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12 (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. (2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited. (3) any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him. (4) the law shall provide for penal & civil sanctions for violations of this section as well as compensation to & rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices, and their families. Rights under investigation: (1) (2) The right to remain silent The right to competent & independent counsel preferably of his own choice

Supreme Court more friendly to police operations limited its scope several times, although failing to reverse its central holding, and in 2000 the Rehnquist court, in an opinion authored by the chief justice, reaffirmed the original decision as a constitutional rule that may not be overturned by an act of Congress. Civil liberties groups have continued to protest that police routinely omit Miranda warnings The ff constitutional requirements must be observed in custodial investigations: (1) The person in custody must be informed at the outset in clear & unequivocal terms that he has the right to remain silent After being so informed, he must be told that anything he says can and will be used against him in court He must be clearly informed that he has the right to consult with a lawyer and to have the lawyer with him during the interrogation. He does not have to ask for a lawyer. The investigators should tell him that he has the right to counsel at that point. He should be warned that not only has he the right to consult with a lawyer but also that if he is indigent, a lawyer will be appointed to represent him. Even if the person consents to answer questions without the assistance of counsel, the moment he asks for a lawyer at any point in the investigation, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present. If the foregoing protections and warnings are not demonstrated during the trial to have been observed by the prosecution, no evidence obtained as a result of the interrogation can be used against him.




(5) (3) The right to be informed of such rights

Reason making the rule applicable to investigation: According to Miranda vs Arizona, it is but a recognition of the fact that the psychological if not physical atmosphere of custodial investigations, in the absence of proper safeguards, is inherently coercive. Miranda v Arizona (immediate jurisprudential antecedent ) Of all cases to make its way to the Supreme Court, Miranda v Arizona may well be the most popular to date. Virtually everyone has heard of the "Miranda Rights" which are read to suspects. While many people may be familiar with the terminology from television shows, not nearly as many understand the true origins of the Miranda rights. The actual case of Miranda v Illinois may be the case the "Miranda Rights" are named after, but several other Supreme Court decisions all came together to form the ruling, including Escabedo v Illinois. However, since Miranda was the final case to be decided at the time covering this issue, it is considered the father of the "Right to remain silent." On March 13, 1963, Ernesto Miranda was arrested at Arizona his home. The police took him into custody, and transported him to a Phoenix police station. The witness whom had filed the complaint identified him. Miranda was then lead to the interrogation room. Then, the police officers proceeded to question him. Miranda had never been informed of his rights prior to the questioning. He was never told he had the right to an attorney to be present during the questioning. After two hours, the officers had succeeded in getting a written confession signed by Miranda. Located on the top of the confession was a typed paragraph stating that the confession was voluntary, without any promises of immunity or threats. The statement also said that Miranda signed the confession "with full knowledge of my legal rights, understanding any statement I make may be used against me." When Miranda's case went to trial, the prosecution used the written confession as evidence against him. The defense objected, asking for the evidence to be suppressed. However, the judge allowed the confession to be admitted. Miranda was convicted of all counts, which consisted of kidnapping and rape. On each count he was sentenced to 20 to 30 years, with the sentences running concurrently. On Miranda's first appeal, the Supreme Court of Arizona ruled that his rights had not been violated by the admission of the confession, and therefore affirmed the conviction. The basis for the decision was connected to the fact that Miranda never specifically requested council. Identified in a police lineup, Miranda had been questioned, had confessed, and had signed a written statement without being told that he had a right to a lawyer; his confession was used at trial. In overturning Miranda's conviction, Chief Justice Earl Warren held that the prosecution may not use statements made by a person in police custody unless certain minimum procedural safeguards were in place. Before questioning, a person must be given what is now known as a Miranda warning: that you have the right to remain silent; that anything you say may be used as evidence against you; that you may request the presence of an attorney, either retained by you or appointed by the court; and that you have the right, even after beginning to answer questions, to stop answering or request an attorney. The Miranda decision was one of the most controversial of the Warren Court. Under Chief Justices Warren Burger and William Rehnquist (who as a legal spokesman for the Nixon administration had proposed that Miranda be overturned), a (6)

** The entirety of the Miranda Rule is now part of Philippine Law Pp vs DE LA CRUZ, alias RODOLFO DOMINGO or "OMPONG Rodolfo de la Cruz, aliasRodolfo Domingo or "Ompong impugns his conviction for multiple murder in Antipolo, Rizal. He anchors his entreaty for the reversal thereof mainly on the ground that he was not fully and appropriately apprised of or allowed to exercise his constitutional rights prior to and while undergoing custodial investigation. The 3 Laroyas were all bloodied consequent to numerous stab wounds, and each of them had a knife still embedded in and protruding from their bodies when found by neighbors in Cainta, Rizal. Karen Verona also bore external signs of sexual assault. None of their neighbors, however, witnessed the gruesome murders. Two of them later testified in court, namely, Harold Jim F. Balocating and Anita F. Pangan. The former merely recounted how, while playing table tennis in front of the Laroya residence, he and his friends stumbled upon the dead bodies of the victims. Anita Pangan, on the other hand, recalled that at around 9:00 P.M. of June 23, 1992, appellant, who was a brother-in-law of Teodorico Laroya, Jr., purchased some candies at her store which is located inside the village. 4 Both Balocating and Pangan had previously executed sworn statements just three days after the incident, the assertions in which were of the same import as their respective testimonies in court. 5On June 27, 1992, the police authorities apprehended appellant at the house of his brother in Fort Bonifacio. SPO1 Carlos R. Atanacio, Jr., a member of the Cainta Police Station in Cainta, Rizal interrogated appellant regarding the crimes on the same day that he was arrested. This police officer declared in the trial court that before he questioned appellant as to his participation in said crimes, all steps were undertaken to completely inform the latter of his rights and this he did in the presence of appellant's supposed counsel, one Atty. Lorenza Bernardino-Villanueva. Appellant then signed, likewise in the presence of said counsel, an extrajudicial confession wherein he narrated in detail how he allegedly snuffed out the lives of the victims. When presented as the lone witness for himself, appellant was observed by the trial court to be afflicted with a problem in expressing himself and an impediment in his speech (ngo-ngo). By appellant's own account, he only reached the fourth grade of elementary schooling and, although conversant with Tagalog, he is unable to read and write, although he can sign his name. He bluntly repudiated the version of SPO1 Atanacio, Jr. and insisted that he was never assisted by any counsel of his choice, much less met said Atty. Lorenza Bernardino-Villanueva, when he was interrogated at the police

headquarters in Cainta, Rizal and signed his supposed extrajudicial confession. Parenthetically, his answers to the questions appearing therein are in surprisingly fluent, flawless and expressive Tagalog, which could not have been done by him because of his defect in speech and articulation. He further claims that he was instead tortured by the police authorities into signing the same, and not that he did so voluntarily. While he admits having been at the residence of the victims on the night that they were murdered, he flatly denied having killed them as he left the trio well and alive that same night when he proceeded to his brother's place in Fort Bonifacio. In unambiguous and explicit terms, Section 12, paragraph 1, of Article III of the Constitution requires that "[a]ny person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel." Corollary thereto, paragraph 3 thereof declares that any confession or admission obtained in violation of the same shall be inadmissible in evidence against the confessant. An accused person must be informed of the rights set out in said paragraph of Section 12 upon being held as a suspect and made to undergo custodial investigation by the police authorities. As explained by this Court in People vs. Marra, custodial investigation involves any questioning initiated by law enforcement authorities after a person is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant manner. And, the rule begins to operate at once as soon as the investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into an unsolved crime and direction is then aimed upon a particular suspect who has been taken into custody and to whom the police would then direct interrogatory question which tend to elicit incriminating statements. Furthermore, not only does the fundamental law impose, as a requisite function of the investigating officer, the duty to explain those rights to the accused but also that there must correspondingly be a meaningful communication to and understanding thereof by the accused. A mere perfunctory reading by the constable of such rights to the accused would thus not suffice. The defendant in the dock must be made to understand comprehensively, in the language or dialect that he knows, the full extent of the same. A confession made in an atmosphere characterized by deficiencies in informing the accused of all the rights to which he is entitled would be rendered valueless and inadmissible, perforated, as it is by non-compliance with the procedural and substantive safeguards to which an accused is entitled . In the present case, SPO1 Atanacio, Jr., admitted in his the investigation actually commenced at the time when appellant was still without counsel. While SPO1 Atanacio, Jr. informed appellant in Tagalog of his right to remain silent, that any statement he made could be used for or against him in any court, and that he could have counsel preferably of his own choice, he nonetheless failed to tell appellant that if the latter could not afford the services of counsel, he could be provided with one. The foregoing lapses on the part of the police authorities are all fatal to the admissibility of the extrajudicial confession supposedly executed by appellant before SPO1 Atanacio, Jr. Jurisprudence along these lines have all been too consistent an accused under custodial interrogation must continuously have a counsel assisting him from the very start thereof. Where he lacks a counsel of his choice because of indigence or other incapacitating cause, he shall be provided with one. Without this further safeguard, that his right thereto would mean simply that he can consult a lawyer if he has one or has the financial capacity to obtain legal services, and nothing more. Curiously, the record is completely bereft of any indication as to how appellant was able to engage the services of Atty. Lorenza BernardinoVillanueva, where what emerges from a perusal of the record is that this counsel was merely picked out and provided by the law enforcers themselves, thus putting into serious doubt her independence and competence in assisting appellant during the investigation as to affect its admissibility. Again, about the only matter that bears out the presence of such counsel at that stage of custodial interrogation are the signatures which she affixed on the affidavit. Withal, a cursory reading of the confession itself and SPO1 Atanacio's version of the manner in which he conducted the interrogation, yields no evidence or indication pointing to her having explained to the appellant his rights under the Constitution.

The objective is to prohibit "incommunicado" interrogation of individuals in a police-dominated atmosphere, resulting in selfincriminating statements without full warnings of constitutional rights. The rights above specified, to repeat, exist only in "custodial interrogations," or "in-custody interrogation of accused persons." And, as this Court has already stated, by custodial interrogation is meant "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." The situation contemplated has also been more precisely described by this Court. . . . After a person is arrested and his custodial investigation begins, a confrontation arises which at best may be termed unequal. The detainee is brought to an army camp or police headquarters and there questioned and "cross-examined" not only by one but as many investigators as may be necessary to break down his morale. He finds himself in strange and unfamiliar surroundings, and every person he meets, he considers hostile to him. The investigators are well-trained and seasoned in their work. They employ all the methods and means that experience and study have taught them to extract the truth, or what may pass for it, out of the detainee. Most detainees are unlettered and are not aware of their constitutional rights. And even if they were, the intimidating and coercive presence of the officers of the law in such an atmosphere overwhelms them into silence. Section 20 of the Bill of Rights seeks to remedy this imbalance. Equally inadmissible, for being integral parts of the uncouselled admission or fruits of the poisonous tree are the photographs of subsequent acts which the accused was made to do in order to obtain proof to support such admission or confession, such as (a) his digging in the place where Virginia Trangia was allegedly buried, (b) his retrieving of the bones discovered therein (c) his posing before a photographer while executing such acts. Evidently, herein appellant cannot be made to suffer the extreme penal consequences of the crimes on account of the shaky and decrepit circumstantial evidence proffered by the prosecution. While the defense of alibi advanced by appellant is by nature a weak one by itself, it assumes commensurate significance and strength where the evidence for the prosecution itself is frail and effete. For, needless to state, the prosecution must not rely on the weakness of the evidence of the defense but upon the vigor of its own. In sum, the presumption of innocence enjoyed by appellant has remained intact and impervious to the prosecution's assault thereon. accused-appellant Rodolfo de la Cruz, alias Rodolfo Domingo or "Ompong," is hereby ACQUITTED. PEOPLE v ESCORDIAL Facts Petitioners were all living in the ground floor of a boarding house. On the night of the crime (December 27, 1997), a jeep was parked in front of the boarding house where children (later witnesses) were playing. They were told to go home by a man who would be later identified as the accused. While the three were sleeping, Erma was awakened by the presence of a man. This man had his head covered with a t-shirt to prevent identification and carried a knife about four inches long. He asked for her money and was able to get P500 from her. She then turned to the other petitioners who were already awake by that time and was able to take P3100 from Michelle and none from Teresa because her bag was in the other room. After taking the money, they were told to blindfold one another. He then proceeded to have carnal knowledge with Michelle. Michelle said that although she was blindfolded and could not see, she could feel that the man had no cover on his face when he was raping her. She felt that his chest was rough and had some scars. When he placed her hands on his nape, she felt that it was also rough (keloid). On the other hand, Erma claimed she was able to see through her blindfold and that she saw the mans face.

After he finished raping Michelle, he sat down on the bed and talked to the women. He then raped Michelle for the second time, threatening her so shed concede that it would be much worse if hed call others (companions) from outside to rape her. After which (about 12:30am) he left. PO3 Tancinco was one of those who responded to the crime. A report was made in the police station. Subsequent searches, through the descriptions of the petitioners, the children playing in the jeep in front of the boarding house, and others led to the pinpointing of accused-appellant. Accused was playing in basketball when the police invited him to the Pontevedra police station for questioning. At the station Michelle saw him and she identified him as his alleged robber and rapist. He was also brought to the Bacolod police station so that the other witnesses could identify him. They picked him out of four in the line-up. Accused claims that he went home to Pontevedra, Negros Occidental at the time of the incident as testified by three other witnesses for the defense. (Accused, having become the focus of attention by the police after he had been pointed to by a certain Ramie as the possible perpetrator of the crime) Issue: WON, the accused is already under custodial investigation? HELD SC held that when the out-of-court identification was conducted by the police, the accused was already under custodial investigation. OUT-OF-COURT IDENTIFICATION: This should have been inadmissible because identification of an uncounseled accused made in a police line-up (where the suspect is identified by a witness from a group of persons gathered for that purpose), or in a show-up (where the accused is brought face to face with witness for identification) for that matter, after the start of the custodial investigation is inadmissible as evidence against him. However, again, failure to object when these pieces of evidence were presented constituted a waiver. During custodial investigation, these types of identification have been recognized as critical confrontations of the accused by the prosecution, necessitating the presence of counsel for the accused. This is because the result of these pre-trial proceedings might well settle the fate of the accused and reduce the trial to a mere formality Thus, any identification of an uncounseled accused made in a police line-up or in a show-up after the start of custodial investigation is inadmissible in evidence against him. TESTIMONIES OF THE WITNESSES (regarding the identity of the accused): should be regarded as inadmissible under the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine. IN-COURT IDENTIFICATION: inadmissibility of these out-of-court identifications does not render the in-court identification of accusedappellant inadmissible for being the fruits of the poisonous tree. As it was not derived or drawn from the illegal arrest of accused-appellant or as a consequence PEOPLE vs BENITO BRAVO

and balut. Len-Len asked her to go with them but she did not want to because she was watching television. Len-Len went alone with the accused. The following morning Len-Lens mother told Evelyn and her mother that Len-Len was missing. In court, Evelyn positively identified the appellant as the person last seen with Len-len before she was found dead. The owner of the house where Len-len and Evelyn watched television, Gracia Monahan, corroborated Evelyns testimony that on the evening she saw the appellant talking to Len-len while the two girls were watching television from her open window and that when she looked again towards the end of the program to the direction where the girls were situated, only Evelyn was left watching television. Monahan testified that she is familiar with the appellant and the two children because they are neighbors. The Chief of the Intelligence Section of the Santiago Police Department, Alexander Mico interviewed Evelyn who pointed to the appellant as the man last seen with the deceased. Mico found the appellant at his place of work at the Spring Garden Resort at Sinsayon, Santiago City. Upon seeing Bravo, Mico informed him that he is a suspect in the killing of a girl in Rosario, Santiago City and asked him to come with him for questioning. The appellant agreed. Mico further narrated in court that at the police station the appellant admitted he was with the girl and he carried her on his shoulder but he was so drunk that night that he does not remember what he did to her. On cross-examination Mico admitted that he did not inform the appellant of his constitutional rights to remain silent, to counsel and of his right against self-incrimination before the appellant made the said admission because he was only informally interviewing the accused when he made the admission and that custodial interrogation proper was conducted by the assigned investigator. Appellant admitted in court that he passed by the house of Gracia Monahan but stated that he did not see the two girls watching television along the road. At home, he found his mother very sick and so he decided to stay home all night. He woke up the following morning at around 4:30 a.m. and prepared to go to work. On January 15, 1994 a policeman came to his place of work and apprehended him without a warrant of arrest and at the police station he was forced to admit commission of the crime of rape. The appellant denied the accusation and stated that the deceased was his godchild and that he has known Fely Handoc, the mother of the child, for three years prior to this proceedings Juanito Bravo, the brother of the appellant testified that the appellant stayed home on the night of January 12, 1994 to take care of their sick mother who died a few days thereafter. Ernesto Pastor, the foreman at the Spring Garden Resort where the appellant was employed, testified that he has known the appellant for a long time and that he knows him to be hardworking and of good moral character. Pastor corroborated the appellants testimony that police investigator Mico came to the Spring Garden Resort and arrested Bravo without a warrant. The testimony of the Municipal Health Officer who conducted the autopsy was dispensed with by the prosecution as the handwritten Autopsy Report made by the Municipal Health Officer of Santiago, Isabela, marked as Exhibit B, was admitted by both parties. Was investigated under the mango tree where the crime was committed and left side of the face is covered by sand (done by anay) with rigor mortis and with putrification, easy pulling of the skin and plenty of small worms coming out from the ears, nose, eyes and mouth (without panty), the whole body is edematous. After complete washing, coming out of small worms on both eyes and ears and mouth, scalp on the left side was detached and skull exposed. -Fracture of the skull with left temporal

On January 15, 1994 the decomposing body of nine year old girl named Juanita Len-len Antolin was found in a vacant lot along the road leading Rosario, Santiago City between two concrete fences half naked, shirtless and skirt pulled up, her panty stuffed in her mouth. The scalp on the left side of her head was detached exposing a fracture on the left temporal lobe of her skull. Vaginal examination showed fresh laceration at 2:30 oclock and old lacerations at 5:00 and 7:00 oclock and easily accepts two fingers. The cause of death was cerebral hemorrhage On May 25, 1994 an Information for rape with homicide[5] was filed against BENITO BRAVO that he willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with lewd design and by means of violence and intimidation, have carnal knowledge with Len-len & inflicting upon her, a fracture on the skull, which directly caused her death. On September 26, 1994 the accused was arraigned and pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. Evelyn San Mateo an eight year old second grader from Rosario, Santiago City neighbor and cousin of the victim testified that she was with the deceased the night before she disappeared. She stated that while they stood on the roadside watching Home Along Da Riles from an open window of a neighbors house the appellant approached them and asked Len-Len to come with him to a birthday party and then he will buy her Coke

-Edematous -Abdomen, extremities has no pertinent findings except easy pulling of skin and all are edematous Vaginal examination- shows fresh laceration at 2:30 oclock, old lacerations at 5:00 and 7:00 oclock-could easily accept two fingers. Cause of death- cerebral hemorrhage (fracture of skull temporal region, left). trial court Wherefore, finding the accused BENITO BRAVO GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of RAPE WITH HOMICIDE This case is before us on automatic review in view of the penalty imposed by the trial court. Both counsels for the accused-appellant and the appellee plead for the acquittal of the accused. Both the accused-appellant and the appellee invoke the constitutionally guarded presumption of innocence in favor of the accused and the latters right to remain silent and to counsel. The

testimony of the policeman that the accused admitted he was with the victim on the evening of January 12, 1994 but the latter was too drunk to remember what happened should have been held inadmissible by the trial court in view of the policemans own admission, he did not inform the accused of his constitutional rights before he asked him of his participation in the crime under investigation. Trial court erred in relying merely the sole circumstantial evidence that the victim was last seen by her cousin in the company of the accused whereas the Rules of Court clearly requires the presence of at least two proven circumstances & cannot serve as basis for any conclusion leading to the guilt of the accused of the crime charged. The evidence for the prosecution falls short of the quantum of evidence required by the Rules to establish guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. In sum, both the appellant and the appellee profess that the presumption of innocence of the accused was not successfully overturned by the prosecution. We resolve to acquit Benito Bravo. Section 12 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution embodies the mandatory protection afforded a person under investigation for the commission of a crime and the correlative duty of the State and its agencies to enforce such mandate. It states: The mantle of protection under this constitutional provision covers the period from the time a person is taken into custody for investigation of his possible participation in the commission of a crime or from the time he is singled out as a suspect in the commission of a crime although not yet in custody The exclusionary rule sprang from a recognition that police interrogatory procedures lay fertile grounds for coercion, physical and psychological, of the suspect to admit responsibility for the crime under investigation. It is to protect the accused from admitting what he is coerced to admit although untrue. Law enforcement agencies are required to effectively communicate the rights of a person under investigation and to insure that it is fully understood. Any measure short of this requirement is considered a denial of such right. Courts are not allowed to distinguish between preliminary questioning and custodial investigation proper when applying the exclusionary rule. Any information or admission given by a person while in custody which may appear harmless or innocuous at the time without the competent assistance of an independent counsel should be struck down as inadmissible. It has been held, however, that an admission made to news reporters or to a confidant of the accused is not covered by the exclusionary rule. The admission was allegedly made to the arresting officer during an informal talk at the police station after his arrest as a prime suspect. The arresting policeman admitted that he did not inform the appellant of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel. We note that the alleged admission is incriminating because it places the accused in the company of the victim at the time the crime was probably committed. The exclusionary rule applies. Any statement allegedly made by him pertaining to his possible complicity in the crime without prior notification of his constitutional rights is inadmissible in evidence. The appellant was not invited to the police station as part of a general inquiry for any possible lead to the perpetrators of the crime under investigation. At the time the alleged admission was made the appellant was in custody and had been arrested as the prime suspect in the rape and killing. The exclusionary rule presumes that the alleged admission was coerced, the very evil the rule stands to avoid. Supportive of such presumption is the absence of a written extrajudicial confession to that effect and the appellants denial in court of the alleged oral admission. The alleged admission should be struck down as inadmissible. . We must however uphold the primacy of the presumption of innocence in favor of the accused when the evidence at hand falls short of the quantum required to support conviction. The appellant Benito Bravo is acquitted. **A police line-up is not considered a part of any custodial inquest, because it is conducted before that stage of investigation is reached.

confession, coupled with circumstantial evidence, the trial court found Juanito guilty of rape with homicide and sentenced him to death. On appeal, Juanito maintains that the trial court violated Section 12(1) of Article III of the Constitution when it admitted in evidence his alleged extrajudicial confession to Barangay Captain Ceniza and Judge Dicon. According to him, the two failed to inform him of his constitutional rights before they took it upon themselves to elicit from him the incriminatory information. It is of no moment that Ceniza and Dicon are not police investigators, for as public officials it was incumbent upon them to observe the express mandate of the Constitution. While these rights may be waived, the prosecution failed to show that he effectively waived his rights through a written waiver executed in the presence of counsel. He concludes that his extrajudicial confession is inadmissible in evidence. ISSUE: (1) Whether or not Juanitos extrajudicial confession before the barangay captain was admissible. (2) Whether or not Juanitos extrajudicial confession before the was admissible. HELD: (1)YES. As to his confession with the Baragay Captain Ceniza, it has been held that the constitutional provision on custodial investigation does not apply to a spontaneous statement, not elicited through questioning by the authorities but given in an ordinary manner whereby the suspect orally admits having committed the crime. Neither can it apply to admissions or confessions made by a suspect in the commission of a crime before he is placed under investigation. What the Constitution bars is the compulsory disclosure of incriminating facts or confessions. In the instant case, Juanito voluntarily narrated to Ceniza that he raped GENELYN and thereafter threw her body into the ravine. This narration was a spontaneous answer, freely and voluntarily given in an ordinary manner. It was given before he was arrested or placed under custody for investigation in connection with the commission of the offense. Moreover, Juanito did not offer any evidence of improper or ulterior motive on the part of Ceniza, which could have compelled her to testify falsely against him. (2) NO. However, there is merit in Juanitos claim that his constitutional rights during custodial investigation were violated by Judge Dicon when the latter propounded to him incriminating questions without informing him of his constitutional rights. It is settled that at the moment the accused voluntarily surrenders to, or is arrested by, the police officers, the custodial investigation is deemed to have started. So, he could not thenceforth be asked about his complicity in the offense without the assistance of counsel. Judge Dicon's claim that no complaint has yet been filed and that neither was he conducting a preliminary investigation deserves scant consideration. The fact remains that at that time Juanito was already under the custody of the police authorities, who had already taken the statement of the witnesses who were then before Judge Dicon for the administration of their oaths on their statements.


Rape with homicide was filed against CLEMENTE JOHN LUGOD in Cavinti, province of Laguna by means force and intimidation and with lewd designs, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with one NAIRUBE J. RAMOS, an eight-year old girl, against her will and by reason or on the same occasion and in order to hide the crime he just committed, dump the victim in the grassy coconut plantation area, which resulted in her death due to shock secondary to vulvar laceration EDILBERTO CASTILLO, the medico-legal officer who examined the cadaver of Nairube on September 19, 1997, testified that during the course of his examination of the cadaver, he discovered an 8 cm. wound penetration in her vagina which was probably caused by the insertion of a penis; that the cadaver was in an advanced state of decomposition; that more or less, the approximate time of death of the victim was three (3) days prior to his examination; and that the cause of death of the victim was hypovolenic shock secondary to the laceration.[4] RICARDO VIDA, the Task Force Chief of Cavinti, the accused pointed out where the body of the victim was; he was handcuffed to the accused VIOLETA CABUHAT ; LORETO VELORIA; PEDRO DELA TORRE; ROMUALDO RAMOS; ALMA DIAZ ; HELEN DANILO RAMOS, the parents of the victim and SPO2 QUIRINO GALLARDO testified that on September 16, 1997 at around 7:30 in the a.m., Helen Ramos reported that her daughter, Nairube, was missing. He thereafter proceeded to the house of the victim together with members of the Crime Investigation Group, the PNP and some townspeople to conduct an ocular inspection. Helen Ramos gave him a pair of slippers and pointed to him the location where she found the same. Alma Diaz also gave him a black T-shirt which she found. Loreto


FACTS: At the waterfalls of Barangay Inasagan, Aurora, Zamboanga del Sur, on the evening of August 3, 1996, the dead body of an 11-year-old girl Genelyn Camacho was found. Autopsy reports found that Genelyn was raped before she was drowned. The one who caused its discovery was accused-appellant Juanito Baloloy himself, who claimed that he had caught sight of it while he was catching frogs in a nearby creek. While in the wake of Genelyn, Juanito confessed to the Barangay Captain that he only wanted to frighten the girl but ended up raping and throwing her body in the ravine. While in the custody of the authorities, he was asked incriminating questions by Judge Dicon who justified his actions saying that Juanito was not yet in custodial investigation. Based on his alleged extrajudicial

Veloria informed him that the two items were worn by the accused when he went to the house of Violeta Cabuhat. At around 7:00 p.m., he apprehended the accused on the basis of the pair of slippers and the black Tshirt. He then brought the accused to the police station where he was temporarily incarcerated. At first, the accused denied that he did anything to Nairube but after he told him what happened to the girl. Gallardo claims that the accused told him that after the drinking spree on September 15, 1997, the accused wanted to have sexual intercourse with a woman. So after the drinking spree, the accused went to the house of Gemma Lingatong, the neighbor of Helen Ramos. Upon his arrival at the house of Gemma, he bumped pots which awakened the occupants of the house. Considering the commotion he caused, he left and went to the house of Nairube Ramos. After removing his slippers, he entered the house of Nairube and slowly went upstairs. He saw that Helen Ramos was sleeping beside her husband so he took Nairube instead. In court, Gallardo demonstrated how the accused claimed to have lifted the child by raising two of his hands as if he was lifting something off the ground. After taking Nairube, he brought her to the farm where according to the accused; he raped her three times. After successfully raping Nairube, the accused slept. When he woke up, he saw the lifeless body of Nairube which he wrapped in a blanket and hid in a grassy place. Then, he took a bath in the river. He then returned to Villa Anastacia and went out through its gate. Although he admitted to having raped and killed Nairube, the accused refused to make a statement regarding the same. After having been informed that the body of Nairube was in the grassy area, Gallardo together with other members of the PNP, the Crime Watch and the townspeople continued the search but they were still not able to find the body of Nairube. It was only when they brought the accused to Villa Anastacia to point out the location of the cadaver that they found the body of Nairube. Gallardo stated that the accused pointed to the location by using his lips. (PO2 ANTONIO DECENA agree) FLORO ESGUERRA, the Vice-Mayor of Cavinti, he attended the funeral of Nairube. After the funeral, he visited the accused in his cell. In the course of his conversation with the accused, the accused confessed to the commission of the offense RTC rendered a decision finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape with homicide. In view of the imposition of the death penalty, the case is now before this Court on automatic review. In support of his appeal, accused-appellant submits that the evidence presented by the prosecution fails to establish that he raped and killed Nairube Ramos beyond reasonable doubt. He claims that the alleged confession he made to the vice-mayor was not a confession. Issue: WON, accused entitled with Miranda rights?

response. Amidst such a highly coercive atmosphere, accused-appellants claim that he was beaten up and maltreated by the police officers raises a very serious doubt as to the voluntariness of his alleged confession. The Vice-Mayor, who testified that when he visited accused-appellant in the jail cell, he noticed that the accused-appellant had bruises on his face, corroborated accused-appellants assertion that he was maltreated.[24] In addition, the records do not support the confession allegedly made by the accused-appellant to the Mayor and Vice-Mayor of Cavinti. Records show that the Mayor of Cavinti did not testify in the criminal trial. Moreover, the testimony of the Vice-Mayor with respect to the alleged confession made by the accused-appellant is not conclusive. The ViceMayors testimony reads as follows: As can be seen from the testimony of the Vice-Mayor, accusedappellant merely responded to the ambiguous questions that the ViceMayor propounded to him. He did not state in certain and categorical terms that he raped and killed Nairube. In fact, the Vice-Mayor admitted that the accused-appellant did not tell him that he raped and killed Nairube. In addition, we note the contradiction between the testimony of the Vice-Mayor who stated that he was alone when he spoke to the accusedappellant and that of SPO2 Gallardo who claimed that he was present when accused-appellant confessed to the Mayor and Vice-Mayor. Not having the benefit of counsel & not having been informed of his rights, the confession is inadmissible, thus, Clemente John Lugod alias HONASAN is ACQUITTED.

PEOPLE VS. JUDGE AYSON [175 SCRA 216; G.R. NO. 85215; 7 JUL 1989]

Held:. Yes. There is no question that at the time of his apprehension, accused-appellant was already placed under arrest and was suspected of having something to do with the disappearance of Nairube. In fact, the lower court declared that accused-appellants warrantless arrest was valid based on Section 5 (b) of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court.[19] However, at the time of his arrest, the apprehending officers did not inform the accusedappellant and in fact acted in a blatant and wanton disregard of his constitutional rights specified in Section 12, Article III of the Constitution. He was not informed of his right to remain silent and to counsel, and that if he cannot afford to have counsel of his choice, he would be provided with one. Moreover, there is no evidence to indicate that he intended to waive these rights. Besides, even if he did waive these rights, in order to be valid, the waiver must be made in writing and with the assistance of counsel. Consequently, his act of confessing to SPO2 Gallardo that he raped and killed Nairube without the assistance of counsel cannot be used against him for having transgressed accused-appellants rights under the Bill of Rights. This is a basic tenet of our Constitution which cannot be disregarded or ignored no matter how brutal the crime committed may be. In the same vein, the act in pointing out the location of the body of Nairube was also elicited in violation of the accused-appellants right to remain silent. The same was an integral part of the uncounselled confession and is considered a fruit of the poisonous tree. Thus, reiterated People vs. De La Cruz. Even if we were to assume that accused-appellant was not yet under interrogation and thus not entitled to his constitutional rights at the time he was brought to the police station, the acts of accused-appellant subsequent to his apprehension cannot be characterized as having been voluntarily made considering the peculiar circumstances surrounding his detention. His confession was elicited by SPO2 Gallardo who promised him that he would help him if he told the truth. Furthermore, when accused-appellant allegedly pointed out the body of the victim, SPO2 Gallardo, the whole police force as well as nearly one hundred (100) of the townspeople of Cavinti escorted him there. Ricardo Vida stated that the townspeople were antagonistic towards accused-appellant and wanted to hurt him. The atmosphere from the time accused-appellant was apprehended and taken to the police station up until the time he was alleged to have pointed out the location of the body of the victim was highly intimidating and was not conducive to a spontaneous

Facts: Felipe Ramos was a ticket freight clerk of the Philippine Airlines, assigned at its Baguio City station. It was alleged that he was involved in irregularities in the sales of plane tickets, the PAL management notified him of an investigation to be conducted. That investigation was scheduled in accordance with PAL's Code of Conduct and Discipline, and the Collective Bargaining Agreement signed by it with the Philippine Airlines Employees' Association (PALEA) to which Ramos pertained. A letter was sent by Ramos stating his willingness to settle the amount of P76,000. The findings of the Audit team were given to him, and he refuted that he misused proceeds of tickets also stating that he was prevented from settling said amounts. He proffered a compromise however this did not ensue. Two months after a crime of estafa was charged against Ramos. Ramos pleaded not guilty. Evidence by the prosecution contained Ramos written admission and statement, to which defendants argued that the confession was taken without the accused being represented by a lawyer. Respondent Judge did not admit those stating that accused was not reminded of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to have counsel. A motion for reconsideration filed by the prosecutors was denied. Hence this appeal.

Issue: Whether or Not the respondent Judge correct in making inadmissible as evidence the admission and statement of accused.

Held: No. Section 20 of the 1987 constitution provides that the right against self-incrimination (only to witnesses other than accused, unless what is asked is relating to a different crime charged- not present in case at bar). This is accorded to every person who gives evidence, whether voluntarily or under compulsion of subpoena, in any civil, criminal, or administrative proceeding. The right is not to "be compelled to be a witness against himself. It prescribes an "option of refusal to answer incriminating questions and not a prohibition of inquiry." the right can be claimed only when the specific question, incriminatory in character, is actually put to the witness. It cannot be claimed at any other time. It does not give a witness the right to disregard a subpoena, to decline to appear before the court at the time appointed, or to refuse to testify altogether. It is a right that a witness knows or should know. He must claim it and could be waived. Rights in custodial interrogation as laid down in miranda v. Arizona: the rights of the accused include: 1) he shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right. 2) nor force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used against him. 3) any confession obtained in violation of these rights shall be inadmissible in evidence. The individual may knowingly and intelligently waive these rights and agree to answer or make a statement. But unless and until such rights and waivers are demonstrated by the prosecution at the trial, no evidence obtained as a result of interrogation can be used against him. custody investigation which has been defined as questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. The rule

begins to operate at once as soon as the investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into an unsolved crime, and direction is then aimed upon a particular suspect who has been taken into custody and to whom the police would then direct interrogatory questions which tend to elicit incriminating statements. NAVALLO VS. SANDIGANBAYAN

appellant. There was no evidence that he was indeed coerced or threatened by the police to do the interview.

Facts: Accused was the Collecting and Disbursing Officer of the Numancia National Vocational School, which school is also located at del Carmen, Surigao del Norte. His duties included the collection of tuition fees, preparation of vouchers for salaries of teachers and employees, and remittance of collections exceeding P500.00 to the National Treasury. An information for malversation of public funds was filed. A warrant of arrest was issued, but accused-petitioner could not be found. on 10 December 1978, Presidential Decree No. 1606 took effect creating the Sandiganbayan and conferring on it original and exclusive jurisdiction over crimes committed by public officersembraced in Title VII of the Revised Penal Code. On 15 November 1984, Navallo was finally arrested. He was released on provisional liberty upon the approval of his property bail bond Upon motion of the prosecution, the RTC transferred the case and transmitted its records to the Sandiganbayan. Special Prosecutor Luz L. Quiones-Marcos opined that since Navallo had already been arraigned before the case was transferred to the Sandiganbayan, the RTC should continue taking cognizance of the case. The matter was referred to the Office of the Ombudsman which held otherwise. The information was then docketed with the Sandiganbayan. A new order for Navallo's arrest was issued by the Sandiganbayan. The warrant was returned with a certification by the RTC Clerk of Court that the accused had posted a bail bond. Navallo filed a motion to quash, contending (1) that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the offense and the person of the accused and (2) that since the accused had already been arraigned by the RTC, the attempt to prosecute him before the Sandiganbayan would constitute double jeopardy. However this was denied and trial ensued and he was found guilty.

Nevertheless, the Court still left a word of caution against presumptions that confessions to the media are always voluntary and permissible as evidence in court. The constitutional safeguards for the rights of the accused should never be disregarded. Therefore, people must ascertain whether such confessions are made under duress or with the influence of police officers. ** SC ruled that the admission of the videotaped confession is proper. The interview was recorded on video and it showed accused unburdening his guilt willingly, openly, and publicly in the presence of newsmen. Such confession does not form part of custodial investigation as it was not given to police officers but to media men in an attempt to solicit sympathy and forgiveness from the public. There was no showing that the interview was coerced or against his will. However, because of the inherent danger in the use of television as a medium for admitting ones guilt, courts are reminded that extreme caution must be taken in further admitting similar confessions. **Such investigation does not form part of custodial investigation as it was not given to police officers but to media men in an attempt to elicit sympathy and forgiveness from the public. Besides, if he had indeed been forced into confessing, he could have easily sought succor from the newsmen who, in all likelihood, would have been sympathetic with him. However, because of the inherent danger in the use of the television as a medium for admitting ones guilt, and the recurrence of this phenomenon in several cases, it is prudent that the trial courts are reminded that extreme caution must be taken in further admitting similar confessions. For in all probability, the police, with the connivance of unscrupulous media practitioners, may attempt to legitimize coerced extrajudicial confessions and place them beyong the exclusionary rule by having an accused admit an offense on television. We should never presume that all media confessions described as voluntary have been freely given. People vs. Eric Guillermo GR 147786, January 20, 2004

Issue: Whether or Not the constitutional right against custodial investigations in favor of the accused violated?

Held: No. Appellant is not in custodial investigation. A person under a normal audit examination is not under custodial investigation. An audit examiner himself can hardly be deemed to be the law enforcement officer contemplated in the above rule. In any case, the allegation of his having been "pressured" to sign the Examination Report prepared by Dulguime (examined cash, as ordered by Espino, the provincial auditor) appears to be belied by his own testimony. The rights enumerated are not available before police investigators become involved. Thus the protection is not available to a person undergoing audit because an audit examiner is not a law enforcement officer.

FACTS This is an automatic review of the Antipolo RTC's decision to convict accused Guillermo of the crime of murder, thereby sentencing him to death. The accused allegedly murdered Victor Keyser, the owner of Keyser Plastics and employer of the accused. According to the security guard of the factory, the accused asked him to dispose of Keyser's corpse. Shocked by this revelation, the guard ran to the police station and reported the matter to the authorities. When the police officers arrived at the scene, the accused calmly surrendered and admitted that he killed Keyser. He even narrated how he bashed Keyser on the head and dismembered him thereafter. He also said that he did not regret his actions. The accused was interviewed by news reporters Gus Abelgas of ABS CBN and Karen David of GMA. Both interviews were broadcast nationwide. He also told David the details of the killing. The accused initially entered a plea of guilty, but subsequently changed it to not guilty. His defense consisted of outright denial and he alleged that he was just framed-up. ISSUE (1) (2) Whether the police officers violated the accused's Miranda rights. Whether the accused's confession to the media is admissible as evidence against him.

People vs. Edward Endino and Gerry Galgarin FACTS: Edward Endino, with the aid of his uncle Gerry Galgarin, were charged with the murder of Dennis Aquino who was Endino's rival for the love of Aquino's girlfriend Clara Agagas. The suspects fled after killing Aquino. However, through the combined efforts of the Antipolo and Palawan police forces, Galgarin was arrested and taken into custody in the Antipolo Police Station. He was to be transferred to Palawan for him to be tried there. On their way to the airport, they stopped at the ABS CBN TV station where Galgarin had an interview with the media. In the interview, he admitted that it was his nephew Endino who shot Aquino and he was only an accomplice in the crime. This interview was aired on TV Patrol. However, during the trial, the accused-appellant pleaded not guilty and disowned his interview with TV Patrol. He claimed that he was coerced by police officers to admit to the crime. ISSUE WON, the accused-appellant's videotaped confession is admissible as evidence in court? HELD YES. The interview did not form part of the custodial investigation. Moreover, it was made spontaneously and voluntarily by the accused-

HELD (1) YES. First, he made his confession without the assistance of counsel. The police also did not make an active effort to make sure he was provided with one before they began questioning the accused.

Second, although the police contended that the accused was informed of his rights, it was found that the accused was only made to read a list of rights

posted on the wall of the police station. There was no evidence that he actually understood those rights. According to the Court, a mere reading of the constitutional rights of the accused is not enough; the authorities must also make sure that the accused understood his rights. Third, the confession that the police obtained from him was inadmissible as evidence against the accused because it did not conform to the following requirements: (1) it must be voluntary; (2) it must be express; (3) it must be made in the presence of counsel; and (4) it must be made in writing. Last, even if the police alleged that the accused waived his right to counsel, there was no showing that he actually did so voluntarily, expressly, in the presence of counsel and in writing. (2) YES, because it was voluntary and spontaneous. In fact, he even narrated how and why he killed the victim. This strongly contrasts with and overcomes his outright denial in court.

gross negligence and ordered him to pay a fine of P3,000.00 for his failure to act on a motion to dismiss in an expeditious manner. A judge must always remember that as the administrator of his court, he is responsible for the conduct and management thereof. He has the duty to supervise his court personnel to ensure prompt and efficient dispatch of business in his court. The ignorance of respondent Judge as to the irregularities occurring in his own backyard constitutes serious breach of judicial ethics Judge Sumilangs excuse, that upon learning of the irregularities being committed by his court personnel, he immediately acted with haste and instructed Malla to turn over the money,[15] is specious and unconvincing. His admission that he had no knowledge regarding the anomalies going on in his court underscores his inefficiency and incompetence. It clearly demonstrates a lack of control expected of a judge exercising proper office management. The evidence against Malla is equally incriminating. It has been clearly established, and this is not denied by Malla,[16] that she misappropriated for her own use the amount of P240,000.00 which she received from Villarica, the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 858, instead of directing him to deposit said amount with the Municipal Treasurer. A court interpreter should not receive payments made by litigants in relation to their cases in his personal charge.[17] In her defense, Malla testified that her uncle Entero Villarica allowed her to use the money on the condition that she should be ready to produce it when necessary.[18] Malla, however, never presented Villarica as her witness to bolster her claim which,therefore, has no evidentiary value for being selfserving. Besides, there is a disputable presumption that evidence wilfully suppressed would be adverse if produced during trial.[19] Malla further claims that her constitutional rights under Section 12, Article III of the Constitution[20] were violated when she was pressured to sign an affidavit before the Office of the Court Administrator, where she admitted her misdeed.[21] Thus, she concludes that the affidavit is inadmissible in evidence. In People v. Loveria,[22] however, we ruled that the aforementioned constitutional provision may be invoked only during custodial investigation or as in custody investigation which has been defined as questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.] The investigation is defined as an investigation conducted by police authorities which will include investigation conducted by the Municipal Police, P.C. (now PNP) and the NBI and such other police agencies in our government. Thus, the Office of the Court Administrator can hardly be deemed to be the law enforcement authority contemplated in the constitutional provision. At any rate, Malla admitted during her testimony that she received the said check from Villarica covering the amount of P240,000.00 payable to Dizon. However, when she tried to deposit it with the Municipal Treasurer, the latter refused because there was no order from Judge Sumilang. Consequently, Villarica entrusted said check to her. It was at this juncture that she used the money for personal purposes. Worth stressing is the well-entrenched principle that in administrative proceedings, such as the instant case, the quantum of proof necessary for a finding of guilt is only substantial evidence.[30] Substantial evidence has been defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.[31] In resolving this case, this Court emphasizes the Constitutional tenet that (p)ublic office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with outmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives. WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Augusto Sumilang is hereby found guilty of gross negligence .Respondent Felicidad Malla is found guilty of misappropriating funds . **Because the court administrator is not a law enforcement officer, an investigation conducted by him does not constitute custodial investigation within the contemplation of the constitutional guarantee.

**Spontaneous statements or those not elicited through questioning by law enforcement officers, but given in an ordinary manner where the appellant verbally admits to having committed the offense, are admissible.

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR vs. JUDGE AUGUSTO SUMILANG Respondents Judge Augusto Sumilang, Felicidad Malla, Edelita Lagmay and Nieva Mercado, court employees of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pila, Laguna (hereinafter referred to as the lower court), were charged in a memorandum report by the Office of Court Administrator dated August 16, 1994,[1] for misappropriating funds deposited by the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 858, entitled Spouses Entero Villarica and Felicidad Domingo v. Teodorico Dizon. (administrative complaint ) In addition, a second complaint was lodged against Malla for removing judicial records outside the court premises. This case arose as an aftermath of an on-the-spot audit examination of the official cashbook and other documents of the lower court. It appears from the evidence that court interpreter Malla who was the officer-in-charge from July 1, 1992 to November 15, 1992, took a maternity leave for one (1) month (November 16, 1992 to December 15, 1992) and reassumed her position on December 16, 1992, until her resignation on August 31, 1993. On September 1, 1993, Rebecca Avanzado assumed the position of officer in charge. It was during her tenure on August 8, 1994, that an on-thespot audit examination was conducted by the Fiscal Audit Division of the Office of Court Administrator. In the course of the examination, several anomalous transactions were discovered. One involved a managers check deposited in the name of Teodorico Dizon in connection with Civil Case No. 858, wherein Entero Villarica, on August 7, 1992 during the tenure of Malla entrusted the amount of P240,000.00 to said respondent instead of handling it over to the Clerk of Court pursuant to Supreme Court Circular. When asked to explain where the P240,000.00 was, Malla, explained that she deposited it at the Sta Cruz, Laguna branch of the Philippine National Bank but she and Judge Sumilang later withdrew it allegedly under the belief that the defendant, Dizon, would demand the delivery of the money upon the termination of the case. Upon further questioning by the examining team, however, Malla admitted that she lent the amount of P87,000.00 to steno-reporter Lagmay,P40,000.00 to steno-reporter Mercado, and P81,000.00 to Mrs. Sumilang, wife of Judge Sumilang. She spentP32,000.00 for the hospitalization of her husband and the remaining balance for personal purposes.[6] Later on, she executed an affidavit stating that only Lagmay and Mercado borrowed P55,000.00 and P40,000.00, respectively. On the other hand, she used P100,000.00 for her personal needs.[7] Upon learning that they were being implicated in the anomalous transaction, Lagmay executed an affidavit stating that the amount of P55,000.00 was from the personal account of Malla and not from the P240,000.00 amount deposited before the court and such loan has already been paid.[8] Mercado, on the other hand, claims that the amount of P40,000.00 was borrowed only two weeks before the audit took place, when Malla was no longer employed with the court.[9] Mrs. Sumilang, for her part, denied any involvement in any of the transactions.[10] After carefully studying the records of this case, the Court is convinced that respondents did commit acts prejudicial to the service for which they should be held accountable. The evidence against Judge Sumilang adequately proves his gross negligence in this matter. In his proffered explanation, he averred that his wife did not borrow any money from Malla and that he had no knowledge of the irregularities involving members of his own staff.[11] It bears emphasizing that this is not the first time that respondent judge has been charged with an administrative case. In Arviso v. Sumilang,[12] this Court found him guilty of

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE, vs. ABELARDO SALONGA Abelardo Salonga, Flaviano Pangilinan, Amiel Garcia and Ricardo Licup were charged with the crime of Qualified Theft through Falsification of Commercial Document. That on or before the 23rd day of October, 1986, in the Municipality of Makati, accused, conspiring and confederating with one another and mutually helping and aiding one another, and as such had access to the preparation of checks in the said Metrobank and Trust Company, with grave abuse of confidence, intent of gain and without the knowledge and consent of the owner thereof, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away the total amount of P36,480.30 by forging the

signature of officers authorized to sign the said check and have the said check deposited in the account of Firebrake Sales and Services, the supposed payee when in truth and in fact there is no such transaction between Firebrake and Metrobank, thereby causing the preparation and use of a simulated check described as Check No. 013702 in the amount of P36,480.30 making it appear genuine and authorized, through which they succeeded in its encashment, enabling them to gain for themselves the total sum of P36,480.30, to the damage and prejudice of Metrobank and Trust Company in the total amount of P36,480.30. On January 7, 1991, Salonga was arraigned and pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. His co-accused, Flaviano Pangilinan, Amiel Garcia and Ricardo Licup are still at large. On July 19, 1993, the RTC rendered its decision finding Salonga guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Qualified Theft through Falsification of Commercial Document. On January 20, 1987, Arthur Christy Mariano, lead examiner of Metrobanks Loans and Placement Department, conducted a spot audit of the Loans and Placement Department of Metrobank. Unauthorized Issuance of Cashiers check Test-verification of the daily issuance of cashiers checks by the Loans and Placement Department disclosed the following: 1. There was a cashiers check issued on October 23, 1986 under CC No. 013702 payable to a certain Firebreak Sales and Services for P36,480.30 the xerox copy of which is shown as EXHIBIT A. 2. The signatures of the authorized signatories appearing on the subject cashiers check have an apparent dissimilarity with their genuine signature particularly that of Mrs. Antonia L. Manuel, Manager of Loans and Placement Department. 3. At the back portion of the Cashiers check, it was traced that the same was deposited to Account No. 3021-3900-53 maintained at BPI-Ayala Ave. Branch. However, we were not able to establish the name/owner of the account at BPI. 4. On the day of issuance of the cashiers check, it was found out that the corresponding debit and credit balances appearing in the proof sheet of Loans and Placement Department are balanced. However, the supporting accounting ticket debiting Accounts payable was short by P36,480.30, the amount of the cashiers check while the credit accounting ticket for the Cashiers and Gift Checks account reflects the correct total of issuances for the day but the signature of the Authorized Signature space is forged 5. The Cashiers check in question was properly recorded in the register maintained at the FX/Loans Accounting Section. It passed to the usual clearing procedure except for the signature verification of the authorized signatories. Thus, the unauthorized issuance/dissimilarity of the signatures could not be readily detected. 6. The matter was brought to the attention of the Division Heads concerned who immediately confronted the responsible officers, Mr. Abelardo A. Salonga, Acting Asst. Cashier and Custodian of the unissued cashiers check at the Loans & Placement Department and Mr. Flaviano M. Pangilinan, Asst. Manager of FX/Loans Accounting Section. Both admitted their participation on the irregularity/unauthorized issuance of said cashiers check. 7. The case was already endorsed to the Department of Internal Affairs by the Controller. UNAUTHORIZED ISSUANCE OF CASHIERS CHECK Except _for the unauthorized issuance of Cashiers Check No. 013702 for P36,480.30 on October 23, 1986, we found out that the transactions involving Accounts payable account are in order per verification conducted from October to December 1986. All items lodged under said account were properly accounted for. As have been reported, the perpetrators on this particular scheme are Messrs. Flaviano M. Pangilinan and Abelardo A. Salonga, Assistant Manager and Acting Assistant Cashier, respectively. Mr. Pangilinan made a payment of P17,500.00 on January 28, 1987 under O.R. No. 65696 while no payment was received from Mr. Salonga as of this writing. Antonia Manuel and Arthur Christy Mariano both testified that the signature of the former appearing on the subject check and on Metrobank Debit (Local) Ticket TR No. 8 dated October 23, 1986 which was prepared by accused Amiel S. Garcia (Exhibits 1, 1-1, 1-2) corresponding to the subject

check, is a forgery after comparison thereof with the genuine signature of Antonia Manuel appearing on the cashiers checks also issued by the Loans and Placement Department of Metrobank Arthur Mariano declared that while the amount of accounts payable for October 23, 1986 as reflected in the proof sheet of Metrobanks Loans and Placement Department is P97,112.17 (Exhibits J, J-1, J-2), the total amount of accounts payable by said department for October 23, 1986 under Metrobank Debit (Local) Tickets TR No. 8 both dated October 23, 1986 is P60,631.87 (P60,390.58 + P241.29) (Exhibits K, K-1, K-2; L, L-1, L-2, respectively), which two amounts under normal circumstances, should be equal. The difference of the two aforesaid amounts totaled P36,480.30 which is equivalent to the amount stated in the subject cashiers check, which allegedly shows that the check was issued bereft of any transaction. By virtue of the alleged anomaly surrounding the issuance of the subject cashiers check, accused Abelardo Salonga was summoned to appear before Valentino Elevado, Assistant Accountant, Department of Internal Affairs of Metrobank. After allegedly appraising Abelardo Salonga of his constitutional right to remain silent and to counsel, an interview in a question and answer from was conducted. Accused Abelardo Salonga allegedly waived his constitutional rights and submitted himself to the interview. In the course of the interview, accused Abelardo Salonga admitted having issued the subject cashiers check without any legitimate transaction, to accused Amiel Garcia as accused who was then encountering financial difficulties. That out of the amount of the check, P8,500.00 went to the personal benefit of accused Abelardo Salonga. A letter dated September 15, 1987 was addressed by accused Abelardo Salonga to Atty. Severino Tobias of Metrobank Head Office wherein the former signified his intention to compromise the case (Exhibits C to C-3). Upon the other hand, accused-appellant relied on denial as his defense; attributed to simple negligence the loss of the check which was admittedly in his custody and also repudiated his extra-judicial confession. The evidence for the defense was summarized by the trial court as follows: Defense: x x x x Abelardo Salonga testified that from 1973 to 1987, he was employed by Metrobank as an acting assistant cashier. In such capacity, he was in charge of managing money market placements and payments of maturing money placement investments. Before accused Abelardo Salonga may prepare and issue a cashiers check, he must first be instructed by his manager to do so. Then the prepared check will be back to the Accounting Section for examination, then back to the manager for his signature and to the other officer for his counter-signature, the check is then returned to accused Abelardo Salonga for eventual release to the banks client. According to Abelardo Salonga, he first learned that he was being accused of the present charge after the audit of his department was concluded. Two persons from the Internal Affairs Department invited him to an investigation. During the investigation, accused Abelardo Salongas alleged statement was typewritten but he was neither asked any questions nor did the investigators talk to him. He was given an opportunity to read his statement but only for a limited period of time. He allegedly affixed his signature involuntarily on the typewritten statement after the investigators threatened him and hit him on the nape. The investigators never informed him of his right to counsel and neither did they believe this claim of innocence. Upon learning that a criminal complaint was filed against him, accused Abelardo Salonga sought the assistance of a lawyer and wrote a letter to the Personnel Head of Metrobank. In the said letter, accused Abelardo Salonga admitted his negligence in connection with the subject check because of the threats employed by the investigators and that he has never been employed nor has he any interest whatsoever with Firebreak Sales and Services. In the letter which accused Abelardo Salonga sent to Atty. Severino Tabios of Metrobank (Exhibit C prosecution), said accused offered to pay the bank the amount of P8,500.00 just to finish the case so that he can earn a living and get a new job. Giving full credence to the evidence of the prosecution, the trial court convicted accused-appellant of the crime charged

IssueWON THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE THE ALLEGED EXTRA JUDICIAL CONFESSION/ADMISSION (EXH. `B') OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT ABELARDO SALONGA WHICH WAS OBTAINED IN VIOLATION OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL. HELD: admissibility of accused-appellants extra-judicial confession/admission we reject accused-appellants argument that his so-called extra-judicial confession/admission is inadmissible in evidence on the ground that the waiver of his right to counsel was made without the assistance of counsel in violation of Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution which mandates-- any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right. Any confession obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in evidence. Applying said provision of the 1973 Constitution, the Court in Morales, Jr. vs. Enrile laid down the guidelines to be observed strictly by law enforcers during custodial investigation: At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform him of the reason for the arrest and he must be shown the warrant of arrest, if any. He shall be informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and that any statement he might make could be used against him. The person arrested shall have the right to communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or anyone he chooses by the most expedient means by telephone if possible - or by letter or messenger. It shall be the responsibility of the arresting officer to see to it that that this is accomplished. No custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel engaged by the person arrested, by any person on his behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition either of the detainee himself or by anyone on his behalf. The right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel. Any statement obtained in violation of the procedure herein laid down, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence. Clearly, the constitutional right to counsel as enunciated in the aforecited case may be invoked only by a person under custodial investigation for an offense. Accused-appellants extra-judicial confession was properly admitted and considered by the trial court considering that when accused-appellant gave his statement he was not under custodial investigation. Custodial investigation is the stage where the police investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect taken into custody by the police who carry out a process of interrogation that lends itself to elicit incriminating statements. Indeed, custodial investigation refers to questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. In this case, when Arthur Christy Mariano of the spot audit group discovered that there was a discrepancy in the proof sheet brought about by the issuance of a cashiers check made payable to Firebrake Sales and Services in the amount of (P36,480.30), accused-appellant was summoned to appear before Valentino Elevado, Assistant Accountant, Department of Internal Affairs of Metrobank for questioning. It bears stressing that Elevado is not a police officer or law enforcer but a private person who was a bank officer. In the course of the interview, accused-appellant admitted having issued the subject cashiers check without any legitimate transaction, to his co-accused Amiel Garcia who was then encountering financial difficulties. He also admitted that out of the amount of the check, P8,500.00 went to his personal benefit. His admissions were reduced into writing and offered as Exhibit B by the prosecution. It is well-settled that the legal formalities required by the fundamental law of the land apply only to those extrajudicial confessions obtained during custodial investigation. Salonga contends that his confession is inadmissible as evidence as it violated his constitutional right to counsel. HELD: The confession was admissible. His right to counsel only existed when he is under custodial investigation. He was not under custodial investigation during his interview. He was interviewed by a bank officer, not a police officer. **Where, after an audit, the accused was summoned to appear before the Assistant Accountant of MetroBank and, in the course of the interview, accused admitted having issued the subject cashiers checks without any legitimate transaction, the written confession was held admissible in evidence in as much as the interview did not constitute custodial investigation.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. AUGUSTO MANZANO y REYES, respondent. An information filed on 05 September 1983 before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, charges . . . AUGUSTO MANZANO Y REYES (with) Violation of Section 4, Article II in relation to section 2 (i) Article I of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended by P.D. 44, as further amended by P.D. 1675, committed as follows: That on or about September 2, 1983, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, not being authorized by law to sell, deliver, distribute or transport to another any prohibited drug, did then and there willfully and unlawfully sell and deliver for monetary consideration seven (7) teat-bag size plastic containing marijuana flowering tops at P5.00 per tea bag, which is a prohibited drug. The trial of the case was originally presided over by Hon. Oscar C. Fernandez. When Hon. Romeo J. Callejo assumed the post of Judge Fernandez, he promptly ordered the Court Stenographic Reporters to submit their transcripts of stenographic notes. To his dismay, however, discrepancies were discovered in the transcripts; the transcriptions submitted by one Mercedes Velasquez were incomprehensible; and no stenographic notes were apparently taken during the testimony of defense witness Leonardo Quiambao. Upon motion of the accused's counsel, the incumbent judge ordered the retaking of the testimonies of Pat. Gaudencio Quebuyen and defense witness Leonardo Quiambao and the cross-examination of Pat. Paterno Banawel. Additional documentary evidence was likewise admitted. On 02 October 1987, the court a quo, following the formal submission of evidence, rendered judgment, finding the accused guilty of the crime charged and sentencing him, thus WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the Accused Augusto Manzano y Reyes, guilty beyond reasonable doubt, as principal, for the crime of violation of Section 4 Article II in relation to Section 2 (e) (i) of Republic Act 6425, as amended and hereby sentences him to the penalty ofRECLUSION PERPETUA, with accessory penalties of the law and to pay a fine of P25,000.00, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs of the suit. The marijuana subject matter of this case is hereby declared forfeited in favor of the government. The Accused shall be credited for the entire period of his detention during the pendency of this case provided that he undertook in writing, to abide by and comply strictly with the rules and regulations of the City Jail of Manila. In this appeal, the accused claims that THE LOWER COURT (HAS) GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY OF THE CRIME CHARGED NOTWITHSTANDING THE FOLLOWING: (a) Inadmissibility of evidence obtained in violation of the accused's rights under the Constitution (; and) (b) Proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt has not been adequately, positively and convincingly established. The trial court, in convicting the accused-appellant, relied, in main, on the evidence for the prosecution, thus The Drug Enforcement Section of the Western Police District received information that the accused was engaged in the sale of marijuana. On 02 September 1983, a "trial-buy" operation was conducted by the law enforcement operatives. At five o'clock that afternoon, a civilian poseurbuyer was able to purchase from the accused dried flowering tops of suspected marijuana with cigarette rolling papers contained in three (3) teabag sized plastic bags. Each bag sold for P5.00. No arrest was made. At seven o'clock in the evening of the same day, however, a "buy-bust" operation, this time conducted by police officers Sgt. Gaudencio Quebuyen, Pat. Rolando Anza, Pat. Paterno Banawel, Pat. Bernabe Yokingco and Pat. Eriberto

Alameda, with Rebecca Avila Reyes, a civilian informer, as poseur buyer, was set into motion. The team was so positioned as to have a clear view of the transaction that was to take place near an electric post. Not long after, the poseur-buyer gave the accused four (4) P5.00 marked bills. The accused left; moments later, he returned and handed over to the poseur-buyer four (4) plastic bags, tea-bag size, containing marijuana flowering tops and pieces of white rolling paper. Forthwith, the informer gave the pre-arranged signal (by scratching her head). The team promptly moved in and arrested the accused. Accused-appellant firstly anchors his assigned error on the fact that he has been "investigated, interrogated and made to sign an accomplished booking sheet and arrest report without the benefit of counsel." 1 The contention is without merit. This Court has already emphasized that "(w)hen an arrested person signs a booking sheet and arrest report at a police station, he does not (thereby) admit the commission of an offense nor confess to any incriminating circumstance." 2 The booking sheet is no more than a record of arrest and a statement on how the arrest is made. It is simply a police report, and it has no probative value as an extrajudicial statement of the person being detained. 3 The signing by the accused of the booking sheet and arrest report is not a part of the custodial investigation which would otherwise require the presence of counsel to ensure the protection of the accused's constitutional rights. 4 The appellant's plea of innocence on the basis of reasonable doubt, however, deserves serious considerations. In the prosecution of an accused for an illegal sale of prohibited drugs "what is (initially) material is . . . the presentation in court of the corpus delicti as evidence." 5 The laboratory tests and the chemical microscopic examination, conducted by NBI Forensic Chemist Neva Gamosa, definitely reveal the contents of the plastic bags to be marijuana. 6 The chemistry report, attested to by the forensic chemist, has undoubtly established the corpus delicti of the crime. 7 The other question is whether or not the prosecution has been able to prove the fact of sale and delivery of the prohibited drug by the accused, a matter that must likewise be established beyond reasonable doubt. 8 In any criminal prosecution, it would be imperative to establish the elements of the offense; viz: (1) That the accused has sold and delivered a prohibited drug to another; and (2) That he knew that what he had sold and delivered was a dangerous drug. 9 A tedious and conscientious effort has been made to evaluate the evidence presented by the prosecution; the results, every time, however, appear to yield more questions than answers to a number of concerns that has bewildered the Court. First. The prosecution witnesses could not agree on the number of marijuana tea bags taken from the accused. Patrolman Quebuyen 10 testified that three bags were taken from the accused during the buy-bust operation. On the other hand, Patrolman Banawel 11 claimed that four marijuana bags were sold by the accused to the informer. Second. The buy-bust team was supposed to be composed of six members: five members of the police force and a civilian informer. Yet, the name of a sixth police officer kept on cropping up that of Patrolman Borlongan. 12No effort was made to clarify who this Patrolman Borlongan is. Third. Patrolman Quebuyen 13 testified that only the accused was arrested and that defense witness Leonardo Quiambao (who claimed to have likewise been arrested together with the accused) was not present at the place of the incident. According, however, to Patrolman Anza, 14 the accused was seen with a companion who, in fact, was chased by police officers. This conflicting versions given by the prosecution itself, again, were not explained. More importantly, the prosecution has missed putting on record any evidence to indicate that the tea bags, supposedly delivered to the poseurbuyer, had been known by the accused to contain dangerous drugs. Even the information itself has failed to allege this fact. 15 Section (2) (f), Article I of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, defines the term "deliver," the offense that is charged in the information, as ". . . a person's act of knowingly passing a dangerous drug to another personally or otherwise, and by any means, with or without consideration." Given all the above, it is readily discernible that the testimony of the poseurbuyer would have been most vital to the prosecution's case. 16 Yet, the prosecution did not even bother t have her take the witness stand.

A final remark on the buy-bust operation that simply cannot escape one's attention. The prosecution sought to prove that the accused left the place of the transaction for a few minutes and entered an alleyway to get the marijuana tea bags from an unknown supplier. No attempt was made to find out who this person was, either before or after the accused was apprehended. Then, while it was asserted by the prosecution that the informer gave the accused four P5.00-marked bills, only one P5.00 marked bill was recovered from the latter when he was arrested. The three other P5.00-marked bills were not accounted for. Too much, indeed, has been left to conjecture. While buy-bust operations have been recognized as a valid means of apprehending peddlers of drugs, 17 we also did caution, however, that the use of poseur-buyer is to be employed with solicitude being, as it is, easily susceptible to mistake, harassment, extortion and abuse. 18 Considering the severity of the penalty imposed, it behooves the law enforcement agencies it its investigatorial work, the prosecution in its presentation and submission of the evidence, 19 and the courts in its evaluation of the merits of the case, to exercise no less that the extreme care and professionalism demanded in these cases if we are to attain a good degree of success in our drive to curb the drug menace. Unfortunately, the buy-bust operation, assuming that it did not take place in this particular instance, has appeared to have been laid out quite haphazardly. Instead of taking that cue for it to excel on its own, the prosecution regrettably has likewise exhibited a lukewarm stance. The rule is clear : The guilt of the accused must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. 20 The prosecution, on its part, must rely on the strength of its own evidence and must not simply depend on the weakness of the defense. The slightest possibility of an innocent man being convicted for an offense he has never committed, let alone when no less than a capital punishment is imposed, would be far more dreadful than letting a guilty person go unpunished for a crime he may have perpetrated. WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the accused is hereby ACQUITTED of the offense charged. **SC held that when an arrested person signs a booking sheet and an arrest report at the police station, he does not admit the commission of an offense nor confess to any incriminating circumstance. The booking sheet is no more than a record of arrest & a statement on how the arrest was made. It is simply a police report, and it has no probative value as an extrajudicial statement of the person being detained. The signing by the accused of the booking sheet and the arrest report is not a part of custodial investigation.