Comissioning

SHE MANUAL COMMISSIONING
LARSEN & TOUBRO LIMITED E & C DIVISION SAFETY CONTROL DEPARTMENT POWAI
E & C Division
SHE Manual (Commissioning)
Contents Part III: Commissioning of plant 1. Corporate Policy 2. Safety responsibilities 2.1 Safety Control Department 2.2 Commissioning Team Leader 2.3 Commissioning Team members 3. Rules and regulations 3.1 Safety practices operating personnel 4. 5. 3.2 Safety Rules Contractors/Sub Contractors Safety during Pre-commissioning Technical Measures for common Refinery Operations 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5 5.6 5.7 Plant Layout Alarms / Trips / Interlocks Control Systems Corrosion / Selection of Materials Drum / Cylinder Handling Pressure Plants/Reactors Static Electricity
5.8 Causes of Plant failure 5.9 Explosion Relief 5.10 Hazardous Area Classification / Flame proofing 5.11 Inerting 5.12 Isolation 5.13 Leak / Gas Detection 5.14 5.15 5.16 5.17 Active / Passive Fire Protection Quench Systems Raw Materials Control / Sampling Reaction / Product Testing
5.18 Reliability of Utilities 5.19 Relief Systems / Vent Systems 5.20 Roadways / Site Traffic Control 5.21 Secondary Containment 5.22 Segregation of Hazardous Materials 5.23 Warning Signs 5.24 Protective Devices Contents 1
E & C Division 6. Material Safety Data Sheet 6.1 MSDS Contents 6.2 6.3 7. 8.
National Fire protection Association (NFPA) Hazard diamond Interpretation MSDS of various chemicals generally used in refinery
On site Emergency plan The Environmental Preservation Acts in India 8.1 The Water prevention and Control of pollution Act, 1974 8.2 The Water Prevention and Control of Pollution Cess Act, 1974 8.3 8.4 8.5 8.6 The Air Prevention and Control of Pollution Act 1981 The environmental Protection Act,1986 Hazardous Waste Management and Handling Rules,1989
9.
The Manufacturer Storage and Import of hazardous Chemical Rules,1989 Procedural Control 9.1 9.2 9.3 Procedure for Sample Collection Procedure for the disposal of Waste Procedure for pipeline cleaning, gas freeing, purging, draining of equipment and lines.
10.
9.4 Procedure for isolation of flare header, safety valve 9.5 Permit to work system Personnel Protective Equipment (PPE) 10.1 Non Respiratory 10.2 Respiratory Gas Detection Devices 11.1 Combustible/Combustible gas Detector 11.2 Toxic gas detectors 11.3 Oxygen Indicator
11.
Contents
LARSEN & TOUBRO LIMITED
Engineering & Construction Division

CORPORATE POLICY 1. To Engineer and Execute projects with consistent quality, cost and delivery in line with the requirements of our customers, and to exceed or meet their expectations, whilst enhancing our shareholder value. To set and review quality objectives for Continual Improvement of our products and services, whilst implementing the globally recognised management systems for Quality, Safety, Environment and Information Technology, and integrating these systems with our business partners and customers. To design / operate and maintain safe and environmentally friendly plants which meet all applicable statutory and regulatory requirements. To advance / ensure the use of better and cleaner technology to minimise adverse environmental impacts. To continually reduce the risk of pollution through setting environmental objectives in our design / operation and maintenance processes, based on the feedback. To deploy Information Technology for increasing the efficiencies of our business processes, while ensuring its security by protecting information as valuable assets and ensure availability, integrity and confidentiality of all information. To comply with all applicable occupational Health & Safety legislation and continually improve safe working practices through setting health and safety objectives and ensure good health, safety and security of all our people, our biggest asset. To encourage enthusiasm, innovation and empowerment whilst developing inspiring leaders to make working at L&T a rich experience and create new global benchmarks in whatever we do. To promote a culture of mutual trust, caring and sharing achievements, with our people, our society, our stakeholders and our customers for the growth and benefit of our Nation. As an undisputed leader in the Indian context, we continue to make things that make India proud, and shall strive to be amongst the globally outstanding companies, which the World is proud of.
_____________________________
K . VENKATARAMANAN
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
Issue : Jan , 2002
( Member of the Board & President )
E & C Division
2. 2.1 The
SAFETY RESPONSIBILITIES Responsibility of the safety control department responsibility of the Safety Control is to develop safety
consciousness amongst the commissioning team. The Safety Control will function in an advisory capacity. The Safety Control Department will ensure that: The commissioning team members have access to and are familiar with the HSE Manual for Commissioning. The commissioning team is familiar with the process hazards and the hazards of chemicals being used / handled during commissioning. The Safety Control will assist SBU for the procurement of Personnel Protective Equipment. The Safety Control will co-ordinate with the Safety Department of client / owner on the safety related issues in consultation with the commissioning team leader. A representative from the Safety Control will be present during the commissioning of the plant. His responsibilities would include : Identifying the requirement of safety equipment and Personnel Protective Equipment (PPE), ensuring its availability at site, and enforcing use of the PPE as the job requirement. Ensure functioning of the Fire and Safety equipment. Ensure functioning of Fire Alarm System and Gas Detector System before entry of Hydrocarbons into the unit. Check availability of proper emergency lighting and wind cock. Ensure availability of Display Boards at site, detailing the safety precautions, the important telephone numbers, the escape route in case of any emergency like fire or emission of toxic gases etc.
____________________________________________________ Responsibility 1
E & C Division
Enforcement of Safety Procedures in dealing with hazardous jobs like Hot Work, entry / work in Confined Space / Vessels etc. Ensure availability of First Aid kit. In consultation with the Commissioning Team Leader, will co-ordinate for the medical assistance for the commissioning team.
Monitoring the environment as and when necessary for toxicity level and noise level. The HSE department of the client can be asked for assistance in this regard. Formulation of proper evacuation plan in co-ordination with client safety department. Organise regular safety meetings with client safety
department and the commissioning team. Carryout Emergency Mock Drill in co-ordination with the client's fire fighting / safety / operation departments. Organise training of the commissioning team with respect to use of fire fighting equipment and first aid measures. Will carry out the Safety Audit before start of commissioning activities.
____________________________________________________ Responsibility 2
E & C Division
2.2
Responsibility of the commissioning team leader designation, will be designated as Commissioning Team Leader to ensure safety during commissioning.
1. Person responsible for overall commissioning, regardless of his
2. The Commissioning Team Leader (CTL) will be responsible to ensure safety of the commissioning team and the facility being commissioned. 3. The CTL will ensure that: a) The HSE manual for commissioning is accessible to the commissioning team. b) The Personnel Protective Equipment necessary for the safe execution of job is inspected and is in order. c) The commissioning team members are briefed on the availability and use of PPE. d) The commissioning team members are briefed on process hazards and that they are following the safe method of working. 4. Co-ordinate with the safety department of the client. 5. Obtain copies of the safety manual and other safety related documents from the client. This is more so in case of project site within or near an operating plant. 6. Ensure availability of medical help and facility for the treatment in case of: a) Exposure to hazardous chemical. b) Physical Injury c) Asphyxiation
7. The CTL will, before the start of commissioning, ensure that the safety audit (Check) of the plant is completed and the checklist neutralized (Corrective action completed). ____________________________________________________ Responsibility 3
E & C Division
8. The CTL will ensure that the commissioning team members are aware of overall plot plan and familiar with the emergency escape routes. 9. The CTL will ensure that a mock emergency drill is conducted and emergency procedures followed. 10. The CTL will ensure before undertaking the commissioning that he has all emergency phone numbers with him. 11. The CTL will ensure that he has the copy of the "On-site Emergency Management Plan " and is conversant with its requirements.
____________________________________________________ Responsibility 4
E & C Division
2.3
Responsibility of the commissioning team members
All the members of the commissioning team will ensure that: 1. They have read and familiarized themselves with the HSE commissioning manual. 2. They have read the HSE protocol of the Operations Manual. 3. They have read and have access to the Material Safety Data Sheet of the Hazardous Chemicals being handled. 4. They are aware and conversant with the Process Hazard of the Plant being commissioned. 5. They have the list of PPE and familiar with the use of these equipments. 6. They have read and understood the safety procedure of the operating plant. 7. They are familiar with the plant layout and knowledge of the escape routes. 8. They are using the right PPE. 9. They are familiar with the exposure symptoms of the hazardous chemicals being handled. 10. They have access to the emergency telephone numbers. 11. They are physically fit and mentally alert during the work.
__________________________________________________ Responsibility 5
E & C Division
3.0 BASIC SAFETY RULES OPERATING PERSONNEL Basic Safety rules to be followed by the operating personnel within the plant limits are given below. The commissioning team is required to know and observe these rules. Whenever specific safety rules are provided by the client, (the commissioning team leader is required to procure such rules) the same shall be adhered to. This will ensure safety of the personnel, plant and equipment. 1. Smoking is not permitted in any part of the operating plant / areas except in smoking booth / locations specifically designated and permitted for smoking. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. Wearing of loose clothes is unsafe. Walk through or across operating plants not to be practiced. Operation of machine / equipment by authorized personnel only. Use of personnel protective equipment to comply with. To take proper precautions and use of fall protection equipment when working at heights. Compliance to confined space entry procedures when entering empty tanks / vessels / reactors or closed locations. To obtain necessary safety permit before start of any repair maintenance work. To provide and maintain protective guards on moving machinery and parts to replace protective guards after completion of maintenance work. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. Not to use compressed air for blowing dust, drying of clothes it is unsafe. Use of empty drums / barrels as support or workbench is unsafe. Removal of left over material / junk after completion of work. Keep plant area clean and free of junk. Keep stairways / platforms / walkways clean. Use of approved safety lights and torches. Use of only flame proof 24 V portable lamps inside tanks / confined locations. ____________________________________________________ Rules & Regulations 1
E & C Division 16.
In case of contamination of clothes with chemicals to follow proper safety instructions according to the chemical's Material Safety Data Sheet (MDDS) supplied by the manufacturer / supplier
17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23.
Not to use solvents for cleaning clothes / hands. Use of only authorized vehicles only with in the plant premises and to driven by licensed persons within the speed limits. Use of photo Flash unit in the operating plant is unsafe . Use of camera only on authorization. Use of drugs / alcoholic drinks / narcotic within the premises prohibited. Carrying of arms and ammunition prohibited. In case of accident / injury follow the procedure as per the E&C HSE Manual.
____________________________________________________ Rules & Regulations 2
E & C Division
SAFETY CODES FOR CONTRACTOR / SUB-CONTRACTOR Following are the general safety codes to be imposed on contractors / subcontractors to ensure safety within the operating plant. These codes should be followed by the commissioning team. In case specific safety codes are available from the client for any specific job, the same should be governing. 1. 2. 3. 4. Smoking and smoking requisites within the plant B/L is strictly prohibited. No spark or flame-producing gadgets like lighter, photo-flash, torch light, electronic equipment is allowed inside the plant area. Entry of automotive vehicles within the plant is restricted. Safety clearance procedure: Any work carried out within the plant must be covered by the work permit system prevailing in the plant- Following types of work normally require work permits. A. B. C. D. E. F. G. H. 5. 6. 7. Any work involving open flame and sparks such as welding, gas cutting, soldering, grinding (hot working). Sand blasting (cold working) Use of gasoline, diesel, electric power driven engine and tools. Entry of vehicles inside the battery limits of process area, tank dykes, pump house, API separators and loading gantries. Entry of personnel into hazardous areas like TEL building, floating roof of storage tanks. Entry of personnel into confined space. Radiography Working on Electrical lines/equipment
All conditions stipulated in the safety permit must be read carefully and complied with. When using gas cylinders they should be used in upright position and complied with safety rules for use of gas cylinders. All personnel to use personnel protection equipment suitable for the job.
__________________________________________________ Rules and Regulations 3
E & C Division 8. 9. 10.
All personnel to follow dress code. All personnel to follow personnel conduct rules. Vehicles to comply with traffic rules regarding speed limit, parking, number of passengers and vehicle fitness with regard to breaks horns, lights, muffler etc.
11. 12.
Vehicle to be driven by authorized person only. When welding is being done proper screen must be provided to proven? Eye injury and guards against fire hazard due to sparks and hot slugs.
13. 14. 15.
All electrical equipment used are properly grounded and fitted with proper 3 pin plugs. All cables in one piece preferable. Workplace to be clean and tidy good housekeeping to be practiced. Ensure that existing fire fighting equipment are not to be obstructed and no material is piled to cause blockage or hindrance to operation.
16.
Use barricades during (i) excavation (ii) hoisting (iii) areas adjudged hazardous by shift in charge (iv) existing property subject to damage by work.
In addition to above basic safety codes, the commissioning team may have to undergo safety induction training, which will be imparted by the Safety Control.
__________________________________________________ Rules and Regulations 4
E & C Division
4.
Safety during Pre-commissioning
Pipework erection All pipes shall be inspected before erection to ensure that they are free from loose contamination. Pipework shall be erected on permanent supports designated for the line. Temporary supports shall be kept to an absolute minimum, but to an extent sufficient to protect nozzles and adjacent piping from excessive loads during the erection. Pipework shall be fitted in place without springing or forcing to avoid undue stressing of the line or strain being placed on a vessel or item of equipment, etc. All temporary pipe spools and supports that are an aid to erection, testing/flushing, sea fastening, etc. are to be specially marked for removal identification.
Flanged joints Before assembly flanges shall be c lean and free from any detritus matter (e.g. rust, dirt or other contamination). The joints shall be brought up flush and square without forcing so that the entire mating surfaces bear uniformly on the gasket and then mated-up with uniform bolt tension.
Valve and equipment flange connections Flange covers shall be retained on all flange connections to valve or equipment, until ready to connect the mating piping. All equipment shall be blanked, either by pressure test blanks, spades or blinds, to stop the ingress of internal pipe debris. Flanges connecting to strain sensitive mechanical equipment e.g. pumps, compressors, turbines, etc. shall be fitted-up in close parallel and lateral alignment prior to tightening the bolting.
__________________________________________________ Precommissioning Activities 1
E & C Division
In general, flange connections to equipment shall be the last connection made on completion of a line or interconnecting system of lines. With the piping flange fitted and prior to bolting-up the joint, the following tolerances shall be maintained: Bolting shall move freely through accompanying bolt-holes at right angle to the flange faces. There shall be a clear gap between two flange faces before gasket installation. There shall be sufficient flexibility to install and replace gaskets.
Gaskets Gaskets shall be treated in accordance with manufacturers'
instructions. Gaskets shall be replaced after opening or dismantling of flange connections. RTJ gaskets are to be lightly smeared on the mating surface with a propriety anti-friction lubricant prior to fitting between the flange grooves. Anti-friction lubricant, compatible with the flange material and process fluid shall be used.
Bolting Bolting shall be in accordance with the requirements in the Piping and valve material standard. Manually pulled flange bolts and studbolts shall extend fully through their nuts with minimum one, maximum five threads. All flanged stud bolts shall be progressively controlled to equalise bolt pressure on the gasket. A detailed procedure shall be developed prior to start. Hydraulic bolt thigthening shall be used on all bolts greater than 1" diameter. Calculation of the required bolt tension value shall be in accordance with the DIN 2505, with the following exeptions: Minimum required bolt tension value shall be multiplied with 1.5. __________________________________________________ Precommissioning Activities 2
E & C Division
Maximum bolt tension value shall not exceed 2/3 of the specified yield of the bolt or maximum allowable stress for the gasket.
Nuts and bolts shall have their grade marks visible after installation. Studbolts cut from long lengths of studding shall have material grade stamped on end of each cut. Bolts larger than 1" shall be protected against mechanical damage and corrosion.
Pipe support Pipe supports shall be in accordance with the relevant pipe support detail drawings developed for the project. Piping shall not be forced to fit with support locations in such a manner that additional stress is introduced. Where spring support are installed the spring shall locked gagged until commissioning/start up. All piping shall be arranged to facilitate supporting, and shall be planned for ease of removal of equipment for inspection and servicing. Pipes shall not normally be supported by other pipes, i.e. individual supporting is required. Vent holes in wear plates and trunnions are generally not required. However, when the wear plate or a trunnion covers a circumferential weld that has not been pressure tested, a vent hole is required for leak detection.
Global tolerances, installation Hook-up termination points shall be within 25mm in all directions. Over length may be provided where required. Installation tolerances of piping components shall be as required by the individual service of the piping component including requirements for: Maintenance access. Position relative to surrounding steelwork, equipment, cable tray
and HVAC duct routings. __________________________________________________ Precommissioning Activities 3
E & C Division
Positioning of pipe supports relative to the structural steel. Pipe stress.
FLUSHING General The initial flushing shall be carried out prior to pressure testing. For austenitic steelwork flushing can be performed after pressure testing, upon agreement. General requirements for flushing for specific systems are listed in table 1, annex B. Procedures for flushing shall be developed prior to start. All pipework shall be free from dirt, grease and temporary protective coating upon completion of flushing.
Hydro flushing Items of equipment that would be sensitive to damage during hydro flushing shall be removed, blocked off or isolated. A list shall be prepared and be part of the flush & test procedure. Ball valves shall be flushed in fully open position. All piping systems shall be flushed using high-pressure jet flushing equipment, such as rotating hose or rotating nozzle. Minimum pressure shall be 600 bar. Below 4", High Velocity Water Flushing (HVWF) may be used. Water velocity shall be a minimum of 10m/s. On systems where high pressure jet flushing cannot be used due to complicated shapes and/or long runs HVWF may be used. The flushing medium shall in general be fresh water. When flushing stainless steel lines, the chloride ion content shall be less than 200 ppm. After flushing, the piping systems shall be completely drained and protected against corrosion. __________________________________________________ Precommissioning Activities 4
E & C Division
Ball valves shall be flushed fully open. Pressurised air shockblowing This method may be used as an initial cleaning method for instrument air, plant air and as an alternative method for initial cleaning of smallbore pipe (less than 2 inch). This method may also be used when there are problems removing trapped liquid in the circuit, or to verify cleanliness of small-bore pipe where video inspection is impossible or inadequate due to pipe dimension or configuration. When using PAS method for cleaning or verification the procedure shall be repeated until cleanliness is acceptable. The air shocking pressure shall never exceed the working pressure of the system and shall never be more than 8 bar. Safety precaution shall be taken like warning to all the personnel working nearby as well as effective barrication to avoid unauthorised entry when this method is used.
Pneumatic flushing In cases where water is not desirable in the piping system (e.g. instrument/utility air), flushing by pressurised air or PAS shall be carried out. When pressurised air is used, the minimum velocity shall be 35m/s. Procedure covering all safety aspects shall be established.
PRESSURE TESTS General The test pressure shall, unless otherwise specified, be in accordance with ASME B31.3. Testing shall not take place with system temperatures 4C or less or where the ambient temperature during test falls by 5C or more, nor during rain or fog unless under suitable cover. Hydrostatic pressure test may however be performed under a lower temperature with a proper frost preventive added to the test water. The following are excluded from pressure tests: __________________________________________________ Precommissioning Activities 5
E & C Division
All small bore instrument control piping downstream of the first piping block valve. Open drains and vents to atmosphere (leak test only).
Test preparation Pressure, temperature and time recorders shall be used for all hydrostatic tests. The pressure shall be shown in bar. Pressure gauges and recorders used to indicate and record test pressure shall be dead weight tested for accuracy according to a procedure, dependent of type of equipment. Minimum of one gauge shall be positioned at the highest point and one recorder to be positioned at the lowest point. Accuracy of pressure gauge shall be at least 1-2% at full scale and 1-2% for the recorder. The test pressure shall be within 60% of the gauge range (20% from top and 20% from bottom). If there is a deviation of more than 2% between gauge and recorder during test, the test shall be stopped and the equipment recalibrate. Piping joints and welds shall not be insulated or physically covered until satisfactory completion of testing in accordance with this specification, except for painting of prefabricated welds. All piping shall be adequately supported before the pressure test. Spring or other variable type supports shall be blocked to prevent movement. Unless otherwise noted, all valves are to be through body tested. First block valve for pressure instruments shall be included in the test. Piping containing check valves shall have the source of test pressure on the upstream side. If this is not possible, the check valve disc shall be removed or jacked open. Ball valves shall be pressure tested in the half open position. Other valves shall be tested in the fully open position. Where the test pressure to be applied to the piping is greater than the maximum allowable test pressure for valves, the valves shall be blinded off on the side to be tested, or removed and replaced by dummy spools. __________________________________________________ Precommissioning Activities 6
E & C Division
Turbines, pumps, compressors and vessels shall be blinded off prior to pressure testing. A list shall be prepared for sensitive equipment that shall be removed, blocked off or isolated during testing, such as relief valves, inline instruments, turbines, pumps, compressors and vessels. This list shall be a part of the test procedure.
Test media For hydrostatic testing the test medium shall in general be fresh water, except that other suitable liquid may be used if: The piping or inline equipment would be adversely affected by water. If the liquid is flammable, it's flash point shall be at least 49C and consideration shall be given to the environment. The liquid is approved to be used.
The chloride ion content of the water used for pressure testing stainless steel lines shall be less than 200 ppm and the line shall be properly drained soon after testing. pH value of the water shall be between 6.5 and 7.5. Carbon steel systems as defined in table 1, annex B shall be tested with an acceptable preservation fluid. The preservation fluid shall be a water impellent and emulsifiable rust preventive lubricating oils that contain detergents and inhibitors that have been specially formulated to prevent rust. For pneumatic testing, the test media shall be oil free, dry air or any inert gas. The use of air for testing shall be limited to a maximum pressure of 7.0 barg. Above this pressure nitrogen shall be used. The extent of pneumatic testing shall be approved. For instrument/utility air systems, where the introduction of water is undesirable, test media shall be air or inert gas.
E & C Division
Hydrostatic testing The test pressure shall be maintained for a sufficient length of time to permit visual examination to be made of all surfaces, welds and connections, but not less than thirty minutes. A one hour test duration shall apply for piping systems with pressure rating class 600# and above. Care shall be taken to ensure that overpressuring due to static head does not take place. The piping systems shall not show any sign of plastic deformation or leakage.
Pneumatic testing The sequence of test pressuring installed systems shall be as follows: A pressure of 0.5 bar shall be introduced in the system and a leak test performed. The pressure shall gradually be increased to 50% of the specified test pressure and kept for minimum 10 minutes to equalise strain. The pressure shall then be increased in steps of 10% of the specified test pressure, until the specified test pressure is reached. At each step, the pressure shall be kept for 10 minutes minimum to equalise strain. The specified test pressure shall be kept for one hour. The pressure shall than be reduced to the design pressure before examining for leakage. The piping systems shall not show any sign of plastic deformation or leakage.
After completion of test The tested systems shall be depressurised by opening the
depressurising valve in the test rig. After depressurisation, all vents and low point drain valves shall be opened and the system shall be thoroughly drained where the test medium is water. Where required, blowing by dry air or Pressurised Air Shock Blowing to remove any trapped water to be performed. __________________________________________________ Precommissioning Activities 8
E & C Division
Systems with drying requirement as defined in table 1, annex B shall be dried out after hydrotesting with dry oil free air with a dew point of -10C. Drying can be terminated when the dew point at the outlet is equal to the dew point at the inlet. Other methods, such as vacuum drying or air shocking, may also be used if the same dryness can be documented. Requirement for drying as defined in table 2, annex C shall take in to consideration the time for start up of system. If more than 3 months to commissioning, drying shall be followed by preservation with nitrogen to keep the pipe system completely dry and to avoid condense. Other alternatives are subject to agreement. Reinstallation of the system shall be performed in accordance with the test procedure. Where permanent or temporary strainers have remained in place for the hydrostatic pressure test, they shall be removed following the test and thoroughly cleaned before reinstalling. Ends of pipes and nozzles shall be fully protected against the ingress of foreign material by the use of caps, plugs or plate blinds sealed with gaskets. These shall not be removed until just prior to final assembly. Flange parallellity and alignment to equipment shall be checked prior to reinstatement. Vent holes in reinforcing pads shall be sealed upon completion of pressure test.
Verification of cleanliness All systems shall be internal visual inspected for acceptable cleanliness by spot check. Internal visual inspection includes the use of Boroscope, video etc. If pipe configuration in critical parts of systems as defined in table 1, annex B is too complicated for visual inspection, the PAS method or other suitable methods shall be used for verification of cleanliness.
E & C Division CHEMICAL CLEANING
Lines to be chemical cleaned shall be identified on the P&ID's and Line Index. A procedure shall describe in detail the steps for chemical cleaning. Chemical cleaning shall include: Degassing. Chemical cleaning/descaling. Neutralisation. Passivation. Water flushing. Drying.
The end result shall be a clean smooth surface. Maximum temperatures used during these operations shall not exceed maximum design temperature for the systems as listed in the Line Index. For equipment such as turbines, generators, pumps and compressors, the piping to be cleaned shall have all sensitive items that can be damaged by the cleaning medium removed or blanked off. Generally, the following items shall not be chemically cleaned (items shall be identified on chemical cleaning are): All instrument tubing downstream the first piping block valve. Piping systems with copper alloy materials. Flexible hoses. Vessels. Exchangers. Pumps. All bolted/screwed valves and instruments.
Removed or blanked off items shall be cleaned separately prior to reinstallation.
E & C Division
The systems to be cleaned shall have high and low point vents and drains installed. "Dead legs" shall be avoided. Cleaning shall be carried out after pressure testing unless otherwise specified. If more than 3 months to start up of commissioning activities, system shall be preserved with nitrogen. Overpressure shall be 0.5 bar.
HOT OIL FLUSHING General Required cleanliness for systems subject to hot oil flushing shall be in accordance with table 1, annex B. A detailed procedure for hot oil flushing shall be developed out prior to start. Filters used for hot oil flushing shall be: 3m ABS for hydraulic systems. <=10m ABS for lube and seal oil.
Filling of lubricant oil shall take place through filters with 10m ABS. Flushing and sampling to verify cleanness shall take place at turbulent flow, upstream any filters. The Reynolds number shall be min. 4000. The level of cleanness shall be documented from an automatic particle counter or a membrane checked in a microscope before a flushing operation is considered finalised. A flowmeter shall be installed to verify flow used during flushing operation. Maximum water content in oil used for flushing shall be less than 500ppm. Marking Piping spools or systems that have been chemical cleaned or hot oil flushed shall be marked in a unique manner. __________________________________________________ Precommissioning Activities 11
E & C Division
5.1
Plant Layout
This Technical Measures Document refers to Plant Layout. General Principles Plant layout is often a compromise between a number of factors such as: The need to keep distances for transfer of materials between plant/storage units to a minimum to reduce costs and risks; The geographical limitations of the site; Interaction with existing or planned facilities on site such as existing roadways, drainage and utilities routings; Interaction with other plants on site; The need for plant operability and maintainability; The need to locate hazardous materials facilities as far as possible from site boundaries and people living in the local neighbourhood; The need to prevent confinement where release of flammable substances may occur; The need to provide access for emergency services; The need to provide emergency escape routes for on-site personnel; The need to provide acceptable working conditions for operators.
The most important factors of plant layout as far as safety aspects are concerned are those to: Prevent, limit and/or mitigate escalation of adjacent events (domino); Ensure safety within on-site occupied buildings; Control access of unauthorised personnel;
Facilitate access for emergency services. In determining plant layout designers should consider the factors in outlined in the following sections. Inherent Safety The major principle in Inherent Safety is to remove the hazard altogether. The best method to achieve this is to reduce the inventory of __________________________________________________ Plant Layout 1
E & C Division
hazardous substances such that a major hazard is no longer presented. However, this is not often readily achievable. Other possible methods to achieve an Inherently Safer design are: Intensification to reduce inventories; Substitution of hazardous substances by less hazardous alternatives; Attenuation to reduce hazardous process conditions i.e. temperature, pressure; Simpler systems/processes to reduce potential loss of containment
or possibility of errors causing a hazardous event; Fail-safe designs e.g. valve position on failure. Plant layout considerations to achieve Inherent Safety are mainly those concerned with domino effects (see below). The Dow / Mond Indices These hazard indices are useful for evaluating processes or projects, ranking them against existing facilities, and assigning incident classifications. They provides a comparative measure of the overall risk of fire and explosion of a process, and are useful tools in the plant layout development stage since they enable objective spacing distances to be taken into account at all stages. Although these are useful rule-of thumb methodologies for first consideration of plant layout, they do not replace risk assessment. The distances derived between plant units using these systems are based upon engineering judgement and some degree of experience rather than any detailed analysis. Domino Effects Hazard assessment of site layout is critical to ensure consequences of loss of containment and chances of escalation are minimised. Domino may be by fire, explosion (pressure wave and missiles) or toxic gas cloud causing loss of control of operations in another location. __________________________________________________ Plant Layout 2
E & C Division
Fire A fire can spread in four ways: Direct burning (including running liquid fires); Convection; Radiation; Conduction. The spread of fire from its origin to other parts of the premises can be prevented by vertical and horizontal compartmentation using fireresisting walls and floors. Consideration should also be given to the spread of flammable material via drains, ducts and ventilation systems. Delayed ignition following a release may result in spread of flames through such systems via dispersed flammable gases and vapours. Protection against domino effects by convection, conduction and radiation can be achieved by inherent safety principles i.e. ensuring that the distances between plant items are sufficient to prevent overheating of adjacent plants compromising safety of those plants also. Where this is not possible due to other restrictions, other methods such as fire walls, active or passive fire protection may be considered. Explosion Explosion propagation may be directly by pressure waves or indirectly by missiles. As for fires, inherently safe methods that should be considered are: arranging separation distances such that damage to adjacent plants will not occur even in the worst case; provision of barriers e.g. blast walls, location in strong buildings; protecting plant against damage e.g. provision of thicker walls on vessels; directing explosion relief vents away from vulnerable areas e.g. other plants or buildings, roadways near site boundaries. Toxic Gas Releases Toxic gas releases may cause domino effects by rendering adjacent plants inoperable and injuring operators. Prevention/mitigation of such effects may be affected by provision of automatic control systems using __________________________________________________ Plant Layout 3
E & C Division
inherently safer principles and a suitable control room (see section below on Occupied Buildings). Reduction of Consequences of Event On and Off Site
In addition to the measures described above, Plant Layout design techniques applicable to the reduction of the risks from release of flammable or toxic materials include: Locating all high-volume storage of flammable / toxic material well outside process areas; Locating hazardous plant away from main roadways through the site; Fitting remote-actuated isolation valves where high inventories of hazardous materials may be released into vulnerable areas; Provision of ditches, dykes, embankments, sloping terrain to contain and control releases and limit the safety and environmental effects; Siting of plants within buildings as secondary containment; Siting of plants in the open air to ensure rapid dispersion of minor releases of flammable gases and vapours and thus prevent concentrations building up which may lead to flash fires and explosions; Hazardous area classification for flammable gases, vapours and dusts to designate areas where ignition sources should be
eliminated. Risk management techniques should be used to identify control measures that can be adopted to reduce the consequences of on or off site events. See references cited in further reading material. Positioning of Occupied Buildings The distance between occupied buildings and plant buildings will be governed by the need to reduce the dangers of explosion, fire and toxicity. In particular, evacuation routes should not be blocked by poor plant layout, and personnel with more general site responsibilities should usually be housed in buildings sited in a non-hazard area near the main entrance. Consideration should be given to siting of occupied buildings
__________________________________________________ Plant Layout 4
E & C Division
outside the main fence. In all cases occupied buildings should not be sited downwind of hazardous plant areas. Aggregation / Trapping of Flammable Vapours To avoid aggregation and trapping of flammable / toxic vapours which could lead to a hazardous event, buildings should be designed so that all parts of the building are well ventilated by natural or forced ventilation. Flammable storages should be sited in the open air so that minor leaks or thermal outbreathing can be dissipated by natural ventilation. Segregation of Incompatible Substances (particularly in warehouses / storage areas) This is detailed in the Technical Measures Document on Segregation of Hazardous Materials.
__________________________________________________ Plant Layout 5
E & C Division
5.2 Alarm Systems Alarm systems alert operators to plant conditions, such as deviation from normal operating limits and to abnormal events, which require timely action or assessment. Alarm systems are not normally safety related, but do have a role in enabling operators to reduce the demand on the safety-related systems, thus improving overall plant safety. However, where a risk reduction of better than 10-1 failures on demand is claimed then the alarm system, including the operator, is a safety related system, which requires a suitable safety integrity level. EEMUA 191 Alarm systems - a guide to design, management and procurement considers alarm settings, the human interface (alarm presentation), alarm processing and system management controls for both safety related and other alarm systems. It provides the following guidance in regard to safety related alarm systems: The alarm system should be independent from the process control system and other alarms unless it has also been designated safety related; The operator should have a clear written alarm response procedure for each alarm which his simple, obvious and invariant, and in which he is trained; The alarms should be presented in an obvious manner, distinguishable from other alarms, have the highest priority, and remain on view at all times when it is active;
The claimed operator workload and performance should be stated and verified. Alarms which are not designated as safety should be carefully designed to ensure that they fulfil their role in reducing demands on safety related systems. For all alarms, regardless of their safety designation, attention is required to ensure that under abnormal condition such as severe disturbance, onset of hazard, or emergency situations, the alarm system is remains effective given the limitations of human response. The extent to which __________________________________________________ Alarms/Trips/Interlocks 1
E & C Division
the alarm system survives common cause failures, such as a power loss, should also be adequately defined. Alarm settings The type of alarm and its setting should be established so as to enable the operator to make the necessary assessment and take the required timely action. Settings should be documented and controlled in accordance with the alarm system management controls.
Human interface (alarm presentation) The human interface should be suitable. Alarms may be presented either on annunciator panel, individual indicators, VDU screen, or programmable display device. Alarms lists should be carefully designed to ensure that high priority alarms are readily identified, that low priority alarms are not overlooked, and that the list remains readable even during times of high alarm activity or with repeat alarms. Alarms should be prioritised in terms of which alarms require the most urgent operator attention. Alarms should be presented within the operators field of view, and use consistent presentation style (colour, flash rate, naming convention). Each alarm should provide sufficient operator information for the alarm condition, plant affected, action required, alarm priority, time of alarm and alarm status to be readily identified. The visual display device may be augmented by audible warnings, which should at a level considerably higher than the ambient noise at the signal frequency. Where there are multiple audible warnings, they should be designed so that they are readily distinguished from each other and from emergency alarm systems. They should be designed to avoid distraction of the operator in high operator workload situations. Where both constant frequency and variable frequency (including pulsed or intermittent) signals are used, then the later should denote a higher level of danger or a more urgent need for intervention.
__________________________________________________ Alarms/Trips/Interlocks 2
E & C Division
Alarm processing The alarms should be processed in such a manner as to avoid operator overload at all times (alarm floods). The alarm processing should ensure that fleeting or repeating alarms do not result in operator overload even under the most severe conditions. The presentation of alarms should not exceed that which the operator is capable of acting upon, or alternatively the alarms should be prioritised and presented in such a way that the operator may deal with the most important alarms without distraction of the others. Applicable alarm processing techniques include grouping and first-up alarms, eclipsing of lower grade alarms (e.g. suppression high alarm when the high-high activates) suppression of out of service plant alarms, suppression of selected alarms during certain operating modes, automatic alarm load shedding and shelving. Care should be taken in the use of shelving or suppression to ensure that controls exist to ensure that alarms are returned to an active state when they are relevant to plant operation. Alarm system management procedures Management systems should be in place to ensure that the alarm system is operated, maintained and modified in a controlled manner. Alarm response procedures should be available, and alarm parameters should be documented. The performance of the alarms system should be assessed and monitored to ensure that it is effective during normal and abnormal plant conditions. The monitoring should include evaluation of the alarm presentation rate, operator acceptance and response times, operator workload, standing alarm count and duration, repeat or nuisance alarms, and operator views of operability of the system. Monitoring may be achieved by regular and systematic auditing. Matters which are not worthy of operator attention should not be alarmed. __________________________________________________ Alarms/Trips/Interlocks 3
E & C Division
Logging may be a suitable alternative for engineering or discrepancy events to prevent unnecessary standing alarms. A system for assessing the significance of such logged events to ensure timely intervention by maintenance personnel may be required. Protection Systems (Trips and Interlocks)
Protective tripping systems provide a defense against excursions beyond the safe operating limits by detecting a excursions beyond set points related to the safe operating limits (i.e. the onset of a hazard) and taking timely action to maintain or restore the equipment under control to a safe state. Trips should not be self-resetting unless adequate justification has been made. Protective interlocks prevent those control actions which might initiate a hazard from being undertaken by an operator or process control system, and are by nature self-resetting. Protection systems should indicate that a demand to perform a safety function has been made and that the necessary actions have been performed. Independence Protective systems should be sufficiently independent of the control system or other protective systems (electrical/electronic or programmable). Where there is an interface between systems (e.g. for indication, monitoring or shared components) or shared utilities (e.g. power), environment (e.g. accommodation, wiring routes) or management systems (maintenance procedures, personnel), then the method of achieving independence should be defined, and common cause failures adequately considered. Measures to defend against common mode failures due to environmental interactions may include physical separation or segregation of system elements (sensors, wiring, logic, actuators or utilities) of different protective systems. Independence will also be required for protection against systematic and __________________________________________________ Alarms/Trips/Interlocks 4
E & C Division
common mode faults. Measures may include use of diverse technology for different protective systems. Where more than one E/E/PES protective system is used to provide the required risk reduction for a safety function, then adequate independence should be achieved by diverse technology, construction, manufacturer or software as necessary to achieve the requires safety integrity level. Dependence on utilities The action required from the protective system depend upon the nature of the process. The actions may be passive in nature, such as simple isolation of plant or removal of power, or they may be active in that continued or positive action is required to maintain or restore a safe state, for example by injection of inhibitor into the process, or provision of emergency cooling. Active protective measures have a high dependence upon utilities, and may be particularly vulnerable to common mode failures. The scope of the protective system therefore includes all utilities upon which it depends, and they should have an integrity consistent and contributory to that of the remainder of the system. Measures taken to defend against common mode failure of utilities will be commensurate with the level of safety integrity required, but may include standby or uninterruptable/reservoir supplies for electricity, air, cooling water, or other utilities essential for performance of the safety function. Such measures should themselves be of sufficient integrity. Survivability and external influences The protective system should be adequately protected against environmental influences, the effects of the hazard against which it is protecting, and other hazards which may be present. Environmental influences include power system failure or characteristics, lightning, electromagnetic radiation, flammable atmospheres, corrosive or humid atmospheres, ingress of water or dust, temperature, rodent attack, chemical attack, vibration physical impact, and other plant hazards.
E & C Division
Degradation of protection against environmental influences during maintenance and testing should have been considered and appropriate measures taken. e.g. Use of radios by maintenance personnel may be prohibited during testing of a protective system with the cabinet door open where the cabinet provides protection against EMR. Protection against random hardware faults The architecture of the protective system should be designed to protect against random hardware failure. It should be demonstrated that the required reliability has been achieved commensurate with the require integrity level. Defensive measures may include high reliability elements, automatic diagnostic features to reveal faults, and redundancy of elements (e.g. 2 out of 3 voting for sensors) to provide fault tolerance. Protection common mode failures Diversity of elements is not effective for protection against random hardware faults, but is useful in defense against common mode failures within a protective system. Protection systematic failures Protection against systematic hardware and software failures may be achieved by appropriate safety lifecycles. Sensing Sensors include their connection to the process, both of which should be adequately reliable. A measure of their reliability is used in confirming the integrity level of the protective system. This measure should take into account the proportion of failures of the sensor and its process connection, which are failures to danger. Dangerous failures can be minimised by a number of measures such as: Use of measurement which is as direct as possible, (e.g. pneumercators provide an inferred level measurement but actually measure back pressure against a head and are sensitive to changes in density due to temperature variations within the process, and to balance gas flow, upon which they are dependant); __________________________________________________ Alarms/Trips/Interlocks 6
E & C Division
Control of isolation or bleed valves to prevent uncoupling from the process between proof tests or monitoring such that their operation causes a trip; Use of good engineering practice and well proven techniques for process connections and sample lines to prevent blockage, hydraulic locking, sensing delays etc.; Use of analogue devices (transmitters) rather than digital (switches); Use of positively actuated switches operating in a positive mode together with idle current (de-energise to trip); Appropriate measures to protect against the effects of the process on the process connection or sensor, such as vibration, corrosion, and erosion; Monitoring of protective system process variable measurement (PV) and comparison against the equivalent control system PV either by the operator or the control system.
Proof testing procedures should clearly set out how sensors are reinstated and how such reinstatement is verified after proof testing. Maintenance procedures should define how sensors/transmitters are calibrated with traceability back to national reference standards by use of calibrated test equipment. Other matters which will need to have been considered are: Cross sensitivities of analysers to other fluids which might be present in the process; Reliability of sampling systems; Protection against systematic failures on programmable sensors/analysers. The measures taken will depend on the level of variability and track record of the software. Smart transmitters with limited variability software which are extensively proven in use may require no additional measures other than those related to control of operation, maintenance, and modification, whereas bespoke software for an on-line analyser may require a defense in depth against systematic failures ; __________________________________________________ Alarms/Trips/Interlocks 7
E & C Division
Signal conditioning (e.g. filtering) and which may affect the sensor response times; Degradation of measurement signals (distance between sensor and transmitter may be important); Accuracy, repeatability, hysteresis and common mode effects (e.g. effects of gauge pressure or temperature on differential pressure measurement); Integrity of process connections and sensors for containment (sample or impulse lines, instrument pockets are often a weak link in process containment measures).
Use of SMART instruments requires adequate diagnostic coverage and fault tolerance and measures to protect against systematic failures (software design/integration, inadvertent re-ranging during maintenance). Measures may include use of equipment in non-smart mode (analogue signal output, no remote setting) and equipment of stable design for which there is an extensive record of reliability under similar circumstances. Actuators and signal conversion Actuators are the final control elements or systems and include contactors and the electrical apparatus under control, valves (control and isolation), including pilots valves, valve actuators and positioners, power supplies and utilities which are required for the actuator to perform its safety function, all of which should be adequately reliable. A measure of their reliability is used in confirming the integrity level of the protective system. This measure should take into account the proportion of failures of the actuator under the relevant process conditions which are failures to danger. Actuators are frequently the most unreliable part of the tripping process. Dangerous failures can be minimised by a number of measures such as: Use of fail-safe principles so that the actuator takes up the tripped state on loss of signal or power (electricity, air etc.). e.g. held open, spring return actuator; Provision of uninterruptable or reservoir supplies of sufficient capacity for essential power;
E & C Division
Failure detection and performance monitoring (end of travel switches, time to operate, brake performance, shaft speed, torque etc.) during operation; Actuator exercising or partial stroke shutoff simulation during normal operation to reveal failures or degradation in performance. Note this is not proof testing but may reduce probability of failure by improved diagnostic coverage
Overrating of equipment.
Other matters which should have been considered are: Valves should be properly selected for their duty, and it should not be assumed that a control valve can satisfactorily perform isolation functions; Actuators may also include programmable control elements (e.g. SMART instruments) particularly within positioners and variable speed drives and motor control centers. Modern motor control centers may use programmable digital addressing. This introduces a significant risk of introduction of systematic failure and failure modes which cannot be readily predicted. Such an arrangement should be treated with caution. It is normally reasonably practicable for trip signal to act directly upon the final contactor; Potential for failure due to hydraulic locking between valves (e.g. trace-heated lines between redundant shutoff valves).
Logic systems Commonly, the logic systems for protective systems are electronic, but programmable and other technology fluidic/pneumatic) have been used. systems (magnetic or
The architecture of the logic system will be determined by the hardware fault tolerance requirements, for example dual redundant channels. Where a high level of integrity for the system is required (SIL3 or SIL4) then diverse hardware between channels may be employed. This should not be confused with diversity of independent protective systems. Logic systems are likely to incorporate provisions for fault alarms and __________________________________________________ Alarms/Trips/Interlocks 9
E & C Division
overrides, for which there should be suitable management control arrangements. They may also provide monitoring of input and output signal lines for detection of wiring (open circuit, short circuit) and sensors/actuators (stuck-at, out of range). Such monitoring may initiate an alarm, a trip action or, in a voting arrangement, disable the faulty element. Software based systems should be adequately protected against systematic failures, for example by an appropriate hardware and software safety lifecycles, and suitable techniques and quality systems. Wiring and communications (signal transmission) Transmitters, communications devices and wiring systems should be arranged to meet the requirements for survivability, protection against External influences and independence. Independent systems or redundant channels should not share multicore cables with each other or power circuits, and may require diverse routes depending upon the safety integrity level to be achieved. Measures to protect against failures include: Use of fail-safe principles such as DC model (e.g. 4-20 ma loop) for analogue signal transmission diagnosis and alarm of out of range, abnormal, or fault states (such as stuck-at) with defined control system responses for both the sensor and transmitter; Cable selection (screening etc.); Protection of cables against fire, chemical attack, physical damage etc.; Physical separation or segregation of cables and cable routes; Routing in benign environments; Use of optical fibres to protect against electrical interference; Careful attention to lightning protection of data links between buildings.
Use of fieldbus or other digital communication protocols in protective systems should be considered a novel approach requiring a thorough evaluation and demonstration of the safety integrity. __________________________________________________ Alarms/Trips/Interlocks 10
E & C Division
Utilities Utilities which are required for the protective system to perform its safety function may include power supplies such as electricity, air, inhibitor materials and their propellants, inert gas such as nitrogen, cooling water, steam, pilot flames and their gases all of which should be adequately reliable. Measures such as redundancy, and uninterruptable/reservoir supplies, and availability monitoring (e.g. loss of air alarm) may be required. Confirmation that the designed capacity of reserves is adequate should be demonstrated by test. Utilities may also introduce external influences into the protective systems (e.g. from electrical supplies). Measures to protect against external influences may include:
Under/Over voltage protection; Overcurrent and short circuit protection; Use of an uninterruptable power supply or voltage conditioning or filtering; Careful attention to lightning protection and equipotential bonding.
Proof testing The probability of failure on demand, or the failure rate of a protective system is critically dependent upon the frequency of proof testing and its ability to detect previously unrevealed failures of the system. The proof test interval should therefore be established accordingly, and as a rule of thumb for low demand systems, should be an order of magnitude less than the mean time between failure of the system and the demand rate. Proof test procedures should be available which specify the
success/failure criteria and detail how the test will be performed safely, including any management arrangements, operating restrictions and competence of personnel. The tests should be arranged to reveal all dangerous failures which have been unrevealed in normal operation including the following measures: __________________________________________________ Alarms/Trips/Interlocks 11
E & C Division
Tests performed at the conditions which would be expected at trip. (Where test under trip conditions cannot be performed, for example for safety reasons, then measures to ensure that potential failures at trip conditions will be revealed should be clarified); End to end tests at appropriate intervals, including proving sample/impulse lines. (Different elements of the protective system may require proof testing at different intervals).
Operation Procedures should be available which detail the operation of the protective system including: Override management (authorisation, security, recording, monitoring and review of overrides, reset requirements); Operating instruction for trips; Instructions for response to equipment faults including fault alarms. (There should be procedural arrangements in place to ensure timely repair so that mean time to repair criteria can be met).
Maintenance Procedures should be available for maintenance activities including: Maintenance instructions; Control of spares (segregation of faulty or non-conforming parts, identification to prevent interchange of similar parts etc.); Competence of maintenance personnel; Operating restriction during maintenance; Control of software back-ups and memory media (floppy disks, files
on hard disks on portable PCs etc.); Post maintenance reinstatement and proof testing. For systems where a high diagnostic coverage is claimed, for example high integrity high systems, the probability of failure (expressed as failure rate) is critically dependent upon the mean time to repair the faults revealed. For such systems, the repair performance should monitored and reviewed against the design criteria.
E & C Division
Modification A management system for control of modifications should be available to ensure that: Unauthorised modifications are prevented; Authorised modifications are not ill conceived; Safety verification to confirm that the required safety function and integrity have been maintained; Designed and implementation is carried out by competent persons.
Remote diagnostic systems Remote diagnostic systems have the potential to cause danger by initiating unexpected operations or by affecting safety functions by software/parameter modification or by diverting the control system processor from time critical functions. The need for remote diagnosis should be justified, a risk assessment completed, and measures taken to ensure that safety is not affected by normal operation or malfunction of the diagnostic system, including the remote diagnostic terminal and software, communication link, and the control system diagnostic interface and software. Consideration should be given to: Security and control of access; Communication between diagnostician and plant personnel; Restricted mode of operation; passive (monitoring only), active (control/operator functions), interactive (software change possible); Potential for operation outside restricted mode under fault conditions; Protection of safety functions from unauthorised modification; Change control; Competence of personnel.
E & C Division SHE Manual (Commissioning) ____________________________________________________ 5.3 Control Room Design
This Technical Measures Document refers to codes, standards and best practice applicable to the design of control rooms. General Principles There are two major aspects of control room design that should be taken into account in the Safety Report these are: the suitability of the structure of the control room to withstand possible major hazards events; and the layout of control rooms and the arrangement of panels, VDUs etc to ensure effective ergonomic operation of the plant in normal circumstances and in an emergency. Control Room Structure For large plants, control rooms are likely to be situated in separate buildings away from the process plant which they serve. For medium or small plants control rooms may be within the plant building or control panels may be located local to the plant. Whatever the location, control rooms should be designed to ensure that the risks to the occupants of the control room are within acceptable limits and that it is suitable for the purposes of maintaining plant control, should the emergency response plan require it, following any foreseeable, undesirable event within the plant. Events that may affect the control room are: Vapour Cloud Explosions (VCEs) Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour Explosions (BLEVEs) Pressure bursts Exothermic reactions Toxic gas releases Fires, including pool fires, jet fires, flash fires and fire balls. The threat from explosions and pressure bursts should be considered in the structural design of control building. A methodology for this is presented in the recent CIA/CISHEC guidance CIA Guidance for the location and design of occupied building on chemical manufacturing sites. This considers the vulnerability of the building to possible overpressures associated with particular events. Buildings should be designed to withstand an overpressure that will ensure that risks to individuals within the building are below acceptable limits. Particular attention should be given to the provision of windows, the presence of heavy equipment on roofs (e.g. air conditioners) and the ability of internal fixtures to withstand the building shaking. If windows are present, consideration should be given to the use of laminated or polycarbonate glass, to prevent serious injury to occupiers of the control room in the event of an overpressure. ALARP principles should be applied in these considerations
______________________________________________________________________
Control System
E & C Division SHE Manual (Commissioning) ____________________________________________________ and cost benefit used to determine if additional measures should be applied. In consideration of toxic gas releases the control room should provide a safe haven for its occupants. This will include arranging that the building is adequately sealed to prevent ingress of gases to levels of concentration that will affect the health and thereby the ability of the operators to maintain control of the plant. Careful consideration of the building ventilation system is required to ensure that air intakes are situated away from areas that may be affected or to arrange that there is no air intake during an incident, preferably by closure of an automatic valve linked to a gas analyser. Measures for protection from fires should ensure the control room will withstand thermal radiation effects without collapse and that smoke ingress is controlled. Materials of construction should be fire resistant for the duration of any possible fire event. Smoke ingress may be controlled in a similar manner to toxic gas ingress. Each of these methodologies should be applied to control rooms within buildings as well as separate control buildings. Control panels on the plant itself cannot be so easily be protected, therefore diversity and redundancy should be applied to ensure that plant control can be maintained in an emergency. Risk Assessments should be undertaken to demonstrate that primary and secondary (domino) risks are within acceptable limits. Human Factors/Ergonomics Operators should be able to demonstrate that appropriate human factors considerations have been given to the design, commissioning, and operation of control rooms under both normal and abnormal plant operating conditions to reduce the frequency of human error due to control room deficiencies. It is vitally important that a control room and its operators are considered as a whole system and not in isolation of each other. For example a well designed control room for use by 4 operators is dangerous when staffed by 3 operators. Similarly, the best-trained operators cannot guarantee high reliability in a poorly designed control room. Factors to be taken in account are included on the following paragraphs. Environmental issues Layout Control room dimensions should take into account the 5th and 95th percentile user.
______________________________________________________________________
Control System
E & C Division SHE Manual (Commissioning) ____________________________________________________ The design of the control room should be derived from an appropriate task analysis method, such as link analysis or hierarchical task analysis. Emergency exits should accommodate egress by the 99th percentile user. Access and egress should be considered for disabled operators. Adequate access should be provided throughout the control room. However, the layout should discourage flow from general circulation areas to ensure that necessary lines of sight are not obscured. If there are a number of control rooms operating on the same system they should adopt similar layouts to ensure consistency. Operational links between control room operators, such as communications and lines of site should be considered during the design stage. The layout should not hinder verbal and non-verbal communication and should facilitate team working. The layout of the control room should reflect the allocation of responsibility and the requirements for supervision. The layout should be effective under high and low staffing levels. Circulation of all personal should be achieved with the minimum of disruption to operators. Where supervisory positions will increase the amount of personnel circulation, it is recommended that these positions are located close to main entrances. Distances between workstations should mean that operators are not sitting within each others intimate zones. As a guide the minimum spacing distance should be between 300 - 700 mm.
Maintenance Adequate access should be provided so that inadvertent operation of equipment during maintenance is not possible. Behind panel equipment should be appropriately coded to reduce the potential for human error. Thermal environment Temperature and airflow should be adjustable. As a guide, comfortable temperature for office work should be between 18.3C and 20.0C with airflow between 0.11 and 0.15 m/s. Visual environment Lighting should be such that it does not create veiling reflections on VDUs or other reflective surfaces that require monitoring. The type of lighting should be adequate for the task. i.e. for office work a lux (lux is the unit of illuminance - measured using a light meter at the work surface) figure of between 500 - 800 is suggested. There should be no perceptible flicker from strip lighting.
______________________________________________________________________
Control System
E & C Division SHE Manual (Commissioning) ____________________________________________________ It is desirable to provide adjustable lighting for control rooms that are manned 24 hours a day. During night-time operation lighting is often dimmed. Windows in control rooms should not cause veiling reflections on reflective surfaces. Adequate means of blocking out direct sunlight should be provided. Auditory environment The average noise level within the control room shall not exceed 85 dB(A) during the length of the working day. For office work a noise level below 40 dB(A) is not desirable as it can cause interference between operators. Prolonged, very low or very high frequency noises should be avoided. Noise levels should not interfere with communications, warning signals, mental performance (i.e. be distracting). Man Machine Interface (MMI) For mental workload, conditions of over and under-arousal should be avoided. The duration of tasks that have an associated low or high level of mental workload should be limited. Both these extremes will increase the likelihood of human error affecting the system. The design of the MMI should be based on a full Task Analysis. An interface should provide the operator with the general following information: After initiating an action within a system the operator should be clearly informed of the result of their action. If there is a delay in the system that prevents the operator from being informed of the result of his/her action, the system should inform the operator of this fact. If an action is made in error then it should be possible to reverse such an action where it would not be detrimental to plant safety to do so. The system should inform the operator of any deviations from safe operating levels. Alarms All employees and contractors on site should know what each alarm means and what the required response is, if the cause of the alarm has the potential to affect them. An alarm should reset automatically if the fault that generated it is rectified.
______________________________________________________________________
Control System
E & C Division SHE Manual (Commissioning) ____________________________________________________ Alarm messages should be presented in a standard format, based upon existing conventions. Alarm messages should clearly inform the operator of the reason for the alarm. Following an alarm response required by the operator should be clear. The coding of alarms should not be based purely on colour, as colour blind operators will be unable to recognise what the alarm indicates. Alarm signals should be at least 10 dB(A) over the background noise of the control room. Alarms should not prevent effective communication within the control room. An alarm log should be provided to for diagnostic purposes. The design of the alarm system should prevent masking and flooding of alarms. Masking is where one alarm noise masks a similar sounding alarm preventing the operator from detecting the signal. Flooding happens when a system alarms which has a knock on effect on other related systems, the result of which is the triggering of myriad other alarms - flooding the control room with sound.
Coding techniques Coding should follow international conventions. Arbitrary coding by operators can actually propagate, rather than mitigate, human error if not carried out correctly. Coding should be consistent across plant. Coding should be used appropriately. Example methods of coding are: Colour Flash Brightness Inverse video/highlighting Sound frequency Sound type Shape 2D/3D Symbols Coding should be used redundantly where colour is one of the coding methods. Designing displays Text The language used should always be capable of being easily understood by the operator. Active rather than passive language should be used. Text should be left justified.
______________________________________________________________________
Control System
E & C Division SHE Manual (Commissioning) ____________________________________________________ Sans serif fonts should be used as these have been found to be the most legible. An example of a sans serif font is Ariel.
Labels Labelling should be used consistently across plant. Labels should be used appropriately. The relationship between labels and the equipment they refer to should be clear. Labels should be easily read. Standard abbreviations should be used where abbreviations are required. Display devices Display devices should be appropriate for the type of information they are presenting. Display devices should be grouped logically to improve signal detection. It is recommended that formal task analysis methods be performed to determine the optimum arrangement for displays and their associated controls. The relationship between a control and its associated display should be obvious. The operator should be able to easily understand display feedback. The response to this feedback should be obvious, wherever possible. The control method provided for navigation around displays should be appropriate for the task. Graphics Appropriate presentation methods should be used for information. A simple guide is presented below:
Method Numeric Advantage Accurate quantitative information Quickly read Easy to check whether data is within limits Possible to mark alarm limits Displays rate of change well. Easily compared to other similarly presented data. Disadvantage Cannot illustrate rate of change or approach to limit Rapidly changing data is unreadable Difficult to locate individual data items if presented in a list or table. Movement can potentially distract operators. Slow read time. Inaccurate if numerical value has to be derived.
Bar charts/analog ue dials
______________________________________________________________________
Control System
E & C Division SHE Manual (Commissioning) ____________________________________________________

Provides at a glance appreciation of operating conditions Ideal for showing plant configurations. Can improve operator situational awareness of plant. Ideal for presenting continuously changing information. Presents rate of change in an easily understood format. Good for comparing data plots Provides historical data over time
Pictorial displays
Operators mental model of the plant may differ from the mimic. Can be very difficult to learn.
Trend displays
Inaccurate if numerical value has to be derived. Only four parameters can be displayed
Mimics should follow current conventions for symbols etc. Mimics should be user tested prior installation to ensure that they are compatible with the end users mental model of the plant.
Anthropometry Reach Control desk/panels should conform to reach distances for the 5th percentile operator. Seating Seating should be anthropometrically sound and should be usable by both 5th and 95th percentile operators. Adjustment should be provided to allow the operator set up the chair to a configuration that is comfortable. Seating should not promote a slumped posture. Posture The workstation should be designed so that it allows the operator to regularly change their posture or move around the room. This should not however, be during primary control duties or during an emergency scenario.
______________________________________________________________________
Control System
E & C Division
5.4
Corrosion / Selection of Materials
This Technical Measures Document covers the corrosion of materials and the selection of materials of construction. Reference is made to relevant codes of practice and standards. Introduction Corrosion is the largest single cause of plant and equipment breakdown in the process industries. For most applications it is possible to select materials of construction which are completely resistant to attack by the process fluids, but the cost of such an approach is often prohibitive. In practice it is usual to select materials which corrode slowly at a known rate and to make an allowance for this in specifying the material thickness. However, a significant proportion of corrosion failures occur due to some form of localised corrosion, which results in failure in a much shorter time than would be expected from uniform wastage. Additionally, it is important to take into account that external atmospheric corrosion leads to many instances of loss of containment and tends to be a greater problem than internal corrosion. All these aspects of corrosive behaviour need to be addressed both at plant design time and during the life of the plant. General Principles The operator should demonstrate that procedures are in place to ensure that corrosion and the selection of the correct materials of construction are considered at the process design stage. Additionally the operator should demonstrate that it has appropriate inspection and maintenance programmes in place in order to prevent corrosion causing loss of containment from its process operations. In doing so the following should be considered: Process Fluid Corrosion Corrosion in metallic components occurs when pure metals and their alloys form stable compounds with the process fluid by chemical reaction or electrochemical processes resulting in surface wastage. Appreciable corrosion can be permitted for tanks and piping if anticipated and allowed for in design thickness, but essentially no corrosion can be permitted in __________________________________________________ Corrosion / Selection of Material 1
E & C Division
fine mesh wire screens, orifice plates and other items in which small changes in dimensions are critical. Rates of corrosion can be heavily affected by temperature changes and whilst a material of construction may be suitable at one temperature it may not be appropriate for use at a higher temperature with the same process fluid. The corrosion of non-metallic materials is essentially a physiochemical process that manifests itself as swelling, cracking or softening of the material of construction. In many instances nonmetallic materials will prove to be attractive from an economic and performance view. The use of various substances as additives to process streams to inhibit corrosion has found widespread use and is generally most economically attractive in recirculation systems, however it has also been found to be attractive in some once through systems such as those encountered in the petroleum industry. Typical inhibitors used to prevent corrosion of iron or steel in aqueous solutions are chromates, phosphates, and silicates. In acid solutions organic sulphides and amides are effective. Localised Corrosion There are many forms of localised corrosion than can lead to early failure of equipment. The prevention of corrosion should be addressed at the mechanical design stage and proper design to minimise local corrosion should include free and complete drainage, minimising crevices, no dead spots in pipework and ease of cleaning and inspection. Some of the more common types of local corrosion are briefly discussed in this section. Pitting often occurs where certain impurities such as chlorides are present in process streams and cooling waters. This is an extreme form of localised corrosion. Once initiated pits are usually self-accelerating and can result in rapid failures. Many metals suffer from stress corrosion cracking under certain
conditions. In piping the most frequent failures from stress corrosion cracking occur with austenitic stainless steels in contact with solutions
__________________________________________________ Corrosion / Selection of Material 2
E & C Division
containing chloride. Even trace quantities of chlorides can cause problems at temperatures above 60C. Crevice corrosion may occur where liquid is trapped between close fitting metal surfaces, or between a metal surface or a non metallic material such as a gasket. Attention to detail at the design and fabrication stage should be given to areas such as jointing to prevent crevice corrosion. Localised erosion can occur where equipment orientation causes fluid velocities to accelerate such as at bends. Some chemicals can be handled in carbon steel piping because they form protective coatings of ferric compounds in pipework. Careful design to ensure the coating is not eroded is necessary. External Corrosion Exterior surface corrosion or rusting of pipework occurs by the formation of iron oxides. Painting to an appropriate specification will significantly extend the period to the onset of corrosion but the durability of the paint finish is largely dependent on the quality of the surface preparation. Improperly installed insulation can provide ideal conditions for corrosion and should be weatherproofed or otherwise protected from moisture and spills to avoid contact of the wet material on equipment surfaces. Application of an impervious coating such as bitumen to the exterior of the pipework is beneficial in some circumstances. Cathodic protection is an electrochemical method of corrosion control which has found widespread application in the protection of carbon steel underground structures such as pipelines and tanks from soil corrosion. The process equipment metal surface is made the cathode in an electrolytic circuit to prevent metal wastage. Anodic protection is less commonly used and relies on an external potential control system to maintain the metal in a passive condition. This form of corrosion protection has found practical application in the sulphuric acid manufacturing industry.
E & C Division
Materials Selection Corrosion rates are expressed in terms of inches per year of surface wastage and are used to provide a corrosion allowance in the design thickness of equipment such as vessels and pipework. Operators will often use data based on historical experience from plant operations to aid them in determining appropriate corrosion allowances. Alternatively corrosion charts are widely available that give corrosion rates for many combinations of materials of construction and process fluids and normally a range of values will be provided for various process temperatures. In some instances, particularly where there is a mixture of chemicals present, appropriate data may not exist and corrosion tests may be necessary in order to determine the suitability of equipment. Operators should be able to demonstrate the use of corrosion allowances in equipment specification and design. The sources of data used should be traceable. Whilst carbon and stainless steels are commonly used materials of construction, increasing use is being made of nonmetallic and lined or plastic process equipment. The selection of the material of construction should taken into account worst case process conditions that may occur under foreseeable upset conditions and should be applied to all components including valves, pipe fittings, instruments and gauges. Both composition (e.g. chlorides, moisture) and temperature deviations can have a significant direct effect on the rate of corrosion. The operator should demonstrate that procedures are in place to ensure that potential deviations in process conditions such as fluid temperature, pressure and composition are identified by competent persons and assessed in relation to the selection of materials of construction for pipework systems. A wide range of plastics are available for use as materials of construction and can be used in areas such as handling inorganic salt solutions where metals are unsuitable. The use of plastic linings is widespread in equipment such as tanks, pipes, and drums. However, their use is limited to moderate temperatures and they are generally unsuitable for use in abrasive duties. Some of the more commonly used plastics are PVC, PTFE and polypropylene. __________________________________________________ Corrosion / Selection of Material 4
E & C Division
Special glasses can be bonded to steel, providing an impervious liner. Glass or 'epoxy' lined equipment is widely used in severely corrosive acid duties. The glass lining can be easily damaged and careful attention is required. The thin paint like coatings are unlikely to give full protection due to defects and the most dependable barrier linings are those which are built up in multiple layers to a depth in the region of 3 mm. Performance Tests Normally testing is carried out in order to determine the suitability of a material of construction for handling a process fluid. However, testing can be used for different purposes. Typically this might be to justify a modified inspection frequency of equipment on an existing plant. There are a variety of test methods available. Commonly test specimens consisting of a small strip or 'coupon' of the material of interest are exposed to the process fluid. The weight loss of the test specimen over a time period is measured in order to determine the corrosion rate. Testing can be carried out on the plant, in the laboratory, or on a pilot plan depending on the situation. Where laboratory testing is carried out using standard test methods there are difficulties in interpreting results and translating them into plant performance. Care is required to ensure that the test fluid is exactly the same as on the process plant. Discrepancies in test conditions such as trace impurities, dissolved gases, velocity, and turbulence can lead to erroneous results. Maintenance Requirements Process equipment handling hazardous materials should be inspected at regular frequencies, both internally and externally. Localised corrosion can be unpredictable and fabrication defects such as poor welds can be present. Linings can deform or be damaged. Typically the glass lining on a jacketed reactor can suffer thermal shock or a static discharge may occur through the lining. The frequency of inspection can be amended once an inspection history has been built up and the condition of a piece of equipment can be reasonably predicted. The operator should __________________________________________________ Corrosion / Selection of Material 5
E & C Division
demonstrate that it has inspection and maintenance programmes in place for hazardous process equipment including lagged systems. Where equipment is lined electrical continuity tests for lining defects should be carried out where appropriate. Cathodic and anodic protection systems should be regularly checked to ensure continued protection.
Control of Operating Conditions Where control of corrosion is dependent on the concentration of contaminants or moisture the operator should demonstrate that procedures and the necessary controls are in place to maintain a safe operating condition. Similarly where inhibitors are added or systems such as cathodic protection are used the operator should demonstrate that these systems are inspected and adequately maintained to ensure continued protection of the process. Industry Applications Chlorine The flow rate of liquid chlorine through pipework is restricted to 2 m/s to avoid removing the ferric chloride coating on the pipe surface which protects against erosion / corrosion of carbon steel. Wet chlorine gas corrodes mild steel and ebonite or rubber lined steel is used for this duty. Chlorine gas handled at temperatures in excess of 200C in carbon steel can result in chlorine / steel fires. Zinc can be used for this duty, but for low temperature embrittlement. Bromine chlorine special steels are required to avoid
PVDF pipework and PVDF lined steel are commonly used for handling bromine. If the bromine is 'dry' then metals such as monel and hastelloy can be used. Vessels are normally constructed of either lead, PVDF or GRP lined steel. Sulphuric Acid Corrosion protection of mild steel vessels occurs by the formation of an iron sulphate coating. Any condition leading to excessive turbulence can result in the removal of the coating and corrosion. Additionally the temperature influence on corrosion rate varies with different strengths of acid and consequently it is necessary to define maximum operating __________________________________________________ Corrosion / Selection of Material 6
E & C Division
temperatures. Chemical lead is widely used where steel is unsuitable and PVC can be used in certain applications. Hydrochloric Acid This acid is very corrosive towards most of the common metals and alloys. This is exacerbated where aeration or contamination by oxidising agents is present. Copper is particularly prone to this problem. Also many failures occur due to the presence of minor impurities such as ferric chloride. Plastics and rubber-lined steel are widely used for pipework and small vessels. Ammonia Materials of construction for ammonia are dependent on the operating temperature. Whilst mild steel may be used at ambient temperature special steels are required at low temperatures to avoid embrittlement. Impurities in liquid ammonia such as air or carbon dioxide can cause stress corrosion cracking of mild steel. Ammonia is highly corrosive towards copper and zinc. Hydrofluoric Acid Bulk storage of 70% acid or greater may be in mild steel or PVDF tanks. Polyethylene, polypropylene, and PVDF are commonly used for construction of major components. PTFE is often used for smaller components such as gaskets. Glass or GRP should never be used. Oxygen Materials suitable for liquid oxygen service are nickel steel, austenitic stainless steels, and copper or aluminium alloys. Carbon steels and plastics are brittle at low temperatures and should not be used on liquid oxygen duty. PTFE is the most widely used sealant. Hydrogen At temperatures below 120C carbon steel can be used up to high pressures. At elevated temperatures and significant pressures hydrogen will penetrate carbon steel and react with the carbon to form methane. This results in a loss of ductility and cracking or blistering of the steel. For high temperature applications steel alloys containing molybdenum and steel are satisfactory.
E & C Division
5.5
Drum / Cylinder Handling
Introduction A variety of toxic and flammable chemicals are frequently stored and transported in drums and cylinders. Although individual containers hold relatively small inventories, a single cylinder of a compressed or liquefied toxic gas can present a significant hazard to personnel. Additionally large quantities of drums and cylinders are often stored together giving rise to potentially large inventories of hazardous materials. The movement and connection / disconnection of drums and cylinders to process plant requires the direct involvement of operating personnel giving rise to the potential for human error to cause incidents. General Principles Storage Location Both the hazards of the material and the size of the inventory need to be considered in determining where a store should be located. Considerations should include the distance from other stored materials, process plant, traffic routes and occupied buildings.. Where separation distances are inadequate measures such as fire walls can be employed to reduce the impact of incidents. The operator should demonstrate that the storage location and design has taken into account site specific security requirements and the potential for vandalism. Ventilation The preferred location for the storage of drummed flammable liquids and compressed / liquefied gases is in the open air, to allow vapours to be dispersed effectively. When located in buildings, the operator should demonstrate that there is an adequate level of ventilation achieved by either the presence of a sufficient size and number of permanent openings such as louvres or mechanical ventilation. If stored indoors, flammable gases such as LPG may only be stored in purpose built compartments or buildings constructed with fire resistant walls and explosion relief. __________________________________________________ Drum / Cylinder Handling 1
E & C Division
Compatibility With Other Stored Materials Toxic, flammable or self reactive materials should not in general be stored in the same location (see Technical Measures Document (Segregation of Hazardous Materials). The operators risk assessment should demonstrate the compatibility of the substances stored and the suitability of the arrangements. Layout Drums and cylinders should be stored in a safe manner. Both the height and method of stacking should take into account the hazard of the material stored and the construction of the container. Racking or freestanding multi layer stacks can be used for drummed materials storing low hazard liquids. Consideration should be given to the detection of leaks from containers and the method for collection and disposal of such spills to reduce the possibility of cross-contamination and domino effects. Training should be provided to operators on dealing with spills and emergency procedures. Adequate access for fork lift trucks should be provided. Pressurised cylinders and drums should be stored with their valves uppermost in secure manner. The size of any particular stack should be limited and separation distances should be provided between stacks. Drums should not be filled or emptied within the storage area. Transportation Whilst drums containing flammable liquids can be transported securely on a simple pallet, cylinders and drums containing compressed or liquefied gases require careful and appropriate means of transport such as cylinder trolleys or purpose designed attachments for fork lift trucks should be used at all times. The operator should maintain records demonstrating that personnel involved in the movement of drums and cylinders have received training in the hazards involved in handling them and in the operation of any machinery involved such as cranes and fork lift trucks.
__________________________________________________ Drum / Cylinder Handling 2
E & C Division Containment of Spills
Suitable precautions should be in place for the containment of leaked materials. Where liquids are handled suitable spillage containment such as bunding and drainage sumps should be in place. Arrangements should be in place for the routine drainage of rainwater from sumps. Where materials that react with water are stored outdoors, the operators risk assessment should demonstrate the suitability of the arrangements For the storage of toxic gases, location of the containers in a purpose designed indoor store will reduce the rate at which gas is released to the environment. Control of Ignition Sources Where flammable liquids or gases are stored, the area should be subject to hazardous area classification for the control of ignition sources. This requirement should be reflected both in the equipment installed and in the control of operational and maintenance activities in the location. The movement of drums and cylinders often involves the use of fork lift trucks, which can provide a source of ignition for flammable vapours. Any vehicle operating in a zoned area should be protected to an appropriate standard. Industry Applications Flammable Liquids Containers should be stored in the open air where practical, but if stored inside five air changes per hour is considered a sufficient ventilation rate. Standard 205 litre metal drums should be stacked no more than three high and preferably on pallets or racking. The maximum stack size should be 300,000 litres with at least 4 metres between stacks. Storage should be on an impervious surface such as concrete and be bunded with drainage towards a sump or other suitable handling system.
E & C Division LPG Cylinders
Cylinders should be stored preferably in the open air on a concrete or load bearing surface. Flammable liquids, combustible, corrosive, oxidising materials, toxic materials or compressed gas cylinders should be kept separate from LPG containers in general. Containers should be stored with their valves uppermost. The maximum size of any stack should not exceed 30,000 kg. For storage indoors, no more than 5000 kg may be stored in each purpose designed building compartment and a maximum of five compartments may exist in a single building. Chlorine Cylinders The vast majority of chlorine cylinder and drum stores are located indoors and should be solely used for storing chlorine. Access doors should fit closely to help contain any leak. These stores should be protected from any nearby radiant heat hazards. The store should be at least 5 m from any roadway. A cylinder store should be at least 20 m from the site boundary and a drum store 60 m. Chlorine gas detectors / alarms should normally be provided. Risk assessments should be carried out to consider hazards arising from mishandling (dropping of containers in transport/handling), incorrect operation of valves and failure to connect correctly, maintenance errors and damage by external sources (domino, vehicle impacts, etc.)
E & C Division
5.6
Pressure Plants / Reactors
Introduction If pressure equipment fails in use, it can seriously injure or kill people nearby and cause serious damage to property. To minimise the risks when working with systems or equipment which contain a liquid or gas under pressure. It does not cover gas cylinders (now called transportable pressure receptacles or transportable pressure vessels), or tanks and tank containers. As an employer or self-employed person, you have a duty to provide a safe workplace and safe work equipment. Designers, manufacturers, suppliers, installers, users and owners also have duties. Employers have a further duty to consult any safety or employee representatives on health and safety matters. Where none are appointed, employers should consult the workforce direct. Examples of pressure systems and equipment are: boilers and steam heating systems; pressurised process plant and piping; compressed air systems (fixed and portable); pressure cookers, autoclaves and retorts; heat exchangers and refrigeration plant; valves, steam traps and filters; pipework and hoses; and pressure gauges and level indicators.
Principal causes of incidents are: poor equipment and/or system design; poor maintenance of equipment; an unsafe system of work; operator error, poor training/supervision; poor installation; and inadequate repairs or modifications.
The main hazards are: impact from the blast of an explosion or release of compressed liquid or gas; impact from parts of equipment that fail or any flying debris; contact with the released liquid or gas, such as steam; and fire resulting from the escape of flammable liquids or gases.
______________________________________________________________________
E & C Division
Reduce the risk of failure: The level of risk from the failure of pressure systems and equipment depends on a number of factors including: the pressure in the system; the type of liquid or gas and its properties; the suitability of the equipment and pipe work that contains it; the age and condition of the equipment; the complexity and control of its operation; the prevailing conditions (eg a process carried out at high temperature); and the skills and knowledge of the people who design, manufacture, install, maintain, test and operate the pressure equipment and systems. Provide safe and suitable equipment To reduce the risks you need to know (and act on) some basic precautions, When installing new equipment, ensure that it is suitable for its intended purpose and that it is installed correctly. This requirement can normally be met by using the appropriate design, construction and installation standards and/or codes of practice. The pressure system should be designed and manufactured from suitable materials. You should make sure that the vessel, pipes and valves have been made of suitable materials for the liquids or gases they will contain. Ensure the system can be operated safely without having to climb or struggle through gaps in pipe work or structures, Example. Be careful when repairing or modifying a pressure system. Following a major repair and/or modification, you may need to have the whole system re-examined before allowing the system to come back into use. Know the operating conditions Know what liquid or gas is being contained, stored or processed (eg is it toxic/flammable?). Know the process conditions, such as the pressures and temperatures. Know the safe operating limits of the system and any equipment directly linked to it or affected by it. Ensure there is a set of operating instructions for all the equipment and for the control of the whole system including emergencies.
______________________________________________________________________
E & C Division
Ensure that appropriate employees have access to these instructions, and are properly trained in the operation and use of the equipment or system (see the section on training).
Fit suitable protective devices and ensure they function properly Ensure suitable protective devices are fitted to the vessels, or pipework (eg safety valves and any electronic devices which cause shutdown when the pressure, temperature or liquid or gas level exceed permissible limits). Ensure the protective devices have been adjusted to the correct settings. If warning devices are fitted, ensure they are noticeable, either by sight or sound. Ensure protective devices are kept in good working order at all times. Ensure that, where fitted, protective devices such as safety valves and bursting discs discharge to a safe place. Ensure that, once set, protective devices cannot be altered except by an authorised person.
Carry out suitable maintenance All pressure equipment and systems should be properly maintained. There should be a maintenance programme for the system as a whole. It should take into account the system and equipment age, its uses and the environment. Look for tell-tale signs of problems with the system, eg if a safety valve repeatedly discharges, this could be an indication that either the system is overpressurising or the safety valve is not working correctly. Look for signs of wear and corrosion. Systems should be depressurised before maintenance work is carried out. Ensure there is a safe system of work, so that maintenance work is carried out properly and under suitable supervision.
Make provision for appropriate training Everybody operating, installing, maintaining, repairing, inspecting and testing pressure equipment should have the necessary skills and knowledge to carry out their job safely so you need to provide suitable training. This includes all new employees, who should have initial training and be supervised closely.
______________________________________________________________________
E & C Division
Additional training or retraining may be required if: the job changes; the equipment or operation changes; or skills have not been used for a while. Have the equipment examined You must not allow your pressure system to be operated (or hired out) until you have a written scheme of examination and ensured that the system has been examined. The written scheme of examination must cover all protective devices. It must also include every pressure vessel and those parts of pipelines and pipework which, if they fail, may give rise to danger. The written scheme must specify the nature and frequency of examinations, and include any special measures that may be needed to prepare a system for a safe examination. The pressure system must be examined in accordance with the written scheme by a competent person. For fired (heated) pressure systems, such as steam boilers, the written scheme should include an examination of the system when it is cold and stripped down and when it is running under normal conditions.
The key steps are: Decide what items of equipment and parts of the plant should be included in the scheme. This must include all protective devices. It must also include pressure vessels, and parts of pipework, which if they failed could give rise to danger. The scheme must be drawn up (or certified as suitable) by a competent person. It must specify whether the examination is inservice or out-of service and how often the system is to be examined. The system must be examined by a competent person in accordance with that scheme. Choose a competent person You must assure yourself that the competent person has the necessary knowledge, experience and independence to undertake the functions required of them. The competent person carrying out examinations under a written scheme does not necessarily need to be the same one who prepares or certifies the scheme as suitable.
______________________________________________________________________
E & C Division
A competent person may be: a company's own in-house inspection department; an individual person (eg, a self-employed person); or an organisation providing independent inspection services. The competent person undertaking an examination of a pressure system in accordance with the written scheme of examination takes the responsibility for all aspects of the examination. For example, on systems where ancillary examination techniques (eg non-destructive testing) are undertaken, the competent person must assume responsibility for the results of these tests and their interpretation even though the tests may have been carried out by someone else.
______________________________________________________________________
E & C Division
5.7
Earthing
This Technical Measures Document refers to codes and standards applicable to earthing of plant. General Principles Earthing can classified in two ways: System earthing; Equipment earthing.
System earthing is essential to the proper operation of the system, whereas equipment earthing concerns the safety of personnel and plant. A key function of equipment earthing is to provide a controlled method to prevent the build up of static electricity, thus reducing the risk of electrical discharge in potentially hazardous environments. Generally, a resistance to earth of less than 106 electricity in all situations. Flammable Liquids Transfer The major hazard involved with the transfer of flammable liquids is the build up of static due to charge separation with potential for discharge resulting in fire and subsequent loss of containment. Certain non-polar liquids can be charged, e.g. while flowing through pipelines. Detectable and hazardous charges must be expected if the specific resistance of the liquid exceeds 108 .m. The potential for accumulation of static charges may strongly increase if the liquid contains a non-miscible component or a suspended solid. Examples include: Crystallisation processes in toluene; Quantities of water in toluene. With the presence of a second phase, velocities less than 1 m/s should be employed. will ensure safe dissipation of static
__________________________________________________ Static Electricity 1
E & C Division
Measures that can be employed to reduce these hazards include: Ensure that the pipe transferring the liquid is completely filled to exclude the formation of explosive mixtures; Wherever possible ensure no contaminants / solids are present; Utilise inert gas blanketing; When transferring flammable liquids by blowing across use an inert gas; Avoid mechanical mixing or agitation of low conductivity liquids wherever possible; Use of ball valves with earthed metal spheres; Employ low transfer velocities. For only partially filled pipes, or pipes which discharge into containers, the velocity is to be limited as follows: For chargeable esters: maximum 10 m/s; For mineral oil products (e.g. gasoline, petrol, kerosene, paraffin, jet fuel) and for other chargeable liquids (excluding carbon disulphide and ether): Nominal pipe diameter, mm Velocity, m/s Quantity, l/min 40 7.0 50 80 100 3.0 200 1.8 400 1.3 600 1.0
6.0 3.6
600 800 1100 1600 3500 10000 17000
If these velocities are adhered to, no hazardous charges will be generated within homogenous liquids. But when suspensions of crystals in nonconductive liquids are conveyed, hazardous charges may always be generated, even at velocities below 1 m/s. For ether and carbon disulphide in pipelines up to a diameter of 25 mm, the maximum velocity should not exceed 1m/s. Larger pipes require lower velocities; A general rule for all homogeneous liquids (except carbon disulphide and ether) and all pipelines: at velocities below 1 m/s, no dangerous charges will be generated; Flanges should be earth bonded; Use sub-surface dip pipes or bottom entry filling when discharging into vessels; Ensure regular inspection and testing of earth bonding.
E & C Division Powder Transfer
Powder transfer can be carried out by several different methods: Screw conveying; Vacuum transfer; Pneumatic conveying;
There are two distinct types of pneumatic conveying used for powder transfer, namely low pressure / dilute phase or high pressure / dense phase. Low pressure / dilute phase systems tend to employ high system velocities ranging from 10 to 25 m/s, whereas high pressure / dense phase systems tend to employ low system velocities ranging from 0.25 to 2.5 m/s. Intensive charging of the conveyed material and pipeline is possible during pneumatic powder transfer potentially resulting in: Electrostatic discharge between conductive parts (e.g. between metal flanges and a part of the steel structure of the building); Entrapment of considerable charges into receiving containers.
Powders can be divided into three groups depending upon the volume resistivity of the material of which the particles are composed. These groups are: Low resistivity powders, e.g. metals having volume resistivities up to about 106 .m; Medium resistivity powders, e.g. many organic powders, such as flour, having volume resistivities in the approximate range 106 .m to 109 .m; High resistivity powders, e.g. certain organic powders, many
synthetic polymers and some minerals, such as quartz, having volume resistivities above about 109 .m.
E & C Division
Measures that reduce these hazards include: Ensure pipelines used for pneumatic conveying are made from metal with good earth bonding. Resistance to ground for all conductive components should be < 10 ohms; Ground all operators loading powder so that their resistance to ground is < 1 x108 ohms; Avoid use of insulating coatings on the inner surfaces of metal containers and pipelines; Use plastic flanges with plastic transfer lines; Avoid use of coating or sheathing on pipelines constructed of insulating material; Use antistatic plastic or paper bags in or around flammable gases, vapours or dusts having minimum ignition energies of < 4 mJ; Discharge powder into the container or silo via intermediate loading equipment, e.g. a cyclone fabricated from conductive material to reduce velocities and earth charge. (Alternatively rotary valves, bag dump hoppers or scroll feeder systems can be employed).
Offloading Stringent precautions are required to prevent accumulations of static electricity and to give protection against lightning. Standard copper strip (25 mm x 3 mm section or equivalent) is usually employed for the main earthing system. This should be connected to at least one copperearthing rod that has been tested and shown to have a total resistance to earth of <10 ohms. The operator should employ a bulk loading and offloading procedure. This should include written instruction that state when offloading flammable liquids, the driver must first connect the tanker to the earthing connection at the off-loading point. The electrically conducting discharge hose can then be connected to the liquid intake point on the storage. The electrical resistance between the two couplings on a flexible hose must not be higher than 106 ohms.
E & C Division Temporary Storage
Before temporary storage is brought on line for storage of flammable liquids or explosible powders, an assessment of earthing provision with associated earth testing should be undertaken. This should encompass the storage vessel and all supporting ancillary equipment.
Flexible Pipelines When flexible hoses are employed, measures that can be adopted include: Where velocities exceed 1m/s hoses should be made of conductive material or non-conductive material with embedded fine wire mesh. The mesh should be bonded to the metal flanges or coupling of the hose; If a metal hose with a liner is employed, the metal mantle and flanges or couplings must be bonded to each other; The electrical resistance between the two couplings must not be higher than 106 ohms. This resistance is to be measured at regular intervals; Use of ball valves with earthed metal spheres.
E & C Division
5.8
Causes of Plant Failure Contents 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. Corrosion Erosion External Loading Impact Pressure Temperature Vibration Wrong Equipment Defective Equipment Human Error
1. CORROSION Corrosion is caused by electro-chemical processes in which a metal reacts with its environment to form an oxide or compound by the formation of cells comprising an anode (the deteriorating metal), a cathode (adjacent metal) and a conducting solution (acid / salts). It can occur both internally and externally to pipelines, vessels, plant, machinery, structures and supports. The materials selection philosophy aspect of the design phase of all plant and structures should take into account the anticipated conditions (pressure, temperature and atmosphere) and the contents of the system in order to either minimise corrosion or to make adequate allowances for it in the form of additional material thicknesses. The initial corrosion on some metals creates an impervious coating, which prevents further corrosion taking place. Corrosion can be exacerbated by utilising different materials which then set up an electrochemical cell which in turn causes wastage of the anode. 1.1 Types 1. Oxygen pitting, bi-metallic (internal and external). 2. Water lines, low velocity/stagnant conditions, under millscale deposits, crevice-type corrosion (differential aeration), localised at areas of dissimilar metals (galvanic action). 3. Carbon dioxide uniform loss, specific through turbulence, wet gas Mesa type (internal). Note: Mesa type corrosion is a descriptive word emanating from the Mesa region of Spain which is noted for its table top sharp edged plateau with shallow broad valleys. __________________________________________________ Causes Of Plant Failure 1
E & C Division
4. Hot aerated water lines, where CO2 partial pressure is 0.2 barg, areas of turbulence (bends, tees, weld upsets), wet gas lines. 5. Hydrogen Sulphide (internal). 6. Sour service, partial pressure > 0.003 barg, bacterial attack on sulphates in low acid conditions. 7. Stress Corrosion Cracking (internal and external). 8. Chloride SCC in austenitic steels at temperatures above 60C, combined corrosive and tensile stress, externally. 9. Can be associated with damaged / wet coverings and insulation material, inadequate or maloperating cathodic protection. 1.2 Prevention Adequate design parameters. 1. Choice of materials, taking into accounts all envisaged conditions and contained fluids or products. 2. Avoiding the use of dissimilar metals. 3. Suitable corrosion allowances. 4. Joint design and configuration. 5. Applied coatings (internal and external). 6. Drainage facilities. 7. Inspection and monitoring facilities. 8. Installation considerations. 1.3 Monitoring a) Condition Monitoring (containment system): i) Planned inspection procedures. ii) Planned corrosion monitoring procedures, by ultrasonic thickness measurement, probes, coupons, cathodic protection,etc. b) Condition Monitoring. (contained fluids): i) Continuous process and operation monitoring. ii) Planned application of inhibitors to contained fluids. iii) Regular checks and monitoring that the contained fluids are within the design parameters. c) Monitoring at manufacture and installation: i) Storage and protection of pipework and plant at fabrication stage and prior to commissioning. ii) Correct selection and usage of fabrication methods and consumables. iii) Satisfactory installation to avoid deadlegs, moisture traps, environmental hazards. iv) Proper selection and application of monitoring and inspection procedures during fabrication and installation. v) Suitable insulation and protection during installation. Equipment and installation drainage points etc. __________________________________________________ Causes Of Plant Failure 2
E & C Division
1.4 Examples 1. External Chlorine induced SCC of Oil/Gas HP Separator due to warm, (90C) wet insulation attached to solid stainless steel (duplex). 2. Stress Corrosion Cracking in duplex stainless steel pipe welds due to low pH, high chloride and high hydrogen sulphide environment (Acid washing downhole safety valves). 3. Pin-point corrosion of heat exchanger tubes in fin-fan coolers on closed circuit cooling water systems due to inadequate addition of corrosion inhibitors and tested alkalinity of the medium. 4. External corrosion of pipework, vessels and storage tanks in places that usually are covered, but where insulation breaks have occurred, particularly in harsh environments. e.g. coastal locations, (gas terminals etc.) 5. External corrosion of boiler blowdown elbows and associated pipework, located in floor sumps, which become fouled with wet warm debris. 6. Cavitational corrosion caused by bubble collapse in process systems and more commonly in boiler water tubes as scab pitting. 7. Internal corrosion occurring in dead-legs on systems which do not have adequate draining facilities, or are not operated as frequently as required. 8. Floor plate and lower shell plate corrosion due to smothering with wet acidic/chlorinated waste material and debris. 9. Preferential corrosion attack in the heat affected zone (HAZ) of welds in carbon steel gas flow lines, initiated from a fairly benign gas output at start up of production to an inclusion of degrees of corrosive trace elements without proper degrees of inhibition being implemented. 1.5 Key Words Trace elements, corrosive extraction products, oxygen bubbling, H2S attack, damp warm conditions (under insulation), sub-surface (soil), acidic, chlorine content, preferential attack, drainage, design, monitoring. 2.EROSION Caused by internally by excessive fluid velocity, change in phase, cavitation, change in flow direction, presence of particulates. Caused externally by sand, salt, water (rain and sea), wind, cavitation, venturi effect round buildings etc. Pressure leaks can cause impingement and have a lancing effect at the leak itself and at areas where the leaking fluid strikes another surface. __________________________________________________ Causes Of Plant Failure 3
E & C Division
2.1 Prevention Adequate design parameters: i) Choice of materials. ii) Plant layout and siting. iii) Coverings and coatings. iv) Filtration. v) Reduction of dissolved gases in fluids. vi) Avoidance of abrupt changes in pipe section and short radius bends. 2.2 Monitoring Routine inspection programmes (visual supported by ultrasonic thickness measurements where appropriate). i) Non-intrusive internal inspection and monitoring at suspected system sites (bends, Tees, elbows etc.). ii) Intrusive inspection and monitoring at areas where erosion is probable. 2.3 Examples 1. Failure of bends on 50 mmNB pipework carrying pulverised anthracite to the combustion chamber of a fluidised bed steam generator at the Grimesthorpe European power station project. 2. Thinning of swept bends of flowlines carrying first oil from offshore extraction due to the scouring effect of sand particulates. 3. Perforation of U bends in tubular heat exchangers. 4. Rapid perforation of adjacent boiler downcomer tubes from tubewall leak through cracking. 5. Thinning of exposed pipe through sand blasting in desert and seaside locations. 6. Turbulence effect created by incorrectly fitted / incorrectly sized flange gaskets. 3. EXTERNAL LOADING Can be caused by the effects of snow, winds, ice, floods, support failure, system/equipment failure, environmental failures (earth movements), filling / emptying, change in contained fluids. 3.1 Prevention Adequately considered design parameters. i) Adequate consideration of environmental factors, (wind, snow, ice formations, earth tremors). ii) Provision of spiral deflector vanes on pipework, tall vessels etc. iii) Provision of guyed supports for tall structures. __________________________________________________ Causes Of Plant Failure 4
E & C Division
iv) Design considerations for supports and hangers (to include perceived environmental loadings). v) Golfballing of large spherical or cylindrical storage and process vessels. vi) Adequate foundations provision. vii) Provision of trace heating for the prevention of ice or snow buildup. 3.2 Monitoring 1. Regular, scheduled external inspection regimes with dedicated methods and reviews. 2. Regular scheduled maintenance of trace heating facilities etc. 3. Documented procedures for information sharing in the event of a change of use, including change in contained fluids. 4. IMPACT From road and rail vehicles, failed equipment, or other sources, including aircraft, and dropped or swinging loads or objects. 4.1 Prevention 1. Adequate provision to ensure surrounding equipment, building attachments, are safe and secure. 2. Avoid siting plant within the arc of cranes, winches, gantries, etc. 3. Avoid crossing roads with pipelines, and ensure sufficient clearance for all foreseeable vehicle travel (including JCBs with elevated buckets). 4. Employ rigid guarding where necessary (likelihood, possibility). 5. Adequate distance between plant and road, railways, rivers and canals etc. 6. Careful siting of small bore pipework in relation to walkways and access points. 4.2 Monitoring Surveillance of plant, surroundings and adjacent equipment. 4.3 Examples Distorted and ruptured pipelines on overhead pipetrack resulting from impact by JCB raised bucket during travel (illegal). Indented pipelines from equipment miss-handling during removal/replacement for refurbishment or inspection during refinery downtimes (numerous). Sheet steel cladding of crane structures becoming detached and impacting on pipework during fall. Distortion and severance of unprotected small bore pipework in way of regular human access. __________________________________________________ Causes Of Plant Failure 5
E & C Division
5. PRESSURE Failure due to over-pressure caused by control failure, external fire, internal explosion, excessive reaction rate, liquid expansion, exothermic reaction, or collapse caused by vacuum. 5.1 Prevention 1. Design parameters to include suitable process pressure controllers for systems, particularly where multi-system inter-action is required. 2. Installation of suitable additional pressure controlled shutdown or warning devices where operational environments deem this a necessity (Gas terminals, chemical plant etc.). 3. Design parameters should ensure conditions where there may be a potential for internal explosion (e.g. through mixture of gasses) are fully considered. 4. Design and operating procedures should take account of the possibility of excessive reaction rates and limit the resulting rises in pressure and / or temperature to acceptable limits. 5. Design and operating procedures should take account of the possibility of liquid expansion to limit the resulting rises in pressure and / or temperature to acceptable limits. 6. Design and operating procedures should take account of the possibility of exothermic reaction and limit the resulting rises in pressure and / or temperature to acceptable limits. 7. Design parameters should include suitable prevention devices (vacuum breakers) and structural strength where vacuum generation is possible unless the plant has been designed to safely withstand vacuum conditions. 8. Fitting of suitable relieving devices to the systems and vessels (pressure safety valves, bursting discs, fusible plugs) which have adequate margin between system operating pressure and actuation pressure and which prevent design parameters being exceeded. 9. System dump facilities in case of over-pressure. 5.2 Monitoring 1. Regular programmed and audited testing and calibration of pressure control, relieving, indicating and warning devices. 2. Regular review of design codes and guidance for pressure systems. 3. Regular review of safety notices regarding incidents to pressure systems. 4. Regular review of the operators awareness and skills. 5. A formal procedure to review operating procedures in the event of change of use or contents of a pressure system. 6. Regular and formal testing and maintenance of vent and flare headers. __________________________________________________ Causes Of Plant Failure 6
E & C Division 6. TEMPERATURE
Excessive excursions of high and low temperatures due to process upsets, fire, adverse weather conditions, fouling, blockages or phase changes can lead to failure due to rapid or large temperature variations. Rapid temperature changes or low temperatures can lead to cracking. High temperatures can lead to failure due to loss of structural strength without the design pressure being exceeded. 6.1 Prevention (internal) 1. Adequate thermostatic control of the system contents. 2. Design parameters adequate for predictable temperature variations. 3. Provision of insulation where required. 6.2 Prevention (external) 1. Temperature sensors, gas sensors. 2. The provision of blast and fire walls where required. 3. Deluge systems provision. 4. Insulation to the systems vessels and pipe work. 6.3 Monitoring 1. Implement regular inspection and testing of all alarm, control and shut down devices. 2. Regular surveillance and monitoring of insulation, fireproofing etc. 7. VIBRATION Vibration can be generated through changes in phase, water hammer, liquid slugs in gas systems, gas bubbles or pockets in liquid systems, high pressure drop, cavitation, incorrect siting of rotating machinery, incorrect pipe supports, loss of buffer gas in damper vessels, damaged supports and hangers, all of which can give rise to fatigue failure. 7.1 Prevention 1. Ensure that system operation and contained fluid flow characteristics are constantly monitored for prevention of mechanical shocking caused by fluctuations. 2. Ensuring that provision is made for liquid systems to be vented to prevent gas entrainment. 3. Accurately determined siting of mechanical and rotating machinery. 4. Pipelines and pipework layout is are such that the effect of vibration is minimised. 5. All pipelines and pipework is properly supported, and such supports and hangers are suitable for the purpose. __________________________________________________ Causes Of Plant Failure 7
E & C Division
6. All equipment and piping holding down devices are adequate and secure. 7. Adequate shock / vibration mountings are fitted to plant and machinery. 8. There is adequate provision of damper vessels at pump/compressor discharges, (especially reciprocating type). 7.2 Monitoring 1. Adequate, programmed, audited surveillance by visual and electromechanical means. 2. Machinery vibration analysis exercises carried out, results reported and acted on. 3. Monitoring and recording of damper vessel precharge pressure. 8. WRONG EQUIPMENT Wrong equipment can be fitted at installation or be supplied as a replacement during the life of the plant or at a modification. The equipment may be wrong because it has been incorrectly specified, or because the supplier has not supplied in accordance with the specification. Wrongly supplied equipment can lead to failure due to incompatible materials, wrong design, or it may have a rating or duty other than that which it is intended to fulfil. 8.1 Prevention 1. Formal system for ensuring that only equipment specified under the design approval process is supplied and fitted. 2. Adequate system design parameters from inception to first fabrication. 3. Audited and auditable TIPS (Technical Integrity Procurement System) in place for new and replacement items, including pipework, steelwork, fixtures and fittings. 4. Auditable obedience to design procedures during build, to include formal design change procedures and engineering query routes to fulfilment. 5. Manufacturer, supplier, installer, operator and maintainer knowledge assessment and awareness systems are in place and audited. 6. Auditable maintenance procedures, check lists, equipment lists in place. 7. Permit to work systems in place.
__________________________________________________ Causes Of Plant Failure 8
E & C Division 9. DEFECTIVE EQUIPMENT
Defective equipment can be supplied when the plant is initially installed or subsequently as a replacement or during a modification. This category covers circumstances where the equipment was correctly specified, but was defective in some way, such as the materials, the duty, or it may have been wrongly assembled. It may not work in accordance with the specification, in terms of performance, or the trips, interlocks, protective devices etc. may not function as required. The materials of construction may not be as per the specification, or it may be intended for a duty other than that which was specified. Such defects can lead to the system failing or at least not perform as required. 9.1 Prevention 1. Formal system for ensuring that only equipment specified under the design approval process is supplied and fitted. 2. Plant and equipment purchased from approved suppliers only. 3. Audited and auditable TIPS (Technical Integrity Procurement System) in place for new and replacement items, including pipework, steelwork, fixtures and fittings . 4. Recorded vendor inspections at the suppliers or manufacturers works on all major plant and equipment. 5. Adequate and recorded commissioning tests on all new and repaired equipment. 6. Manufacturer, supplier, installer, operator and maintainer knowledge assessment and awareness systems are in place and audited. 7. Auditable maintenance procedures, check lists, equipment lists in place. 8. Permit to work systems in place. 10. HUMAN ERROR Many of the causes of plant failure already discussed have elements of human error built in to them, from the design stage through to operation and maintenance. The types of failure directly covered here are those associated with the operation of the plant, where errors of judgement or ignorance form a major hazard. Human error can cause overfilling, overloading through lack of or misplaced judgement and/or information giving rise to incorrect decisions by __________________________________________________ Causes Of Plant Failure 9
E & C Division
operators. Lack of knowledge or training of operations staff giving can also give rise to failure due to operational errors. 10.1 Prevention 1. Formal written training schemes are in place with performance tests and assessments where required. 2. Formal written operating procedure manuals are available covering normal and emergency operations. 3. Formal written operating instructions with check lists as required are on hand / displayed and signed up. 4. Regular auditing of procedures to account for changes in operating parameters etc. 5. Formal permit to work systems in place.
__________________________________________________ Causes Of Plant Failure 10
E & C Division
5.9
Explosion Relief
This Technical Measures Document refers to the explosion relief measures that can be adopted in plant design to ensure safe operation. General Principles Operators should demonstrate that appropriate measures are in place either to prevent explosions from taking against/minimise the effects of explosions. place, or to protect
Explosion prevention is always preferable to explosion protection, particularly where an explosion is likely to result in emission of toxic material. In the event of an explosion, consideration must be given to flame propagation, pressure effects, recoil forces and the possible toxic nature of relieving components. These factors will have a significant impact on plant layout, design of plant and supporting structures and explosion relief routes. Relief points from explosion protection devices should be located in an area typically outside the plant, but certainly not in the vicinity of plant or personnel. Restriction of explosion relief routes may result in system back-pressures compromising the effectiveness of the explosion relief device. Standard relief systems are inadequate for explosion relief conditions because explosions : Are too fast for a safety valve to open in time; Cannot be relieved through piping only through large explosion panels or doors with short ducts; Do not have uniform conditions throughout each phase at any one moment; Further reaction in vent flow is important; Steady state flow equations may not be applicable.
__________________________________________________ Explosion Relief 1
E & C Division
Explosion prevention can be achieved by: Inerting (exclusion of oxygen by use of inert gases); Elimination of ignition sources (segregation); Monitoring and detection of smouldering particles with automatic quench systems (specific to dust explosions); Control of concentration, i.e. outside explosive limits by ventilation; Replacement of combustible materials.
Explosion protection and control can be achieved by: Containment (explosion-resistant construction); High speed isolation; Segregation; Explosion pressure relief (venting); Explosion suppression.
Sizing of Explosion Panels General principles that relate to sizing methods for bursting discs and relief valves are covered in the Technical Measures Document Relief Systems / Vent Systems. Rates of pressure rise of dust explosions are generally slower than those of gas or vapour explosions, therefore design requirements are different for each case. Explosion Panels for Gases and Vapours The size of vent area required for effective control depends upon a number of factors including: The type of gas or vapour; The concentration; The geometry of the hazardous region; The distance of the ignition source from the vent.
Various general rules are available for predicting vent areas based on plant or vessel volumes. However, there is some discrepancy between these general rules, so they should only be used with utmost caution. __________________________________________________ Explosion Relief 2
E & C Division
These methods also depend upon the physical properties of the material in the vessel. Two of the most common general rules are: The Fire Protection Association suggest 1 ft 2 of vent area should be allowed for every 20 ft3 of plant volume (equivalent to 1 of vent area per 7 m3 of plant volume);
2 3 API RP 521 suggests a relief area of 6.6 m per 100 m of vessel
volume as an empirical guide. Explosion Panels for Dusts and Powders HS (G) 103 quotes 1 m2 per 6 m3 of plant volume for up to 30 m3, and 1 m2 per 25 m3 of plant volume for greater than 300 m3 as a rule of thumb for dusts. For more considered sizing of vent areas for dust explosion, several basic methods exist. These include: The Kst Nomograph Method; The ST Group Nomograph Method; The NFPA 68 Method; The Vent Ratio Method The K-Factor Method The NFPA Randstadt Alternative Method; The Scholl Method.
Selection of the appropriate explosion panel sizing method is dependent upon the configuration of the vessel to be protected, the physical properties of the dust or powder being handled, the prevailing process conditions, whether pneumatic conveying is involved (homogeneous or heterogeneous dust distribution), and whether vent ducting is employed. Each individual method outlines the requirements that need to be fulfilled for the method to be valid. Any attempt to apply a single method indiscriminately may lead either to uneconomic and impracticably large vents or, more seriously, to inadequate vents which could result in extensive damage and injury. It is good practice to undertake sizing of explosion panels by implementation of several methods to corroborate the ultimate size selected.
E & C Division Explosion Relief from Buildings
Consideration should be given to the provision of lightweight roofs and relief panels in walls which vent to a safe place so as not to injure people or damage neighboring property. This is particularly relevant to warehouses storing drums/cylinders of flammable substances Dust Explosions (especially in powder transfer and dryers) A dust explosion can take place only if a number of conditions are simultaneously satisfied: The dust must be explosible (refer to table on dust explosion classes); The dust must have a particle size distribution that will allow the propagation of flame; The atmosphere into which the dust is dispersed as a cloud or suspension must contain sufficient oxidant to support combustion; The dust cloud must have a concentration within the explosible range; The dust cloud must be in contact with an ignition source of sufficient energy to cause an ignition. Dust may be grouped into dust explosion classes as determined using standard test apparatus. These groupings are as follows:
Dust Explosion Kst (bar m s-1) Characteristics Class St 0 St 1 St 2 0 Non-explosible
0 < Kst < 200 Weak to moderately explosible 200 < Kst <300 300 < Kst Strongly explosible
St 3
Very strongly explosible
E & C Division
Separate ignition prevention precautions for dryers are detailed in references although typical precautions include: Maintaining the temperature of flammable materials below the relevant ignition temperatures; Regulating heat input during the start-up and shut-down to prevent the exhaust air temperature exceeding a predetermined value; Earthing of equipment; Elimination of points where dust can accumulate; Regular cleaning of dust spills and accumulation; Avoidance of non-conducting or low conductivity materials.
Dryers may present specific fire or explosion risk due to: The combustion of the fuel used for heating them; The ignition of the material being processed in them; The proximity of hot surfaces to other processes and materials.
Where explosion protection measures have to be adopted, in some cases it may be more appropriate to employ explosion suppression instead of explosion venting. These cases typically include: When equipment is located indoors; The dust is particularly explosible or a hybrid mixture (i.e. dust and flammable vapour); The vessel has insufficient area for vent installation; The dust is toxic and emissions are unacceptable; There is no safe vent discharge point; To prevent propagation of the explosion from one piece of equipment through the interconnection to other equipment. A combination of preventative and protective measures should be employed to minimise risk of escalation due to flame propagation between interconnected vessels. A common approach is to employ isolation methods. __________________________________________________ Explosion Relief 5
E & C Division
Separation Distances (Layout) Consideration should be given to the location and layout of plant areas in which potentially explosive conditions could develop to ensure reduction of on-site and off-site risks. Exothermic Reactions Overpressurisation of reactors is addressed in the Technical Measures Documents Relief Systems / Vent Systems. Hazards from exothermic reactions occur in the event of thermal runaway of the reaction mixture in which the rate of generation of heat is greater than the available cooling capacity of the system. Various testing strategies and experimental methods are commonly available for determination of thermal decomposition hazards. The operator should have shown due consideration of these hazards and taken appropriate measures to provide pressure relief. Measures for provision of pressure relief in these cases are addressed in the Technical Measures Document on Relief Systems / Vent Systems. Unstable Substances When unstable substances are in use, the operator should demonstrate that at the research stage of the product a systematic approach to the identification of hazards relating to the nature of the materials has been followed. These hazards should be identified and documented, with subsequent evidence of implementation of control measures. Hazards that merit consideration include: Explosibility; Thermal and pressure conditions; Flammability; Toxicity; Environmental problems.
The assessment is specifically concerned with the physical properties of the products, and possible by-products.
E & C Division
5.10
Hazardous Area Classification / Flameproofing
This Technical Measures Document refers to the classification of plant into hazardous areas, and the flameproofing measures that can be adopted for electrical apparatus.
General Principles The methodology for classification of hazardous areas is covered by appropriate British and European standards. All likely ignition sources must be considered, and only equipment designed to an appropriate standard should be employed in designated zones.
Catastrophic failures, such as vessel or line rupture are not considered by an area extent and classification study. These abnormal events should be considered by a Preliminary Hazard Analysis and a Hazard and Operability Study. Zoning A hazardous area may be defined as an 'Area in which an explosive atmosphere is, or may be expected to be, present in quantities such as to require special precautions for the construction, installation and use of electrical apparatus'. Area classification is a method of analysing and classifying the environment where explosive gas atmospheres may occur so as to facilitate the proper selection an installation of apparatus to be used safely in that environment, taking into account gas groups and temperature classes. Hazardous areas are classified into zones based on an assessment of the frequency of the occurrence and duration of an explosive gas atmosphere, as follows: Zone 0: An area in which an explosive gas atmosphere is present continuously or for long periods; Zone 1: An area in which an explosive gas atmosphere is likely to occur in normal operation; __________________________________________________ Hazardous Area Classification/Flameproofing 1
E & C Division
Zone 2: An area in which an explosive gas atmosphere is not likely to occur in normal operation and, if it occurs, will only exist for a short time.
When the hazardous areas of a plant have been classified, the remainder will be defined as non-hazardous, sometimes referred to as safe areas. An area extent and classification study involves due consideration of the following: The flammable materials that may be present; The physical properties and characteristics of each of the flammable materials; The source of potential releases; Prevailing operating temperatures and pressures; Presence, natural); Dispersion of released vapours to below flammable limits; The probability of each release scenario. degree and availability of ventilation (forced and
These factors enable appropriate selection of a grouping, temperature class, zone type and zone extent. This information may be summarised in Hazardous Area Classification data sheets, supported by appropriate reference drawings. The zone so designated is a three-dimensional area of space, and thus will extend above and below the plant item under consideration (if appropriate), as well as horizontally.
Electrical Equipment Design Codes/Selection The classification of hazardous areas where flammable gas or vapour risks may arise allows the selection and subsequent installation of electrical apparatus that is appropriate for use in such hazardous areas. Design codes related to classification of electrical apparatus are listed in the table shown on next page __________________________________________________ Hazardous Area Classification/Flameproofing 2
E & C Division
Zone 0 Ex ia Intrinsic safety (IEC 79-11)
Zone 1
Zone 2
Methods suitable for Zone Methods suitable for 0 Zone 0 or 1 Ex n Type of protection N (IEC 79-15) Ex p Pressurised or purging (IEC 79-2) Ex q Powder filling (IEC 79-5) Ex o Oil immersion (IEC 79-6) Ex e Increased safety (IEC 79-7) Ex ib Intrinsic safety (IEC 79-11) Ex m Encapsulation (IEC 79-18) Ex s Special protection
Ex s Special protection Ex d Flameproof if specifically certified for enclosure (IEC 79-1) Zone 0
It should be noted that references in the table are to the equivalent IEC 79 standard Selection of electrical equipment for hazardous areas requires the following information: classification of the hazardous area (as in zones shown in the table above); temperature class or ignition temperature of the gas or vapour involved according to the table next page:
__________________________________________________ Hazardous Area Classification/Flameproofing 3
E & C Division
Temperature Maximum Surface Classification Temperature, C T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 T6 450 300 200 135 100 85
Ignition Temperature of gas or vapour, C >450 >300 >200 >135 >100 >85
Where applicable, gas or vapour classification in relation to the group or sub-group of the electrical apparatus as in the table below.
Group I IIA IIB IIC
Representative Gas Methane Propene Ethylene Hydrogen
For particular gases, the group classification provided in BS EN 50014: 1998 should be used. This is based upon the comparison of the Maximum Experimental Safe Gaps (MESG) for flameproof enclosures or Maximum Ignition Currents (MIC) for intrinsically safe equipment with Group I methane. The sub-groups in Group II are derived as shown in the table below: Sub Division A B C MESG > 0.9 mm MIC Ratio > 0.8
0.5 - 0.9 mm 0.45 - 0.8 < 0.5 mm < 0.45
E & C Division
If several different flammable materials may be present within a particular area, the material that gives the highest classification dictates the overall area classification. Consideration should be shown for flammable material that may be generated due to interaction between chemical species. Ignition Sources Identification and Elimination Ignition sources may be: Flames; Direct fired space and process heating; Fires involving waste materials allowed to accumulate; Use of cigarettes/matches etc; Internal combustion engines; Cutting and welding flames; Large scale fires started elsewhere on site Hot surfaces; Heated process vessels such as dryers and furnaces; Hot process vessels; Space heating equipment; Mechanical machinery; Electrical equipment and lights Spontaneous heating; Friction heating or sparks; Impact sparks; Electric sparks; Electrostatic discharge sparks: Lightning strikes.
E & C Division
Sources of ignition should be eliminated from all hazardous areas by: Avoidance of the use of direct fired heating; Prohibition of smoking/use of matches; Control of the use of internal combustion engines (see Technical Measures Document on Permit to Work Systems; Control of cutting and welding activity through a Permit to Work system; Elimination of surfaces above autoignition temperatures of flammable materials being handled/stored (see above); Using electrical equipment classified for the zone in which it is located (see above); Control of maintenance activities that may cause sparks/hot surfaces through a Permit to Work System; Earthing of all plant/ equipment Provision of lightning protection.
Lightning Protection
Protection against lightning involves installation of a surge protection device between each non-earth bonded core of the cable and the local structure. Dust Explosions Hazardous area classification for flammable dusts may be undertaken in the same manner as that for flammable gases and vapours. Zoning as described above may be applied, replacing 'gas atmosphere' with 'dust/air mixtures'. Classification of dusts relating to autoignition and minimum ignition current is undertaken similarly to gases/vapours, but involves additional complications.
E & C Division
The explosibility of dusts is dependent upon a number of factors: chemical composition; particle size; moisture content; oxygen concentration; inert dust admixture.
In general, dusts with a particle size greater than 500 m are unlikely to cause an explosion, and particle sizes below 50-74 m do not result in a reduction of explosibility as size reduces. For this reason, most tests are carried out on 75 m samples as the worst case. Ignition due to a hot surface is particularly likely to occur. The minimum surface temperature which can cause ignition is about 100-200C in most cases. Factors for assessor to consider Identification of Hazardous Areas Effectiveness of management and control of hazardous areas, with respect to elimination of ignition sources; Demonstration that by design, operation and location extent of hazardous areas has been minimised; Completeness of existing area extent and classification studies; All flammable substances present have been considered during area classification, including raw materials, intermediates and by products, final product and effluents; The appropriateness of the standards adopted for area classification; Reference to impact upon area extent and classification due to plant modification Control measures in hazardous areas required during maintenance; Procedures for change/temporary works
E & C Division
5.11
INERTING
General Principles The partial or complete substitution of the air or flammable atmosphere by an inert gas is a very effective method of explosion prevention. Inerting is normally only considered when the flammable or explosive hazard cannot be eliminated by other means i.e. substitution of flammable material with non-flammable, adjustment of process conditions to ensure substances are below flammable limits. Typical uses are within storage tanks where a material may be above its flashpoint and within reactor systems when excursions into flammable atmospheres may occur. Inert gases are also used to transfer flammable liquids under pressure. Inerting is applicable to enclosed plant, since plant that is substantially open to atmosphere cannot be effectively inerted because the prevailing oxygen concentration is likely to vary. A major risk associated with use of inerting is that of asphyxiation, particularly in confined spaces. In those events where people are required to enter a confined space, a formal management control system in the form of a Permit to Work should be in place so that appropriate precautions and control measures can be implemented. The Permit to Work system is covered separately. Gases that can be used for inerting include: Nitrogen; Carbon Dioxide; Argon; Helium; Flue gases.
The practice of inerting is also employed in explosion suppression systems, where typically a quick acting pressure switch responds to the initial comparatively slow increase in pressure due to initiation of explosion conditions. This in turn triggers injection of an explosion suppressant such as chlorobromomethane or carbon dioxide into the path of the advancing flame front. This technique can also be employed to
__________________________________________________ Inerting 1
E & C Division
provide protection to interconnected plant by inerting plant items downstream of the explosion. In most inerting systems a slight positive pressure should be maintained within the enclosed plant to reduce the possibility of air ingress. Inert gases may be generated on site, or via bulk storage of cylinder facilities. Flammable Limits To produce Fuel; Ignition; Oxygen. an explosion, three key 'ingredients' are required simultaneously. These are:
The fuel must be within its range of flammability, i.e. at a concentration above the lower flammable limit, but below the upper flammable limit. This means that it is perfectly acceptable to have an environment with the flammable material above the upper flammable limit provided appropriate control protocols are in place since the potential for further dilution If the would fuel bring the be material within or its flammable steps range. be
cannot
eliminated
minimised,
must
implemented to eliminate or minimise the source of ignition (see the Technical Measures documentation on Hazardous Area Classification). The final measure that can be adopted involves reducing the oxygen levels necessary to sustain combustion. This can be achieved by pressurising / purging with an inert gas such as nitrogen. The flammable limits for individual materials with air are readily available in standard references, however appropriate methods should be employed to determine the flammable limits for mixtures of materials. Where flammable dusts are handled in an atmosphere containing flammable gas or vapour, determination of flammable limits is difficult and use of inerting should be considered wherever possible. Reliability / Back-up / Proof Testing In many applications, the maintenance of an inert atmosphere is a safety-critical measure, in the absence of which many potential hazards __________________________________________________ Inerting 2
E & C Division
could be realised. Reliability of the supply of inert gas is therefore of vital importance, and the system should be regularly inspected and maintained. Consideration should be given to the possibility of failure of the inert gas supply and the acceptable unavailability. This will involve calculations to determine the rate of leakage / replacement in all process conditions encountered to find the worst case that must be considered.
Back up of supplies with alarm systems to bring about operator intervention or automatic change-over should be provided as required to meet the required availability determined. Consideration should also be given to the reliability of the control systems employed for operation and change-over. Back-up facilities may be via alternative bulk storage or cylinder provision. A major consideration when designing plant to be protected by inerting is the need for continuous monitoring of oxygen and flammable gas or vapour concentrations.
Operating / Maintenance Procedures Inert gases are often used to purge tanks and vessels which normally contain flammable substances prior to maintenance, commissioning or decommissioning. The presence of inert atmospheres should always be taken into consideration during operational or maintenance activities since potential hazards could arise from: Asphyxiation; Loss of inert atmosphere.
Control systems based upon the use of explosimeters and oxygen analysers should protect against asphyxiation if entering such areas. Maintenance activities should only be undertaken by suitably trained and authorised personnel, and controlled by a Permit to Work system.
__________________________________________________ Inerting 3
E & C Division
5.13
LEAK / GAS DETECTION
This Technical Measures Document refers to issues surrounding the detection of leaks and gases and what type of containment control systems have been designed to manage unplanned releases. General Principles The following aspects should be considered with respect to Leak/Gas Detection: Human Factors; Objectives of leak/gas detection systems; Types of leak/gas detectors required; Maintenance of leak/gas detectors; and Management of leak/gas detector systems.
The following issues may contribute towards a major accident or hazard: Unrecognised high-risk areas, where detectors could be used; No detectors or the wrong types in place in high risk areas; Detectors incorrectly positioned and installed on site; Poor level of maintenance and control of detection systems; Too heavy a reliance on ineffective detectors.
Contributory Factors for an Assessor to Consider Concerning Leak/Gas Detection The Report should address the following points: The appropriateness of the types of detectors being used (UV detectors, IR. detectors, smoke detectors, intrinsically safe detectors, heat detectors, specific substance detectors, explosimeters) in terms of the environment in which they are located and to perform the duty expected; The effectiveness of using the detectors in terms of their positioning relative to the possible leak sources, taking account of dispersion and dilution of the released gases/vapours; __________________________________________________ Leak/ Gas Detection 1
E & C Division
The effectiveness of the detectors for the types of substances to be detected (flammable substances, acid gases, smoke, explosive substances, toxic substances) at the concentrations required. Detectors may be chosen to react to more than one substance;
The types of protective devices linked to the detection systems (alarms, warning lights, reaction quenching systems, isolation systems, fire retardant systems, plant shutdown systems, trip devices, emergency services);
The reliability of each detector (range of detection, response time of detection, level of maintenance, calibration performance testing frequency, proof testing); frequency, understood,
The
detectors
can
be
clearly
seen,
heard
and
(appropriate warning signs, lighting, noise recognition), on plant, in the control room and off-site (if appropriate); The procedures to respond to alarms, as a result of a leak/gas being detected (emergency evacuation plans, fire drills, risk assessing existing emergency evacuation plans), to confirm that the release has actually occurred and to record and investigate false alarms and take action to change the system to maintain the confidence of operators; The level of risk associated with each potential leak source (risk assessments, risk-rating systems) and the reduction in that assessed risk value achieved by the use of detectors; The provision and accessibility (to operators, maintenance staff etc)of a sufficient site plan which maps all potentially hazardous areas (zones 0, 1 & 2, segregation of compatible hazardous substances); Contributory Factors for an Assessor to Consider Concerning Fire Detection and Control The Report should address the following points: The types of fire detector systems in place (infrared detectors, ultraviolet light detectors); detectors, temperature detectors, smoke
The area covered by the detection system;
__________________________________________________ Leak/ Gas Detection 2
E & C Division
The reliability of the fire detection systems (fail-to-danger faults, spurious alarms); and The types of fire protection systems in place (fire proofing, water sprays, foam/filming agents, monitor guns, combustible gas monitors, foam on tanks, fire walls/barrier walls, emergency relief venting for buildings, dust explosion control).
Major Hazards The Report should address the following points: Detector fails to detect in time (i.e. response time of instrument and/or response to high reading/alarm failing to prevent a major accident), Detector fails in undetected unsafe state (reading zero), Alarms, warning devices and protective devices fail to operate on demand, A leak occurs which cannot be detected (due to position of sensor or weather conditions), and Maintenance procedures not followed, increasing unavailability of system or rendering system ineffective.
__________________________________________________ Leak/ Gas Detection 3
E & C Division
5.14
Active/Passive Fire Protection
Introduction Active fire protection systems such as water sprinkler and spray systems are widely used in the process industries for protection of storage vessels, process plant, loading installations and warehouses. The duty of the fire protection system may be to extinguish the fire, control the fire, or provide exposure protection to prevent domino effects. For some applications foam pourers or fixed water monitors may be a more appropriate method of delivery than sprays or sprinklers. Other more specialised systems using inert gases and halogen based gases are used for flooding enclosed spaces. Passive fire protection can provide an effective alternative to active systems for protecting against vessel failure. This generally consists of a coating of fire resistant insulating media applied to a vessel or steel surface. It is often used where water or other active protection media supplies are inadequate, such as in remote locations, or where there are difficulties with handling firewater run-off. Firewalls are another form of passive fire protection that are used to prevent the spread of fire and the exposure of adjacent equipment to thermal radiation. An important criterion in deciding which system is most appropriate for fire exposure protection is the likely duration of the exposure to fire as passive fire protection is only effective for short duration exposure (1-2 hours). General Principles The operator should be able to demonstrate that it has an effective and practical plan for the containment and fighting of fires on its process installations. The following site factors should be considered in determining whether active and passive fire protection measures are required: fire hazard posed by substance; toxicity of substances and the smoke produced; inventory size;
__________________________________________________ Active / Passive fire protection 1
E & C Division
frequency of hazardous operations; distance to other hazardous installations; available access to fight fire; fire fighting capability of on site emergency response team; response time of nearest fire brigade; resources available to fire brigade.
Design of System Active fire fighting systems need to be reliable and the design of the system should demonstrate this. The design of fire fighting systems should conform to specified standards such as Teriff Advisory Committee (TAC) and Fire Offices Committee 'Tentative rules for medium and high velocity spray systems'. The location of items such as the foam and water sources should be a safe distance from any hazardous installation. Critical valving and instrument cabling located on the protected installation should be capable of withstanding the effects of fire and heat. The system should be supplied by a secure water supply, which should include items such as backup diesel pumps where appropriate. The design must ensure that the active fire protection system is not starved of water due to other demands on the water supply system during a fire. Choice of Fire Fighting Media The selection of media will depend on the required duty. This may be to extinguish the fire, control the fire, or provide exposure protection. Types of fire fighting media are: Water; Foams; Inert gases; Chemical powders; Halons.
E & C Division
Water is not recommended as an extinguishing media for low flash point liquids, but it is used widely throughout industry for fire control and exposure protection. Foam is a more effective extinguishing media for low flash point substances and is widely used against liquid fires. There are various types of foam available, but the most widely used is protein foam. Alcohol resistant foam is used for application on polar solvents where the foam stability is affected. Other more specialist foams have been developed to give improved extinguishing properties such as fluoro-protein and aqueous film forming foams. Foam can be delivered as low, medium or high expansion depending on the required duty. Other agents such as inert gases, chemical powders and halogen based gases (Halons) can be delivered by active fire protection systems, but these tend to be installed where process equipment is contained within an enclosure such as a gas turbine enclosure. A common use for these systems is in the protection of switch rooms and control panels. There has been movement away from the use of Halons over recent years due to their potential effect upon the ozone layer and other undesirable environmental effects. Standard Material Safety Data Sheets should also specify appropriate fire fighting media.
Choice of Passive Fire Protection For the protection of vessels from fire exposure there are a number of types of passive fire protection that can be applied. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. mortar based coating intumescent coating sublimation coating mineral fiber matting earth mounds
The protective systems based on coatings are normally sprayed onto the surface following mixing of the required components. A reinforcing glass fiber scrim or steel wire gauze is applied to prevent cracking and peeling __________________________________________________ Active / Passive fire protection 3
E & C Division
of the coating under fire conditions and to provide additional strength to resist the impact of high pressure water jets. The fire protective coating is further protected by a weather protective top layer. The fire resistant performance of the coatings is dependent on the thickness of the coating. Fiber matting systems consist of fireproof mineral fiber matting clad with a protective galvanised steel sheet. The protective capability of the system is provided by the poor heat conductivity of the system. Earth mounds are commonly used in the LPG industry, where vessels are either fully or partially buried in an earth mound. The presence of the earth mound effectively prevents a fire from developing around the vessel. Fire walls are sometimes employed in process and storage areas to prevent the spread of fire and protect adjacent equipment from thermal radiation. These may be an integral part of a process building or warehouse structure or may consist of a free-standing wall specifically built for the purpose. Firewalls are normally built of brick, concrete or masonry and the number and size of openings should be kept to a minimum. Performance of the Protective System For active fire protection systems required delivery rates and durations for various types of application are specified in BS 5306. For fire engulfment protection a water rate of 9.81 litres/min/m2 over the exposed vessel surface and its supports is standard. For protection from lower levels of thermal radiation from fires on adjacent units lower rates of water application are allowable. For passive fire protection systems the operator should have supplier or manufacturer information demonstrating that the fire protective system employed meets defined performance criteria based on standard tests that replicate the fire conditions likely to be encountered in the work place. Typically the criteria will be that a protected surface will not reach a certain temperature in a defined time period during a standard test. The protective system should meet the requirements of a pool fire test or a jet fire test .Jet Fire resistance for Passive Fire Protection Materials'. __________________________________________________ Active / Passive fire protection 4
E & C Division
Maintenance Requirements Active fire protection systems require to be well maintained to ensure reliability. In particular systems using water and water based foam are prone to rust deposits which can block sprinkler heads and spray nozzles. Procedures should be in place to ensure regular maintenance and testing of systems. Maintenance contracts are often placed with the supplier of the fire protection system. Records of these activities should be kept by site operators. The performance of passive fire protection systems can deteriorate in time due to weathering and corrosion. Plant operational and maintenance activities may damage or remove the fire protection. Additionally the protected surface itself can corrode beneath the fire protection. Procedures should be in place to ensure that both the passive fire protective system and the protected surface are regularly inspected and repaired as appropriate.
Containment of Firewater Foam and water based active fire protection systems can generate considerable amounts of effluent with significant potential environmental damage. Where active fire protection systems are installed the overall design of the facility should cater for the collection of fire fighting effluents. Operating sites should have effluent disposal plans in place as part of their emergency plans.
Supporting Measures Where active or passive fire protection is installed, these systems should be supported by hydrants at suitable locations as specified in BS 5908. Suitable portable fire fighting equipment should also be located on the plant. Mortar based fire protection fire protection is commonly used to protect load bearing steel work from collapse under fire exposure. The application of this to vessel supports and supporting structures for process __________________________________________________ Active / Passive fire protection 5
E & C Division
equipment is standard where flammable substances are handled in quantity.
Industry Applications LPG Industry The use of water deluge systems for the protection of bulk LPG storage vessels and loading bays is standard in the industry for all but the smallest installations. Passive fire protection is used as an alternative and in particular earth mounding of LPG vessels is an established practice. Large LPG cylinder compounds covered by canopies are normally provided with either fixed water monitors or a sprinkler system. Flammable Liquids / Solvent Bulk Storage Whilst active fire protection is not a standard requirement for vessels containing flammable and highly flammable liquids, site factors such as inadequate separation distances from other plant or the proximity of occupied buildings may necessitate the use of active or passive fire protection to prevent escalation of a fire event. Where protection of remote storage tanks is required, passive fire protection is commonly used. However, it is not normal practice to protect storage tanks in locations that do not represent a hazard to people directly or by domino effect. Process Operating Units Both the material handled, the size of the flammable inventory and the local fire fighting capability will influence the requirement for active fire protection on a process structure. In particular, where process equipment handling significant quantities of flammable material are located inside a building and fire fighting access is poor, then fixed fire protection systems should be provided. Warehousing Some significant fires have occurred in chemical warehouses, The considerations are much the same as those for process operating units. For the storage of high hazard materials such as organic peroxides in __________________________________________________ Active / Passive fire protection 6
E & C Division
warehouses, fixed sprinkler systems using either foam or water should be provided. However, it should be noted that the effectiveness of sprinkler systems in warehouses may be limited if stocking densities are high. Particular care is required in designing such systems.
E & C Division
5.15
QUENCH SYSTEMS
This Technical Measures Document covers the design and use of quench systems Introduction Quenching can either be used to directly control a chemical reaction or in the treatment of an emergency vent stream. For the direct quenching of a chemical reaction when loss of control has occurred, the quench material both cools and dilutes the reactants, thereby slowing down the reaction rate and the rate of heat generation to a controllable level. Quenching may be carried out by adding the quench liquid to the reactor or by discharging the reactants to a dedicated dump tank. Quench systems are used in vent disposal systems for the treatment of streams that can not be discharged directly to atmosphere or where continuing reaction is taking place. The process involves the mixing of a solvent with the relief stream. This results in the condensation and removal of volatile components from the relief stream and / or the cooling of the vent stream which prevents further reaction from taking place. General Principles The operator should be able to demonstrate that it has evaluated the options for emergency protection of an uncontrolled exothermic reaction. Where venting has been chosen as the means of protection, the operator should demonstrate that it has considered the consequences of a vent emission directly to atmosphere and installed appropriate vent treatment measures where necessary.
Reactor Quenching Where a quench system for the control of a reaction is installed the following should have been considered: compatibility of the quench material with the reactants; reliability of the quench delivery system;
__________________________________________________ Quench System 1
E & C Division
availability of space in the reactor / dump tank to accommodate quench material in addition to the reactor contents; the effects of level swell and foaming on quench addition; rate of mixing of the quench material with reaction fluids; the effectiveness of quenching for all conditions leading to loss of control.
The operator should demonstrate the validity of the approach used by appropriate test work. Consideration of the conditions leading to loss of control of the reaction are particularly important. For instance if loss of agitation can initiate this, the use of quenching to control the exotherm is questionable as the cooling and dilution effects are reliant on effective mixing. The pressure relief arrangements will need careful consideration where a dump tank is employed.
Vent Stream Quenching For the treatment of a vent stream there are a variety of arrangements possible. The duty of the system to either condense volatiles or control further reaction in the vent system will dictate the arrangement. A commonly used arrangement for handling two phase discharge from a reactor is a simple knockout drum containing an inventory of an appropriate quenching agent. The vent stream is sparged into the knockout drum below the liquid surface. The knockout drum itself then vents to atmosphere, a scrubber or a flare stack. Alternatively the quenching agent can be sprayed into the vessel from which the discharge arises, or it can be injected into the vent stream in a quench nozzle to effect partial condensation of the stream. Where a quenching agent is used in a vent disposal system the following should be considered: the duty condensation or control of reaction; compatibility of the quench material with the vent stream; reliability of the quench delivery system; the effects of level swell and foaming in the reactor and/or knockout drum. __________________________________________________ Quench System 2
E & C Division Design of Quenching Systems
Data produced from adiabatic tests will strongly influence the design requirements and form the basis for mass and heat balances. The operator should be able to show how these have been used in the design. The design should ensure effective mixing of the quenching agent and cater for the effects of level swell where appropriate. As an emergency protective measure the operation of a quench system needs to be reliable. The instrument and control features of a quench delivery system should demonstrate this and features such as voting systems and hard wiring of trips should be included for critical duties. Other support systems, such as utilities, that are critical to delivery of the quench system need similar high integrity.
Maintenance Requirements Quenching systems require to be well maintained to ensure reliability. Procedures should be in place to ensure regular maintenance and testing of relevant instrument and control systems. The inspection and maintenance of pipe work and vessels should be carried out to written procedures on a regular basis. Where the quality or specification of quenching agents may deteriorate over time so as to reduce effectiveness, the inventory should be replenished at set frequencies. Effluent Disposal Control of a reaction with a quenching agent may cause irreversible contamination of the reactants. Where a quenching agent has been used in a vent disposal system, this will need to be removed before plant operations can recommence. Plans should be in place for the safe handling and disposal of effluents generated from the use of a quench system.
__________________________________________________ Quench System 3
E & C Division
5.16
Raw Materials Control / Sampling
This Technical Measures Document refers to the cradle to grave approach to prevent an unwanted chemical being used in a plant resulting in a major accident or hazard. A chemical can be a contaminant, raw material, reactant, intermediate, by-product or product. See also Technical Measures Documents on Corrosion / Selection of Materials General Principles The following aspects should be considered with respect to Raw Materials Control/Sampling: Human factors; Poorly skilled work force; Unconscious and conscious incompetence; What would happen if the wrong material was used in the wrong place; and What would happen if contaminated or out of specification material was used. The following issues may contribute towards a major accident or hazard. Human error during acceptance of delivery and sampling; Incompetent quality control staff; Contaminant entering the plant for example, flammables in nonflameproof areas, oxidisers mixing with flammable solvents; Failure to understand the properties of substances handled; Failure of quality assurance procedures; and Failure to identify all credible contaminants and resultant reaction pathways that could disrupt the integrity of the plant involved.
Contributory Factors for an Assessor to Consider Concerning Raw Material Delivery, Test and Storage The Safety Report should address the following points: Whether there is are sufficient management systems in place to control the handling and use of all raw materials on site (Quality Safety Management, Quality Control/Assurance Procedures);
1
Raw Material Control/Sampling
E & C Division
Whether staff is sufficiently informed, instructed, trained and supervised to minimise a potential human failing during raw material delivery, test and storage; Whether there a sufficient chemical inventory of all chemicals used on site; The procedures in place to vet the suppliers of raw materials (Audits, supplier history, reputation); The amount of information with each raw material delivery (Trem Cards, Certificate of Analysis, Safety Data Sheets, representative samples); The suitability of quality assurance procedures in place to test all incoming raw materials on site if deemed necessary (Quarantine procedures, quality control procedures, representative sampling procedures); The suitability of validated quality control test methods and equipment in place to identify any potentially hazardous contaminants present within a raw material delivery; and The effectiveness of the systems of work in place to prevent contamination of raw materials once placed in storage, after QC approval (Storage procedures, chemicals before use). QC tests to approve stored
Contributory Factors for an Assessor to Consider During Plant Production The Safety Report should address the following points: The possibility of a major accident as a result of a change in the process reaction kinetics due to contaminants in the raw materials (R&D data, safety reliability data, engineering constraints); Whether all raw materials, reactants, intermediates, products and by-products known and can be retained safely without a deterioration in plant integrity (R&D data, analytical data, safety reliability data, engineering constraints); and Identification of required emergency procedures, systems and provisions in place to deal with events resulting from raw materials control failure.
E & C Division Major Hazards
The Safety Report should address the following points: Static discharge during sampling of flammable substances; Exposure to head-space gases during profile sampling of raw material tanker; Overfilling of storage vessels; Non-compliance of quality and safety procedures resulting in a Domino effect; Failure of safety systems manual or automatic.
E & C Division
5.17
Reaction / Product Testing
This Technical Measures Document covers the identification and control of reaction hazards Related Technical Measures Documents are Relief Systems / Vent Systems, Raw Materials Control / Sampling, Trips / Interlocks, and Secondary Containment. Introduction Chemical reaction hazards may result from loss of control of an exothermic chemical synthesis reaction, or an undesired reaction occurring in the reaction mixture such as the decomposition of a chemical present. So called 'runaway reactions' are normally associated with batch reactors however an uncontrolled exotherm may occur in many types of equipment. Storage vessels, batch distillation units and drying operations are some of the more common types of process equipment where undesired exothermic reactions have resulted in severe incidents. Thermal runaway begins when the heat generated by a reaction exceeds the rate at which heat is lost to the surroundings. The heat generation rate is a function of temperature and chemical composition. Whilst the temperature of the reactants may not directly constitute a major hazard, the pressure developed as a result of thermal runaway in a vessel or other item of process equipment can cause catastrophic failure of the equipment. General Principles The operator should be able to demonstrate that it has evaluated the potential reaction hazards of a process and carried out reaction hazard studies as part of an overall hazard assessment of a process. This should involve the following activities:
__________________________________________________ Reaction / Product Testing 1
E & C Division
Preliminary Reviews
As a starting point for a reaction hazard assessment a literature survey and some theoretical calculations are useful, but are no substitute for chemical hazard testing. Thermochemical calculations based on bond energies or heats of formation can be used to calculate a heat of reaction or a decomposition energy. The structure of individual molecules can be reviewed to identify potentially reactive groups such as acetylenic compounds, peroxides and nitro compounds. An oxygen balance of an organic compound such as propylene oxide can give an indication of the chemicals propensity to decompose on heating.
Screening Tests
The simplest and most common apparatus used are Differential Scanning Calorimetry (DSC) and Differential Thermal Analysis (DTA). These apparatus use a sample size of a few milligrams and are used to for purposes such as identifying at what temperature materials involved in a reaction decompose and the possible effects of contaminants on thermal stability.
Worst Case
To define the worst case foreseeable upset conditions consideration of failure of equipment, instrumentation, utility supplies, etc is required to identify the scenarios that could result in uncontrolled process temperature rise and subsequent over pressurisation of process equipment.
Adiabatic Tests
Adiabatic calorimeters are used to mimic plant conditions and give accurate data on rates of heat production and gas evolution under runaway conditions. Commonly used apparatus are the Dewar Calorimeter, the Vent Sizing Package, the Phi-Tec Calorimeter and the __________________________________________________ Reaction / Product Testing 2
E & C Division
Reactive Systems Screening Tool. The data from these tests is used to determine the Time to Maximum Rate and whether the pressure developed is sufficient to cause failure of the vessel or relevant process equipment. The data can be used to calculate a vent size where appropriate. The Time to Maximum Rate is the time taken from onset of the runaway to its maximum rate of heat generation.
Basis for Safe Operation
Where reaction hazard studies identify that a thermal runaway can occur, the studies should clearly define the technical measures in place to ensure the safe operation of the process. For a reaction the important parameters of the reaction such as temperature, cooling conditions and time of addition should be defined in order to maintain the reaction within safe limits. The requirement for protective measures, such as emergency relief or quench systems, should be detailed. Chemical Reactors Chemical reactions are widely used in the process industries and are the process operation commonly associated with thermal runaway. Surveys have shown that the following types of reaction have been involved in incidents: Polymerisation Nitration Sulphonation Hydrolysis Salt formation Halogenation Alkylation Amination
E & C Division
The screening test programme and the adiabatic tests should show whether the normal reaction or a secondary reaction or decomposition are capable of over pressurising the reactor. The test work should be used as the basis for determining whether additional protective measures need to be included in the plant design such as: emergency pressure relief devices redundant systems / high integrity controls and trips emergency cooling quench systems reaction inhibition containment
Typically for a batch or semi batch reactor, failures such as cooling failure, loss of agitation, addition rate of reactants, and reactant temperature are considered to determine the worst case scenario. In deciding whether emergency protective measures are appropriate it is necessary to taken into account the time available to carry out emergency preventative measures and rectify the situation. Where emergency relief devices are employed, the toxic and flammable hazards of the materials in the process may require additional features to limit the consequences of a release. Depending on the severity of the hazard these may include liquid catchpots, scrubbing systems, quench pools or secondary containment vessels.
Other Process Operations The situations in which the handling of self-reactive materials may result in thermal explosion are numerous. This can be due to the decomposition of an energetic substance or due to contamination causing an undesired reaction. Some of the situations common to the process industries are given below:
E & C Division
Batch Distillation In a batch distillation process loss of vacuum may result in increased temperatures that could initiate decomposition. Additionally batch distillation residues can be prone to thermal explosion due to the thermal ageing process that takes place during distillation. In 1993 a severe incident occurred at a plant in southern Ireland when an operational change to a batch distillation process resulted in a thermal explosion followed by a large fire. Storage The slow decomposition of a reactive material in storage may cause an increase in temperature over a period of leading to a thermal explosion. This process can occur in a variety of situations from large-scale storage in vessels to small transport packages. Accidental contamination of materials in storage has resulted in some significant incidents, notably the Bhopal incident. Drying Operations Loss of temperature control in a powder drier may expose a self-reactive powder to a temperature that causes it to decompose. Similarly when a drier is shut down the thermal cladding may cause heat to be retained for a long period and a powder build-up or residues may start to decompose after a period of time.
E & C Division
5.18
RELIABILITY OF UTILITIES
This Technical Measures Document covers the reliability of utility services and reference is made to relevant codes of practice and standards. Introduction The reliable supply of utilities on sites operating hazardous plant is necessary in order to prevent events that may lead to multiple failures of equipment and potentially hazardous events. The modes of failure of site wide utility systems are numerous and may lead to site wide or local loss of supply or even only partial failure on a particular plant. Whilst most plant are designed to 'fail safe' on loss of utility supplies, there are those where failure to operate correctly will almost certainly result in a hazardous event and local back-up facilities are required. Particular care is required in the design of site power systems as loss of power can also result in loss of supply of all other site utility systems as well. General Principles Risk Assessment The company should demonstrate that it has assessed the risk of loss of utility supplies to its plants and identified the hazardous events that could occur following such loss (e.g. using relevant techniques such as HAZOP/HAZAN). These events should not only include fire and toxic gas emissions, but also the release of process streams hazardous to the environment such as the overflow of effluent sumps. The numerous ways in which loss of supply of a utility can occur total site, part of a site, a single plant unit, part of a plant should all be taken into consideration in order to identify which process streams will continue to flow or not and any potential hazards or domino effects arising as a consequence. Site utility systems may include: 1. 2. 3. 4. Electrical Power; Steam / Condensate; Inerting Gases normally nitrogen; Compressed Air;
__________________________________________________ Reliability of Utilities 1
E & C Division 5. 6. 7. Vacuum Systems; Cooling Water;
Fire Water / other Extinguishing Agents (e.g. BCF, foam, etc.);
8. 9. 10.
Process / Service Water; Fuel (oil, gas, etc.); Refrigeration.
On some sites other more specialised utility systems may exist such as the supply of oxygen through a distribution system from a cryogenic plant unit. Where a hazard assessment identifies that a plant may not continue to operate or may not shutdown safely then back-up features may be necessary to ensure its continued safe operation. Normally, such back-up supplies are provided local to the plant, e.g. bottled gas supplies, but may be via a redundant or diverse system arrangement, e.g. a parallel or alternative supply. Design Based on risk assessment the operator should demonstrate that utility systems have been designed with an appropriate level of redundancy within the system to cope with failures and maintain the required integrity (availability) of supply. Items such as pumps and compressors can be expected to fail occasionally and typically this would mean the availability of back-up pumps, compressors, or steam boilers available on an auto start basis. To improve availability diverse equipment can be used to avoid common mode failures. Routing of critical utility supplies should take into account the hazards on site and the potential for fire and impact damage on the distribution system. Appropriate shielding should be used where necessary. The loss of supply of a utility such as steam to a plant can often be handled safely by appropriate trip systems, but where the continued operation of a utility system is more critical, the design of the distribution system should demonstrate the availability of various routes to achieve supply. Routes for duplicate distribution lines should be segregated. Often a 'ring main' __________________________________________________ Reliability of Utilities 2
E & C Division
approach is used for the distribution of fire water in hydrant systems. Compressed air and inert gases should be supplied through local receiver vessels with sufficient volume to ensure safe shutdown or continued operation until normal supplies have been reinstated. Electrical power supply systems involve much complex equipment and deserve special consideration as failure can also impact on the supply of other utilities and directly on process equipment. Typically a system for a high hazard site may consist of two independent Grid supply points, both fed from different circuits. Power may be fed to sub stations in duplicate lines with cross over connections. The distribution from local substations to various plant switch rooms can be switched between substations. Nominated critical drives should be capable of being fed from a standby emergency diesel generator and should auto start-up on receiving power. An uninterruptable power supply (often referred to as an UPS) should feed critical control and instrumentation systems. The operator should demonstrate an appropriate level of availability for critical utility systems using methods such as fault tree analysis. Preferably for such calculations site specific data should be used, however, where this is not possible generic data may be used. Where this is the case some consideration of its appropriateness to the actual site should be provided. Regular reviews of the systems should be undertaken to ensure the required availability is being achieved in practice. Training / Emergency Plans The operator should demonstrate that site personnel understand the implications of loss of a utility system and that emergency plans are in place for the safe reinstatement of critical supplies where necessary. Competent persons should be trained in the requirements of the emergency plans and exercises should take place to test those plans. Maintenance / Testing Programmes should be in place for inspection and maintenance of utility systems at regular intervals to written procedures. The intervals for proof tests should be based upon the required availability of the utility system. Where back-up systems are in place the operator should demonstrate __________________________________________________ Reliability of Utilities 3
E & C Division
that the test routine involves 'end to end' testing of the system. As an example, it is insufficient to test a diesel power generator set without testing that the auto start-up facility works and that the switchgear in the distribution system works properly. Examples of Industry Applications Emergency Absorption Plants Emergency absorption plants must be able to handle vents under all circumstances. These plants are built with standby recirculation pumps and suction fans. Emergency power is provided by a standby diesel generator. This approach is used in the handling of chlorine and other toxic gases. Operating procedures should include the shutdown of plant in the event of failure of such systems. Flammables Handling Where site operations involve the handling of flammable liquids a fire hydrant system should be provided that preferably encircles the plant and is provided with cross over connections at appropriate points. The ring should be maintained under pressure by e.g. 'jockey' pumps. Any fall in pressure should automatically start the main fire pump. A diesel powered pump should be provided on high hazard sites in case of power failure. Centrifuging of Flammable Materials Many industrial processes involve the centrifuging of a powder from a flammable liquid. Centrifuges are well known for providing an ignition source due to their high speed moving parts and a secure nitrogen source is necessary. A local emergency back-up supply of nitrogen is often provided from local cylinders in case of site nitrogen failure.
Steam Heating Where a hazard can arise from the solidification of a liquid chemical on loss of steam heating, back-up heating is often provided by an electrical heater or trace heating. Whilst there are not many instances of this being __________________________________________________ Reliability of Utilities 4
E & C Division
a direct hazard, the exposure of personnel during the process of dealing with a solid tank of a substance such as sulphur can represent a hazard. Reactor Cooling Loss of water cooling to a reactor can be hazardous where the reactions involved are exothermic. The use of site utility water supplies to back-up a local purpose designed cooling tower-based system is common. Where a refrigerant is used for cooling, loss of power supply to the refrigeration package can be critical.
__________________________________________________ Reliability of Utilities 5
E & C Division
5.19
RELIEF SYSTEMS / VENT SYSTEMS
General Principles Process plant can be subjected to excessive overpressure or underpressure due to: External fire; Process abnormality or mal operation; Equipment or service / utility failure; Changes in ambient conditions; Excess chemical reaction.
To achieve a more inherently safe design, and to arrive at the most economical solution overall consideration should always be given to: Can the overpressure or underpressure hazard be eliminated by changes in process or plant design? Can the overpressure or underpressure hazard be reduced by reducing inventories or changing process conditions? Can the overpressure or underpressure be contained by designing equipment to withstand maximum feasible pressure?; Can alternative protection to a relief system be considered?; Can the required relief system be minimised by mechanical or instrumented systems?. Explosion Relief is considered in a separate Technical Measures Document. Relief systems considered in this document are based on systems where pressure rise occurs over several seconds or longer, and there is no reaction front. In these cases we may assume: Safety valves can open in time; Piping is adequately sized to provide pressure relief; Relief flow may be determined by steady-state flow equations; Conditions are approximately uniform throughout each phase at any moment; __________________________________________________ Relief System / Vent System 1
E & C Division
Further pressure generation by reaction in the relief piping is negligible.
General principles applicable to relief systems include: In all cases, relief devices must be selected and located to minimise disturbance to plant and environment; Relief devices must not be isolated from equipment they protect while the equipment is in use; The discharge from a relief device should pass to a safe location which may be: A dump tank; Upstream in the process; A storage tank; A quench vessel or tower; A sewer; The atmosphere; A knockout drum; A scrubber; An incinerator; A flare stack.
Design basis and methodology of all relief stream packages must be documented, and incorporated into plant modification and change procedures to ensure that relief stream invalidation does not occur. Sizing of Vents (Especially Exothermic Reactions, Storage Tanks) One of the biggest problems in sizing vents is the availability and accuracy of physical property data for the reaction components. It is good practice when sizing a relief system to utilise several design methods to achieve consistency in design. When sizing pressure / vacuum relief systems for storage, if several tanks are connected up to a single relief system the relief device should be capable of accommodating the simultaneous vent loading at a relieving pressure less than the lowest tank design pressure. __________________________________________________ Relief System / Vent System 2
E & C Division
Venting can either be normal or atmospheric venting or emergency venting. Different measures may be adopted to provide protection for the vessel or tank in each case. The worst case scenario is generally experienced when tanks are exposed to fire. Normal venting requirements may be met by installation of pressurevacuum relief valves. Emergency venting may be accomplished by installation of a bursting or rupture disc device. Depending upon the tank contents and the physical characteristics of these contents consideration should be given to the vent discharge point and configuration. Guidance is provided in recognised industry standards.
There are various recognised methods for sizing vents. These include: API Methods; NFPA Methods; Vapour / Gas Only method; Leungs method; Level Swell method; Stepwise method; Nomogram method; Fauskes method; Two-phase method; DIERS method; Huffs method; Boyles method.
The use of DIERS (Design Institute for Emergency Relief Systems) methodology is becoming increasingly widespread. Detailed analysis of relief systems using this methodology, together with experimental testing, is now the accepted practice.
__________________________________________________ Relief System / Vent System 3
E & C Division
Flame Arresters Flame arresters are commonly installed on the vent outlet of tanks containing liquids with flashpoints below 21C, generally where pressurevacuum vent valves are not in use. Their prime function is to prevent the unrestricted propagation of flame through flammable gas or vapour mixtures, and secondly to absorb heat from unburnt gas. Flame arresters should be designed for each specific application, and due to the likelihood of progressive blockage a rigorous inspection and maintenance schedule should be in place. Relief Valves Relief valves are characterised by: Slow response times (tenths of a second up to > 1 second); Risk of blockage; Trace leakage.
Design considerations for relief valves include: The pressure drop before the safety valve must be low to avoid instability; The design must take into consideration differences between gas and liquid duties; Back pressure can affect opening / closing pressures, stability and capacity; The relief valve usually solely determines relief capacity if appropriate piping is used. Regular proof checks are required to check lifting pressure, particularly if located in a corrosive environment. Also valve seating checks should be undertaken to ensure that the valve is not passing. Bursting Discs Bursting discs are characterised by: Very fast response times (milliseconds); Less risk of blockage than relief valves;
E & C Division Cheap to install and maintain;
Available in a wide range of materials; No leakage; Non re-closing hence may allow large discharges even when pressure falls below relieving (rupture) pressure; Potential for premature failure due to pressure pulsation, especially if the rupture pressure is close to the operating pressure; Rupture pressure affected by back pressure; Risk of incorrect assembly.
Design considerations for bursting discs include: Protection against reverse pressure (vac dials); Differences between disc temperature and vessel temperature; Main factor affecting relief capacity is piping configuration;
The rupture pressure of a bursting disc is a function of the prevailing temperature. It is common practice for an operator to specify the required rupture pressure at a specific operating or relieving temperature however, if the temperature cycles or changes during the process operation the degree of protection of the vessel can be compromised. This is because as the prevailing temperature decreases the rupture pressure of the bursting disc will increase potentially resulting in the rupture pressure at temperature being greater than the design pressure of the vessel. Thus if the pressure increases at this condition, vessel failure will occur. The converse case can also apply if the rupture pressure is quoted for ambient temperatures, since the actual rupture pressure will decrease under normal operating conditions which can cause premature failure of bursting discs. The surrounding vent pipework should be adequately sized to accommodate relief flows in the event of bursting disc failure. Bursting discs are a common method for fulfilling emergency venting requirements, although a routine maintenance programme should cover bursting disc installations. Bursting disc installations should incorporate vent pipework that is the same diameter as the bursting disc itself. __________________________________________________ Relief System / Vent System 5
E & C Division
Combinations of bursting discs and relief valves are occasionally employed for specific applications. Double bursting discs (back to back arrangements) are often provided with a pressure indicator/alarm between them in aggressive environments where failures of the initial disc may occur. In such instances the second bursting disc is reversed to withstand the initial shock pressure. Scrubbers (Design for Maximum Foreseeable Flow) In many installations, scrubbing systems provide one of the major lines of defence against release of toxic gas. Several key factors must therefore be taken into consideration when designing and sizing the scrubbing system. These include: Composition of gas load; The composition of the gas load must be known with respect to: Solids loading, particle size distribution and chemical composition; Water vapour loading; Toxic gas loading; Inerts loading.
Variations in gas load; The basis of the scrubber design should take into consideration the peak gas loading, the minimum gas loading and the mean gas loading in addition to corresponding variations in inert gas loading.
Depletion / saturation of scrubbing liquor; Analysis of the reaction stoichiometry between the gas and the scrubbing liquor will give some indication of the minimum scrubbing liquor strength at which the absorption process can occur for a recirculatory system. A methodology must be in place that ensures replenishment of the scrubbing liquor at an appropriate point. Hence monitoring of depletion of scrubber liquor and modelling of breakthrough concentrations is critical. Furthermore, the process may specify a maximum concentration of absorbed gas in the scrubbing liquor at which the scrubber liquor should be replenished.
E & C Division Provision of Back-up systems;
In the vent of scrubber failure, it is sometimes possible to isolate plant and process to prevent toxic gas emission by implementation of appropriate interlocks and control systems. However, if temporary isolation of plant and process is unfeasible a back up system should be provided.
Control systems; The control system for the scrubber operation should be interlocked with the plant and processes that the scrubber services such that in the event of scrubber failure process operations can be isolated and / or suspended. The control system should feature scrubber diagnostics that verify and indicate that the scrubber is healthy and working.
Monitoring and instrumentation; Typical instrumentation on a toxic gas scrubbing system should include: Stack gas analyser; Scrubbing liquor flow indicator; Scrubbing liquor tank level indication; Flow indication or DP instrumentation across scrubbing fan; Process interlocks for event of scrubber failure.
Stack Heights The concentration of waste gases at ground level can be reduced significantly by emitting the waste gases from a process at great height, although the actual amount of pollutants released into the atmosphere will remain the same. The basis for design begins with determination of an acceptable groundlevel concentration of the pollutant or pollutants. If the waste gas is to be discharged through an existing stack, or the stack size is restricted the ground-level concentration should be determined and if it is unacceptable __________________________________________________ Relief System / Vent System 7
E & C Division
appropriate control measures should be adopted. Steps in the design methodology include: For a given stack height, the effective height of the emission can be determined by employing an appropriate plume-rise equation; Application of atmospheric dispersion formula enables the downward path of the emission to be modelled. Various formulae may be employed. These include: Bosanquet-Pearson model; Gaussian model employing Briggs formulae; Wilson model Pasquill-Gifford model; Sutton model; TVA model.
Factors affecting stack design include: Composition of waste gas (and changes in composition); Physical and chemical properties of waste gas; Topography (buildings, hills, lakes and rivers etc.); Seasonal changes in weather; Prevailing winds (direction and speed); Humidity; Rainfall
Flaring Flaring may be used to destroy flammable, toxic or corrosive vapours, particularly those produced during process upsets and emergency venting. Key design factors to ensure flare safety and performance include: Smokeless operation; Flame stability; Flare size and capacity;
E & C Division Thermal radiation; Noise level;
Reliable pilot and ignition system; Flashback protection. BS 5908: 1990
The major safety issues are the latter two items.
recommends that permanent pilot burners should be provided with a reliable means of remote ignition. An additional means of ignition, e.g. a piccolo tube should be provided, independent of power supplies. Flare header systems should be provided with an inert gas purge sufficient to provide a positive gas flow up the stack to prevent back diffusion of air. Forced Ventilation (Especially to Control Direction of Flow and Dilution) Non-pressurised systems in which fumes and vapours are generated should have adequate ventilation to remove those fumes to a safe place. This may be a scrubber or a stack for discharge. Consideration should also be given to the venting of discharges from relief systems. Both dedicated enclosed forced ventilation systems and area forced ventilation will need to be considered. A further purpose of ventilation is to dilute and remove the hazardous substance to such an extent that the concentration in the protected space is kept to acceptable levels. Ventilation rates are generally designed to reduce the concentration to about one-quarter of these levels. The use of forced ventilation has an impact on the area extent and classification of hazardous areas. The methodology for assessment of type and degree of ventilation is covered in British Standards. Although mainly applied inside a room or enclosed space, forced ventilation can also be applied to situations in the open air to compensate for restricted or impeded natural ventilation due to obstacles. Spot Ventilation General ventilation is applied to the room or compartment as a whole (see forced ventilation above). It may also be applied locally to the plant or process as spot or local ventilation. Basic design principles include:
E & C Division
Fume extraction inlet should be as close to the source of gas or vapour as possible; The rate of extraction of fume should be greater than or equal to the rate of generation of fume in the particular area; Air supply inlets should be located to provide ventilation for other regions that may become contaminated; General air movement should be from areas surrounding the emission source, across the contaminated zone and thence through the fume extraction inlet;
A velocity of 0.5 to 2 m/s is generally recommended (Lees 25.7). Trunking is often used to allow operators to move the point of extraction as required.
Special Cases: Chlorine, LPG Storage In the event of overpressure in liquid chlorine storage tanks, the discharge line from the pressure relief system should enter a closed expansion vessel with a capacity of nominally 10% of the largest storage vessel. This expansion vessel should then be manually relieved at a controlled rate to an absorption system. In the event of overpressure of LPG storage tanks, the tank should be fitted with a pressure relief valve connected directly to the vapour space. Underground or mounded vessels affect full flow capacity of pressure relief valves. In the event of overpressure in anhydrous ammonia storage tanks, the tank should be protected by a relief system fitted with at least two pressure relief valves should be fitted.
E & C Division
5.20
ROADWAYS / SITE TRAFFIC CONTROL
Introduction The good design of roadways and the control of traffic on-site are important factors in the prevention of road traffic accidents and an important consideration in the prevention of major accident hazards onsite. Collisions between moving vehicles, collisions between pedestrians and moving vehicles, or the impact of a vehicle with stationary plant, vehicles or equipment can lead to physical injuries and damage or a loss of containment of chemicals. The detailed design and construction of roadways is outside the scope of this technical measures document but some of the important considerations relating to roadway design are highlighted below. In addition the safe and correct immobilisation of vehicles during tanker loading and unloading operations and at other times when on site is also an important factor in the prevention of site major accident hazards. This technical measures document considers the following elements: Design Codes Roadways; Site Traffic Control; Operational Issues.
General Principles Design Codes Roadways In principle the road layout, signing and marking should be such that all road users can reasonably understand what is required of them. Roads should be designed to accommodate the largest vehicles that may have to use them in respect of strength, width, radius, gradient, clearance and visibility. Access routes on-site are required for pedestrians, cyclists and road traffic. Access is required for the transport of equipment and materials, for emergency vehicle access and maintenance purposes. Roadways and access routes should be designed to avoid congestion and hence reduce the likelihood of road traffic accidents occurring.
__________________________________________________ Roadways / Site Traffic Control 1
E & C Division
Road Layout & Geometry The following are important considerations in the design of road layout: The surface should be firm, level and of an appropriate material; Consideration should be given to other physical characteristics of the road such as the camber, width, headroom, visibility, drainage, gradient and radius of bends etc; Road layouts should be carefully planned and clearly marked; There should be appropriate segregation between pedestrians and road traffic; Parking and loading/unloading areas on site should be separated; and Hazards, restrictions and directions should be clearly identified and communicated by signs, signals and instructions. However, for the majority of industrial sites with an existing infrastructure road layouts cannot be readily amended. Layout Depending on the size of the site the road layout should preferably be a looped arrangement, which avoids the need for reversing. In smaller sites, a street with only one way in or out may be acceptable subject to the provision of adequate turning facilities, which may be in the form of a hammerhead but preferably a turning circle. In larger sites, individual access roads should feed to the main industrial distributor road, which should not provide direct access to individual factory units. All two-way industrial roads should have a minimum width of 7.3 meters with local widening on bends to cater for the swept path of HGV vehicles. Individual premises should have an access of minimum width of 6.1 meters. When designing a new or improved layout it is helpful to use a design vehicle to achieve efficient and uniform layouts. Most designs will operate satisfactorily if they can cope with the requirements of a 15.5 metre long design articulated vehicle and a 10.0 metre long design rigid vehicle.
E & C Division
Gradient The maximum longitudinal gradient should be 1 in 12 and the minimum channel gradient should be 1 in 125. A crossfall or camber of 1 in 40 provides adequate drainage. If minimum gradients are not provided, surface water will tend to pond, which will be hazardous in freezing conditions. Standing water can also obscure road markings and lead to an increased likelihood of accidents. Materials of Construction Different types of road pavements are available including flexible pavement where surface materials are bound with a bituminous binder, a rigid pavement which utilises pavement quality concrete for the surfacing layers, or a flexible pavement surfaced with block paviors. Bituminous surfacing will degrade if exposed to oil products and other chemical spillages. Areas where spillages are likely such as loading and unloading areas should utilise a resistant surfacing, such as concrete or some other appropriate material, with drainage facilities that can intercept hazardous chemicals. The design of the road pavement will be dependent on the ground conditions at sub-grade level and the expected traffic flow and vehicle type during the design life of the pavement.
Kerbing Kerbing to roadways should be provided wherever possible to clearly define the roadway and provide a measure of protection. Dropped kerbs should be provided at pedestrian crossing points. Height Restrictions Areas that are vulnerable such as pipebridges, overhead gantries etc should be clearly identified and height restrictions clearly marked. The standard minimum clearance over every part of the carriageway of a public road is 16 feet 6 inches (5.03 meters). When the clearance over any part is less than this standard, a warning sign both on and prior to the
E & C Division
structure should be provided which should be at least 75mm less than the measured height. Heights of vehicle likely to be encountered are 4.2 meters high (i.e. A standard container on a suitable flatbed vehicle). Minimum headroom provided should be 4.65 meters exclusive of any additional space required for lighting units. Additional clearance will be required if there is a requirement for an overlay in the future. Changes in gradient may also reduce the effective headroom for long vehicles.
Visibility Consideration should be given to road traffic visibility. Road traffic should have adequate forward visibility on bends to enable a driver to stop before an obstruction in the road. In addition, there should be adequate visibility at junctions so those drivers emerging can see and be seen by approaching drivers. Visibility requirements are related to vehicle speed and stopping distances. Lighting There should be adequate lighting of site locations and vehicles at all times to enable all persons to carry out their work tasks safely and in safety. Lighting should be provided for junctions, plant and buildings, pedestrian routes and areas where loading/unloading is to be carried out. Signs should either be illuminated for night-time visibility or adverse weather conditions, or be suitably reflective. Vehicles on site should use lights/beacons etc in darkness or poor visibility to aid detection by other vehicles. Consideration should be given to the difference in light levels between internal and external areas at the points of access to and from buildings that may hinder detection of vehicle movement. Adequate lighting should be provided to all areas and especially to those areas used in darkness hours.
E & C Division Drainage
Roadways on site should be adequately drained to ensure that standing water is not present on-site. Connections for rainwater run-off from roads into drainage systems may have to include interception facilities in the case of chemical contamination.
Bridges Bridges and other structures, which have maximum weight restrictions, should be clearly identified.
Parking Parking areas on site for employees, visitors and delivery vehicles should be clearly identified and marked. Staff and visitor car parking areas should be separate from site access routes wherever possible. Provision for disabled users should also be made. Parking bays should be clearly identified by surface markings in order to avoid random parking arrangements. Lay-bys or similar should be considered to avoid obstruction of the main site access roads. Secure, convenient and adequate parking areas should be provided onsite for vehicles such that the general roadway is not obstructed. Off-road pull-in areas that are clearly identified should be provided wherever possible. Random parking should be avoided and discouraged wherever possible since this can introduce additional hazards and increase the likelihood of a road traffic accident.
Loading/Offloading Areas for loading and unloading should preferably be separate from general access areas and loading bay edges should be clearly marked and protected by barriers. Adequate space for vehicle manoeuvring should be available in loading/unloading and delivery areas. If reversing or manoeuvring into position is required consideration should be given to the provision of physical barriers or the attendance of another __________________________________________________ Roadways / Site Traffic Control 5
E & C Division
person to supervise the movements. In some instances audible warnings for vehicles reversing or manoeuvring may be appropriate. Operators in unloading areas should be provided with suitable refuges and drivers of vehicles should be segregated from dangerous working areas. Special coatings to road surfaces may be required to provide resistance against chemical attack from spillages. Raised kerbing and other containment measures may also be required to ensure that spillages do not spread across adjacent areas. In these areas special drainage channels may also be required that drain to collection sumps for reclamation purposes. Pedestrian Walkways Pedestrians should be kept away from access routes for vehicles wherever possible in order to avoid possible conflict. Separate pedestrian pavements that are clearly identified should be provided. Guard rails or fencing should be provided where appropriate and additional protection should be provided at pedestrian exits and entrances from buildings. Normal road crossing points for pedestrians should be clearly identified and consideration should be given to clearly identifying walkways by zebra markings or other such systems. Zebra crossings can also be incorporated into layout design. Zebra crossings are normally only considered when traffic flows do not provide adequate gaps in the traffic for pedestrians to cross. Consideration should be given to the provision of pedestrian walkways clearly segregated from adjacent roadways wherever possible. The positioning of pedestrian crossing points should be considered carefully to ensure the pedestrian and road user have adequate visibility. It may be necessary to erect guardrails to stop pedestrians crossing on corners where visibility is reduced. Guardrails should be set back a minimum of 500mm from the kerb. Where road crossings are wide, it is appropriate to provide central refuges to allow the roadway to be crossed safely in two or more movements. In some circumstances overhead pedestrian footbridges or subways may be considered necessary
E & C Division
The movement of pedestrians onto/off and around site should be considered, not only for routine access between plants during the working day but also for mass movements which may occur at the beginning or end of the working day, during shift changeovers, at lunchtime and under emergency evacuation conditions. The interaction between pedestrians, cycle traffic and vehicles should be evaluated. Railways Rail deliveries are generally only applicable for the bulk transfer of raw materials or product onto or off site. Specially designed facilities for loading/offloading are generally available. Special consideration needs to be given to rail car movements onto and off-site in co-ordination with the relevant railtrack operator. Whilst on-site, rail car movements may restrict normal traffic flow arrangements, either whilst moving into location or whilst being loaded. Special consideration should be given to the segregation of rail traffic from other areas and the provision of suitable barriers and warning signals for locations where rail tracks cross pedestrian footpaths or roadways. The legislative requirements for rail traffic are outside the scope of this document. Areas where road and rail lines interact should be given special consideration to ensure that suitable signing and barriers, if required, are provided between road and rail.
General Principles Site Traffic Control Site traffic control relies upon a combination of physical features such as road layout and marking, signs and signals and other considerations such as systems, procedures and training. Site traffic control should typically consider the following types of traffic: Road traffic commercial delivery vehicles (including road tankers, wagons, couriers etc), internal vehicles (including fork lift trucks, mobile cranes, bicycles), visitor and staff cars/motorbikes/bicycles etc; __________________________________________________ Roadways / Site Traffic Control 7
E & C Division
Rail traffic some sites may receive and dispatch goods by rail. Rail routes may cross site access roads for vehicles or affect pedestrian areas; and
Pedestrian traffic site employees, contractors and visitors either on their way to or from their normal place of work at the beginning or end of the working day, or as part of their work during the day.
Road users, both drivers and pedestrians, should know exactly what is expected of them. This can be achieved by establishing a Road Hierarchy, which is used to provide a consistent standard for each road type in terms of design standard, signing, access constraints etc. Traffic routes should be determined and can be classified as either access/through routes to site for deliveries, shuttle routes between buildings for on-site activities, or emergency access routes for fire engines, ambulances etc. Careful planning and consideration of site traffic control issues can result in a reduction in the likelihood of collisions between vehicles and/or equipment. Incompatible types of traffic should be segregated as far as possible to avoid potential interactions between chemicals in the event of a collision between road traffic vehicles or between road traffic and stationary storage facilities or pipelines carrying chemicals. This guidance is not concerned with traffic control within buildings such as warehouses or process plant areas where special consideration needs to be given to the potential interaction between forklift trucks and/or pedestrians. Road Traffic Consideration should be given both to the hazards introduced by the loads being conveyed and the mode of transport used. Chemical hazards are considered elsewhere. Consideration should be given to the physical size, the presence of ignition sources and hot surfaces, the presence of flammable fuels, the possibility of impact caused by size or speed, and loading/unloading issues. The purpose of the presence of vehicles on site should be assessed. Some vehicles may be used simply for access and the transportation of __________________________________________________ Roadways / Site Traffic Control 8
E & C Division
personnel and others for the delivery of materials (solids, liquids and gases) and equipment to/from site. Some of the items that may be transported are given below: Bulk deliveries of liquids or solids; Small packages, containers, drums etc of solids or liquids; Gas cylinders; Mechanical equipment; Letters, parcels etc; and Personnel.
Some of the different modes of road traffic transport which may be present on site on either a routine or an irregular basis are given below and consideration should be given for any possible implications due to variation in height, length, width, weight etc. Bulk delivery tankers; Wagons, trucks, lorries and vans; Mobile cranes; Cars; Mini-buses; Cyclists; and Fork lift trucks.
Each type of vehicle has different characteristics and introduces different potential problems to site. An assessment of the risks of transportation of each material/load on site should be carried out, an estimate of the frequency of each delivery made and the access route carefully defined in relation to the hazards present. Traffic Flow In order to assist in controlling traffic flow on-site a number of additional measures can be incorporated in order to manage traffic flow in congested areas and reduce speeds on-site. Such techniques include: __________________________________________________ Roadways / Site Traffic Control 9
E & C Division
Traffic lights can be used to control flow at busy junctions, in narrow locations and at entry and exit locations to the site; One-way systems should be considered where necessary to reduce the likelihood of collision, reduce congestion and improve traffic movement;
Roundabouts may smooth traffic flow and avoid road traffic turning directly in front of on-coming traffic; Traffic calming devices such as speed humps, rumble strips, width restrictors etc can be incorporated into road design to encourage a reduction in speed. (Such devices are not appropriate in areas where forklift trucks routinely operate since they introduce additional hazards for this type of vehicle). The design of such features must be appropriate for the type of traffic envisaged;
Physical barriers should be incorporated into road design to protect vulnerable and hazardous installations such as storage tanks, pipework systems, buildings or pedestrian access areas;
Signs and road markings; and, Site speed limits.
Physical Barriers Physical barriers should be installed, wherever practical, adjacent to roadways to reduce the potential impact of road traffic accidents. Consideration should be given to the protection of vulnerable pipework, storage tanks and other plant and equipment. When considering the installation of barriers it is important that visibility is not reduced pedestrians. below acceptable standards for road users and
Signs/Road Markings Signs and signals should be used on-site to clearly identify hazards, restrictions and to give directions. Chemical hazards should be identified along with height, width and loading restrictions for pipebridges, arches, bridges etc. __________________________________________________ Roadways / Site Traffic Control 10
E & C Division
Road markings should be used to designate traffic routes, non-parking areas, give way areas etc in accordance with standard road markings. All signs should be unambiguous, conspicuous, clean and unobstructed. Speed sensors and flashing warning signs can be used to improve communication of information to traffic on-site. A site plan should be available at the site entrance, the site speed limit should be clearly identified and adequate sign posting to assist delivery vehicles unfamiliar with the site layout should be provided to assist navigation. Speed Limits Speed limits should be imposed on larger industrial sites to limit the possibility and severity of accidents. A suitable site speed limit (s) should be determined based upon consideration of what is a safe speed on-site accounting for the layout, bends etc. Limits of 10, 15 or 20 mph may be appropriate depending on the site layout and hazards. This should then be effectively communicated to drivers of all vehicles who require access to the site, sign-posted at appropriate intervals and locations to remind drivers of the speed limit and enforced. To be effective the limits should be enforced by site security. Speed limits should be included in the Site Rules with appropriate disciplinary action taken as necessary.
Operational Issues A number of on-going measures should be considered when considering roads and traffic control. Spillage Clean-up Adequate facilities and materials should be readily available on-site for clean-up of spillages. Any materials used should not directly affect the road surface.
Maintenance Roads on site should be adequately maintained and free from pot-holes and other surface defects which may affect vehicles __________________________________________________ Roadways / Site Traffic Control 11
E & C Division
Adequate equipment grit/sand etc should be readily available on-site for snow and icy conditions. Systems and Procedures Systems and procedures should be in place to ensure that site traffic control issues are adequately considered and incorporated into site safety management systems. Consideration should be given to segregating incompatible traffic loads and organising deliveries outside busy periods. Systems should be in place for assessing the transport requirements, vehicles and routes to be used. Consideration should be given to the necessity for transport, and to a vehicle selection system for the site that considers the design, maintenance and operability of the vehicles to be used. Procedures for accidents to be reported and investigated should exist. Lessons for improving traffic flow and reducing accidents should be learnt. Normal requirements of Road Traffic Acts should be adhered to on-site. This includes seatbelt and alcohol policies. Procedures should exist to deal with the increased hazards caused by adverse weather conditions. Procedures for routine clearance of debris from roadways and road cleaning along with adequate resources should be available. Standard access routes should be defined and prepared. In the event of site roadwork, temporary construction work or other reasons why areas may be temporarily out of use (cranes, rail delivery etc) a system needs to be in place to ensure that alternative routes are developed, temporary access signs installed etc. Under all circumstances access for emergency vehicles to all facilities should be maintained. For those sites where offloading/loading can result in temporary road closures being necessary care should be taken that a combination of more than one road closure at a time does not lead to areas of site becoming temporarily inaccessible for pedestrians, or emergency __________________________________________________ Roadways / Site Traffic Control 12
E & C Division
vehicles. Visitors should be the subject of suitable reception and security checks prior to access to site. Visitor vehicles should be separated from site operations as far as possible. Prior to access to site visitors should be made aware of vehicle restrictions and safety considerations. Pedestrian visitors should be accompanied whilst on-site in operational areas. Site based vehicles should be routinely inspected and maintained to set standards and procedures to ensure roadworthiness and the effectiveness of safety systems such as brakes, lights, horns, indicators etc. Daily preuse checks for site based vehicles such as fork lift trucks should be considered. There should be a clear procedure for reporting and correcting defects in vehicles and maintenance records should be available for inspection. Systems should be in place to ensure effective communication between gatehouse and operators accepting delivery on-site to warn of the arrival of delivery vehicles. CCTV systems can be considered as a mechanism for managing and controlling road traffic systems. Training Training is an essential component of site traffic control and should cover not only those engaged in driving vehicles on site, but also pedestrians and those responsible for monitoring and enforcing traffic control on site. Training of site personnel engaged in driving site-based vehicles is an essential part of the prevention of site traffic accidents. Site based personnel should be made aware of the hazards of driving fork lift trucks for example and should be routinely checked for competence and licensed as appropriate. Unauthorised personnel should not be allowed to drive vehicles on site. Training for all site staff should cover technical issues such as vehicles, equipment, hazard awareness, speed limits, parking and loading requirements, safe operating practices etc, site layout, traffic routes, reporting procedures etc. The competence of third party delivery drivers on site can be assessed by checking the health & safety standards of contractors and their subcontractors in relation to their selection and training procedures, __________________________________________________ Roadways / Site Traffic Control 13
E & C Division
maintenance of vehicles, use of regular or ad-hoc drivers, accident and safety records etc. The company may undertake spot checks and inspections of delivery vehicles to ensure suitable road safety standards, driver competence and vehicle maintenance is being carried out.
E & C Division
5.21
SECONDARY CONTAINMENT
This Technical Measures Document refers to secondary containment. Temporary or mobile systems which are required to be put in place in response to an emergency e.g. booms, absorbent materials, sandbags are considered under the Technical Measures Document on Emergency Response / Spill Control. Also water sprays/curtains and foam blankets are considered under the Technical Measures Document on Active / Passive Fire Protection. Related Technical Measures Documents are Emergency Response / Spill Control, Active / Passive Fire Protection, Drum/Cylinder Storage/Handling and Relief Systems / Vent Systems. General Principles Secondary containment is used on plant as a second line of defense for preventing, controlling or mitigating major hazards events. It can take a number of forms, the most common are: Bunds Drip trays Off-gas treatment systems Interceptors/Sumps Expansion vessels Double skinned tanks/vessels Concentric pipes Building structures/ventilation
Bunds Bunds are generally used around storage tanks or drum storage areas where flammable or toxic liquids are held. Alternative measures may be earth dikes (usually for very large tanks), sumps and interceptors. Bunds are also sometimes used within plant buildings for reactors and other process vessels. For materials that are normally gases at ambient conditions, bunds are used where flash fractions are sufficiently low to __________________________________________________ Secondary Containment 1
E & C Division
merit them. Therefore they are often used for refrigerated gases but not for the same gases stored under pressure. It is normal to limit the number of tanks in a single bund to 60,000 m3 total capacity. However, incompatible materials should have separate bunds. Tanks often have individual bunds. Bunds should be sized to hold 110% of the maximum capacity of the largest tank or drum. This will allow some latitude for the addition of foam during response to the emergency. There are no set rules on the ratio between wall height and floor area and codes vary greatly with respect to recommendations of bund wall height. Low wall heights (1-1.5 m) are often used to facilitate firefighting but are poor defense against spigot flow (where a leak in the wall of a tank passes over the bund wall) or the tidal wave effect of a catastrophic tank failure. In some cases bunds up to height of the tank are used, but these are quite unusual. For high walled bunds, consideration will need to be given to the possibility of tanks floating as the bund fills, causing catastrophic failure. Bunds are generally fabricated from brick/mortar or concrete but where liquids are being stored above their boiling point additional insulation, e.g. vermiculite mortar, may be added as cladding to reduce the evaporation rate. Such materials provide adequate chemical resistance to most liquids.
Maintenance of bunds is an important aspect, often overlooked, particularly in remote locations. A system of inspection should be in place to ensure the integrity of the bund. Also due consideration should be given to drainage to allow the removal of rainwater. This is normally achieved by incorporating a drain at a low point of a sloping floor with a manual valve, normally kept closed. Operating schedules should include daily opening of the valve to remove accumulated water, this will also assist in identifying minor leaks. However, with this system there is the problem that the valve may be left open or fail, thus reducing the effectiveness of the bund if a tank failure occurs. Also in winter conditions, ice may form blocking the drain. Failure to remove rainwater will reduce the capacity of the bund and may result in overtopping and if the substance to be contained is incompatible with water e.g. oleum, may __________________________________________________ Secondary Containment 2
E & C Division
result in an increased airborne release. Consideration of these scenarios should be included in the Safety Report. Drip Trays Drip trays are often used beneath equipment liable to small leaks, such as pumps, in process buildings and are effectively mini-bunds. They are intended to prevent the spread of toxic or flammable substances to other plant areas or to sumps and drains where secondary effects resulting in a major accident could occur by domino effect. Drip trays vary greatly in size and design. They are normally tailored to the individual item of equipment but may serve a number of items. Materials of construction are often metals such as stainless steel or strong rigid plastics that can be readily moved. Drainage is not normally provided and liquid collected is normally removed using absorbent material, after neutralisation or dilution (if required). One variation on this theme is the use of sumps on drum stillages. These are intended to hold the total contents of a drum in the event of a catastrophic failure. They are normally limited to 1 or 2 drums and may be used in drum transport by forklift truck. HAZOP/HAZAN studies should determine where drip trays are required. Off-Gas Treatment Systems Off-gas treatment systems which may act as secondary containment include: Scrubbers Flares Catchpots/Knock-out drums Electrostatic precipitators
These systems may be used to reduce concentrations of hazardous gases and vapours prior to discharge of the stream to atmosphere. Apart from scrubbers, often such systems are part of the normal process but they may be used in a secondary containment role. The latter two are used when discharge streams may contain liquids or solids e.g. from reactor emergency venting, which need to be removed, prior to further treatment. Catchpots may be chilled or contain an absorbent liquid to remove contaminants. The worst credible case discharge rate and volume __________________________________________________ Secondary Containment 3
E & C Division
should considered when designing such systems. HAZOP/HAZAN should be used to establish the worst case scenario. The Technical Measures Document Relief Systems / Vent Systems provides more detail. Interceptors/Sumps Design of drainage systems both within and outside process buildings should take account of the need to segregate spillages of hazardous materials. Drains systems to be considered may include: Sewers Stormwater drains Process effluent systems Firewater drainage systems
In many cases these functions are combined and often firewater and process effluents are drained into main sewerage systems. Where there is a possibility that hazardous substances could be discharged into a drainage system, interceptors or sumps should be provided of sufficient capacity to ensure that an offsite major accident does not occur. HAZOP studies or an alternative hazard identification methodology should be used to identify such hazards. For process effluents arising from leaks or plant washdown, good practice is to provide a local sump which is sampled before emptying. Such sumps normally incorporate level indicators/alarms for monitoring. Discharge can be to drums via submersible or mobile pumps for onward disposal or via manual or manually operated automatic valves into main drainage systems if the contents are non-hazardous. As for bund drainage consideration will need to be given in the Safety Report on the possibility of valves being left open. A particular concern is the discharge of non-water miscible flammable liquids, which form a top layer. These could ignite considerable distances from the plant after discharge. More sophisticated interceptors can be provided to facilitate removal of floating flammable liquids. These tend to be designed to meet individual needs and may incorporate conductivitybased level sensors to distinguish between layers. Firewater run-off is likely to involve very large quantities of contaminated water (Lees quotes 900-2700 m3/hr). Risk Assessments should be __________________________________________________ Secondary Containment 4
E & C Division
undertaken to consider the requirement for segregation of these streams into lagoons or other catchment systems.
Expansion Systems Expansion systems are used to prevent pressure build up, leading to loss of containment, in the event of overfilling or temperature increases. They are used mainly on liquefied gas storage systems, reactors and long runs of pipelines. Codes of practice for chlorine systems include the use of an expansion vessel to allow for overfilling of the main storage tank. Depending upon the arrangement, pressure, level or weight detection/alarms on the expansion vessel may included to alert operators if liquid reaches this point. Capacity of the expansion vessel is recommended as 10% of the capacity of a storage tank. Expansion vessels are sometimes provided for atmospheric storage tanks, particularly where substances are particularly toxic or noxious. A liquid scrubbing medium may be included in the expansion vessel to provide for removal of fumes from air displaced on filling. The vent stream is sparged into vessel below the liquid surface. The expansion vessel itself then vents to either atmosphere or a scrubber. An alternative, where a number of tanks are used for the same substance, is to arrange overflows from one tank to another. Expansion tanks for reactors are described in the Technical Measure Document Quench Systems. Long pipelines containing liquids that have a high coefficient of expansion should be provided with relief systems or expansion chambers to prevent loss of containment due to overpressure. Relief systems should be discharged into expansion vessels or off gas treatment plant if discharge rates are within the design limits for such systems. Expansion chambers should have a capacity of 20% of the pipeline volume. Chlorine is a particular case to consider. Codes of practice recommend pressure relief valves or bursting discs for liquid chlorine pipelines venting to the expansion vessel or use of expansion chambers.
__________________________________________________ Secondary Containment 5
E & C Division
Double Skinned Vessels Where there is particular concern about leakages occurring from tanks, an alternative to bunding is to provide a second skin to collect material lost. Monitoring of the annulus using specific analysers or level detection can alert operators to the problem. Such systems are sometimes used for underground or tanks in remote areas, where undetected leaks to the environment may occur. Similarly tanks within process buildings may also be doubled skinned. Jacketed vessels including reactors and other process vessels are primarily used to provide cooling or heating (using water, steam, refrigerants, heating fluids etc.) to maintain temperatures of contained substances. In some cases monitoring of the heat transfer medium is used to detect loss of containment. Concentric Pipes Pipes are sometimes provided with an outer shell or secondary pipe to protect against loss of containment. As for double skinned tanks, these tend to be used where the substance contained is particularly hazardous and no alternative means i.e. bunding is available to contain any release. Such methods are used in particular to protect pipes of less robust materials of construction such as glass or plastic which are being used for very corrosive substances e.g. bromine, strong acids. The outer pipe may be of much stronger material, e.g. steel, which is sufficient to provide further containment for a short duration without failure. Again monitoring of the annulus is used to detect the initial failure and alert operators. Such systems are often used where there are long runs of pipe on overhead pipebridges. Pipes can be sloped to allow drainage to a collection pot provided with level detection/alarms. As for jacketed vessels, coolant/heating medium flow through jacketed pipes may be used to detect leaks also.
Building Ventilation Building ventilation systems can be arranged such that flow is maintained from less contaminated to areas that may become contaminated following a loss of containment, before discharge via off-gas systems, to __________________________________________________ Secondary Containment 6
E & C Division
provide some degree of secondary containment. Such systems are used routinely in the nuclear industry. The Technical Measures Document Relief Systems / Vent Systems considers ventilation systems.
__________________________________________________ Secondary Containment 7
E & C Division
5.22
SEGREGATION OF HAZARDOUS MATERIALS
This Technical Measures Document refers to issues surrounding the storing and segregation of hazardous materials and how it can be used to minimise the foreseeable risks of a major accident or hazard. General Principles The following aspects should be considered with respect to the Segregation of Hazardous Materials: Human factors; Poorly skilled work force; Ignorance towards physical and chemical properties of stored substances; Unconscious and conscious incompetence; Plant lay-out; and Plant siting.
The following issues may contribute towards a major accident or hazard: Failure to understand the properties of substances handled; Failure to identify hazards associated with mixing substances and domino events; Failure of quality assurance procedures; Insufficient recording of chemical inventories at each location on site; Insufficient labelling of chemical storage containers (raw materials, reactants, intermediates, products, by-products and waste); Poor warehousing management systems; Poor house keeping.
Contributory Factors for an Assessor to Consider Concerning All Aspects of Segregation of Hazardous Materials
__________________________________________________ Segregation of Hazardous Material 1
E & C Division
The Safety Report should address the following points: Whether formal hazard identification and risk assessment has been used to determine the need for segregation (e.g. HAZOP, HAZAN,); Whether there is a chemical inventory system sufficient to address and categorise hazardous materials into compatible groups; Whether there is a sufficient site plan illustrating a compact block layout system with designated zones/plots for compatible hazardous materials (zones 0, 1 & 2, oxidising agents, flammable substances, explosive compounds, LPG); substances, strong acids, cyanide
Whether hazardous areas are classified and sufficient to segregate compatible, hazardous materials to avoid overlap of these areas. (oxidising agents and flammable substances areas should not overlap, strong acids and cyanide compound areas should not overlap, peroxides should not be stored near any metallic compounds that could cause decomposition and the liberation of oxygen);
Whether there are sufficient warning signs in place to inform employees and visitors of the potentially, hazardous environments they are approaching (no smoking signs, flammable area, intrinsically safe zone);
Whether there are sufficient traffic routes for the emergency services to safely access and egress a hazardous area in the event of an emergency;
Whether the emergency services are aware of all risks associated within and around the segregated areas; Whether the designated plots for containing hazardous substances are sited on impervious ground with an adequate drainage slope, (1 in 40 to 1 in 60);
Whether mixing of incompatible substance can occur within the drainage system or anywhere that leaks/spills may accumulate (in particular consideration of the location and routing of pipelines/pumps etc from which hazardous substances may leak);
E & C Division
Whether the processes and plant operating procedures minimise the inventories of hazardous substances stored, handled or in process;
Whether plots containing flammable and toxic chemicals are sufficiently ventilated; Whether enclosed plots containing flammable chemicals have sufficient explosive relief systems within the building structure to allow for safe relief ventilation;
Whether the bund facilities are sufficient to contain a maximum volume of spillage from a hazardous chemical storage vessel; Whether there are sufficient emergency provisions in place to control the risks associated with leaks and spills extinguishers/blankets/hydrants, absorbent materials, emergency services, emergency evacuation procedures); and (fire PPE,
Whether there are sufficient escape routes in place in the event of a major accident or hazard (minimum of two escape routes, no dead end should exceed 8 metres).
Major Hazards Major hazards could arise from the following: Storing incompatible substances together; Domino effects (e.g. thermal radiation from fires); Direction of leaks to common sumps/manifolds; Incorrect labelling/delivery of raw materials, intermediates and products; Introduction of ignition sources into segregated areas containing flammable, combustible and explosive substances (e.g. smoking, mobile equipment and vehicles, power tools); Use of non-intrinsically safe equipment within intrinsically safe zones; Poorly managed inventory control and identification systems for hazardous chemicals stored in drums and vessels; Poor house keeping.
E & C Division
5.23
WARNING SIGNS
This Technical Measure Document refers to issues surrounding physical and electronic warning signs and how they can be used to minimise the foreseeable risks of a major accident and hazard. General Principles For warning signs and alarm indications, the first requirement is to alert the operator to the situation, and then to aid his/her accurate and prompt diagnosis. The following aspects should be considered with respect to Warning Signs: Human factors; Unconscious and conscious incompetence; Ergonomic design; Inadequate/lack of warning signs; Unidentifiable warning signs; Misinterpretation of warning signs; and, Wrong warning signs used.
General Issues Appropriate management systems should be in place to ensure that areas of plant and plant items (valves, pipes, etc.) are identified which require warning or instructional signs and that signs are provided as appropriate. This also includes temporary works, such as restricted areas e.g. for tanker offloading, lifting operations, hot works, confined space etc. Appropriate risk assessments should be conducted to determine hazardous areas/zones on site.
__________________________________________________________ Warning Signs 1
E & C Division
All site staff (including contractors) should be informed, instructed, trained and supervised as appropriate to minimise a potential for human error when recognising the meaning of warning signs.
The system of housekeeping should ensure that all damaged or missing labels, signs, etc are replaced swiftly The maintenance and calibration of electronic warning signs need to be considered (noise/visual warning systems). A warning sign should be compelling but not startling.
Visual Warning Signs Where possible, accepted warning signs should be used so that they conform to the readers assumptions. The types of warning signs required to be in place within the designated zones should be appropriate for the hazard, i.e. mandatory, warning, caution, electronic, physical, intrinsically safe, chemical/heat resistant. The long-term visibility of the warning signs, i.e., lighting, degradation due to exposure to UV, corrosion, size, positioning, orientation should be considered. Improvised signs, that are laminated to protect them, are susceptible to veiling reflections. In certain positions this can mean that they are unreadable. Colour should not be used as the sole means of coding. It should always be used redundantly. For example, apart the issue of colour blindness, red is extremely difficult to detect under sodium lighting. New designs or icons or pictograms should conform to accepted codes and widely used systems and should be user tested prior to being put into use to ensure that the designers mental model of what the icon or pictogram means is compatible with that of the user. The variability in human dimensions should be considered when placing warning signs. For example, a warning sign that is clearly __________________________________________________________ Warning Signs 2
E & C Division
visible to someone who is 5 ft 5 might not be visible to someone who is 6 ft 5, or vice versa. Signs should be placed so that all the people who need to, can see them. Warning signs should contain no more information than is necessary to inform the reader of the its meaning. Dyslexic or illiterate employees should be considered when considering the use of purely text based warning signs. Colour warning signs and labels are perceived as representing a greater hazard than achromatic labels. If signs are used to indicate direction, there should be no ambiguity as to the route the sign indicates. Wherever it is possible to take the wrong route a sign should be positioned to reduce the likelihood of this happening. The typeface used for text on warning signs should be a sans-serif type. For example Ariel. All types of viewing conditions should be considered when deciding on what types of warning sign to use. If the warning message is more than a couple of words long do not use all capitals. This is because it slows down the reading time of the message. The minimum size of letters within warning signs should be based on the following: For Non VDU applications use this table:
Viewing 501-900 901-1800 1801-3600 3601-6000
Height 5 9 18 30
distance (mm) in mm
__________________________________________________________ Warning Signs 3
E & C Division
Or if the viewing distance exceeds in 6000 mm use the formula: Height in mm = Viewing distance in mm/200
For VDU applications use the following table:
Viewing Height distance (mm) in mm 500 700 1000 3 4 .3 4.8
The preferred colour contrasts on VDUs are presented in the table below: Character Black Yellow White Black White White Background White Dark Blue Green Light Grey Dark Grey Red
Non-Verbal Auditory Warnings All employees and contractors on site should know what each alarm means and what the required response is, if the cause of the alarm has the potential to affect them. When an alarm triggers it should provide enough time to effect recovery where applicable. __________________________________________________________ Warning Signs 4
E & C Division
Alarms should prioritised, where appropriate. An alarm should reset automatically if the fault that generated it is rectified Following an alarm, the response required by the operator should be clear. Alarm signals should be at least 10-dB (A) over the background noise. Do not use alarms that have a frequency of 1 kHz if the source of the sound needs to be detected. Alarms should not prevent effective communication across the site. The design of the alarm system should prevent masking and flooding of alarms. Masking is where one alarm noise masks a similar sounding alarm preventing the operator from detecting the signal. Flooding happens when a system alarms which has a knock on effect on other related systems, the result of which is the triggering of myriad other alarms, flooding the site with sound.
There should be a noticeable difference between alarm sounds used to alert, than for routine signals.
Verbal Auditory Warnings Consider using verbal auditory warnings in combination with visual warnings. Use of both methods has been found to improve compliance with the warning message. Verbal warnings can be more effective in crowd situations when signs can become obscured. Major Hazards The safety report should address the following points: Adequacy of management systems to identify when/where warnings signs are required;
__________________________________________________________ Warning Signs 5
E & C Division
Adequacy of management systems to deal with human failings to obey warning signs; Adequacy of risk assessments programmes, which may identify the requirement for warning signs; Adequacy of warning signs for emergency response, particularly for local fire brigades/police; Adequacy of warning signs for visitors or intruders to site; Suitability of warning signs for the area in which they are located e.g. use of non-flameproof electric/electronic signs in flameproof areas;
Maintenance/review of warning signs; and Mis-information included on warning signs.
__________________________________________________________ Warning Signs 6
E & C Division
5.24 Contents
PROTECTIVE DEVICES
1. Introduction 2. Pressure 3. Level 4. Temperature 1. INTRODUCTION Process equipment, including storage tanks and vessels, are usually provided with protective devices in order that system safe operating limits are not exceeded. In addition to protective devices, other devices will perform a controlling function (e.g. pressure control, level control or temperature control) and others will perform an alarm and / or shut down function (e.g. high-pressure alarm, high level alarm, emergency shutdown etc.). The latter function is usually actioned as a result of the failure of a controlling function (e.g. emergency shutdown of a process vessel due to high liquid level). The protective devices as described here are the ultimate devices which are the last line of defense against safe operating limits being exceeded. The most common processing parameters that require to be controlled, or against which process equipment needs to be protected are: pressure (positive pressure and vacuum) temperature level
A range of protective devices, and protective functions (i.e. alarms, shutdown etc.), are utilised for these parameters and these are discussed, together with their merits, settings, installation locations etc., in the following sections.
______________________________________________________________________
Protective Device
E & C Division
2. PRESSURE All pressure systems must be provided with protective devices to prevent the system being subject to pressures in excess of the safe operating pressure. The safe operating pressure is the pressure quoted on the last report of thorough examination made by the competent person, which must be the same as or below the design pressure. Where the current condition has deteriorated since manufacture, the safe operating pressure may have been reduced below the design pressure by the competent person. This applies equally to positive pressure and to negative pressure (vacuum) - some large storage tanks and vessels can fail due to inadvertently experiencing a vacuum. The only exception to the provision of pressure protection/relief is in the case of a vessel (or system) that has been specifically designed to withstand the maximum (or minimum) pressure that can be generated within it - inherently safe (pressure) design. Over pressure protection for process pressure vessels usually involves a hierarchy of passive and reactive protection devices. These devices range from simple pressure indicators or gauges, through pressure transmitters providing alarms, to pressure switches providing alarms and invoking automatic shutdowns, and finally through to mechanical pressure relief devices (e.g. pressure safety valves and bursting discs). Pressure monitoring via gauges and automatic alarms is typically used to check that the process system is operating at, or close to, the intended operating pressure. Automatic shutdown systems are designed to shut the system down before the Safe Operating Pressure is reached, or to react to loss of pressure situations (e.g. vessel leakage). Pressure relief (protective) devices are designed to prevent the system exceeding the Safe Operating Pressure. 2.1 Pressure Relief Devices Pressure relief devices typically take the form of a pressure, vacuum or pressure/vacuum relief device. There are 2 types of common relief devices - relief valves and bursting (or rupture) discs. These devices are normally installed at the top of the vessels or tanks that they are
______________________________________________________________________
Protective Device
E & C Division
protecting. However, it is permissible to mount these devices on pipework which is directly attached to the item. It should not normally be possible to isolate the pressure protective device from the vessel/tank which it is protecting, however, it is quite common for a pressure vessel to be protected by a pair of pressure relief valves set in parallel with interlock controlled lockable isolation valves fitted between these relief valves and the vessel. This arrangement allows individual relief valves to be removed, tested, reset and refitted without shutting down the vessel. 2.2 System Operating Pressure and Relief Pressure In order to ensure effective seating/sealing of the pressure relief device it is necessary to have an adequate margin between the system operating pressure and the set pressure of the pressure relief device. Conventional pressure relief valves can simmer when the system pressure approaches the set pressure of the valve. This pressure setting margin is normally not less than: 5% for gas service 15% for liquid service
2.3 Relief Capacity Of paramount importance is for the pressure relief device to have an adequate discharge capacity in order to limit the pressure to within the safe operating limits. When two-phase or multi-phase flow conditions can occur, the relief device should be designed to deal adequately with the dynamic flow conditions of such fluids. In situations where a pair of relief valves are fitted in parallel, and where each relief valve can be separately isolated from the vessel, each individual relief valve must have sufficient discharge capacity on its own. 2.4 Discharge Systems Pressure relief devices, when they operate, discharge into either an open system (i.e. directly to atmosphere), a containment vessel, or into a disposal system such as a flare. Discharge systems associated with pressure relief devices used for hazardous fluids (e.g. toxic or highly
______________________________________________________________________
Protective Device
E & C Division
flammable) require careful design and consideration. Fluids such as chlorine, ammonia and liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) present hazards when discharged through pressure relief systems. Chlorine, in particular, requires the pressure relief discharge to be directed into a dedicated expansion vessel or to a chlorine absorption system. Dual bursting discs, placed back to back, are the preferred overpressure protection arrangement, however, a pressure relief valve may be used for chlorine systems if the valve is protected from exposure to the chlorine by the use of an upstream bursting disc. Whichever system is used, a pressure alarm and indication should always be fitted between the bursting discs and the bursting disc and the relief valve. Use of a pressure relief valve on its own is NOT recommended. For ammonia and LPG applications, the discharge system should be designed to discharge the fluids safely, typically by use of vertical extension pipework.
2.5 Back Pressure When a pressure relief device is designed to relieve into a disposal system, due consideration must be given to the superimposed or back pressure within the disposal system. Conventional pressure relief valves are typically used in situations where the back pressure does not exceed 10% of the set pressure. In situations where the back pressure is high or variable (e.g. in a relief valve discharge header routed to a flare) a balanced bellows pressure relief valve will typically be used. This type of pressure relief valve utilises a bellows to isolate the effect of the back pressure on the valve disc, and therefore the lift pressure. Pilot operated relief valves can also be used for pressure relief into disposal systems subject to back pressure. Pilot operated relief valves use a pressure tapping or pressure impulse pipe, which is connected to the underside of the relief valve disc, to supply a pilot valve which, once activated, opens the main valve.
______________________________________________________________________
Protective Device
E & C Division
2.6 Thermal (Pressure) Relief When parts of a pressure system can be isolated from a protective device and where the contents may be subject to a pressure rise due to a temperature rise (e.g. LPG trapped in piping between shut-off valves) then that part of the system should be protected against excessive pressure by fitting a thermal relief valve (sometimes referred to as a hydrostatic relief valve). 2.7 Conventional Relief Valve A conventional pressure relief valve consists essentially of a nozzle and disc assembly which is held together to effect a seal by means of an adjustable spring. The seal is usually a metal to metal seal. The sealing surfaces are lapped to a high degree of flatness and surface finish to achieve a good quality of seal. Elastomeric seals can be used, but are usually limited to low (ambient) temperature service applications in order to take advantage of the use of a resilient seal. When in service, the pressure retaining parts (i.e. nozzle and disc) of a conventional pressure relief valve will encounter the process fluids and, as such, require to be trimmed (i.e. furnished in suitable material) accordingly. Bursting (or rupture) discs can be fitted upstream (underneath) pressure relief valves in highly corrosive or toxic services thus enabling the pressure relief valve to be furnished with a conventional trim. The discharge side of the pressure relief valve will be subject to the environment into which the valve would relieve. 2.8 Balanced Bellows Relief Valve Balanced bellows pressure relief valves are so-called because of their use of a bellows to isolate the valve sealing components from the discharge systems environment and because they equalise (balance) the back pressure forces acting on both sides of the valve disc. Their relieving capacity is largely unaffected up to around 30% of the set pressure. Most manufacturers limit the back pressure on balanced bellows pressure relief valves to around 45/50% of the set pressure.
______________________________________________________________________
Protective Device
E & C Division
2.9 Pilot Operated Relief Valve Pilot operated relief valves use a pressure tapping or pressure impulse pipe, which is connected to the underside of the relief valve disc, to supply a pilot valve which, once activated, opens the main valve. Pilot operated relief valves are commonly used in clean, low-pressure service and where a large relieving area is required. Because of the use of the pilot valve to effect opening of the main valve, these valves do not simmer when the system operating pressure approaches the set pressure of the valve. The set pressure, therefore, of pilot operated relief valves can be close to the system operating pressure - they are often used when the system operating pressure is higher than 90% of the set pressure of the valve. 2.10 Vacuum Relief Valve Certain conditions may prevail (e.g. excessive condensation, process upset) to cause a vessel to experience a vacuum. Unless the vessel has been specifically designed to withstand partial or full vacuum, a vacuum relief valve must be provided. Vacuum relief valves operate along the same principle of a conventional relief valve. Special care must be exercised when utilising vacuum relief valves on highly flammable service since the introduction of air into a vessel, to prevent a vacuum from developing, can present hazardous conditions. Systems are available which supply nitrogen or fuel gas to the vessel to prevent a vacuum occurring thus preventing hazardous conditions. 2.11 Pressure/Vacuum Relief Valve For atmospheric and low-pressure storage tanks, pressure/vacuum relief valves are typically used to provide the necessary pressure relief. These devices incorporate a pressure relief valve and a vacuum relief valve within a single assembly which will be mounted onto a single nozzle/flange on the top of the tank. These valves allow the tanks to operate within their normal working conditions, as caused by filling, emptying and reacting to temperature and product variations. It is often found that an additional, independent, pressure relief valve will be fitted
______________________________________________________________________
Protective Device
E & C Division
to the tank in order to provide pressure relief in emergency situations. 2.12 Bursting (Rupture) Disc A bursting disc assembly consists of a circular membrane which may be made of metal, plastic, or graphite and which is sandwiched between two plates or holders. This assembly is usually installed between a pair of flanges. Bursting discs operate by simply bursting the membrane and thus allowing instantaneous relief. The burst tolerance of bursting discs is typically around 5% of the set pressure unlike the tolerance of pressure relief valves which have a typical tolerance of around 3% of the set pressure. Tighter burst pressure tolerances are possible, however, manufacturing tolerances of the membrane tend to dictate the achievable burst pressure tolerance. Bursting discs are sensitive to temperature variations. Pressure relief valves may be removed and tested to check for correct operation (methods do exist to check valves in situ), however, bursting discs cannot be tested without destroying them. The major disadvantage of bursting discs is that once activated they cannot reseat and, therefore, the process must be shutdown, the vessel isolated, or the bursting disc isolated, to allow for replacement of the disc. The major advantage of bursting discs is that they are more effective than pressure relief valves in protecting equipment from sudden explosions. They are more resistant to corrosion or potential plugging than relief valves and are, therefore, often used upstream of relief valves in toxic or corrosive services. Bursting discs only burst when the set pressure of the disc is reached which prevents any seepage or leakage of the product during normal operation of the process. 2.13 Pressure Monitoring, Alarms and Trips As mentioned previously, a hierarchy of alarms and trips will typically be found on process vessels. These actions provide layers of protection between the manual monitoring of pressure and the ultimate lifting of a pressure relief valve or bursting of a bursting disc. These alarms and trips are provided with pressure measurements from simple pressure sensors
______________________________________________________________________
Protective Device
E & C Division
(e.g. Bourdon tubes, diaphragm sealed sensors, differential pressure gauges/sensors). A hierarchy of monitoring and automatic shutdown is employed with vessels typically being provided with high pressure and low pressure alarms and high/high pressure and low/low pressure alarms/shutdown. These pressure alarm and shutdown protective devices/systems are typically found on the process and instrumentation diagrams (P&IDs) designated as PSLL, PSHH, PSL, PSH, PALL or PAHH P indicating pressure, S indicating switch, A indicating alarm, and L&H indicating low or high.
3. LEVEL Correct level control, and indication, is often critical to the safe and efficient operation of process plant. Many process vessels, such as separators and distillation columns, require liquid levels to be strictly controlled in order to effect product separation (e.g. separation of oil, gas and water) and to prevent product carry over. Level indication is usually accomplished by displacer/float instruments and sight glasses. Other level indicators include differential pressure gauges, ultrasonic, microwave, radiological, and fibreoptic instruments. Providing that it is appropriate for the particular application, the method of level indication is of less importance than the use of the level information and / or measurement for control and protection purposes. A typical level control function would be accomplished by using a level transmitter which feeds control signals to a level control valve (LCV). The LCV will open or close (modulate) to maintain the level within, say, the vessel within pre-defined limits. When it has not been possible to control the correct level within, say, a process vessel, protective devices are provided to prevent hazardous conditions arising. These protective devices, which usually take the form of level transmitters and level switches, provide alarms and/or effect shutdown of the process or individual vessel. A hierarchy of monitoring and automatic shutdown is employed with vessels typically being provided with high level and low level alarms and high/high level and
______________________________________________________________________
Protective Device
E & C Division
low/low level alarms/shutdown. These level alarm and shutdown protective devices/systems are typically found on the process and instrumentation diagrams (P&IDs) designated as LSLL, LSHH, LSL, LSH, LALL, LAHH L indicating level, S indicating switch, A indicating alarm, and L&H indicating low or high. Dedicated level switches may be found on vessels to protect pumps from losing suction caused by low liquid levels and to protect compressors from liquid carry over caused by high liquid levels. These protective devices/systems are independent of the level control system, utilising separate level bridles or standpipes. Level measurement or control using differential pressure gauges should not be used for fluids which can be subject to variations in specific gravity since the change in the weight of the material column will affect the operation of the instrument. Sight (level) glasses are used for manually monitoring the levels within the process plant. Sight glasses are, however, not recommended for fluids which are toxic or highly flammable unless they are armoured or of high pressure, robust design. Use of sight glasses for ammonia is not recommended due to incompatibility. Vessel tappings and nozzles used for level indication and control must be located to provide accurate indication or measurement of the actual levels within the vessels or tanks. Level indications can be affected by movement of the product within the vessel and, therefore, tappings should not be placed in areas that could be affected (e.g. close to outlet piping). 4. TEMPERATURE Temperature plays an important part in processes involving product separation and refining. Many processes involve chemical reactions and this reaction is sensitive to temperature variations. Materials used for process equipment can impose temperature limitations and the structural strength of equipment can be dramatically reduced at elevated temperatures. Likewise, low temperatures can present material problems
______________________________________________________________________
Protective Device
E & C Division
through embrittlement. Temperature monitoring and control is, therefore, crucial to the safe and efficient operation of process plant. Temperature measurements are typically accomplished by using sensors such as thermocouples. In order to protect the sensor itself from the harmful effects of the process stream (e.g. corrosion, erosion) the sensor is usually installed within a thermowell. A thermowell is a tube which protrudes into the vessel or pipework through a sealed opening. The thermowell is closed at the protruding end but is open at the other end. The sensor can, therefore, be readily inserted or removed. The thermowell itself may be furnished in suitable material to prevent corrosion, however, since the thermowell protrudes into the product stream it can be subject to structural loading due to fluid dynamics. Failures of thermowells have been experienced due to vibration fatigue cracking caused by vortex shedding at the thermowell. Temperature measurements must be taken at the areas within the process plant that are of interest. Sensors must be located in areas that are subject to continuous movement of the process fluids and must not be located in stagnant areas. If liquid temperature is of interest then the thermowell complete with sensor must project into the liquid phase and if gas temperature is of interest then the thermowell complete with sensor must project into the gas phase. In very much a similar way to pressure and level monitoring and control, temperature monitoring and control may use a hierarchy of alarms and trips to ensure safe and efficient operation of process plant.
______________________________________________________________________
Protective Device
10
E & C Division
6.0 6.1
MATERIAL SAFETY DATA SHEET (MSDS) MSDS CONTENTS
The MSDS for the chemicals are part of the process and Basic Engineering Design Document of the licensor. As per OSHA (USA) manufacturers, importers and distributors are required to provide the MSDS for each hazardous chemical they produce or handle. The purchaser of these chemicals (Client) is entitled to receive these MSDS from the supplier. Each member of the commissioning team is required to read the MSDS carefully before undertaking the commissioning activity. Although the format of MSDS can vary, they should all include the following information: 1. Chemical and common name 2. Ingredient information 3. Physical and chemical characteristics 4. Physical hazards - Potential for reactivity, fire and/or explosion. 5. Health hazard 6. Symptoms of exposure 7. Primary route of likely entry into the body upon exposure. 8. OSHA permissible exposure levels. 9. Precautions for use 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. Waste disposal Protective measures and equipment including during spills and maintenance. Emergency and first aid procedures Date of MSDS preparation and last revision Emergency contact of manufacturer
The OSHA standard requires that the manufacturer or distributor provide quick and easy access to all MSDS applicable to their work place.
____________________________________________________ Material Safety Data Sheet (MSDS) 1
E & C Division
MSDS for chemicals generally handled during Refinery / Petrochemical / Fertilizer plant commissioning are enclosed at the end of Chapter .
For more data on MSDS, following sites in the Internet may be used :
1.
University of California MSDS Resources at
http://www.ucop.edu/riskmgt/ohp/msds.html 2. MSDS SEARCH
http://www.msdssearch.com 3. Occupational Safety & Health Administration, OSHA, Data Base
http://www.osh.nct 4. Safety links: Material Safety Data Sheets
http://www.ksu.edu/area/irml/safetv/msds.html 5. The Hong Kong Occupational Safety & Health Association http://www.hkosha.org.hk/weblinks.htm This site has the following resources other than MSDS : a. Safety related web sites. b. Safety Magazine c. Occupational health d. Fire e. Related Chemical Resources f. Emergency g. Lessons learnt from Accidents h. Safety Equipment Supplies
E & C Division
CODE SYMBOL: NATIONAL FIRE PROTECTION ASSOCIATION (NFPA) DIAMOND H Health F Fire R Reactivity 1 - Low 2 - Medium 3 High 4 - Extreme
Note: More information can be had from the following site: http://vvww.orcbs.msu.edu/Chemical/nfpa/nfpa.html
E & C Division
RATING SUMMARY:
Health (Blue):
4 Danger 3 Warning
May be fatal on short exposure. Specialized protective equipment required Corrosive or toxic. Avoid skin contact or Inhalation
2 Warning 1 Caution
May be harmful if inhaled or absorbed May be irritating
0 - No unusual hazard
Flammability (Red):
4 Danger 3 - Warning
Flammable gas or extremely flammable liquid Flammable liquid flash point below 100 F
2 Caution
Combustible liquid flash point of 100 to 200F
1 0
Combustible if heated Not combustible
Reactivity (Yellow):
4 Danger 3 Danger
Explosive material at room temperature May be explosive if shocked, heated under confinement or mixed with water
2 Warning
Unstable or may react violently if mixed with Water
E & C Division 1 Caution
May react if heated or mixed with water but not violently
0 Stable
Not reactive when mixed with water
Special Notice Key (White):
W Oxy
Water Reactive Oxidizing Agent
Note: More information can be had from the following site: http://www.orcbs.msuedu/chemical/nfpa/nfpa.htrnl
E & C Division
MSDS OF VERIOUS CHEMICALS COMMONLY USED IN REFINERY
Material Safety data Sheets of verious chemicals which are generally used in refinery are given in Annexure 1 for ready reference.
E & C Division 7.0
ON-SITE EMERGENCY PLAN
It is recommended that the commissioning team leader and other members of the commissioning team read and familiarize themselves with following two documents available with the client. These two documents are prepared and submitted to the authority in compliance to the Manufacture, Storage and Import of Hazardous Chemicals Rules, 1989. The formats of these two documents are given as Schedule 8 and Schedule 11 of the rules. 1. Safety Report (Schedule 8, Manufacture, Storage and import of hazardous chemicals rules 1989). On site emergency Plan (Schedule 11, Manufacture. Storage and import of hazardous chemicals rules, 1989).
2.
It is recommended that the commissioning team leader procures a copy of the On-site Emergency Plan and keeps the same at site with access to team members.
__________________________________________________ On site Emergency Plan 1
E & C Division
8.0
THE ENVIRONMENTAL PRESERVATION ACTS IN INDIA
1. THE WATER (PREVENTION AND CONTROL OF POLLUTION) ACT, 1974. 2. THE WATER (PREVENTION AND CONTROL OF POLLUTION) CESS ACT, 1975. 3. THE AIR (PREVENTION AND CONTROL OF POLLUTION) ACT, 1981. 4. THE ENVIRONMENT (PROJECTION) ACT, 1986. 5. THE HAZARDOUS WASTES (MANAGEMENT AND HANDLING) RULES. 1989. 6. MANUFACTURE, STORAGE AND IMPORT OF HAZARDOUS CHEMICALS RULES. 1989.
__________________________________________________ Environmental Preservation Acts in India 1
E & C Division
ENVIRONMENTAL LEGISLATION FOR INDUSTRY IN INDIA India is the first country, which has provided for the protection and improvement of the Environment in its Constitution. Article 51 -(g) of the Constitution states: "It shall be the duty of every citizen of India to protect and improve the natural / environment including forest, lakes, rivers and wildlife and to have compassion for all living creatures". The Directive Principles of State Policy, an integral and significant element of our democratic set-up, also contains a specific provision enunciating the State's commitment for protecting the environment. These constitutional provisions are implemented through environmental protection laws of the country. Table 1 Represents various specific legislation and regulations dealing Table 2 Table 3 Table 4 with protection and improvement of the environment. Represents the air emission standards in India. Represents the ambient air quality standards. Represents the Minimum National Standards (MINAS) for the refinery effluents. Table 5 Represents the Minimum National Standards (MINAS) for the petrochemical Plants. Table 6 Table 7 Represents the General standards for Discharge of Effluent. Represents the effluent sample preservation conditions.
E & C Division
Table 1
ENVIRONMENTAL LEGISLATION IN INDIA
The Water (Prevention & Control of Pollution) Act, 1974, as amended up to 1988 The Water (Prevention & Control of Pollution) Rules, 1975 The Water (Prevention & Control of Pollution) Cess Act, 1977 as amended upto 1991 The Water (Prevention & Control of Pollution) Cess Rules, 1978 as amended up to 1992 The Air (Prevention & Control of Pollution) Act, 1981 as amended up to 1987 The Air (Prevention & Control of Pollution) Rules, 1982 and 1983 The Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 The Environmental (Protection) Rules, 1986 The Hazardous Wastes (Management and Handling) Rules, 1989 Manufacture, Storage and Import of Hazardous chemical Rules, 1989 Manufacture, Use, Import, Export and Storage of Hazardous MicroOrganisms, Genetically Engineered Micro-organisms of Cells Rules, 1989 The Public Liability Insurance Act, 1991 The Public Liability Insurance Rules, 1991 Environmental (Protection) Rules, 1992 and 1993 - "Environmental Statement" Environmental (Protection) Rules, 1993 - "Environmental Standards" Environmental (Protection) Rules, 1994 - "Environmental Clearance"
E & C Division
1.0
THE WATER (PREVENTION AND CONTROL OF POLLUTION) ACT, 1974
Following are the specific obligations, under this Act, which are to be complied with: Obligations Provide the Pollution Control Board (PCB) any information which is sought for preventing or controlling pollution of water regarding the construction, installation, operation or the treatment and disposal systems of an industrial establishment Provide access to the PCB, or any officer empowered by it, for taking samples of water or effluents from the industrial establishment for the purpose of analysis Allow entry to the PCB or any person empowered by it, at any time, for the purpose of performing any of the entrusted functions; or for seizing of any plant, records, registers, documents or any material object, in case there are reasons to believe that provisions of the Act are being contravened Not to discharge, knowingly, of any effluent into the stream, sewer or on land, of quality which is not conforming to the standards prescribed by the PCB Furnish information to the PCB and other designation agencies, of any accidental or unforeseen event, in which effluents not conforming to the prescribed standards are being discharged, or likely to be discharged into a stream or sewer or on land
E & C Division
Comply with the directions issued in writing by the PCB, within the specified time, as mentioned in the order. The directions may include: 1. the closure, prohibition or regulation of any industry, operation or process; or 2. the stoppage or regulation of supply of electricity, water or any other service
Comply with the conditions as prescribed in the "Consent to Establish" or "Consent to Operate" for discharge of effluents into a stream or sewer or on land
Responsibilities Obtain "Consent to Establish", prior to taking any steps to establish any industry, operation or process or any treatment and disposal system which is likely to discharge effluents Obtain "Consent to Operate" prior to commencing operations of any industry, or any treatment and disposal system, which is likely to discharge effluents. Apply for renewal of the "Consent to Operate" before the expiry of validity period, as specified in the consent granted earlier, in the prescribed form and along with the prescribed fees
Rights Industry to ensure that specified effluent sampling procedure is being followed by the PCB or any officer empowered by it, in case results of analysis are to be used as evidence in legal proceedings A prior "Notice of Inspection" for the purpose of making an enquiry for grant of consent to be served by the Board to the industry in the prescribed form.
E & C Division
PCS to maintain "Consent Register" containing particulars of the consent issued, and to provide access to industry, at all reasonable hours
Consent to be deemed as granted automatically and unconditionally after four months from the date of application which was complete in all respects unless already given or refused before this period
Refusal of "Consent" to be recorded in writing, by the PCB "Right to Appeal" to the "Appellate Authority" under the Act, in case of grievance against the order of the PCB, in the prescribed form of appeal, within the specified time limit (30 days from the date of the order) The Appellate Authority is a grievance redressal forum, appointed by the government, and consists of a single person or three persons as its members
Opportunity to file objections with the PCB against notice of proposed directions for closure or stoppage of any essential service to the industry, within the Specified time (15 days from the date of service of the notice)
PCB to record reason(s), in writing, in case it is not providing an opportunity to the industry to file objections.
E & C Division
THE WATER (PREVENTION AND CONTROL OF POLLUTION) CESS ACT, 1975
Obligations Pay water cess, as prescribed within the specified time as indicated in the assessment order, if the industry is included in the specified schedule under title Act. Affix meters of the prescribed standards for water consumption measurements at places specified by the PCB Provide access to PCB, at all reasonable times, for implementing the provisions of the Act, including testing of the meters for their accuracy. Pay interest at the prescribed rates, in case of delay in paying the water CESS. Pay penalty for non-payment of cess, within the specified time, not exceeding the amount of cess, in arrears, after being given a reasonable opportunity of hearing.
Responsibilities Submit the " Water Cess Return" in the prescribed form, at specified intervals, to the PCB.
Right Industry is entitled to 25% rebate in Water Cess payable, provided : i) ii) it consumes water, in quantity less than or equal to the maximum specified quantity in the Schedule and it complies with the provisions of "Consent to Operate" as well as the prescribed standards under the Environment (Protection Act), 1986
E & C Division
Opportunity for hearing before imposing penalty for non-payment of cess within the specified time. Right to appeal to the "Appellate Authority" in case of any grievance(s) against any Order of Assessment in the prescribed form and along with the prescribed fee.
E & C Division
THE AIR (PREVENTION AND CONTROL OF POLLUTION) ACT, 1981
Obligations Comply with the conditions, as prescribed in the "Consent to Establish" or "Consent to Operate" for emissions Not to discharge air pollutant(s) in excess of the standards prescribed standards by the PCB Furnish information to the PCB and other designated agencies, of any accident or unforeseen act or event in which emissions of air pollutant(s) occurred in excess of the prescribed standards or are likely to occur Allow entry to the PCB or any official empowered by it to the industrial establishment, at all reasonable times, for the purposes of carrying out any of the entrusted functions or for inspecting to ascertain that provisions of the Act are being complied with; or for seizing any equipment, plant, records registers, documents or any other material object if there are reasons to believe that provisions of the Act are being contravened Provide the PCB any information to enable it to implement the provisions of the Act. Provide access to the PCB or any officer empowered by it, for taking samples of air or emissions from the industrial plant for the purpose of analysis Comply with the directions, issued in writing by the PCB, within the specified time as indicated in the order. The directions may include : 1. the closure, prohibition or regulation of any industry, operation or process or 2. the stoppage or regulation of supply of electricity, water or any other service Industry to provide all facilities required by the PCB official for the purpose of sampling. __________________________________________________ Environmental Preservation Acts in India 9
E & C Division Responsibilities
Obtain "Consent to Establish" prior to establishing any industrial plant in an air pollution control area, which is likely to emit air pollutanl(s) Obtain "Consent to Operate" prior to commencing operation of any industrial plant which is likely to emit air pollutant(s) in an air pollution control area
Apply for the renewal of "Consent to Operate" before expiry of the validity period, as specified in the consent granted earlier, in the prescribed form, along with the prescribed fees
Rights Consent to be deemed as granted, automatically and unconditionally, after four months, from the date of receipt of application, which is complete in all respects, unless it is given or refused earlier than this period Refusal of consent to be recorded in writing, by the PCB Opportunity for hearing before withdrawing the consent, already granted, or in case renewal of consent is refused PCB to maintain "Consent Register" containing particulars of consent issued and provide access to the industry, at all reasonable hours Right to appeal to the Appellate Authority, in case of a grievance against an order by the PCB, under the Act, in the prescribed form within the specified time limit (30 days from the date of order) A prior "Notice of Inspection" for the purposes of making an enquiry for granting consent, to be served by the PCB to the industry, in the prescribed form Industry to ensure that specified emission sampling procedure is being followed by the PCB or any officer empowered by it, in case, results of analysis are to be used as evidence in legal proceedings Opportunity to file objections with the PCB against notice of proposed directions for closure or stoppage of any essential service to the __________________________________________________ Environmental Preservation Acts in India 10
E & C Division
industry, within the specified time (15 days from the date of service of notice) PCB to record reasons, in writing, in case it does not provide an opportunity to the industry to file objections.
E & C Division
ENVIRONMENT (PROTECTION) ACT, 1986
Obligations Comply with the directions issued in writing by the Central Government within a specified time as mentioned in the order. The directions may include: 1. closure, prohibition or regulation of any industry, operation or process or 2. stoppage or regulation of the supply of electricity, water or any other service Prevent discharges or emissions of environmental pollutants in excess of the prescribed standards Furnish information to the prescribed agencies of any accidental or unforeseen event in which environmental pollutant(s) not conforming to the prescribed standards are being discharged, or are likely to be discharged into the environment Allow entry and inspection by any person empowered by the Central Government into the industrial establishment at all reasonable times, for the purpose of performing any of the functions entrusted, or to ascertain compliance with the provisions of the Act; or for seizing of any equipment, plant, registers, records or documents in case there are reasons to believe and any provision of the Act is being contravened Allow Central Government or any official empowered by it, to take samples of air, water, soil or any other substance from the industrial establishment for the purpose of analysis
E & C Division
Responsibilities Submit an "Environmental Statement" every year, before 30th September, to the PCB, in case consent is required under the Water/Air Act or authorization under the Hazardous Wastes (Management and Handling) rules or both Obtain prior "Environmental Clearance" from MoEF, in case of a new project or for modernization/expansion of the existing project, if it falls under the specified schedule, subject to certain conditions
Rights Ensure that specified procedure is being followed by Central Government or any officer empowered by it, for taking samples of air, water, soil or other substance form the industrial establishment, in case results of the analysis are to be used as evidence in legal proceedings Opportunity to file objections against the proposed directions of closure or stoppage of any essential services to the industry, with the Central Government, within the specified time (15 days form the data of service of notice) Central Government to record reasons, in writing, in case it does not provide an opportunity to the industry to file objections against the proposed directions.
E & C Division
THE
HAZARDOUS
WASTES
(MANAGEMENT
AND
HANDLING) RULES, 1989 Obligations Ensure packaging, labeling and transportation of hazardous wastes in accordance with the provisions of Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 Comply with the conditions specified in the authorization granted for handling of hazardous wastes. Responsibilities Ensure proper collection, reception, treatment, storage and disposal of hazardous wastes by the owner himself or through an operator of the facility for specified hazardous wastes Obtain "grant of authorization" for handling hazardous wastes form PCB Apply for renewal of authorization before expiry of the validity period as specified in the authorization granted in the prescribed form Maintain records of hazardous wastes handling, at the site, in the prescribed form Submit "Annual Returns" to the PCB regarding disposal of hazardous wastes in the prescribed form Report to the PCB any accident at site, or during transportation, while handling hazardous wastes, in the prescribed form
Rights
An authorization that is granted would be in force for a period of two years form the date of issue, unless suspended or cancelled earlier Opportunity of hearing given to the industry before refusing grant of an authorization PCB to give show cause notice to industry, stating reasons before
E & C Division
suspending or canceling any authorization granted under the rules State Government to identify sites for disposal of hazardous wastes and publish an inventory periodically Import of hazardous wastes to follow specified procedures given below : - Exporting country or exporter to apply to the Ministry of Environment and Forests, Government of India, in the prescribed form for grant of permission - Exporter and importer to follow prescribed conditions laid down by the Ministry of Environment and Forest, Government of India, and the PCB - Importer to keep records of imports of hazardous wastes, in the prescribed form Note: Import of hazardous wastes from any country to India is not permitted for dumping. Import of such wastes may only be allowed for processing or reuse as raw material on a case to case basis Right to appeal in writing, against an order of suspension, cancellation or refusal of authorization, to the State Government, in case of the State Pollution Control Board and to the Central Government, in case of the Central Pollution Control Board, within the specified time (30 days form the date of the order).
E & C Division 6 MANUFACTURE, STORAGE
SHE Manual (Commissioning) AND IMPORT OF HAZARDOUS
CHEMICALS RULES, 1989 Obligations Occupier to identify major accidents, hazards related with industrial activity involving hazardous chemicals, and to take adequate steps for the prevention and control of such hazards Occupier to provide relevant information to the persons liable to be affected by a major accident Occupier to develop information in the form of a safety data sheet Occupier to label the specified information on every container of a hazardous chemical Occupier to follow specified procedures for importing hazardous chemicals
Responsibilities Occupier to furnish information required to notify the concerned authorities of a major accident occurred at the site or in a pipe line in the prescribed form Occupier to furnish information regarding "Notification of Sites" for industrial activity involving hazardous chemicals to the concerned authority in the prescribed form at least 3 months before commencing activity Occupier to submit "Safety Report" containing the prescribed information to the concerned authority at least 3 months before commencing activity Occupier to send further information, within the specified time, as mentioned in the notice, if so desired, by the concerned authority relating to the "Safety Report" ( refer Schedule - 8 appended here)
E & C Division Occupier to prepare up-to-date
SHE Manual (Commissioning) on-site "emergency plans"(refer
Schedule - 11 appended here) in case of a major accident, before commencing an industrial activity involving hazardous chemicals Occupier to maintain records of imports of hazardous chemicals in the prescribed form Ensure transportation of hazardous substances as per the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988
E & C Division
SCHEDULE 8 See rule 10(1) 1 INFORMATION TO BE FURNISHED IN A SAFETY REPORT 1. 2. The name and address of the person furnishing the information. Description of the industrial activity, namely 3. Site, Construction design, Protection zones explosion protection, separation distance, Accessibility of plant. Maximum number of persons working on the site and particularly of those persons exposed to be hazard. Description of the plant design, namely, 4. Technical purpose of the industrial activity. Basic principles of the technological process. Process and safety-relating data for the individual process stages, Process description, Safety-related types of utilities
Description of the hazardous chemicals, namely Chemicals (quantities, substance data, safety-related data, toxicological data and threshold values.) The form in which the chemical may occur on or into which they may be transformed in the event of abnormal conditions. The degree of purity of the hazardous chemical.
5.
Information on the preliminary hazard analysis, namely Types of accident System elements or events that can lead to a major accident Hazards Safety-relevant components.
6.
Description of safety-relevant units, among others: Special design criteria,
E & C Division Controls and alarms. Special relief systems, Quick-acting valves. Collecting tanks/dump tank, Sprinkler system, Fire - fighting etc.
7. Information on the hazard assessment, namely Identification of hazards, The cause of major accidents, Assessment of hazards according to their occurrence frequency. Assessment of accident consequences, Safety systems, Known accident history.
8. Description of information on organizational systems used to carry on the industrial activity safety, namely Maintenance and inspection schedules, Guidelines for the training of personnel. Allocation and delegation of responsibility for plant safety, Implementation of safety procedures.
9. Information on assessment of the consequences of major accidents, namely 10. Assessment of the possible release of hazardous chemicals or of energy, Assessment of the effects of the released (size of the affected area, health effects, property damage) Information on the mitigation of major accidents, namely Fire brigade Alarm systems, Emergency plan containing system of organization; used to fight the emergency, the alarm and the communication rules, __________________________________________________ Environmental Preservation Acts in India 19
E & C Division
guidelines for fighting the emergency, information about hazardous chemicals, examples of possible accident sequence, Coordination with the District Emergency authority and its off site emergency plan, Notification of the nature and scope of the hazard in the event of an accident, Antidotes in the event of a release of a hazardous chemicals.
E & C Division
TABLE 2: ATMOSPHERIC EMISSION STANDARDS I. Concentration based Standard 150mg/Nm3 50mg/Nm3
Suspended Particular Matter (SPM) Sulfur dioxide
II.
Load / Mass - Based Standards - Oil Refineries 0.25 Kg/MT of feed*
Distillation (Atmospheric and Vacuum) Catalytic cracker Sulfur Recovery Unit (SRU) Feed indicates the feed for consideration
2.5 Kg/Mt of feed* 120 Kg/MT of sulfur in the feed* that part of the process under
III.
Equipment Based Standards
For dispersion of Sulfur- dioxide, a minimum stack height has been prescribed as: a) Power Generation Capacity >500MW 200/210 - 150 MW <200/210 MW Stack height 275 m Stack height 220m Stack height H = 14 (Q) 3 meters
b) Steam generation capacity >30 Tone / Hr Stack height H = 14 (Q) 3 meters
Here Q is Emission rate of SO 2 in Kg/Hr. however, the minimum stack height of 30 m shall be maintained in case it is less by computation using above formula.
E & C Division
TABLE 3: NATIONAL AMBIENT AIR QUALITY STANDARDS
Pollutants
Time weighted average
Concentration in ambient air
Method of measurement
Industrial area
Residenti Sensitive al , Rural Area & other

3 3 50 pg/m 15 pg/m
Sulfur dioxide
Annual average* 24 hours**
3 80 pg/m 3
1. Improved West & Gaeke 2. Ultraviolet Fluorescence
3 3 120 pg/m 80 pg/m 30 pg/m
Oxides of Nitrogen (as N02)
Annual average* 24 hours** Annual average* 24 hours** Annual average* 24 hours**
3 80 pg/m 3
3 3 60 pg/m 15 pg/m 3
1. Jacob & Hochheiser (Na-Arsenite) method 2. Gas phase Chemiluminescence
120 pg/m 80 pg/m
30 pg/m
Suspended Particulate Matter (SPM) Respirable Particulate matter (size) less than 10pm)(RPM) Lead (Pb)
3 360 pg/m 140
3 70 pg/m 3 3
1. High volume (Average flow rate not less than 1.1 m3/min
150 pg/m pg/m 200
100 pg/m sampling
pg/m3 120 pg/m 60 pg/m 150 pg/m 100 pg/m

3 3 3 3
50 pg/m 75 pg/m
3 3
2. Respirable particulate Matter sample
Annual average* 24 hours**
3 1.0 pg/m 0.75
0.50
3
1. AAS method after

3
1.5 pg/m
pg/m 1.00
pg/m 0.75
2.sampling using EPM 2000 or equivalent filter paper 1. Non- dispersive infrared Spectroscope
pg/m3
pg/m3 1.00
3 Carbon Monoxide 8 Hours* 1 5.0 pg/m 2.0
I(CO)
hour
10.0 pg/m
3
pg/m 4.0 pg/m pg/m

3
2.00
Annual arithmetic mean of minimum 104 measurements in a year taken twice a week 24 hourly at uniform interval.
E & C Division **
24 hourly / 8 hourly values should be met 98% of the time in a
year. However, 2% of the time, it may exceed but not on two consecutive days.
E & C Division
TABLE 4: MINIMUM NATIONAL STANDARDS (MINAS) FOR OIL REFINERIES
Pollutant Characteristics
Max. Permissible Concentration*
Max. Permissible Quantum in Kg/1000 Tonnes Crude Processed 14. 10.5 7 0.70 0.35
PH Suspended solids BOD 5 days, 20C Oil and grease Phenols Sulphides
6.0-8.5 20 15 10 1 0.5
All values except pH are in mg/L Note: MINAS are the Minimum National Standards or the concentration and quantitative limits that are to be complied with. The respective state pollution control board can specify more stringent standards than these.
E & C Division
TABLE: 5
MINIMUM NATIONAL STANDARDS (MINAS) FOR PETROCHEMICAL INDUSTRIES
The standards proposed by the Central Board were reviewed by the Core and Peer Groups constituted by the Central Board. The Standards recommended by the Core and Peer Groups are presented below:
Parameter PH *BOD5, 20C COD **Phenol Cyanide as CN Sulphide as S ***Fluoride as F
Concentration not to exceed (mg/1 except pH) 6.5-8.5 50 250 5 0.2 2 15 0.1 2 100
****Hexavalent Chromium as Cr Total chromium as Cr Total suspended solids *
State Board may prescribe the BOD value of 30mg/l, if the recipient system so demands
**
The limit for phenol shall be conformed to at the outlet of effluent treatment of phenol-cumene plant however, at the final disposal point, the limit shall be less than 1mg/l
***
The limit for fluoride shall be conformed to at the outlet of fluoride removal unit. However, at the disposal point fluoride concentration shall be lower than 5mg /1
**** " The limits for total and hexavalent chromium shall be conformed to at the outlet of the chromate removal unit. This implies that in the final treated effluent, total and hexavalent chromium shall be lower than prescribed herein __________________________________________________ Environmental Preservation Acts in India 25
E & C Division
Table: - 6 GENERAL STANDARDS FOR DISCHARGE OF ENVIRONMENT

POLLUTANTS: EFFLUENT (Gazette Notification of MoEF- May 1993)
S. No. Parameter Standards Inland surface Waters (a) 1 2. Colour and odour Suspended solids, 100 Public Sewers (b) 600 Land for Irrigation (c) 200 Marine coastal Areas
(d) a) For process waste water100 b) For cooling water effluent 10% above total suspended matter of influent
3.
Particular size of Suspended solids
Shall pass 850 Micron Sieve
a) Floatable solids, max.3 mm b) Settleable solids, max 850 microns
4. 5.
pH value Temperature
5.5 to 9.0 Shall not exceed 5C above the receiving water temp.
5.5 to 9.0 5.5 to 9.0 -
5.5 to 9.0 Shall not exceed 5C above the receiving water temperature
6. 7. 8.
Oil and residual chlorine, Max.
10
20 50
10 -
20 1.0 50
Total residual chlorine, mg/l, 1.0 Max. Ammonical nitrogen (as N), mg/l, Max. Total Kjeldahl nitrogen (as NH3),mg/l, Max. Free ammonia (as NH3),mg/l, Max. Biochemical Oxygen Demand(5 days at 20C), Mg/l, Max. Chemical Oxygen Demand, mg/l, Max. Arsenic (as As) mg/l, Max. Mercury (as Hg), Mg/l, Max. Lead (as Pb), mg/l, Max. 50
9. 10.
100 5.0
100 5.0
11.
30
350
100
100
12.
250
250
13. 14 15. 16.
0.2 0.01 0.1
0.2 0.01 1.0 1.0
0.2 -
0.2 0.01 2.0 2.0
Cadmium (as Cd), mg/l, Max. 2.0
E & C Division
Table: 6 Contd.....
S. No. Parameter
Standards Inland surface Waters Public Sewers Land for Irrigation 2.0 ^ Marine coastal Areas 2.0
17
Hexavalent chromium (as Cr+6),mg/l, Max.
0.1
18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25.
Total chromium (as Cr), mg/l, Max. Copper (as Cu), mg/l, Max. Zinc (as Zn), mg/l, Max. Swiwnium (as Se), ing/I, Max. Nickel (as Ni),mg/l, Max. Cyanide (as CN), mg/l, Max. Fluoride (as F), mg/l, Max. Dissolved phosphates (as P), mg/l, Max. Sulphide (as SO), mg/l. Max. Phenoilic compounds, (as CgHsOH), mg/l, Max. Radioactive materials Alpha emitter - micro curie/ml Beta emitter - micro curie/ml Bio-assay test
2.0 3.0 5.0 0.05 3.0 0.2 2.0 5.0
2.0 3.0 15 0.05 3.0 2.0 15 -
^ ^ * 0.2 * -
2.0 3.0 15 0.05 5.0 0.2 15 -
26. 27. 28. (a) (b) 29.
2.0 1.0
~ 5.0
~ -
5.0 5.0
10-7 10-6 90%survival of fish after 96 hours in 100% effluent 2 3 0.2 10
10-7 10-6 90%survival of fish after 96 hours in 100% effluent 2 3 0.2 '
10-8 10-7 90%survival of fish after 96 hours in 100% effluent * ^
10-7 10-6 90%surviv al of fish after 96 hours in 100% 2 3 0.2 20
30. 31. 32. 33
Manganese(as Mn) mg/l.<ax. Iron (as Fe) mg/l, Max. Vanadium (as V) Nitrate Nitrogen, mg/l, Max.
Wastewater Sources, Characterization and Quantification of Pollution Loads
E & C Division
TABLE 7: PRESERVATION OF WASTE WATER SAMPLE

Parameters Acidity-alkalinity BOD Calcium COD Chloride Cyanide Dissolved oxygen Fluoride Metals, total Metals .dissolved Nitrogen .Ammonia Nitrogen, Kjeldahl N itrogen-N itrate-N itrite Oil and grease Organic carbon PH Phenolics Preservative Refrigeration at 4 "C Refrigeration at 4 "C None required 2 ml/LH2S04(Conc.) Refrigeration at 4 "C NaOH to pH 10 Determine onsrte None required 5 ml/L HN03 Filtrate, 3 mi/11 HNOs 40 mg/l HgCh, 4 "C 40 mg/l HgCl2,4 "C 40 mg/l HgCb, 4 "C 2 ml/L H2S04, 4 "C 2 ml/L H2S04, None available 1.0 g CuS04 + H3P04 to pH 4.0, 4 "C Solids Specific conductance Sulfate Sulfide Threshold odour Turbidity None available None available Refrigeration at 4 "C 2 ml/L Zn acetate Refrigeration at 4 "C None available 7days 7days 7days 24hrs 6months 6months 7days Unstable 7days 24hrs 7days 7days 24hrs 24hrs Maximum holding period 24hrs 6hrs
*a : Slow-freezing techniques (up to 250"C) can be used for preserving samples to be analysed for organic content. **b : for some methods of determination, 4 to 8 hrs preservation can be accomplished with 0.7 ml cone. H2S04 and 20 mg NaN02. Refer to Standard Methods for prescribed applications.
E & C Division 9.0 SAFETY PROCEDURES
Safety Procedures Note: Some of the safety procedures followed in operating chemical complex are given here these are for information purpose. The activities are generally carried out by the maintenance personal of the plant in consultation with operations department.
Procedural Control
E & C Division 9.1
PROCEDURES FOR SAMPLE COLLECTION
Many a times the commissioning team will be required to collect process stream samples. Following precautions are to be observed for safe sample collection and disposal. 1. 2. 3. 4. It is preferred to obtain help from the clients analytical laboratory for sample collection. The scientific staff is well trained for this purpose. The samples should be collected from sampling points specially provided for. The person collecting the sample should be fully aware about the hazards of the plant and also the properties of chemical being collected. When sampling hot or corrosive liquids the person collecting the sample must wear safety equipments like face shield, gloves, goggles, apron etc. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. Ensure that the sampling point system is not damaged and physically in good shape. Damaged sampling lines could be hazardous. The sampling valve should be opened slowly and in stages to avoid splashing / gushing of sample. In case of plugged sampling line proper unplugging procedure to be followed. Unplugging not to be done on open sample valve. While unplugging personnel to stand upwind direction to avoid exposure. Personnel to wear protective gear. Sample collector to have unobstructed view of the sampling point. Do not collect sample from points that are not visible. 10. Purge volume of the sampling line of toxic should be collected in sample bottle or bladder to be disposed in a controlled manner as per procedure 8.2. 11. While collecting toxic sample wear gas mask specified for the chemical or use breathing apparatus. 12. While collecting samples under pressure care should be taken to avoid splashing of liquid or toxic gas jet formation. 13. Samples should be labeled and dispatched for analysis promptly.
Procedural Control
E & C Division 9.2 DISPOSAL OF WASTE
The waste material during commissioning may contain flammable, toxic and hazardous chemicals it is recommended that the waste is disposed in consultation with the environmental control department of the plant. Handling precautions are as follows:
Solid Waste
Solid flakes, pellets or powder should be collected separately in appropriate inert containers. Intermixing of waste should not be done. The waste is to be labeled, sealed and handed over to the environmental department for proper disposal.
Liquid
Waste samples etc., should be kept in a separate container specially made for the purpose, duly labeled and handed over to the environmental department for disposal when disposing liquid waste into the OWS it is to be diluted effectively to avoid shock loading to the effluent treatment plant.
Disposal of liquid waste into the OWS done after consultation and with the knowledge of the plants environmental central department.
Gases
Waste samples contained in SS bombs or rubber bladders should be discharged out door in a manner to effectively dilute the contents. There should not be a source of ignition when disposing flammable gases. Toxic gases should be disposed extremely carefully avoiding possibility of exposure.
Procedural Control
E & C Division 9.3 PROCEDURE FOR PIPELINES
SHE Manual (Commissioning) CLEANING, GAS FREEING
PURGING. DRAINING OF EQUIPMENT AND LINES.
To avoid accidents of toxic gas inhalation, fire and explosion of splashing c harmful chemicals it is essential to prepare equipment, tank or pipe line to make free from hazardous substances.
PROCEDURE:
Media used for freeing / purging and precautions to be observed: a) Water b) Inert gas or N2 c) Steam d) Air (with precautions)
Tank Cleaning: a) Drain/pump out the contents b) Fill the tank with water & drain. c) Purge with steam if containing solvents or hydrocarbon liquids. d) Purge with inert gas if containing fire hazardous gases. e) Purge with air after purging with inert gas before entry. (Entry with fire Safety Permit only). f) Remove all sludge, deposits inside the tanks.
When closed piping systems are parted for replacing valves, servicing pump replacing sections of lines etc this is called "Opening Lines". This type of work not properly planned can lead to serious accidents.
To protect against such accidents the following rules must be followed while performing such work: 1 Familiarize yourself with the piping system to be worked on.
Procedural Control
E & C Division 2 3 4
Check to make sure all valves are properly positioned. All drain valves should be opened. Any pump on the system that could be accidentally started shall be electrically isolated. Although the previous steps have been taken, the job should be performed as though the line is full and under pressure. a) A sloping line may have a plug, a valve and another plug. You can open the valve to drain the line, but it could still be full between the plugs. b) A horizontal line may have sag or dip in it. You can open the line up and blow it out, but there could still be acid or other material where the line is sagging, if that section of the line is taken out and tilted, the material will run out. c) d) You can't drain a line if the valve, you are trying to use is lower than the discharge end of the line. If a line is plugged, it may be from corrosion, which can produce gas under pressure.
5. 6.
The area around the possible spray release of material should be roped off. Personnel performing this work shall wear protective clothing as follows: a) b) c) Protective suit. Face shield. PVC gloves.
Since opening a flange is the most common procedure used to open a line, the procedure to follow is: a) b) c) d) If the flange is horizontal, you want any sprays to be away from you. If it is vertical a spray should be downward, These are the edges of the flanges that should be opened first. Keep the bolts near, you tight, and slowly open the ones away from you. A quarter of a turn at a time is not too little. If the flange stays tight, start a wedge between the flange on the side where the bolts were loosened.
Procedural Control
E & C Division e) 8
When you are sure the flange is open and that any drip is over, remove the rest of the bolts and nuts.
Lines taken out or brought to the shop can also be hazardous. Further handling or dismantling in the shop could release material. The only fitting or section of line that is safe is one that has been blowout, washed out and looked through and tested.
After a section of line has been removed the remaining open flanges should be blinded.
Draining Of Equipment / Lines Draining of lines, vessels and tanks is a common operation. Work of this nature is primarily required when units or portion of unit are shut down for the purpose of inspection and /or repair. This operation or type of work normally can be accomplished without encountering any hazards, however, consideration must be given to several factors, each and every time when such work is to be performed.
The following is to serve as a guide in determining the safe method to be used when draining materials from lines, vessels, tanks and like equipment. 1. 2. 3. 4. The wind draining of toxic materials to atmosphere are prohibited when there is the possibility of personnel over exposure. The direction can be an important factor in determining personnel exposure when releasing (draining ) toxic or obnoxious material. The rate at which the material is being drained can be a factor in determining personnel exposure. The careful control of releasing (draining) flammable materials cannot be overemphasized. Careful and thorough consideration must be given to: a) b) c) d) Rate of release. Sources of ignition Wind direction Type of material being released, (whether it is heavier lighter then air, as vapour will readily disperse). or
Procedural Control
E & C Division 5.
The use of protective equipment shall be evaluated prior to starting the job. The supervisor shall specify the equipments required for the safety of personnel and/or equipment.
6.
When draining toxic, flammable, hot or obnoxious material, the hazardous area involved shall be restricted (roped off). All personnel who work in and around the area involved shall be notified of the work being performed /precautions to be taken to avoid accidents.
7.
The waste material to be drained if containing Arcylonitrile or Hydrocyanic acid then it should be put in chemical sewer only looking towards the possibility of the hazard involved.
8.
If a hose is used to drain material from a piece of equipment or line, the proper type of hose must be used. Many materials will deteriorate the hoses such as these used for water and air. If this is done, serious accidents can & will occur.
9.
When draining is to be performed on/or close to ground level, the protection of personnel must be considered, If draining through a hose, the free end must be secured to prevent swinging action. The direction of material release shall be downward not horizontal to the ground.
10.
Permanent and Temporary drains or bleeds on equipment such as pumps shall be directed in a downward position. The material when released should not be in a direction, which is horizontal to the ground.
Procedural Control
E & C Division 9.4
PROCEDURE FOR UNPLUGGING OF LINES
A plugged line is an abnormal condition. These plugs develop from some mechanical failure and also from polymerization / or salting / congealing. Although care is taken to avoid these conditions they still occur occasionally. Since a plugged line is an abnormal condition it must be treated as unpredictable. A plug in a line is adhering to the inner surface of the pipe. This blocking however is not firm and some change in the condition might cause it to loosen and spray materials out of a previously dear opening. There is always a hazard associated with the plugged line and care needs to be taken in dealing with them Tracing or Jacketing in a line is great help in melting out of a plug. But when line is opened, the heat applied can cause pressure to build up and hot or corrosive material to spray out on to anything in its path. Due to various piping arrangement and materials handled, procedure can not be set up to handle each specific condition, however, from past experience we have learned many facts that must be applied when unplugging lines. The following are the rules to be followed when performing such a job: 1. 2. Since a plugged is an abnormal condition and unusual hazards might exit, the job of clearing a line should be preplanned. The procedure outlined shall be to first try to clear the line by applying a solvent directly in to the closed line. Normally this is done with steam or water applied to permanent connection of hose. Compatibility of the de-plugging liquid with the fluid contents of the pipe should be verified before using the technique (remember Bhopal) 3. The most effective means of cleaning in this manner is to pressurize this line & then drain, repeating this process frequently. This cyclic process helps to clear the clog. It also drains the solution from the area of the plug facilitating unplugging. 4. Heat should be applied to the outside of the line if it is possible, this can be in the form of steam tracing or steam applied safely from the open hose. Procedural Control 8
E & C Division 5. 6. 7. 8.
If the plug does not respond to the above clearing procedure, probably it will be necessary to dismantle the line. The line must be depressurized as completely as possible. All tracing and jacketing should be shut off and the line allowed to cool. Since the line may still be under pressure in spots or pockets, protective equipment must. be worn when parting a line. This equipment consist of: a. b. c. Protective suit. Face shield over the helmet and glasses (if a full cover one piece suit is available the same should be used). PVC and gloves.
This equipment is worn to protect against unexpected splashes or released material. 9. 10. 11. After opening the line, the condition should be considered hazardous, even if no material is released from the opening. If the cleaning can be carried out by attaching valves and hoses and in a closed manner the same should be attempted. If the cleaning at the point must be conducted openly it should be performed by the use of a suitable lance so that close exposure to the opening is not required. Those performing the lancing operation shall wear the same protective clothing used in opening the line. 12. In case of fouling / choking of the tubes of heat exchangers, following is the procedure for caustic cleaning: a. b. c. d. Isolate the fouled/choked exchanger. Depressurize drain and flush the exchanger. Dismantle the exchanger tube bundles using personnel protective safety equipment. Carefully put the exchanger tube bundle in caustic cleaning tank and start heating the caustic by stream coils to 80 - 90c. Keep the exchanger bundles soaked for overnight preferable 24 hours. e. Remove the exchanger carefully after caustic has cooled down. Use all safety precautions as far as handling not alkalis is
Procedural Control
E & C Division concerned. f. 13.
Flush he exchanger tubes bundles with large quantities of water, till the entire caustic is washed out.
For de-choking of column and in case of partial choking of heat exchanger tubes: In process like ACN, suction/discharge lines 2" caustic connections are provided which are normally kept blinded. In case choking problem is experienced, a particular type of operation is isolated / by-passed as per the procedures laid down, then the column drained / flushed out to toxic sewer. Caustic connection can be made by hose connecting a loop circulation and established for a period of time till choking is removed. Than the contents can be drained out in to proper sewer and flushing with water carried out-This is normally used in case of polymerized material or fouling material which are responsible for plugging of process equipments.
Procedural Control
10
E & C Division 9.5
PROCEDURE FOR ISOLATION OF FLARE HEADER, SAFETY VALVE Etc.
Isolation of Flare Header or Safety Valve connected to flare header requires special safety precautions due to the following hazards associated with the job. (Same hazards are present while installing back the isolated valve). 1. 2. 3. job. 1. Keep the sealing plate (as per figure 1 below) and special bolts ready, suitable for the size of the flare pipe to be isolated. The special bolts have a small head, which will pass through the bolt-holes of safety valve flange, but not through the holes of sealing plate. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. Keep gaskets, nuts & bolts & proper size of spanners & tools ready for the job. Rouse one by one all the bolts & nuts of the flange of the pipe. Remove all the bolts marked A in Fig. 1 in attached drawing. Slacken the bolts marked 'B' in attached drawing. Quickly insert the sealing plate (shown in Fig. 2) in between the flanges. Tighten bolt 'B' to stop gas escaping. Insert special bolts in the holes where bolts 'A' were to hold the seal plate tight to the flare pipeline. When the small bolts are tight remove bolts 'B' Ensure that seal plate is holding property. Entry of air in the flare header. Fire hazard due to leakage of gases. Inhalation of toxic vapors.
The following safe maintenance procedures are followed for undertaking the
The reverse procedure as mentioned below, is to be followed while removing slip plate and re-fixing the safety valve: a) b) Position safety valve and fix bolts 'B' tightly. Remove all special bolts marked "A".
Procedural Control
11
E & C Division c) d) e) f)
Slacken bolts 'B' to remove slip plate. Remove slip-plates quickly & tighten bolts "B" immediately. Insert & tighten original bolt 'A'. Ensure that no gas leak after tightening.
Special Precautions Before undertaking removal of S. V., ensure proper access and working platform or scaffolding. 1. Before isolation or installations work is undertaken of flare header, ensure that plant operations are smooth (no up sets) and flare header is on normal load. 2. 3. 4. 5. Isolation & Installation work to be undertaken in the personal supervision of responsible engineer with minimum two technicians. Ensure flare header under positive pressure. The job is to be undertaken under "Fire -Safety Permit". Make use of Air Line gas Mask/Self contained breathing equipment or Gas Mask organic canister while removing the bolts and putting the sealing plate (Select safety equipment as per toxic conditions of escaping gases). 6. 7. 8. Make use of Brass hammer if required or Non sparking Tools for such jobs. Do not allow any welding / cutting or spark producing job near by while the above job is being undertaken. Keep water hose & fire extinguishers ready for use, in case of any emergency.
Procedural Control
12
E & C Division 9.6 WORK PERMIT SYSTEM
Note: Work Permit system specified in Oil Industry Safety Directorate guidelines is reproduced here. The purpose is to familiarize with the work permit system prevailing in Hydrocarbon industry. The actual formats may vary; however, the procedure is to be based on the OISD -105 guidelines.
9.6.1
INTRODUCTION
The Work Permit System is an important tool for safety in hydrocarbon processing / handling. In the following pages the recommended Work Permit System is described covering various aspects like when a work permit is required, type of permits, responsibilities, check lists, validity, etc. The success of a work Permit System depends upon the training, motivation and participation of all individuals concerned with its implementation. Since several maintenance / construction jobs are often carried out with assistance from contractors, it is essential to provide sufficient exposure to contractor and his employees as well.
If work has to be performed in a hydrocarbon processing / handling installation by any person other than the operating personnel of that area, a duly authorized written permit shall be obtained by the person / agency executing the work before commencement of the work. However, even for operating personnel, where work has to be performed outside their normal routine, an exclusive permit to that effect by the authorized person shall be obtained.
9.6.2
SCOPE
The Work Permit System shall cover all hydrocarbon processing / handling installations such as onshore / offshore processing platforms, gas treating units, crude terminals, refineries, pipelines, marketing installations, and LPG bottling plants.
Procedural Control
13
E & C Division 9.6.3 a) b) DEFINITIONS
Hot work: Hot work is an activity, which may produce enough heat to ignite a flammable air hydrocarbon mixture or a flammable substance. Cold Work : Cold Work is an activity which does not produce sufficient heat to ignite a flammable air hydrocarbon mixture or a flammable substance.
9.6.4
TYPE OF WORK PERMITS
Two types of permits, one for cold work and the other for hot work, are the minimum requirements, which must be fulfilled before commencing work. Based on the nature of the work that is to be undertaken, permit should be obtained either under Hot Work Permit or Cold Work Permit. For jobs like excavation, road / dike cutting, electrical lockout / energizing etc. where the work permit issuing authority may have to take clearances from other sections / personnel, organizations may introduce supplement formats for these purposes. If they wish, format for electrical lockout energizing is given in OISD-Std. 137 (on Inspection of Electrical Equipment).
9.6.5
PROCEDURE FOR WORK PERMIT SYSTEM
Following is the procedure for the implementation of Work Permit System: a) The Work Permit System shall always operate on Owner / In-charge concept. (Example : Process Unit - Shift In-charge; Laboratory - Chief Chemist; Depot - Depot Manager). The concerned management shall issue the appropriate authority limits for various installations and type of permits based on this concept. b) c) d) The permit shall be in printed form. Separate forms shall be used for Hot Work and Cold Work. For simplification of procedure, Hot Work Permit also covers permission for vessel entry, vessel boxing up and excavation. Cold Work Permit shall cover all activities outside the scope of Hot Work Permit. e) No hot / cold work shall be undertaken without a work permit except in the areas pre-determined and designated by the owner in-charge. All work permits shall be issued by the person who is designated as Procedural Control 14
E & C Division
responsible person for the operation of the area where work is to be carried out. In respect of work permits for handling highly critical types of work and also for long duration work such as in construction jobs in a running installation, the authorizing level should be elevated. f) The work to be done may be planned either departmentally or through a contractor. In either case, the work permit should be received and signed by the maintenance project / construction supervisor of the company as he is responsible for the work of the contractor also. Where no such independent supervisor exists, for example in small installations, the owner in-charge can issue the permit to the contractor's supervisor directly and obtain his signature. g) Permit should be issued only for a single shift and its validity should expire at the termination of the shift. However, where the work has to be continued, the same permit may be revalidated in the succeeding shift by authorized person, after satisfying the normal checks.
In instances like plant turnaround or an activity where work is of continuous nature involving round the clock activity, Blanket Hot Work Permit could be given if the owner in-charge is fully satisfied that the conditions are totally safe for the multiple jobs to be performed. But this should not be resorted to, especially in highly integrated units.
Even when construction activity has to be undertaken in non operating areas in integrated units, it is recommended that approval be obtained from designated senior management for issuing Blanket Hot Work Permit.) h) It is recommended that both Hot Work Permit as well as Cold Work Permit be made in the form of books with tear off facility. In the case of Hot Work Permit the authorized Original copy shall be given to the receiver, the Duplicate to the Fire and Safety Section and Triplicate retained in the book. In case of Cold Work Permit, the authorized Original shall be issued to the receiver, retaining the Duplicate in the book.
It is recommended that plot plans of the installation and the operating
Procedural Control
15
E & C Division
blocks should be displayed in the Fire and concerned Unit Control Rooms respectively, and site of hot jobs under progress should be indicated on these plot plans with fed pins. This helps the incoming supervisor (in Fire and operating departments) to get a quick idea of the hot jobs being undertaken and help in identifying the areas which require inspection / attention, depending upon the criticality of the area and job. i) As a prerequisite to permit issue, particularly in the case of hot work / vessel entry permit, gas test for hydrocarbons / oxygen deficiency toxic gases shall be conducted as applicable. j) Where gas free conditions are not fully assured for the duration of hot work, a system of monitoring either by automatic or by manual periodic verification shall be resorted to depending upon the prevalent conditions of the operating area. k) After completion or stoppage of the job, the person to whom the permit was issued, should thoroughly check the area for clearing of debris, removal of temporary electrical installations etc., and then shall sign the work permit and return it to the issuer.
9.6.6
SPECIMEN WORK PERMIT FORMS
Specimen Work Permit forms for the two types of permits illustrating the suggested colour code, layout, and size are exhibited in pages 5-14 of OISD 105.
9.6.7
EXPLANATORY NOTES TO WORK PERMIT FORMS
The check-listed items in the Work Permit Forms are elaborated below to amplify the underlying concepts and highlight their significance. i) Equipment / Area inspected Equipment or area where work is to be conducted, should be inspected to ensure that it is safe to carry out work and assess other safety requirements / stipulations. In case of vessel box-up permit, the inspection is required to ensure work is complete, all personnel are out, no maintenance gear is left behind and debris is removed.
Procedural Control
16
E & C Division ii)
Surrounding area checked / cleaned. Unsafe conditions for performance of work may arise from surrounding area. It should be cleaned up to remove flammable material such as oil, rags, grass.
iii)
Sewers, Manholes, CBD etc., and Hot Surfaces covered. Flammable gases may be released from nearby sewers. Hot uninsulated surfaces, pipelines may provide a source of ignition. Therefore, these are to be properly covered to prevent fires.
iv)
Considered hazard from other routine / non-routine operations and persons alerted. Other activities (routine / non routine) being carried out near by, which can create conditions which are unsafe for performance of the permit work, should be taken into consideration and the concerned persons should be alerted accordingly.
v)
Equipment electrically isolated and tagged. Before issuing permit for mechanical / electrical work in the operating area, it should be ensured that electrical switches are locked out and cautionary tags duly signed with date and time are attached. Wherever local locking arrangement is provided in the field, the same should be used. Refer format for electrical lockout / energizing given in OISD-STD- 137 on Inspection of Electrical equipment.
vi)
Running water hose / Portable extinguisher provided Running water hose and portable fire extinguisher are required respectively to flush / dilute in case of release of any hazardous chemical or to quench sparks and to put out small fires immediately.
vii)
Fire water system checked for readiness In order to meet any contingency, it should be ensured that the fire water system including fire water pumps, storage, network, etc. is checked and kept ready for immediate use.
viii)
Equipment blinded / disconnected / closed-isolated / wedged open Equipment / Vessel on which Work Permit is being issued, should be completely isolated from the rest of the plant with which it is connected during normal operation, in order to ensure that there is no
Procedural Control
17
E & C Division
change in the work environment with respect to presence of toxic / flammable gases, solids, hazardous chemicals etc., in the course of the work. Blinding is one of the most effective ways of isolation. Blinds should be installed as close to the vessel as possible. If lines cannot be blinded, they should be disconnected and the open ends should be made safe by installing pipe caps plugs, blind flanges, mud packing etc. ix) Equipment properly drained / depressurized Equipment under pressure should be depressurized after isolation. This will be followed by draining, purging, water flushing etc., as the case may be. Equipment containing liquid hydrocarbons should be drained completely. There may be a possibility of overlooking liquid collected in pockets or inaccessible areas such as level gauges, small nozzlebleeders on vessels, laterals in pipe work etc. All low point drains should be in unplugged condition. x) Equipment properly steamed / purged Purging of equipment (vessels, pipelines, compressors etc.) is done to free them of flammable hydrocarbons and toxic gases. Steam is used for gas-freeing of vessels and pipes in refineries and processing units, but it may not be available at other locations. Other means of purging is by displacement with water and final traces of gas removed by air eductor. All high point vents should be unplugged while purging. Purging may be done continuously or in batches to conserve purge medium. It should be done in a systematic manner to cover the entire equipment/plant and continued till the allowable level of toxic flammable gas concentration is attained. xi) Equipment water flushed Water flushing is an effective means of cooling, cleaning and even gas-freeing of equipment. It is also employed to remove traces of acids/chemicals. Equipment metallurgy must be considered before using sea / saline water. Sometimes flushing with demineralised water would be necessary depending upon the metallurgy of the equipment xii) Gas / Oxygen deficiency test done and found OK. Gas test includes measurement of:
Procedural Control
18
E & C Division (a) (b) (c)
Hydrocarbons by Explosivity Meter Oxygen Deficiency by Oxygen Meter Toxic gases like Hydrogen Sulphide, Carbon Monoxide, Nickel Carbonyl, Chlorine, etc. by techniques like Indicator Tube method, Lead Acetate Paper etc.
Measurement of Lead in air is required for entering Leaded tanks. Octal Ethyl regulations are to be followed while handling leaded gasoline. Gas tests may be specified for vessel entry including open excavation where head of a man will be below ground level and when hot work is being carried out. The person carrying out gas test must wear proper protective gear. No hot work shall be permitted unless the explosivity meter reading is zero. Vessel entry where no hot work is to be carried out may be permitted if combustible gases are up to 5% of lower explosivity limit (LEL). Entry with an air supplied mask, may be permitted with LEL of up to 50%. The oxygen level should be at least 19.5 % by volume and the concentration of toxic gases below the threshold limits. xiii) Shield against sparks provided In order to protect against welding sparks, which can provide ignition in operating areas, shields are to be provided. The shield material should be non-flammable. In case tarpaulins are used, they should be kept wet with water. xiv) Proper ventilation and lighting provided Where natural ventilation is not available, fans / air eductors are provided. Some types of works like welding, may generate fumes. Facilities may be required for the speedy dispersal of these fumes. Only approved reduced voltage extension lights (24 volts) are to be allowed for work inside vessels, from consideration of personal. xv) Proper means of exit provided Proper means of exit is required in case of emergencies developed on account of the work or otherwise. Availability of an alternate route of escape should be considered. xvi) Precautionary tags / boards provided To prevent any unwarranted entry in the work area and also to caution other personnel taking actions, which may endanger people Procedural Control 19
E & C Division
working on the permit job, precautionary tags / boards are to be provided. Example: "No Entry" sign on roads or "Caution Men At Work Inside" on the manhole of a vessel etc. xvii) Portable equipment / Hose nozzles properly grounded As a precaution against static electricity generation, portable equipment hose nozzles, example: nozzle of a sand blasting gun is to be grounded. Use of hydrocarbon lines for earthing should be avoided. xviii) Standby person provided for vessel entry Whenever a vessel is being entered or work is being carried out in confined space, it may be necessary to keep standby persons (minimum 2) at the manhole or entry point holding the rope connected to the safety belt of the person inside. In case of any emergence inside or outside the vessel, the standby will be able to pull the person out. xix) Standby personnel provided for fire watch from Process / Maintenance / Contractor Fire Department Depending on criticality of the job work permit issuer shall decide the type of standby to be provided i.e., from which department, of what level, how many and also additional fire fighting support facilities. xx) Iron Sulphide removed / kept wet Pyrophoric substances may be present in operating area / equipment handling hydrocarbon. Iron sulphide scale is the most common pyrophoric substance encountered. These should be either removed to safe locations or kept wet all the time to prevent their auto-ignition. xxi) Area cordoned off In order to prevent the unauthorized entry of people and to avoid accidents during excavation jobs. work area is to be cordoned off. xxii) Precaution against public traffic taken In case hot work is to be carried out in the close proximity of a public road, for example, in the case of a trunk pipeline, it may be desirable to block-off / divert public traffic for the duration of the job as a precautionary measure. xxiii) Clearance obtained for excavation from Technical / concerned departments
Procedural Control
20
E & C Division
For any excavation work which may affect underground sewers / telephone lines / cables / pipelines etc. Technical Services Dept. and / or other concerned departments should be consulted for obtaining the co-ordinates and the depth to which excavation can be resorted to without damaging the existing facilities. Markers should be put around the area where excavation can be done, and the depth can be indicated in the work permit. xxiv) Clearance obtained for road cutting from Technical / Fire / concerned departments Since road cutting can hamper the movement of the fire trucks, initial clearance should be obtained from Fire Department, and final approval from the higher designated authorities. If the road is wide, preferably the road should be cut half at a time. Duration of cut road should be restricted as far as possible. xxv) Clearance obtained for dyke cutting When the dyke is cut. Any mishap in the tank farm can lead to a free flow of oil to outside the bund. A high level authority should be designated for authorizing dike cutting. Further, it should be ensured that dike would be reconstructed in the shortest possible time. For example, if pipes have to be laid through the dikes, the pipes should be laid quickly and plugged / capped so that the dike can be dosed. Thereafter, balance of pipe fabrication can continue without any risk. Standby personnel should be available at the work site, who should possess a suitable size steel plate for blocking the opening in case of a mishap / tank failure. If no work is undertaken in evening and night shifts, invariably the gap should be dosed with steel plate and mud packing at the end of day's work. xxvi) Checked the flame arrester on mobile equipment Although only certified vehicles engines are permitted in operating areas, it should be ensured that the flame arrester is not inadvertently removed. xxvii) Checked for oil / gas trapped behind lining in equipment Before undertaking hot jobs a check should be done for oil / gas trapped behind lining in the equipment. Many times oil / gas trapped behind lining depicts itself in the form of swelling and can be
Procedural Control
21
E & C Division confirmed h y way of drilling holes. xxviii) Hot tapping
While it is presumed that modification jobs will be undertaken always with the approval of the designated authority, it is further to be noted that hot tapping shall be undertaken only after an approval by Inspection Personnel. Continuous flow in the line should be ensured.
9.6.8 permits:
E&C WORK PERMIT SYSTEM
E&C division has an elaborate work permit system and has following work 1. Hot Work Permit 2. Cold Work Permit 3. Confined Space Entry Permit 4. Electrical Lines / Equipment Work Permit 5. Radiography Work Permit. Formats: Formats for each type of work permit are reproduced of at the end of this Chapter. Validity: The permit is to be renewed each day only after checking all the compliance jointly by the E&C Site Engineer and the contractor site-in-charge. The permit can be renewed for not more than 7 times including the issue date. Safety Instructions: Specific Safety Instructions to be followed strictly during the work are printed on the backside of the work permit and are reproduced here. Hot Work: 1. Combustible / inflammable materials shall be removed within 30 feet of the place of the work and also from opposite side of the partition / structure. 2. Materials which can catch fire / get damaged due to sparks, metal globules falling on them during Hot Work shall be covered with "Fire
Procedural Control
22
E & C Division blanket". 3. 4.
One DCP type 5 Kg. Capacity portable fire extinguisher shall be kept near Hot Work Place. All persons engaged in "Hot Work" shall be provided with all necessary Personal Protective Equipment like; Welding Screen; Asbestos hand gloves; Safety Shoes; respiratory mask; and Apron and they shall wear these while working.
5.
While doing Hot Work in confined space one stand-by person shall be kept outside the vessel, to assist in case of emergency, and the emergency exit shall be kept open.
6.
If Hot Work is to be carried on tank / drum which contained explosive flammable or other dangerous substances then following precautions shall be taken: a) b) Decontaminate the container by steaming or other similar method. Flush / Purge the container with water having detergents.
7. 8. 9.
Empty drums shall not be used instead of ladder for standing on it. After completing the Hot Work, materials / substances shall be removed from the working place. Supervisor shall be available at welding site during the period of work. work.
10. This permit shall be cancelled if any deficiencies are noticed during the 11. Explosimeter reading shall be taken before starting of hot work and must be entered in the space provided in the permit.
Procedural Control
23
E & C Division
10.0 PERSONNEL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENTS INTRODUCTION In industrial accident prevention, in spite of all the best efforts, there are some activities where exposure of persons to hazards can only be minimised but cannot be totally eliminated. Hence there rises a need for protection of our valuable body parts from injuries, even in case of such exposure to hazard either due to nature of job or accidental. Personal protective appliances of various types are now available in our country and with proper planning, selection, training and use, a lot of injuries can be avoided. Statistics prove that a high percentage of all injuries arising out of industrial construction accidents are caused due to non-compliance of wearing safety equipment. SELECTION AND USE OF PERSONAL PROTECTIVE APPLIANCES In order to have the best utilisation of available personal protective appliances, we should have knowledge and information on the following: a) The nature of hazards against which a particular equipment is required to be used. b) Standards and occupational safety & health requirements on various hazards in the work area. c) Selection, procurement and inspection of different equipments as per the required quantity. d) Methods of procuring / maintaining and storing of equipments. e) Effective methods of training and motivation of employees, so that they use as and when required. TYPES OF PERSONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT Personal protective equipments are mainly divided into two main categories: (A) Non-Respiratory (B) Respiratory
__________________________________________________ Personnel Protective Equipment(PPE) 1
E & C Division
10.1 NON-RESPIRATORY These equipment are used to protect following non-respiratory body parts 10.1.1 HEAD PROTECTION : INDUSTRIAL SAFETY HELMET: Presently available with cushioned end adjustable suspension cradles and two-three different sizes with IS certificates. These helmets are impact resistant, electrical shock-proof & comparatively light in weight (400 to 500 gms). This gives protection for common hazard of striking objects, falling objects as well as chemical splashes. Up-keep and maintenance Safety helmets are individually issued to all employees. The suspension cradles are washable and replaceable. Drilling of holes or tampering with the shell is unsafe, as this will reduce the strength of the helmet against impact. For proper fitting and grip, the chin-straps should also be tied after wearing the helmet. 10.1.2 EYE - PROTECTION : Industrial eye injuries are caused due to flying objects like chips, splinters, etc. dusts, liquid chemical splashes, glares due to harmful radiation etc. Following charts show the requirements of specific type of goggles / eye protection for specific use: Types Safely spectacles with frame clear lens glass Brief Description Combustion resistant plastic
or
metal
with or without side shields and toughened or plastic lenses.
Recommended use : Babbiting, butting, chipping, minor dust hazards, grinding machine shop operations, spot and butt welding, etc. Safety spectacles with frame coloured or filter lens Combustion resistant plastic or metal
with side shield and toughened glass.
E & C Division
Impact goggles
Combustion resistant plastic or metal cups, adjustable nose-bridge. The cups may be shallow or deep and are shaped to fit the contours of the face. Clear toughened plastic lenses. Ventilation is provided
glass or through sides of the cup and slots in the lens retaining rings. Recommended use Chipping, fitting, grinding, riveting, boiler & other fabrication work, hand & power tools, machine shop operations, wood working, spot and butt welding, dusts etc. Welding goggles adjustable deep and are shaped to fit the contours of the face. Filter glass of suitable grade has to be used. Clear cover glass is provided to protect the filter glass from pitting, ventilation is provided through indirect ports. Recommended use Glare, furnace operations, infra red and ultraviolet radiation, molten and red hot metals, gas welding and cutting etc. Dust goggles Fabric cups with tufted cord binding to provide dust tight fitting. Clear toughened glass or plastic through the fabric of the cups. Combustion resistant plastic cups and
nose-bridge. The cups may be shallow or
E & C Division Recommended use Extremely fine dusts and particles. Chemical Goggles rolled
One piece moulded rubber frame with edge for comfortable and air tight fit. Clear toughened glass or plastic through the
fabric of the cups. Recommended use Acids, caustic and other chemicals, dusts and particles, light impacts etc. Eye screens and face shields the visor may be clear or tinted plastic or fine wire mesh or a combination of tinted plastic and wire mesh. Recommended use Babbiting, Chemicals, furnace operations spot and butt welding, flying particles, frontal splashes, glare molten metals etc. and for additional protection over the gogglesWelding shields window with clear cover glass to protect the filter glass from pitting. The shield may be held in hand or suspended in front of the face by a head __________________________________________________ Personnel Protective Equipment(PPE) 4 A shell of fibre-glass provided with a for fitting suitable grade of fitter glass A single screen suspended in front of face from a head band or cap. The
E & C Division
SHE Manual (Commissioning) band or bracket on a safety cap. The
shield can protection is not required and dropped back into position by a sharp downward motion of the wearer's head. Recommended use Arc welding, atomic hydrogen welding. 10.1.3 HAND PROTECTION About 22% of industrial accidents injure hands. The following chart gives an idea of how to select the proper type of gloves for the specific job and hazard. HAZARDS Sustained heat leather Aluminium faced fabric Sparks leather Fire resistant fabric Leather Glass fibre Hot metal splash Leather Fire resistant fabric Glass fibre Fabric Coated fabric Asbestos Asbestos MATERIALS Asbestos Asbestos be raised off the face when
reinforced
with
reinforced
with
Dust
E & C Division
SHE Manual (Commissioning) Plastic Natural rubber Synthetic rubber
Sharp object Abrasion
Fabric Leather Coated fabric Teflon NBR (Nitric
Butadiene
Rubber) Cuts steel Leather reinforced with
staples Metal Mesh Electric Circuit Moisture Rubber Coated fabric Natural rubber Synthetic rubber Plastic Glass
fibre Acids, alkalis and other natural materials rubber chemicals Petroleum products plastic X-ray In some cases synthetic
like neoprene, Teflon etc. Synthetic rubber, neoprene,
Rubber, leather or plastic with lining.
10.1.4 FOOT & LEG PROTECTION Manual as well as mechanical handling of materials are part of the day-to-day industrial activities. The statistics on occupational injuries show that about 23% of the accidents occur during material handling. __________________________________________________ Personnel Protective Equipment(PPE) 6
E & C Division
Toe and foot injuries are common in industry while handling materials or getting struck on obstructions while working. Adequate foot protection against impact on toes as well as exposure of foot to chemicals, dusts, dirty materials etc. will go long way in reducing injuries. Most common foot protection in industries are : 1) Safety shoes and boots 2) Legging 3) Foot guards and leg guards 1) Safety (Toe) Shoes: They appear just like any other normal leather shoes except for the additional provision of a concealed steel cap above the toe portions. This provides additional protection from impact and crushing force. In few cases a steel innersole is provided for protections against punctures from nails, glass pieces etc. But, now a days, sturdy rubber soles are available which serve the above purpose. Common utility of safety shoes is in construction sites, engineering industries, foundries as well as chemical operating plants. The soles are also provided with Non-Slip strips at the bottom. 2) Natural rubber, synthetic rubber, neoprene or plastic (PVC) shoes : These can be with or without (overshoe type) steel toes providing protection up to ankles knee, or same times up to thigh. Recommended in construction sites fishing, food processing, chemicals petroleums, water/ sewage plants, tanneries, breweries, laundries etc. 3) Rubber boots for fire fighting : These are having felt lining thick clealed soles and metal or wood shanks to relieve pressure of ladder rungs. They may have steel toe caps and steel inner soles too. 4) Rubber boots with conductive soles : These are designed to ground static charges build up in potentially explosive atmospheres of grain, metal dusts, oil and petroleum, chemical fumes and vapours, solvent extractions plants. It may be noted that use of talcum powder on feet and wearing of synthetic fibre socks will adversely affect the conductivities of the charge. __________________________________________________ Personnel Protective Equipment(PPE) 7
E & C Division
5) Asbestos overshoes: These may be with leather sole and recommended for protection against heat, sparks and for operation at coke, asphalt & steel plants. 6) Leggings: The leggings may be knee high or hip high or they may be spats which shield the lower shin, ankle and instep. Knee leggings are held in place by metal spring clip or may wrapped round the leg and fastened with a snap button or similar quick release device. Hip leggings are suspended by straps from waist belt. The spats are generally held in position by straps. The leggings and spats are made of appropriate material depending upon the hazard as choosing gloves and shoes. 7) Foot guards & leg guards : Foot guard is a steel / plastic guard, which may be attached to the shoe when circumstances require. Foot guard is held in place by a heel strap. Leg guard is similar to a foot guard. It is a metal sheet, which protects the skin and ankle. This is strapped to the leg and offers protection against falling weights & impacts from striking objects. 10.1.5 BODY PROTECTION : Even after protecting head eyes, face, ears and limbs, some times injury may occur to the trunk portion of the body. Aprons, overalls jackets and some time complete head to toe suits are used to protect the trunk. Aprons : These may be bib type, covering the chest, waist, knees, or ankles or up to waist only. Aprons may be used to protect against heat, sparks, hot metal splashes, impact cut hazards and liquid splashes or radiations. Jackets and coats: Jackets are for protection of the general upper section of the body. covering the body and attending to the hips. Coats are longer then jackets and may be of knee or ankle length.
E & C Division
Complete suits : These units cover the wearer from head to foot. Generally this consists of overalls or trousers topped by short jackets and hoods. Suits may be made of materials such as oiled fabric, plastic coated fabric, glass fibre, conductive plastic, natural rubber, synthetic coated fabric asbestos and fire resistant fabric. 10.1.6 EAR PROTECTION : Continuous exposure to excessive noise can often result in serious hearing impairment or deafness. High noise levels endured over long period also result in fatigue, loosening of efficiency and making persons irritable and may even result in loss of hearing. Hearing loss varies with the type of exposure and the total duration of exposure. A committee formed under the American Conference of Government Industrial Hygienists in USA have agreed to the following points to establish threshold limit values for noise : 1. Exposure to 90 dBA (i.e. 'A' scale reading of sound level meter) for an eight hours per day, five days a week is not injurious to about 90% of the people exposed. It may be stated here that 'A' scale reading is used for hazard rating only but if studies are made for the purpose of engineering control, the octave band analysis should be made of the noise. 2. Equal energy will produce equal damage to the ear. Based on this assumption if sound level is increased by 3 decibels the exposure time should be reduced to half. If noise is intermittent, ear can tolerate more acoustical energy than for a single exposure to continuous noise. 3. Considering these two factors, the limit is increased to 5 decibels for each halving of the exposure time. The following table may be taken as a guide to control the noise hazard. The exposure should not exceed the duration shown below against each sound level: Duration per day (hours) Sound level (dBA) 8 90 6 92 4 95 3 97 __________________________________________________ Personnel Protective Equipment(PPE) 9
E & C Division 2 1 1
SHE Manual (Commissioning) 100 102 105 107 110 115 ceiling value
When noise levels exceed the above values, ear protectors have to be used. Common types of ear protectors are ear plugs and ear muffs. Ear plugs attenuate a large part of the noise when properly fitted in the outer portion of the ear canal. These are usually made of rubber, plastic or similar non-porous pliable material. It is important that ear plugs fit properly and remain correctly seated because even the slightest leakage will lower the amount of attenuation. Ear plugs if properly fitted and used, generally reduce noise reaching the ear by 25-30 dB in the higher frequencies, which are more harmful. EARMUFFS Earmuffs are designed to cover the external ear. These are suspended from adjustable head band or nape bands. The attenuation provided by ear muffs varies due to difference in size, shape, sealing material, shell mass and type of suspension. The type of cushion used between the shell and the head has a great deal to do with attenuation efficiency. Liquid or grease filled cushions give better results than plastic or foam rubber type Better type of ear muffs may have 10-15 dB better attenuation than that of ear plugs. 10.2 RESPIRATORY PROTECTIVE APPLIANCES
INTRODUCTION There are three modes of entry of matter into human body. (1) Inhalation through nose / mouth. (2) Ingestion through mouth. (3) Skin absorption. In the simplest physiological term, respiration is "taking oxygen from atmosphere, converting it into energy by circulation through blood and __________________________________________________ Personnel Protective Equipment(PPE) 10
E & C Division
venting out carbon dioxide, the by product and waste in this reaction." The tireless lungs do this function at a rate of 20-24 times a minute and repeats through out our life term. Since this is such an automatic function proceeding unknowingly, many of us take it for granted that there is nothing particular. The fact is reverse. Even a slightest change in the flow of quality or quantity of air we breathe makes lot of difference. As we all are aware the air we breathe is a mixture of about 22% oxygen and remaining Nitrogen with traces of carbon dioxide, moisture, rare gases etc. A difference of 10-12%, oxygen below 20% for about 6-8 minutes means a difference between life and death. The chart shown below illustrates this fact in a better way. Signs and symptoms from reduced level of oxygen in atmosphere are as below : % O 2 in air Effect Above 20 Normal 12-15 Muscular co-ordination for skilled movements is lost. 10-14 Consciousness continues, but judgement is faulty and muscular effect leads to fatigue. 6-8 Collapse occurs rapidly but quick treatment prevents fatal outcome. Below 6 Death occurs in 6-8 minutes. In a chemical industry where different types of toxic gas, vapours, dusts, fumes, etc and asphyxiating gases like Nitrogen, Carbon dioxide, etc. are likely to be present the importance of identifying the hazards, controlling / confining and using proper effective breathing protective gears need not be over emphasized. 10.2.1 DESCRIPTION OF HAZARDS :
i) Type of hazard-whether toxic/poisonous or asphyxiating. Toxic / poisonous - Chlorine Ammonia, Cyanides, hydrocarbon, etc. which react with blood and makes it impure. __________________________________________________ Personnel Protective Equipment(PPE) 11
E & C Division
Asphyxiating - Nitrogen, C02 etc. which do not react with blood but obviously stop the oxidation process in the blood by reducing oxygen content. ii) Dusts, fumes, etc Asbestos, Catalyst fine, Glass-wool Insulation fines, silica, carbon, etc. which block the respiratory track and deposit foreign particles in the lungs. While choosing a personal protective equipment for respiration we should consider the type of hazards as mentioned above and select the correct type equipment. Remember using a wrong equipment may mean immediate danger to life. That is why invariably respiratory protective equipment are known as emergency equipment also. 10.2.2 DIFFERENT TYPES OF RESPIRATORY SAFETY EQUIPMENTS
1.
2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.
Canister type Gas Mask - Mask with separate canisters for different chemicals, Organics, Acid fumes, Ammonia & Chlorine, etc. 1 Hr. MSA CHEMOX Mask. Hr. MSA -401 compressed air cylinder breathing apparatus. 10 minutes Escape Mask with compressed air - DRAGER, SABRE & SCOTT make. Hand operated blower hose mask - MSA make. On-line air hose mask. Resuscitator - both, hand-operated (balloon type) and with pressurized medical oxygen cylinder. Compressed air Pressurized head to toe suits.
10.2.2.1 Canister Type Gas Mask: Gas mask gives some emergency protection in the acid gas, organic vapours and other poisonous gaseous atmosphere. But it does not provide protection against oxygen deficiency. For most of the hazards universal gas mask is provided which gives protection against organic vapours, acid, fumes, fog, rust, etc. For Cl 2, NH3 & CO separate gas mask canisters are available. Gas masks with chemical cartridge for __________________________________________________ Personnel Protective Equipment(PPE) 12
E & C Division
organic vapours are also available, covering mouth & nose portion, which is lighter and easy to wear. Limitations : i) It shall not be used where oxygen content in the atmosphere is less than 18% by volume in the air. ii) The gas mask should not be used where gases are present at more than 2% by volume or the figure indicated by the manufacturer. Operation and Use: i) Check for proper type of canister to be used. ii) Remove the seal from the bottom of the canister and put on the headpiece. iii) Adjust the head strap until the mask fits closely and comfortably to avoid leaking. After Use: Enter in the card the duration of use of canister Gas Mask. CAUTION: NEVER USE A CANISTER WHOSE SELF LIFE (MENTIONED ON THE SHELL) HAS BEEN EXPIRED. 10.2.2.2 One Hour MSA CHEMOX Breathing Apparatus:
The 'Chemex' oxygen breathing set is a complete independent breathing apparatus, which provides oxygen. It can be used for a duration of 60 minutes (1 hour) only. The chemical filled into the canister comes in contact with moisture and carbon dioxide in the exhaled breath, removes the carbon dioxide and provides oxygen for breathing. It can be used in any gaseous atmosphere containing carbon monoxide. Phosgene, Hydrogen Sulphide, Chlorine, Ammonia, etc. where normal breathing is restricted.
E & C Division
Limitations: 1. It has got the service life of maximum one hour. 2. It can be used only at a temp. above 32F, provided hard work is not to be performed. 3. It can not be used in the explosive atmosphere where the auto-ignition temp. is 600F. 4. This equipment cannot be used under water and in open fires. Preparation for use: Install canister into apparatus before wearing the apparatus. i) Installing Standard Type Canister: Be sure that the copper foil seal must be fully exposed before inserting Canister. Lift up on tip of plastic cap until seal is broken completely. Remove the remaining of the cap exposing the air tight copper foil canister seal. With the hand wheel screwed down far enough for the bail to be swung outward, and insert canister fully into canister holder with the smooth side to the front. It is to be inserted in a way so that the copper foil seal is punctured and the rubber gasket fits against the V-shaped recess in the plunger casting. Screw the hand wheel clockwise until it is tight against the canister. ii) Remove candle cover by rotating swivel plate 180 Pull swivel plate down, push cover towards centre of canister and let the cover dangle. DO NOT PULL LANYARD UNTIL READY FOR USE. The canister will produce more oxygen than needed and hence the breathing bags will become over inflated and resist exhalation. The excess volume can be vented out by depressing the button valve on the face piece, but do not over vent. There are two indications in addition to the timer that the canister is becoming expended. a) b) Fogging of the lenses on inhalation and Increased resistance of exhalation.
iii)
iv)
E & C Division
If either of these two indications appear, return to fresh air. The following are the important steps in putting on the apparatus before entering a toxic atmosphere. It must be put on in fresh air only. i) ii) Unfasten and straighten all harness straps. Hold the apparatus by the plunger casting with one hand. Let the face piece drop over the hand, holding the apparatus. iii) With other hand the D-ring assembly where the two large web straps join and place the breast plate of the canister holder on the chest. Pass the head through V-shaped opening, formed by two web straps. iv) With one hand, continue to hold the apparatus on the chest and with other hand grasp the free end of the web strap. Bring the end of the strap under the arm & join with D-ring located on the top side of the breast plate. Repeat the same for other strap. v) Adjust the position of the apparatus on the body in such a way with the help of metal straps so that when the face piece is put on, the breathing tubes will permit free head movement. vi) Join waist strap to the small D-ring, located on the lower comer of the breast plate and pull up to a "Smart fit". vii) Grip face piece between thumb and fingers, after pulling out all the head band straps ends towards buckles. Insert chin welt into the lower part of the face piece and pull the head-bands, extreme back over the head and get properly fitted. viii) This must be done in fresh air. (a) Pull lanyard straight out away from the body. Removal of cotter pin fires candle, inflating breathing bag with oxygen within 15 seconds. Note : If candle fails to fire, insert new canister. (b) Starting of the candle may be accompanied by a slight amount of harmless smoke. The breathing bag will be inflated with oxygen. Note: Do not attempt to restart and reuse of any type of canisters. __________________________________________________ Personnel Protective Equipment(PPE) 15
E & C Division
The apparatus must always be put on in trash air. i) Check every part before use. ii) Use only if you are a trained personnel. iii) Do not enter any explosive atmosphere where the auto-ignition temp. is lower than 600 F. iv) Never allow any substance to enter the neck of the canister, especially oil, water & gasoline, grease etc. v) Do not use it in atmosphere where gases and vapours can effect by skin absorption. vi) When not in use the apparatus should be kept in the carrying case provided and canisters should be stored in a dry place. After Use: Remove the canister by turning the hand wheel down. Swing bail outward and remove the canister with the hand suitably protected by a gloves or other covering since the canister may be hot. "DO NOT RE-USE THE CANISTER" To dispose off canister remove out side, punch a small hole in front, back and bottom, and place in bucket of clean water sufficient deep to cover the canister at least three inches. When bubbling stops, any residual oxygen will be dissipated and the canister will be expended. Pour the residual water, which is caustic, in drain or any other suitable manner and then discard the canister. This is having a multi-purpose design, i.e. (1) either direct air supply can be taken from the outside air line by passing the cylinder or (2) air can be drawn directly from the cylinder by-passing the air supply line. In both cases there is an automatic provision of one of the supplies entering into the breathing mask when the other one fails, either due to pressure reduction or any other mechanical or instrument failure. 10.2.2.3 1/2 HR. MSA 401 Breathing Apparatus. Compressed Air Cylinder
MSA 401, compressed air cylinder breathing apparatus is a complete independent breathing protection. It can be used in any gas such as Carbon-Monoxide, Phosgene, Hydrogen Sulphide, Chlorine, Ammonia etc. where normal breathing is restricted. This apparatus can be used __________________________________________________ Personnel Protective Equipment(PPE) 16
E & C Division
in the full range of temperature endured by man. It can only be used for the duration of 30 minutes at 2216 psi. pressure. Limitations : i) This equipment can not be used in open fires and under water. ii) At the full pressure, it can last for 30 minutes only but the service life may vary or may change on wearer's breathing condition and the nature of job. Preparation for Use: Before use check the following for order. i) Pressure gauge for full air in the cylinder. ii) The high pressure tube is securely attached to the regulator and cylinder valve. iii) Check Audio-Alarm Device before going to Hazardous Area. Operation and Use i) Wear the complete apparatus so as the cylinder should be on the back and cylinder valve should be in downward position. ii) Close the by-pass valve (if opened), red hand-wheel on the demand regulator and then open the cylinder valve fully. iii) Open fully the yellow valve (Main line) and observe the pressure gauge on the demand regulator. The pressure should read approximately 20 Atm if fully charged. iv) Wear the mask and pull the straps, so mask should be tight fit on the face. WARNINGS : i) To warn the user about the scarcity of air in cylinder, an Audio Alarm is given. Leave the hazardous area immediately after the alarm. ii) Never remove the face piece except in a safe and nonhazardous and non-toxic atmosphere. iii) Cylinder is pressurized. In case of fall the cylinder may damage and it may create a hazard. 10.2.2.4 Escape Mask with Compressed Air There are three types of different escape masks with compressed air cylinder which are kept in plant areas. They are as follows : __________________________________________________ Personnel Protective Equipment(PPE) 17
E & C Division
a) Saver Set (Drager Escape Mask) b) Sabre Set c) SKA-PAK Set. All these sets are having face mask assembly with corrugated tube, pressure demand regulator & compressed air cylinder. The duration of first two types of escape mask is 6 minutes and the third one is of 5 minutes duration. Limitation : i) It can not be used in open fires and under water. ii) These equipment are especially meant for escape purpose only and having short duration. Operation & Use: i) Check the cylinder pressure, the condition of corrugated tube, facemask & headband (all rubber components). ii) Clean the visor of the facemask with wet handkerchiefpreferably with Dettol. iii) Put the bag on shoulder, wear the facemask & start respiration. a) Saver Set: 6 minutes duration; Cylinder pressure : 2840 psi Special feature : Cylinder valve is not provided on cylinder. Airflow regulates with the help of high pressure demand regulator. b) Sabre Set: 6 minutes duration; Cylinder pressure : 2900 psi Special feature : It has got a provision (which is optional) to attach the audio alarm device which operates when pressure in the cylinder is reduced up to certain extent. It has also got the additional provision to connect the 'on line air connection." c) SKA-PAK Set: 5 minutes duration; cylinder pressure : 2216 psi Special feature : Additional provision of online air connection is available.
E & C Division 10.2.2.5
Hand operated Blower Hose Mask (Blowman's Breathing Apparatus) These masks are designed to provide fresh air to the wearer from outside the gaseous area by keeping the air intake end in fresh air. The use is restricted for a maximum of two hose lines, each originating at the blower and not exceeding 30 feet length. Limitation: There should not be any entanglement of the hose which restricts the movement of the person. Points to remember. i) Blower should be kept in the open atmosphere where contamination of any dangerous vapours are not present. ii) Blower must be operated continuously during use of the mask and the man who operates should not leave the place. iii) Life line should be provided. iv) The face piece should be properly adjusted and tested before using it. v) The use of this apparatus is restricted for a maximum of two hose lines, each originating from the blower and not exceeding 30" length. vi) The proper functioning of the blower to discharge the air is to be ensured. vii) Safety harness & belt should be properly fastened to provide comfortable movement of personnel. 10.2.2.6 On Line Air Hose Mask: Normally a breathing airline connection from the compressor to the plant area will be provided. The header pressure of the compressor is 8 to 9 kg/cm3g and at the plant battery limit is normally 1.5 kg/cm3g. Tapping is taken to concern plant areas. At the end of the service air line, an assembly known as the norozen filter along with pressure indicator is provided. To this assembly, a provision of two " dia. tappings is made with quick fix / release coupling 'Female end'. In the plant areas where these facilities are provided, the following assemblies are available: __________________________________________________ Personnel Protective Equipment(PPE) 19
E & C Division i) ii)
Face mask with headbands and a corrugated tube with couplings. An air line regulator along with leather belt & the upstream of the regulator is fitted with the coupling & corrugated tube & the downstream with a rubber tubing of 3/8" dia. The length of the rubber tubing is generally 15 to 30 Mts. and the end of the tubing is provided with a 'Male end' of the quick fix / release coupling.
Use: i) ii) iii) Push the 'Male end' of quick fix coupling into the 'Female end'. Open the isolation valve. Wear the mask.
Limitation : This is not a completely dependent system. 10.2.2.7 Resuscitator: To restore normal breathing when accidents or illness interferes with respiration, two different devices / equipments are used. They are as follows: a) LA-IF resuscitator. b) Pneolator. a) LA - IF resuscitator : This is a bellow type hand operated equipment used for giving artificial respiration. It has also got a provision at one end of the aspirator bulb, to connect extra 02 cylinder so that pure oxygen can also be administered. Limitation : i) Limited quantity of air-blow can be achieved. ii) Continuous manual administering of compressed air is required without any interruption. Operation and use: i) Before use, remove the air from the aspirator bulb by squeezing it. Repeat the same 2 to 3 times. __________________________________________________ Personnel Protective Equipment(PPE) 20
E & C Division ii)
Squeeze the aspirator bulb, by holding the mouth piece on victim's mouth. Remove it for victim's exhalation. Repeat the procedure.
Precaution : The aspirator bulb should be checked and cleaned prior to use of equipment. b) Pneolator: Introduction: Pneolator is an instrument that automatically performs artificial respiration with a gentle predetermined pressure on inhalation and without suction on exhalation. When the victim is breathing, this instrument is very much effective for applying Oxygen by a simple adjustment. If the air passage is obstructed by mucous or any foreign material, immediately a warning is given by a chattering sound from the valve. This obstruction can be removed by using the ejector provided with the Pneolator. Operating instructions (for the non-breathing victim) : i) Open the lid of the case and turn on cylinder valve fully. ii) Remove cycling valve assembly from holder and select and attach the proper size of mask. iii) Turn the pressure adjusting knob, so that the low pressure gauge needle is set (at Infant, Child or Adult) as required. The pressure increases as the knob is turned anti-clockwise. iv) Place the mask on the victim's face holding it secured, so that air tight seal is obtained. The exhalation valve cover murt be hand tight for the purpose of cycling valve. Caution: i) The use of Aspirator and Airways by laymen is subject to a difference of opinion medically. Therefore the Aspirator of the airways should be
E & C Division
ii)
used only with approval of a physician and subject to his instructions. Replace the mask on victim and continue the artificial respiration until breathing is re-established.
Operating Instructions ( for the breathing victim ) : If the victim is breathing when the Pneolator arrives after the restoration of breathing on a non-breathing victim, Oxygen should be administered for therapeutic support until a physician decides it is no longer necessary. Turn the pressure adjusting knob so that low pressure gauge needle is set at "ASSISTER" position. This provides a small constant flow of Oxygen at a slight positive pressure so that easier breathing results. Whenever more Oxygen than the constant flow is delivered, he automatically obtains all the desired Oxygen by actuating the inhalator valve. 10.2.2.8 Pressurised Head-to-Toe Suits : Special pressurised head-to-toe suits are provided in plant areas, which can protect the external body parts as well as internal respiratory system. These are commonly used during the maintenance and repair jobs for the acids, caustic, chemical vapour service. Mainly two types of chemical resistance air pressurised head-to-toe suits are used, namely "Class C Suit" and "Class D Suit". Class C Suit: This is a gralite mode synthetic rubber air pressure suit made for corrosive acids and hydrocarbon services. Class D Suit: Two types of Class D type suits are available : a) It is complete air fed PVC suit made of double coated thick and flexible PVC to resist hydrofluoric acid. The suit comprises of jacket, combined with hood and pant having air line regulator connection. b) It is a complete air fed suit made up from Butyl coated nylon fabric to be impervious to liquids and vapours. It covers neck-totoe and has got a separate provision of chemical resistance hood.
E & C Division 11.0 General
GAS TESTING / DETECTION DEVICES
Besides the fixed installations for identifying, monitoring and controlling hazards such as flammability, toxicity and Oxygen deficiency, portable and robust instruments are needed during the commissioning period as well. Various types of portable instruments such as Explosive meter, Toxic Gas detector are available. They are to periodically checked and ensured that they are in good working conditions, before being put into actual use by the commissioning team. 11.1 COMBUSTIBLE / EXPLOSIVE GAS DETECTOR
For detection of combustible gases, the instrument known as the Explosimeter is used. It is an instrument by means of which an area / atmosphere can be conveniently and quickly tested for the presence of combustible gases / vapours within their flammable limits. For areas of Hydrogen / Hydrocarbon and pure oxygen mixtures, the instrument should be ordered specific as per the requirement. They should be weather proof and pertaining to the Hydrogen / Hydrocarbon ambience requirement. Few Important Hints: a) The instrument assembly, sampling line and the aspirator bulb assembly should be proof and tested before each set of sampling. b) Always keep the sampling line combustion chamber free of choking. c) Never dip the -sampling tube into a liquid and always use a flash trap assembly. d) Check the instrument whether in use or not at least once in a day. e) Replace the battery cells immediately if found leaky. f) While in doubt, have the instrument serviced and calibrated. __________________________________________________ Gas Detection Devices 1
E & C Division
Technical Brochure and the operating instruction sheet for the combustible gas detector available with the safety cell is enclosed here 11.2 TOXIC GAS DETECTORS
Accurate measurement of toxic gases and vapours present at very low concentrations (ppm) is necessary for monitoring of plant / work areas and confined spaces before jobs are taken up. The toxic gas detectors helps us in knowing the concentrations of the given chemical, which can be matched against the Threshold Limit Value of that chemical, based on which we can judge whether it is safe for routine operations / work / maintenance requirements etc. Each detector tube packet comes with an instructions sheet and readings and interpretations done exactly as per the same. 11.3 OXYGEN DEFICIENCY INSTRUMENTS
Prior oxygen measurement in areas suspected to be deficient in oxygen, like process vessels, pits, tanks and other confined areas which are to be worked on is a mandatory safety requirement before authorizing the work. Even after commencement of jobs this should be repeated at regular intervals to ensure oxygen content is a minimum of 18% by volume in the areas where work is going on. Before the usage of the instrument, it should be checked for the calibration. Technical Brochure and the operating instruction sheet for the oxygen level monitor available with the safety cell is enclosed here.
__________________________________________________ Gas Detection Devices 2

Comissioning

Загружено:

Сведения о документе

Авторское право

Доступные форматы

Поделиться этим документом

Поделиться или встроить документ

Параметры публикации

Этот документ был вам полезен?

Это неприемлемый материал?

Авторское право:

Доступные форматы

Comissioning

Загружено:

Авторское право:

Доступные форматы

SHE MANUAL COMMISSIONING

SHE Manual (Commissioning)

SHE Manual (Commissioning)

LARSEN & TOUBRO LIMITED

Engineering & Construction Division

Issue : Jan , 2002

( Member of the Board & President )

SHE Manual (Commissioning)

SHE Manual (Commissioning)

SHE Manual (Commissioning)

1. Person responsible for overall commissioning, regardless of his

SHE Manual (Commissioning)

SHE Manual (Commissioning)

Responsibility of the commissioning team members

SHE Manual (Commissioning)

E & C Division 16.

SHE Manual (Commissioning)

17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23.

____________________________________________________ Rules & Regulations 2

SHE Manual (Commissioning)

__________________________________________________ Rules and Regulations 3

E & C Division 8. 9. 10.

SHE Manual (Commissioning)

13. 14. 15.

__________________________________________________ Rules and Regulations 4

SHE Manual (Commissioning)

Safety during Pre-commissioning

__________________________________________________ Precommissioning Activities 1

SHE Manual (Commissioning)

Gaskets Gaskets shall be treated in accordance with manufacturers'

SHE Manual (Commissioning)

and HVAC duct routings. __________________________________________________ Precommissioning Activities 3

SHE Manual (Commissioning)

Positioning of pipe supports relative to the structural steel. Pipe stress.

SHE Manual (Commissioning)

SHE Manual (Commissioning)

SHE Manual (Commissioning)

__________________________________________________ Precommissioning Activities 7

SHE Manual (Commissioning)

SHE Manual (Commissioning)

__________________________________________________ Precommissioning Activities 9

E & C Division CHEMICAL CLEANING

SHE Manual (Commissioning)

Removed or blanked off items shall be cleaned separately prior to reinstallation.

__________________________________________________ Precommissioning Activities 10

SHE Manual (Commissioning)

SHE Manual (Commissioning)

SHE Manual (Commissioning)

SHE Manual (Commissioning)

SHE Manual (Commissioning)

__________________________________________________ Plant Layout 4

SHE Manual (Commissioning)

__________________________________________________ Plant Layout 5

SHE Manual (Commissioning)

SHE Manual (Commissioning)

SHE Manual (Commissioning)

SHE Manual (Commissioning)

SHE Manual (Commissioning)

SHE Manual (Commissioning)

SHE Manual (Commissioning)

SHE Manual (Commissioning)

SHE Manual (Commissioning)

SHE Manual (Commissioning)

SHE Manual (Commissioning)