k C o d e , b u t n o t t h o s e o f t h e s u b s e q u e n t W H A Resolutions, can be validly implemented by the DOH through the subject RIRR.W/n the provisions of the RIRR being in accordance with the Milk Code? Not all of them Assailed provisions: [1] extending the coverage to young children; [2] imposing exclusive breastfeeding for infants from 0-6 months; [3] imposes an absolute ban on advertising and promotion for breastmilk substitutes; [4] requiring additional labeling requirements; [5] prohibits the dissemination of information on infant formula; [6] forbids milk manufacturers and distributors to extend assistance in research and continuing education Although the DOH has the power under the Milk Code to control information regarding breastmilk vis-vis breastmilk substitutes, this power is not absolute because it has no power to impose an absolute prohibition in the marketing, promotion and advertising of breastmilk substitutes. Several provisions of the Milk Code attest to the fact that such power to control information is not absolute.-Sections 11 and 4(f) of the RIRR are clearly violative of the Milk Code because such provisions impose an absolute prohibition on advertising, promotion and marketing of breastmilk substitutes, which is not provided for in the Milk Code. Section 46 is violative of the Milk Code because the DOH has exceeded its authority in imposing such fines or sanctions when the Milk Code does not do so. Other assailed provisions are in accordance with the Milk Code. W/n Section 13 of the RIRR providing a sufficient standard? Yes. Questioned provision, in addition to Section 26 of Rule VII provide labelling requirements for breastmilk substitutes found to be in consonance with the Milk CodeT h e p r o v i s i o n s i n q u e s t i o n p r o v i d e r e a s o n a b l e m e a n s o f e n f o r c i n g r e l a t e d provisions in the Milk Code. W/n Section 57 of the RIRR repeals existing laws?-Section in question only repeals orders, issuances and rules and regulations, not laws. The provision is valid as it is within the DOHs rule-making power.-An administrative agency has quasi -legislative or rule-making power. However, such power is limited to making rules and regulation subjected to the boundaries set by the granting statute and the Constitution. The power is also subject to the doctrine of non-delegability and separability of powers. The power, whichincludes amending, revising, altering or repealing, is granted to allo w forflexibility in the implementation of the laws. W/n On Section 4, 5(w), 11, 22, 32, 47 and 52 violates the due process clause of the Constitution (Article III Section 1)? Despite the fact that the present Constitution enshrines free enterprise as apolicy, it nonetheless reserves to the government the power to intervenewhenever necessary to promote the general welfare free enterprise does not call for the removal of protective regulations. It must be clearly explained and proven by competent evidence just exactly how such protective regulation would result in the restraint of trade .-Section 4 proscription of milk manufacturers participation in any policy making body; Section 22 classes and seminars for women and children; Section 32 giving of assistance, support and logistics or training; Section 52 giving of donations In the instant case, petitioner failed to show how the aforementioned sections hamper the trade of breast milk substitutes. They also failed to establish that these activities are essential and indispensable to their trade. Disposition: The Petition is partially granted. Only sections 4(f), 11 and 46 of A.O. 2006-0014 are declared null and void for being ultra vires. The TRO is lifted insofar as the rest of the provisions of A.O. 20060012 is concerned.