CONTENTS Abbreviations ..................................................................................... 2 1. Topic: Development in Arms Control ....................................... 3 2. Frame of References .................................................................... 3 3. Inrtoduction .................................................................................. 5 4.

Historical Development ................................................................ 6 5. Arms Control and Nuclear Era Challenges ............................ . 11 6. Arms Control Achievements After World War II ................... 22 7. Current Issues in Arms Control ................................................ 28 8. Instead of the Conclusion ........................................................... 32 9. Annexes Annex A: Treaties on Nuclear Explosion ................................... 34 Annex B: Treaties on Nuclear Arms Limitation ..........................35 Annex C: Estimated Post-START US-Russian Strategic Nuclear Warheads after ...............................37 Annex D: Comparative Effects of CB and Nuclear Weapons .....38 Annex E: Treaties on CB Weapons ............................................. 39 Annex F: Treaties on Outer Space and Celestial Bodies, Treaties on The Sea Environment ................................40 Annex G: Treaties on Demilitarized Areas, Treaties on Denuclearized Zones ................................. 41 Annex H: Documents on CBM in Europe, The Treaty and Documents on MBFR ........................42 Annex I: Agreements on Prevention of Accidental War ............ 43 Annex J: Arms Imports in the Asia/Pacific,1987-91 .................. 45 Annex K: The Sub-Regional Arms Control for Balkan ............... 46 Annex L: Nuclear Flashpoints .................................................... 47 Annex M: Third World Weapons Development ........................... 48

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Bibliography ..................................................................................50 1. TOPIC: DEVELOPMENT IN ARMS CONTROL 2. FRAME OF REFERENCE Time frame:
Through discourse on the particular subject, we will briefly pass through the historical background of Arms Control phenomena, but we will be focused on modern historical period related to development in Arms Control and from that angle we will be in position to review all key matters of its progression and development from the beginning to nowadays.

Scope:
During discussion on this topic, we will try to briefly highlight important components of Arms Control with all its main dilemmas and complexity.

Definition:
Arms Control denotes the measures taken unilaterally or through agreement among states to reduce the danger of war by such means as partial disarmament, security agreements to avoid nuclear war, and the stabilization of force level. Arms Control measures are aimed at restricting only certain aspects of the arms race, as, for example, prohibiting certain types of weapons, restricting nuclear testing, or demilitarizing geographical areas.1 Arms control is restraint internationally exercised upon armaments policy, whether in respect of the level of armaments, their character, deployment or use. 2 Originally, arms control was meant to denote rules for limiting arms competition (mainly nuclear) rather than reversing it. Subsequently, however, a wide range of measures have come to be included under the rubric of arms control, in particular those intended to: (a) Freeze, limit, reduce or abolish certain categories of weapons; (b) Prevent certain military activities; (c) Regulate the deployment of armed forces; (d) Proscribe transfers of some militarily important items; (e) Reduce the risk of accidental war; (f) Constrain or prohibit the use of certain weapons or methods of war; and (g) Build up confidence among states through greater openness in military matters. 3
1

Jack C. Plano & Roy Olton, The International Relations Dictionary, Western Michigan University, ABC-CLIO, Inc.- Santa Barbara, California, 1988. 2 Hedley Bull, The Control of the Arms Race: Disarmament and Arms Control in the Missile Age (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson for the International Institute of Strategic Studies, 1961) 3 Jozef Goldbat, Arms Control: A Guide to Negotiations and Agreements, International Peace Research Institute, Oslo 1994

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3. INTRODUCTION General
Disarmament is a continuation of strategy by a reduction of military means, and arms control is a continuation of strategy by a mutual restraint on military means. On first sight disarmament and arms control appear straightforward approaches to the problem of peace and security, but in reality, they are highly complex both in their theory and in their practice. They are reflections of some of the most profound problems of the international system.4 The terms disarmament and arms control are some times used synonymously. However, although they are clearly related, there is a distinction between them, based on the difference between reduction and restraint. Arms Control attempts through treaties, proclamations, convention, and tacit agreement to limit the destructiveness of war by controlling the acquisition and use of weapons and military technology. Arms Control and Disarmament also cannot be divorced from consideration of deterrence. Attempts to control or abolish the use of force are nearly as old as war itself, and they have taken the form of trying to limit both the aspirations through war, and the instruments of violence. Attempts that are more modest have been made to limit and control the instruments of violence. Historically, war appears to be an integral part of human affairs. In 3,000 years of recorded history, less than 300 years have been free of armed conflict. Yet, people have always recognized the folly, waste, brutality, and inhumanity of warfare and have continually attempted to limit its devastation and the spread of increasingly destructive weapons.

4. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT The Old Ages

One of the earliest formal attempts to limit the scope of war was organized by the Amphictyonic League, a quasi-religious alliance of most of the Greek tribes, formed before the 7th century BC. League members were given to restrain their actions in war against other members. For example, they were prohibited from cutting a blocked citys water supply. The league was empowered to impose sanctions on violating members, including sanctions and punishing expeditions, and could require its members to provide troops and funds for this purpose.

The Middle Ages

Arms technology remained nearly static from the 3rd century BC to the Middle Ages, and few attempts were made to control the spread of new weapons. In feudal societies, such as those of medieval Europe or Japan, laws and customs developed to keep weapons a monopoly of the military classes and to suppress arms that might democratize warfare. These customs tended to disappear as soon as some power saw a decisive advantage in the use of a new weapon. In medieval Europe, the Roman Catholic Church attempted to use its power as a supranational organization to limit both new weapons and the intensity of warfare. The Peace of God, instituted in 990, protected church-owned property, defenseless noncombatants, and the agrarian base of the economy from the ravages of war. In 1139, the

John Baylis, Ken Boot, John Garnett, Phil Williams, Contemporary Strategy: Theories and Concepts, London: Croom Helm, 1985

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Second Lateran Council prohibited the use of the crossbow against Christians, although not against those the church considered infidels.5

Early Modern Period

Firearms widened the scope of war and increased the potential for violence, culminating in the devastation of central Europe in the Thirty Years' War (1618-1648). Widespread revulsion against the horrors of that conflict led to attempts in many countries to lessen the brutality of warfare by limiting combat to recognized armed forces, by formulating conventions for the humane treatment of prisoners and wounded, and by organizing logistics to end supply by pillage. These rules prevailed throughout the 18th century, making war a relatively limited and civilized game of kings. Men such as French philosopher Jean Jacques Rousseau and Charles Castel, Abb de Saint Pierre also formulated many utopian plans for the total abolition of war during this period. Frederick the Great, King of Prussia, commented that all these plans needed to succeed was the cooperation of all the kings of Europe. The rise of mass armies during the American Revolution (1775-1783) and Napoleonic Wars (1799-1815) again enlarged the size and devastation of war; yet, throughout that period no attempts were made to reduce or limit national arsenals other than those imposed by the victors upon the defeated. The one exception was the Rush-Bagot Treaty (1817), under which Britain and the United States reduced, equalized, and eventually eliminated their naval forces on the Great Lakes.6

Arms Control from the end of 19thcentury until World War II

The Hague Peace Conferences held in 1899 and 1907 on Russian Emperor initiative were revolutionary effort toward world peace. However, disarmament goals of Hague Conferences were not achieved, because of low level of interest for decreasing the competition in arms among politicians. Main achievements of named conferences were: - Codifying the laws of war, including restriction of use certain types of weapons; - Establishment of the Permanent International Court of Arbitration to settle disputes between states, which fail to be solved by diplomatic instruments. The Treaty of Versailles after World War I in 1919 was another attempt in international Arms Control, but this time it was more successful because, it was dictated by victorious allies against Germany. The Treaty had covered more aspects in Arms Control, such as: reduction in military personnel, reduction in different types of arms, demilitarizing military important areas and restrictions in future military development. Other Peace treaties signed after the Great War were on same way restrictions against the vanquished nation, but in signing them the victorious powers committed themselves to limit their own armaments, in accordance with the principles set out by the newly founded League of Nations. Those Treaties were: - The 1919 Austrian Peace Treaty signed at St Germain-en-Laye; - The 1919 Bulgarian, Peace Treaty signed at Neuilly; - The 1920 Hungarian Peace Treaty signed at Trianon, and - The 1920 Turkish Peace Treaty signed at Sevres.7 The Agreement of the League of Nations, which was a Part of the Treaty of Versailles, required the reduction of armaments of all nations to the lowest point
5 6

Burns, Richard Dean, ed. Encyclopedia of Arms Control and Disarmament. Scribner, 1993. Burns, Richard Dean, ed. Encyclopedia of Arms Control and Disarmament. Scribner, 1993. 7 Jozef Goldbat, Arms Control: A Guide to Negotiations and Agreements, International Peace Research Institute, Oslo 1994

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consistent with national safety and the enforcement by common action of international obligations. Members of the League undertook to exchange information regarding the scale of their armaments, their military, naval and air force programs, and the condition of those of their industries that were adaptable to war-like purposes. Permanent Advisory Commission was set up to advise the Council of the League on implementation of the disarmament provisions of the Covenant, composed of military, naval and air force representatives appointed by each state member of the Council. Moreover, a Temporary Mixed Commission was established to examine the relevant political, social, and economic questions in 1925. The Preparatory Commission consisting of representatives of both members and non-members of the League started its deliberations regarding the envisaged Disarmament Conference. This Commission held six sessions and dissolved in 1930 after it had submitted a draft Convention on the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments. Another effort of the League of Nations in direction of Arms Control was publishing of the Armaments Yearbook in 1924, which provided various official states data on the armaments production, trade, military expenditure and data related to paramilitary formations and police forces. It was first public introducing in the matters of arms control. The League of Nations also did first steps in attempts to regulate arms trade and production through following documents: - The 1919 St Germain Convention; - The 1925 Geneva Convention on the Arms Trade and - The 1929 Proposal for Supervision of Arms Production The Pact for the Renunciation of War, signed in 1928 in Paris, well known as Kellog-Briand Pact was most significant effort trough the League of Nations in inter war period. There was achieved high degree of unity between states for solving all disputes by peaceful means. Weaknesses of this pact were again lack of efficient instruments to implement what was agreed.8 The First World Disarmament Conference was organized in Geneva in 1932. In presence of 60 nations, it was first discussion about universal reduction and limitation of all types of armament. The Conference covered following areas which were contained in final agreement, published in 1933: - Renunciation of War; - Armed Forces, Armaments and Defense Expenditures; - Chemical, Incendiary and Bacteriological Warfare; - Arms Trade and Manufacture; - Verification and Sanction and - Moral Disarmament. German withdrawal from both, the League of Nations and the Disarmament Conference and her increasing of military power and openly avoiding to respect the Treaty of Versailles, made situation untenable and caused decision of Leagues Council to suspend the Disarmament Conference at the beginning of 1936. That was the end of idealistic international ambitions to prevent war by the global disarmament. This statement was approved by enormous and unseen destruction during the World War II.

ARMS CONTROL AND NUCLEAR ERA CHALLENGES

8

Jozef Goldbat, Arms Control: A Guide to Negotiations and Agreements, International Peace Research Institute, Oslo 1994

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In the early post- World War II years, a major international problem was the demilitarization of the vanquished states. On that way in 1947 were concluded Peace Treaties by the Allied Powers with Italy, Finland, Romania, Bulgaria and Hungary which imposed arms restriction related to number of land forces, possessing, constructing, and testing any kind of atomic weapons, and any sophisticated land, naval and air weapons. In 1954 at Paris Conference was definitely agreed formulation of military restriction against Federal Republic of Germany in document known as Paris Agreement, which was ratified in 1955 by all states of West European Union (WEU). The Austrian State Treaty was signed in 1955 with aim to re-establish independent and democratic Austria and brought measures of military restrictions. On same way in 1955, through the Joint US Japanese Statement was adopted Japanese concept of Self-Defense Forces (SDF).

Arms Control Concepts after World War II

After WW II in accordance with strong technological development in arms industry and due to presence and progress in nuclear weapons development, it was needed to find the way for effective arms control instruments on bilateral and multilateral international level. Because of that, we can say that modern concept of arms control was divided into several sub-concepts or sub-approaches, which will be briefly, consider in this part of discussion. The Role of United Nations in Arms Control In accordance with purity of its universal character, the United Nations is the only place where universal consensus on key security issues can be worked out. It produces therefore primary responsibility in the field of arms control. This means that it must set goals for; both regional and global arms control negotiations, and assist in the conduct of it, as well as stand ready to ensure the implementation of the agreements reached. The UN Secretariat helps in fulfilling these tasks by: - Servicing international conferences, - Working together with experts engaged in disarmament-related studies, - Following up UN General Assembly resolutions, - Administering a programme of fellowships on disarmament for government officials, - Maintaining liaison with non-governmental organizations and - Publishing the Disarmament Yearbook and disseminating relevant information. In accordance with its responsibility for the progressive development of international law, the United Nations can perform the important function of codifying the principles of the law of arms control, already accepted internationally, as well as of elaborating new principles. The latter could include extending the rule of customary law of armed conflict - that the right of belligerents to choose methods and means of warfare is not unlimited - by providing that the right of states to possess arms is not unlimited either. a) Nuclear-Weapon Explosions The problem of nuclear-weapon explosions has been question of multilateral, bilateral (US-Soviet), and trilateral (British-US-Soviet) arms control negotiations since 1954. They have aim to defined environment for testing and reduced the size of the explosions. Main treaties on that plan are presented in Annex A. b) Nuclear Arms Limitation With changing nuclear strategy and doctrine during the time, it was also changed concept f or achievement of relative stability and objectives of international security regarding to possible use of nuclear weapons. On that way, since the end of WW II on international arena was 6

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present intention to limit nuclear arms capabilities. Treaties that were signed in that purpose are shown in Annex B and C. c) Nuclear Weapon Proliferation The Nuclear Age brought another dangerous aspect for international security and it was proliferation of the nuclear weapons on both ways: - Horizontal proliferation related to proliferation between nuclear powers, which resulted in increasing of total available nuclear capabilities or - Vertical proliferation which referred to spreading of nuclear weapons on several countries which is new dimension in balance of nuclear poverty on the world level and challenge to International security. Because of that, it was needed to establish instruments against nuclear proliferation. It was beginning in development of the non-proliferation regime, which encompasses various restrictive rules as well as specialized institutions, both national and international. Result of those activities was The Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) that was signed at London, Moscow, and Washington, DC, on 1 July 1968 and was entered into force on 5 March 1970. It was unique international document which, prohibited possession, developing and spreading nuclear weapons. Treaty was consider remaining right for nuclear states to co-operate in development, testing and receiving from any state material for its development. Main obligation was on non-nuclear state to avoid possessing of nuclear weapons. Non-Proliferation Treaty has covered basic field in non-proliferation of nuclear weapons: - Security Assurance for Non-Nuclear-Weapon States; - Protection of Nuclear Material; - Nuclear Supplies and - The Missile Technology Control Regime. Nuclear Non-Proliferation policy is four-decade-old project and from that distance, we can tell that it was successful and unsuccessful on same time. Good side and achievements are expressed by: - Decisions by West European Countries Not to Acquire the Bomb; - Third World Incentives and the Nuclear Nonproliferation Norm; (Until 1993 NPT was signed by nearly 140 non-nuclear states, including all West European States) (See Annex B) The Nuclear Supply Regime (due to International Atomic Energy Agency-IAEA); Winning Widespread Adherence to the NPT9

Nuclear Nonproliferation Losses: - Additional Nuclear Weapon States; - The NPT Holdouts (Israel, India, South Africa and Pakistan); - Widespread Civilian Use of Plutonium; e) Chemical and Biological Weapons The use of Chemical and Biological (CB) weapons involves the dissemination of materials that cause harm or death to the attacked population. Both chemical and biological weapons are unique in two respects: - They produce no collateral damage and - They require materials that can be acquired from legitimate peaceful facilities;
9

Lewis A. Dunn, US Security in Uncertain Era: Four Decades of Nuclear Nonproliferation, MIT Press, London, England 1993.

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There is no necessity for expensive nuclear facilities or for conventional military explosives.10 Chemical weapons were used in WW I, in Italian attacks on Abyssinia in 1930s, and in the Iraq-Iran conflict of the 1980s. In all these cases, they were used against essentially unprotected personnel. Some characteristic and effects of CB weapons are given in the Annex D. All that facts required reaction on international level to limit use of CB weapons in the war conflicts. Development of CB weapons during last century also asked for improvements of actual limitation documents. That development in restriction had following flow shown in Annex E. Results of CB Arms Control in past gave a solid base for further development in this field although CB arms control was followed by serious problems with inspections and collecting information. Key issues for CB arms control in future could be defined as: - CB arms-control regimes need to be made as effective as possible, verification measures to be strictly carried, and on that way penalties to be more effective especially on political plan; - Export of materials and equipment useful for producing of CB weapons to be monitored and controlled so that potential proliferation will be made more difficult; - Effective CB protective measures need to be acquired and maintained to reduce the range of materials and equipment for CB weapons production and - The penalties imposed by international community should be more strict and effective; to make clear to potential proliferators that punishment will be fully implemented.11 f) Environmental and Radiological Weapons This part of Arms Control is directed against every attempt of changing world living environment with aim to manipulate with it in achieving some political or other objectives. It also considers restriction of use weapons based on radiological (neutron) effects. Conventions and Negotiations made in that purpose are: - The 1977 Environmental Modification Convention signed on 18 May 1977 and entered into force in 1978; - Negotiations for a Ban on Radiological Weapons permanently conducted on bilateral and multilateral level since 1979. g) Outer Space and Celestial Bodies This aspect of Arms Control covering field of launching in the outer space (earth orbit) any kind of weapons for mass destruction including chemical and biological weapons. Treaties and agreements treating this aspect are shown in Annex F-a. h) The Sea Environment More than 70% of the surface of our globe is sea, and more than two-thirds of the world's human population lives within 300 kilometers of a seacoast. Consequently the continuous interest with which nations have followed the buildup of naval forces and the effects of militarization of the seas on international security. Several attempts were made in the past control naval armaments through international agreements. This intention was present in the post WW II era and become more important
10

Graham S. Pearson, US Security in Uncertain Era: Prospects for Chemical and Biological Arms Control, MIT Press, London, England 1993.
11

Graham S. Pearson, US Security in Uncertain Era: Prospects for Chemical and Biological Arms Control, MIT Press, London, England 1993.

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with strong development of maritime capabilities in modern technologies time on world plan. Therefore, we can recognize serious efforts in last four decade to create and implement adequate arms control measures on maritime field.12 Main Documents on Arms Control in the Sea Environment are shown in Annex F-b. i) Demilitarized Areas Arms limitations regarding certain geographical areas in one country or in neighboring countries have been negotiated several times in the past. For example, on 26 October 1905, Sweden and Norway established on both sides of their common border a permanently neutral zone. There are to be no fortifications, no armed units stationed, nor military materiel stored there, and all war operations in the zone are prohibited. In the period immediately following World War I, arms control provisions were included in the territorial settlements regarding two groups of islands, the sovereign status of which had been the subject of international dispute: the archipelago of Spitsbergen and the Aaland Islands. However, in both case arms control was not the main issue. It was chiefly a means to achieve a compromise solution by providing a quid pro quo to those countries whose territorial claims had not been accepted.13 Treaties on Demilitarized Areas are shown in Annex G-a. j) Denuclearized Zones The idea of establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones in populated parts of the globe (as distinct from uninhabited areas, such as the Antarctic) was conceived primarily with a view to preventing the emergence of new nuclear-weapon states. To the extent that the incentive to acquire nuclear weapons may emerge from regional considerations, the establishment of such zones could be an asset for the cause of nuclear non-proliferation. This is why the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty encouraged the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones. In 1975, in the United Nations was reached consensus that states setting up nuclearweapon-free zones should be guided by the set of certain principles. Treaties on Denuclearized Zones are shown in Annex G-b. k) Confidence Building in Europe In 1954, when Western efforts to bring FR Germany into NATO were nearing fruition, the Soviet Union proposed that a conference on security in Europe should be convened to deal with what it then considered a threat to its security. The proposal called for the withdrawal of all occupation forces from Germany and for a treaty on collective security in Europe. The West rejected this proposal among several other reasons, because it did not provide for full US participation in the conference. Only in the early 1970s, after the political situation in Europe had improved significantly, did a conference on European security become a possibility. The improvement was brought about by the 1970 Soviet-West German treaty, in which the two countries committed themselves to regard the borders of all states in Europe as inviolable; by the 1970 treaty between Poland and West Germany, in which the latter formally abandoned its claim to the territories east of the Oder-Neisse line; by the 1971 quadripartite (French-Soviet-British-US) agreement on Berlin, which allowed unhindered movement of people and goods between the
12

Jozef Goldbat, Arms Control: A Guide to Negotiations and Agreements, International Peace Research Institute, Oslo 1994
13

Ibid.

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western sectors of Berlin and West Germany; by the 1972 treaty between the two German states reaffirming the inviolability of the border between them; and by the Soviet agreement to participate in talks on the reduction of troops in Europe. The Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) opened on 3 July 1973. Nearly all the participants were organized in one of three major groupings: NATO, the Warsaw Treaty Organization, and the neutral/non-aligned countries. Proposals for measures to be negotiated by the Conference fell into three areas, called 'baskets': political, including military security; economic; and cultural-humanitarian. Documents on Confidence Building Measures (CBM) in Europe are presented in Annex H-a. l) Reduction of Force in Europe The situation in Europe for many years after World War II was characterized by profound political and ideological antagonisms, reflected in the largest concentration of armed forces and armaments, both conventional and nuclear, ever known in peacetime. In the early 1970s, relations between the opposed military blocks improved, not only prompting a search for confidence-building measures but also making it possible to consider limitations on the conventional military potential of European states. Negotiations on force reductions in Europe opened in Vienna in October 1973. Officially called the Mutual Reduction of Forces and Armaments and Associated Measures in Central Europe talks, they were referred to by the West as Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks, to emphasize NATO's aim of achieving a balance of forces through lower but equal force ceilings. For the US Administration, an important motivation for entering the MBFR talks was to open the prospect of troop cuts negotiated with the Soviet Union and thereby the passage by the US Congress of Senator Mansfield's proposal for a substantial unilateral reduction of the US military presence in Europe. The Soviet Union agreed to engage in these talks as a concession to NATO, in order to secure its consent to convening a conference on European security, which would ratify the post-war political and territorial status quo in Europe. Eleven states, on the NATO side, with forces in Central Europe were full participants in the Vienna talks; and Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Poland and the Soviet Union, on the WTO side. Eight additional countries had special status of 'indirect' participants. France refused to participate in the talks. Talks were continued until 1989.14 The Treaty and Documents on MBFR are in Annex H-b. m) Prevention of Accidental War Exchange of letters between Premier Khrushchev and President Eisenhower, in 1958 led to an agreement to convene a conference of experts for the study of possible measures which might be helpful in preventing surprise attack. The Conference opened on 10 November. Participants were, on the Western side, experts from Canada, France, Italy, the United Kingdom and the United States and, on the Eastern side, experts from Albania, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Poland and the Soviet Union. The group of experts from the five Western countries viewed their task to be that of preparing a technical, military analysis of the problem of surprise attack and of evaluating the effects of various systems of inspection and observations. The five Eastern experts, on the other hand,
14

Jozef Goldbat, Arms Control: A Guide to Negotiations and Agreements, International Peace Research Institute, Oslo 1994

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submitted detailed proposals for a system of inspection and disarmament in Europe as a means of preventing surprise attack. The two groups were thus operating under different terms of reference. The conference was suspended in December 1958 and never reconvened. In 1962 came the US-Soviet confrontation, provoked by the deployment of Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba. This clearly demonstrated the need for quick and reliable communications between heads of government to reduce the danger of war breaking out due to technical failure, misunderstanding or miscalculation. An agreement to set up such communications was concluded between the United States and the Soviet Union less than one year after the Cuban missile crisis.15 Agreements on Prevention of Accidental War are shown in Annex I.

ARMS CONTROL ACHIEVEMENTS AFTER WORLD WAR II

a. Failure and achievements during Cold War Sometimes it seems that the end of the fixed confrontation of the Cold War years has reduced the role of arms control in managing international security. In the literature of the Cold War years, the 'Golden Age' of arms control is usually seen as being the period from 1957 until the mid-1970s.' By 1957, it had become clear that tile era of US nuclear superiority was coming to an end. The Soviet Union would soon acquire the ability to 'ride out' an American first strike, and reply with massive force against the US. Advocates of arms control argued that the two superpowers had a common interest: preventing nuclear war. They proposed a series of policy proposals designed to contribute to this end. The Golden Age proved to be a great disappointment. At the beginning of that period were recognized three objectives for Arms Control: The avoidance of war that neither side wants; Minimizing the costs and risks of arms competition; and

- Shortening the scope and violence of war in the event it occurs. There was little progress on any of these fronts, and in some respects arms control may have proved counter-productive. With the possible exception of the ABM Treaty, nuclear arms control did little to affect the offence/defense balance and failed to halt the most destabilizing trend of the late 1970s and 1980s: the deployment of large numbers of increasingly accurate MIRVed missiles. The nuclear arms control did not contribute to a reduction in the level of damage that might be inflicted in a war. The mega-tonnage of strategic nuclear weapons declined sharply between the 1960s and the 1980s, even as the number of such weapons increased. There was never a serious possibility of reducing arsenals to levels below those needed for 'assured destruction' of the entire population of the northern hemisphere. Moreover, arms control during the Cold War was a double-edged sword. There were some achievements for arms control during the Cold War. The Partial Test Ban Treaty, by ending superpower tests in the atmosphere, probably saved more lives than any other arms control measure before or since. The ABM Treaty substantially reduced the scope for worst case nuclear planning, especially in Britain and France, and thus perhaps moderated the level of investment in offensive nuclear weapons.

15

Jozef Goldbat, Arms Control: A Guide to Negotiations and Agreements, International Peace Research Institute, Oslo 1994

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The existence of a SALT process may have contributed, rather marginally, to the political acceptability of the 1969 Non-Proliferation Treaty, which was perhaps the most successful single measure of arms control from the Cold War period16. By the 1980s, there was a growing enlightenment limitations of arms control. It was time of absence of fundamental improve in the overall relationship. In one respect, arms control was to the mutual benefit of both states. The acceptance of the principle of parity 1972 SALT 1 agreement formalized the privileged position of the 'superpowers' compared with other states, most of had just acceded to the 1969 NonProliferation Treaty. Because of its failure to halt the process of MIRVing, the agreement cannot be said to have curbed the arms race. It symbolized a mutual interest, even though, in a world based on the leading role of only two states. A similar effect was seen in the longrunning MBFR negotiations. However we can say that, with some exceptions, on the whole the Cold War proved rather bad condition for arms control. It demonstrated that fixed and intense antagonism, makes arms control exceptionally difficult to agree on measures that are seen to benefit both parties. The fact that some measures of arms control were achieved suggests that, in more favorable circumstances, more can be done. b. Arms control and the end of the cold war The successful negotiation of the 1NF, CFE and START treaties can create the impression that the Cold War was the heyday of arms control, and that arms control in the post-Cold War world is, by contrast, less important. Yet this outbreak of agreements was a consequence not of the Cold War but of its end. None of the three major treaties, all of which involved the Soviet Union making most of the concessions, could have been concluded while the Cold War antagonism continued. The treaties played a vital role in providing additional assurance to NATO members that unilateral Soviet cutbacks could be verified and that they would not be reversed. They may also have helped provide political 'cover' for the Soviet leadership against domestic criticism. The end of the zero-sum thinking that dominated the Cold War not only made possible a series of agreements to limit the nuclear and conventional arsenals of West and East. The emergence of 'cooperative security' thinking may also have helped to create circumstances in which other arms control measure unrelated to the recover of the East-West conflict, became possible for the first time. Perhaps of most significance to date, agreement was reached on a Chemical Weapons Convention, which opened for signature in January 1993 and is expected to come into force in 1997. Most of the obstacles to a verifiable Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty were removed in 1996, with only India standing in the way of a universal commitment to end all nuclear tests. Serious efforts are being made to find ways of adequately verifying the Biological Weapons Convention. New supplier regimes, such as the Missile Technology Control Regime established in 1987, are having some success in limiting the spread of potentially destabilizing technologies 17. The establishment of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, has illustrated that it is possible to reach a broad international consensus in favor of transparency measures related to conventional arms that would have been quite unrealistic only five years before.

16

Malcolm Chalmers,Brasseys Defense Yearbook 1997: Conceptualising Arms Control After the Cold War, The Center for Defense Studies, Kings College, London 1997.
17

Malcolm Chalmers,Brasseys Defense Yearbook 1997: Conceptualising Arms Control After the Cold War, The Center for Defense Studies, Kings College, London 1997.

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c) Current Arms Control concepts If the concept of arms control is to continue to be of value, needs to move beyond some of the rather narrow definitions that found favor during the Cold War. In particular, we need to reject the assumption that arms control is only relevant between 'antagonists'. The limitations of this assumption were less important during the Cold War. Today, however, it is necessary to insist on a concept of arms control that does not limit itself in this way. A usable concept of arms control must still assume a world that is basically anarchic in structural terms. Even if it were desirable, world government is not imminent, and states will therefore continue to be the main possessors of military power. At the same time, account needs to be taken of the growing importance of security communities and of international regimes contributed to security dilemmas which might be the result of such anarchy. War has become obsolescent as an instrument of policy within a large and growing group of states. The development and spread of 'civil' technology brings with it, and is often inseparable from, new and more destructive means of warfare. The tempo of economic development in some parts of the world (such as East Asia) can lead to a rapid realignment of the relative power of different states, requiring a flexibility both from national leaders and from international regimes. The lack of sustained economic development in other regions (such as the Middle East), when combined with access to increasingly destructive military technologies, heightens the danger of conflicts with global consequences.18 Central to such a response will continue to have to be deterrence and in the last resort, military force. Some analysts suggest that the decline of war between states has gone so far that arms control may also be obsolete as a means of preventing war, even in areas where serious disputes remain, and the threat or arms is ever present. Today's world has far more states in existence than ever before - 184 UN members as of 1996, compared with only 51 founding members in 1945. Yet the Gulf War has been the only major armed conflict of a clearly inter-state character that has taken place since 1990. In the regions of greatest interstate tension - the Middle East and South Asia - the probability of war seems, for the moment at least, less than during the Cold War. And the states of two regions that have experienced some of the most devastating wars in the past - South America and Western Europe - live now gone half a century without any major conflicts between them. Attempts to create regional balances of military power are often irrelevant to security, as are arms control schemes based on calculating 'sufficient defense' based on some combination of force-tospace ratios and the length of national borders. National defense, narrowly defined, is becoming a less important security concern for many states. 19 Some commentators appear to believe that security policy should still be based on: (a) the 'realist' assumption that war between the Great Powers is a real possibility , and/or (b) that the 'South' has replaced the Soviet Union as the main source of possible future threat. Even ,the environment for Arms Control was changed from Cold War to post Cold War condition ,the Arms Control objectives stay almost same as in last three decades: - Reducing the probability of war; - Reducing the destructiveness of war should it occur; and - Saving money. Same thing happened with main obstacles which Arms Control faced in past, as:
18

Malcolm Chalmers,Brasseys Defense Yearbook 1997: Conceptualising Arms Control After the Cold War, The Center for Defense Studies, Kings College, London 1997. 19 Ibid.

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- Verification and Transparency; - Non-fulfillment and Enforcement. During the rather short period since cold war, Arms Control has achieved significant progress addressing the problems. It seems that after the arid years after Cold War, however, Arms Control is at last coming into its own.

CURRENT ISSUES IN ARMS CONTROL

In order to give some more information and views about current arms control, here we will present in short, three issues for present-day arms control: The Arms trading after the Golf War and Arms Race in the Asia-Pacific; Arms Control in Balkans.

I. The Arms trading after the Golf War and Arms Race in the Asia-Pacific After the Gulf War it become clear that arms trading with the Middle East states (especially with Iraq) was more than uncontrolled, and it was one of the main factors that cause Iraqs ability and courage to conduct invasion against Kuwait. That problem was present and known in the past but on political plan it was also argument for Israel arms supplying from the west. In the same time for arms traders it was ensured market and good opportunity for quick profit. After the Gulf War measures of arms trade control become more strict and intensive, even it is very difficult to control and limit. Arm traders in that case were in situation to put main effort to trade under better condition in another market which was found earlier in Asia-Pacific region. Arms Races are powered by the twin engines of insecurity and the ability to pay for new weapons. Partly both of them were present in Asia-Pacific region because of present disputes between some countries and strong technological and economic progress in the region. Another reason was that, because of focus on arms trade in the Middle East, relatively little attention has been given to the risk of arms races in the Asia-Pacific. In 1991 the Asia-Pacific accounted for 35 percents of all imports of major weapon, more than any other region including Europe. In the post-cold war world there are good reasons to be worried about risks of arms races in both East and South Asia. Of the leading importers of major conventional weapons among countries of developing world in 1987-1991, seven Asia-Pacific states were to be found in top 15. (See Annex J) Three of the top five importers among all countries included India, Japan, and Afghanistan. The other major importers in the Asia-Pacific region in this time were North Korea, South Korea, Thailand, Pakistan, and Taiwan. We can divided states importers in the Asia-Pacific region under four criteria: High Wealth and Low Insecurity; High Wealth and Higher Insecurities; Low Wealth and Low Insecurity; Low Wealth and High Insecurity.

In the 1987-1991 period, the transfer of major conventional arms to the Asia-Pacific region was dominated by superpowers: The Soviet Union (45%), The United States (35%), Western European States (10%), the PR China (5,8%).

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The regional powers have great deal of opportunities in Arms trade but it has to be supported by major world powers, firstly by US, and also results cannot be achieved without full Chinas involving and cooperation.20 II. Arms Control in Balkans Current Arms Control trends in Balkans are close related to NATO expansion on East Europe and actual US policy in managing peace after war in ex Yugoslav republics. This is present through project of Partnership for Peace and implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement. The arms control provisions in the Dayton-Paris Peace Agreement for Bosnia-Hercegovina are to be found in Annex B-l which deals with Regional Stabilization. Article II requires the parties to negotiate Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBMs) designed to avoid a return to conflict. Article III instructs the parties to move towards regional CSBMs. Article IV mandates the parties to negotiate a sub-regional arms control agreement limiting the same five categories of heavy weaponry as in the original NATO-WTO CFE Treaty. Article V decrees that the OSCE will assist the parties to negotiate under the auspices of the Forum on Security Cooperation with the goal of establishing a regional arms control regime in and around former Yugoslavia. On schedule, in late January 1996, die former warring parties in Bosnia negotiated a series of CSBMs modelled on those negotiated throughout Europe under the CSCE. Inspections and exchanges of information were conducted during 1996 under the supervision of the OSCE. Some of the post-Dayton CSBMs go further than the OSCE regime in that they restrain military deployments in certain areas, forbid the reintroduction of foreign forces, and insist on the withdrawal of heavy weapons to cantonments. Another major loophole is in Measure IV Notification an Observation of and Constraints on Certain Military Activities. The deadline for reaching this agreement limiting heavy military equipment in Croatia, Bosnia and Serbia was 11 June 1996, but signature was delayed because Bosnia objected to Republika Srpska being awarded a status equivalent to the Federation o Bosnia-Herzegovina. Eventually the agreement was signed in Florence on 14 June 1996. The dispute over what status to accord Republika Srpska reflected the essential obscurity of the Dayton Agreement. The sub-regional agreement (SR-CFE) limits five categories of weapons on the basis of a 5:2:2 ratio between Serbia and Montenegro (FRY): Bosnia-Herzegovina: Croatia. Within Bosnia-Herzegovina (B-H) the ratio of agreed limits is 2:1 between the Bosniaks-Croat Federation (B-C Fed) and Republika Srpska (RS). The five categories are: battle tanks (BT), armored combat vehicles (ACVs), attack helicopters, artillery above 75 mm caliber and combat aircraft. The lower caliber for artillery (i.e. lower than the 100mm artillery limited by the original CFE Treaty) included in this agreement reflected the indiscriminate use of 81mm caliber mortars by the Bosnian Serbs against Sarajevo and other designated 'safe areas' in Bosnia over the previous three years.21 (Annex K) Balkans is most probably the best example of effective Arms Control, but it is due mainly to strict US managing and presence of NATO forces in the region.

INSTEAD OF THE CONCLUSION

20

Gerald Segal, US Security in Uncertain Era: Managing New Arms Races in the Asia/Pacific , MIT Press, London, England 1993.
21

Jane O. M. Sharp,Brasseys Defense Yearbook 1997: CFE Adaptation and Arms Control in Balkans, The Center for Defense Studies, Kings College, London 1997.

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Arms-Control Future The end of the Cold War has changed the place of arms control in world policy but has not eliminated it. Arms control will remain a major focus of major world powers interest and energy in the decades ahead. But not as In the narrowest sense, arms control as a body of legal treaties relating to the disposition of the military forces most threatening to the world peace is likely to be of less salience in the new era started with the disintegration of the Soviet Union. But plenty of work remains in the implementation of existing treaties and the strengthening of global regimes. Moreover, the United States has key roles to play as facilitator, monitor, and guarantor of future regional arms-control measures. In a broader sense, arms control as a set of formal and informal undertakings concerning the disposition of military capabilities, local or global, will continue to have value as a way to shape the threats to regional and international security. In regional conflicts, arms control is likely to become a principal element of preventive diplomacy and a way to decrease dependence on U.S. power projection. Thus, from the perspective of world policymakers in the 1990s, both an expansion and dilution of the arms-control agenda is in evidence. That agenda includes many more elements than in the cold war era. They may nevertheless be critical tools in building a new order of international affairs that is more cooperative than anarchic and that channels the energies of the developing world away from military means of solving conflict and toward the building of stable, prosperous nations and regions. Now, after Cold War era, risk of uncontrolled use of mass destruction arms is quite possible, especially on local level, if we consider political and military structure of states in crisis regions, and also their progressing arms capabilities. Very good example Iraq gave to us during the invasion against Kuwait. Because of that major powers have main responsibilities for Arms Control future, and its managing on world level. It would be difficult job to do, regarding to present third world states possession of nuclear and chemical weapons. (See Annex L and M)

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