A One Nation approach to Europe By Bernard Donoughue

With Europe in crisis and Britain in a political muddle, it is alarmingly possible that the UK will, as Ed Miliband presciently warned, "sleepwalk' out of the European Union without having seriously considered the consequences or the alternatives. That would, in my view (and I have never been a 'Euro-fanatic'), be a historical disaster. The immediate explanations for this dire prospect lie with a weak Conservative prime minister trying to appease his rampant right wing and a currently unattractive EU offering an easy sacrice. But deeper reasons lie in the historical evolution of our relations with the European continent Initially. Britain's reservations about joining the post-war movement towards greater European unity stemmed from feelings that our islands were more outward-looking, that we were a great global empire, and somehow superior to the squabbling continentals. Churchill opposed as an imperialist, Labour's Hugh Gaitskell as a Commonwealth man (both really from the same emotional if not political club). With our decline as a world power and Macmillan's Wind of Change blowing away the imperial dream, those reservations diminished. Other politicians from the next generation, such as Edward Heath and Roy Jenkins, who had fought in the second world war, felt that Britain was actually becoming more 'European' and wanted to join in healing the wounds resulting from centuries of civil war on the continent. They were joined by modernisers such as Harold Wilson, concerned with our economic decline and wanting to share the then economic growth in

Europe (though Wilson was always a Little Englander at heart). So the UK joined the EEC under Heath and voted to stay there in Wilson's referendum in 1975. But the British people's commitment was never complete and reservations remained on the nationalist right and the old socialist left. Many Brits never quite felt European, were still proudly different, and were easily irritated by intrusions from the Brussels bureaucracy in their traditional ways of life -often fanned by a right wing press partly owned by Australians and Canadians with little attachment to European sentiment. Europe itself had over the years advanced crab-like towards ultimate union (rarely stating that was the elite's goal for fear of rebellion by the un-consulted troops). By 2012 the situation is complex. There are 27 members of the EU who have joined the club for diverse reasons, usually and understandably based on some rough calculation of national self interest. Most of the original members still share a deep belief in the European project, to have a fully united Europe, including for many full political union. Newer ones, some on the geographical periphery, often made hard calculations of nancial gain from the European budgetary pay-outs. Former victims of the Soviet tyranny wanted to join the non-Russian club to live under its defensive umbrella. All members want to a greater or lesser degree to be considered European and in the European game. But some, especially the British, have reservations about the evolving European 'package'. That package contains many elements of 'Europeanism'-a complex mixture of emotional, spiritual, cultural, political, economic, nancial, trading, legal, social, diplomatic and military Europeanism. For Britain, the main reservations concerning some of our citizens are probably: (1) political/constitutional - opposition to submitting our parliamentary sovereignty to Brussels; (2) nancial - opposition to joining the European currency; (3) legal - reluctance to submitting our courts to overseas jurisdiction; (4) social not wanting to be exposed to free movement of labour and open immigration; (5) sporadic irritation at Brussels interference, often exaggerated and misrepresented by our press, comes under all headings. There are others but these are probably

the ones giving ammunition to the anti-Europeans (though their opposition may sometimes be less rationally based). For some people, probably a minority, they constitute a reason for withdrawal from the European Union. For many more they are a reason for working to amend our relationship still within Europe and possibly for seeking a revised settlement. The danger is that those who are simply irritated by the present situation will go along with the minority who dogmatically want full withdrawal and will throw out the European baby with the bathwater. Normally, a strong British prime minister and an adult and independent media debate, including the mature voices of Britain's industries and services, would ensure that this does not happen. But we do not have either at the moment. We have a trivial mass media often supporting a ranting right wing minority and a weak prime minister bending to those winds. It is therefore crucial that we open a full and reasoned debate to determine what is truly in the long term interests of the UK (and the EU). I believe that interest lies in remaining within the European community, willing to make reasonable compromises as always happens in healthy families, and seeking in a few areas a revised settlement which would be in the interests of both the UK and Europe. I also believe that there are other members of the EU who might be sympathetic to those changes as in their interests too. Their support would be more likely to be achieved by a positive British approach than by the current Cameron style of threats and posturing. It might of course be possible to work for particular changes within the present structure, involving the repatriation of some powers on a nation by nation basis. That seems to be Britain's present diplomatic position (though with the Coalition the government's actual position is never clear). The problem with that approach is that it involves endless wrangling and the UK always seems to be whingeing and holding up the European 'project'. It damages relations with our key European allies (as currently with an exasperated Germany) and leaves some of them feeling that in the end it may be easier to assist our departure. It also provides a cover for

anti-Europeans to secure eventual withdrawal by a prolonged process of baconslicing; they will never be actually satised by anything less than full exit. It is therefore worth examining whether a limited structural alteration in the EU would introduce a exibility which enables Britain (and others such as Greece?) to remain in Europe in conditions more suited to their particular national personalities or economic circumstances. There has of course often been discussion of such changes under the heading of a '2 speed' Europe or with the football analogy of rst and second divisions. I do not like the former designation because it seems to assume that all members are proceeding to the same ultimate destination of full political union, only at different speeds. We may not all want to reach that nal destination. I do not like the latter designation because of its implication of the inferiority of the second category. But provision for two different categories of membership would surely provide greater exibility and leave the UK comfortably able to play a big part in Europe. A rst category, possibly called the European Union (a Premier League in German and French eyes) , would consist of those who sign up to the full menu, including political, nancial, economic, banking legal and social union. Presumably, Germany, France, Italy, Holland, Belgium and Luxembourg would choose to join that, plus any other central and east European countries which can honestly meet the full budgetary implications. The second category, perhaps called the European Community (Championship League ?), could contain the UK, Sweden, Finland and Denmark if they wished. Greece, Spain and Portugal might in the present crisis prefer to join there, able to have their own monetary, scal and budgetary policies and not depend on German subsidies until they demonstrate their ability to survive the nancial rigour of the new EU category. They might not have to impose on themselves the savage and immediate austerities which currently threaten their whole political and social stability. Ireland would have a nely balanced decision. Some smaller countries might prefer the second status until their nancial and legal systems are
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more soundly established. Norway might even nally join on this basis and Turkey nd it easier to meet the criteria for accession. As in football, it would be possible to qualify to transfer from one category to the other - and 'demotion' need not mean leaving the European community altogether-though there should be no automatic transfer. The European authorities would have the nal decision, preferably applying more rigorous and honest budget scrutiny than in the recent accession process. Both categories would be truly 'European', with membership of the European parliament, and each would be fully represented in the executives and administrations of Europe. But the second category would not participate in the decision-making process on the policy spheres from which they had chosen to withdraw (as currently with the UK and the Euro currency). For Britain, this structural change would enable her to avoid the damaging process of full exit from the EU and to play a proper and less negative role in the development of Europe. For the EU, it would allow it to proceed more positively with less obstructions and less posturing threats of vetoes from the British prime minister. For the Labour opposition, such a policy could have clear benets. It would reect the genuine reservations about some aspects of the current EU held by many of its supporters, while at the same time taking a positive stance on Europe and rejecting the irresponsible rantings of our right wing. It provides a positive basis from which Ed Miliband and Britain would face the challenging prospect that in the not too distant future the core nations of the EU may well move to full political and nancial union, which we probably could not share. Ed Miliband is certainly thinking about this challenge. His increasingly pragmatic approach to big policy issues gives him the right basis for exercising party and national leadership here. That would especially appeal to the leaders of British industries and services who know that full exit from Europe would be very damaging to business and to jobs (many foreign rms and banks would remove their headquarters from Britain if we left Europe). It also gives him the political opportunity to expose David Cameron as once again having no real vision for
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Britain's future. In this context, Labour's leader could begin by strongly making the case for Britain remaining a positive member of the European community. Some pro-Europeans may feel that my suggestions concede too much to the antis and involve some 'cherry-picking' which would not be popular in Brussels, But in fact it narrows the case for 'Euro-scepticism', meets some of the genuine reservations held by many Brits, and would create a base for a majority in any future referendum on the European issue (which may now be hard to avoid). If presented in a positive European context, it gives a vision for a better future in and for Europe. Ed Miliband should feel more comfortable in that stance and would look more like a suitable prime minister for Britain in 2015 than his dithering opponent. Bernard Donoughue was Head of the Number Ten Policy Unit for Labour Prime Ministers Harold Wilson and James Callaghan; and Minister for Farming and Food under Tony Blair He was Wilson's personal representative conducting the 1975 referendum on Britain's membership of the EEC -----------Political notes are published by One Nation Register. They are a monthly contribution to the debates shaping Labours political renewal. The articles published do not represent Labours policy positions. To contact political notes, email onenationregister@gmail.com