Journal of Religious Ethics, Inc

The Self and Its Discontents: Recent Work on Morality and the Self The Varieties of Moral Personality by Owen Flanagan; Oneself as Another by Paul Ricoeur; Selves, People, and Persons by Leroy Rouner; Sources of the Self by Charles Taylor; The Ethics of Authenticity by Charles Taylor; Psychoanalysis and Ethics by Ernest Wallwork Review by: Paul Lauritzen The Journal of Religious Ethics, Vol. 22, No. 1 (Spring, 1994), pp. 187-210 Published by: on behalf of Journal of Religious Ethics, Inc Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40017846 . Accessed: 21/11/2011 22:38
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Blackwell Publishing and Journal of Religious Ethics, Inc are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The Journal of Religious Ethics.

http://www.jstor.org

Review Essay

Books reviewed: Owen Flanagan. The Varieties of Moral Personality. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991. Paul Ricoeur. Oneself as Another. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992. Leroy Rouner, ed. Selves, People, and Persons. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1992. Charles Taylor. Sources of the Self Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989. Charles Taylor. The Ethics of Authenticity. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991. Ernest Wallwork. Psychoanalysis and Ethics. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991.

THE SELF AND ITS DISCONTENTS Recent Workon Moralityand the Self Paul Lauritzen
ABSTRACT

Viewsof the self maybe plottedon a set of coordinates.Onthe axis that to Freudchampion runs fromfragmentation unity,Rortyand Rorty's the decenteredself while Wallwork, Taylor,and Ricoeurargue for a sovereign, unified self. On the other axis, which runs fromthe disengaged, self self, Wallwork, inward-turning to the engaged and "sedimented" nearRorty,defending self-creation wouldbe positioned againstthe narrative identityaffirmed Taylorand Ricoeur.Despitehis skepticism conby agendaof the narrativists,Flanagangrants cerningthe communitarian that the self is socialand relational a positionfurtherexplored Oliby ver, Stendahl,Deutsch,and Mackin Selves,People,and Persons. In a provocative essay on Sigmund Freud and moral reflection, Richard Rorty offers a reading of Freud that places him in what Rorty calls a "story of decentering-as-mechanization"(1991, 145). The story is told first by Freud, who claims that his insight that the ego is not even master in its own house is comparableto the discovery, by Copernicus, that the earth is not the center of the universe and to the Darwinian claim that we have evolved just as every other animal has. To be sure, Copernicus, Darwin, and Freud can all be seen as belonging to a history of decentering, but in what, Rorty asks, does this decentering consist? Rorty's answer is instructive. It cannot be reduced simply to the fact that in pressing the importance of unconscious wishes, drives, and so on, Freud offers a vision of humanity considerably less elevated than the traditional picture and thus contributes to "a history of humiliation" that has moved humanity from the center of creation. Rather, what binds together Copernicus, Darwin, and Freud is a
Thanks to Robert Sweeney (John Carroll University) for his help with this essay, and special thanks to Sumner B. Twiss and James P. Gubbins (both of Brown University) for the very careful reading they gave to an earlier version of this work. Their suggestions improved the piece significantly.

189

190

Journal of ReligiousEthics

commonvision that sees neitherthe worldnor ourselvesas having a center or an essence. Freud'scontribution this movement,says Rorty,is not merely to that he proposesmechanizingthe human mind, but rather that he offersa particularly disturbingpictureof how the mechanismis conis stituted. Freud'sview of the unconscious troubling,not merelybecause it disturbsourpictureof ourselvesas mastersin ourownhouse, but becauseit leads us to wonderaboutthe nature of the self that is supposedlydoing the mastering. In fact, the Freudianunconscious with an internallycoherent appearsto be an alternativeself, complete set of beliefs and desires. The upshotis that Freudplants the haunting suggestionthat we are centerless;that there is no one self, but many; that we are "random assemblagesof contingentand idiosynview of craticneeds"(1991, 155). In Rorty's view, Freud'smechanistic in the self requiressubstitutinga vocabulary whichthe idea of a "true self no longermakes sense for one in which appealsto a "trueself have been prominent. Anyonefamiliarwith Rorty'sworkknows that he does not mourn in the passingof a vocabulary whichappealsto one's"trueself are an importantpart of moraldeliberation.In fact, he positivelycelebrates the demise of this vocabulary.In helpingus to see ourselvesas centerless, Rorty writes, Freud "helpedus becomeincreasinglyironic, (1991, playful,free, and inventive in our choiceof self descriptions" 155). In opposingFreud'sdecentered view of the self to a traditionalessentialist pictureof the self, and in tying these distinctiveviews of the self to particularvocabulariesof moral deliberation, Rortygives expressionto a centralcontrastin recentworkon moralityand the self. Indeed,Rortyhere articulatesan axis alongwhichmuchrecentwork turns. At one pole stands what might be called on moralpersonhood the fragmented schismaticself (Bowie1991). Thisis the view of the or self typically identified with Freud's ancestor,FriedrichNietzsche, and with his descendants, Jacques Lacan, Jacques Derrida, and self MichelFoucault. It is the radicallydecentered that Rortywishes to embrace,while neverthelessrejectingthe nihilism said to come with this self. At the otherpolestandswhat mightbe calledthe sovereign or unifiedself. This view of the self is frequentlyassociatedwith ImmanuelKant. It is a sovereignself becauseit definesitself through chooses. the ends it spontaneously I proposeto readeach of the worksreviewedhere as identifyingand defendinga view of the self that can be plotted on this axis, unity/ work,CharlesTaylor,and fragmentation.To anticipate:Ernest Wall as attempting combatthe fragmentato Paul Ricoeur eachbe read can

The Self and Its Discontents

191

tion of the self identifiedand celebrated Rorty. Each offersa view by that allows us to retain familiar of the self and of moralpersonhood of vocabularies moralself-description thus, each fiercelyresists a and, in ironist" a preferred is moralvocabulary which "liberal self-image. Nevertheless,althoughthe contrastbetweenunity and fragmentation is important,it is not exhaustive. We will see, for example,that sharea commitment a unito Taylor,and Ricoeur althoughWallwork, fied self, Taylor and Ricoeurmove beyond Wallworkin important ways, ways that requireus to articulatea second axis along which views of the self can be plotted. I will thus sketch a secondcontrast, the engagedself versusthe disengagedself, and suggestthat this contrast is every bit as importantto understanding views contemporary of the self as the other,morecommoncontrast. I then turn to considerOwen Flanagan'swork, for Flanagan exthe plores the questionof whetherembracing sort of narrativelyenalso requiresembracing a by gagedself envisioned Taylorand Ricoeur moraltheoryor a particular ideal of the morallife. We will particular to see that, according Flanagan,narrativeidentity does not have the normativesignificancethat is sometimesassigned to it, althoughit does requireus to reject a completelyatomisticview of the self. Finally, I take up several of the essays from Leroy Rouner'sSelves, People,and Persons. This volume,like Flanagan's,exploresthe normative implicationsof viewingthe self relationally.

1. Unity versus Fragmentation

to Freudand his radicallydecentered Wallwork's opposition Rorty's and Ethics. self is evident fromthe openingpages of Psychoanalysis Indeed, in the preface,Wallworktells us that he intends to offer a "radicalnew interpretationof Freud,"one that "challengespostmodernistreadingsof Freudthat find in him a modelof the radically pluralisticself (1991,ix, x). To make the case for this morecohesive an undertakes impressiveand painstaking self, Wallwork rereadingof he muchof the Freudiancorpus. In particular, focuseson those texts that have been used to paint Freudas a determinist,on the one hand, and as a psychological egoist,on the other. BothpicturesdepictFreud subversiveof morality,and both are mistaken. We as fundamentally if see the mistake,says Wallwork, we attendcloselyto the differences and between Freud'smetapsychology his clinical theory. The metawas Freud'sattemptto offera natural scientificmodelof psychology the human psyche. Committed makingpsychoanalytic to theory sciFreudsought a meta-theory capableof reducentificallyrespectable, of tive explanations the sortfoundin the naturalsciences. Construing

192

Journal of Religious Ethics

theorizing human behavior as a "consequence of quasi-physical psychic energies and forces operating in accordancewith law-like generalizations" provided Freud with an account of human psychic life that was arguably scientific. Alas, if taken seriously, it also made Freud a hard determinist. Fortunately, says Wallwork, the metapsychology is only part of the story, and not the most important part. Indeed, Wallwork marshals substantial evidence that Freud was always deeply ambivalent about the meta-theory. Although he never abandoned the effort to articulate a theoretical account of psychoanalysis that would secure for it the status of an empirical science, and although he never ceased to revise, rework, and generally fine-tune the meta-theory that was central to this effort, Freud was also clear that the meta-theory must be taken with a grain of salt. As Wallwork says, Freud "repeatedly described the metapsychology as 'tentative,' 'speculative/ and 'hypothetical'. . . and even went so far as to call it a 'fantasy,' a 'myth,' a product of wish fulfillment on the part of its creator"(1991, 22). He did so, Wallwork argues, because, ultimately, he was committed first and foremost to clinical insight, to making mental phenomena intelligible. Freud's commitment to clinical insight can be seen in his case histories, where the "emphasis is on fitting mental phenomena not into the categories of Freud's high-level scientific theory but into the subject's own narrative history" (1991, 25). Once this is the goal, clinically interpretable meanings come to have a "rock-bottom, incorrigible status" (1991, 47). Freud's commitment to accounting for the possibility of moral responsibility is particularly evident, says Wallwork, in his post-1919 writings, where he moves to a less mechanistic meta-theory, and we see in these writings a corresponding evolution of Freud's view of the self. In fact, says Wallwork, in these writings, there is a systematic attempt to account for ego freedom. Since the whole point of therapy is precisely the liberation of the ego from the bondage of unconscious forces, Freud ultimately must offer a view of the self sufficiently cohesive to allow for therapy's ability to "enable the ego to achieve a progressive conquest of the id." Freud is no hard determinist, then, because his clinical theory trumps his meta-psychology, and his clinical theory presupposes a unitary and relatively cohesive self. Because the whole psychoanalytic enterprise is rooted in a fundamental moral commitment to increasing a patient's freedom of choice and because his clinical work presupposes the possibility of moral freedom and responsibility, Freud is committed to offering a unitary and relatively cohesive self and to rejecting determinism in a decentered self. "Ofcourse,"Wallwork writes, "psychoanalysis moves beyond what is available through ordinary introspection, but not with-

The Self and Its Discontents

193

T out first postulatinga conscious with uniquelyhumancapacitiesfor as conditionof the possibilself-reflection a necessaryepistemological (1991, 47). knowledge" ity of psychoanalytic Here we see the fundamentalcontrastbetween Wallwork's Freud and Rorty's, betweentheir alternativeviews of the self. In Rorty's and account,Freud'srecognitionof the unconsciousas involving"oneor more well articulatedsystems of belief and desires"had the fundamentally destabilizingeffect of populatinginner space with quasipersons. The Platonicpictureof a higher,rationalpart of the soul in battle with a lower,animalpart of the soul gives way to a "picture of sophisticatedtransactionsbetween two or more "intellects'" (Rorty 1991, 149). The Socraticinjunction"know thyself is revised to read "know selves."Thus,whenRortyglossesFreud'sdictum"where id thy once was, there will ego be,"he insists that it doesnot mean:"whereas I was drivenby instinct,I shall becomeautonomous, motivatedsolely of (1991, 150). It is not, in otherwords,the endorsement a by reason" It projectof self-purification. cannotbe this, Rortysays, becausesuch notionthat one'sego is more'natural' a view requires"theAristotelian or more truly 'oneself than one's id,"a conclusionfundamentallyat odds with Freud'sview of the unconscious (1991, 148). is By contrast, self-purification precisely what Wallworkrecommends. Moralfreedomis not merelyfreedomfromexternalcoercion, and it is not freedom from one's sensuous desires and instincts. Rather,it is the capacityto choosefromamongone'spreexistingmotives, desires, and drives, and this capacityrequiresthat one know oneself. Onlyif we turn inwardwill we be able to make unconscious motives accessibleto an ego that may therebyexercisesome control. "whereid was, Thus, when Wallwork interpretsFreud'sdeclaration, there will ego be,"he offers a fundamentally differentreading from in Wallworkwrites, "lies freedom," Rorty's. "Growth psychoanalytic in the slow, gradualprocessof self-understanding reinterpretaand to tion that alone providesan opportunity gain access to and some degreeof controloverelementalmotivesthat will otherwiseeruptand (1991, 98). disruptour best intentions"

2. Disengagementversus EngagedExploration
So far, I have suggestedthat RortyandWallwork articulateviews of the self that can be mappedalong an axis of fragmentation versus At one pole of this axis is the schismaticself, so touted among unity. writers. This is Rorty's postmodernist self, fragmented that centerless collection contingent of caresandconcerns.At the otherpole,stands a a sovereignand unifiedself. This is the self celebrated Wallwork, by

194

Journal of ReligiousEthics

self that is sovereignin its domainthroughthe help of psychoanalysis and that is unifiedin its reign with an ego capableof life-longplan1991, 120). ning in relationto a view of itself and the good(Wallwork accountof By now, this is a familiarcontrast,and any contemporary the self and moraldeliberation be plottedalongthis axis. can Nevertheless, it is worth asking whether the fact that both the schismatic self and the sovereignself can be rooted in readings of Freud does not suggest that these two views have more in common than is suggestedby starklycontrasting fragmentation against unity. I want to follow this suggestionby lookingat Taylor'swork, which offersan alternativeaxis for plottingviews of the self, an axis along whichRortyand Wallwork not polaropposites.As we will see, the are nuancedto lois contrast,unity versusfragmentation, not sufficiently cate views of selfhoodin moralspace. To begin to see that an alternativestorycan be told aboutthe relationshipbetweenthe schismaticself and the sovereignself, one which we highlights commonalities, can attend to the fact that Rorty and Wallwork both counselturninginwardas a means of moraldevelopment. That Wallworkwould endorse introspectionas necessary to moraldevelopment perhapsobvious,forthe wholepointof psychoais nalysis is to liberatethe self fromthe forceswithin it that, if hidden from view, restrict human freedom. Rorty'sendorsementof inwardness, however,is no less thorough.To be sure, on Rorty'saccount,we do not turn inwardto find the "trueself; we simplycannotexpectto find some essence that will providea beaconfor moral deliberation. Nevertheless,we must turn inward,becausein the unconsciousone finds alternativedescriptionsof one's self and one's past. The turn inward thus helps us to see moral deliberationas a matter of selfand creationratherthan self-knowledge, moralityas a matterof selfratherthan self-purification. enlargement That Rortywouldcounsel such inwardnessmay at first seem surworkon the self, we may cometo prising,but if we considerTaylor's see why this is not so puzzlingafter all. In both Sourcesof the Self and TheEthics of Authenticity, Tayloroffersan accountof the origins views of selfhoodand moral and the problems with, contemporary of, He tells us in Sourcesof the Self that one of the defining identity. featuresof modernidentityis a sense of inwardness,a sense that our thoughts, ideas, and feelings are inside us and are to be contrasted with objectsin the worldthat are outside us. Our modernnotion of the self is partly constitutedby this inner/outerdichotomyand the partitioningof the worldthat comeswith it. Taylorcorrectlynotes that not all humans in all times and places would understandselfhoodin this way, and he offers an extremely

The Self and Its Discontents

195

interesting account of how we came to this view. It is a story that takes us from Plato through Augustine to Descartes, Locke, and beyond. For our purposes, what is crucially significant about Taylor's account of inwardness is that he ties its development to the concomitant development of what he describes as the "punctual"self. It is worth quoting Taylor at some length here. Describing what he says is an "unprecedentedlyradical form of self objedification" to be found in the work of Locke, Taylor writes: both Thedisengagement fromthe activitiesof thoughtandfromourunreflecting desires and tastes allows us to see ourselvesas objectsof farof reachingreformation.Rationalcontrolcan extend to the re-creation our habits, and hence of ourselves.... The subjectwho can take this kind of radicalstanceof disengagement is to himselfor herselfwith the view to remaking, what I want to call the self. Totake this stanceis to identifyoneselfwith the powerto 'punctual' and objectify remake,andby this act to distanceoneselffromall the parof ticularfeatureswhichareobjects potentialchange. Whatwe are essentially is noneof the latter,but whatfindsitself capableof fixingthemand on working them. Thisis whatthe imageof the pointis meantto convey, term:the real self is "extensionless"; is noit drawingon the geometrical wherebut in this powerto fix things as objects[1989, 171-72]. Rorty and Wallwork, in their respective calls to inwardness, are both heirs to Locke's punctual self. Both Rorty and Wallwork see the turn within to be the proper path toward the remaking of the self, and both suggest that we can radically remake ourselves.1 Yet, to see Rorty and Wallwork together as Locke'sdescendants is to see the need to supplement our earlier mapping of the self. It is to see that the contrast, fragmentation versus unity, is not the only, and perhaps not the most important, distinction that can be drawn among views of the self. To get a sense of how Taylor's discussion of the "punctual"self may provide us with an alternative map by which to track views of the self, it is useful to compare ancient and modern treatments of the passions. For the ancients, Taylor tells us, the passions were an important source of moral insight, for they were "implicit appreciations" of the good. By contrast, beginning with Descartes, passions are understood quite differently. Consistent with the disengagement associated with the "punctual"self, the goal is not to engage our emotions as possibly instructive resources for moral deliberation, but to control them. The 1Both Wallwork Rorty move and in Freud thisregard, for may significantly beyond thereis reason doubt to whether Freud would the of accept possibility radical change.

196

Journal of ReligiousEthics

lived experienceof the passions must be deeply discountedand, in fact, reconstitutedaccordingto a disengagedreason (Taylor 1989, 283). This disengagement, says Taylor,is quitedifferentfromwhat might is be called "engagedexploration." reject disengagement not unTo to acceptpassionatereactionsas moralwarrantsfor action. critically nor contrastis neither critical/uncritical reflective/ The appropriate describes sort the but ratherdisengaged/engaged. unreflective, Taylor in mindthis way:"There he says, "a he of engagedexploration has is," kind of searchwhichinvolvesbeing 'all there,'being moreattentively 'in' our experience.. . . This involvesreflexivityand self awareness, but preciselynot of the disengagingkind. Rather,we think of that personor event, we allow our feelingsfull reign, preciselyas the way we experiencethe personconcerned" (1989, 163). By contrast,disenstance and takour gagement"involves goingoutsidethe first-person ing on board some theory, or at least some suppositionabout how (1989, 163). things work" to Taylor,what all views of the self that requiredisenAccording is gagementhave in common that they attemptto accountfor the self fromthe very commitments that give the self an identity. Inapart in orderto makeeven minimalsense of ourlives, in deed,says Taylor, orderto have an identity at all, "weneed an orientationto the good" (1989,47). Thereis an "essentiallink betweenidentity and a kind of orientation" the world,and to breakthis link is to shatter identity to (Taylor1989, 28). The vision of a (punctual)self that is capableof completelyremakinghimself or herself by abstractingfrom any and all commitments value is, in fact, the vision of a person"inthe grip of of an appallingidentity crisis"(1989, 31). Thus, on Taylor'saccount, and the central contrastis engagement/disengagement, on this axis are Rortyand Wallwork close together. That Rorty'sself is a disengagedself is suggestedby the fact that that he believes Rortycelebratesthe greatercapacityfor self-creation is Freud'slegacy. Rorty'stalk of our being able, after Freud, to be and increasingly "inventivein our choice of self-descriptions," his of claimthat Freudis an "apostle" the aestheticlife that "seeksto extend its own boundsratherthan to find its center," suggests a picture of a self that stands apartfromany horizonof value andthat tries out, so to speak,variousformsof self-description (1991, 154, 155). Indeed, in the very fragmentation whichRortydelightsseems necessarilyconnectedto a stance of disengagement.If there is no one storythat deof constitutive selfhood, fines identity,if thereis no one set of concerns then the self is necessarilyneutral.

The Self and Its Discontents

197

It may at first appearthat Wallworkescapes the disengagement work'sself is not fragmented; inthat Taylorlaments. After all, Wall deed, ideally it has sufficientcohesionand strength to allow us to of speak meaningfully freedom,choice,and responsibility.Nevertheself self view,Wallwork's is still a disengaged because less, on Taylor's Wallwork not reallymovedbeyondFreudin articulating concephas a tion of selfhood that allows for the necessary connectionbetween human agency and what Taylorcalls "strongevaluation."There is, and we says Taylor,no escaping strong qualitativediscriminations, can see this by tendingto the question,Whoam I? This questioncannot be answeredsimplyby citing a name or a genealogy. Rather,to answerthis question,I must announcewhere I stand. "Myidentity," and which says Taylor,"isdefinedby the commitments identifications providethe frameor horizonwithin whichI can try to determine. . . what is good,or valuable,or what oughtto be done,or what I endorse or oppose" (1989, 27). aboutWallwork's Wecan now see what is problematic analysisfrom Wallwork no moregive an accountof where can Taylor'sperspective: the self standsthan can Rorty. Likeeverydisengaged self, Wallwork's self appearsto stand nowhereor everywhere. Tayloris quite clear aboutFreud'sview of the self, andWallwork not advanced has beyond what Taylorunderstandsto be the Freudianself. Taylorwrites:
Nor is it sufficient to be a self in the sense that one can steer one's actions strategically in the light of certain factors, including one's own desires, capacities, etc. This is part of what is meant by having [or being] an Ego in the Freudian sense, and in related uses. This strategic capacity requires some kind of reflective awareness. But there is an important difference. It is not essential to the Ego that it orient itself in the space of questions about the good, that it stands somewhere on these questions. Rather the reverse. The Freudian Ego is at its freest, is most capable of exercising control, when it has the maximum margin of manoeuvre in relation to the imperious demands of the Superego as well as in the face of the urgings of the Id. The really free Ego would be a lucid calculator of pay-offs [1989, 33].

What Taylor would find problematic about Wallworkis precisely that Wallworkshares the essentially Cartesianand Lockeanview of the agent as the disengaged subjectwhotakes an instrumentalstance to his own inclinations,desires,habits, and feelings and attempts to folgain rationalmasteryof them (1989, 159). To be sure, Wallwork, is considerably more cautious about the prospectsof lowing Freud, genuinemasteryhere than either Descartesor Locke,but his view of the self is, nevertheless,fundamentally same as theirs. the

198

Journal of ReligiousEthics

In TheEthics ofAuthenticity with Taylorsuggeststhat one problem this disengagedsubjectis that embracingsuch a view of the self too of easily leads to what he calls the "individualism self-fulfillment" leads to a centeringon the self (1991, 14). Becausethis individualism at the same time that it severs the self fromany ties of constitutive value, it narrowsand flattens the self in ways that debasethe idea of authenticity,of being true to oneself. One can no longer be true to oneself because at the core there is only the instrumentalego. The debasementis evidentenough,says Taylor. In psychology, see the we of most of whichembracea radical proliferation self-helpmovements, moralrelativism. In politics,we see the "liberalism neutrality" of that requires neutrality on matters of what constitutes a good life. Whetherwe are offeredthe debasementthat comes with a centered but insubstantial self or that which comes with its decenteredand fragmentedself, the result is the same: a regrettableself-absorption that is destructiveof civil society. Bothviews of the self shouldtherefore be rejectedin favorof the engagedself.

3. Engagementand NarrativeIdentity
If a view of the self as disengagedcontributes the malaise of moto what view of the self will help speeda recovery?Whatwill an dernity, engagedview of the self involve? To answerthese questions,Taylor between a says that we must cometo see the inescapableconnection sense of selfhoodand an orientationto the good. As we saw, Taylor holds that I cannotanswerthe question,Whoam I? withoutlocating this of myselfwithin a framework value. Yet, to acknowledge pointis also to see that we cannot accept a punctualview of the self. Selfof understanding requiresorientingoneself to a conception the good both retrospectively prospectively; and it has a sort of temporal thus, this depthforwhichthe punctualself cannotaccount.Acknowledging featureof humanlife." Taylorwrites, us to see an "inescapable helps "Nowwe see that this sense of the goodhas to be woveninto my understandingof my life as an unfoldingstory. But this is to state another basic conditionof makingsense of ourselves,that we grasp our our lives in a narrative" (1989, 47). Understanding lives narratively, "In is "notan optionalextra." orderto have a sense of who says Taylor, we are, we have to have a notionof howwe have become,and of where we are going"(1989, 47). Tayloradmitsthat he is not the first to talk abouta narrativeview of the self, and althoughhe has some very interestingthings to say about narrativeand selfhood,he does not in fact providea sustained discussionof what he means by a narrativeview of the self. It is at

The Self and Its Discontents

199

as this pointthat Paul Ricoeur's Oneself Anotherserves as a nice comviews, for one of the stated goals of that workis to plementto Taylor's reconstruct theoryof narrativeconsidered a fromthe perspective its of to contribution the constitutionof the self (1992, 114). workcomplements That Ricoeur's is Taylor's clearfromthe context in which Ricoeurplaces his study. Like Taylor,Ricoeurwishes to avoidboththe "foundational ambition" the Cartesiancogitoand the of anti-foundationalist nihilismthat followsfromthe "shattered" cogito. "Thehermeneutics the self,"Ricoeurinsists, must be "placed an of at (1992, equaldistancefromthe apologyof the cogitoand its overthrow" 4). Indeed, Ricoeur'scomplaintconcerningDescartes is essentially that of Taylor. Descartes'ssubjecthas "akind of pointlikeahistorical identity"that is "entirelydifferentfrom the narrativeidentity of a concreteperson" (1992,7). This comesclearlyinto view, says Ricoeur, when we ask who the "I" who is doingthe doubting the cogito. It is in is not an ordinarysubjectof experiences, speaker,an agent, a chara acterwhobothchangesand remainsthe same overtime. Rather,it is a "free-floating no in subjectivity," longeranchored time and space;it is the very epitomeof Taylor'sdisengagedself. If we must flee the immediacy the cogitoin orderto avoida sense of of identityas free-floating subjectivity, ultimatelywe will needto have an accountof personalidentitythat providesfor the temporaldimension of humanexistence. A theoryof narrativeidentity,says Ricoeur, to providesjust such an account. According Ricoeur,in orderto understandthe relationbetween personalidentity and narrativeidentity, we must draw a fundamentaldistinctionbetween identity as sameness (idem-identity)and identity as selfhood (ipse-identity). Idem -identityis familiarenough. Sameness is a conceptof relation that incorporates numerical identityor qualitativeidentityor uninterof ruptedcontinuityacrosschange. So we may say of two occurrences an objectthat they are not two differentthings, but one and the same thing. Or we say that Joe and Davidare wearingthe same suit if the suits are so similarthat they couldbe exchangedwithoutnotice. Or we say that this is the oak tree we planted many years ago as an acorn. Nowthink of personalidentity. Identityas samenessdoes not seem fully adequateto accountfor the identityof personsovertime. Idemidentityis too closelytied to the questionWhat? Whatcontinuesover time? Yet, if we are asking aboutpersonal identity, we are asking Who?not What? So Ricoeurasks, "Isthere a formof permanence in time which can be connected the question'who'in as much as it is to irreducible any question'what?'" to (1992, 118). The answer is ipseas selfhood.Identityas selfhoodis a permanence in identity,identity

200

Journal of Religious Ethics

time which belongs to persons, and there are two models of permanence in time for persons, both of which move beyond idem-identity. The first model of permanence in time for persons Ricoeur calls "character." Character is "the set of lasting dispositions by which a person is recognized" and reidentified as the same individual over time (Ricoeur 1992, 121). Character includes habits and traits; it thus embodies an individual's preferences, evaluations, and estimations. Moreover, there is a process of "sedimentation"by which these habits and traits acquire a stability that makes it possible to speak of permanence in time for persons. Indeed, character is that point where idem and ipse appear to overlap, for it is even possible to say that "character is truly the 'what' of the 'who'"(1992, 122). Nevertheless, for reasons we will turn to shortly, character cannot be understood solely in terms of idem-identity. The second model of permanence in time is self-constancy, that is, keeping one's word. It is a form of permanence in time for persons that moves entirely beyond idem-identity for there is no "what"answering to self-constancy, but only a "who." Consider, says Ricoeur, the constancy of a self that has made a promise. It is not the permanence of character. The perseverance of character comes from the sedimented stability of acquired habits, traits, dispositions. Yet, even if my desires change, my habits change, my dispositions change, if I keep my promises, I remain the same. There is no "what," only a "who." As Ricoeur puts it, "I will hold firm,"and it is "here, precisely, that selfhood and sameness cease to coincide"(1992, 124). Once we acknowledge these two models of personal identity, we begin to see the connection between the self and narrative. This connection is initially signaled by character because beneath the sedimentation of established dispositions is a history of acquisition. There is, thus, a temporal dimension of character that its permanence may at first obscure. Accordingly, Ricoeur writes: the The dialecticof innovation sedimentation, and underlying acquisition of a habit,and the equallyrichdialecticof othernessand internalization, are the underlying processof identification, thereto remindus that char... acterhas a historywhichit has contracted. It is then comprehensible as can that the stablepoleof character containa narrative dimension, we it have seen in the uses of the term "character" identifying with the pronarrationcan has tagonist in a story. What sedimentation contracted, language. . . which paves the way for redeploy.And it is dispositional this narrativeunfolding[1992, 122]. It is the narrative dimension of selfhood and the mediation it provides between character and self-constancy that is so frequently ig-

The Self and Its Discontents

201

nored in philosophicaldiscussions of personal identity. Indeed, because idem-identityis so seldom distinguishedfrom ipse-identity, most discussionsof personalidentityare deeplyflawed. At this point, we hear echoes of Taylor'sclaim that selves are necessarilystrong is evaluators. Self-concern constitutiveof selfhood,and self-concern is in tied to narrative. We can see this, says Ricoeur, what he calls "the dialecticof selfhoodand sameness."That is, we can see it in the dialectic by which selves acquirestabilitywithouttherebybeing reduced to objects. Narrativeidentity holds the key. Drawingon his work in Timeand Narrative,Ricoeursketches an accountof narrative and of the tension between "concordances," or of or principlesof orderin the arrangement facts, and "discordances," of that the "reversals fortune" threatenorder(1984-1988). "Narrative is whichmediates configuration," Ricoeur, the "artof composition says and between concordance discordance" througha processof emplotment (1992, 141). Accordingto Ricoeur, the connectednessthat is emergesfromnarrativeconfiguration differentfromthat foundin and is impersonaldescription, this difference seen most clearlyin the status each assigns to events. By contrastto a "causal-type model," the narrativeevent is definedby the operation configuration such of in a way that a contingentoccurrence transfiguredinto a narrative is necessity as it becomesan integralpart of the story. Whatbegins as the the unexpected, surprising, mereoccurrence, the acquiresa sort of necessity(1992, 142-43). retrograde The relevanceof this analysisto a narrativeconception personal of identitycan be seen if we turn froman accountof actionsor events to an accountof character. Since a characteris the one who performs actionsin a narrative,character also a narrativecategory. Indeed, is characters"arethemselvesplots"(1992, 143). Just as says Ricoeur, confers"unity, internalstructure,and completeness" a on emplotment story, so, too, does it conferon character"an identity correlativeto that of the story itself (1992, 143). Moreover, there is a dialecticto the identity of characterthat corresponds the dialecticof concorto in danceand discordance the emplotment action. Sincethis pointis of it is worthquotingRicoeurat length. of considerable importance,
The dialectic consists in the fact that, following the line of concordance, the character draws his or her singularity from the unity of a life considered a temporal totality which is itself singular and distinguished from all others. Following the line of discordance, this temporal totality is threatened by the disruptive effect of the unforeseeable events that punctuate it (encounters, accidents, etc.). Because of the concordant-discordant synthesis, the contingency of the event contributes to the necessity, retroactive so to speak, of the history of a life, to which is equated the

202

Journal of ReligiousEthics

into fate. And the identityof the character.Thus chanceis transmuted so to speak,canbe understood in of the character only identity emplotted, as terms of this dialectic.. . . The person,understood a characterin a Quite the story, is not an entity distinctfromhis or her "experiences." of the identitypeculiarto opposite: personsharesthe condition dynamic the the storyrecounted.The narrativeconstructs identityof the characthat ter, what can be calledhis or her narrative identity,in constructing of the storytold. It is the identityof the storythat makesthe identityof the character [1992,147-48].

HereTaylor's discussionof humanlife as a quest that requiresnarrative formis fullyjoined,for Ricoeuris offeringan extremelysubtle analysis of how the identityof the self is formedthrougha storythat to providesnarrativeconfiguration a life. LikeTaylor,Ricoeurdraws notionof the narrativeunity of a life, but upon Alastair Maclntyre's he also movesbeyondboth Taylorand Maclntyrein providingan account of the relationshipbetween literatureand life. Not only does Ricoeur's theory of narrativeprovidean accountof how characteris establishedboth in fictionand in life, it also offersan accountof the relationbetweenfictionand life in the constitutionof character. Notwithstanding the differences between literature and life, Ricoeurarguesthat fictionmayhelp us to organizelife bothretrospectively and prospectively.For example,despite the hazy memoriesof narrativebeginningswe readaboutin literaturemay early childhood, the help us to "stabilize" actualbeginningsof ourlife story. Similarly, thoughwe cannottell the story of our own death, literaturemay proin narrativesof particular vide an "apprenticeship dying" providing by deaths that we find exemplaryin one way or another(Ricoeur1992, 160-62). discusRicoeur's accountof narrativenot only supplements Taylor's sion of the unity of a life but also lends forceto Taylor'sclaim that selfhoodand strongevaluationare necessarilylinked. Ricoeurhighlights this connection,for example, when he notes that narratives both invite and demandmoraljudgment. "Inthe exchangeof experare iences which the narrativeperforms," Ricoeurwrites, "actions alto approval disapproval agentsto praiseor blame" or and ways subject (1992, 164). This is why Ricoeur says that narrative mediates that narrativestands "at the between descriptionand prescription, crossroads the theoryof actionand moraltheory. . ."(1992, 170). It of is also why Ricoeurargues that ethics, understood the "aimof an as as life"has primacyover morality,understood particuaccomplished lar normsthat embodythat aim. For our acts of evaluationoccurin the space openedup by a story of what the good life is. Thus, says Ricoeur,"... the idea of gatheringtogetherone'slife in the formof a

The Self and Its Discontents

203

narrativeis destined to serve as a basis for the aim of 'good'life," of whichis in turn the cornerstone ethics (1992, 158). "How, indeed," a to he continues,"could subjectof actiongive an ethicalcharacter his or her ownlife taken as a whole,if this life werenot gatheredtogether in someway, and howcouldthis occurif not, precisely,in the formof a narrative?" (1992, 158).

4. Implicationsof NarrativeIdentity
So far I have suggestedthat there are two axes alongwhichcontemand poraryviews of the self can be plotted,engaged/disengaged unity/ that the axis engaged/disengaged normativelythe is fragmentation; moreimportantof the two;and that a narrativeview of the self is the most adequateaccountof an engagedself. Wemust now ask the pracfollowfromthinking of tical question,So what? What consequences identityin narrativeterms? Wouldwe need to think of ethicaltheory differentways if we acceptthe narrativeview of the in fundamentally self? yes Manywritershave answered to this last question. Forexample, in Situating the Self, Seyla Benhabibhas arguedthat Enlightenment in universalismneeds to be wholly reconstructed light of recent attacks by communitarians, feminists, and postmodernists,and she makes it clearthat a narrativeview of the self is centralto this effort at reconstruction."The'narrativestructureof actions and personal identity/"she writes,"isthe secondpremisewhichallowsone to move beyond the metaphysicalassumptionsof Enlightenmentuniversalism" (1992, 5-6; see also 162, 198). Mark Johnson has argued in Moral Imaginationthat narrativeis "uniqueand indispensablefor and moralreasoning" that "anadequatemoraltheorymust acknowledge the way we try to constructnarrativeunities that give us the meansto criticizeour presentsituation,explorenew avenuesof possiour ble action,and transform identityin the process" (1993, 170, 154). claims on behalfof narrativeare well known(Maclntyre Maclntyre's 1981),and the list couldgo on. Are these writerscorrect? AlthoughOwen Flanagandoes not pose the questionin precisely of these terms, one of the centralconvictions Varietiesof MoralPeris that the claim that a particularphilosophical sonality psychology dictatesa particular moraltheoryor a particular moralpersonalityis almost always exaggerated.Flanaganacknowledges appeal of a the narrativeview of the self. He argues,forexample,that personalidenor tity maybe seen froman objective subjective pointof view, and that narrativeis perhapsthe "essentialgenre" identityseen froma subof

204

Journal of ReligiousEthics

jective pointof view. Nevertheless,he is skepticalof the grandclaims made on behalf of narrativeidentity. Flanagan draws a distinctionbetween what he calls "actualfull identity"and "self-represented identity."Actualfull identity is idenfroman objectivepoint of view, and it can be undertity understood stoodas a "dynamic of integratedsystem" desires,beliefs,dispositions, an and so on, alongwith whateversense of self-understanding individual bringsto his or her life (Flanagan1991, 135). It is the self "seen that fromthe pointof view of a certainclass of theoretical perspectives and try to admit the reality of the self as an emergentphenomenon give an objectiveaccountof what it, in general and in particular,is like"(1991, 137). Self-represented identity, by contrast,"is the conscious or semiconsciouspicture a person has of who she or he is" (1991, 137). Self-represented identity is that subjectiveunderstanding of ourselvesthat gives us some degreeof controlover our lives by makingexplanationand prediction possible. Again,Flanaganadmits that self-represented identityhas a kind of narrativestructure,for it is essentially the story we tell ourselvesin orderto understandwho we are. Even if we admitthat "thereis somethingboth naturaland normatively ideal about the narrativemodel,"we still have reason to be skepticalaboutsome of the normativeclaimsmadeon its behalf. We can see this, says Flanagan,by attendingto a series of questionsthat might reasonablybe raised at this point. First, in thinkingaboutlife as an unfolding story, how should we think about the connection between various parts of the story? Advocatesof narrativeidentity typicallystress the unity of the storyover a wholelife, but, as Flanagan pointsout, for manyindividualsthere will be significantdiscontinuities between differentparts of a single life, discontinuitiesthat make it intelligibleto speak of differentselves. Second,will we restrict the models of narrativeidentity to familiar structuresof fictional representation, realisticnovels,or may self-understanding say, be mediatedby otherformsof narrativestructure, epicpoems,streamhow is the relationship of-consciousness writing, and so on? Third, Too betweennarrativeidentityand moralgoodnessto be understood? of narrativewriteas if narrativeidentityis somehow manysupporters constitutiveof a goodlife. Such a claim,says Flanagan,is simplynot true. "Thereare, after all,"writes Flanagan,"liveswhich have elegant narrativestructurebut are hardlyworthaspiringto or emulat(1991, 150). Fourth,how do we ing, indeedwhich are not even good" life story,beginning,middle,and end, in weigh the variousparts of a a assessingthe qualityof a life? Forsome,a goodendingcan "redeem" bad beginning; for others, the story of one's middle years, one's

The Self and Its Discontents

205

"prime,"is more important than either the beginning or the end of one's story. Finally, even if we answer all these questions satisfactorily, we still must ask: are there particular social structures "which the preferred types of narrative presuppose for their legitimate construction" (1991, 150)? This last question is of special interest to Flanagan because he believes that proponents of narrative identity frequently go awry in answering yes. For example, communitarians often claim that significant homogeneity among traditions and social practices is necessary within particular communities in order for stable selves to emerge. To see that homogeneity is not necessary either for coherent identity formation or for narrative self-understanding, we need only note that even where consistency, reliability, and shared values are necessary conditions for positive self-esteem and coherent identity namely, within the class of primary socializers- homogeneity is not required. To be sure, if children are to have self-esteem, if they are to form stable identities, there must be some degree of consistency, stability, and uniform valuation within a family, but all of these are compatible with considerable heterogeneity. Within many contemporary families, for example, parents disagree markedly between themselves in beliefs and values, but nevertheless have developed strategies for resolving disagreements in affirming unity in diversity. Moreover, what is true of families is true of societies. Just as the beginning of one's life story may be given coherent structure within a family that is diverse, so may coherent identity be sustained amid diversity later in life. "So long as one's heterogeneous society operates on principles of tolerance and mutual respect, and especially if it is based on an active appreciation of the way diversity can contribute to the common good, the social conditions necessary for the maintenance of identity and self-esteem are realized"(Flanagan 1991, 153). So affirming narrative identity does not commit us to a communitarian social theory. Flanagan even questions the more modest claim, put forward by Taylor, that selfhood and strong evaluation are necessarily linked. Communitarians like Taylor are correct that any adequate moral or political theory must be able to account for the fact that persons are "self-comprehending creatures" and "intersubjective selves," but it does not follow from this that there is any necessity that persons understand themselves in these terms. In fact, says Flanagan, for many, self-comprehension is dim and inchoate (1990, 44). Flanagan puts the point this way, "a particular self might be self-comprehended,without being subject to elegant narrative construction by the self who so comprehends it" (1990, 54). The problem with Taylor's account is thus that it requires a degree of reflectiveness and articulateness of per-

206

Journal of ReligiousEthics

sons that is simplynot plausible. Think,says Flanagan,of the characters in many of Leo Tolstoy'sstories. Tolstoy's peasants are typically unreflectiveand inarticulate,yet their lives are coherentand express a commitment certainvalues. So to talk of strongevaluationin the to intellectualistway that Taylordoes, or even to talk of narrativeidentity in a way that suggests a complexand well-articulated story, is misleading.2 reservations aboutcommunitarian effortsto use DespiteFlanagan's philosophicalpsychologyas a winch by which to raise up an ideal moralor politicaltheory,he doesbelievethat acknowledging narraa tive view of the self has some (minimal)normativepurchase. For example, Flanagan writes, "if our identities are primarilyemergent, relational productsrather than pure self-creations,it follows that gaining accurate self-understandingwill involve seeing oneself (1991, 142). Here Flanagandraws attentionto a dinonatomically" mensionof narrativeselfhood that has so far remainedonlyimplicit:a narrative self is necessarilya social or relationalself. So even if a commitment a narrativeview of the self does not privilegecommuto nitarianismover,say, liberalindividualism, may still be morallyimit portantbecauseit highlightsthe relationalityof the self.

5. FromNarrativeto Relationality
Is an emphasis on the notion of relationalitynormativelyimportant? Severalessays in Selves,People,and Personsseek to makethis case (Rouner1992). For example,in an essay entitled, "TheRelathe tional Self,"HaroldOliver argues that understanding self relain us to overcome crisisof selfhood" the Westthat "a tionallymay help can be tracedto the inabilityof the traditionalatomistic"substantialist" self to copewith the processof globalization the ensuing enand counterwith nonWesternselves (1992, 37). We must, Oliverinsists, repudiatethe Augustinian/Cartesian legacy and re-envisionthe self, andhe suggestsa numberof resources doingso, includingthe work for of MeisterEckhartand MartinBuber. However,perhapsthe most interestingresourceuponwhich Oliver drawsis the doctrineof the Trinityin Orthodox Christianity.Accordto Oliver,the perichoretic of the Trinityin Orthodox ing interpretation one thoughtprovidesa useful modelforthinkingof selfhood, that captures the inescapably relationalcharacterof the self. It does so, says
2 Flanagan's own commentshere may be somewhat misleading in that the coherence and virtue displayed in the lives of many of Tolstoy's peasants is mediated by the implicit narrative configurationprovidedby folktales and biblical stories.

The Self and Its Discontents

207

Oliver,becauseit is non-substantialist.In the West, Trinitarianrein the flectionemphasized idea of one'ssubstance; the East, emphasis was placed on three persons, distinct but not separate. The perthe ichoretic doctrinethus "interpreted relationof the three personsof . the Trinityas 'mutualinterpenetration' . ." (1992, 43). The idea of mutual interpenetration may thus be used to breakdown,or at least betweenself and other,and may lead us to see, recast,the dichotomy in Oliver'swords,that "thereis no-self,and it is the relationalself (1992, 37). The claimthat a relationalview of the self requiresus to rethinknot only our understandingof the self, but also how we think of the is "other" echoed elsewhere in Selves, People,and Persons. Krister Stendahl,for example,makes essentiallythe same point in his essay in "Selfhood the Imageof God."He, too, drawson Eastern Christian views of the Trinityin orderto use an image of Godas "totalinterdeas pendence" a modelfor the relationof self and other. "Ifwe are created in the image of God,"Stendahl writes, "then our being, our selfhood,the essence of being human,is interdependence, giving and (1992, 146). Moreover, Selves, Peoreceivingin constantmutuality" ple, and Personsoffersreflectionson the implicationsof a relational Westernsourcesas well. In "TheComparaview of the self fromnontive Study of the Self,"Eliot Deutschpoints out that in the mainline to Confucian sotradition,wherethe self is understood be thoroughly of cial in nature,thereis also the sort of interpenetration whichOliver and Stendahlspeak (1992, 96). "Itis not so much that an otherwise self Deutschwrites,"as autonomous entersinto relationswith others," that she or he is constitutedorganically those relations" (1992,96). by and a Finally,in an essay entitled,"Psychoanalysis the Self:Toward John Mackarguesthat traditionalpsychoaSpiritualPoint of View," a nalysis must be recast in orderto accommodate relationalview of the too the self. Withinpsychoanalysis, self has been understood atit has been thoughtof as "bounded, structurenot very a omistically; differentfrom the ego, the propertyof discrete individuals"(1992, view of the 176). By contrast,says Mack,we need a more"spiritual" self. Self in the spiritualsense, Mackwrites,"isnot discreteor limited to an individual,but a kind of fluid potentialthroughwhich one connects with other selves and all of reality"(1992, 176). To stress the necessarilyrelationalqualityof this spiritualself, Mackborrowsthe fromBuddhistpoet ThichNhat Hanh, and "wego" term "interbeing" fromfellow psychoanalyst GeorgeKlein.

208

Journal of ReligiousEthics

6. Concluding Remarks to Mack'sreflectionson the need for psychoanalysis adopt a more can relationalview of the self and his insistencethat psychoanalysis such a view lead me, in closing,to suggest one direction accommodate forfutureworkon this topic,a suggestionrootedin a lacunaidentified thought has atby Mack'sremarks. Recent French psychoanalytic tendedto the radicalsocialityof the self, and none of the volumesreviewedin this essay takes note of that fact. For example,none of the writerswe have examineddiscussesthe theoryof the self espousedby and Guy Lefort under the Rene Girard,Jean-MichelOughourlian, (Girard1987). heading"interdividual" psychology This omissionis regrettablebecauseat least some of the theorists influencedby Girardraise the hauntingquestionof whetheran emdoes not ultimatelylead phasis on narrativeidentityand relationality idenbackto fragmentation away fromthe sort of compassionate and tificationwith others celebratedby Deutsch,Mack,and Oliver. For insists that example,in TheFreudianSubject,MikkelBorch-Jacobsen identification with the other, if it is constitutiveof the ego "Original . . . , is likewiseradicalviolencewith respectto the other a devouring mouth clampeddown on the alterity of others . . ." (Borch-Jacobsen 1988, quotedin Webb1993, 76). and Thus, the fact that the argumentsof Girard,Borch-Jacobsen, others are not joined in the worksunderreviewhere is unfortunate. At the same time, however,this omissionprovidesa sort of directional signal for future research, for even a brief juxtaposition of "inwith narrativeviews of the self suggests the terdividual" psychology need for further work on the connectionsamong relationality,fragmentation, and individualmoral responsibility. Moreover,the fact that the accountof the self foundin Girardand his followersis, at of least on the surface,strikinglysimilarto someEasternconceptions the self, furtherindicatesthat anotherpotentiallyfruitfulavenuefor wouldbe a comparative study of the self. exploringthese connections If I am right that recentFrenchcritiquesof Freudmay forceus to examine,in a seriousand sustainedway,the possibilitythat emphasis then this study will on relationalitypushes toward fragmentation, and have comefull circle. Webeganwith Freudand fragmentation, it that we end there as well. We may well wonder,therefore, appears Westernview of the self can really escape whetherany contemporary Freud. As we saw, both the fragmentedand the unitary self can be read out of (or into) Freud,and a narrativeview of the self, although apparentlytaking us away fromFreud,perhapsreturnsus to him in the end. Indeed,what Foucaultsaid of Hegel appearsto be equally

The Self and Its Discontents

209

true of Freud,at least of Freudand accountsof moralpersonhood: for all our efforts to move beyond or away from Freud, in the end he stands, motionless,waiting for us.

REFERENCES
Benhabib, Seyla 1992 Situating the Self. New York: Routledge. Borch-Jacobsen,Mikkel The Freudian Subject. Translated by Catherine Porter. Stan1988 ford, Calif.: Stanford University Press. Bowie, Malcolm Lacan. Cambridge,Mass.: Harvard University Press. 1991 Deutsch, Eliot "TheComparativeStudy of the Self." In Selves, People, and Per1992 sons, 95-105. See Rouner 1992. Flanagan, Owen 1990 "Identityand Strong and Weak Evaluation." In Identity, Character, and Morality, edited by Owen Flanagan and Amelie Oksenberg Rorty, 37-65. Cambridge,Mass.: MIT Press. 1991 Varieties of Moral Personality. Cambridge,Mass.: Harvard University Press. Girard, Rene 1987 Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World. With JeanMichel Oughourlian and Guy Lefort and translated by Stephen Bann and Michael Metter. Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press. Johnson, Mark Moral Imagination. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1993 Alastair Maclntyre, 1981 After Virtue. Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press. Mack, John E. 1992 "Psychoanalysisand the Self: Toward a Spiritual Point of View." In Selves, People, and Persons, 169-86. See Rouner 1992. Harold H. Oliver, 1992 "TheRelational Self." In Selves, People, and Persons, 37-51. See Rouner 1992. Paul Ricoeur, 1984-88 Time and Narrative. 3 vols. Translated by Kathleen McLaughlin and David Pellauer. Chicago:University of Chicago Press. 1992 Oneself as Another. Translated by Kathleen Blarney. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

210

Journal of Religious Ethics

Rorty, Richard 1991 Essays on Heidegger and Others. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Rouner, Leroy, ed. 1992 Selves, People, and Persons. Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press. Stendahl, Krister 1992 "Selfhoodin the Image of God." In Selves, People, and Persons, 141-48. See Rouner 1992. Taylor, Charles 1989 Sources of the Self. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 1991 The Ethics of Authenticity. Cambridge,Mass.: Harvard University Press. Wallwork, Ernest 1991 Psychoanalysis and Ethics. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press. Webb, Eugene 1993 Between the Self. Seattle: University of Washington Press.