Hon. Richard E. Welch, III: Should We Listen To The Supreme Court and Should The Court Listen To Us?

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TheyWillNotOpenTheirEars:Should WeListentotheSupremeCourtand ShouldtheCourtListentoUs?
HON.RICHARDE.WELCHIII
You have an increasingly arrogant judiciary. And the question is,isthereanythingwetheAmericanpeoplecando?...Ithink many lawyers will find this [proposal of Congress issuing subpoenas to federal judges to explain their decisions] a very frightening idea. Theyve had this run of 50 years of pretending judgesaresupreme,thattheycantbechallenged.
Former Speaker of the House of Representatives Newt Gingrich, interviewwithBobSchieffer,FacetheNation,December18,2011.

[U]nder Gingrichs scheme... judges would be deciding cases whileconstantlylookingovertheirshoulderatthepossibilityof retaliation from politicians. If a president and majorities in Congresscouldsimplyoverturntheconstitutionalinterpretations of the Court, and if judges could be arrested for displeasing politicians...we would beplacing our basic rights in jeopardy. Theruleoflawwouldbedestroyed.
U.S.SenatorScottBrown,BostonGlobe,January4,2012. t is no secret that our society has become comfortable allowing the federal courts to handle some of its most politically divisive and difficult issues. One of the more frequent occurrences in the political culturewarsishavingthelosingsideinsomelegislativebattleruntocourt in an attempt to undo the political result. The fight over the extensive federal health care reform, titled the Affordable Care Act, is a prime example.1Assoonasthelawwassigned,ahostofcaseschallengingthe
I
1
Associate Justice, Superior Court, Commonwealth of Massachusetts; Adjunct Professor of Law,NewEnglandLaw|Boston.Thisarticleisdedicatedtotheovertwentyyearsworthof students whom have taken my course, Federal Courts and the Federal System, particularly thosethat,evenat7:00p.m.,stillopenedtheirears. SeePatientProtectionandAffordableCareActof2010,Pub.L.No.111148,124Stat.119
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constitutionality of the law were filed, and now, during an election year, the Supreme Court has decided the matter.2 Nor are the federal courts simply passive recipients of these political hot potatoes. The Supreme Courts extraordinary efforts to take jurisdiction over the Bush v. Gore3 votingdisputespringstomind.4 This reliance upon federal judicial review has a necessary corollary: American society now unquestionably obeys most any Supreme Court ruling.Indeed,themostremarkableaspectoftheBushv.Goredecisionwas notitsmuchcriticizedreasoning,5butrather,thepublicsfirmacceptance of the Supreme Courts role in deciding the outcome of a presidential election.AsJusticeAnthonyKennedyobserved,[wehave]comefarfrom theparadigmofMarburysuingMadisontogethiscommission.6Wesure have.By1803,JamesMadisonamanwhoknewathingortwoaboutthe Constitutionand others had serious doubts about the Supreme Courts power to declare a popularly enacted law unconstitutional.7 Now, such
(codifiedasamendedinscatteredsectionsof42U.S.C.).
2 Natl Fedn of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 260809 (2012) (upholding individualmandatewithfivemembermajority,whereChiefJusticeRobertssdecisiontermed themandateatax,invalidatingexpansionofMedicaidasaviolationofstatesovereignty). 3 4
531U.S.98(2000)(percuriam).
See Samuel Issacharoff, Political Judgments, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 637, 63839 (2001) ([T]he Court . . . failed in the preservation of an institutional reticence to intercede in the political thicket when other institutional actors were amply well positioned to address the claimed harm.). See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Bush v. Gore Was Not Justiciable, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1093,109395(2001);LarryD.Kramer,Foreword:WetheCourt,115HARV.L.REV.4,6,10,1315, 15254(2001);LaurenceH.Tribe,eroGv.hsuBandItsDisguises:FreeingBushv.GoreFromIts Hall of Mirrors, 115 HARV. L. REV. 170, 17779 (2001). These authors criticize not only the reasoning of Bush v. Gore, but also the Rehnquist Courts tendency to assume exclusive competenceinallconstitutionalmatters.
6 7 5
Lujanv.DefendersofWildlife,504U.S.555,580(1992)(Kennedy,J.,concurring).
Madisonssupportforjudicialreviewappearedtowaxandwaneovertime,depending uponthecircumstances.SeeRalphL.Ketcham,JamesMadisonandJudicialReview,8SYRACUSE L. REV.158,158(1957)(IntheyearsbetweentheopeningoftheFederalConventionof1787 and Jeffersons election to the Presidency in 1800, Madison took a bewildering number of positions on the question of interpretation of the Constitution . . . .). Madisons intellectual soul mate, Thomas Jefferson, found the view that judges [are] the ultimate arbiters of all constitutional questions; a very dangerous doctrine indeed, and one which would place us underthedespotismofanoligarchy.SeeThomasJefferson,LettertoWilliamC.Jarvis(Sept. 28, 1820), in 10 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, 18161826, at 160 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., The Knickerbocker Press 1899). As to constitutional interpretation, he considered the Constitution as having made all the departments coequal and cosovereign within themselves. Id. See generally RAOUL BERGER, CONGRESS V. THE SUPREME COURT (1969) (reviewingthedifferingviewsregardingjudicialreviewamongmembersoftheconstitutional convention);KATHLEENM.SULLIVAN&GERALDGUNTHER,CONSTITUTIONALLAW,1113,2223
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judicial review is runofthemill. The point of this article is not to attack the firmly entrenched practice of federal judicial review.8 It would be a fools errand to challenge an institution that has been such a vital and beneficialpartofAmericangovernance,atleastsinceChiefJusticeStones famous United States v. Carolene Products, Co.9 footnote converted judicial reviewinto a protection of the fundamental Bill ofRights guaranteesand forinsularand discreteminorities. Itisimportantto remember, however, thatthependulumhasswungfarinregardtotheSupremeCourtspower andacceptance. The public acceptance of federal judicial review during the last half century and the resulting impact that federal courts have in our society have not gone unnoticed. Conservative politicians railing against federal judgesisnothingnew,butrecentlytherhetorichasincreasedinintensity. The two quotes that begin this article show the political divide on this issue. Newt Gingrich is correct in observing that most lawyersnever mindmoststudentswhopaidattentionintheirhighschoolcivicsclass would find his latest pronouncements attacking federal judicial review to be frightening.10 Many a law professor could spend numerous classes shooting down Gingrichs ideas or his interpretation of various Supreme Court decisions. Still, this political rhetoric hits a chord with people for a reason.11 The traditional response defending federal judicial review, represented by Senator Scott Browns reply to Gingrich, in essence is the
(17thed.2010)(discussingvariousopinionsofsomeoftheframersonjudicialreview).
8 Forafamousdebateoverthelegitimacyofjudicialreview,compareLEARNEDHAND,THE BILL OF RIGHTS 1, 311, 2730 (Atheneum 1977) (1958) (arguing that there is nothing in the language of the Constitution giving the Supreme Court the power of judicial review), with Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 110 (1959) (arguing that the power of judicial review is grounded in the language of the Constitution).ForaninterestingandratherharshcriticismofMarburyandjudicialreview,see JAMESMCGREGORBURNS,PACKINGTHECOURT:THERISEOFJUDICIALPOWERANDTHECOMING CRISISOFTHESUPREMECOURT15,259(2009)(arguingthatChiefJusticeJohnMarshallerredin MarburywhenholdingthattheSupremeCourtistheultimateinterpreteroftheConstitution becausethatpowerlieswiththeAmericanpeoplethemselves). 9
304U.S.144,152n.4(1938).
Mr.Gingrichsviewswerenottheoffthecuffmusingsofapresidentialcandidate.He has issued a position paper supporting his views. See Bringing the Courts Back Under the Constitution: NEWT2012PositionPaperSupportingItemNo.9of the21stCenturyContract with America,NEWT.ORG(Oct.7,2011),http://www.newt.org/sites/newt.org/files/Courts.pdf.
11 See, e.g., Jeff Jacoby, The Supreme Court Cant Be Absolute, BOS. GLOBE (Jan. 1, 2012), www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2012/01/01/supremecourtcanabsolute/gp7sg853zm9jTatBj LcJfL/story.html; Michael C. Dorf, Newt Gingrich Is Right That Judicial Supremacy Has Been Challenged Before, but Wrong to Try to Turn Back the Clock, JUSTIA.COM (Dec. 28, 2011), verdict.justia.com/2011/12/28/newtgingrichisrightthatjudicialsupremacyhasbeen challengedbeforebutwrongtotrytoturnbacktheclock.
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factthatthefederalcourtsgetthefinalsayonlegalinterpretationmaybe irritating at times, but it is essential to protect the rule of law. This, however,maynotbeanadequateresponse. There is room between these two perspectives. Perhaps it is time to check the swing of that pendulum, because itisalways beneficial forany branch of government, even the least dangerous, to be subjected to challenge and criticism. The appropriate way to check any judicial intransigence or imperialismbe it from the right or the leftis not to disregard judicial holdings or subpoena judges. Instead, the solution is morenuancedandinvolvesmeaningfulcommunicationwiththeSupreme Court. The three most effective messengers are Congress, the President, and thestatecourts.Congresssroleinthisdialogueisthepassageoflegislation thattests,modifies,orcorrectscertainjudicialholdings.ThePresidentcan effectivelycommunicatedirectlytotheSupremeCourtandrallythepublic against unwarranted or controversial decisions. State courts also have a roleinthisinteractionbyrestrictivelyinterpretingordistinguishingfederal judicial precedents. Such actions serve as important avenues to check judicial supremacy or arrogance, and such communication allows the Court to reconsideror better define and defendits rulings. In the long run, such interaction is good for the Court and good for the political process. Meaningful communication protects the Court from the threat of beingignoredandrevitalizestheothergovernmentalbranches. I. AGlanceatthePast Ourpresentacceptanceoffederaljudicialreviewisarelativelymodern phenomenon. The early nineteenth century is littered with wellknown examples of scant respect for the Supreme Court or its powers. The most famousandvividexamplescomefromtheStateofGeorgia. His name was George Corn Tassel, and he was a Cherokee Indian livingonCherokeelandsinwhatisnownorthernGeorgia.12Theyearwas 1830;AndrewJacksonwasthePresident,andJohnMarshallwastheChief JusticeoftheSupremeCourt.Atfortyoneyearsold,theConstitutionhad survived its infancy and was well into its young adulthood. Under the Constitution,theIndianNationswereseparatesovereignsfromthestates, and only the federal governmentnot the stateswas empowered to exerciseanyregulationoftheIndianTribes.13
12 See Robert S. Davis, State v. George Tassel: States Rights and the Cherokee Court Cases, 18271830,12J.S.LEGALHIST.41,41(2004);R.KentNewmyer,ChiefJusticeJohnMarshallsLast Campaign:Georgia,Jackson,andtheCherokeeCases,24J.SUP.CT.HIST.76,81,83(1999);RobertB. McKay,GeorgiaVersustheUnitedStatesSupremeCourt,4J.PUB.L.285,293(1955). 13
SeeU.S.CONST.art.I,8,cl.3;SeminoleTribeofFla.v.Florida,517U.S.44,62(1996)(If
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The Cherokees boasted of being the most civilized of the Native American tribes. Far from nomadic savages, the Cherokees farmed their rich lands in northern Georgia, converted to Christianity, and developed theirownwrittenlanguage.14Havingtheluxuryofhistorichindsight,some mightviewtheseactionsassadaccommodationstoappeaseanoccupying power. No matter how civilized, the Cherokees remained just Indians to the Georgians who lusted for the rich Cherokee land and wanted the successfulandpeskytribegone. CornTasselmightnothavebeenasgenteelorcivilizedassomeofhis fellow tribesmen in that he was accused of murder.15 There seems little doubtthatthismurder,ifitoccurred,tookplacewithintheCherokeeland holdings.Georgia,refusingtorecognizeCherokeeownershipofthelandor the sovereignty of the tribe, seized Corn Tassel and promptly tried and convictedhimofmurderinthestatecourts.16Notsurprisingly,CornTassel wassentencedtodeath.17CornTasselarguedthattheGeorgiastatecourts hadnojurisdictionoveractionsthattookplaceontheCherokeelandsand appealedthisconvictionanddeathsentencetotheUnitedStatesSupreme Court.18 The Supreme Court accepted the appeal and issued an order stayinghisimpendingexecution.19Uponreceivingnoticeoftheappealand thestay,GeorgiaintentionallydisregardedtheorderandhungCornTassel on the appointed day.20 Without a live body, there was no live issue and theSupremeCourtchosetododgeafightwithGeorgiaanddismissedthe case.21 No one was prosecuted or disciplined for Corn Tassels illegal hangingortheintentionaldisregardoftheSupremeCourtsorderofstay. Two years later, the Cherokee Nation hired the services of one of the nationsbestlawyers,formerAttorneyGeneralWilliamWirt,andappealed anothercasetotheSupremeCourt.AtissuewasaGeorgialawthatmadeit a crime for white people to work on the Cherokee lands without a state
anything, the Indian Commerce Clause accomplishes a greater transfer of power from the StatestotheFederalGovernmentthandoestheInterstateCommerceClause....[T]heStates. ..havebeendivestedofvirtuallyallauthorityoverIndiancommerceandIndianTribes.).
14 15 16 17 18 19
SeeMcKay,supranote12,at293. Id.at29394. Seeid. Id. SeeCherokeeNationv.Georgia,30U.S.1,2(1831);McKay,supranote12,at294.
See Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 12 (explaining that the execution order was stayed pending this appeal); Davis, supra note 12, at 56 (stating that the Supreme Court agreed to heartheappeal). See Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 12 (explaining that Tassel was hung in defiance of the SupremeCourt);McKay,supranote12,at294.
21 SeeCherokeeNation,30U.S.at31(statingthattheCourthadnojurisdictiontohearthe case). 20
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permit.22 The law was directed against white missionaries who allegedly were giving spiritual guidance and counsel to the Cherokees while the Cherokees were resisting Georgias attempts to seize more and more Cherokee land.23 Georgia wanted to banish these missionary troublemakers. One missionary, Samuel Worcester, who had helped publishaCherokeenewspaper,wasconvictedbytheStateandsentenced tofouryearsofhardlabor.24 Remember, the Constitution rather explicitly prohibits states from regulatingthesovereignIndiannations;25therefore,itwasratherclearthat Georgia could not prohibit missionaries from entering or working on Cherokeelands.ThisissueeventuallylandedonappealinJohnMarshalls lap. Marshall issued a rather emphatic and unanimous decision that commanded Georgia to release Worcester and further held that Georgia mustrecognizethesovereigntyoftheCherokeeNation,becausetheState hadnocontrolorpoweroveranyoftheCherokeelands.26TheWorcesterv. Georgia decision infuriated Georgia; furthermore, President Andrew Jackson, that old Indian fighter, was not too pleased.27 Upon receiving word of the decision, popular folk legend has it that Jackson announced: [ChiefJustice]JohnMarshallhasmadehisdecision;nowlethimenforce it.28 Whether or not Old Hickory had the presence of mind to coin this phrase is beside the point. Asone historian has noted:The now let him enforce it remark is like the more colorful images from holy scripture: historically questionable but philosophically true.29 Jackson certainly did not lift a finger to enforce the Supreme Courts order, and thus, Jackson pinpointedaconstitutionaldilemma.Underourseparationofpowers,the federaljudiciarycannotordertheArmyortheNationalGuardtoenforce
22 MatthewL.Sundquist,Worcesterv.Georgia:ABreakdownintheSeparationofPowers,35 AM.INDIANL.REV.239,240(2010).
See Gerard N. Magliocca, The Cherokee Removal and the Fourteenth Amendment, 53 DUKE L.J. 875, 881 (2003); Sundquist, supra note 22, at 240, 242 (stating that Worcester was a missionaryandthatGeorgiawantedtoacquireCherokeeland,asotherstatesweredoing).
24 ForexcellentandmoredetailedexplanationsofWorcesterandtheotherCherokeeCases, see Sundquist, supra note 22, at 240; Joseph C. Burke, The Cherokee Cases: A Study in Law, PoliticsandMorality,21STAN.L.REV.500,520(1969). 25 26
23
U.S.CONST.art.I,8,cl.3.
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 531 (1832). Marshall had avoided the issue the year beforewhendenyinginjunctivereliefinCherokeeNationv.Georgia,30U.S.1,20(1831).
27 See Richard P. Longaker, Andrew Jackson and the Judiciary, 71 POL. SCI. Q. 341, 34950 (1956)(examiningAndrewJacksonsattitudetowardthejudiciary). 28 29
Id.at341. JONMEACHAM,AMERICANLION:ANDREWJACKSONINTHEWHITEHOUSE204(2008).
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its orders or threaten Georgia with loss of federal funds.30 The judiciary doesnothavethepoweroftheswordorthepurse.IntheWorcestercase, Jackson treated the Supreme Courts order with disdain as he quietly encouraged Georgians to push the Cherokees off their lands.31 And, sure enough, that happened. The Cherokees were forced to leave Georgia for Oklahoma.32 For the second time in two years, the Supreme Court issued anemphaticorderandnobodylistened. Although the Supreme Courts stature rose after the Jackson Administration, later presidents rattled their sabers to remind the Court that it remained the least dangerous branch. Abraham Lincoln famously suggested that the controversial Dred Scott decision was binding only on the parties involved in the litigation and did not set a national policy.33 Recognizing the profound and divisive impact of the Dred Scott decision uponthenation,Lincolnaddresseditdirectlyinhisfirstinauguraladdress:
[T]he candid citizen must confess that if the policy of the Governmentuponvitalquestionsaffectingthewholepeopleisto be irrevocably fixed by decisions of the Supreme Court, the instant they are made in ordinary litigation between parties in personal actions, the people will have ceased to be their own rulers, having to that extent practically resigned their Governmentintothehandsofthateminenttribunal.34
Lincoln suggested negating the significance of any Supreme Court constitutional interpretation by restricting the holding to the parties involvedinthatparticularcase,therebyeliminatinganyprecedentialvalue tothejudicialdecision.35
30 31 32
Id. Seeid.at20405.
ArthurManuel&NicoleSchabus,IndigenousPeoplesattheMarginoftheGlobalEconomy: AViolationofInternationalHumanRightsandInternationalTradeLaw,8CHAP. L. REV.229,232 (2005).

33 Prior to Lincolns First Inaugural, various northern state courts indicated significant resistancetoenforcingtheFugitiveSlaveAct.See,e.g.,Commonwealthv.Aves,35Mass.193, 224(1836);Arnoldv.Booth,14Wis.195,205(1861).SeealsoJuliusYanuck,TheGarnerFugitive SlaveCase,40MISS.VALLEYHIST.REV.47,4950(1953). 34 Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address, in 5 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERSOFTHEPRESIDENTS3206,321011(Richardsoned.,1897). 35 Id.at3210.Inthisvein,oneshouldalsoconsiderPresidentLincolnsdirectdefianceof Chief Justice Taneys judicial order to release John Merryman. The order came from Taney, sittingasafederalcircuitjudgeandnotasaSupremeCourtjustice,rulingonahabeascorpus petition of Merryman. Merryman was accused of treasonous activity including cutting telegraphlinesanddestroyingbridgesinMarylandinanefforttohelptheConfederacy.See ExparteMerryman,17F.Cas.144,152(C.C.D.Md.1861).ThePresidentandtheUnitedStates ArmyrefusedtoobeyTaneysorderandTaneydidnottakeanyactiontoassurecompliance. For an excellent and readable description of the case and its background, see Bruce A.
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Quoting from Lincolns First Inaugural, Franklin D. Roosevelt was preparedtodirectlydefyaSupremeCourtordershouldtheCourtdecide against the government in the gold clause cases.36 In his draft address that he would have given had the Supreme Court ruled against the governments ability to abrogate gold clauses, Roosevelt refused [t]o standidlybyandtopermitthedecisionoftheSupremeCourttobecarried throughtoitslogical,inescapableconclusion[forit]wouldsoimperilthe economic and political security of this nation.37 Had the Supreme Court ruleddifferentlyandthrowntheAmericaneconomyintochaosduringthe difficulteconomiccrisisofthe1930s,manywouldhavesupportedoutright defianceofaSupremeCourtdecision.Theymightwellhavebeencorrectif only as a matter of practical necessity and national security. Of course, Rooseveltssocalledcourtpackingplan38wasanexplicitshotacrossthe SupremeCourtsbow.Althoughnotfreeofdebate,thereisevidencethat Roosevelts famous plan, although soundly rejected by the Senate, effectivelyacceleratedtheSupremeCourtsreconsiderationandrejectionof itsLochnereraholdings.39 Given the realities of modern America, the disregard of John MarshallsSupremeCourtseemsratherantiquatedandunlikelytoreoccur. By the early 1900s, the Supreme Court was able to enforce its orders to reluctantstateofficialsbyuseofthecontemptpower.WhenSheriffShipp ofChattanooga,TennesseeconspiredtocontraveneJusticeHarlansorder to stay the execution of a poor, black man convicted of raping a young, whitewoman,theSupremeCourt,sittingasatrialcourt,tried,convicted, and jailed the politically influential sheriff.40 Still, the Supreme Courts contempt powers likely would be ineffective when enforcing broader based court orders typical in modern public rights litigation, such as
Ragsdale, Ex parte Merryman and Debates on Civil Liberties During the Civil War, FEDERAL JUDICIALCENTER(2007),http://www.fjc.gov/history/docs/merryman.pdf. Girardeau A. Spann, Neutralizing Grutter, 7 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 633, 658 (2005) (citing Perryv.UnitedStates,294U.S.330(1935)).
37 FranklinD.Roosevelt,MemorandumfromF.D.R.toJosephP.Kennedy(Feb.19,1935), in 1 F.D.R.: HIS PERSONAL LETTERS, 19281945, at 45960 (Elliott Roosevelt ed., 1950). See also JAMESF.SIMON,FDRANDCHIEFJUSTICEHUGHES25256(2012). 38 JEFFSHESOL,SUPREMEPOWER:FRANKLINROOSEVELTVS.THESUPREMECOURT34(2010). 39 The extent that certain members of the Court, particularly Justice Owen Roberts, were actuallyaffectedbythepubliccriticismoftheCourtsantiNewDealrulingsandthethreatof the court packing plan is, in all likelihood, a never ending historical debate. For the most recent views on this issue, see SIMON, supra note 37, at 34345 and SHESOL, supra note 38, at 43437. 40 UnitedStatesv.Shipp,203U.S.563,57172(1906);UnitedStatesv.Shipp,214U.S.386, 42325(1909);UnitedStatesv.Shipp,215U.S.580,58182(1909).SeealsoMARK CURRIDEN & LEROY PHILLIPS, JR., CONTEMPT OF COURT: THE TURNOFTHECENTURY LYNCHING THAT LAUNCHEDAHUNDREDYEARSOFFEDERALISM284,323,334(Faber&Fabered.,1999). 36
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desegregatingaschooldistrictoralteringstatewideprisonprocedures.41 Althoughnotoutsidetherealmofpossibility,itnowseemsmostlyan academic exercise to imagine both a State and a President willfully ignoringaSupremeCourtedict.Itmaybeintriguingtoask,forexample, whatifPresidentEisenhowerhadnotsentinthe101stAirbornetoenforce thefederaljudicialordertodesegregatetheLittleRockpublicschools?But, the fact is that Eisenhower, no great fan of racially integrated public schools,did.42InlightoftheExecutiveBranchsconsistentenforcementof unpopularjudicialdecisionsduringthemassiveSouthernresistanceofthe late 1950s and early 1960s, it is now almost a cultural given that the Supreme Court is to be obeyed by coequal branches of power.43 This is trueevenifonesgriponthePresidencyisatstake.DuringtheWatergate scandal, President Nixons lawyer made rumblings that Nixon might not comply with a Supreme Court order to hand over the Watergate tapes to the grand jury. Nixon did, in fact, comply when the Supreme Court ordered the production of the tapes.44 One of the tapes contained the famoussmokinggunthatprovedNixonknewoftheWatergateburglary and engaged in a coverup.45 Fourteen days after complying with the
See Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys and U.S. Marshals Service: Oversight Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties & the Admin. of Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. 4142 (1987) (statement of Stanley E. Morris, Director, U.S. Marshals Service). Even the Supreme Courts contempt power requires a modicum of cooperation of the Executive Department. See, e.g., id. For example, the U.S. Marshals Service, controlled ultimatelybytheExecutive,wouldarrangeforthearrestandtransportofthepartyaccusedof contempt.See,e.g.,id.
42 SeeTAYLOR BRANCH, PARTINGTHE WATERS: AMERICAINTHE KING YEARS 195463,at224 (1988); DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER, THE EISENHOWER DIARIES (Robert H. Ferrell ed., 1981); RICHARDKLUGER,SIMPLEJUSTICE75354(1975). 41
See, e.g., Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) (illustrating the unanimous decision affirmingthefederaldistrictcourtsdesegregationorderinLittleRock).Cooperisoftencited as the most farreaching pronouncement by the Court of its paramount position to interpret theConstitution.Thecourtstated,inatonethatmadeitseemlikethepropositionwasagiven since1803,thefederaljudiciaryissupremeintheexpositionofthelawoftheConstitution, andthisprincipleisapermanentandindispensablefeatureofourconstitutionalsystem.Id. ProfessorGeraldGuntherconvincinglyarguedthatthisdictainCooperexpandedtheMarbury holdingbyconfus[ing]MarshallsassertionofjudicialauthoritytointerprettheConstitution with judicial exclusiveness. Gerald Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the Passive VirtuesA CommentonPrincipleandExpediencyinJudicialReview,64COLUM.L.REV.1,25n.155(1964).
44 UnitedStatesv.Nixon,418U.S.683,683,705(1974)(quotingMarburyv.Madison,5U.S. 137, 177 (1803) (reviewing a claim of executive privilege and reaffirming that it is the province and the duty of this Court to say what the law is with respect to the claim of privilegepresentedinthiscase)).
43
PhillipAllenLacovara,UnitedStatesv.Nixon:ThePrelude,83MINN. L. REV. 1061,1064 (1999); see generally The Smoking Gun Tape, WATERGATE.INFO (Jun. 23, 1972), http://Watergate.info/1972/06/23/thesmokingguntape.html (displaying a transcript of the
45
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SupremeCourtorder,NixonresignedthePresidency.46Theoverlayoflate twentieth century history has solidified the Supreme Court as the supremeinterpreteroftheConstitution.Addtothisthefactthat,inmost instances, our national economy and the other coequal branches of governmentrelytooheavilyuponthejudiciarytoevenimaginedisobeying a Supreme Court mandate. All this has led to a situation where the SupremeCourt,likeRumpoleswife,isshewhomustbeobeyed.47 II. ASuggestionfortheFuture:CommunicationwithandPressure upontheSupremeCourt Thisunhesitatingobedienceis,forthemostpart,allforthegood.The countermajoritarian aspects of judicial review are invaluable when upholding fundamental civil rights and the rights of insular and discrete minorities. Would any of us want Eisenhower to abandon young black studentstoaLittleRockmob?Wouldweeverwanttorelivethehanging ofaprisonerinoutrightdefianceofaSupremeCourtorder?Theansweris, rather obviously: of course not. Still, there is a need and a value to communicatingdispleasuretotheCourtand,indeed,aneedandavalueto exertingsomepressureupontheCourt.Whileobedienceisimportant,itis equally important that it is not unquestioning obedience. No branch of government, even the least dangerous, should have a questionable assertionofpowergounanswered.Inthelatetwentiethandearlytwenty firstcenturies,communicationbetweentheCourt,thepublic,andCongress hasattimesbeeneffective.Forthemostpart,however,thereismuchroom for improvement. The following briefly explores the dialogue that has or should take place between the Court, the public, and Congress in three areas: constitutional interpretation, the development of federal constitutionalcommonlaw,andstatutoryinterpretation.Pressureexerted bythedemocraticforcesofgovernmentuponthejudiciarywill,inthelong term,bebeneficialtoboth. A. ConstitutionalInterpretation:ADialogueBetweentheCourtand Congress The ability to influence Supreme Court decisions is most limited in cases involving actual interpretation of constitutional provisions. Such insulation is appropriate particularly in decisions regarding civil rights where the Court uses judicial review as a countermajoritarian protection
recordingofameetingbetweenPresidentNixonandH.R.HaldemanintheOvalOffice). See Randall K. Miller, Congressional Inquests: Suffocating the Constitutional Prerogative of ExecutivePrivilege,81MINN.L.REV.631,638(1997).
47 Rumpole Remembered, PBS.ORG, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/mystery/rumpole.html (last visitedOct.22,2012). 46
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forthepoliticallypowerlessorunpopular.48Still,Congressandstatecourts canresponsiblyattempttoinfluencetheSupremeCourtbylegislationand judicialdecisions. A good example of Congress initiating a dialogue with the Supreme Court can be found in federal statutes restricting the right to habeas corpus. In the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) of 1996, Congress mandated deportation of any alien convicted of certain felony charges, including most drug crimes.49 The legislation eliminated federal court jurisdiction over any appeal of an Immigration and Nationalization Service (INS) deportation order.50 Congress also eliminated any jurisdiction to hear a writ of habeas corpus broughtbyanalienchallengingadeportationorder.51Thissetthestagefor INS v. St. Cyr.52 St. Cyr, a citizen of Haiti, was legally admitted into the UnitedStatesbutlaterpledguiltytoastatefelonydrugcharge.53Underthe IIRIRA,theINSinstituteddeportationproceedingsagainstSt.Cyr.St.Cyr filedahabeaspetitionunderthefederalhabeasstatute54challengingboth the interpretation and constitutionality of the statute and requesting release. TheUnitedStatesarguedthattheSupremeCourtlackedjurisdictionto hear the habeas petition because Congress explicitly precluded judicial reviewintheIIRIRAandinacompanionstatute.55Theargumentcertainly
48 Not everyone would agree with this statement. Former Speaker Newt Gingrich, citing ThomasJeffersonsviews,appearstobelievethateachbranchiscoequalinitsinterpretation of all aspects of the Constitution. Under this analysis, if two branches of the federal governmentinterpretedtheConstitutiondifferentlythanthethirdbranch,themajoritywins. Thus,ifCongressand the Executivedisagreedwith Brownv. BoardofEducation,thepolitical brancheswouldnotbeobligatedtofolloworenforcetheSupremeCourtsmandate.Suchan approachwouldeliminatetheprotectionthatjudicialreviewprovidesforfundamentalrights anddiscreteandinsularminorities.ThisisnottosaythatCongressandtheExecutivedonot havearoleoranobligationtointerprettheConstitution.Insomeareas,theinterpretation by Congress or the Executive may be definitive. This is the basis of the political question doctrine.Inotherareas,however,theCourtmaygetthefinalsay. 49 IllegalImmigrationReformandImmigrantResponsibilityActof1996,Pub.L.No.104 208,348(1996). 50 51
CalcanoMartinezv.INS,533U.S.348,34950(2001).
Indeed, Section 401(e) of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA)featuredaprovisionentitledEliminationofCustodyReviewbyHabeasCorpus, andtheIIRIRA provided:Notwithstandinganyotherprovisionoflaw,nocourtshallhave jurisdictiontoreviewanyfinalorderofremovalagainstanalienwhoisremovablebyreason ofhavingcommitted[variousoffenses].INSv.St.Cyr,533U.S.289,311,328(2001).
52 53 54 55
Id.at289. Id.at408. 28U.S.C.2241(2008). SeeSt.Cyr,533U.S.at308.
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had some forceone provision of the law was titled Elimination of Custody Review by Habeas Corpus.56 By a closely divided 54 vote, the Supreme Court held that the IIRIRA must be interpreted not to preclude jurisdiction. The majority opinion, written by Justice Stevens, stated that thereisastrongpresumptioninfavorofjudicialreviewofadministrative action and that only a clear statement from Congress to repeal habeas jurisdictionwouldovercomethatpresumption.57Interpretingthestatuteto preclude jurisdiction to hear the habeas petition absent a clear statement from Congress would raise serious constitutional problems.58 The majorityexplained:aseriousSuspensionClauseissuewouldbepresented if we were to accept the INSs submission that the 1996 statutes have withdrawn that power from federal judges and provided no adequate substitute for the exercise.59 Despite wording that almost anyone could understand,themajorityfoundthattherewasnoclearstatement.Straining mightily,JusticeStevensreasonedthatthestatutespreclusionofjudicial review did not include precluding jurisdiction over habeas corpus petitions. In the immigration context, Stevens wrote, judicial review andhabeascorpushavehistoricallydistinctmeanings.60 Not surprisingly, Justice Scalia filed a withering dissent claiming that themajorityfoundambiguityintheutterlyclearlanguageofthestatute and fabricated a superclear statement, magic words requirement.61 JusticeScalia(nowwritingforonlytwootherjustices,asJusticeOConnor didnotjointhisportionofhisopinion)opinedthattheSuspensionClause does not guarantee any [particular] writ of habeas corpus but only ensures that whatever habeas rights exist at a particular time may not be suspended.62 Scaliascriticismofthemajoritysinabilitytofindaclearstatementis wellfounded.Thatcritique,however,missesthelargerpoint.WhenSt.Cyr wasargued,theissueofwhetherthereexistedanaffirmativeconstitutional right to habeas corpus was unanswered. Since the First Judiciary Act of 1789, a statutory habeas remedy existed and was only suspended by AbrahamLincoln.WhetherArticleIsSuspensionClauseimpliedsucha right was unclear and, thus, as the majority noted, constituted a serious
56 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104132, 110 Stat. 1214,1268. 57 58 59 60 61 62
St.Cyr,533U.S.at298. Id.at299300. Id.at305. Id.at311. Id.at32627(Scalia,J.,dissenting). Id.at337.
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Suspension Clause issue.63 Given the importance of the issue and the noveltyofsuspendingthewrit,themajoritywaswisetoruleasitdid.By duckingtheconstitutionalissue,theSupremeCourteffectivelyputtheball back in Congresss court and allowed the democratic branch of governmentanopportunitytoreconsiderthisimportantstep. As time would tell, Congress did mean to eliminate jurisdiction over writs of habeas corpus, albeit in a different context. Picking up on the Courtsrequestforasuperclearstatement,Congressprovidedthatinthe MilitaryCommissionsAct.64ThatActexplicitlyeliminatedanyjurisdiction over a habeas corpus petition filed by any alien deemed an enemy combatant.65 Because every Justice agreed that the statute unequivocally and clearly eliminated habeas corpus for enemy combatants, the Court wasforcedtoconfronttheissueinBoumedienev.Bush.66Themajorityofthe CourtfoundthattheSuspensionClause,ArticleI,Section9,Clause2,did provideaconstitutionalrighttohabeascorpusreliefandthattheMilitary CommissionsActunconstitutionallysuspendedthatright.67 The Supreme Court, of course, could have reached its Boumediene rulingontherighttohabeasreliefsevenyearsearlierinSt.Cyr.Thedelay waswarranted,however,becauseitallowedadialoguebetweenCongress and the Court. The Court emphasized in St. Cyr what an important decision Congress was making and Congress, in turn, made the difficult decisionandrelayedittotheCourtinverycertainterms.68This,afterall,is
63 See St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 30405. There exists historical ammunition for each side in this debate.PriortothedraftingoftheConstitution,everyStateprovidedfortherighttopetition forhabeascorpus.ErwinChemerinsky,ThinkingAboutHabeasCorpus,37CASE W. RES. L. REV. 748, 75152 (1987). That right, long established in English common law, was generally consideredthefundamentalbuildingblockfortheAngloAmericanconceptoftheruleoflaw. After all, why would the drafters include a prohibition against suspending the writ if there wasnt an implied right to habeas corpus? On the other hand, Charles Pinckney proposed includinganexplicitrighttohabeascorpusduringtheConstitutionalConventionanditwas voteddown.Id.Thisfailuretoincludeanexplicitrighttohabeasdidnotgounnoticed.Four of the state ratifying conventions objected to the Constitutions lack of an affirmative guaranteeofarighttohabeascorpusrelief.Id.
Cf.MilitaryCommissionActof2006,Pub.L.No.109366,7(e)(1),120Stat.2600,2636 (2006); St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 29899 (showing the Courts issues with Congressional language andtheActwhichusedmoreexplicitlanguage).
65 Military Commission Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109366, 7(e)(1), 120 Stat. 2600, 2636 (2006). 66 67 68
64
Boumedienev.Bush,553U.S.723,776(2008). Id.at73233.
Seeid.at73738(explainingthatwhentheCourtrequestsaclear,unequivocalstatement fromCongress,Congresscanrespondasitdidherewithanamendedstatutethatmakestheir intent clear); St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 29899 (explaining that the Court required a clear unambiguousstatementfromCongress).
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what democracyisallabout. The Court, then, was completely justified in making, indeed was obligated to make, the difficult constitutional determination as to whether there existed a constitutional right to habeas relief that could only be suspended in times of rebellion or invasion. In making this determination, the Courtwhether one agrees with the majoritys reasoning or notwas most justified in using the counter majoritarianpowerofjudicialreview.TheCourtwasdealingwithamost fundamentalright,thewritofhabeascorpus,asitappliedtoaclassically discreteandinsularminority,i.e.,aliens. The advantage of this extended dialogue between the two governmental branches was that it initially avoided unnecessary constitutional interpretation and eventually allowed the Court to hone its constitutional analysis. This is true of both the majority and the dissent. Justice Scalia, for example, did not repeat the questionable Suspension Clause analysis that he tried out in his St. Cyr dissent. This type of back andforthbetweenCongressandtheCourtbenefitsbothbranches.Itforces Congresstomakedifficultpoliticalchoiceswhileenforcingselfrestrainton thejudicialbranch.OnceCongressmakesitspoliticalchoiceandforcesthe Courtshand,thepublicbetterunderstandsthattheirreplaceablevalueof thepower[ofjudicialreview]...liesintheprotectionithasaffordedthe constitutional rights and liberties of individual citizens and minority groupsagainstoppressiveordiscriminatorygovernmentaction.69 B. QuestioningandRefiningofSupremeCourtDecisionsbyState Courts Statecourtscanplayanimportantanduniqueroleincommunicating with the Supreme Court. When the Supreme Court interprets the Constitution in a new or expansive fashion, it almost necessarily does so without fully anticipatingthe effect such a ruling will havein the unique settings of various states or regional areas of the nation. A rather recent example is the Supreme Courts foray into corporate free speech as delineatedinitscontroversialCitizensUnitedv.F.E.C.decision.70InCitizens United, a fractured Court extended First Amendment protections to corporations and struck down federal statutes and regulations that prohibitedcorporationsfromfinanciallysupportingacandidateforfederal office.71 The majority found that the laws provision that gave the corporationtheoptionofspendingmoneyforpoliticalsupportthrougha separatepoliticalactioncommitteeconstitutedanunconstitutionalburden
69 70 71
UnitedStatesv.Richardson,418U.S.166,18892(1974)(Powell,J.,concurring). CitizensUnitedv.Fed.ElectionCommn,130S.Ct.876(2010). Seeid.at886,91213.
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to the corporations right of free speech.72 No matter whether one agrees with the majority or the strenuous dissenting opinions,73 one must acknowledge that Citizens United plowed new constitutional ground and willhaveasignificantimpactonnationalelectoralpolitics. TheBigSkyStateofMontanaisquiteadistance,bothgeographically andculturally,fromtheBeltwayofWashington,D.C.In1912,thecitizens of the young state of Montana, disgusted with the political corruption caused by large mining corporations, enacted, by initiative petition, a statutorybanonallcorporatepoliticalcontributions.Sincethatearlytime, Montana has prohibited any corporation from making a contribution or anexpenditureinconnectionwithacandidateorapoliticalcommitteethat supportsoropposesacandidateorapoliticalparty.74Thelawdidallow shareholdersandemployeestovoluntarilycontributetoaseparatefund (similar to a political action committee) for political contributions. In the wake of the Citizens United decision, three corporations argued, in a state lawsuit, that the Montana law was an unconstitutional restriction on free speech.75 ThemajorityoftheMontanaSupremeCourtupheldthestatelawand distinguishedCitizensUnited,inpart,duetotheuniquehistoryofMontana political corruption caused by foreign trusts or corporations.76 The Montanastatutewasenactedinresponsetoratherblatant,albeitcolorful, politicalabuses.Attheturnofthenineteenthcentury,theminingbaronF. Augustus Heinze and the Amalgamated Copper Company,77 then controlled by Standard Oil, fought over the mineral rights of the richest hill on earth in Butte, Montana.78 Heinze allegedly bought two Butte judges who ruled consistently in his favor.79 Amalgamated responded by
72 73
Seeid.at897.
See generally id. at 92979 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 98082(Thomas,J.,concurringinpartanddissentinginpart).
74 75
MONT.CODEANN.1335227(1)(2011).
W.TraditionPship,Inc.v. AttyGen.,2011MT328,2,363Mont.220,271P.3d1,3, revdsubnom.Am.TraditionPship,Inc.v.Bullock,132S.Ct.2490(2012).

76 77
Id.22,363Mont.at234,271P.3dat8.
AmalgamatedCopperCompanywasrenamedtheAnacondaCopperCompanyin1915 as a result of dissolution and acquisition. See JOHN MOODY, MOODYS ANALYSES OF INVESTMENTS1196(1916);THE MANUALOF STATISTICS COMPANY, THE MANUALOF STATISTICS 63(1919).
78 LarryHowell,OnceUponaTimeintheWest:CitizensUnited,Caperton,andtheWarofthe CopperKings,73MONT.L.REV.25,31(2012). 79 See,e.g.,W.WilliamLeaphart,Comment,FirstRightofRecusal,72MONT.L.REV.287,287 (2011) (discussing need of Montana Supreme Court to supervise decisions of bought and paidforJudgeClancyfromButte);seealsoLarryHowell,PurelytheCreatureoftheInventive Genius of the Court: State Ex Rel. Whiteside and the Creation and Evolution of the Montana
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offering $250,000 to one of the Butte judges if he signed an affidavit admitting to the bribe.80 When the bribeuponbribe ploy did not work, Amalgamatedcloseddownitsminingoperationsandthrewfourfifthsof the Montana labor force out of work.81 This heavyhanded measure induced the legislature to pass a statute in special session that protected Amalgamated from litigating in front of the Butte judges.82 Around the same time, another of the Copper Kings, William A. Clark, supposedly bribedenoughMontanalegislatorstobenamedasaU.S.senator.TheU.S. Senate investigated, expressed shock at the degree of political payola in Montana, and unseated Clark.83 The Clark affair and Montana political corruption became sufficiently famous for Mark Twain to opine in 1907 that[b]yhisexample[Clark]hassoexcusedandsosweetenedcorruption that in Montana it no longer has an offensive smell.84 Meanwhile, Amalgamatedcontinuedtoamasspowerand,by1910,controlledmostof the economy and almost all the newspapers in Montana. Montanans felt locked in the grip of a corporation controlled from Wall Street and insensitive to their concerns.85 After relating this history, the Montana Supreme Court explained that this naked corporate manipulation of the very government (Governor and Legislature) of the State ultimately resulted in populist reforms that are still part of Montana law.86 One of those reforms was the challenged ban on corporate funding of political candidates. Based on this history of corporate political abuse, the Montana Supreme Court found that the state clearly had a compelling interest to enact the challenged statute and defined that interest as preserving the integrityofitselectoralprocess[and]encouragingthefullparticipationof the Montana electorate.87 The court explained that unlimited corporate money would irrevocably change the dynamic of local Montana political office races, which have historically been characterized by the lowdollar,
Supreme Courts Unique and Controversial Writ of Supervisory Control, 69 MONT. L. REV. 1, 32 (2008).
80 81 82
W.TraditionPship,Inc.,2011MT23,363Mont.at23031,271P.3dat8. Id.24,363Mont.at231,271P.3dat8.
K. ROSS TOOLE, MONTANA: AN UNCOMMON LAND 20809 (1959); see also Howell, supra note78,at3235.
83 SeeMichaelP.Malone,MidasoftheWest:TheIncredibleCareerofWilliamAndrewsClark,33 MONTANA:THEMAGAZINEOFWESTERNHISTORY1(1983).
MarkTwain,ThePlutocracy,inMARKTWAININERUPTION61,72(BernardDeVotoed.,3d ed.1940).
85 MICHAELP.MALONE & RICHARD B. ROEDER, MONTANA: A HISTORY OF TWO CENTURIES 176(1976). 86 87
84
W.TraditionPship,Inc.,2011MT28,363Mont.at232,271P.3dat9. Id.38,363Mont.at236,271P.3dat11.
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broadbased campaigns run by Montana candidates.88 Perhaps recognizing that this compelling interest might not be a sufficient distinctionwiththeinterestscitedinCitizensUnited,theMontanaSupreme Courtbuttresseditsanalysisbyidentifyingasecondcompellinginterest that did not exist in the federal lawsuit: protecting and preserving [Montanas] system of elected judges.89 Expressing a concern that obviouslyhitclosetohome,thecourtstated[i]tisclearthatanentity... willing to spend even hundreds of thousands of dollars, much less millions, on a Montana judicial election could effectively drown out all othervoices.90Thejudgeswentsofarastolikensuchcorporatemoneyas resurrectingtheboughtjudgesofButte.91 In further distinguishing Citizens United, the Montana Supreme Court found the state statute achieved these compelling interests by narrowly tailored means.92 Although the Citizens United opinion found corporate PACs burdensome alternatives that are expensive to administer and subjecttoextensiveregulations,93theMontanaSupremeCourtfoundthe political committee to be an easily implemented and effective alternativetodirectcorporatespendingforengaginginpoliticalspeech.94 Unlikethelength,complexityandambiguityofthe[f]ederalrestrictions, the majority argued, under Montana law a political committee can be formedandmaintainedbyfilingsimpleandstraightforwardforms....95 The Montana corporate spending ban was upheld as being one of those rarebirds:astatutethatimpingedonamostfundamentalright,freedomof politicalspeech,butpassedthestrictscrutinytestbybeingjustifiedbya compellinginterestmetbytheleastrestrictivemeans.96
88 89
Id.
Id. 39, 363 Mont. at 23637, 271 P.3d at 12. The court explained: In this State, the people elect the Justices of the Supreme Court, the Judges of the District Courts, and most lower court judges as well. Id. As can be seen from the tenor of the opinion, corporate electoral spending has a much more direct impact on the Justices of the Montana Supreme CourtthanontheJusticesoftheUnitedStatesSupremeCourt.Seeid.
90 91
W.TraditionPship,Inc.,2011MT44,363Mont.at238,271P.3dat13.
Id.22,44,363Mont.at230,238,271P.3dat8,13.TheMontanaSupremeCourtnoted that the 2008 contested election for Chief Justice of the Montana Supreme Court involved a modest$60,000inmediaadvertising.Id.44,363Mont.at238,271P.3dat13.
92
Id.47,363Mont.at393,271P.3dat13. Id.21(majorityopinion),363Mont.at230,271P.3dat7. Id.21,363Mont.at230,271P.3dat7.
93CitizensUnitedv.Fed.ElectionCommn,130S.Ct.876,897(2010). 94 95 96
Seeid.78,363Mont.at25253,271P.3dat21(Nelson,J.,dissenting);GeraldGunther, In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972) (describing judicial scrutiny [of legislation] that was strict in theoryandfatalinfact).
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While the majoritys opinion in Western Traditions makes interesting reading, the dissent proved to have the better legal argument. As the dissentnoted,Montanasinterestsinprotectingtheintegrityofthepolitical process is hardly unique and was addressed by the Supreme Courts broad,sweeping,andunqualifiedlanguageinCitizensUnited.97Likewise, protectingjudicialelectionsisnotauniqueinterestforeverystatewithan electedjudiciaryhasthesesameinterests.98AsJusticeNelsonadmittedin his dissent, I thoroughly disagree with the Supreme Courts decision in CitizensUnited.Iagree,rather,withtheeloquentand,inmyview,better reasoneddissentofJusticeStevens.99JusticeNelsonrecognized,however, that Justice Stevenss Citizens United dissent did not carry the day and reflected many of the points made by the Western Traditions majority. Although he found himself in a distasteful position, Justice Nelson observedtheobvious:[O]urobligationsherearetoacknowledgethatthe Supreme Courts interpretation of the United States Constitution is, for better or worse, binding on this Court....100 Montana, Justice Nelson observed,isinthesameFirstAmendmentswimmingpoolaseveryother state,andtheSupremeCourthasdictatedthatitswatersareexpansiveand deepwhenitcomestocorporatepoliticalspeech.101 JusticeNelsonsWesternTraditionsdissentfoundthemajoritysreliance upon the unique history of Montana to be disingenuous. In his view, the majorityopiniononlymadesenseifthisFirstAmendmentprotection[for corporatespeech]magicallyevaporatesatMontanasbordersbecauseofa law adopted 100 years ago to address a very factspecific situation.102 If every state, like Montana, could restrict corporate political speech based onpopulationdensity,theexistenceofmineralwealth,ahistoryoflow dollar, broadbased campaigns, and past experience with heavyhanded influence asserted by corporations, the Supreme Courts Citizens United decision will be statelawed into oblivion.103 Justice Nelson, therefore, disagreedwiththemajoritysdecisiontoparseCitizensUnitedinafashion soastosendamessageto,orbethenexttestcasebefore,theSupreme Court.104 WhenappealedtotheUnitedStatesSupremeCourt,thefivemember
97 98 99
W.TraditionPship,Inc.,2011MT72,363Mont.at249,271P.3dat19. Id.64,363Mont.at245,271P.3dat17. Id.69,363Mont.at24748,271P.3dat18. Id.6970,363Mont.at24748,271P.3dat1819. Id.134,363Mont.at276,271P.3dat36. Id.72,363Mont.at249,271P.3dat19.
100 101 102 103
W. Tradition Pship, Inc., 2011 MT 72, 363 Mont. at 249, 271 P.3d at 19 (Nelson, J., dissenting).
104
Id.134,363Mont.at276,271P.3dat36.
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Citizens United majority summarily reversed the Montana Supreme Court decisionwithacurtpercuriamdecision.105Thepercuriamannouncedthat therecanbenoseriousdoubtthattheCitizensUnitedholdingappliedto theMontanalaw.Aspredictedbythedissentingstatejustices,themajority held that Montanas arguments... were already rejected in Citizens United,orfailtomeaningfullydistinguishthatcase.106 Wasit,however,unwiseoftheMontanaSupremeCourttoparsethe Citizens United decision and send a message to the United States Supreme Court? The answer is: definitely not. The Montana Supreme CourtdidnotattempttodefytheUnitedStatesSupremeCourt,although therewereundoubtedlyplentyofMontanapoliticianswhomightposture and recommend ignoring the Supreme Court.107 Instead, the state court majority emphasized that certain rural states, particularly those that elect theirjudges,wouldbegreatlyaffectedbytoobroadanapplicationofthe Citizens United holding.108 The rather unique history of Montana and the effectuponjudicialelectionsweremattersnotfullyconsideredinCitizens United. There is nothing wrongindeed there are definite benefitsin allowing a fractured Supreme Court to assess the impact of a novel constitutional interpretation in the context of a rural state with a small, dispersed population and a long history of corporate political corruption. Unlikeatrialcourt,theSupremeCourtdoesnotreceivemanymotionsfor reconsiderationormotionsforanewtrial.Thereisabenefittoanyjudge, nevermindaJusticemakingarulingthatwillhavenationwideimpact,to rethinkanimportantdecisioninlightofadditionalfactsortheapplication oftheruleinasignificantlydifferentcontext.Unfortunately,bysummarily reversingtheMontanaSupremeCourtandnotobtainingthebenefitoffull briefingorargument,theUnitedStatesSupremeCourtmajoritymissedthe opportunity to consider the impact of its controversial Citizens United decision in the somewhat unique context of a rural state beset with a history of electoral corruption caused by disproportionate financial contributions.109Fullyconsideringdecisionsfromstatesupremecourts,like
105 106
Am.TraditionPship,Inc.v.Bullock,132S.Ct.2490,2491(2012).
Id.at1;seealsoIraP.Robbins,HidingBehindtheCloakofInvisibility:TheSupremeCourt and Per Curiam Opinions, 86 TUL. L. REV. 1197, 1207, 121718 (2012) (criticizing the increased use of per curiam opinions by the Roberts Court); Laura Krugman Ray, The Road to Bush v. Gore:TheHistoryoftheSupremeCourtsUseofthePerCuriamOpinion,79 NEB. L. REV.517,519, 549(2000)(criticizingthehistoryanduseofpercuriamopinions).
107 W. Traditions Pship, Inc., 2011 MT 71, 363 Mont. at 248, 271 P.3d at 19 (Nelson, J., dissenting)(citingMikeDennison,BillsTestStatesPowertoNullifyFedLaws,HELENA INDEP. RECORD,Feb.13,2011(describingMontanapoliticianscallforMontanatothumbitsnoseat thefederalgovernment)). 108 109
Seeid.30,44,363Mont.at233,238,271P.3dat10,13. Justice Breyer (joined by three others) dissented from the summary reversal and
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Western Traditions, would allow the Supreme Court the opportunity for reconsiderationandrefinementofnovelconstitutionaldecisions.Although there are undoubtedly times when per curiam decisions are appropriate, this was not one of them. Sounding like an irritated parent confronting a childsprotests,theSupremeCourtlostthechancetobeneficiallyinteract with a state supreme court, which was attempting to apply a new First Amendmentholdingtoaverydistinctivelocalsetting.110 There is, of course, a limit on state court efforts to distinguish clearly applicableSupremeCourtprecedent.Oncethefederaljudicialprecedentis clearly established and plainly applicable to the local context, the state court judge has the dutyno matter how distastefulto apply and effectuatethatSupremeCourtruling.Afterall,thatiswhattheSupremacy
recognizedthedistinctivehistoryandpoliticallandscapeinMontana.Am.TraditionPship, 132S.Ct.at2491(Breyer,J.,dissenting)([E]venifIweretoacceptCitizensUnited,thisCourts legal conclusion should not bar the Montana Supreme Courts finding . . . that independent expendituresbycorporationsdidinfactleadtocorruptionortheappearanceofcorruptionin Montana.).
110 State legislatures also have a role to play in communicating with the Supreme Court, althoughitissomewhatlessdirectthandecisionsappealedfromthestateshighestappellate court. State legislatures pass bills that attempt to define the contours of Supreme Court constitutional interpretation or to sidestep some controversial constitutional ruling. For example,numerousstatelegislatureshavepassedbillsthatattempttoplacelimitationsona womansrighttoanabortionrecognizedinRoev.Wade,410U.S.113(1973).Thesestatelaws, whenappealedtotheSupremeCourt,haveprovidedtheCourttheopportunitytorevisitthe Roe v. Wade decision and to, depending on ones point of view, limit or further define the right.See,e.g.,PlannedParenthoodofSe.Pa.v.Casey,505U.S.833,895(1992)(invalidatinga state law requirement that wives inform husbands of abortion); Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 511, 51920 (1989) (upholding state restrictions on abortions in state facilities and requiring doctors to perform certain fetus viability tests prior to abortion); Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 76768 (1986) (invalidatingstatelawthatrequiresreportingtheidentitiesofpatientswhoobtainanabortion andthephysicianswhoperformthem);Akronv.AkronCtr.forReprod.Health,462U.S.416, 438 (1983) (striking down state law requiring second and thirdtrimester abortions be performedinhospital);PlannedParenthoodAssnofKan.Cityv.Ashcroft,462U.S.476,490 94 (1983) (upholding state law allowing parental consent or judicial alternative); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 649 (1979) (upholding state law allowing parental consent or judicial alternative);PlannedParenthoodofCent.Mo.v.Danforth,428U.S.52,6971(1976)(striking downMissourilawthatrequiredhusbandswrittenconsenttoobtainanabortion).Underthe SupremacyClause,oneassumesthatresponsiblestatelegislaturesshouldeventuallyresistthe temptationtopasslawschallengingSupremeCourtconstitutionalinterpretationafterthelaw is clearly settled. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 844 (Liberty finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt. Yet 19 years after our holding that the Constitution protects a womans right to terminate her pregnancy in its early stages, Roe[s] . . . definition of liberty is still questioned.). State legislatures, however, being some of the most direct sources of our democraticvoice,donothavethesamestricturestofollowfederalprecedentsasdothestate courts.
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Clauseisallabout.111Carefullyparsing,distinguishing,andtestingarecent Supreme Court decision is categorically different than the type of calculated,widebasedresistancethatwaspracticedbythehighestcourts of certain southern states during the late 1950s and early 1960s.112 The formerconstitutesresponsibleeffortstohavetheSupremeCourtrefinethe scopeofanovelrulingwhilethelatterisathinlydisguisedefforttoignore a courts constitutional duties mandated by Article VI. The point is that there exists a legitimate window of opportunity for a state court to press the Supreme Court to reconsider the contours of a controversial decision. Inthelongrun,thispressurefromstatecourtsisgoodforourfederalism andgoodfortheSupremeCourt.Onecanholdthisviewwithoutadopting Lincolns proposal to limit or eliminate the precedential value of controversialSupremeCourtdecisions.Thetrickyportionofthisapproach isdeterminingwhenaSupremeCourtrulingisfirmlysettledandmustbe routinely obeyed. On this matter, Herbert Wechsler, long ago, wisely stated:
Whenthatchancehasbeenexploitedandhasrunitscourse,with reaffirmation rather than reversal of decision, has not the time arrived when its acceptance is demanded, without insisting on repeatedlitigation? Theanswerhere,itseemstome,mustbeaffirmative,bothasthe necessaryimplicationofourconstitutionaltraditionandtoavoid thegreaterevilsthatwillotherwiseensue.113
Using the Montana Supreme Courts decision in Western Traditions as an example, the majoritys efforts to distinguish the Supreme Courts holdingwasjustifiedbecausetheCitizensUnitedholdinghadnotyetbeen reaffirmed,andtheSupremeCourtwouldhavedonewelltoreconsiderits holdinginadifferentcontext. C. PresidentialCriticismofSupremeCourtConstitutional Interpretation Other than the power to fill Supreme Court vacancies, the President
111 112
SeeU.S.CONST.art.VI,cl.2.
See, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Flowers, 377 U.S. 288, 28993 (1964) (showing the AlabamacourtsystemsattemptstofrustratetheNAACPfrompresentingtheircase,contrary to the Supreme Courts wishes); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 45154 (1958) (referring to the first holding in a series of decisions in which the Alabama Supreme Court was resistant to the U.S. Supreme Courts interpretation of constitutional civil rights); Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U.S. 313, 31820 (1958) (noting the strategy employed by the southern court systems in an attempt to restrict the Supreme Courts ability to determine constitutionalissues).
113
HerbertWechsler,TheCourtsandtheConstitution,65COLUM.L.REV.1001,1008(1965).
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has few avenues to legitimately and effectively communicate with the Supreme Court. The President does not enact legislation in response to Supreme Court decisions nor write opinions that will be reviewed by the Supreme Court.114 Still, the President does have the bully pulpit of the Presidency.115Arecentcelebrateduseofthatpulpitoccurredinresponseto thecontroversialCitizensUnitedcasediscussedabove.Inhis2010Stateof the Union Address, President Obama rather famously criticized the decisioninfrontofthemajorityoftheSupremeCourtjusticesseatedinthe House Chamber. Obama noted that last week, the Supreme Court reversedacenturyoflawthatIbelievewillopenthefloodgatesforspecial interests, including foreign corporations, to spend without limit in our elections.116 Newspaper editorials denounced Obamas comments as rude and selfserving.117 Senator Orrin Hatch found the comment disrespectful and added that [n]o president has done that, and he shouldnothaveusedthatspeechforiteither.118 AlthoughChiefJusticeRobertsadmittedthat[s]omepeople...have an obligation to criticize what we do, given their office, he opined that [t]otheextenttheStateoftheUnionhasdegeneratedintoapoliticalpep rally, Im not sure why were there.119 This harsh reaction to Obamas
114 While the President is usually limited to attempting to rally public support against a Supreme Court interpretation, there are exceptional situations where the President has used more extreme measures. Franklin D. Roosevelts threat to defy the Supreme Court in the goldclausecasesandtheannouncementofhisfamouscourtpackingplanareexamples. See JAMES MACGREGOR BURNS, PACKING THE COURT: THE RISE OF JUDICIAL POWER AND THE COMINGCRISISOFTHESUPREMECOURT14546(LauraStickneyed.,2009).Thissortofactionby theExecutiveBranchistheexception,ratherthantherule,andhasbeenlimitedtosituations ofnationaleconomiccrisis.Id. 115 SeeBarryFriedman,ThePoliticsofJudicialReview,84TEX. L. REV. 257,316(2005);Elena Kagan,PresidentialAdministration,114HARV.L.REV.2245,2299300(2001). 116 PresidentBarackH.Obama,AddressBeforeaJointSessionofCongressontheStateof the Union (Jan. 27, 2010),available athttp://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/DCPD 201000055/pdf/DCPD201000055.pdf.
Editorial,BySkippingObamaSpeech,JusticesBringPoliticstoCourt,BOS. GLOBE, Jan.27, 2011,at18,availableat2011WLNR1639505.

118 KaraRowland,ChiefJusticeReignitesFeudwithObamaCountersStateofUnionJab,WASH. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2010, at A01, available at 2010 WLNR 5111426. Senator Hatch was wrong in asserting that no president had ever used the State of the Union Address to criticize the SupremeCourt.FranklinD.Roosevelt,forinstance,criticizedtheCourtinhis1937Stateofthe UnionAddress,nottomentionotherpublicspeeches.SIMON, supranote37,at31112.Teddy Roosevelt happily whacked away at the Supreme Court while he was President. See, e.g., BURNS,supranote8,at120(notinganinstancewhenPresidentRooseveltcriticizedtheCourt inpublicaftertheystruckdownacongressionalstatutethatincreasedliabilityofemployers foremployeesinjuries). 119 Bill Mears, Chief Justice Chides State of the Union as Political Pep Rally, CNN POLITICS (Mar.10,2010),http://articles.cnn.com/20100310/politics/obama.supremecourt
117
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legitimateanalysisdisplaysthecurrentvenerationoftheSupremeCourt.It is unclear how the Presidents criticism was rude or disrespectful to the Court. Given the temperature of todays politics, the statement was rather restrained, and few have claimed that Obamas analysis was incorrect.120ToChiefJusticeRobertsandhisbrethren,likeJusticeAlitowho has refused to attend more recent State of the Union addresses, my respectful suggestion is: toughen up. Any state court judge trying a high profile criminal case, or even setting bail for someone accused of an infamouscrime,issubjectedtoatleastthislevelofcriticismonafrequent basis. There is nothing inappropriate about the President criticizing the highestmembersoftheJudicialBranchtotheirfaces.Anyjudgesdecision makingisimprovedifheorsheunderstandsthedepthofpublicreaction totheruling.121Thishardlymeansthatthejudgeshouldpandertopublic pressure; but, the judge should understand the societal reaction to the decisionifonlytobebetterabletogaugethewisdomofthedecisionand explaintosocietythereasoningbehindthedecision. President Obama incurred similar criticism when he predicted at a pressconferencethattheSupremeCourt,whichatthetimewasreviewing the constitutionality of the Affordable Care Act,122 would not take the unprecedentedextraordinarystepofoverturningthelaw.Takingapage from his opponents playbook, he further suggested that, if the Supreme Court held that such a law was unconstitutional, such a ruling would exemplifyjudicialactivism.123ThenextdaythePresidentexplained:
[T]heSupremeCourt[has]thefinalsayonourConstitutionand
_1_supremecourtcampaignfinancecasechiefjusticejohnroberts?_s=PM:POLITICS.
120 OnewhomightnotagreewiththeaccuracyofthePresidentslegalanalysisisJustice Alito,whoreportedlymouthedthewordsnot truewhenattendingtheStateoftheUnion address. Justice Mouths Not True as Obama Slams Court, FOXNEWS.COM (Jan. 28, 2010), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2010/01/27/justicemouthstrueobamaslamscourt. 121 It is beyond the scope of this article to discuss general criticism of Supreme Court decisionsfromthepublicandthepress.SuchcriticismspanstheentirehistoryoftheCourt. Suchcriticism,evenifintense,isplainlyappropriateandproper.
TherewillbeandthereshouldbepopularresponsetotheSupremeCourtsdecisionnot just the informed criticism of law professors but the deepfelt, emotionladen, unsophisticated reaction of the laity. This is so because more than any court in the modern worldtheSupreme Courtmakespolicy,andisat thesametimesolittlesubjectto formal democraticcontrol. LouisL.Jaffe,ImpromptuRemarks,76HARV.L.REV.1111,1111(1963).
122 123
PatientProtectionandAffordableCareAct,42U.S.C.18001(2010).
Corbett B. Daly, Obama: Supreme Court Overturning Health Care Would Be Unprecedented, CBSNEWS.COM (Apr. 2, 2012, 2:26 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301 503544_16257408181503544/obamasupremecourtoverturninghealthcarewouldbe unprecedented/.
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ourlaws,andallofushavetorespectit,butitspreciselybecause of that extraordinary power that the court has traditionally exercised significant restraint and deference to our duly elected legislature... [a]nd so the burden is on those who would overturnalawlikethis.124
The Presidents political opponents leapt to defend the concept of judicialindependencewithaspeedandvigorthatwouldhavemadeChief Justice Marshall smile. Republican presidential candidate Mitt Romney termedtheremarksanattackthat[are]terriblydisrespectfulofoneof the branches of our government.125 The Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnellopinedthatthePresidentsstatementwasintolerabletoallof us andconcluded that the President was nolonger trying to embarrass thecourtafteradecision;rather,hetriedtointimidateitbeforeadecision ha[d]beenmade.126AnotherRepublicanSenatorcalledPresidentObama a bully for making the remarks; while Representative Lamar Smith statedthatthePresidentshouldnotbeinanyshape[or]formthreatening the Supreme Court and making statements that are inappropriate or deemed trying to intimidate the Supreme Court.127 One must take the Republican criticism of a Democratic President in its proper context and remember that politics often makes good theater. Was President Obama trying to cast himself in the light of FDR, bravely battling the nine old men as the 1930s Supreme Court overturned popular New Deal legislation?Perhaps.Washetryingtorallypopularsupportforoneofhis mostsignificantpiecesoflegislation?Undoubtedly.Washetryingtosend a message to any Supreme Court Justice on the fence? Probably. Was he trying to bully or intimidate the Supreme Court? Not a chance. To characterize the Presidents comments as an attack upon the Supreme Courts independence, or as an effort at intimidation, is to misconstrue reality due to excessive political partisanship. To repeat, there simply is nothing wrongand actually a lot rightwith a branch of government forcefullyarguingitsposition.Luckilyinthiscountry,judgesdonotquake
BillMears,Holder:ObamaRecognizesSupremeCourtsAuthority,CNN.COM(Apr.5,2012, 2:03PM),http://www.cnn.com/2012/04/05/us/obamajudges/index.html.
125 Ryan Grim & Sam Stein, A New Love Affair: Republicans Rally to Defend Judges, HUFFINGTONPOST.COM (Apr. 5, 2012, 4:01 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com /2012/04/05/republicansjudgessupremecourt_n_1406580.html [hereinafter A New Love Affair]. 124
Sunlen Miller, McConnell Urges Obama to Back Off on Supreme Court Comments, ABCNEWS.GO.COM (Apr. 5, 2012, 12:00 PM), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2012/04/ mcconnellurgesobamatobackoffonsupremecourtcomments/.
127
126
ANewLoveAffair,supranote125.
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in their shoes when some politician criticizes their decisions,128 but such politicalattentionmaycauseajudgetohonehisorherdecisiontodisplay forceful,comprehensiblereasoning.Thus,theinterplayisbeneficialtoboth branchesandtosocietyingeneral. D. CongressionalChangestoConstitutionalCommonLaw The Supreme Court frequently creates constitutionally inspired rules and doctrines that are best described as constitutional common law.129 On the surface, this decisional law resembles constitutional interpretationbutitisnot.Thus,Congresscanplayaroleinshapingthis constitutionallyinspiredcommonlawbythepassageoflegislation.When Congressdoesso,theSupremeCourthasadutytorespectthelegislative branchs coordinate role. Constitutional common law, therefore, provides Congress the opportunity to have a very productive partnership with the Supreme Court in crafting the contours of important constitutionally inspireddoctrines. A brief example of this process may be helpful. In its wellknown decision Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics,130 theSupremeCourtimpliedacivildamagescauseofactionfromtheFourth Amendment. The Court reasoned, in part, that such a remedy was appropriate because Congress had not provided Mr. Bivens another remedy equally effective in the view of Congress.131 Although inspired by the Fourth Amendment, one cannot seriously consider the Bivens remedy to constitute an interpretation of the words of the Fourth Amendment. Thus, Bivens is an example of constitutionally inspired common law. Congress, as with any judiciallycreated common law, can alter the contours of the damage remedy or provide an alternative remedy132or,inspecialinstances,eliminatetheremedyaltogether.133With
128 At least this is true of all Article III judges and the judiciary in those states, like Massachusetts,whoenjoytheprotectionoflifetenure.
SeeHenryP.Monaghan,TheSupremeCourt1974Term,Foreword:ConstitutionalCommon Law,89HARV. L. REV. 1, 1, 11(1975);RichardE.WelchIII,Mr.SullivansTrunk:Constitutional CommonLawandFederalism,46NEWENG.L.REV.275,275,29194(2012).

130 131 132
129
403U.S.388(1971). Id.at397.
See, e.g., Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 423, 429 (1988) (holding that congressionally enacted civil service remedies foreclosed traditional Bivens remedy for damages);Bushv.Lucas,462U.S.367,390(1983). See,e.g.,UnitedStatesv.Stanley,483U.S.669,68384(1987)(findingnoremedybecause suit arose in military context which constitutes a special factor counseling hesitation); Chappellv.Wallace,462U.S.296,30405(1983).
133
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constitutional common law, Congress plays a coordinate role in shaping theruleordoctrine.134 The socalled prudential components of the Article III standing doctrine also are best considered constitutional common law that may be adjustedbyCongress.AlthoughtheCourtpreferstoexplainmoststanding doctrine cases as straight interpretations of the case or controversy requirement,acloserlookatthedoctrinerevealsthatitembracesseveral judiciallyselfimposedlimitsoftheexerciseoffederaljurisdiction.135The prudentialcomponentofstanding,largelyinspiredbyseparationofpower concerns, but not required by the Article III case or controversy requirement, was explicitly recognized by the Court in Elk Grove Unified SchoolDist.v.Newdow.136AlthoughtheCourtdoesnotcurrentlydefineits prudentialdoctrineinthisway,itiseasiesttocategorizeitasconstitutional common law. Congress has a role in restricting this discretionary componentofthestandingdoctrine.Inotherwords,eventhoughtheCourt might consider the litigants interest too general or the alleged injury not sufficiently imminent, the Court will recognize a cause of action if Congress has appropriately authorized such suits.137 As Justice Harlan explained,[a]nyhazardstotheproperallocationofauthorityamongthe three branches of the Government would be substantially diminished if public actions had been pertinently authorized by Congress....138 More
Other examples of constitutional common law include Supreme Court decisions striking down state laws as unconstitutionally impeding interstate commerce under the dormantCommerceClause.SeeMonaghan,supranote129,at17.Congresscanaffirmatively approve state laws that burden interstate commerce, even though the Court would have invalidated such laws under the dormant Commerce Clause. See, e.g., Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 421, 423, 434 (1946). Likewise, certain criminal procedure doctrines liketheexclusionaryruleorthefruitofthepoisonoustreemightbeconsideredrulesthat effectuate constitutional guarantees but could be altered by Congress should the legislature provide an equally effective remedy. See Bivens Doctrine in Flux: Statutory Preclusion of a ConstitutionalCauseofAction,101HARV.L.REV.1251,1251(1988).
135 136 134
Allenv.Wright,468U.S.737,751(1984).
Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 1112 (2004) ([O]ur standing jurisprudence contains two strands: Article III standing, which enforces the Constitutions caseorcontroversyrequirement...andprudentialstanding,whichembodiesjudiciallyself imposedlimitsontheexerciseoffederaljurisdiction.).
137 138
Flastv.Cohen,392U.S.83,131(1968)(Harlan,J.,dissenting).
Id. at 13132. In his wellknown United States v. Richardson concurrence, Justice Lewis Powell picked up on Harlans suggestion that litigants with generalized grievances are not constitutionally excluded from the federal courts but the federal courts should use self restraint and decline jurisdiction (using the standing doctrine) in taxpayer or citizen advocacy lawsuits. 418 U.S. 166, 189, 196 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring). At least several membersofthecurrentSupremeCourthaveadoptedthepositionsetforthbyJusticePowell in his concurrence in Richardson and have limit[ed] the expansion of federal taxpayer and
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recently, Justice Kennedy reiterated Congresss role in shaping the standingdoctrine:Inmyview,Congresshasthepowertodefineinjuries andarticulatechainsofcausationthatwillgiverisetoacaseorcontroversy where none existed before....139 Recognizing this, Congress has authorized socalled citizen suit provisions that give a litigant standing to sue when his or her rather general statutory rights are violated. Even though these types of lawsuits often present generalized grievances with rather attenuated chains of injury causation, the Supreme Court has authorized such congressionallycreated standing.140 In plain language, CongresscannotaltertheArticleIIIrequirementthatthereexistacaseor controversy but Congress can instruct the Court to pare back its self imposed prudential standing doctrine to its constitutional minimum. The current Courts acceptance of Congresss role in this regard is an encouragingsignofcommunicationbetweenthetwobranches. Not so encouraging is the Courts failure, in other contexts, to recognize the existence of constitutional common law, and Congresss powers to modify it. The prophylactic rules established by the Court in ordertoeffectuatevariousBillofRightsguaranteesarebestconsideredan exerciseinconstitutionalcommonlaw.Forexample,theSupremeCourts famousrecitationofrightstobegiventosuspectsinpolicecustodypriorto questioningare derivedfrom due process concernsenshrined inthe Fifth Amendment. In creating the Miranda rights, however, the Court was not suggesting that interpretation of the Fifth Amendment required these precise warnings. Indeed, the Miranda decision contains language that indicates that Congress could implement other measures in lieu of the courtsuggested warnings, as long as they are equally as effective in protectinganindividualsdueprocessprotections.JustaswiththeBivens remedy, Congress could choose to have a hand in effectuating these important criminal procedural rights. So it seemed until the Courts opinioninDickersonv.UnitedStates.141 DickersoninvolvedaCongressionalstatutethatallowedintoevidencea defendants confession as long as it was voluntary. The statute set forth that the voluntariness of the statement was to be determined from the
citizenstandingintheabsenceofspecificstatutoryauthorizationtotheouterboundarydrawnby theresultsinFlast.Heinv.FreedomFromReligionFound.,551U.S.587,610(2007)(Alito,J., joined by Roberts, C.J., and Kennedy, J.) (emphasis added) (quoting Richardson, 418 U.S. at 196).
139 140
Lujanv.DefendersofWildlife,504U.S.555,580(1992)(Kennedy,J.,concurring).
See,e.g.,FriendsoftheEarthv.LaidlawEnvtl.Servs.,Inc.,528U.S.167,174(2000);FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 19 (1998). Justices Scalia and Thomas dissent in these decisions and would prefer the narrower approach taken in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 528 U.S. at 198 (Scalia,J.,dissenting);Akins,524U.S.at30(Scalia,J.,dissenting).
141
530U.S.428,432(2000).
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totality of the circumstances. One of the factors the court could consider was whether the Miranda warnings had been provided. The majority opinion did not rule that the Congressional statute violated the Fifth Amendment.TheCourt,instead,heldthatMiranda,beingaconstitutional decision of this Court, may not be in effect overruled by an Act of Congress....142 Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist explained that Congress may not legislatively supersede our decisions interpretingandapplyingtheConstitution.143Accordingtothisreasoning, theCourtinMirandawasactuallyinterpretingtheFifthAmendmentself incrimination clause. In essence, the Court refused to acknowledge the existence of constitutional common law. The Court in Dickerson set up a false choice: This case therefore turns on whether the Miranda Court announced a constitutional rule or merely exercised its supervisory authoritytoregulateevidenceintheabsenceofcongressionaldirection.144 In reality, the Supreme Court in Miranda, Bivens, and other cases, is doingsomethinginbetweenconstitutionalinterpretationandestablishing rulesofcourt.Thatis,theCourtiseffectuatingBillofRightsguaranteesby creating remedies that are constitutionally inspired but not required. Of course,CongresscannotreverseaconstitutionalinterpretationoftheCourt bymerelegislation,butitshouldhavearoleinshapingandtailoringsuch courtcreatedremedies.Bydenyingtheexistenceofconstitutionalcommon law in the Miranda context, the Court is unjustifiably limiting the role of Congress.145 Even accepting that the Court is the supreme interpreter of certainconstitutionalprovisions,theDickersonCourtdisplaysaregrettable kneejerk reaction against Congressional assistance in defining the contours of judicially created and constitutionally inspired rules and doctrines. This is an area where the Court certainly should listen to Congress, but refuses to consider the option. This failure to acknowledge Congresss coordinate role in developing constitutional common law is particularly regrettable. When the Court extrapolates rules from constitutionalpostulates,itismostlikelytobeviewedasoverreachingor activist.TheCourtcanavoidordeflectmostofthepubliccriticismofits role by respecting Congresss role in crafting or modifying these constitutionallyinspiredremedies.
142 143 144 145
Id. Id.at437. Id.
Inhisdissent,JusticeScalia(joinedbyJusticeThomas)alsorefusestotaketheapproach thattheMirandawarningswerealegitimateexerciseofconstitutionalcommonlaw.Whilehe acknowledgestheconcept,heconsiderstheSupremeCourtsadoptionofprophylacticrules tobuttressconstitutionalrightsasjudicialoverreachingandalawlesspractice.Id.at457, 465(Scalia,J.,dissenting).
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E. CongressionalAttemptstoCorrecttheCourtsErroneousStatutory Interpretation This same reluctance to listen to Congress, coupled with a tendency towardjudicialimperialism,isparticularlyapparentincasesinwhichthe Court reviews congressional statutes that alter previous judicial statutory interpretation. The Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc.146 decision displays this discouraging tendency in spades. A bit of background may be helpful. Section10(b)oftheSecuritiesExchangeActof1934waslonginterpretedto provideforanimpliedcauseofactionforindividualsdefraudedbystock brokers and related individuals. Section 10(b) did not contain an explicit statute of limitations provision, but the federal courts consistently assumed, as a matter of federal common law, that the limitations period was the same length as the states statute of limitations for fraud actions. All went smoothly for years until the Supreme Court surprised many by ruling in Lampf v. Gilberston that the limitation period was considerably shorter: litigation . . . must be commenced within one year after the discoveryofthefactsconstitutingtheviolationandwithinthreeyearsafter such violation.147 The Lampf decision caught Congresss attention due to the prevalence and importance of securities fraud litigation. Congress responded by restoring the earlier, often longer, state limitations period. CongressexplicitlymadethestatuteretroactivesothattheLampflitigants andotherscouldhavetheirdayincourt.148 The Supreme Court declared this statute unconstitutional in Plaut. TrumpetingMarburysfamousphrasethatitistheprovinceanddutyof thejudicialdepartmenttosaywhatthelawis,theCourtfoundthatthe statute retroactively commanded the federal courts to reopen final judgments and, thus, violated [the] fundamental principle that Article IIIgivesthefederaljudiciarythepower,notmerelytoruleoncases,butto decidethem.149CitingthemuchmalignedandancientUnitedStatesv.Klein decision,150 the Court reasoned that Congress could not correct a final
146 147 148
SeePlautv.SpendthriftFarm,Inc.,514U.S.211,240(1995). 501U.S.350,364(1991).
SeeFed.DepositIns.ImprovementActof1991,Pub.L.No.102242,105Stat.2236,2387 (1991).TheInsuranceImprovementActeventuallybecamepartoftheSecuritiesExchangeAct of1934.SeeSecuritiesExchangeActof1934,Pub.L.No.112106,27A(a),442(2012),available athttp://www.sec.gov/about/laws/sea34.pdf.

149 150
Plaut,514U.S.at21819.
80 U.S. 128 (1872). The literature concerning and criticizing the rather ancient and unique Klein decision is voluminous. See, e.g., Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part II: Reconstructions Political Court, 91 GEO. L.J. 1, 34 (2003) (calling [the Klein reasoning] opaque is a compliment); Gordon G. Young, Congressional RegulationofFederalCourtsJurisdictionandProcesses:UnitedStatesv.KleinRevisited,1981WIS.
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judicialdecision:havingachievedfinality...ajudicialdecisionbecomes thelastwordofthejudicialdepartmentwithregardtoaparticularcaseor controversy, and Congress may not declare by retroactive legislation that the law applicable to that very case was something other than what the courts said it was.151 The most understandable reading of Plaut is that Congress,becauseofseparationofpowerconcerns,cannotcorrectjudicial statutoryinterpretationinacasealreadydecided. Although there may be a surface appeal to the Plaut reasoning, it is simplywrong,andthedecisioninappropriatelylimitsCongresssabilityto tellthecourtwhatthelawiswhenitcomestoastatutorilycreatedright. The Courts separationofpowers analysis is undercut considerably, because Congress plainly may alter the final judgment of a federal court when that judgment includes injunctive relief.152 If separation of power concerns create some sanctity for a final damages judgment in federal court, why does that constitutional limitation disappear when the federal court final judgment is based in equity? The matter, however, is simpler thansomelawschoolexerciseofdistinguishingbetweencasesinlawand cases in equity. It is important to remember that we are talking about statutory rights created by Congress. These rights may be altered or eliminated at the whim and will of Congress. Any later change in a law undoubtedly affects the rights of the public and litigants who have filed federal lawsuits based on those statutory rights. Nevertheless, Congress plainly can do this.153 Certainly Congress cannot give jurisdiction to the federalcourtstohearacaseand,then,tellthecourtshowtodecideit.154 That, however, is not what the Plaut decision is all about. The legislation struck down in Plaut never suggestednever mind toldany court how todecidethecase.Thelegislationsimplytoldthefederalcourttohearthe caseanddecideitanywhichwaythecourtwanted.Congressalwayshas the definitive word on the allocation of jurisdiction to the lower federal
L. REV. 1189, 1195 (1981) (noting that because of its hazy reasoning the decision may be viewed as nearly all things to all men); Henry M. Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1373 (1953) (narrowly interpreting Klein to prohibit Congress to direct an Article III Court on how to decide a case). See generally PETER W. LOW ET AL., FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW OF FEDERALSTATERELATIONS31617(7thed.2011).
151 152
SeePlaut,514U.S.at22728.
See, e.g., Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327, 344 (2000) (attemptingin this authors view, unsuccessfullyto distinguish equity judgments encompassing injunctive relief from monetary damage judgments); see also Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U.S.421,458(1855).
153 154
Robertsonv.SeattleAudubonSocy,503U.S.429,436(1992). Hart,supranote150,at1373.
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courts.155ToquoteChiefJusticeMarshallscorollarytoMarbury:Wehave nomorerighttodeclinetheexerciseofjurisdictionwhichisgiven,thanto usurpthatwhichisnotgiven.156FortheCourttorulethatCongresscould notgrantjurisdictiontohearafederalstatutorycauseofactionisnotonly a profound mistake, but also a reflection of an unwarranted attitude that smacks of judicial mistrust of Congress and/or overprotection of judicial turf.157 Evenbeyondthejurisdictionalcontext,itisvitaltoourdemocracyfor Congress to be able to inform the federal judiciary when a court has misinterpreted Congresss intent, and there is no reason why that congressional correction may not be applied retroactively. After all, peoples rights are at stake, and it was the Court, not Congress, who incorrectly interpreted the statute. The Plaut Court seems to consider Congresss input to be inappropriate, at least to the extent it attempts to correcttheCourtspastmistake.158Somemayviewtheapproachtakenin Plautasanarrogantjudicialpowergrab.Itcertainlyappearstobeamisuse of the valuable tool of judicial review that, if persisted in, could significantlylowertheesteemoftheCourtandunderminethedemocratic valuesofthenation. Nevertheless,thesignificanceofPlautshouldnotbeoverstated.Plauts reasoning is limited to the somewhat unusual situation where Congress legislatesinaretroactivefashion.PlautdoesnotaffectCongresssabilityto prospectively amend statutes that have been interpreted by the Court contrarytothedesiresofCongress.159Inthisfashion,Congresshasaready and effective means to communicate to the federal courts regarding the scopeofstatutoryrightsandobligations. III. ConcludingThoughts:ListeninginaPrincipledFashion As the Corps of Discovery traveled up the Missouri River in 1804, MeriwetherLewisandWilliamClarkeagerlyanticipatedtheirfirstcontact withthepowerfulTetonSiouxtribe.Thetribesdownriverneighborsand
155 156
Sheldonv.Sill,49U.S.441,449(1850);seeHart,supranote150,at1365.
Cohensv. Virginia,19U.S.264,404(1821);seeMeredithv. CityofWinterHaven, 320 U.S.228,237(1943). See Danforth v. Minnesota, 552U.S. 264, 29192(2008) (Roberts, C.J., and Kennedy, J., dissenting).InDanforth,themajorityupheldtheunsurprisingandwellestablishedabilityofa state court, interpreting state law, to grant more expansive civil rights than the Supreme Courts interpretation of the Constitution. Id. at 266. The two dissenting justices, quoting Marbury, considered such state action as intruding on the province and duty of the Court tosaywhatthelawis.Id.at29192.
158 159 157
Plautv.SpendthriftFarm,Inc.,514U.S.211,227,237(1995).
Id. at 237. At least this is true unless the Court truly wishes to reinvigorate the Klein decisiontoitsmostexpansiveholding.This,however,appearsunlikely.
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relations, the Yankton Sioux, met first with the expedition, and Yankton Chief Arcawechar issued this warning about the dominant, confident Teton Sioux: But I fear those nations above will not open their ears, and you cannot I fear open them.160 May the same not be said of the current Supreme Court. For the Courts failure to open its collective ears only invitesmorecontroversy,which,inthelongrun,maywellunderminethe unquestionedauthoritytheCourtcurrentlyenjoys.ThetitleofthisArticle asks two questions: 1) Should we listen to the Supreme Court?, and 2) Should the Court listen to us? The answer to both questions is: always. Yet, the two questions, or obligations, are necessarily linked. If the Supreme Court does not heed Congresss efforts to mold constitutional common law and define statutory rights, or ignores the Presidents legitimate criticism of developing constitutional doctrine, or casts a blind eye to the state courts efforts to adapt novel constitutional holdings to local conditions, then the Supreme Court risks not being listened to by other governmental branches or, more dangerously, the general population. EncouragingtheSupremeCourttolistenmoreattentivelytoCongress, the President, state courts, and other groups does not suggest that the Courtshouldfunctionasapoliticalbranchofgovernment.Tothecontrary, I hold the somewhat idealistic and oldfashioned view that judicial decisionsaretobemadeinaneutralandprincipledfashion.161Thisviewis oftenridiculedinthepopularpress162andputintoquestioneverytimeone watchesarecentSenateconfirmationhearingofaSupremeCourtnominee. Still, striving for the neutral, principled interpretation of the law is the justification behind Marbury and the valuable countermajoritarian protections of judicial review. Should the federal judiciary be considered simplyanotherpoliticalbranch,thethreatsofearliererastoignorejudicial holdingsaremuchmorelikely. WithoutechoingLordActonsfamousdictum,onecansafelyobserve that different branches of government are prone to jealously guard and expand their power. Public acceptance of judicial review is at historically high levels. This public acceptance, however, should not encourage the Court to ignore attempts by Congress to craft modifications to constitutionallyinspired doctrines, or turn a deaf ear to state court
160
STEPHEN E. AMBROSE, UNDAUNTED COURAGE, MERIWETHER LEWIS, THOMAS JEFFERSON,
ANDTHEOPENINGOFTHEAMERICANWEST164(1996).
161 SeeHerbertWechsler,TowardNeutralPrinciplesofConstitutionalLaw,73HARV. L.REV.1, 19(1959).
See,e.g.,JEFFREY TOOBIN, THE NINE: INSIDETHE SECRET WORLDOFTHE SUPREME COURT 33839(2007)(arguingthatSupremeCourtdecisionsalwayshavebeenandshouldcontinueto beinfluencedbypoliticalconsiderations).
162
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attempts to define or distinguish novel constitutional interpretations, or recognize the appropriate role of Congress in creating statutory rights. While the judiciary should be insulated from the pressure of politics, it onlystrengthensitselfbypayingattentiontosuggestionsfromotherstate andfederalgovernmentalbranches.

Hon. Richard E. Welch, III: Should We Listen To The Supreme Court and Should The Court Listen To Us?

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Hon. Richard E. Welch, III: Should We Listen To The Supreme Court and Should The Court Listen To Us?

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TheyWillNotOpenTheirEars:Should WeListentotheSupremeCourtand ShouldtheCourtListentoUs?

Former Speaker of the House of Representatives Newt Gingrich, interviewwithBobSchieffer,FacetheNation,December18,2011.

SeeMcKay,supranote12,at293. Id.at29394. Seeid. Id. SeeCherokeeNationv.Georgia,30U.S.1,2(1831);McKay,supranote12,at294.

ArthurManuel&NicoleSchabus,IndigenousPeoplesattheMarginoftheGlobalEconomy: AViolationofInternationalHumanRightsandInternationalTradeLaw,8CHAP. L. REV.229,232 (2005).

Id.at289. Id.at408. 28U.S.C.2241(2008). SeeSt.Cyr,533U.S.at308.

St.Cyr,533U.S.at298. Id.at299300. Id.at305. Id.at311. Id.at32627(Scalia,J.,dissenting). Id.at337.

UnitedStatesv.Richardson,418U.S.166,18892(1974)(Powell,J.,concurring). CitizensUnitedv.Fed.ElectionCommn,130S.Ct.876(2010). Seeid.at886,91213.

W.TraditionPship,Inc.v. AttyGen.,2011MT328,2,363Mont.220,271P.3d1,3, revdsubnom.Am.TraditionPship,Inc.v.Bullock,132S.Ct.2490(2012).

Id.47,363Mont.at393,271P.3dat13. Id.21(majorityopinion),363Mont.at230,271P.3dat7. Id.21,363Mont.at230,271P.3dat7.

W.TraditionPship,Inc.,2011MT72,363Mont.at249,271P.3dat19. Id.64,363Mont.at245,271P.3dat17. Id.69,363Mont.at24748,271P.3dat18. Id.6970,363Mont.at24748,271P.3dat1819. Id.134,363Mont.at276,271P.3dat36. Id.72,363Mont.at249,271P.3dat19.

100 101 102 103

Editorial,BySkippingObamaSpeech,JusticesBringPoliticstoCourt,BOS. GLOBE, Jan.27, 2011,at18,availableat2011WLNR1639505.

SeeHenryP.Monaghan,TheSupremeCourt1974Term,Foreword:ConstitutionalCommon Law,89HARV. L. REV. 1, 1, 11(1975);RichardE.WelchIII,Mr.SullivansTrunk:Constitutional CommonLawandFederalism,46NEWENG.L.REV.275,275,29194(2012).

Id. Id.at437. Id.

SeeFed.DepositIns.ImprovementActof1991,Pub.L.No.102242,105Stat.2236,2387 (1991).TheInsuranceImprovementActeventuallybecamepartoftheSecuritiesExchangeAct of1934.SeeSecuritiesExchangeActof1934,Pub.L.No.112106,27A(a),442(2012),available athttp://www.sec.gov/about/laws/sea34.pdf.

STEPHEN E. AMBROSE, UNDAUNTED COURAGE, MERIWETHER LEWIS, THOMAS JEFFERSON,

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