USACMLS/MANSCEN 573-XXX-XXXX/DSN 676-XXXX COMMANDANT BG Patricia L.

Nilo
nilop@wood.army.mil

563-8053

ASSISTANT COMMANDANT COL Thomas W. Klewin

klewint@wood.army.mil

563-8054

COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR CSM James A. Barkley

barkleyj@wood.army.mil

563-5081

3d CHEMICAL BRIGADE/DSN 581-XXXX COL Thomas S. Spoehr

spoehrt@wood.army.mil

596-0016

82d CHEMICAL BATTALION LTC Joe Stewart

stewarjo@wood.army.mil

596-4835

84th CHEMICAL BATTALION LTC Patrick Sharon

sharonp@wood.army.mil

596-2414

58th TRANSPORTATION BATTALION LTC David Nelson

nelsonda@wood.army.mil

596-0991

USACMLS Directors JOINT SERVICE INTEGRATION GROUP LTC Frank Kohout

kohoutf@wood.army.mil

563-7754

DOCTRINE TRAINING LEADER DEVELOPMENT ORGANIZATION MATERIEL & SOLDIERS COL Gary R. Wallace 563-6652
wallaceg@wood.army.mil

CHEMICAL DEFENSE TRAINING FACILITY LTC James Smith

smithjame@wood.army.mil

596-0608

MANSCEN DIRECTORATE of TRAINING DEVELOPMENT COL Kevin T. LaMar 563-4111

lamark@wood.army.mil

CML, Army Chemical Review is prepared twice a year by the U.S. Army Chemical School, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. CML presents professional information about Chemical Corps functions related to nuclear, biological, chemical, smoke, flame field expedients, and NBC reconnaissance in combat support. Objectives of CML are to inform, motivate, increase knowledge, improve performance, and provide a forum for exchange of ideas. This publication presents professional information, but the views expressed herein are those of the authors, not the Department of Defense or its elements. The content does not necessarily reflect the official U.S. Army position and does not change or supersede any information in other U.S. Army publications. Use of news items constitutes neither affirmation of their accuracy or product endorsement. Articles may be reprinted if credit is given to CML and its authors. All photographs are official U.S. Army photos unless otherwise noted. CML reserves the right to edit material. PERSONAL SUBSCRIPTIONS: Available through the Superintendent of Documents, PO Box 371954, Pittsburgh, PA 15250-7954. POSTMASTER: Send address changes to Army Chemical Review, 320 MANSCEN Loop, Suite 210, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri 65473-8929. By Order of the Secretary of the Army: ERIC K. SHINSEKI General, United States Army Chief of Staff Official:

DIRECTORATE of COMBAT DEVELOPMENTS Chemical Division Chief LTC Robert Serino 563-4078
serinor@wood.army.mil

Managing Editor, Lynne M. Sparks

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573-563-4104 573-596-0131, 35267 573-596-0131, 37726

Editor, Mattie E. Kirby

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Graphic Designer, Kathryn M. Troxell

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JOEL B. HUDSON Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army 0129004

THE PROFESSIONAL BULLETIN OF THE CHEMICAL CORPS Articles

PB 3-02-1 February 2002

Departments

Chief of Chemical

February 2002

Attention! Future Cadets

A Special Book Review

Book Review

Send Us Feedback on Our Courses

Hall of Fame and Distinguished Members of the Corps Honors 2002

Regimental Command Sergeant Major

Chemical School Resumes Live Smoke Pot Training

Patient Decontamination

Military Decision MakingA Process

Chemical Company Command Post Operations

The Mechanized Smoke Company As I See It

Environmental Transformations: What a Company Commander Needs to Know

How the Chemical Corps Addresses Hazardous Materials

Masks of the Sea ServiceA Joint Effort

Terrorism and the Mind of It

Responding to Terrorism

NBC Battlespace Digitization

Forces in Transition and the NBC Threat: Where are we now?

4 8 13 17 19 29 33 36 37 42 45 49

2 3 7 12 25 27 48

Chief of Chemical
A very tragic reality of terrorism struck great insights into the potential replacement our nation not only in the horrific events of decontamination systems for the old M12A1 September 11th but also, more recently, with PDDA. Though it has served us well, it is time the very real presence of anthrax in our nations to modernize and take advantage of todays capital, Florida, New York, and many other technologies in decon systems and deconplaces around the world. We are no longer taminants. We are aggressively pursuing these living in a secure sanctuary, untouchable by advances. the threats that grow around the world. This is We have embarked on the most significant not a new reality to our Corps. We have been transformation of our Army since World War beating the warning drum for some timenow II. We have all recently experienced the shadow we are being heard and responding to these of terrorist acts, and they will not soon disappear. threats. In moving forward to support our nation and It seems only yesterday, though it was our Army, the role of the Chemical Corps is to months ago, that our nation suffered a violent protect the force and maximize combat power. and brutal attack which leveled the World We do this by training and equipping you to Trade Center Towers in New York and serve on Americas battle staffs to deal with the damaged the Pentagon in Washington D.C. consequences and manage the effects of a WMD BG Patricia L. Nilo This was a direct attack at the very fiber of the event. Officers, noncommissioned officers, free society we live in as guaranteed by our Constitutionthe enlisted soldiers, and civilians all play key and critical roles in the same Constitution you and I have sworn to uphold and protect. defense against these asymmetric threats. Furthermore, we clearly Exact figures are still unknown, but it appears that thousands have understand that we must protect the force during all phases of been killed or wounded. Many of them were emergency response operations. We must ensure that our strategic national interests personnel who lost their lives as they endeavored to save the lives are protected against any enemy, foreign or domestic, attempting of others. No greater love hath a man, than to lay down his life to employ chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons, for his brother. Such selflessness is what draws our citizens and regardless of the level of the NBC threat. It is in this area that we our Army together and makes America a great nation. all clearly play a critical role. September 11, 2001, is a date we will always remember. We accomplish this only through relentless preparation and The unthinkable events that unfolded have already dramatically proactive action. We cannot afford not to be ready! Some of you impacted our nations and our Corpss future. It will be a reminder have become very much engaged in preparing for our future. I to all of us that the freedoms we enjoy come at a significant price. call your attention to some of the articles that were published by We just completed our second year at Fort Wood, Missouri, members of our Corps in this bulletin, as well as many others, to and what a year it has been. It certainly has been a year of challenge include the AUSAs Institute of Land Warfare, Military Review, for all of us, but I am proud to say that the Chemical School and and Joint Forces Quarterly. Each has addressed critical aspects the Regiment have met the challenge and continue to move of our future strategy and the path forward well into the twentyforward with great initiative and momentum. We have been a first century. I challenge each of you to get just as engaged and key and essential player in many of the ongoing homeland security, share your thoughts and ideas. Whether it is an article for DOD, and Army NBC defense and Transformation forums, and publication or an idea exchange across the doctrine net, we need many more are planned in the near future. Also, we just completed each and every one of you to do your part. Challenge what does our strategic plan for the Chemical School and have established a not make sense. If it is truly a good idea, it will stand the test of working team for creating the strategic plan for the Corps. As the debate. Army undergoes Transformation and changes as a result of recent As a Corps, we have a lot to look forward to in the coming events, so will our school and Corps, and you can look with months and years. Our Army and DOD have taken dramatic steps anticipation and excitement to those changes as well. to improve our nations overall NBC defense capabilities, and This summer marked the 83d anniversary of the Corps and we are not finished yet. Much work still needs to be done. I want the 18th annual Worldwide Chemical Conference. The highlight to thank all who have contributed to this effort for your many was the Conference and Regimental Week activities that took long hours and tireless efforts. Your work will not go unnoticed. place from 9-13 July, followed directly by the Decontamination My deepest condolences go out to those directly affected by Platform Performance Demonstration, 16-20 July, at Fort Wood. the attacks and to you who may have been directly impacted. I I did not think it possible, but this years conference was even encourage you to pray for the victims, the survivors, and the people bigger and better than last years. This years theme was NBC involved in the ongoing recovery operations. Pray for our nation DefenseTransforming the Chemical Corps and was most and our leaders as they endeavor to address this catastrophe and appropriate to represent the many activities and programs our the ongoing war against terrorism. May God grant us wisdom Corps is leading and partnering to meet the new Joint and Army and discernment in this situation and the strength and resolve to visions. As always, this was the preeminent chemical and act responsibly and appropriately as we go forward in the days biological conference in the world, and it exposed and engaged ahead. its attendees in some glimpses of where we are going in near and ELEMENTIS REGAMUS PROELIUM! midterm future capabilities and organizations. We also gained Dragon Soldiers . . . Rule the Battle

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Regimental Command Sergeant Major

Greetings to all Dragon Soldiers! without adequate soldier training publications Since this bulletin was last published, our (STPs) and doctrine to support the new world, as we knew it, changed dramatically. training concepts. We will continue to work With the terrorist events of 11 September hard in getting Corps training products 2001, our nation is now at war and, as Dragon updated. TRADOC has published the new soldiers, we must be prepared to contribute Soldiers Manual of Common Tasks (SMCT) to the effort when the call comes. This means 21-1 and 21-24 skill levels. Our chemical we must continue to motivate and train our STPs will be updated to reflect these changes young soldierstrain them to standard. as well. I urge you to help support and provide The terrorist threat has forced us to step input to these changes to help our Dragon up our training and seek new technological Soldiers train to standard. Again, this is only advances to counter this horrible war. We all a small part of the Army Transformation. face challenges in training to standard in the I assumed my duties as the Regimental WMD environment. We have trained and Command Sergeant Major (RCSM) in June certified most of the civil support teams. Our 2001 and have several goals I plan to achieve. proponency must look at the career path of First, I intend to make a difference in the the 54B soldiers. Unfortunately, the number STPs. MANSCEN and the Chemical School CSM James A. Barkley of 54B soldiers has increased substantially are working to fix the manuals for skill levels without having any skill identifier. We say they are 54Bs, but 1 through 4 for our Dragon Soldiers. If you think a task you their duties are different from what other 54Bs are doing in are performing in the field needs to be changed or that you are the field. They are trained on different equipment, and we need not getting proper training, I would like to hear about it. Second, to recognize these differences with a special skill identifier or ensure that The Army School System (TASS) battalions are MOS. We are working this issue with proponency; doctrine, using the same training materials that are being taught at the training, leader development, organization, materiel, and Chemical School and MANSCEN NCO academy. The only soldiers (DTLOMS); and the Maneuver Support Centers difference in Active and Reserve should be the time it takes to (MANSCENs) Directorate of Training Development and train. I intend for all Dragon Soldiers to be trained to one Directorate of Combat Developments. We will continue to standard. work this issue until it is resolved. I encourage you to provide Third, I understand that some soldiers have concerns about comments or suggestions to the proponency office, DTLOMS, the caliber of NCOs conducting training at the schoolhouse. I USACMLS. assure you that we have top-notch NCOs, and most of our The potential use of WMD against American citizens and small-group leaders were honor or distinguished honor assets is one of the most disturbing threats facing the United graduates in their respective classes. Three of our seven States today. For decades, the United States has faced this chemical TASS battalions rotated through Fort Leonard Wood, possibility in a conventional setting. Today, however, use of Missouri, this past summer/fall, and Im happy to report that WMD against domestic U.S. targets is becoming a more all were accredited. This means that all of our TASS battalions credible threat. The Chemical Corps is on the cutting edge of are accredited. I have talked with all of our Title XI NCOs the advancements being made in combating the uses of WMD. who are assigned to these battalions, and I can tell you that Army Transformation requires the Chemical Corps to they are outstanding advisors to our Reserve Component. As transform and create new training strategies for Dragon your RCSM, I intend to continue to assign top-notch soldiers Soldiers. We are moving toward Joint training to help minimize to these positions. If you think you can contribute in this communication within DOD, sister services, and federal important assignment and like a challenge to help others, I agencies to combat the NBC terrorist threat. need to hear from you. Our Chemical School is taking the lead on training Dragon Finally, I know you Dragon Soldiers are ready to accept a Soldiers in new training endeavorsthe Digitized Army challenge and that you deserve to be highly trained and Division and the Initial Brigade Combat Teamto fight as motivated when called upon. I commit to you my leadership the Army of One. Some of our Dragon Soldiers are playing a and support in providing trained-to-standard Dragon Soldiers pivotal role during this Transformation. We need your help in to meet the current and future terrorist threats. As the Chemical providing your comments to the trainers at MANSCEN. Corps moves to transform this fighting force with cutting-edge Some of our doctrine may not reflect how you are training technology, let us never forget that terrorist threats must be in the field. If you need help in this area, we would like to hear eradicated. from you. Many of our Chemical Corps NCOs are performing Dragon Soldiers Stay Motivated!

February 2002

Forces in Transition and the NBC Threat: Where are we now?

By Major William E. King, IV Only a decade ago, as the Berlin Wall fell, the Iron Curtain opened on the stage of a new-world order. The world applauded the final act of the Cold War as the threat of global annihilation faded and the superpowers bowed out in the last dramatic episode of the arms race. The threat of global annihilation had been vanquished, and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) were just a fading nightmare. We wanted so badly to believe in global peace. Insidiously, while the attention of the world focused on the superpowers on center stage, more sinister dangers were growing in the shadows of our global theater. Who knew this historic event would be an invitation for unrecognized players to step into the leading roles of this realworld drama? While this may sound like a fictional suspense drama, I believe it describes the real nuclear, biological, or chemical (NBC) concerns we face for our contingency forces today.
NBC Threat to Todays Contingency Forces equipment. The threat of WMD forces any opponent to consider additional planning factors not normally Todays actors are busy at work expanding their required. conspicuous proliferation of WMD. Today, about 25 Restraint, or the reluctance to respond to an NBC nations have an NBC warfare program compared to only attack with NBC retaliation, is likely with large-yield 12 during the Cold War. These same countries have longweapons; nevertheless, nuclear hazards on the battlefield range delivery systems and continue to pursue efforts to may result from other sources. Restraint does not apply acquire systems with greater accuracy and range. NBC to chemical and biological weapons (CBW). An weapons provide their only feasible counterbalance to adversarys use of CBW is very likely as a means for U.S. precision-guided munitions and sophisticated reducing its military risk of defeat against deploying U.S. weaponry. contingency forces into a new theater of operations. The Americas military superiority cannot shield us former Secretary of Defense embedded these concerns completely from this (nuclear, biological, and in a number of clear policy statements. For example, the chemical) threat. Indeed, a paradox of the new strategic environment is that American Full-Spectrum Continuum military superiority actually increases the Domestic Battlefield Foreignthreat of nuclear, biological, and chemical Terrorism Use Consequence attack against us by creating incentives for Management adversaries to challenge us asymmetrically. William Cohen Attack on Attack on Attack on Peacetime Attack U.S. Conus U.S. forces attack on on allies Former U.S. Secretary of Defense civilians or military engaged in U.S. forces/ or host Our nations senior leadership is on record nonmilitary facility contingency facilities nations facilities supporting operations overseas for expressing their opinions that the superiority contingency of Americas conventional warfighting will operations likely push an adversary towards asymmetric means, including WMD. Adopting the policy of If you know you cannot win a fair fight, U.S. Military the Target then fight dirty, countries possessing WMD have gained strategic leverage without the cost U.S. Military Response of a large military force and expensive 4 CML

2002-2007 Defense Planning Guidance states, The threat or use of chemical and biological weapons is a likely condition of future warfare, including in the early stages of war. Such weapons could be employed by hostile forces as a means of disrupting U.S. operations and logistics. And the Secretary directs that U.S. forces will be prepared to fight and win in a chemically or biologically contaminated environment. The services also will continue to improve chemical and biological detection and decontamination capabilities at ports and airfields. Additionally, underpinning the U.S. National Military Strategy, Shape, Respond, Prepare Now, are the concepts of strategic agility, power projection, and decisive force. Joint Vision 2020, the conceptual template for U.S. military operational capability in the early twenty-first century, is based on power projection from the continental United States, achieved through rapid strategic mobility and limited overseas presence. Operations at fixed-site installations, including seaports and aerial ports of embarkation and debarkation, logistical centers, and tactical airbases, are critical to executing this strategy successfully. The consequences of a CBW attack on one of these critical nodes can severely hinder, if not completely impede, military operations and put our national military strategy at risk if not properly addressed and resourced today. The expectation that an asymmetric CBW will be used as the preferred weapon of attack is even more clearly applicable to the Army Transformation Strategy. The Army Chief of Staff has stated that transformed forces must be survivable when faced with an adversary employing asymmetric threats. The Initial Brigade Combat Team (IBCT) will face this asymmetric threat for two reasons: 1. The very nature of this highly mobile, lethal force is to use advanced Level technologies to inflict U.S. might I rapidly. 2. The United States has renounced its offensive CBW retaliatory capability. Thus, at best, we would only respond with more conventional precision fires probably delivered by the IBCT after an NBC attack. As the proliferation and availability of WMD continue to expand, so do the threats and the expectation of their use. Aggressive Third World countries and rogue radical groups cannot compete directly with the superpowers. The resources required for supporting a large military force, or even researching and developing innovative
II

weapons systems, are beyond these groups capabilities. Thus, as they compete for strategic positioning, power, and international recognition, they use the most destructive devices already within their grasp. Even the weakest state and nonstate actor believes large numbers of casualties and the ensuing panic inflicted by their insidious assaults will only promote their political objectives. Not to be overlooked is a more subtle, indirect threat: the possibility that some seemingly inoffensive Third World state would provide chemical, biological, or radiological weapons (one of the forms of nuclear weapons) to terrorists. Such an action could covertly contribute to the struggle without fear of direct retaliation from the United States. The problem is still growing. Current U.S. Response to WMD Threat Renegade proliferation of WMD promotes regional instability with potentially global consequences and, as a result, challenges the interests of the United States. Obviously, a significant element of the asymmetric threat facing U.S. forces today, and for the foreseeable future, is the use of nuclear, biological, chemical, radiological, and toxic industrial chemicals by hostile forces. In response, the U.S. Army Chemical School recently categorized these NBC threats into three levels (see table below). Level I NBC threats equate to weaponized WMD. Level II threats include accidental or deliberate release from industrial complexes. Level III threats include crude, yet potentially lethal, application of radiation, biological, and toxic and industrial materials. Although Level III threats lack sophistication, these include substances

Levels of NBC Threat

Nuclear Weaponized Military/ industrial facility Toxic residue Hiroshima Chernobyl Desert Storm Biological Weaponized Military/ industrial facility Toxic residue Chekiang Sverdlosk Rajneeshees Chemical Weaponized Military/ industrial facility Toxic residue Iran-Iraq Bhopal Love Canal

III Examples:

Proliferation of WMD and long-range delivery systems throughout the WMD-capable countries may leverage their asymmetric advantage
to mitigate WMD events versus those of Level I. world should increase.

Levels I, II, and III threats significantly increase the planning factors

over U.S. forces, especially vulnerable during initial-entry operations.

February 2002

which, when released, can be highly lethal but lack the chemical and physical properties, behavior characteristics, or density to be capable of high-order (WMD) levels of destruction. NBC hazards may result from nonstate or terrorist aggression, collateral damage from conventional weapons, natural disasters and industrial accidents, or other sources of environmental contamination. Ammonia and methyl isocyanate are examples of industrial chemicals with potential operational impacts. For example, methyl isocyanate, released in Bhopal, India, resulted in 15,000 deaths and affected almost 300,000 of Bhopals 800,000 residents. These agents and others are produced in large quantities in industrial chemical plants around the world and are usually located in and around the airports and seaports and logistical nodes that we would want to use in future operations. Smaller countries and possibly some terrorist groups can exploit this industrial chemical threat. These newly identified threats pose great challenges to military planners and commanders. While the U.S. Army recognizes that a potential enemy might employ NBC weapons at anytime, planning remains focused on the obvious military threat. The Army usually plans for an NBC attack during a desperate moment in the height of battle, but NBC weapons would actually be most effective during entry or deployment operations. These early preparatory stages of a tactical operation are the most vulnerable. An enemys goal would be to quickly inflict a large number of U.S. casualties and either slow U.S. military forces deployment or swing public opinion against further involvement. Future U.S. Response to the WMD Threat The security of the U.S. Armys future requires an NBC defense system that integrates a full array of land-, air-, and space-based sensors that can detect and identify chemical and biological agents. These sensors must be able to detect production, storage, movement, and environmental releases. This automated, real-time, joint hazard collection system must also be capable of maintaining situational awareness, analyzing input data from the various sensors, leveraging digitized satellite communications, providing immediate warning and reporting to those affected military and civilian populations, and updating the situational-awareness database for all other forces and population centers. This system must operate from land-based sites as well as air- and space-based platformsa necessary redundancy if it is to provide sufficient coverage to operate the triad of prevention, deterrence, and defense. 6

This concept is not unique. It is already being developed as an integrated array of sensors transmitting to a central point of analysis, warning, and reporting as the currently developing theater ballistic missile defense (TBMD) concept. The TBMD concept is built upon three pillars: attack operations, active defense, and passive defense. The attack-operations pillar is focused on the U.S. armed forces ability to prevent the launch of theater missiles by attacking all elements of the enemys overall ballistic missile system. The active-defense pillar is focused on the U.S. armed forces ability to intercept and destroy theater missiles in flight. The passive-defense pillar includes all those individual and collective measures taken to reduce the probability and effects of a theater missile attack by reducing the vulnerability of critical forces and infrastructure and by improving the potential to survive and resume operations after an attack. Obviously, the U.S. Army has already erected similar pillars for NBC attack operations, as well as active defense. The third pillar, WMD passive defense, is also beginning to rise above its original cornerstone of individual soldier protection. I cannot over emphasize the criticality of networking these three pillars to more closely integrate and, therefore, unify and strengthen them. But before they can be linked, the most essential pillar passive defensemust be developed more thoroughly. Conclusion We may feel as if we are scrambling to keep up with the threat, but the fact of the matter is that we are still, with a few extra precautionary measures, the greatest Army in the world. NBC attacks on our ports may slow our arrival to a theater, but they dont have to stop us. It is imperative to remember that, like the rest of the Army,

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the Chemical Corps is in transition. Our goal should be to make NBC WMD so ineffective against us that our adversaries wont even bother with them. We are on the right track, from a defensive perspective, but we havent arrived yet. We have several high-tech conceptssuch as advanced point and stand-off biological detection and identification, single-vehicle-integrated NBC reconnaissance, NBC fusion and battle management, distributed low-quality and high-density NBC sensors, and aerialand space-based NBC reconnaissance and surveillance sensorsyet to integrate into our Corps structure.
References U.S. Army Chemical School, TRADOC Pam 525-20, U.S. Army Operations Concept for Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Defense (Draft), Washington, D.C., Department of the Army, 31 March 1998, p.1. Department of Defense, 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review Defense Planning Guidance, Washington, D.C., Government Printing Office, 1997.

Department of Defense, 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review Defense Planning Guidance, Washington, D.C., Government Printing Office, 1997. U. S. Army, Army Transformation Campaign Plan, Washington, D.C., Department of the Army, October 1999. Richard A. Jackson and Ralph G. Wooten, Protecting the Force: 21st Century Chemical Corps, Military Review, September-October 1996, p. 75. Now, more than 20 nations are known to possess WMD. WMD proliferation is occurring exactly where the United States does not want it to occur- in regional flash points throughout the world. Booz Allen and Hamilton, Assessment of the Impact of Chemical and Biological Weapons on Joint Operations in 2010 (The CB 2010 Study), McLean, VA, Booz Allen and Hamilton, Inc., November 1997, pp. 1-3. U.S. Army Chemical School, Theater Missile Defense (TMD) Passive Defense Strategy, Washington, D.C., Department of the Army, May 1997, pp. 2-5.

Major King is the battalion executive officer, 84th Chemical Battalion, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. His previous assignments include battalion chemical officer, 1st Battalion, 3d Field Artillery, 2AD; smoke platoon leader and company executive officer, 46th Chemical Company (SG)(M); Battalion S1, 2d Chemical Battalion; aide-de-camp, DCG, III Corps; division chemical training officer, DISCOM chemical officer, company commander, 91st Chemical Company, 24th ID, Battalion S3, 703d MSB, 3d ID, G3 Plans, Eighth U.S. Army Yongsan, Korea; and chief of Concepts Branch, Chemical Division, Directorate of Combat Developments, MANSCEN. MAJ King is a graduate of the Chemical Officers Basic and Advance Courses, CAS3, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, U.S. Army School of Advanced Military Studies, and Airborne and Air Assault Schools. He holds a bachelors in chemistry from the University of Richmond in Richmond, Virginia, and a masters in military arts and science from the Command and General Staff College in general military studies and military space applications and from the School of Advanced Military Studies in theater operations and planning.

Hall of Fame and Distinguished Member of the Corps Honors 2002

Call for Nominations Nominations are now being accepted for the Chemical Corps Regimental Associations (CCRAs) Chemical Corps Hall of Fame and Distinguished Member of the Corps. Introduction into the Hall of Fame is an honor extended to those (living or deceased) who have spent their entire professional career working with and serving the Chemical Corps. Their services to the Corps must be extraordinary. However, the Distinguished Member of the Corps is an award extended only to living members of the Chemical Corps who have served the Corps for their professional life, and who are willing to continue to serve the Corps after they have retired. Current Chemical Corps military and civilian members are not eligible for the program. Only those who have been retired for at least two years or deceased may be nominated. Nominating is easy. Simply write a note or send an e-mail to the Chemical Corps Historian, Dr. Burton Wright, and he will send you a CCRA regulation that governs the nomination process and will tell you all about the honor. You can contact Dr. Wright at 573-563-7339 or on the Net at Wrightb@Wood.army.mil. Only one nomination per individual will be accepted. One piece of information for the nomination is vital if the individual is living, the address is necessary, and if deceased, the name and address of any member of the family. Elementis Regamus Proelium

February 2002

NBC Battlespace Digitization

By Mr. Russell Williams, Mr. Romel Gallamoza, Mr. Edward Conley, and Mr. Richard Noel
Battlespace information is vital to tactical, operational, and strategic warfighting. Joint Vision 2010/2020 focuses on information superiority as the key to victory. Traditionally, battlespace information has been provided by text and voice communications. But, in joint vision, digital information and communications systems will undoubtedly become the American warfighters best defensefusing all source intelligence with sensors, platforms, and command and control systems. In fact, these systems will give commanders and warfighters an unsurpassed view of the battlespace. Networking of command and control elements will allow the entire force to operate in concert, giving leaders a clear picture of operations so they can act quickly and decisively. One of the new thrusts in force digitization is the communication of detected nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) threats. Using networked communications systems, sensors mounted on the ground or on combat vehicles will alert ground forces of potential contamination in a fraction of a second. Within moments, these systems will send data through the tactical Internet to command operations centers for automated processing

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and relay precise, nearly instantaneous NBC hazard-zone predictions back to the affected forces on the battlefield. Additionally, the network will notify local civilian authorities in the hazardous area. The NBC hazard warning and reporting system will greatly enhance the warfighters ability to fight and survive on the NBC battlefield. NBC FORCE DIGITIZATION THRUST The joint vision requirement of information superiority can only be met by digitizing the battlespace, including the NBC arena. The Armys project manager for NBC defense systems supports several programs to meet the goals of NBC battlespace digitization. Among these programs are the Joint Warning and Reporting Network (JWARN) and the multipurpose, integrated chemical agent detector (MICAD). JWARN Program As an important step toward the goal of NBC battlespace digitization, the JWARN program will provide a standardized NBC warning and reporting package to all services, provide capabilities for enhanced downwind prediction and battle management, and interface with command and control systems and NBC sensor devices. In addition, the JWARN software provides the capabilities to plan and manage certain NBC operations such as smoke and mission-oriented protective-posture levels. It also provides a rudimentary chemicalcasualty-assessment tool. The JWARN program is divided into multiple blocks to push these needed capabilities to the field more quickly. Block I is an interim commercial-off-the-shelf/ government-off-the-shelf package that will be used until the objective JWARN has been developed and procured under the Block II program. Since Block Is initial release in June 1998, all services have acquired it. Block I is divided into three variantsBlocks IA, IB, and IC. Block IA is a disk operating system (DOS) and 16-bit Windows bundle that provides basic capabilities for NBC warning and reporting and downwind hazard prediction. It also is an information

and analysis suite of software containing NBC analysis for DOS; hazard prediction and analysis capabilities; vapors, liquids, and solids tracking; and emergency management information system. The Block IA package provides a variety of user documentation and NBC information, including the JWARN operators manual, software user manuals, and lesson plans for self-training and the NBC Toolbox (a software tool that provides a variety of NBC-related information through an easy-to-use menu system). For example, the user can look up NBC threat capabilities of many nations or find what NBC detectors exist. Other information includes agent characteristics, chemical casualties handling, defense units organization, and staff responsibilities. Because of the hardware constraints in the field at the time of fielding, the Block IA suite of software works in the DOS/16-bit Windows environment on computers with 486 Intel processors and low-end Pentium machines. The JWARN program office strongly encourages current users of Block IA to upgrade to Block IC. Block IB is a Universal Internet Exchange (UNIX) variant that has been integrated with the Armys maneuver control system (MCS). It, as well as the IC version, has an improved and easier-to-use graphics user interface that provides a standardized NBC warning and reporting process between UNIX (Block IB) and Windows (Block IC) platforms. The project

February 2002

manager has been integrating Block IB with the Armys MCS to use the common-message processor, the joint mapping tool kit suite, the Armys common tactical picture, and the Armys common database. Block IB can send and receive NBC reports, plot and publish common NBC overlays, access unit databases to provide analysis of units at risk, and perform many other common NBC tasks. It can also interface with NBC sensors through a serial-port connection to the MICAD system. Block IB software is scheduled for release with MCS version 6.2.11 as a mission application on the MCS system and will be provided to all users as the system is fielded. The project manager will provide the training and support. Block IC is a 32-bit Windows bundle that extends the capabilities of Block IA. It was acquired to reside in todays Windows-based computing environment. Block IC software is not integrated with a command and control system but can be networked to provide an NBC warning and reporting capability on the battlefield via e-mail, modem, or local-area network. It provides the same capabilities as Block IB but adds the additional capabilities of Block IA. Block II will be a full life-cycle acquisition program. It will not only integrate the best of several NBC models, but it will also be part of the users command and control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) systems in each service. It also will have hardware to interface with a variety of NBC detectors to pass NBCrelated information to JWARN software in C4I systems. Block II will be an integrated application to existing systems and will provide a seamless operation within that environment. JWARN Distribution, Training, and Support The NBC defense systems project manager has provided more than 600 copies of JWARN to the field and trained hundreds of soldiers to use the various versions of JWARN. With the arrival of Blocks IA and IC, the Marine Corps Systems Command provided instructor training for key personnel of each service. The training was limited in availability and time because of the shortage of available funds and the expected arrival of the Block II program. The system project manager coordinated formal Block IC training to six Army garrisons, and Marine Corps Command contractors conducted the training, which lasted 8 months. After the training contract ended, the project managers subject-matter experts provided the remaining Block IC instruction. The JWARN instructor base has expanded to the project manager NBC defense systems

new equipment training and fielding team. Training is conducted on a request basis only. The system project manager has provided or coordinated Blocks IA and IC support in warfighter exercises. He has supported the 32d Army Air and Missile Defense Commands (AAMDCs) use of the Block IA version for its home station training for Exercise Roving Sands and Block IC training and support to the 4th Infantry Division (4ID) Chemical. Later, 4ID participated in Exercise Ulchi Focus Lens and the system project manager provided JWARN support. V Corps used JWARN in its Warrior Focus and Battle Command Training Program exercises and, again, the project manager provided training and support. The most needed type of JWARN support was communication networking. NBC analysis is the only JWARN software that has the capability to directly connect to a local area network, serial interface, mail-application program interface (Microsoft Outlook, Exchange, etc.), and modem. The government-off-the-shelf software has cut and paste functions so the user can put NBC plots on any Windows application like Microsoft PowerPoint, Word, and Corel Draw. Although the project manager supports and continues to work with Army users, there is a JWARN help desk that supports users from all services. Marine Corps Tactical Systems Support Activity provides live, 24-hours, 7-daysa-week technical support. It has a toll-free number for immediate help and an e-mail address for getting JWARN support. The help desk number is (800) 808-7634, and the e-mail address for technical assistance is c4ihelpdesk@mctssa.usmc.mil. Suggestions for improvement are welcomed. Another avenue for obtaining technical support or sending comments is the JWARN integrated process team; each service has one. The Armys representatives are from the NBC defense systems project manager. The teams can be used to formally solicit Block I software, technical support, training, and software improvements. To obtain JWARN point-of-contact information, go to: http://www.sbccom.apgea.army.mil/ RDA/pmnbc/products.htm and click on the JWARN section under Program Director Detection. Other JWARN Efforts The NBC defense project manager realizes that it will take time to integrate Block II into the Army C4I infrastructure, so to bridge the gap, he will build upon Block IB to integrate with other systems within the Army Battle Command System. For example, Block IB for MCS will continue to evolve with the latest and future versions of MCS because the Battle Command System continues to march in evolutionary steps.

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In addition, Block IB has been ported to the Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below (FBCB2) environment for the NBC reconnaissance systems. Work is ongoing to integrate Block IB with the FBCB2 services similar to that in MCS. Upon completion of this effort, the JWARN software will reside on FBCB2 systems throughout the Army to provide a comprehensive NBC warning and reporting network. Other planned efforts include integration with MCSLight and Global Command Control SystemArmy (GCCS-A). Other efforts are also being considered. For example, there has been interest in integrating with the GCCS, Air and Missile Defense Warning System, and Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System. JWARN User Feedback Within the last 3 years, Block I software has been distributed to users from all Joint services and to U.S. government agencies. Ease of use and rapid calculation of NBC plots has made NBC analysis the most popular software in the JWARN package. Feedback from the field indicates a strong desire to merge JWARN with the C4I systems. For example, 4ID can use JWARN effectively if it is integrated with MCS and FBCB2. The 32d AAMDC could provide more adequate warning to subordinate units if JWARN were an application in the Air and Missile Defense Warning System and the GCCS. The project manager has responded to these needs by initiating integration with additional C4I systems. JWARN will not only be integrated in a major C4I system such as MCS, but it will also be integrated in FBCB2, MCS-Light, and the GCCS-A. More C4I systems will follow. MICAD Program The M27 MICAD is the first step for digitizing the NBC battlefield. It automates NBC detection, warning, and reporting in armored vehicles, tactical wheeled vehicles, vans, and shelters. Using standard detectors or sensors, MICAD automatically detects a threat, issues a local alarm (both within a vehicle and to dismounted troops), senses its position, and formats and digitally transmits NBC messages over tactical communication networks to command and control systems at higher headquarters. The modular components of MICAD require a minimum of human interaction for operation and maintenance. The size of the components permits them to be located in any available space (under

platforms, behind equipment, under seats), which greatly simplifies integration with existing host systems. MICAD Distribution, Training, and Support MICAD is an integral part of the M93A1 NBC reconnaissance system Fox vehicle and is currently fielded with the M93A1 at multiple sites within the Army and with the Marines at Camp Pendleton, California. MICAD information is incorporated in the M93A1 technical manuals and is trained as part of the M93A1 training course. The M32 MICAD has been fielded to the 4ID as part of the Armys first digitized division. The distribution within the 4ID consists of 56 systems in high-mobility, multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs) and M1068 shelters. Fielding to HMMWV platforms was conducted in November 2000, and the project managers tactical operations center began installing MICAD in M1068s in February 2001. MICAD technical manuals were provided, and new equipment training was conducted at Fort Hood, Texas, in October 2000 in support of all 4ID MICAD systems. The system was used in the first digitized divisions Capstone Exercise I in April 2001. Support for MICAD hardware installed on vehicles comes in two parts. First, all MICAD hardware comes with a 1-year warranty. When a unit determines that an item is not functional, it will notify the project manager. He will coordinate the defective items return to the production contractor for repair. In addition, the project manager has MICAD assets that permit an immediate replacement to the user while the item is being repaired. Second, MICAD spare and repair parts are being purchased and placed in the Armys supply system to

Background left to right: display control, universal interface unit, communication interface unit, and telemetry link radio. Foreground left to right: personnel alarm, output binding post, terminator, and input binding post.

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support MICAD. MICAD is using life-cycle contractor logistics support. Beyond the warranty period, all depotlevel MICAD repairs will be conducted through this support. The unit will order replacement components through the Armys wholesale supply system. Other MICAD Efforts The battlefield automation team is currently working on the next evolution of the MICAD concept called the Embedded Common Technical Architecture (ECTA). ECTA will eliminate MICADs dedicated display unit and interface with the C4I system on the vehicle to fulfill its display requirements. The current strategy is for ECTA to interface with the M88 chemical detector and with a member of the Radiac family of radiation sensors. Interfaces to various other vehicle systems will be supported, and the design will anticipate future interface expansions. ECTA will implement some of the capabilities of JWARN Block I.

THE WAY AHEAD To effectively meet the goals expressed in the Joint vision, digitization of the NBC battlefield must occur. This digitization will be most effective if the concept is implemented as a system of systems. The NBC battlefield of the future will no longer contain disparate, stove-piped contamination-avoidance systems that require large numbers of soldiers to operate. The NBC battlefield of the future will contain a single NBC battlefield management system. JWARN will be the heart of future NBC battlefield management. As a system of systems, it will integrate advanced hazard prediction models, provide data reach-back capabilities, and be capable of processing input from many sensor types, including non-NBC sensors. In the future, JWARN will leverage many of the current advances in computer and information technology. By combining these abilities into a single system, the goals expressed in the joint vision will be realized. Information superiority will be the key to a clear picture of the NBC battlefield.

Mr. Williams is a computer engineer for the program manager for NBC Defense Systems, U.S. Army Soldier and Biological Chemical Command (SBCCOM), Aberdeen Proving Grounds, Maryland. He is currently working for JWARNs Blocks I and II programs. Mr. Williams holds a bachelors in both computer and electrical engineering from West Virginia University and a masters in computer engineering from Loyola College. Mr. Gallamoza is an electronics engineer for the program manager for NBC Defense Systems, SBCCOM, Aberdeen Proving Grounds, Maryland. He is currently working as a systems engineer for JWARNs Blocks IB and IC programs. Mr. Gallamoza holds a bachelors in computer engineering from the University of Massachusetts at North Dartmouth. Mr.Conley is a mechanical engineer for the program manager for NBC Defense Systems, SBCCOM, Aberdeen Proving Grounds, Maryland. He is currently working as deputy product manager for the battlefield automation team. Mr. Conley holds a bachelors in mechanical engineering from the University of Delaware. Mr. Noel is a software engineer for the program manager for NBC Defense Systems, SBCCOM, Aberdeen Proving Grounds, Maryland. Mr. Noel holds a bachelors in computer science from Towson State University.

Send Us Feedback on Our Courses!

The U.S. Army Chemical School and the 3d Chemical Brigade are instituting a Web-based survey mechanism to gather feedback about the courses we teach. Input from soldiers in the field is critical to helping us modify our courses to ensure that they are providing you, the Chemical Warrior, with the key knowledge and training you need to succeed in your assignments. Because of the personnel cutbacks we all have taken, the Chemical School can no longer conduct external trips and visits to field locations to determine the relevance of our courses. We must depend on surveys, such as these, to gather our input. You can get to the Survey Questionnaires by clicking on the icon at the Chemical Schools home page http://www.wood.army.mil/usacmls/. Both the course manager for that particular course as well as a senior leader at the Chemical School will review the input that you provide us. We will use your input as we periodically update our courses. You can submit anonymously if you desire. Chemical Leadersplease encourage the Chemical soldiers you work with and supervise to take a moment to complete these questionnaires; it will help us all. POC is Colonel Tom Spoehr, e-mail address is spoehrt@wood.army.mil.

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Editorial

Responding to Terrorism
By Albert J. Mauroni

It could have been worse, in many ways. Thats the good news. Youve already heard the bad news.
There probably arent many people, at least those within the Department of Defense (DOD), who havent heard about the 11 September terrorist attack on the Pentagon. While the terrorist attack on the World Trade Center (WTC) Towers certainly eclipsed the one on the Pentagon in scope and number of casualties, there was a particular sense of outrage within the military community that the nations military center was hit. For those of us who work in the Pentagon, it was very hard to comprehend, at first, and still is troubling to many of us. This is not an I-was-there story because I wasnt in the building when the plane hit. You have all heard the accounts and seen the news stories and are probably suffering from news overload, as I am. However, Id like to give an insiders view of the after-action events and what it may predict to the military chemical defense community. Terror at the Pentagon I left my joint staff office at 0815 to attend a Joint Service Integration Group working meeting in nearby Crystal City. It was a normal day like any other day, no special warnings or threat indications. When we heard the news about the WTC buildings, we were shocked, but after a few minutes, we returned to work. When the news came about the Pentagon attack, it pretty much killed the meeting. Although I couldnt get in touch with my colleagues in the Pentagon, I was somewhat comforted by the fact that our office was directly opposite the impact point. After watching some of the television coverage, I joined the mass evacuation out of D.C. It was surreal, watching the dark smoke coming from the Pentagon and drifting above Arlington. My wife and I spent the rest of the afternoon watching the news, trying to understand what was happening and the meaning of it all. At the end of the day, the news came that we were going back to work on Wednesday. The Pentagon was open for business. It was suspected that the terrorists might attack a second time with chemical or biological (CB) warfare agents, targeting the emergency responders and exposed populations. On Tuesday morning, some hospital workers had diagnosed February 2002

patients who were short of breath and they began asking if this was a symptom of a chemical warfare agent. Of course, there had been no CB attacks. One of the few good news stories was the quick response of local emergency responders to the incident site. This was partly due to the previous coordination and training exercises between Pentagon and county emergency responderspracticing to respond to a potential CB terrorist incident at the Pentagon. The open lines of communication between key DOD and local responder personnel and their familiarity with responding to a potential terrorist incident at the Pentagon probably were key factors in saving lives and minimizing damage. I dont know if the Armys Technical Escort Unit was involved or if any of the DODs CB specialists were at the scene. I suspect that the Joint Forces Command would have scrambled its Joint task force for civil support, although I cant say for sure what role it played. I hope those involved tell us how well the current civil support plans held up, since it was local officials responding to a federal terrorism incident site instead of the other way around. It does 13

reemphasize that for no-notice incidents, the emergency responders will be the first to encounter any CB hazards. The DOD CB specialists still have a role in restitution operations, which is a message to the National Guards weapons of mass destruction (WMD) civil support teams (CSTs). On Wednesday, we returned to work. Those of us commuting from the Metro had to walk from the Pentagon City stop, through the south parking lot, to enter the Pentagon. Smoke still was wafting from the roof, and the strong campfire smell of burned wood lingered throughout the corridors. The west end of south parking was turned into a supply depot, complete with food trailers from some fast-food chains sustaining the workforce. Security was tightthe security force was checking 100 percent of the bags, and armed guards with MP5 machine guns roamed the halls. The offices between the second and sixth corridors were roped off and guarded by Old Guard soldiers from Fort Myer. On Thursday, the smoke had ceased, but not much had changed inside the building. The firefighters vehicles were still in the Pentagon courtyard, functioning as a command and control post. I walked over to the end of south parking to view the damage. The gaping hole in the E-ring hit me hard; it is one thing to see the damage on television and in the papers, it is another thing to see it in person. The crews were working hard. I saw the large American flag hanging from the roof to the right of the hole. American flags were waving from many vehicles and trailers surrounding the damaged west side. Walking around the Pentagon, I saw the pools of water in the sixth corridor A-ring. We had heard that all the Army Chemical Corps personnel in the building were healthy and accounted for; however, the Headquarters Army staff personnel were unable to return to their office. By Friday morning, the cordoned-off areas were starting to shrink, and personnel with offices off corridors two and six were returning to work. A Way Ahead The attacks of 11 September lead to further speculation now as to how DOD should prepare for future CB terrorist incidents. Already, in the many major newspapers across the nation, people were discussing when (not if) terrorists would use CB warfare agents against U.S. military and civilian targets. The terrorist groups resolve to create mass casualties was no longer in question. As one pundit pointed out, if one had asked what the odds were that four commercial airplanes would be hijacked simultaneously, the answer probably would have been infinitesimal to none. Yet it happenedso too could a CB terrorist incident with thousands of related casualties. Still the fact remained that the terrorists did not use CB warfare agents this time. 14

Prominent speakers have stated over and over again, since the Aum Shinrikyo incident in 1995, that it was a matter of not if, but when. Well, it appears that terrorists still prefer simple and conventional tools to complex ones. (See Jonathan Tuckers book, Toxic Terror: Assessing Terrorist Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons, MIT Press, 2000.) There has been a good deal of discussion within the DOD CB defense community, and specifically the Army Chemical Corps, as to its role in consequence management or force protection. The challenge to the Chemical Corps has spread from its traditional roots to a more diverse CB threat. The question is how should the Chemical Corps develop and execute doctrine, organization, training, and materiel development in these new, emerging mission areas. Some would suggest that the concept of operations (CONOPS) in responding to a CB incident in consequence management or force protection missions has a different focus than the current CONOPS for passive-defense requirementsits not as simple as thinking in the same principles of contamination avoidance, protection, and decontamination. While the Chemical Corps is leading the development of multiservice tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) in these areas, it is not clear if the armed forces and its leadership have registered this new emphasis on CB defense. Consequence management and force protection are more oriented toward operations other than war, with a greater emphasis on protection of emergency responders than on military personnel. For instance, with consequence management, the requirements are to protect the emergency responders, assess the hazardous area, evacuate and treat the unprotected personnel, and then worry about full restoration of public services. For force protection, the requirements are to protect the military personnel within the gates (especially the gatekeepers), harden key facilities, and ensure that the base has an adequate capability to absorb an attack and continue functioning. These are different requirements than individual protection of the Joint task forceproviding situational awareness of CB hazards across the theater of operations, maintaining maneuver operations tempo, and sustaining operations at fixed sites. This means that the CONOPS will be different for executing a military response to these three very different mission areas (see figure). In addition, the Army Chemical Corps can safely claim that passive defense is mostly, if not all, within its realm of CB defense expertisenot so for consequence management and force protection. While there are CB defense tasks within those mission areas, they do not constitute a major function. They are service-specific funded efforts focused on counterterrorism or responses to terrorism, as opposed to a joint program focused on military operations. Consider that in 2001, according to the Government Accounting Office CML

estimates, the federal government spent five DOD CBDP may support Passive Defense (War): times the amount of counterterrorism funds on research and development Situational awareness of efforts not related to CB incident response than requirements for passive NBC hazards. on related efforts. If the members of the DOD Protect Warfighters. defense, force protection, and CB defense community do not appreciate the Maintain maneuver consequence management, but real politics and issues within the consequence OPTEMPO. the operational capabilities and management and force protection mission areas, Sustain operations at polices differ. they will be drummed out of DOD meetings as fixed sites. irrelevant distractions, and the DOD CB defense Consequence Management Force Protection (Peace): programs (CBDPs) value will be diminished. (Both): Survey and monitor The catch is that the technical development Identify unknown hazards protected area for hazards. of material solutions for passive defense, to safeguard civilians. Protect site occupants. consequence management, and force protection Protect first responders. Maintain services. addressing CB defense requirements are Restore government Protect site infrastructure. applicable across the three mission areas. This services. is both a blessing and a curse. The same DOD Restore and protect civil laboratories and industrial firms develop similar infrastructure. CB defense equipment in all three areas, which CB Defense Emphasis means they are leveraging the talent and expertise to ensure that the technical capability forces passive-defense capability will suffer. The is state of the art and consistent in capability. The operations and maintenance costs of procuring millions downside is that the current and projected DOD budget of protective ensembles and medical CB defense material, for CB defense research, development, and acquisition tons of decontaminants, and thousands of collective does not adequately cover all passive-defense protection filters are a considerable burden, and (to date) requirements of the Defense Planning Guidance, let alone not the top priority of most commanders. The costs of the additional consequence-management and force procuring additional protective ensembles and medical protection CB defense requirements. pre- and posttreatments for hundreds of thousands of Some have already suggested that DOD CBDP (and DOD and other-than-U.S.-forces personnel will be specifically not the service budgets) should procure CB immense (not to mention additional CB agent detectors, defense equipment for responding to CB terrorism as well decontaminants, and collective protection systems for as for traditional passive-defense requirements. If this is every military base that perceives a terrorist CB threat). the case, it will require a hard examination of the services It may be wiser to have DOD CBDP pay for the research priorities. It is not yet clear that the Office of the Secretary and development of CB defense equipment for all three of Defense and service leadership will add additional areas and procure equipment only for passive defense, resources to the jointly funded DOD CBDP to cover these while the services provide their own funds to procure new costs once they understand the current shortfalls in equipment for force protection and consequence DODs ability to respond to CB terrorism. Many will point management requirements. Otherwise, we may face an to the 11 September incident and state that there was no unconstrained appetite for new CB defense equipment CB warfare threat. that is not disciplined toward the top priority threats. There are other DOD capabilities with higher The DOD CBDP may be the appropriate vehicle for priorities that need financing, such as intelligence funding all these new requirements, but it is not prepared to collection efforts, information security, and force execute the effort even if the required funding came protection measures against conventional munitions. Even tomorrow. A long-term DOD CB defense strategic plan has the national missile defense program, despite its lack of not been developed and is not in place yet. We need a serious, capability against this particular form of terrorism, will top-down examination of the DOD counterproliferation still be fighting to retain its planned funding profile. There strategy, including how the counterproliferation pillars of certainly will be some funding for responding to CB counterforce, active defense, passive defense, and terrorism, but the force protection bill of the more than consequence management work together and who is in 600 DOD installations will be very high. Certainly it will charge of developing and implementing these capabilities. take additional DOD guidance, policy, and increased We need to clearly identify how the CBDP should support focus to institute any new efforts. counterproliferation and force protection areas. Next, we If DOD CBDP is taxed to provide for these new need to plan how to transition the DOD CBDP from a mission areas without additional funding, the armed February 2002 15

passive-defense-only effort to a DOD program that coordinates service and DOD requirements in passive defense, consequence management, and force protection. Considering all that has occurred since Public Law 103160 made this a joint program area in 1994 (the Defense Reform Initiative, DOD counterproliferation strategy, the two Quadrennial Defense Reviews), it is time to develop a new DOD CB defense strategy and revise its management structure. This plan will also require increased interaction with the Army staff and senior leadership. While Public Law 103-160 and the Joint service agreement on NBC defense management created a new and stronger DOD CBDP, it unintentionally decreased the Armys leadership role. The Army once had control of more than 70 percent of the DOD CB defense budget, and, having the only dedicated force structure addressing WMD required this emphasis. Previously, a general officer was on the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations (DCSOP) staff and a colonel in the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics (DCSLOG). Now the Army has 25 percent of the program, a colonel in DCSOP and a major in DCSLOG. For a service charged with being the DOD executive agent for NBC defense, it is handicapped in its attempts to lead discussions with the senior Army leadership, let alone with the other services that now equally share the program. The Army Chemical School is understaffed and overworked to keep up with its current responsibilities, let alone develop a new path forward in counterproliferation, as the other services and joint staff are developing in Washington, D.C. The Chemical Corps would benefit if it had a general officer and staff in Washington to liaison with the Army leadership, Joint staff, and services. Certainly there have been enough indications that the time has come for an expansion from passive defense to a broader counterproliferation and force protection charter. Without an Army chemical officer on the Army staff, perhaps even on the Joint staff, this expansion is not certain. There are numerous other cases to be made for a revitalized Army chemical presence on the Army staff. Too many unanswered policy questions and responsibilities exist in DOD CBDP for the DOD executive agent to ignore. The very basic question of how clean is clean begs to be answered, not just for chemical, but also now for biological (re: anthrax in the mail system). We need leadership on how to protect DOD civilians overseas from CB attacks, we need better implementation of the biological vaccine and WMD CST programs, and we need a serious evaluation of the Armys transformation plan to ensure it develops a force that can survive in a CB environment.

Conclusion These are just bold brush strokes of a concept intended to start us thinking on a way forward from the 11 September incidents. It is great to charge forward and offer our expertise in this time of crisis, but we also need to focus on an institutional fix for the DOD CBDP. We are no longer operating under the old scenario of two major theaters of wars. What we need is a clear way forward, unburdened from the constraints of the Chemical Corps operational concepts developed for the Cold War in the mid 1980s. This will require strong leadership and a willingness to explore new options while developing a concept that is executable from a budgetary standpoint as well as supported by the DOD counterproliferation strategy. The Army needs to continue its executive-agent role in guiding the discussion on joint CB defense logistics and consumption rates, and it needs to continue developing Dugway Proving Grounds as the premier DOD CB defense test and evaluation center. This requires Chemical Corps colonels, not majors, to interface and coordinate with the other services and DOD agencies. We are treading water now, and we need to lead the DOD program. Postscript As a final note, I want to acknowledge a personal loss. On that Tuesday, a friend and past colleague of mine died in the attack on the Pentagon. Gerald (Geep) Fisher, a BoozAllen consultant, was meeting Lieutenant General Tim Maude, Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, along with two other colleagues when the plane hit. He was briefing an improved system for survivor benefits for military employees. He was a great guy to know and work with, and he will be sorely missed. His death had a significant impact on memaking me realize how fortunate I was. While I work in the Pentagon every day, the news of his death really brought the impact of the incident home to me. On Monday, 17 September 2001, I saw that the construction workers had posted American flags on top of their tallest crane. From inside the A-ring, I saw the highest one fluttering in the breeze above the Pentagons roof on that beautiful fall day. Their work goes onso does ours.
Mr. Mauroni is a senior policy analyst for Analytic Services, Inc., and former Army chemical officer with 16 years of experience on Joint chemical and biological defense programs and policy issues. He currently supports the J5, Joint Chiefs of Staff, on DOD CB issues. He is the author of two books on chemical-biological defense and is currently working on his third book on the Armys chemical demilitarization program.

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Terrorism and the Mind of It

By Dr. Burton Wright III, USACMLS Command Historian
Many experts believe that the attacks on the World Trade Center Towers and the Pentagon bear the hallmark of Osama bin Laden, the worlds number one terrorist. The attacks were well thought out and executed almost to perfection. They indicated a high state of planning and thought. The attacks also required that the terrorists die in the attempt. A terrorist giving his life for a cause during a terrorist act isnt new. On the former island of Ceylon, a group of minority Tamils has been fighting the government allied with India for almost 20 years. Its members are famous for not allowing themselves to be captured alive. The group also is known to use suicide bombers to assassinate highranking government officials. Rajiv Gandhi, the son of Indira Gandhi who had been assassinated by one of her Sikh guards, was one of its most famous victims. In Russia during the 1880s, one terrorist group often used suicide bombers known as Social Revolutionary Combat Squads to assassinate members of the Tsar government. Its best-known victim was Tsar Alexander III, who was blown up by a suicide bomber as he walked from his coach to see some of his staff who earlier had been wounded in a bombing attack. The attacker was blown to bits, and Alexander (horribly mutilated by the blast) died several hours later. It was later discovered that the head of these combat squads was also an agent of the Tsarist Secret Police, the Okrana. In feudal Japan, ninja assassins were known to commit suicide if they failed in an assassination attempt or were surrounded after the assassination so they could not be captured and interrogated. Ninjas were clan-oriented and loyal only to their clan and the individual who employed them. The attacks on the U.S. embassies in Africa showed the same type of attention to detail as the 11 September 2001, attacks that bin Laden is accused of masterminding. In fact, the embassy attackssmaller, less dramatic operations to see if three different teams could attack separate targets almost simultaneouslycould have been a precursor to the 11 September attacks. Terrorists dont normally reach old age. They are engaged in a high-risk profession where many die violently in less than 10 years or end up in jail for life. The chief plotters of the assault on the U.S. embassies in

The Pentagon after the 11 September attack

Africa are likely to receive a life sentence. That Osama bin Laden has survived for nearly two decades in such a high-risk business says much about his abilities. Bin Laden is the son of a very wealthy Saudi business family. He was raised in comfort and educated as an Islamic scholar. Although his family has disowned him, they apparently gave him an inheritance of more than $100 million, which he has invested all over the world. Hence, he is often his own paymaster. The worlds number one terrorist once trained antiSoviet forces in Afghanistan for the United States. He lives simply and moves about very often. Loyal followers, who are not likely to turn against him, guard him. When reporters have been allowed to meet with him, they were minutely searched to ensure they were not carrying homing devices. It was rumored that some of his soldiers were in Mogadishu during the time the U.S. Rangers were caught behind enemy lines and that they helped the Somali gunman pin down the Rangers. Bin Ladens graduates also have been known to fight in Kosovo as well as in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Bin Laden is well known by most of the intelligence organizations across the Islamic world. He has agents in many major nations, including the United States. These agents do not draw attention to themselves; they merely either acquire information needed for operations or just wait for the phone to ring. Thus, bin Laden can strike from anywhere he chooses. Why does he dislike the United States so much? The reason seems to be his interpretation of his religion and

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Western culture. Bin Laden is what some have called an Islamic fundamentalist. He tends to view Islam with the perspective of a fifteenth-century warrior. Western culture and the influence of the United States around the world are a danger to Islam, as far as Bin Laden is concerned, and he believes the only way to fight this problem is to drive it back to the shores of the United States. To accomplish this, he will use terrorism. We may have seen just the opening salvos in this war with the 11 September attacks and the loss of thousands of lives. Terrorism has changed often over the centuries, but it has reached a new and very dangerous stage. In past years, terrorists expected to survive the act. They took hostages and also asked for a great deal of money to use for the struggle. Todays terrorists are not interested in such a mundane reward. Dying in the act is their reward they believe they will enter paradise. This belief is not, however, that widely held in Islam. Most Moslem scholars do not agree that the Koran allows this. Most Arabs and Moslems are not terrorists but are kind and friendly people. In recent press interviews, bin Laden has made it clear he will now target the United States. Since he recruits from the disaffected all over the Middle East, he does not have a lack of those willing to give their lives for his cause. The final count (including the Pennsylvania crash) suggests that there were at least 18 terrorists involved in the 11 September attacks who died for bin Ladens ideas and faith. The United States has faced such fanaticism before. During World War II, Japanese pilots deliberately dove their planes into U.S. ships. Casualties among ships and crew were high, but America won that war. We can overcome this problem as well; however, it will take time. Bin Laden is not headquartered in Afghanistan by accident. The terrain favors his ability to remain hidden, and he can move around with his small group of direct supporters and guards. Since he doesnt require an estate or what we call luxuries as some of the other terrorists would, he will be as difficult to find as a needle in a haystack. However, if the United States puts its full effort into finding him, he will, eventually be found. But to put him on the defensive, the United States needs to strike along several levels. First, the source of his major troublemaking is his money, which he moves from bank to bank to finance his operations. We must use

Rescue workers search through the rubble of the U.S. Embassy in Kenya in 1998.

our economic power to force countries known to launder his money to provide assistance and to freeze his assets. Tracing the money can be done, but it will take time to get a handle on it. Second, bin Ladens group has other members and other leaders who support him. They, too, must be brought to justice, and they are less protected. The Taliban government of Afghanistan has said publicly that bin Laden wasnt involved. In a sense that could be truehe works through a layered network of operatives. In fact, some of those who killed themselves on 11 September may not have known whom they really worked for. Bin Laden could have come up with the concept and then let others do all the work. Do not think that bin Laden can be persuaded to relent in his terrorist campaign. He will continue until we find and eliminate him or he dies naturally. He will not give up nor will those who support him. Unfortunately, they will not listen to reason. Thats why terrorists have short life spans. Bin Laden is but one of a group of like-minded individuals. Some are involved in wars in other countries. Terrorism is a worldwide problem, and its solutions will not only involve the United States but other nations as well that hold to a universal standard of brotherhood and peaceful coexistence. Only then will the mind of a terrorist interest only psychologists and historians. Soon, we will be taking the first steps in that direction.

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Masks of the Sea Service A Joint Effort

By Lieutenant Colonel Robert D. Walk Until recently, the U.S. Navy always plotted an independent course in acquiring technology, which resulted in similar requirements but different answers for the Army, Navy and, later, Air Force. This occurred with shipboard weaponry as well as gas (or protective) masks. The Navy desired a gas mask to protect the user from chemical agents while working. This meant that the sailor needed to project his voice for effective communications, see clearly to view gauges and knobs, move about the ship through bulkheads and around pipes and machinery, and breathe easily while doing so. After initial developments in World War I, the Navy tried various concepts to protect forces afloat, optical instrument users, shore-based forces, civilians, and submariners. After much effort, it finally issued a standard mask for all Navy personnel. This is the story of Navy mask development.
World War I mounted over the nose. For smoke concentrations, a pair of particulate filters could be mounted on either side of the chemical filter to filter out the smoke particles. An additional filter was available for carbon monoxide. By mounting the filter on top of the head, the Navy leadership sought to increase the usability of the mask on shipboardthere were no hoses to catch on anything, and the mask was relatively well balanced despite being heavy. However, sailors using the Mark II probably had problems ducking through bulkheads. Normally they could duck to one level to get through, but now they had an extra thick layer of stuff on their head and needed to duck lower than before, resulting in a steep learning curve and many sore

The Navys first gas mask, the Mark I, was developed by The Bureau of Mines American University Experimental Station. It was also known as the Navy snout-type mask. The facepiece was of thin, rubberized fabric mounted on a fabric frame. This mask combined the best features of all European masks the designers had available for study. The noseclip and mouthpiece were copied from the American pattern of the British small-box respirator. The replaceable canister and check valve were similar to the French Appareil Respiratoire Special (ARS) masks. The general appearance and rubberized fabric were similar to the standard German mask designs. It was carried in a metal can with a hinged cover and an attached web strap to hang over the shoulder. An interesting characteristic of the mask was the wire frame that allowed the user to adjust the mask for best vision. The Navy Mark II was an attempt to improve the concept of the Mark I by using the latest technology available. Various designs were tried, including placing the filter on the back of the neck and containing it under a helmet. The final mask used the Tissot principle of relying on the facepiece to form the seal that forces the wearer to inhale through the canister. Whereas the Mark I had a snout-type canister, the Mark II put the canister on an aluminum helmet on top of the head. The air flowed through the filter to a Y-adapter that split the airflow to both eye lenses, flowing over the eye lenses and keeping them clear (preventing dimming) and then into the lungs. Exhaled air Examples of early Navy masks: The Mark I (left) and flowed out the mask through a flutter valve the Mark II (right), with the canister on top of the head. February 2002

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heads and necks. It is interesting to note that the basis of issue of the Mark II was 50 percent of crew members on cruisers and destroyers and a total of 500 to battleships (crew of 1,860 sailors) in 1920. No mention is made of how the others were protected. Between the Wars In 1921, the Navy ordered the Armys MI service mask (also known as the Kops-Tissot-Monroe and the Model 1919) for issue to its forces. By 22 February 1922, a total of 25,000 masks had been delivered. At a 1922 chemical warfare conference, the Navy announced the need for a gas mask with speaking capability for the forces afloat, a gas mask to use with optical instruments, and an improved mask for submariners. Work commenced immediately. By 1924, prototypes were produced. Gas Masks of the Forces Afloat The Navy wanted to issue all sailors a mask with speaking capability. The mask so equipped was known as a diaphragm mask. The first one issued to the Navy in 1924 was called the Navy Diaphragm (ND) Mark I. It was essentially an Army MI service mask modified to include a speaking diaphragm. The facepiece was constructed of stockinette-coated rubber sheeting. The diaphragm was housed in a circular metal housing with an inlet valve at the bottom and a protected flutter-type outlet valve right next to it. Keeping with the Tissot design, the mask had a Y-shaped air deflector inside the mask to ensure airflow over the eye lenses. The Army adopted this mask as the Army Diaphragm MI (some references call it the Mark III mask) for leaders and soldiers needing to communicate. The only difference between the Army and Navy masks was the head harness the Army used a standard six-point elastic harness, while

the Navy used a six-point coiled-spring harness. In fact, the coiled-spring harness was used on all Navy diaphragm masks until the Mark V. In actual use, the diaphragm was only marginally effective, so work on an improved mask continued. The diaphragm mask was improved by making the eye lenses replaceable and making a one-size-fits-all mask (called a Universal mask). This mask was known as the ND Mark II (Army: MII diaphragm gas mask). A mask with an unmistakable appearance, it continued to use the basic stockinette-coated rubber sheeting for the facepiece, but it had an ungainly appearing diaphragm. The diaphragm was large, but recessed, and the inlet air tubes were externally mounted to protect the diaphragm and the outlet flutter valve. The outlet flutter valve was mounted directly in front of the diaphragm and pointed up. This mask, while an improvement, still had problems: exhaling was difficult when facing high winds, the long hose could catch on ship equipment, it was bulky, and vision was still restricted. Research continued to create a new mask, preferably a technologically advanced one with a molded facepiece. By 1939, technology had advanced far enough to allow the Navy to adopt a fully molded facepiecethe ND Mark III. This mask had the B2 filter mounted behind the head, aviation goggle-type eye lenses, an improved speaking diaphragm, and a new outlet valve. The aviation goggletype lenses were thoroughly examined in the 1930s by both the Army and Navy to improve the field of view. The Army, who improved vision by using the triangular-shaped lenses in its first fully molded masks, never adopted the ND Mark III. Note, however, the similarities of eye-lens design between the ND Mark III and the newest Army M45. Obviously, there are some advantages to using the aviation goggleshaped eye lens. The ND Mark III moved the filter from the waist to the head to eliminate the long hose that could catch on the myriad of protrusions onboard ship. It also eliminated the filter on

ND Mark I

ND Mark II

ND Mark III

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top of the head from the Mark II that probably caused head and neck injuries when sailors tried to move quickly through the ship or forgot to duck low enough when passing through bulkheads. Finally, the best aspect of the B2 filter was that it had less breathing resistance than earlier masks. These masks were issued only in universal size, purchased for the ships complement, and stored on board for issue when needed. Unfortunately, while the Mark III was lighter than previous masks, all the weight was on the head (although balanced), and this weight probably plagued sailors for the next two decades. In the quest to improve the ND Mark III (and standardize as much as possible with the Army), the Navy adopted the Armys triangular-shaped eye lenses as used on the M2, M3, M4, M5, and M8 masks. The new mask was the ND Mark IV. This mask provided improved vision for the sailor but still retained the basic flaws of the ND Mark III weight, bulk, and head injuries. It remained the standard Navy fleet mask until the mid1950s when the ND Mark V replaced it.
ND Mark V

mask were severely handicapped when working and, most likely, walking. Despite this, the mask was produced in quantity before and during World War II. Still standard in 1952, however, by 1960 this mask was no longer mentioned in Navy publications.

NDO gas mask Mark I

Mask for Submariners The Navy was extremely concerned with protecting the submariners also. The hazards on early submarines were many, not the least of which were noxious chemical vapors (modern terminology: industrial chemicals)carbon monoxide, chlorine (from the batteries), hydrogen chloride (batteries again), sulfur dioxide, gasoline vapors, oil vapors, carbon tetrachloride vapors, and industrial smokes. Emergency masks consisting of only a filter and noseclip were examined in the quest for an adequate submarine mask. They were noted as the Naval Submarine (NS) Model A and B, although no mention is made of any issuance. By 1920, the Navys Mark I gas mask was listed as the standard for defense against chlorine, the primary hazard by far due to battery deterioration. This mask was insufficient, but there was nothing better. Experimentation continued with modifications of the Army Model 1919 (MI) mask resulting in the NS Model C, D, E, and F. The alterations included attaching the filter directly to the facepiece and mounting the flutter (outlet) valve parallel to the filter (pointing out). This was ultimately the best design and was adopted as the Navy submarine mask Mark I, of which 5,000 were produced. The filter was a reactive canister designed strictly for the threat in submarines. It was not meant to proChlorine canister for vide protection against submariners, front view 21

Gas Mask for Optical Instrument Users At their 1922 chemical warfare meeting, the Navy determined it needed a mask to use with optical equipment. This mask was difficult to makethe first was called the E6 (Experimental Model 6) and was quickly delivered to the Navy. This mask was again a variant of the Army MI service gas mask. The use of flat, rubber sheet stock in the mask with optically ground glass used in the eye lenses made the mask extremely difficult to make and required many hand operations. Experimentation continued on this mask through the 1920s and into the 1930s. Finally, in the late 1930s, a fully molded face blank was developed in parallel with the ND Mark III, and a successful optical gas mask was delivered to the fleet. This mask was the Navy Diaphragm Optical (NDO) Gas Mask Mark I (Army: Optical Gas Mask MI) and was standard in 1939. This mask, while successful, still was extremely difficult to manufacture. A relative of the ND Mark III and IV, it shared the others faults (with more problems because of the optical lenses). Vision was extremely limited, and sailors wearing this February 2002

chemical warfare agents. Because of the harsh conditions aboard submarines, later reliability testing showed that the masks and filters did not maintain usability for long. To correct these deficiencies, the mask was constructed of leather, with the filter sealed until used. This leather mask was adopted as the Mark II submarine mask. By 1939, the Navy had deleted the submarine masks from the inventory and replaced them with the submarine escape apparatus. The escape apparatus, also known as the escape lung, provided the submariner with air and could be used in noxious atmospheres inside of the submarine as well as in the water. As space on submarines is at a premium, the mask was deleted. World War II With the onset of World War II, needs developed beyond what the Navy had anticipated in 1922. Production, fitting, and usability difficulties resulted in the need for more than just diaphragm, optical, and submarine masks. New challenges arose in outfitting Navy units whose primary responsibility was on land, not sea. The Navy then procured additional masks for shore-based forces as well as civilians working with the Navy. Masks for Shore-Based Forces During World War II, the Navy adopted the Armys lightweight service gas mask for shore-based forces. With the Navys vast increase in size and the difficulty in manufacturing the ND Mark III, it needed a mask quickly. In addition, naval-construction battalions and port organizations needed an Army-style mask that they could wear under helmets. The Army mask was immediately available because it was a simpler design already in mass production. It also was designed to be worn under the standard Army helmet. This mask did not provide speaking capability, but the ND Mark III or IV could be issued when necessary. This mask remained in use by the shore-based Naval forces until the early 1960s when it was phased out. A Mask for Civilian Workers For civilians, the Navy produced the Navy Civilian (NC) Mark I mask. Starting in 1941, this mask was produced for Navy civilian-support personnel to use during an emergency, beating the Armys MI noncombatant gas mask into production by almost a year. Although the NC Mark I was inexpensive, it still provided the necessary protection for the civilians to escape the hazard, but it was not meant for hard use. This mask was made of stockinette-covered rubber sheeting (like the ND 22
NC Mark I

Mark I and II) with a glued-in plastic eye lens, two cheekmounted filters, an army-style six-point head harness, and an exposed outlet valve. The filters later inspired the design of the filters for the M6 Dog Mask. The NC Mark I mask was eliminated shortly after World War II. Post World War II Masks At the end of World War II, the Navy had four standard masks: NDO Mark I, ND Mark III, ND Mark IV for forces afloat, and the lightweight service mask for shore-based forces. The ND and NDO masks for forces afloat (still in use) were bulky and heavy. To reduce cost and weight, the Navy sought a lighter, less bulky mask with better vision, which resulted in the ND Mark V. This mask used the same basic layout as the earlier NC Mark I and many of the concepts of the Armys fledgling E13 mask program, but it was constructed for hard shipboard use. Adopted in the mid-1950s, the ND Mark V had a single, large eye lens; two large, flat C-1 canisters; and a carrier with a metal plate to prevent damage to the mask. The facepiece also was designed with a new type of seal around the periphery to improve fit and comfort. The innovative seal was pneumatic and allowed the mask to CML

properly fit most faces. This feature worked well when new, but it did not last long in service. It was only produced in size medium (formerly called universal), so the Navy recommended carefully tightening the five headharness straps. This mask carried the Navy from the 1950s to the 1980s. The ND Mark Vs uniqueness among the services and allies was probably its biggest problem. The lightweight service mask used by shore-based forces was phased out by the early 1960s. It was replaced by the M9A1 mask, which was supplemented by, and then replaced by, the M17-series masks. These Army-standard masks have been discussed at length in the article, Mask History Infantry or General-Purpose Mask (see Army Chemical Review, February 2001), and will not be discussed further here. The All-Navy Mask Technology advanced in the aerospace industry in the 1970s with a wonder materialsilicone. The military worked with silicone for aviation uses as well as use in chemical warfare defense. Silicone is a wonder material because it is nonallergenic, and it is so flexible that it can be fitted to anyone. Using silicone as the face blank material, the Army designed the XM29- and XM30-series masks and then dropped the program. The Navy and Air Force liked the XM30s basic design and adopted this mask in 1983 as the Mask, Chemical Uniform (MCU) number 2 or MCU-2/P for short. This became the first All-Navy mask as envisioned in a 1928 article. This one mask replaced both the ND Mark V for the forces afloat and the M17-series masks for forces ashore, which eased the logistical burden. The new features of the mask included

ND Mark V
two voicemitters (one for speaking to others and one for use with telephones), a nosecup to minimize eye lens fogging, and spectacle insert capability, and it allowed the user to drink from a canteen. The NATO standard C-2 filter canister could be mounted on either side of the facepiece to suit the users needs. Like the ND Mark V, the mask had one large eye lens, but this one was more flexible for use with optical instruments. An outsert also could be added for scratch and sun protection. The MCU-2/P was altered to fit a microphone pass through and became the MCU-2A/P. This mask could be fitted to individual sailors through the use of three sizes (small, medium, and large). The MCU-2/P-series mask was the primary mask used by the Navy during Operation Desert Storm, although there were probably some ND Mark Vs still in the system as well. Seeking to further improve the voice transmission of the mask, the Navy adopted the same voicemitter amplifier as the Army the M7except the Navy called it the AN/PNT-2. Mask for Joint Service As technology advances, the Navy looks for a better mask as well. It is full partners in the Joint Services General Purpose Mask (JSGPM) Program. The JSGPM issued to each soldier, sailor, Marine, and airman is to be lightweight, inexpensive, and compact. In addition, the mask will be tested against selected standard industrial chemicals to ensure that the users are protected in modern toxic environments. The programs objective is to lower total ownership cost for the military. 23

MCU-2A/P

February 2002

Hains, Paul W. LT, The Protection of Capital Ships Against Since this mask will be used by all services, the initial unit Poison Gas, Chemical Warfare, Volume 9, Number 9, The cost and spare and repair parts will benefit from an economy Chemical Warfare School, Edgewood Arsenal, MD, September of scale. In essence, the more the military buys, the less each 15, 1923. mask will cost. Reduction in overall weight and bulk are NAVDOCKS-TP-PL-2, ABC Warfare Defense Ashore, critical also, and the JSGPM must occupy less space than a Bureau of Yards and Docks, Washington, D.C., 1960. replacement MCU-2A/P facepiece. NAVEDTRA 10054-F, Basic Military Requirements, GPO, The JSGPM or XM50 is a technological leap forward, Washington, D.C., 1986. but it is not ready for issue yet. The U.S. Army project NAVPERS 10899A, Disaster Control (Ashore and Afloat), manager for the Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical GPO, Washington, D.C., 1964. Defense Systems (PM NBCDS) is the lead for the JSGPM The Navy Mask, Final Report of Gas program and is working closely with the Defense Division Chemical Warfare Service U.S. Navy Coastal Systems Station, U.S.A. Technical Section, Volume 34, Panama City, Florida. On 30 March Undated. 2001, the Program Definition and Risk Optical Mask E6-7-4, Progress Report No. Reduction (PDRR) base developmental 549, Project D1.1-22, Mechanical Division, contract was awarded to Avon Rubber Protective Department, Edgewood Arsenal, and Plastics, Cadillac, Michigan. Avon MD, October 10, 1927. currently makes the FM12 and S10 Project Designations Telephone Mask Navy military masks for the United Kingdom Diaphragm Mask, Progress Report No. 239, and many other NATO countries. Mechanical Division, Protective Department, As of September 2000, initial protoEdgewood Arsenal, MD, July 19, 1922. types were received from Avon. Over the Rockwell, P.O. Development of a Canister past year, development on refining the for Submarine Service, Project F-65, Report masks continued. Final PDRR test articles E.A.C.D. 224, Edgewood Arsenal, MD, were received in November 2001. Early November 7, 1922. initial operational test and evaluation field Service Chemicals United States Navy 1936, tests of this masks will occur in 2001 and Joint Service General Protective GPO, Washington, D.C., 1936. 2002, and end users will get an opportunity Service Chemicals United States Navy 1939, Mask, XM50, prototype to influence both mask design and doctrine GPO, Washington, D.C., 1939. development. Submarine Facepiece E4, Progress Report No. 551, Project

Conclusion Never truly satisfied with the status quo, the Navy leadership sought innovative solutions to the problem of chemical warfare protection. They had specialized masks developed and issued them to the forces afloat and ashore, optical instrument users, civilian workers, and submariners, as needed. When technology allowed it, the Navy finally issued only one mask for all and are fully integrated in the JSGPM Program.
References Bell, Robert C. LT (jg), The All-Navy Gas Mask, Chemical Warfare, Volume 14, Number 7, The Chemical Warfare School, Edgewood Arsenal, MD, July 15, 1928. Bureau of Construction and Repair, Breathing Apparatus (Rescue and Protective), GPO, Washington, 1920. Carey, Christopher, U.S. Chemical and Biological Defense Respirators: An Illustrated History, Schiffer Publishing, Atglen, PA, 1998. The Gas Mask, Mechanical Division, Protective Department, Edgewood Arsenal, MD, March 26, 1927.

D1.1a, Mechanical Division, Protective Department, Edgewood Arsenal, MD, October 21, 1927. Submarine Mask, Progress Report No. 400, Project D1.1-18, Mechanical Division, Protective Department, Edgewood Arsenal, MD, September 24, 1923. Submarine Mask E4-6-3, Progress Report No. 545, Project D1.1-18, Mechanical Division, Protective Department, Edgewood Arsenal, MD, August 15, 1927. Submarine Mask E4-6-3, Progress Report No. 556, Project E1a, Mechanical Division, Protective Department, Edgewood Arsenal, MD, November 26, 1927. http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/ships/BB/BB33_Arkansas.html, Accessed February 25, 2001. Special thanks to Mr. Bart Wilkus for his photographic assistance.
LTC Walk is an Active Reserve chemical officer assigned as the ultimate bureaucrat (executive officer) in the Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations, United States Army Reserve Command. He is a volunteer hazardous-materials technician and firefighter for Fayette County, Georgia.

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Book Review
By Dr. Burton Wright III, USACMLS Command Historian

Germs: Biological Weapons And Americas Secret War, Judith Miller, Stephen Engelburg, and William J. Broad. New York: Simon and Schuster, 2001 Knowledge is power. You cant deal with a situation if you dont know anything about it. This is especially true considering the anthrax scare that America is presently experiencing. Knowledge of the situation is vital in understanding the current problems, and it requires serious reading. A new book, just published, should help the average American comprehend the problems and pitfalls of attempting to stop the spread of bioweapons as well as defending against them. Germs: Biological Weapons And Americas Secret War, by Judith Miller, Stephen Engelburg, and William Broad, is a sober and well-researched book on the problems America has faced in protecting itself from bioweapons attacks. The book begins with an example of bioweapons use the poisoning of salad bars in Antelope, Oregon, with the salmonella bacteria. The perpetrators were a cult led by a con man from India who wanted to gain control of the town. The cult believed that if these attacks were executed, it could win upcoming elections and rule the town. The authors take you through the incidents, searching for the cause and then hunting for those responsible, and their eventual defeat, disbanding, and disappearance. The search wasnt much different than the one now being conducted to find whoever is mailing anthrax. The book covers the Gulf War and the U.S. militarys scramble to try and protect its personnel against Iraqs bioweapons capabilities. It was then thought (later confirmed by the United Nations Special Commissions [UNSCOMs] inspectors) that Iraq had a large biological and chemical weapons arsenal. After UNSCOMs work, it became clear that the bioweapons program Iraq was engaged in was more massive than first thought. Getting a vaccine for anthrax was a top priority for the United States because it was believed that Iraq had developed nosecones filled with anthrax for SCUD missiles, which later proved to be true. Thus, Iraq possessed a biological weapon, which the United States feared they would most likely use. February 2002 The governments efforts, at the time, form several chapters of good intentions running into politics and the bureaucratic inertia of government. The authors clearly state that the situation was not handled well. This cannot be allowed to happen in the future. Throughout the book, the authors call the situation as they see it, and most times are right. This book is not an I-told-you-so type, but one that lays out the problems and then discusses the attempts made to solve them some successful and some not. By using the authors facts on what didnt work in the past, America can build a defense for the future. Several well-researched chapters are devoted to the Soviet bioweapons program called BIOPREPARAT and its full implications. The authors do not exaggerate for effect in this book, but the details they describe are chilling. When the Unites States discovered that the Soviets program existed, it attempted to develop a defense. The startand-stop system that followed restarted genuine efforts to create a defense system that would allow the United States to identify a biological attack, isolate the contamination, and then find out who did it and retaliate. The authors of Germs point out, quite accurately, this is not an easy fix and that there are enough natural problems in nature requiring much work to be done, such as the West Nile virus. They state that the response, in general, to the outbreak of the virus was good, and that the state and local agencies where it existed worked together. But, they also point out that the system used, while it worked well enough, could not stand any real strain and that communication up and down the health net was poor. The seriousness of having to deal with mass casualties is no laughing matter. It would not take long for hospitals to break under the strain of a truly massive use of bioweapons. We are not ready now for this calamity. The authors are clear on one thingbiological warfare is very REAL. It is not the child of a hyperactive press. 25

Germs says it rightthe United States, as the sole global superpower, is now the direct site for enemies who WILL use weapons of mass destruction. In fact, it is very likely that the recent anthrax attack is but a precursor to others. Remember, the authors also point out that bioweapons can be used against targets other than peoplecrops, animals, computers. The book confirms that while terrorists can engage in somewhat crude uses of biowarfare (as is occurring), the most sophisticated use of bioweapons and their coordination over a spectrum of different agents that heralds a conventional attack can only be accomplished by a relatively sophisticated state or countryIraq or Iran.

Reading this book brings the reader up to date on the situation through the mirror of past events and how they were handled. This gives any American a reasonable understanding of the parameters of the problem of Homeland Security and how tough it will be to develop and put in place such a protective system. The authors believe this is not impossible and that it must be done right now. Waste no time and use the past as a way of creating what will work and what will provide lasting protection to the United States. An informed public with the requisite knowledge will ensure that we create what will be needed to keep us safe from this type of an attack.

Media Release U.S. Army Non-Stockpile Chemical Materiel Project Completes First Set of Engineering Scale Tests PLASMOX System Tested in Switzerland on Neutralent Simulants
For further information, contact: Jeff Lindblad (410) 436-4555 Edgewood, MDThe U.S. Army Non-Stockpile Chemical Materiel Project (NSCMP) has completed the first of three phases of engineering scale testing of plasma-arc technologies for the destruction of neutralents. Neutralents are compounds produced by the destruction of either chemical agents or industrial chemicals. In January 2001, while under contract with Stone & Webster for NSCMP, Burns and Roe Enterprises, Inc. and its technology partner, MGC Plasma AG of Switzerland, completed tests of MGCs PLASMOX plasma system. Plasma is generated from ionizing gas so that it becomes a conductor of electrical energy. Plasma technologies use a high intensity electrical discharge, or arc, to break apart the chemical bonds of solid, liquid, and gaseous compounds into simpler, nonhazardous compounds. It has been demonstrated that both liquid and solid wastes can be processed effectively using plasma technologies. The demonstration was performed at MGCs facilities using its transportable plasma system. The purpose of the testing was to assess system operability during the processing of two simulated neutralent waste streams and to obtain engineering data to support preliminary design parameters. The scale tests were also used to demonstrate maximum system throughput; the continuous, stable operation of the PLASMOX system; and the ability to treat neutralents so their byproducts can be readily disposed of without additional treatment. The tests also provided assurance that the systems discharge would meet or exceed environmental laws and regulations. The chemical agents treated during the scale tests were sarin (GB) and mustard (H). Each of the agents was combined with the neutralent simulant monoethanolamine, or MEA. The results of the first of three tests indicate that neutralent byproduct streams treated by a PLASMOX unit can be disposed as nonhazardous wastes. Additional plasma technology tests are planned based on the results of the PLASMOX system tests. The PLASMOX plasma system was selected by NSCMP for limited engineering scale testing based on the recommendation of an independent group of academics, related industry professionals and citizens known as the Technology Evaluation Panel (TEP). TEPs members have many years of experience in conducting technology evaluations for government and industry. PLASMOX technology has been successfully deployed in fixed-base and mobile applications in Europe and Asia. The German Ministry of Defense selected plasma-arc technology to treat chemical warfare materiel and contaminated soils. The transportable plasma system was used to destroy chemical warfare agents, including Clark, Lewisite, Phosgene, Adamsite, and Yperit. Based on its proven success, the plasma system was recently shipped to Albania to destroy its chemical warfare munitions and agents.
For more information, please contact the program manager for Chemical Demilitarization Public Outreach and Information Office at (800) 488-0648.

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A Special Book Review

The Army
Brigadier General Harold W. Nelson, USA (R), Editor-in-Chief; Major General Bruce Jacobs, AUS (R), Editor; Colonel Raymond K. Bluhm, Jr., USA (R), Graphics Editor

By Dr. Burton Wright III, USACMLS Command Historian

They say a picture is worth a thousand words. True enough, but a bodyguard of words that explain the significance of the picture also must surround it. This system usually creates what is often called a coffee table bookone that you leave around for visitors to look though and enjoy. The Army, published by the Army Historical Foundation, is a 353-page book with hundreds of color photos and prints. It has a beautiful hardcover that contains a brass insignia. This book is the type of publication that marks an individual as one who appreciates the sacrifice of those who have served in the U.S. Army and who serve today. The binding of the book, the selection of visuals, and the production indicate richness and a first-class effort. The authors of the book are not only well qualified to pick the visual support for their writing, but they are also good historians. The senior editor, BG Harold Nelson, was the Commander of the U.S. Army Center of Military History before retiring. Before and since his retirement, BG Nelson has been active in writing and speaking about history. The book is essentially a history of the Army from its early days to the present, with a small part dedicated to its perceived future. The current Chief of Staff of the Army, General Eric Shinseki, wrote the first section. It is a short synopsis of what the Army has done during its long and proud history. The next section, which is long and detailed, is a simple time line of what the Army has accomplished from its beginnings. Any organization has to have some form of spirit, and the Army is no exception. But what has been required of the Armyto defend this Republicis not an easy task, but it is one the Army has always accomplished.

BG Nelson describes the spirit of the Army, section three, throughout its 200 plus years of existence. He does a superb job of covering the Armys history, considering the limited space (353 pages) he has to work in. Leaders guide a military force. America has had its share of leaders, both good and bad. Section four, Legends, is dedicated to the Chiefs of Staff of the Army, who were often legends in their own timeDouglas MacArthur, U.S. Grant, and William T. Shermanand left indelible marks on the Army. They did their work through conflicts like the Civil War, World War I, and World War II. The Chief of Staff is an enormous responsibility, but this Army has been blessed with leaders that help create a first-class fighting force. No army, however large or small, can operate without good noncommissioned soldiers. The American Army has had more then its share of outstanding NCOs. In the section written by a historian who is also a sergeant major, the reader is introduced to the life of the NCO in pictures and words. One NCO corps legend, William McKinley who as a sergeant won the Medal of Honor during the Civil Warlater became President of the United States. The quality of the current Army NCO Corps makes it the best Army in the world. The Medal of Honor is the highest award for valor given to a soldier. It usually means that a person of uncommon valor is recognized for actions performed in combat. The Army has had some remarkable Medal of Honor winners, and in the section , Brotherhood of the Brave, their stories are told. My favorite is of the bravery

February 2002

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of Trumpeter Calvin P. Titus who was asked by his officer to climb the walls of Peking. He replied, Ill try, sir! He proceeded to do it under fire and plant the flag of the United States on the battlements. Many Americans, while familiar with the early history of the United States, are not familiar with the Armys part in the development of the American frontier. Lewis and Clark were Army officers, as was the Pathfinder, John C. Fremont. Roads, harbors, and other parts of the infrastructure of this nations formative years were built using the genius and hard work of Army personnel. Army engineers built the Panama Canalone of the wonders of the modern world. This is a part of what the Army does today that has not changed with time and will continue far into the future. The Army is a fighting force. Its principal task is to defend this nation against any enemy. But the Army doesnt always fight to get the job done, which the author vividly illustrates in the section, Building of the Nation. One area the Army has always been, when needed, is civil relief after natural disasters. When a hurricane hit Southern Florida, Army units (Active and Reserve) were rushed to the devastated areas to assist in the cleanup and maintenance of order. They were mighty appreciated, too. Soldiers dont acquire their ability to do their job well by instinctthey must be taught. The section written by former Army Chief of Staff General Gordon Sullivan, who was a historian before he was a soldier, depicts the evolution of the Army school system and how it has come to train its leaders and soldiers so well. Training enables the Army to operate successfully in all parts of the world and create (in less than 24 months) an army of 10 million men in World War II. It is a feat that has never been duplicated before or since. From nothing, the Army fought its way into shape against formidable opposition in the Pacific and Europe and learned how best to train its soldiers. The Germans, who after Kasserine Pass believed that the U.S. Army wasnt that good, sorrowfully learned that they were a bit premature in their judgment. Almost since its inception, the Army has been a twopart forcean Active Component that soldiers 365 days a year and a Reserve Component that reinforces the Active Component when the need arrives. That strength in

reserve has proven vital in our historyit was so in World War I, World War II, and Desert Shield/Desert Storm. The Army National Guard and the Army Reserve were then, and are now, an integral part of the Army. Without the Reserves, the Army would not be able to project American power where it needs to be. Perhaps the most interesting part of the book is one of the last sections, which deals with the future. What will the Army be like in the first decades of the twentyfirst century? There are great changes in the works today. The Army is, quite literally, reshaping itself to be able to respond to the situations it sees in the future. This is not an easy task, but one that is necessary. In the wars of the last century, the Army often started behind and had to catch up. The leaders of today want to reverse the trend and be ready from the first minutes of the conflict. That they have succeeded has been amply demonstrated by the events in Afghanistan. The strategy developed by the military leadership has provided a situation where the Army used its new training and doctrine to perfection. There will be more situations like this, but the Army is ready to undertake any mission, anytime, anywhere. This is evident if you use The Army as a point of reference. In a surrender ceremony in the closing days of World War II, a German general asked an American general for his credentials. What the German wanted to know was what schools, what commands, and what medals the American had so he could determine if he was surrendering to an equal. The American general didnt understand the question at first, but when he did, he pointed to the large number of American soldiers nearby and told the German general, These are my credentials. Americans can be proud of many things in our history; The Army demonstrates how much pride they should have in the men and women who wear the uniform today. They have never failed this countryhistory demonstrates that. They will never fail this countryhistory tells us that is true as well. The Army is a must for the table of everyone who has pride in the Army and its members. The Army is available now, and can be ordered directly from the Army Historical Foundation (703-522-7901 or http://www.armyhistoryfnd.org/). Additional information is available at Website (www.hlla.com).

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How the Chemical Corps Addresses Hazardous Materials

By Albert J. Mauroni On 18 July 2001, about 3 in the afternoon, a CSX train of about 60 cars derailed inside a 2-mile tunnel running under Baltimores inner city. This train carried a number of hazardous chemicals, including propylene glycol, glacial acetic acid, ethyl hexyl phthalate, fluorosilicic acid, tripropylene, and hydrochloric acid. It also carried several boxcars of plywood, pulpboard, and paper. The tanker of tripropylene caught fire and was burning at temperatures above 1000 degrees Fahrenheit. The two tankers of hydrochloric acid, next to the tripropylene tanker, were leaking at a rate of 700 gallons per hour. A total of 13,000 gallons of hydrochloric acid leaked out of the two tankers. The acid didnt burn, but the intense heat created a toxic vapor environment within the tunnel which severely limited firefighters attempts to control the blaze. This is called a classic toxic industrial chemical (TIC) incident. The residents in the immediate area definitely noticed the incident, not just because of the thick, black smoke pouring out of the tunnels entrance, but they could also smell the strong chemical odor, something like burning pain which stung their eyes. Firefighters went door to door advising the residents to keep their doors and windows closed. Police closed roads in a five-block radius of the tunnel, causing a tremendous rush-hour incident. The police wore cloth masks as they directed traffic around the incident; hours later, their eyes felt gritty, their noses were dripping, and their throats were dry from the smoke. The irritants were so strong that the Baltimore Orioles-Texas Rangers doubleheader at Camden Yards was canceled.
This incident is an excellent scenario to consider how the Chemical Corps and the other services chemicalbiological defense (CBD) specialists should be addressing TICs. FMs 3-3, Chemical and Biological Contamination Avoidance, and 3-4, NBC Protection, are being redrafted to address TIC hazards, including those deliberately and accidentally released. How the military addresses these hazardous materials (HAZMATs) will impact our future doctrine, training, and materiel for addressing CBD threats on the battlefield. Do TICs pose a dangerous weaponized threat equal to that of chemical warfare agents, or are TICs just environmental health hazards? The nuance is very important; either we should modify all our chemical detectors, protective ensembles, collective protection shelters, and decontaminants to include protection against TICs, or we could address TICs as the medical environmental health and HAZMAT specialists do. I suggest the latter proposal is more appropriate. TICsChemical Warfare Agents or HAZMAT Incidents In the last Army Chemical Review, Major Mark Lee pointed to the Bosnian peacekeeping mission as an Army operation that involved a TIC hazard, one that was addressed by chemical specialists as a preventivemedicine response. The Air Force and Navy have raised February 2002 the issue of TICs as something that needs to be addressed in military scenarios. They do not have full-time CBD specialists; rather, their CBD expertise comes from general-disaster preparedness experts that address natural incidents, such as severe weather, as well as HAZMAT spills in addition to CB warfare agents. In current military operations, the armed forces are increasingly involved in small-scale contingencies involving nonstate military actors, as well as small nations that cannot afford hightech weapon systems or a full-scale chemical warfare weapon program. One concern is that these adversaries may employ TICs as a substitute for a chemical weapon, although that scenario hasnt yet been seen in actual combat. Some experts believe that terrorists, lacking a sophisticated laboratory or access to bulk chemicals (unlike the Aum Shinrikyo), might use a tanker full of some industrial chemical or a crop duster with pesticides as a weapon against a military installation. Certainly it would be easier to obtain (or steal) industrial chemicals than manufacture chemical warfare agents, but again, we havent seen that happen. Several Arab-American citizens were arrested after the 11 September incident for having false HAZMAT certificates; however, none had any connections to terrorist organizations. It may be more likely that these terrorists would use a large tanker to place a large amount of fuel or volatile gas near an installation 29

and ignite the chemical for its high-yield explosive effect, rather than for its TIC effect. In the event that a HAZMAT event does occur as a domestic-terrorist incident, firefighters and their HAZMAT teams are well-versed in how to handle these events. It may be that military CBD specialists will not be in place with the right equipment to respond as quickly or as thoroughly as these full-time experts. There is the concern that our forces, operating in some military operation overseas, may be deployed near an industrial site that is either not in compliance with our EPA standards or that is accidentally blown up. The Chemical Corps calls this incident a release other than attack (ROTA). The resulting health effects could be detrimental to our forces; traditionally, this has been a medical surveillance concern rather than a Chemical Corps concern. While the CBD specialists should assist the commander in identifying industrial chemical hazards, it is not clear if DOD should modify all CB detectors to view releases of TICs on the battlespace, if DOD should redesign its protective masks and suits to protect its troops from any TIC exposure, and if DOD has the charter to restore the battlespace from TIC residual contamination. Again, it depends on whether we see TICs as a potential health hazard or something equal in lethality to chemical warfare agents. The term toxic industrial materials (TIMs) expands the definition to include toxic industrial biologicals (TIBs) and toxic industrial radiologicals (TIRs), respectively. The military community has not defined a list of TIBs and TIRs, as it has with TICs, but these terms are emerging in doctrine, training, and acquisition documents. This is dangerous because people may start generalizing the threat, as is often done with the term WMD or NBC. Our community stresses the point that NBC defense against NBC agents presents operational differences, which is also true of TICs, TIBs, and TIRs. Therefore, it may be more appropriate to drop the TIC/TIB/TIR/TIM mix and refer to these threats as HAZMATs, as the private sector does. All these statements illuminate the fact that it is not clear if we are considering TICs as weaponized threats or as health hazards. Either we are training DOD CBD specialists to double as HAZMAT or medical specialists, or we think that future adversaries are seriously considering the use of less toxic chemicals than sarin or mustard as weapons against our forces. Of course, maybe both cases are true. But the lack of clarity on this topic has created great confusion among the doctrine and training centers, the material developers, and the policy makers. Examining the Threat of TICs I believe there are three aspects as to why we should not be addressing TICs as a threat equal to chemical 30

warfare agents. First and foremost, TICs are several orders of magnitude less toxic than chemical warfare agents. While all nations in World War I that initiated a chemical weapons program started with industrial chemicals such as chlorine and phosgene, they moved on to other agents for several reasons. Many WW I chemical warfare agents could be seen and smelled by individual soldiers before lethal effects took hold. Many were harassing, not lethal, agents. Others, such as hydrogen cyanide, had to be delivered in such large quantities, or they dissipated too rapidly to kill large numbers of military personnel. For a moment, lets not even look at the first generation gases of WW I. The International Task Force (ITF)-25 report categorized 98 potential TICs in terms of high, moderate, and low hazard. To make the list, they had to have an LCt50 (lethal concentration dose for 50 percent of an exposed population) less than 100,000 mgmin/m3 and be produced in quantities exceeding 30 tons per year at a single facility. In addition, these chemicals had to have appreciable vapor pressures at 20 degrees Centigrade or be listed in the North American Emergency Response Guidebook. When comparing the respective permissive exposure limits (PELs) of selected hazardous chemicals (see table, p. 31), one can immediately identify several orders of magnitude difference in lethality between TICs and modern chemical warfare agents. The major difference between these two types of chemicals is, while a small glass of chemical warfare agents can be incapacitating or fatal to a large crowd, it takes tons of industrial chemical agents to cause mass casualties. The methyl isocyanate spill at Bhopal, India, occurred at night when unprotected individuals were sleeping, and it involved hundreds of thousands of gallons40 tons in all. Those are the only reasons mass casualties ensued. No one evacuated Baltimore because of the July 2001 spill, which involved 13,000 gallons of hydrochloric acid. It may be an error to state that TICs are just as lethal as the traditional chemical warfare agents. There are only four TICs that fall in this categoryphosgene, chloropicrin, hydrogen cyanide, and cyanogen chloride and these are listed in the CWCs Schedule III list. If there were other industrial chemicals as lethal as these, countries would develop them not only for industrial use but also as chemical warfare agents. These agents are developed to kill people, and the more lethal agents are clearly the nerve and blister agents, not toxic industrial chemicals. Second, from a threat perspective, do we expect major nation states (or even minor state players) to employ such tactics? Saddam Husseins orders to dump oil into the Gulf and light all the oil derricks in Kuwait caused inconveniencies to our armed forces, but that didnt stop them from accomplishing the mission. Health effects as well as economic repercussions developed from those CML

Table. Comparison of Various Hazardous Chemicals to Sarin Hazardous Chemical Materials Ammonia Arsine Boron trichloride Boron trifluoride Carbon disulfide Chlorine* Diborane Ethylene oxide Fluorine Formaldehyde Hydrogen bromide* Hydrogen chloride* Hydrogen cyanide* Hydrogen fluoride* Hydrogen sulfide* Nitric Acid, fuming Phosgene* Phosphorus trichloride Sulfur dioxide Sulfuric acid Tungsten hexafluoride Sarin * JCAD objective requirement G=gas, L=liquid Physical State Odor G G G, L G, L L G G G G L G, L G G G, L G L G G, L L L G G Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Color No No No No Yes Yes No No Yes No No Yes No No No Yes No No No Yes No No ppm=parts per million OSHA Permissive Exposure Level 50 ppm 0.05 ppm N/A LD50 2541 ppm 1 ppm 20 ppm 1 ppm 0.1 ppm 0.5 5 ppm 0.1 ppm 1 ppm 3 ppm 5 ppm 5 ppm 3 ppm 20-50 ppm 2 ppm 0.1 ppm 0.5 ppm 5 ppm 1 ppm N/A LD50 217 ppm 0.00001 ppm

actions, but ultimately the Chemical Corpss mission was to ensure that the armed forces could survive and sustain combat operations. Does this mean the Army should have had chemical TIC detectors during the Persian Gulf War? Would the military units have stopped and donned protective ensembles before moving across the oil fields if their chemical detectors alarmed to less-than-lethal hydrogen sulfide concentrations? I dont think so. There are several acids on this ITF-25 list. Is there now a requirement to redesign our protective ensembles to resist TIC penetration if the TIC is a corrosive acid? If so, this may require wearing impermeable suits and air tanks. Fixing the masks to filter out industrial chemical vapors is not too hard, but that doesnt make them National Institute of Safety and Health (NIOSH) compliant. Right now, NIOSH standards for operation in hazardous environments require a self-contained breathing apparatus, such as oxygen-fed firefighter masks. Restoration efforts may require CBD specialists that are HAZMAT-qualified to use Level A suits so they can supervise cleaning up toxic chemical spills. The U.S. Army Center for Health Promotion and Preventive Medicine (USACHPPM) has suggested that not only should the Army have detectors that sense military chemical warfare agents and TICs, but that they February 2002

should also be designed to alarm to much lower levels than they currently detect. Specifically, the concern is that troops may deploy near industrial sites that are offgassing low concentrations of TICs, which over time may result in adverse health effects. This is not just a concern about immediate operational effectiveness; USACHPPMs mandate in preventive medicine also addresses long-term chronic health threatsthose medical concerns that may emerge years after a military deploymentas well as immediate acute threats. This means the concentration levels being monitored are well below first noticeable effects. The long-term health of our military personnel is a top concern to commanders, but this is a medical-force health-protection mission. What would it cost to procure CBD equipment, train our CB specialists in health-protection doctrine, and burden our forces with overly sensitive gear? We just dont know. Designing Military Equipment to New Standards There are a growing number of civilian chemists and engineers at military laboratories developing CBD equipment who have specific questions about TICs. They arent questioning the requirement. If the requirement to detect/protect/decontaminate TICs is in the operational requirements document, they will research and develop

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appropriate equipment against those DOD requirements. The question is, what is the military standard? Are the user representatives asking the material developers to design equipment against all 98 TICs listed in ITF-25, or just the 21 high-hazard agents? The service program managers are creating different TIC lists, based on what can be done from their specific material perspective. How do we ensure consistency that the TICs chemical detector senses are the same TICs against which our suits and shelters can protect, or that we have decontaminants that can neutralize TICs and detectors to verify that equipment and terrain is clean enough? These questions havent been answered. There has yet to be a discussion on what the militarily significant challenge levels of TICs should be for contamination avoidance, protection, and restoration. There is no generic category of TICs with general physical properties, as we sometimes generalize nerve or blister agents. Some TICs are liquid hazards that off-gas vapors; others are strictly vapor hazards. Both types are included in the high-hazard ITF-25 list. Lately, the Office of the Secretary of Defenses Low-Level Chemical Working Group has been struggling in its attempts to define what is operationally hazardous in terms of traditional chemical warfare agent exposures. The medical community has one view; the nonmedical community has another. There is no joint consensus or guidance on industrial chemical hazard levels other than the existing Occupational Safety and Health Administration guidance that was developed for peacetime industrial standards. Without solid guidance on what the challenge levels are for these TICs, the material developers have no way to tell industry what to build to or how to test the equipment. This is beginning to be a very real challenge to the research and development community on several programs approaching procurement stages. The joint chemical agent detector (JCAD), our next chemical agent detector, has an objective requirement of eight TICs. The currently designed JCAD only detects phosgene in addition to chemical warfare agents. Because of a lack of guidance on challenge levels and what the ultimate capability should be, we may be developing equipment that doesnt match the future doctrine. Correcting Perceptions on HAZMATs To summarize: 1. We have not yet seen nation-states or terrorists attempt to weaponize TICs for employment against U.S. forces. 2. TICs are not as lethal as chemical warfare agents. 3. TICs are definitely environmental health hazards but may not be operationally significant hazards.

4. The user community is still in the process of determining what the challenge levels for TICs should be to guide development of doctrine or equipment. Looking at the news stories about the Baltimore chemical fire, we can ask some hard questions. What is the real threatis it that adversaries will use these TICs against military forces or are they just environmental health hazards? Can the Chemical Corps address environmental health hazards without making its protective equipment more encumbering than missionoriented protective posture gear? At Baltimore, no one was evacuated despite a 13,000-gallon toxic acid spill and 5 days of burning fumesthe residents stayed indoors (what emergency responders call shelter in place). What do we expect will happen when military personnel are exposed to low levels of industrial chemicals? Is it an immediate life-threatening event or a long-term environmental hazard? There is a big difference. If the concern is ROTA or HAZMAT, are these events going to happen so frequently that we need to modify all our detectors and protective suits? If not, our troops should retain the correctly designed equipment against the major weaponized threatthe traditional CB warfare agents. There is always the option to purchase commercial HAZMAT gear which is already available in large quantities, is not ruggedized, and is designed for personnel that assume much less risk at the cost of higher encumbrance. I suggest the middle ground is just that CBD specialists may become experts in HAZMATs without modifying detectors, protective suits, shelters, and decontaminants away from their focus on CB-warfare agents. We should consider long and hard how the CBD community is going to address TICs or HAZMATs, whatever the better term is. The Joint Service NBC Defense Modernization Plan should outline a concept that either identifies TICs as a threat equivalent to chemical warfare agents or as environmental health hazards. We need to examine how we best benefit the warfighters and whether we can execute CB warfare defense while also acting as environmental/HAZMAT technicians.
Mr. Mauroni is a senior policy analyst for Analytic Services, Inc., and former Army chemical officer with 16 years of experience on Joint chemical and biological defense programs and policy issues. He currently supports the J5, Joint Chiefs of Staff, on DOD CB issues. He is the author of two books on chemical-biological defense and is currently working on his third book on the Armys chemical demilitarization program.

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Environmental Transformations: What a Company Commander Needs to Know

By Captain Jessica Prindiville Environmental stewardship is changing as the Army shifts the way it does business through the Army Transformation process. We, as company commanders, need to understand how the changes will affect the way we run our companies. The Army Environmental Campaign Plan identifies the four areas the Army is focusing on to improve environmental stewardship. Implementing these focus areasmateriel purchasing, facility management, training, and operationswill make us better environmental stewards.
Army Vision The Armys mission is to fight and win the nations wars. General Eric K. Shinseki, U.S. Army Chief of Staff, has promoted the Armys vision and its plan to transform itself into a force that is strategically responsive and dominant across the spectrum of operations. The following excerpt is based on the objective statement for Army Transformation and is from The Army Environmental Stewardship 2000 Progress Report. It summarizes what Army Transformation is all about and how it applies to environmental stewardship. Each day, as we train soldiers and grow leaders, we ensure that the finest army in the world will be ready to quickly and decisively respond to any threat to our national security. . . As we move into the twenty-first century, we are beginning an historic transformation into a more responsive, deployable, agile, versatile, lethal, survivable, and sustainable forceone that is capable of dominating at every point of the spectrum of operations. More than ever before, our installations must support tough, demanding training to serve as a solid foundation for the high degree of readiness in the continuing Army mission and transformation objective demands. . . As we make the transformation, we will ensure that environmental stewardship remains an integral component of all our operations and activities. (p. 2) Environmental Stewardship As company commanders, we will be the implementers of the Army Transformation process. It is important for company commanders to understand environmental concerns and how to assess their impact on training resources. Army leaders, along with installation managers and civilian agencies, discussed critical environmental and energy issues facing the Army at the Army Worldwide Environmental and February 2002 Energy Conference. This summit resulted in the Army Environmental Campaign Plan that will lead to the integration of environment and energy in support of new Army objectives. This plan integrates environmental stewardship with the Armys Transformation strategy. The plan identifies four focus areas: Materiel and weapon systems we buy. Facilities we manage. Training we provide to our personnel. Operations and activities we undertake. This article provides company commanders valuable information about environmental transformation. Materiel Purchasing The Army is one of the largest institutions in the United States and has great purchasing power and demand for products. The Army has become a catalyst for developing greener, more environmentally friendly products and services. Company commanders will use these environmentally friendly products that have been developed. Two of the first brigades to go through the Army transformation process at Fort Lewis, Washington, are using lead-free 5.56-mm green bullets. Lead is an environmental hazard that affects wildlife and may contaminate groundwater. The green bullet is a dense, rubber material that posses no risk to wildlife of water resources. The Army demanded a safer product, and industry responded with the green bullet. An alternatively fueled vehicle is another product that the leadership in the White House Council on Environmental Quality is exploring. With new technology, these prototype vehicles will cut costs and emissions for the Armys quarter of a million trucks. The future combat system (FCS) will be the primary weapon/troop-carrying platform for the future force. The FCS will include other technologies such as an electromagnetic gun, a directed-energy weapon, precision missiles, networked fire control, and robotics.

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Environmental protection is a key concern when this technology is developed. The Army has moved beyond a merely compliance-based approach toward long-term sustainability. Company commanders will achieve long-term sustainability by considering current and future impacts of our activities on the environment, energy usage, and the well-being of our people. This means we must reduce the environmental footprint that our operations and activities have on community resources. Facility Management Pollution prevention is key to reducing our negative impact on community resources. Since 1993, the Army has reduced hazardous-waste disposal by 52 percent. This is accredited to the company commanders who appointed environmental compliance officers to ensure that soldiers used and disposed of petroleum products correctly. When choosing an environmental subject-matter expert, select and train someone from the motor pool. Most environmental concerns stem from petroleum products, maintenance, and other activities generally conducted in the motor pool. In 2001, the Army hosted the first U.S. Army Worldwide Environmental and Energy Conference in Atlanta, Georgia. This summit highlighted installations that were using alternative energy technologies. For the past 20 years, Fort Huachuca, Arizona, has been operating with solar energy in the form of conventional solar water heaters and photovoltaics or direct electric production from the sun. Consequently, the Army is focusing on other alternatives for energy sources. The post where our companies are located may be involved in switching over to nontraditional energy technologies. In addition to creating energy efficient posts, the Army is looking at how to best regionally manage land and natural resources and execute sustainable range operations. Most posts have the Integrated Training Area Management (ITAM) program that ensures training operations include natural-resource conservation practices. ITAM works hand in hand with range control to make sure that company commanders are practicing environmental stewardship during field training. Training Company commanders have little influence over areas such as material purchasing and large facility management. What they can and do control is training. Leaders must ensure that soldiers have the principles or standards that guide professionals to do the moral or right thing. Every post has different environmental laws and regulations that are mandated at the state level. Company commanders must be familiar with these laws, and ignorance is never an excuse. Mistakes that lead to water and air pollution, training area

abuses, and mismanagement of hazardous wastes result in lost training areas, expensive land reclamation, negative publicity, and fines from state and federal regulators. In 1994, the Army paid $10 million in fines from base operating budgets. The Army has gone to great lengths to train its leaders, and this effort has resulted in a 66 percent reduction of the number of regulatory fines from 1993 to 1999. However, offending units may now pay fines from their training budget. Commanders may have to pay violation fines from their budget if they do not abide by governing regulations. Every commander is required by AR 200-1, Environmental Protection and Enhancement, to comply with policies, regulations, and laws; address environmental concerns throughout the year; promote environmental stewardship; adopt a standing operating procedure (SOP) for environmental considerations; and appoint and train an environmental compliance officer. Battalions generally take care of these requirements, but separate companies, such as divisional chemical companies, are on their own to fulfill these requirements. Of course, company commanders do not need to create new SOPs and training programs; the post environmental office will help. Environmental Constraints on Training and Other Actions The following is a partial list of items used at Fort Hood, Texas, to assist company commanders in being good environmental stewards. Hazardous-Materials/Hazardous-Waste Management (HAZMAT). Take the time to personally inspect HAZMAT storage facilities regularly. Check out the battery collection point, ensure that batteries are being recycled to prevent heavy metals from reaching the landfills, and allow some materials to be reused. Look at the companys hazardcommunication program. It instructs individuals on the potential hazards in using various substances and includes directions on how to read a material safety data sheet, and AR 200-1 mandates the requirements for the annual training program. Noise Management. Smoke generators and vehicles, in general, can make a lot of noise. You must address ways to avoid community annoyance with excessive noise from training. Habitation encroachment on training areas has resulted in more complaints about routine training noise. Soldiers hearing must be protected when operating loud equipment or working in a noisy area such as the motor pool. Air Quality. Painting with chemical-agent-resistant coating paint must be done in approved paint booths only. Units can have touch-up paint, but each installation regulates how much. Think about the last time you sent a person to burn classified material. Is that legal on the post where you

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operate, and did you consider the air quality and fire hazard issues in conjunction with burning? Pollution Prevention. There is so much that individuals can do if each person just takes a little pride in the appearance of the environmentspill prevention is one thing. Conduct training on how to fill liquid containers, maintain spill kits, and operate oil-reclamation points properly. There are oil-water separators in wash racks. Do not allow soldiers to spray at the separators; if soldiers damage these, then you will receive the fine. Refueling procedures are restricted to certain areas, so check and see where. NBC Training. We know that many petroleum, oil, and lubricant products used in the motor pool require special handling, but so do many items in the NBC room. Decontamination agents that have expired shelf life also need special handling. DS2 is not maintained at the unit level anymore; consequently, turn it in if you find some stashed in a container express. Unserviceable filters for NBC masks require specialized turn in. Do not allow smoke or tear gas (CS) to become a nuisance to others. Hexachloroethane (HC) smoke use is limited. Actual decontamination agents are for wartime use only. Use of soapy water is limited near natural-water sources. Water Resources. Policies designed to protect water quality affect decontamination activities. Detergent is usually discouraged because of runoff contamination of surface waters, and use of DS2 and supertropical bleach (STB) is restricted. Threatened and Endangered Species. Nearly every post has some plant or animal concern; accordingly, training has the potential to threaten this environment. It is essential that you check the post environmental center for a map of delicate habitats. Leave the wildlife alone, and check to see what permit you need before cutting down trees or removing brush in training sites. Land Management. Not all training areas are dig sites, so check with range control or the Directorate of Public Works before digging. If you find archeological materials, stop digging and contact the area manager. Do not bury garbage or other solid waste; take it to an approved landfill site. Recycling. Absolutely mandatory, every product that can no longer be used for its intended purpose needs to be recycled. Federal law requires the Army to reduce the amount of solid waste sent to landfills. You must institute a unit recycling program and lead by example. Through efforts of instilling soldier awareness, the Army has reduced solidwaste disposal by 58 percent since 1993. This is not enough;

there is a need to recycle more. Natural-resource raw sources are limited and so is the land that waste can be buried on. Operations Leaders must comply with regulations and understand, teach, and hold subordinates accountable. Something as simple as putting a soda can in the recycle bin instead of throwing it out or directing smoke tracks to be refueled away from a watershed safety zone is a nonverbal communication that soldiers always watch and evaluate commanders on. Our operations and actions influence the environment around us. Wrapping It All Up The Environmental Campaign Plan that focuses our commitment to a world-class environmental program consists of four focus areas: material purchase, facility management, training, and the operations and activities we undertake. Army land is becoming increasingly valuable because there is little possibility for more. In spite of intensive military use for many years, military lands contain a rich diversity of flora and fauna. Company commanders will not be in charge of millions of acres but probably just a motor pool and a fleet of less than a hundred vehicles. No matter what the size of our area of operation, it is our job to ensure that environmental ethics are spread and environmental laws and our unit comply with regulations. As we make the Army Transformation, we must ensure that environmental stewardship remains an integral component of all our operations and activities.
References Conrad, Joseph C., Environmental Considerations in Army Operational Doctrine, White Paper, CR-9421, January 1995. Headquarters III Corp and Fort Hood, Supplemental Handout for Environmental Coordinators, Supplemental Two: Environmental Management Course, June 2000. Houston, Cynthia, Army Plans 21st Century Environmental Transformation, USAEC Environmental Update, (http://www.hqda.army.mil), Spring 2001. Office of the Chief of Public Affairs (PAO), The Army Environmental Stewardship 2000 Progress Report, (http://www.hqda.army.mil/acsimweb/env/), 2001. Steele, Dennis, The Army Magazine Hooah Guide to Army Transformation, Association of the United States Army, 2001.
Captain Prindiville is a student in the Chemical Captains Career Course (CMC3) at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. She was the environmental officer coordinator for 69th Chemical Company in Hanau, Germany, for 5 months. After CMC3, she will be working at Fort Campbell, Kentucky.

February 2002

35

The Mechanized Smoke Company As I See It

By Captain Todd L. Baney
During my command, I have noticed some discrepancies in the mechanized smoke companys modified table of organization (MTOE). With some small changes, a smoke company could function better. However, with some major changes, the company could function at an even higher level. The first discrepancy I noticed is in the maintenance section. In the past, the company was assigned two 63B10s (light-wheeled mechanics); now it is not. With the current authorized personnel, the company is unable to maintain and service the M998s that are authorized. I recommend that two 63B10s be added back to the MTOE. Without 63B10s, the companys operational readiness drops. The company is currently authorized one 63B20, but that soldier has to do the job of three individuals. The second discrepancy is not in personnel but in equipment authorized. Each platoon is authorized nine radiosone radio for each track and two for the platoon leader and platoon sergeants vehicles. The support squad is not authorized any radios. However, under an upcoming MTOE, the support squad is authorized radios, but the platoon tracks will lose two. This just does not make sense. How are those crews expected to communicate with the other vehicles, especially under limited visibility? Since the Army is converting divisional chemical companies to corps-level, dual-purpose companies, there should be more radios in the inventory. That way every vehicle will get a radio. As we approach fiscal year 2003, mechanized smoke companies are going to four line platoons consisting of 25 personnel, seven M58s, and two heavy expanded mobility tactical trucks (HEMTTs) per platoon. This will increase the authorized personnel from 111 personnel to 136. While supporting maneuver brigade commanders, I noticed that most all of them split up the mechanized smoke platoon. They typically give three M58s to one task force and four to another. They justify this by saying that every task force needs smoke assets on an obstacle while breaching, because of their big picture of how the battle is going to flow. I understand their concept and their idea, but it raises big issues for me as a company commander. I also have to figure out how to command and control the sections and resupply them. Currently, a company is scheduled to stand up a fourth line platoon composed of seven M58s and two HEMTTs. If the company were to transition to a support platoon concept, this would lead to having a fourth platoon composed of a lieutenant and a platoon sergeant with three squad leaders and three E4s or below. The soldiers could come from our existing support squads. This would keep the personnel numbers down to 113. Command and control could be worked out if the line platoon leader and sergeant, as well as the support platoon leader and sergeant, each had two radios. This concept would solve not only the C2 issue but also resupply issues. Additionally, two M998s need to be added to the MTOE, but these should be easier to add than two HEMTTs and seven M58s. Another fix is to give both the first sergeant and the operations officer M998s with dual-net capabilities. Currently, neither one has an M998 as regulated by the MTOE. First sergeants and operations officers are asked to do many tasks; now imagine trying to do these without a designated vehicle. That is what will happen if all excess equipment is turned in. Both have to attend meetings and rehearsals on the battlefield ranging from combat service support rehearsals to logistics packages and maintenance meetings. The company is currently authorized only one M998. If the commander is at a brigade meeting or checking on his platoons that are attached out, how are the first sergeant and operations officer suppose to operate? Therefore, I do not think we could afford to not give first sergeants and operations officers an M998. As we begin to reconfigure the corps, let us take the time to hear from those serving in those positions that can best influence the decision. We need to set up our companies for success. We need to give smoke companies the right MTOE and fill them to it.
Captain Baney is the commander of 172d Chemical Company. His previous assignments include both overseas and stateside duties. CPT Baney is a graduate of the Chemical Officer Basic and Advanced Courses, Combined Arms and Services Staff School, Nuclear Target Analysis Course, and the Senior Officer Logistical Management Course. He has a bachelors in engineering from Pennsylvania State University.

36

CML

Chemical Company Command Post Operations

By Captain Tom Duncan, National Training Center Chemical Company Trainer
Training Day (TD) 04 Deliberate Attack (Scenario)

The 3d Brigade Combat Team (BCT) crossed the line of departure (LD) beginning its deliberate attack at 0600. The chemical company is supporting the attack with a smoke platoon; a nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) reconnaissance squad; and a decontamination platoon. The chemical companys command post (CP) is under BCT control and is located near the BCT tactical operations center (TOC). The company commander is located at the CP. The Fox squad and decontamination platoon are under company control; the smoke platoon is in general support of Task Force (TF) Mech. The smoke platoon is screening the north flank of TF Mech (task) to protect them from antiarmor ambushes (purpose). The NBC reconnaissance is overwatching named area of interest 003 (task) to ensure that TF Armors axis of advance is not blocked by a persistent chemical strike (purpose). The decontamination platoon has occupied decontamination site 100 and is prepared to support thorough decontamination operations (task), to assist the BCT in maintaining combat power during the fight (purpose). The fight seems to be going well until both task forces are fixed at the breach and the enemy combined-arms reserve (CAR) makes an unanticipated counterattack into the BCTs north flank. The BCT commander issues a fragmentary order (FRAGO) committing the BCTs reserve armor company to fix the CAR. This catches the company commander by surprise. Part of the FRAGO shifts support of NBC reconnaissance and smoke to support the BCT reserves attack. Suddenly the commander realizes his CP has lost communication with the NBC reconnaissance squad. The smoke platoon is out of fog oil, and its heavy expanded mobility tactical truck (HEMTT) has been deadlined for more than 20 hours. Also, the commander is unaware that the CAR is approaching
February 2002

decontamination site 100 because he has lost situational awareness. The CP is out of the fight. Its inability to receive, distribute, and analyze information; make recommendations to the commander; and integrate and synchronize resources lead to the loss of chemical assets as a combat multiplier. The BCT reserve is destroyed, and the BCT is unable to penetrate the enemys defensive belt and achieve its objective. The commander needs to know why the CP encountered these obstacles and how to avoid them during the next fight.

Layout of training day 04 attack

Purpose FM 3-101, Chemical Staffs and Units, states, CPs are the focal point of all tactical and logistical planning and execution in the company. However, this FM contains only two paragraphs about the chemical company CP. This is insufficient coverage for such a critical command-andcontrol tool for the company commander. This article discusses trends in the chemical company CP operations conducted at the National Training Center (NTC), as well as tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) that can be applied during home-station training to address these 37

trends. All of these issues are based on my direct observation as an observer/controller at NTC. TTP are based on FM 3101; FM 3-100, Chemical Operations, Principals and Fundamentals; FM 101-5, Staff Organization and Operations; and the Center for Army Lessons Learned Newsletter No. 95-7, May 95, Tactical Operations Center. CP Functions According to FM 3-100, Synchronized NBC reconnaissance, decontamination, and smoke operations begin with planning, preparation, and teamwork. The chemical company CP should play a key role in integrating chemical assets into the BCT. However, many CPs come to the NTC manned with soldiers that have little or no experience in a CP. They often do not know the six basic CP functions: 1. Receive Information. This is the collection of messages, reports, and orders from subordinate units and higher headquarters that deal with monitoring the tactical situation, maintaining current unit locations and activities, and tracking the building of combat power. 2. Analyze Information/Consolidate Reports. The CP NCOIC or XO must anticipate events and activities, identify information that relates to the commanders critical information requirements (CCIR), conduct troop-leading procedures, and be prepared to execute contingency plans based on the current situation. 3. Distribute Information. The CP serves as a communication relay between units, publishing orders and submitting reports to higher elements. 4. Make Recommendations to the Commander. The CP NCOIC or XO analyzes information to make recommendations to the commander. 5. Integrate Resources. The commander, along with the company command posts, coordinates the integration of chemical assets into the BCTs scheme of maneuver. 6. Synchronize Resources. The CP leadership must assist the commander to orchestrate all elements of the company to achieve the companys mission. Examples of these elements are The maintenance section which has a priority of maintenance that supports the mission. The first sergeant who has a functional casualtyevacuation plan in place. The supply NCO who has given the platoons all necessary classes of supply, etc. In the scenario, the commander is unaware the HEMTT is deadlined. The commander is also surprised by the sudden turn of events as the CAR counterattacks and is unaware that the decontamination platoon is on the enemy axis of advance. The question is how can we gain better situational awareness in the future. The solution is to 38

Incorporate the six CP functions into the company Clearly define each soldiers role in the execution of Establish a training program to address these issues at Show subordinates in the CP what the expectations
are and how to accomplish them correctly. Time is the primary concern when planning and executing a training plan at the home station. Home-station training time is already strained with the multitude of tasks currently being assigned. I recommend integrating all of these TTP into the daily activities of the operations section. For example, in garrison we track equipment deadlines on a DA Form 2404, Equipment Inspection and Maintenance Worksheet. But how does the operations section track the maintenance status on a day-to-day basis? Why not use the same tracking system in and out of the field? Battle tracking the status on classes of supply, maintenance, and training/ missions can be conducted every day. This not only trains operations soldiers for their field exercises, but it also will assist the leader/commander in managing day-to-day missions by standardizing the operations sections information management procedures. The same techniques used to gain situational awareness in a field environment will enable the commander to manage information in garrison better. This allows the commander to make better decisions based on more accurate data. We can also train information analysis and distribution in garrison. We can submit the same reports done in the field to both higher and lower elements. Information distribution to subordinate elements also can be done routinely in a warning order, FRAGO, or operations order format. The commander can issue priorities and give guidance to supporting elements (maintenance, supply, and communication) to synchronize the company effort. Integration of these TTP into the home stations day-to-day activities can help commanders and operations NCOs to understand CP functions before arriving at NTC. Integrating these techniques into your home-station training also gives you the chance to develop your information management systems and show the soldiers what right looks like in your CP. Duties and Responsibilities of CP Personnel NBC trainers at NTC observe that soldiers often understand how a CP supports the commander and the company but do not understand their individual role in the process. The first thing the CP needs is a clearly designated leader with a defined role. This can be the executive/operations officer, the first sergeant, or the operations sergeant. Whatever technique that works for you is fine, but there are two keys to success. The role of the CP OIC or NCOIC must be clear and captured in the units SOP, and it is CML the home station. these functions. written standing operating procedures (SOP).

their information management helpful if this soldier supervises the systems on training day one, operations shop in garrison as well. instead of bringing a system that If the same information collection, has been proven at the home analysis, and distribution techstation. Lets look at three areas niques are used both in and out of of information management the field, and the same soldier is information displaying, message responsible for these actions, it can handling, and battle-tracking be beneficial in training the rest of techniques. the CP team. The operations shift NCOIC Displaying Information is often one of the hardest working Techniques soldiers in the CP but is rarely the Rotational units often are most effective. The trend is for the unsure of how to display inforNCOIC to be on the radio conmation effectively in the CP. FM stantly, writing in the log, or 101-5 describes the desirable updating the map. Someone must characteristics of all information be responsible for analyzing the to include utility, accuracy, clarity, information that is coming into the brevity, coherence, objectivity, CP, determining what is important, and the ability to verify the and providing quality control of CP RTO information. As long as that product production (FRAGO, criterion is met, any technique that enables the commander graphics, etc.) before it goes to the commander for approval. to maintain situational awareness will work. If the operations NCO in the scenario had maintained There is no one solution as to what information should better situational awareness, instead of serving as a radio be posted. The answer is found in the commanders operator, the CP would have had a better opportunity to guidance on what information is needed to accomplish identify critical issues. the mission. Based on my NTC experience, I developed There are two TTP that have worked well at NTC. The two rules of thumb. First, the commander or CP OIC/ first is to train junior enlisted soldiers to use the radio, manage NCOIC should be able to sit in a central location; evaluate the log, and update the map board. This accomplishes two the tactical situation just by looking at the map (with goalstraining young soldiers and freeing the NCOIC to complete overlays and up-to-date information); and know supervise multiple taskings. If the NCOIC is busy talking the maintenance, logistical, and precombat check/ on the radio, then he is not able to analyze what the company inspection status by looking at the tracking charts without is doing, determine the current friendly/enemy situation, or having to ask a lot of questions. Second, only the charts prepare a recommendation for the commander. The second containing necessary information should be displayed. TTP is to set clear standards and enforce them at the home Too much information is worse then too little because station. The radio/telephone operators (RTOs) can answer the information becomes unmanageable. the phones, log information, and maintain tracking charts in the rear to the same standard they are expected to execute in Planning Execution Phase the field. The junior enlisted soldiers also can assist in the Specified, implied, and Combat power orders production in garrison. Soldiers need to be trained on mission-essential tasks Unit location and activities Weather data CL III/V status their duties daily and then held to the standard. Constraints and limitations Enemy contact The scenario revealed that the commander in the Timelines (CO and Aid station locations deliberate attack was unaware of the current tactical situation platoons) Status of adjacent units Restated mission and the deadlined HEMTT. Establishing CP responsibilities, Task organization Post-Battle Phase clearly defining the soldiers roles, training soldiers every Commanders guidance Equipment readiness day, and holding soldiers to the set standard will help put CCIR Personnel strength Resupply status vital information into the hands of the commanders early Battle Prep Unit locations enough to take corrective action and keep the chemical Class of supply status Consolidation and company in the fight. Subordinate-unit order reorganization status issue and rehearsal status Maintenance and casualty Information Management Maintenance status collection status Putting the role of the CP and its soldiers into the SOP is Note: This is not an all-inclusive list. a great start to ensure that a CP is functional, but it is not Examples of information to display enough. At NTC, we often see rotational units developing February 2002 39

Displaying information is another area we can establish systems for our everyday garrison operations. Of course, everyone will not need all of the same information from day to day in garrison. However, the supply status, work priorities, subordinate unit mission status/timelines, CCIR, and maintenance status apply to all company activities each day. We can develop and train information tracking and display systems that can be used both in garrison and the field with minimal differences. If the commander in the scenario had been able to see the information posted in the CP easily, she could have identified the issue with the deadlined HEMTT without being told or having to ask. This would have enabled the commander to identify the issue and attempt to fix it before the attack. Message-Handling Techniques Chemical company CPs lose vital information because of a lack of established message-handling techniques. We see rotational units taking notes on scraps of paper that are lost or destroyed easily, resulting in failure to transfer valuable data to a chart, logbook, or graphic overlay. The fix is simpleestablish a system for information management. Ensure that each message is logged with a date/time group, the recorders name or initials, and the action taken because of the information. Most importantly, give the RTOs a clear task/purpose, train them to standard in the daily operations, and supervise them to ensure that they meet the standard.
Time Event Actions Taken
Update map. Update map/inform BCT. Update map/inform BCT. Inform BCT/dispatch CASEVAC vehicle.

BCT reserve in support of the counterattack, if the CP had done the following: Obtained the information that the HEMTT fuel truck was deadlined (information collecting/battle tracking). Posted the information on the combat power status chart (message handling). Identified that a maintenance team needed to be dispatched to the smoke platoon to fix the deficiency (analysis). Recommended that course of action to the commander. Again, this is something we can execute on a daily basis. We can exercise our battle-tracking systems every time a platoon prepares and executes a training event.

Identify and prioritize critical information to be Develop tracking systems. Ensure that all participants understand the Ensure that everyone actively works the system. Avoid letting informational input into the log
create a backlog in posting and distributing the data. Battle-tracking TTPs tracking system. tracked.

Initials
TAD TAD JN TAD

0600 BCT crosses LD 0605 Start smoke in support of TF Mech 0615 Fox squad occupies ORP 002 0630 1 M58 SMK track destroyed by direct fire

Example of log book

Battle-Tracking Techniques Most rotational units at NTC do a fair job of battle tracking during a battle. However, CPs are not very good at battle tracking while building combat power. Many CPs at NTC do not know the commanders priority of work, platoon timelines, or how to track the status of platoons to meet the commanders requirements. The CP often does not help the commander ensure that the company is prepared to go into the fight by battle tracking the platoons readiness status and then either tasking to correct the issue or making a recommendation to the commander on how to correct any deficiencies. In the scenario, the HEMTT may have been available for the fight, resulting in a smoke screen for the 40

CP Layout There is no exact answer to what a chemical company CP should look like. But there are three general rules we have developed based on our direct observation at NTC: the CP must be kept orderly, the map and tracking charts must be easily assessible, and the CP NCOIC must be able to overwatch both the RTO and the soldier updating information on the map and charts easily. Ensuring there is a system for reproducing orders and graphics is also critical to the CPs success. Cleanliness and organization are also critical to the CPs success. The CP loses vital information if the area is full of trash, scraps of paper, coffee cups/food, and out-of-date graphics. It becomes difficult to sort relevant information from irrelevant material. A chemical company CP is usually small. Space is at a premium. If the space available is not used efficiently, operations will be hindered. Soldiers must have adequate room to update information quickly and not impede the view of the company leadership, who is depending on fast and accurate data to make decisions critical to the support of the attack. The positioning of the CP NCOIC is very important also. He (or the commander) cannot accurately absorb information that he obtains from eavesdropping on the BCT and company nets and analyze whats on the map and tracking charts unless positioned to observe all areas simultaneously. If the CP NCOIC becomes committed to CML

one area or action, he loses pieces of the puzzle, and the analysis loses accuracy. In the scenario, we should understand that the CAR will be committed to the fight before it happens, anticipate its axis of advance, and prepare a FRAGO supporting the BCT commanders response. Finally, it is a good idea to have a reproduction capability of some sort. A significant amount of information is lost between the company commander and the most junior soldier of the squad. Giving written orders and graphics to the platoons can reduce the loss of critical data significantly as the order flows down to the soldiers who execute the plan. Home-Station Training Too many company headquarters come to NTC without testing their CP layout and information management systems before deploying. Once a unit arrives at the NTC, it is too late to develop those systems. NTC is where your SOPs can be validated. FM 101-5 states, Command posts (during training) should be set up to replicate a field environment. Nothing can replace taking your CP to the field to conduct realistic, combined-arms training. However, throughout this article we discussed how we could develop systems that can be used both in garrison and the field with minimal differences. This will help operations soldiers prepare for any deployment. To reverse negative trends, we must make use of every available training opportunity to train our company CPs. I recommend professional development classes on such topics as CP functions, battle drills, orders process, and battle tracking for our headquarters personnel. These classes should be given to the entire CP section, not just a group of officers or NCOs. Training together ensures everyone understands the systems that will be used. You also can train the soldiers at CP operations every day. RTOs can answer the telephone and log in calls; the

Potential CP layout

commander can develop and post daily CCIR. The CP shiftchange SOP can be used as the agenda for daily/weekly meetings. As discussed earlier, nothing can replace realistic, combined-arms training. The CP can go to the field to plan and battle-track platoon field training exercises or to participate in company/battalion lane training with the units likely to be supported during a deployment. It is a good idea for the CP to participate in BCT training events before deploying to the NTC to ensure the SOPs are aligned with the BCT. This also allows us to get to know the leaders we will be supporting and gives us a chance to train them on our capabilities and limitations.

Create systems that can be used both in the field

and in the garrison. Use field shift change SOP as your daily/weekly meeting agenda. Develop, rehearse, and improve TOC battle drills. Train the CP in the field prior to deployment. Train with the unit you are likely to support prior to deployment. Cross train maintenance, communication, and supply personnel to assist in the CP as needed. Home-station-training checklist

CP in operation

TD 06 The Next Fight The CP maintained an accurate depiction of the battle and the current status of each platoon. The commander anticipated the commitment of the CAR, moved to reestablish communication with the NBC reconnaissance squad, ordered the smoke platoon to conduct refuel operations, was prepared to link up with the BCT reserve, and told the decontamination platoon to prepare to move to decontamination site 200 on order. These actions enabled the commander to provide a smoke haze to screen the advance of the reserve, observe a persistent chemical strike that went on the reserves axis of advance, establish an uncontaminated bypass route,
(continued on page 44)

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41

Military Decision Making A Process

By Captain John F. Fennell
The military decision-making process (MDMP), according to FM 101-5, Staff Organization and Operations, is the single, established, and proven analytical process and the Armys approach to problem solving. By this framework, the brigade chemical officer (ChemO) provides input to the brigade plan and ensures that the realities of nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) warfare are not dismissed and that the chemical units assigned are used effectively as combat multipliers. The seven steps of MDMP are 1. Receive the mission. 2. Analyze the mission. 3. Develop courses of action (COAs). 4. Analyze the COAs. 5. Compare the COAs. 6. Approve the COA. 7. Issue orders. This article discusses how the ChemO contributes to the MDMP framework in steps 1 through 5. Receive the Mission This begins as soon as higher headquarters issues a fragmentary order or as soon as the commander anticipates a new mission. Before initiating mission analysis, the ChemO should gather the necessary tools, which may include overlays, standing operating procedures (SOPs), and staff estimates. Analyze the Mission The commander begins to visualize the battlefield. The ChemOs duty is to ensure that NBC is part of that vision. Mission analysis can be simplified through the following approach: see the terrain, see the enemy, and see yourself. See the terrain/weather first; it is the first point of interest that you share with the S2. The ChemO ensures that he receives updated weather and light data for the mission. Once the ChemO has the weather data, he can determine if the enemys use of chemical munitions is favorable and identify the potential targets, based on the terrain and weather. Once the terrain analysis is complete, the enemy analysis follows. See the enemy by determining the type and composition of the enemy NBC units, their disposition, and their intent. Determining the type and composition of enemy NBC units 42

requires identifying the type of unit regimental/division artillery group that will deliver chemical munitions on friendly units and areas and its delivery systems (2S5s, 2S7s). Disposition of enemy NBC units are chemical threat indicators on the battlefield that are more obvious as an enemy increases in protective posture or movement of chemical munitions toward delivery systems. Next, determine the enemys capabilities, to include range and effectiveness of enemy NBC delivery systems, agent types, protection, and detection equipment available. Then, determine the enemys intent on chemical weapon use. Determine if he is terrain-orientedwill he use chemical weapons to shape the battlefieldor is he force-oriented will he use chemical weapons to target large troop concentrations to cause casualties? Assist the S2 and the rest of the battle staff with the construction of the threat COAs. The S2 and battle staff will create two to three threat COAs. The ChemO identifies probable target areas of interest and designated named areas of interest (NAIs) and recommends observation responsibilities for each of these COAs. The ChemO ensures that every templated NBC event becomes an NAI and is placed on the situational template. Once the enemy is analyzed, the friendly posture can be assessed. See yourself; it is the final step of mission analysis. The ChemO performs the following staff actions: vulnerability analysis, mission-oriented-protectiveposture (MOPP) analysis, NBC threat status, NBC protective measures, chemical asset employment, and task organization of chemical units. Vulnerability analysis and NBC threat analysis are discussed in FM 3-14, Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Vulnerability Analysis. Vulnerability analysis describes how susceptible a friendly unit is to chemical attack. The brigade establishes a minimum NBC threat CML

status as a result of vulnerability analysis, but task forces may increase the NBC threat status in their units as a result of their planning process. When the ChemO completes intelligence preparation of the battlefield (see the terrain, see the enemy), he has a good idea of what MOPP the brigade combat team (BCT) should assume. At BCT level, the ChemO strives to recommend the appropriate minimum levels of MOPP while reserving the option to raise the level of MOPP to task force commanders and their ChemOs. A technique may be establishing minimum MOPP levels by phase line or by using proximity to templated chemical strikes to trigger an increase in MOPP. NBC protective measures include passive and active measures. Active measures affect the enemys ability to engage us with chemical weapons (destruction of chemical weapons facilities, enemy munitions and their delivery systems). Passive measures include actions that prevent friendly units from being targeted (dispersion and camouflage). The ChemO makes initial recommendations during mission analysis for task organization and chemical unit employment. These recommendations are preliminary, yet they help the commander and staff to focus on how to employ chemical units and task organization. Develop COAs COA development is largely the BCT battle staffs attempt at designing unpredictable COAs that are difficult for the enemy to deduce. COA development is focused and usually has constraints placed upon it by the brigade commander. The S3 generates options based on the commanders guidance and relative combat power. The ChemO considers the doctrinal employment of all chemical assets and how they support the S3s maneuver scheme, within the guidance that he received from the brigade commander during the mission analysis briefing. A plan for smoke, reconnaissance, and decontamination assets is developed for each COA. Smoke Planning Smoke planning is either centralized or decentralized. At the BCT level, the brigade prepares a centralized smoke plan that includes smoke missions and targets, start/stop times, and applications. This is an effective method of control for area defense missions, passage of lines, and landing-zone denial. Brigades control smoke operations when smoke must be coordinated between two or more maneuver units that require smoke coverage by a single platoon. In this case, the ChemO posts a smoke support annex to the BCT operation order (OPORD). In decentralized smoke planning, the smoke platoon is usually attached to a task force. Ensure that the task force commander and his ChemO understand the brigade

commanders intent for generated smoke. Decentralizedsmoke planning is practical for offensive operations that include deliberate/hasty attacks and movement to contact. Reconnaissance Planning Chemical reconnaissance is every soldiers job and not just a chemical unit function. Assign all NAIs to observers at the brigade (brigade reconnaissance troop), task force, and separate company level. These NAIs coincide with templated chemical strikes on each enemy COA and must be included in the brigade and battalion intelligence collection plans. Ensure that the observers at the National Training Center know what they are looking for in respect to the centers NBC rules of engagement. Assign the Fox squad to observe NAIs most critical to the BCTs scheme of maneuver. Keep in mind the command and support relationship. It is recommended to keep the squad under brigade control to maintain flexibility. The unit in whose area of operations the Fox squad is operating will support the squad with Classes I, III, V, and IX, and medical and recovery assets. A Fox squad requires additional security, preferably larger than an M2 .50 caliber machine gun. Decontamination Planning Keep in mind the principles of decontamination according to FM 3-5, NBC Decontamination: Decontaminate as far forward as possible Plan link-up points and decontamination sites as close to contaminated areas as mission, enemy, terrain, troops, and time (METT-T) allow. Decontaminate as soon as possible Keep the decontamination platoon set up and water resupply time in mind. Plan for decontamination in depth (along the whole axis of advance) for the offense. In the defense, consider having the decontamination platoon set up and dig one decontamination site. Decontaminate only what is necessaryA decontamination platoon is located at the brigade level for your use; use it wisely. Weathering is still the least costly method of decontamination. Decontaminate by priorityThe BCT commander usually establishes decontamination priorities. Reestablishing operation tempo and reconstituting combat power are key priorities. When the COA is completed, the ChemO should have a good understanding of each friendly maneuver plan and how chemical assets, NBC operations, and logistics fit into each COA. Analyze the COAs COA analysis identifies which course of action accomplishes the mission with the minimum casualties, while best positioning the force for retaining the initiative for future operations. This is done through the war-gaming

February 2002

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process. The ChemO recommends the task organization for chemical assets and the task and purpose for these assets and triggers in COA analysis. An important, yet often overlooked, part of war gaming is the development of triggers. Triggers are eventor time-oriented criteria used to initiate planned actions directed toward achieving surprise or inflicting maximum destruction on the enemy. The creation of triggers can be driven by enemy action (chemical strike at templated area), friendly movements (crossing of phase lines) and, of course, time. The commanders critical intelligence requirements (CCIR) are also identified during COA analysis. Chemical strikes are CCIR and usually become priority intelligence requirements. A chemical strike at a templated location confirms an enemy COA. The ChemO and the S2 cooperate to portray an adversarys intent to use chemical weapons. The ChemO must be adamant about this during the war game. Acting otherwise would produce a friendly COA that is easily desynchronized by NBC attacks. Compare COAs During this step, the brigade staff analyzes and evaluates the advantages and disadvantages of each COA with respect to each Battlefield Operating System. The end product for this step is the decision matrix, which uses evaluation criteria to analyze the effectiveness and efficiency of each COA. NBC reconnaissance, decontamination, and smoke are combat multipliers that can significantly increase the relative combat power of the brigade while force ratios remain constant. These are the criteria the ChemO should use to evaluate the effectiveness of the employment of chemical assets. When COA analysis is completed and briefed to the BCT commander who approves the COA (step 6 of MDMP), the ChemO writes his NBC annex and posts it to the OPORD and then prepares for rehearsals. Following the final MDMP stepissue ordersthe ChemO should brief at the combined arms and combat service support rehearsal. Once the rehearsals are complete, only then can the ChemO rest.
Captain Fennell is stationed in Korea but was a student in the Chemical Captains Career Course (CMC3) at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, when this article was written. Following graduation from the Chemical Officer Basic Course, he was assigned to 3-7 Infantry as the battalion chemical officer at Fort Stewart, Georgia. His subsequent assignments were decontamination platoon leader and executive officer in the 92d Chemical Company (HVY). CPT Fennell served as the DISCOM, 3d Infantry Division (MECH).

(continued from page 41)

and was prepared to provide decontamination support to the BCT. These capabilities contributed to the destruction of the CAR, the BCTs penetration of the enemy defensive belt, and seizing the objective.

The next fight

Conclusion FM 3-101 states, The chemical company is the lowest chemical echelon that can plan and execute continuous operations in support of tactical forces. The ability of our company CP to receive, distribute, analyze information; make recommendations to the commander; and integrate and synchronize resources is vital to the integration and synchronization of chemical company assets in support of a tactical plan that involves multiple chemical platoons. We cannot be satisfied until a chemical company CP Effectively assists the commander to develop a timely and accurate picture of the companys current status. Understands the capabilities and limitations of the enemy. Can visualize the terrain and what effects it will have on our operations. Analyzes information to predict what will happen next during the fight. Has a company FRAGO ready to issue and execute before the BCT commanders FRAGO is issued. The only way to achieve this goal is to create systems that effectively manage information flow and train soldiers in the CP to effectively use this information to manage the company. We must establish a system, train our soldiers on it every day, and ruthlessly enforce the standards.

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Patient Decontamination
By Captain DeAnna Miller Patient decontamination is not an operation that medical providers or chemical personnel conduct regularly. The majority of medical training usually is focused on caring for patients during peacetime. Chemical organizations focus their effort on conducting operations in support of other units. However, during Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm, it became obvious that the threat of chemical/biological attacks required medical professionals to have a greater understanding of processing contaminated patients. Many warfighters and their leaders who deployed to the Persian Gulf knew little about how the medical and chemical communities must work together to accomplish patient decontamination in an effective manner.
Since Desert Storm, there has been a renewed interest in ensuring that chemical leaders and health care professionals gain the necessary background in this important area of decontamination. It is known that several potential adversaries of the United States have worked on or are continuing to explore the offensive use of weapons of mass destruction. The next time American soldiers deploy against an aggressor such as Saddam Hussein, they must have a solid understanding of patient decontamination operations for the medical and chemical communities to execute a seamless patient decontamination process. Effective training will reduce the casualties and conserve the fighting strength of our forces. This article focuses on the roles of chemical organizations, the health support system (HSS), and identification of reoccurring problems during the patient decontamination process. Roles of Chemical Organizations Whether you are the chemical platoon leader or a battalion/brigade chemical staff officer, it is important to understand the role of the Chemical Corps during patient decontamination operations. Leaders must ensure that all chemical soldiers are familiar with the procedure and know their role in the process. Although a medical platoon is in charge of patient decontamination, chemical soldiers are often tasked to assist. Also, the chemical decontamination site may be the first place that contaminated units go to receive initial assistance. If contaminated patients are processed through the decontamination site, a working knowledge of how to assist these casualties is imperative. Chemical leaders must ensure that unit combat lifesavers and decontamination team members are trained to manage, decontaminate, and treat chemical agent casualities. Personnel must be trained to protect themselves from chemical injuries. In addition, rehearsals must be conducted to provide decontamination personnel with the skills to accomplish their responsibilities with speed and efficiency. All personnel must understand contamination detection, decontamination, and buddy aid. It is important that the chemical staff officer understands the process of coordination for medical support of a unit. First, he must accurately articulate the level of assistance that is needed. This requires making an initial assessment of how many casualties are involved. The chemical staff officer must provide crucial information, such as the location of the casualties and knowledge of the agent used during the attack. This information is included in the initial assessment. After the assessment is complete, the chemical staff officer contacts the supporting medical brigade and requests support. Based on the assessment of his request, the medical brigade tasks a medical subordinate unit that has the size and capability to handle the task. This assessment gives the medical personnel an idea of the amount of equipment needed to complete the mission. Initially, a medical platoon is tasked to set up patient decontamination at the designated site. However, in the event of mass casualties, a platoon is not sufficient and other assets are required. The Health and Support System Next, it is important to understand the role that the medical community plays in the decontamination of patients. The HSS is organized and equipped to provide support in a conventional environment. The HSS must train and prepare to operate in all battlefield environments. According to FM 8-10-7, Health Service Support in an NBC Environment, HSS has several goals it must accomplish to successfully complete patient decontamination. These goals include Managing casualities so chemical agent injuries are minimized and any other injuries or illnesses are not aggravated.

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 Protecting persons handling contaminated casualties

or working in contaminated areas. Avoiding the spread of contamination in ambulances or working in contaminated areas. In addition, divisional and nondivisional medical supply companys preventative medicine personnel are responsible for testing the quality of water for the division. Water testing is conducted to ensure that water is not contaminated with biological/chemical agents. What role does HSS have in the actual patient decontamination process? It is solely responsible for providing medical personnel to supervise the patients decontamination process. However, in echelons I and II (unit and division) and nondivisional units, the supported commander must provide eight nonmedical personnel to perform patient decontamination. At echelons III and IV (corps and communication zone hospitals), a 20-man patient decontamination augmentation team or 20 nonmedical personnel must be provided to perform patient decontamination. The base cluster commander or units within the geographical area of the hospital provide the augmentees. Identification of Problems Last is the actual patient decontamination process and examining the reoccuring problems that arise in each step. The teams must be adequately dressed and equipped before decontaminating the patients. Each team is dressed in a mission-oriented protective posture level 4 butyl-rubber apron. Each station is supervised by at least one medic. Before most patients receive any medical treatment, the patient decontamination team decontaminates them. Before beginning decontamination procedures, the team uses M8 detector paper and/or a chemical agent monitor to determine the extent of contamination on each patient. Patient decontamination is extremely time- and manpower-intensive. Patients must be stabilized before they are processed through the decontamination line because decontamination requires approximately 20 minutes per patient. Patient decontamination teams consist of four personnel per station (nonmedical, if possible). Patient decontamination consists of the following seven steps: Step 1: Decontaminate patients mask and hood. The first step is usually the easiest part of the process. As a patient enters this station, the decontamination team must take several factors into consideration: Consciousness of the patient. If the patient is not conscious, what steps are required to ensure that the task is completed efficiently? During training, units need to ensure that different scenarios are practiced. Cutting of the hood. It is common to see personnel

operating this station not decontaminate the scissors regularly. This is a small, but important, step to ensure that the contaminated scissors do not touch the patients skin. Inlets that are contamination-free. Soldiers must use a 5 percent solution of chlorine while cleaning the patients mask. The decontamination personnel must cover the patients mask air inlets with their hands or gauze. A common mistake is that soldiers do not decontaminate their hands or handle the gauze with contaminated hands.

Decontaminating the hood

Step 2: Remove all visible contamination using the M95 skin decontamination kit (SDK). If an SDK is not available, soldiers may use a 5 percent chlorine solution, bleach, or hot, soapy water to remove the majority of the contamination. Step 3: Remove patients protective overgarment and personal effects. It is very important that soldiers decontaminate scissors after every cut of the battle-dress overgarment (BDO). It is especially important when cutting around the bandages, tourniquets, and splints of the contaminated patient. The technique for taking off the BDOs is another common problem in the process. The BDO top and bottom must be carefully rolled off a patients body to avoid contaminating the patient. It is important to know where and how personal effects are handled and where they are maintained after removing them. Often, the procedure for handling the personal effects of the contaminated patient are not practiced in training. This part of the step is frequently overlooked, but it is important to

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Cutting the overgarment jacket

Cutting the overgarment trousers

implement it into this training. If disposal of personal effects are overlooked, they have the potential to cause harm to the decontamination team. Step 4: Remove patients BDUs. This step requires the decontamination team to cut the BDUs off the patient. In training, soldiers simulate this process. However, it is important for the soldiers to simulate decontaminating the equipment used to cut away the BDUs. A 5-percent solution of chlorine must be readily available to decontaminate the cutting instrument. Decontaminate it continuously until the BDUs are removed. This safety measure decreases the patients chances of becoming contaminated. An effective way to do this is to use the cut-and-dip method. After each cut, dip the cutting instrument into the chlorine solution to ensure that the patient does not get contaminated. The team is now ready to remove the patients boots. To remove them correctly, a team member should pull them towards him. A common, incorrect method is to remove the boots so that the team members gloves touch the patients sock or exposed skin. Before removing the boots, the team member is expected to decontaminate his gloves, because at this point there is a higher risk of contaminating the patients exposed skin. As a precautionary measure, the team member should take all actions necessary to ensure that he does not contaminate the patient. After removing the boots, it is imperative to decontaminate the litter before placing the soldiers feet back on it. This ensures that all liquid contamination is neutralized. Step 5: Transfer patient to the litter. This step is the most dangerous for the patient. Cross contamination usually occurs because the patient must be transferred from a dirty litter to a clean one. If the decontamination steps were not conducted to standard before arriving at this station, the soldier is

All litters must be decontaminated after each use

with a 5 percent chlorine solution. Soldiers must remember to check for contamination before using the litters for clean patients. Unfortunately, a common step avoided is the final check of the litters by an improved chemical agent monitor or M8/M9 paper to ensure that the litter is free of contamination. Step 6: Decontaminate skin. At this point, a professional medical team assists the patient. The patients injuries are the primary focus at this station. Step 7: Transfer the patient across the shuffle pit. Decontamination teams are usually efficient in this step. Conclusion This type of decontamination is very tedious and requires soldiers to pay attention to detail. They also need to pay attention to what implied tasks must be accomplished. Successful patient decontamination is a compilation of knowledgeable leaders and well-trained soldiers working together. With intense training and unit emphasis on patient decontamination, American soldiers will be adequately prepared for the potentially dirty wars of future conflicts.
References FM 8-10-7, Health Service Support in an NBC Environment, April 1993, Army Medical Department Center and School Chemical Classroom Guidance. FM 3-5, NBC Decontamination, July 2000.
Captain Miller was a student in the Chemical Captains Career Course (CMC3) at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri when this article was written. Her previous assignments include decontamination platoon leader , 4th Chemical Company, 2d Infantry Division, Camp Casey, Korea; battalion chemical officer, Illesheim, Germany with a deployment to Albania. She is currently working at Fort Bragg, North Carolina.

at a great risk of becoming contaminated again.

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Attention! Future Cadets

By Major Kirk W. Gohlke The United States Military Academy (USMA) at West Point, New York, is the worlds premier institute of leader development. Graduates not only receive a bachelor of science degree but also a commission as a second lieutenant in the U.S. Army. They also gain practical leadership experience that is virtually unmatched in any other profession. Each year, West Point or the U.S. Military Academy Preparatory School (USMAPS) at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, offers admission to approximately 250 soldiers (Active, Reserve Component, and National Guard) and more than 100 military dependents. USMAPS prepares soldiers for success at West Point through an intensive curriculum focused on English and mathematics. For a dependent to be eligible, he or she must be the son or daughter of a military member in one of the following categories. First are career family members. These are members of an armed force (Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines, or Coast Guard) who are on active duty (other than for training) and who have served continuously on active duty for at least 8 years or who died while they were retired with pay or granted retired or retainer pay. Second are service members currently serving in the Reserve Component who are credited with at least 8 continuous years of service computed under Section 12733 of Title 10, United States Code (i.e., at least 2,880 points). Third are reservists who are entitled to retirement pay when they reach age 60, including those who have died. Applicants must be U.S. citizens. Unmarried with no legal obligation to support dependents. High school graduates. Under 23 years of age before July 1 of the year entering USMA (under 22 years of age prior to July 1 of the year entering the Prep School). Of high moral character. Most importantly, the applicant must have a sincere interest in attending West Point and becoming an Army officer. Soldiers and dependents who meet the basic eligibility requirements, have achieved SAT scores greater than 1,000 or ACT composite score of 20 or higher, and have earned good grades in a college preparatory high school curriculum are especially encouraged to apply. All application requirements must be submitted by 1 April 2002 to be considered for appointment to West Point or the USMAPS in July 2002. Those who are interested should contact Captain Cliff Hodges at (DSN) 688-5780 or (845) 938-5780, email: tc2324@usma.edu, or fill out the request form at http://forms.admissions.usma.edu/cb.

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Chemical School Resumes Live Smoke Pot Training

By Melvin Banner

Background Fort Leonard Wood (FLW), Missouris air-quality control restricts the use of hexachloroethane (HC) smoke mixture on its installation. The Army has developed a new, less toxic training smoke based on terephthalic acid (TA). Pine Bluff Arsenal, Arkansas, has produced and manufactured the M8 TA smoke pot, floating training. It is the only type of smoke pot that FLWs air quality control allows. The Smoke/Flame Division, U.S. Army Chemical School (USACMLS), received its first shipment of smoke pots in August 2001. The USACMLS instructors at FLW can only use the M8 TA smoke pot because of additional safety restrictions. Pine Bluff Arsenal and Rock Island, Illinois, have produced a new configuration M8 TA smoke pot and should start production in the first quarter of fiscal year 2002 for Armywide use. It is anticipated that by the first

quarter of fiscal year 2003, or when there is a sufficient supply, the M8 TA should be available for Armywide training. However, the Armywide community will continue to use the current M4 and M5 HC smoke pots pending the restriction of HC use at each location until the new M8 TAs are available. Live M8 TA Smoke Pot Training Class 4-01 of the Chemical Officers Basic Course received live smoke pot training in September 2001. The students gained more valuable knowledge from this training than from the previous training which was restricted to the showing of an inert pot and a film. The students were able to see the smoke pot function and the results of the smoke produced by the live smoke pot.
Mr. Banner is a training specialist, Chemical Division, WARMOD, DOTD, MANSCEN. He is a career civil servant and a retired U.S. Army master sergeant.

Instructors explain the techniques of using live smoke pots February 2002 49

PIN 079365-000