ACT NO. 3326 ACT NO.

3326 - AN ACT TO ESTABLISH PERIODS OF PRESCRIPTION FOR VIOLATIONS PENALIZED BY SPECIAL ACTS AND MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES AND TO PROVIDE WHEN PRESCRIPTION SHALL BEGIN TO RUN Section 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless otherwise provided in such acts, prescribe in accordance with the following rules: (a) after a year for offenses punished only by a fine or by imprisonment for not more than one month, or both; (b) after four years for those punished by imprisonment for more than one month, but less than two years; (c) after eight years for those punished by imprisonment for two years or more, but less than six years; and (d) after twelve years for any other offense punished by imprisonment for six years or more, except the crime of treason, which shall prescribe after twenty years. Violations penalized by municipal ordinances shall prescribe after two months. Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceeding for its investigation and punishment. The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy. Sec. 3. For the purposes of this Act, special acts shall be acts defining and penalizing violations of the law not included in the Penal Code. Sec. 4. This Act shall take effect on its approval.

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8294 AN ACT AMENDING THE PROVISIONS OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1866, AS AMENDED, ENTITLED "CODIFYING THE LAWS ON ILLEGAL/UNLAWFUL POSSESSION, MANUFACTURE, DEALING IN, ACQUISITION OR DISPOSITION OF FIREARMS, AMMUNITION OR EXPLOSIVES OR INSTRUMENTS USED IN THE MANUFACTURE OF FIREARMS, AMMUNITION OR EXPLOSIVES, AND IMPOSING STIFFER PENALTIES FOR CERTAIN VIOLATIONS THEREOF, AND FOR RELEVANT PURPOSES." Section 1. Sec. 1 Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended, is hereby further amended to read as follows: "Sec. 1. Unlawful manufacture, sale, acquisition, disposition or possession of firearms or ammunition or instruments used or intended to be used in the manufacture of firearms or ammunition. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period and a fine of not less than Fifteen thousand pesos (P15,000) shall be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess any low powered firearm, such as rimfire handgun, .380 or .32 and other firearm of similar firepower, part of firearm, ammunition, or machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be used in the manufacture of any firearm or ammunition: Provided, That no other crime was committed. "The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period and a fine of Thirty thousand pesos (P30,000) shall be imposed if the firearm is classified as high powered firearm which includes those with bores bigger in diameter than .38 caliber and 9 millimeter such as caliber .40, .41, .44, .45 and also lesser calibered firearms but considered powerful such as caliber .357 and caliber .22 center-fire magnum and other firearms with firing capability of full automatic and by burst of two or three: Provided, however, That no other crime was committed by the person arrested. "If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance. "If the violation of this Sec. is in furtherance of or incident to, or in connection with the crime of rebellion or insurrection, sedition, or attempted coup d'etat, such violation shall be absorbed as an element of the crime of rebellion, or insurrection, sedition, or attempted coup d'etat. "The same penalty shall be imposed upon the owner, president, manager, director or other responsible officer of any public or private firm, company, corporation or entity, who shall willfully or knowingly allow any of the firearms owned by such firm, company, corporation or entity to be used by any person or persons found guilty of violating the provisions of the preceding

paragraphs or willfully or knowingly allow any of them to use unlicensed firearms or firearms without any legal authority to be carried outside of their residence in the course of their employment. "The penalty of arresto mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall carry any licensed firearm outside his residence without legal authority therefor." Sec. 2. Sec. 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended, is hereby further amended to read as follows: "Sec. 3. Unlawful manufacture, sale, acquisition, disposition or possession of explosives. The penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal and a fine of not less than Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000) shall be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully manufacture, assemble, deal in, acquire, dispose or possess hand grenade(s), rifle grenade(s), and other explosives, including but not limited to 'pillbox,' 'molotov cocktail bombs,' 'fire bombs,' or other incendiary devices capable of producing destructive effect on contiguous objects or causing injury or death to any person. "When a person commits any of the crimes defined in the Revised Penal Code or special laws with the use of the aforementioned explosives, detonation agents or incendiary devices, which results in the death of any person or persons, the use of such explosives, detonation agents or incendiary devices shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance. "If the violation of this Sec. is in furtherance of, or incident to, or in connection with the crime of rebellion, insurrection, sedition or attempted coup d'etat, such violation shall be absorbed as an element of the crimes of rebellion, insurrection, sedition or attempted coup d'etat. "The same penalty shall be imposed upon the owner, president, manager, director or other responsible officer of any public or private firm, company, corporation or entity, who shall willfully or knowingly allow any of the explosives owned by such firm, company, corporation or entity, to be used by any person or persons found guilty of violating the provisions of the preceding paragraphs." Sec. 3. Sec. 5 of Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended, is hereby further amended to read as follows: "Sec. 5. Tampering of firearm's serial number. The penalty of prision correccional shall be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully tamper, change, deface or erase the serial number of any firearm." Sec. 4. Sec. 6 of Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended, is hereby further amended to read as follows: "Sec. 6. Repacking or altering the composition of lawfully manufactured explosives. The penalty of prision correccional shall be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully repack,

alter or modify the composition of any lawfully manufactured explosives." Sec. 5. Coverage of the Term Unlicensed Firearm. The term unlicensed firearm shall include: 1) firearms with expired license; or 2) unauthorized use of licensed firearm in the commission of the crime. Sec. 6. Rules and regulations. The Department of Justice and the Department of the Interior and Local Government shall jointly issue, within ninety (90) days after the approval of this Act, the necessary rules and regulations pertaining to the administrative aspect of the provisions hereof, furnishing the Committee on Public Order and Security and the Committee on Justice and Human Rights of both Houses of Congress copies of such rules and regulations within thirty (30) days from the promulgation hereof. Sec. 7. Separability clause. If, provision of this Act is declared to the other Sec.s or provisions thereof shall continue to be in for any reason, any Sec. or be unconstitutional or invalid, which are not affected thereby full force and effect.

Sec. 8. Repealing clause. All laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulations or parts thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed, amended, or modified accordingly. Sec. 9. Effectivity. This Act shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following its publication in the Official Gazette or in two (2) newspapers of general circulation. Approved: June 6, 1997

G.R. No. 167571

November 25, 2008

LUIS PANAGUITON, JR., petitioner vs. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, RAMON C. TONGSON and RODRIGO G. CAWILI, respondents. DECISION TINGA, J.: This is a Petition for Review1 of the resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated 29 October 2004 and 21 March 2005 in CA G.R. SP No. 87119, which dismissed Luis Panaguiton, Jr.'s (petitioner's) petition for certiorari and his subsequent motion for reconsideration.2 The facts, as culled from the records, follow. In 1992, Rodrigo Cawili (Cawili) borrowed various sums of money amounting to P1,979,459.00 from petitioner. On 8 January 1993, Cawili and his business associate, Ramon C. Tongson (Tongson), jointly issued in favor of petitioner three (3) checks in payment of the said loans. Significantly, all three (3) checks bore the signatures of both Cawili and Tongson. Upon presentment for payment on 18 March 1993, the checks were dishonored, either for insufficiency of funds or by the closure of the account. Petitioner made formal demands to pay the amounts of the checks upon Cawili on 23 May 1995 and upon Tongson on 26 June 1995, but to no avail.3 On 24 August 1995, petitioner filed a complaint against Cawili and Tongson4 for violating Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (B.P. Blg. 22)5 before the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office. During the preliminary investigation, only Tongson appeared and filed his counter-affidavit.6 Tongson claimed that he had been unjustly included as party-respondent in the case since petitioner had lent money to Cawili in the latter's personal capacity. Moreover, like petitioner, he had lent various sums to Cawili and in appreciation of his services, he was offered to be an officer of Roma Oil Corporation. He averred that he was not Cawili's business associate; in fact, he himself had filed several criminal cases against Cawili for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. Tongson denied that he had issued the bounced checks and pointed out that his signatures on the said checks had been falsified. To counter these allegations, petitioner presented several documents showing Tongson's signatures, which were purportedly the same as the those appearing on the checks.7 He also showed a copy of an affidavit of adverse claim wherein Tongson himself had claimed to be Cawili's business associate.8 In a resolution dated 6 December 1995,9 City Prosecutor III Eliodoro V. Lara found probable cause only against Cawili and dismissed the charges against Tongson. Petitioner filed a partial

appeal before the Department of Justice (DOJ) even while the case against Cawili was filed before the proper court. In a letter-resolution dated 11 July 1997,10 after finding that it was possible for Tongson to co-sign the bounced checks and that he had deliberately altered his signature in the pleadings submitted during the preliminary investigation, Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuo directed the City Prosecutor of Quezon City to conduct a reinvestigation of the case against Tongson and to refer the questioned signatures to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). Tongson moved for the reconsideration of the resolution, but his motion was denied for lack of merit. On 15 March 1999, Assistant City Prosecutor Ma. Lelibet S. Sampaga (ACP Sampaga) dismissed the complaint against Tongson without referring the matter to the NBI per the Chief State Prosecutor's resolution. In her resolution,11 ACP Sampaga held that the case had already prescribed pursuant to Act No. 3326, as amended,12 which provides that violations penalized by B.P. Blg. 22 shall prescribe after four (4) years. In this case, the four (4)-year period started on the date the checks were dishonored, or on 20 January 1993 and 18 March 1993. The filing of the complaint before the Quezon City Prosecutor on 24 August 1995 did not interrupt the running of the prescriptive period, as the law contemplates judicial, and not administrative proceedings. Thus, considering that from 1993 to 1998, more than four (4) years had already elapsed and no information had as yet been filed against Tongson, the alleged violation of B.P. Blg. 22 imputed to him had already prescribed.13 Moreover, ACP Sampaga stated that the order of the Chief State Prosecutor to refer the matter to the NBI could no longer be sanctioned under Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure because the initiative should come from petitioner himself and not the investigating prosecutor.14 Finally, ACP Sampaga found that Tongson had no dealings with petitioner.15 Petitioner appealed to the DOJ. But the DOJ, through Undersecretary Manuel A.J. Teehankee, dismissed the same, stating that the offense had already prescribed pursuant to Act No. 3326.16 Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the DOJ resolution. On 3 April 2003,17 the DOJ, this time through then Undersecretary Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez, ruled in his favor and declared that the offense had not prescribed and that the filing of the complaint with the prosecutor's office interrupted the running of the prescriptive period citing Ingco v. Sandiganbayan.18 Thus, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City was directed to file three (3) separate informations against Tongson for violation of B.P. Blg. 22.19 On 8 July 2003, the City Prosecutor's Office filed an information20 charging petitioner with three (3) counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22.21 However, in a resolution dated 9 August 2004,22 the DOJ, presumably acting on a motion for reconsideration filed by Tongson, ruled that the subject offense had already prescribed and ordered "the withdrawal of the three (3) informations for violation of B.P. Blg. 22" against Tongson. In justifying its sudden turnabout, the DOJ explained that Act No. 3326 applies to violations of special acts that do not provide for a prescriptive period for the offenses thereunder. Since B.P. Blg. 22, as a special act, does not provide for the prescription of the offense it defines and punishes, Act No. 3326 applies to it, and not Art. 90 of the Revised Penal Code which governs the prescription of offenses penalized thereunder.23 The DOJ also cited the case of

Zaldivia v. Reyes, Jr.,24 wherein the Supreme Court ruled that the proceedings referred to in Act No. 3326, as amended, are judicial proceedings, and not the one before the prosecutor's office. Petitioner thus filed a petition for certiorari25 before the Court of Appeals assailing the 9 August 2004 resolution of the DOJ. The petition was dismissed by the Court of Appeals in view of petitioner's failure to attach a proper verification and certification of non-forum shopping. The Court of Appeals also noted that the 3 April 2003 resolution of the DOJ attached to the petition is a mere photocopy.26 Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the appellate court's resolution, attaching to said motion an amended Verification/Certification of Non-Forum Shopping.27 Still, the Court of Appeals denied petitioner's motion, stating that subsequent compliance with the formal requirements would not per se warrant a reconsideration of its resolution. Besides, the Court of Appeals added, the petition is patently without merit and the questions raised therein are too unsubstantial to require consideration.28 In the instant petition, petitioner claims that the Court of Appeals committed grave error in dismissing his petition on technical grounds and in ruling that the petition before it was patently without merit and the questions are too unsubstantial to require consideration. The DOJ, in its comment,29 states that the Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing the petition for non-compliance with the Rules of Court. It also reiterates that the filing of a complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City does not interrupt the running of the prescriptive period for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. It argues that under B.P. Blg. 22, a special law which does not provide for its own prescriptive period, offenses prescribe in four (4) years in accordance with Act No. 3326. Cawili and Tongson submitted their comment, arguing that the Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing the petition for certiorari. They claim that the offense of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 has already prescribed per Act No. 3326. In addition, they claim that the long delay, attributable to petitioner and the State, violated their constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases.30 The petition is meritorious. First on the technical issues. Petitioner submits that the verification attached to his petition before the Court of Appeals substantially complies with the rules, the verification being intended simply to secure an assurance that the allegations in the pleading are true and correct and not a product of the imagination or a matter of speculation. He points out that this Court has held in a number of cases that a deficiency in the verification can be excused or dispensed with, the defect being neither jurisdictional nor always fatal. 31 Indeed, the verification is merely a formal requirement intended to secure an assurance that matters which are alleged are true and correctthe court may simply order the correction of unverified pleadings or act on them and waive strict compliance with the rules in order that the ends of justice may be served,32 as in the instant case. In the case at bar, we find that by attaching

the pertinent verification to his motion for reconsideration, petitioner sufficiently complied with the verification requirement. Petitioner also submits that the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition on the ground that there was failure to attach a certified true copy or duplicate original of the 3 April 2003 resolution of the DOJ. We agree. A plain reading of the petition before the Court of Appeals shows that it seeks the annulment of the DOJ resolution dated 9 August 2004,33 a certified true copy of which was attached as Annex "A."34 Obviously, the Court of Appeals committed a grievous mistake. Now, on the substantive aspects. Petitioner assails the DOJ's reliance on Zaldivia v. Reyes,35 a case involving the violation of a municipal ordinance, in declaring that the prescriptive period is tolled only upon filing of the information in court. According to petitioner, what is applicable in this case is Ingco v. Sandiganbayan,36 wherein this Court ruled that the filing of the complaint with the fiscal's office for preliminary investigation suspends the running of the prescriptive period. Petitioner also notes that the Ingco case similarly involved the violation of a special law, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, petitioner notes.37 He argues that sustaining the DOJ's and the Court of Appeals' pronouncements would result in grave injustice to him since the delays in the present case were clearly beyond his control.38 There is no question that Act No. 3326, appropriately entitled An Act to Establish Prescription for Violations of Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin, is the law applicable to offenses under special laws which do not provide their own prescriptive periods. The pertinent provisions read: Section 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless otherwise provided in such acts, prescribe in accordance with the following rules: (a) x x x; (b) after four years for those punished by imprisonment for more than one month, but less than two years; (c) x x x Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment. The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy. We agree that Act. No. 3326 applies to offenses under B.P. Blg. 22. An offense under B.P. Blg. 22 merits the penalty of imprisonment of not less than thirty (30) days but not more than one year or by a fine, hence, under Act No. 3326, a violation of B.P. Blg. 22 prescribes in four (4) years from the commission of the offense or, if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof. Nevertheless, we cannot uphold the

position that only the filing of a case in court can toll the running of the prescriptive period. It must be pointed out that when Act No. 3326 was passed on 4 December 1926, preliminary investigation of criminal offenses was conducted by justices of the peace, thus, the phraseology in the law, "institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment,"39 and the prevailing rule at the time was that once a complaint is filed with the justice of the peace for preliminary investigation, the prescription of the offense is halted.40 The historical perspective on the application of Act No. 3326 is illuminating.41 Act No. 3226 was approved on 4 December 1926 at a time when the function of conducting the preliminary investigation of criminal offenses was vested in the justices of the peace. Thus, the prevailing rule at the time, as shown in the cases of U.S. v. Lazada42 and People v. Joson,43 is that the prescription of the offense is tolled once a complaint is filed with the justice of the peace for preliminary investigation inasmuch as the filing of the complaint signifies the institution of the criminal proceedings against the accused.44 These cases were followed by our declaration in People v. Parao and Parao45 that the first step taken in the investigation or examination of offenses partakes the nature of a judicial proceeding which suspends the prescription of the offense.46 Subsequently, in People v. Olarte,47 we held that the filing of the complaint in the Municipal Court, even if it be merely for purposes of preliminary examination or investigation, should, and does, interrupt the period of prescription of the criminal responsibility, even if the court where the complaint or information is filed cannot try the case on the merits. In addition, even if the court where the complaint or information is filed may only proceed to investigate the case, its actuations already represent the initial step of the proceedings against the offender,48 and hence, the prescriptive period should be interrupted. In Ingco v. Sandiganbayan49 and Sanrio Company Limited v. Lim,50 which involved violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019) and the Intellectual Property Code (R.A. No. 8293), which are both special laws, the Court ruled that the prescriptive period is interrupted by the institution of proceedings for preliminary investigation against the accused. In the more recent case of Securities and Exchange Commission v. Interport Resources Corporation, et al.,51 the Court ruled that the nature and purpose of the investigation conducted by the Securities and Exchange Commission on violations of the Revised Securities Act,52 another special law, is equivalent to the preliminary investigation conducted by the DOJ in criminal cases, and thus effectively interrupts the prescriptive period. The following disquisition in the Interport Resources case53 is instructive, thus: While it may be observed that the term "judicial proceedings" in Sec. 2 of Act No. 3326 appears before "investigation and punishment" in the old law, with the subsequent change in set-up whereby the investigation of the charge for purposes of prosecution has become the exclusive function of the executive branch, the term "proceedings" should now be understood either executive or judicial in character: executive when it involves the investigation phase and judicial when it refers to the trial and judgment stage. With this

clarification, any kind of investigative proceeding instituted against the guilty person which may ultimately lead to his prosecution should be sufficient to toll prescription.54 Indeed, to rule otherwise would deprive the injured party the right to obtain vindication on account of delays that are not under his control.55 A clear example would be this case, wherein petitioner filed his complaint-affidavit on 24 August 1995, well within the four (4)-year prescriptive period. He likewise timely filed his appeals and his motions for reconsideration on the dismissal of the charges against Tongson. He went through the proper channels, within the prescribed periods. However, from the time petitioner filed his complaint-affidavit with the Office of the City Prosecutor (24 August 1995) up to the time the DOJ issued the assailed resolution, an aggregate period of nine (9) years had elapsed. Clearly, the delay was beyond petitioner's control. After all, he had already initiated the active prosecution of the case as early as 24 August 1995, only to suffer setbacks because of the DOJ's flip-flopping resolutions and its misapplication of Act No. 3326. Aggrieved parties, especially those who do not sleep on their rights and actively pursue their causes, should not be allowed to suffer unnecessarily further simply because of circumstances beyond their control, like the accused's delaying tactics or the delay and inefficiency of the investigating agencies. We rule and so hold that the offense has not yet prescribed. Petitioner 's filing of his complaintaffidavit before the Office of the City Prosecutor on 24 August 1995 signified the commencement of the proceedings for the prosecution of the accused and thus effectively interrupted the prescriptive period for the offenses they had been charged under B.P. Blg. 22. Moreover, since there is a definite finding of probable cause, with the debunking of the claim of prescription there is no longer any impediment to the filing of the information against petitioner. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated 29 October 2004 and 21 March 2005 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The resolution of the Department of Justice dated 9 August 2004 is also ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The Department of Justice is ORDERED to REFILE the information against the petitioner. No costs.

G.R. No. 159703

March 3, 2008

CEDRIC SAYCO y VILLANUEVA, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent. DECISION AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.: Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the May 23, 2003 Resolution1 of the Court Appeals (CA) which affirmed the conviction of Cedric Sayco y Villanueva2 (petitioner) for violation of Section 1, Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1866, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8294; as well as the August 7, 2003 CA Resolution3 which denied his Motion for Reconsideration. The facts are not disputed. Petitioner was charged before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Bais City with illegal possession of firearms under an Information which reads: The undersigned Prosecutor II hereby accuses ZEDRIC SAYCO Y VILLANUEVA of the crime of Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunitions penalized and defined under Section 1 of Presidential Decree Number 1866 as amended by Republic Act Number 8294, committed as follows: That on or about January 3, 1999, at Bais City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously possess and carry away one (1) caliber 9MM marked "SIGSAUER P229" with fourteen (14) live ammunitions and with Serial Number AE 25171, without first having obtained the proper license or authority to possess the same. An act contrary.4 Upon arraignment, petitioner entered a plea of "Not Guilty".5 On August 2, 2002, the MTCC rendered a Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds that the evidence presented has sufficiently established the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The accused Zedric V. Sayco is convicted for violation of Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended by Republic Act No. 8294. There being no modifying circumstances, and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the Court sentences the accused to a prison term ranging from THREE YEARS, SIX MONTHS AND TWENTY DAYS of Prision Correccional Medium as minimum, to FIVE YEARS, FOUR MONTHS and TWENTY DAYS of Prision Correccional Maximum as maximum, and to pay a fine of FIFTEEN

THOUSAND PESOS. The firearm (Exhibit A) and the ammunitions (Exhibit B) are forfeited in favor of the government, to be disposed of in accordance with law. IT IS SO ORDERED.6 On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Bais City issued a Decision dated March 14, 2003, affirming the conviction of petitioner but lowering his penalty as follows: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Judgment dated August 2, 2002 rendered by the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Bais City in Criminal Case No. 99-001 is hereby affirmed in all respects subject only to the modification with respect to the penalty imposed by the trial court. The herein accused-appellant is hereby sentenced to the indeterminate penalty of four (4) months of arresto mayor as maximum [sic] to two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as maximum [sic]. SO ORDERED.7 Petitioner filed with the CA a Petition for Review but the same was denied in the May 23, 2003 CA Resolution assailed herein. Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration8 was also denied by the CA in its August 7, 2003 Resolution. Hence, the present Petition raising the following issues: I Whether the lower court erred in convicting the petitioner for violation of P.D. 1866, as amended by RA 8294, despite the latter's proof of authority to possess the subject firearm. II Whether the prosecution's evidence proved the petitioner's guilt beyond reasonable doubt.9 As summarized by the RTC and MTCC, the evidence for the prosecution consisted of the following: EVIDENCE OF THE PROSECUTION The first prosecution witness in the person of PO3 Mariano Labe testified on January 17, 2002. He declared that on or about 3:35 in the afternoon of January 3, 1999, while they were at the Police Station, they received a telephone call from a concerned citizen from Tavera Street, Bais City, informing them that one unidentified person was inside Abueva's Repair Shop located at Tavera Street, tucking a handgun on his waist. They immediately went to the aforementioned place, and upon their arrival thereat, they saw one unidentified person tucking a handgun on his right side waistline. They approached

the unidentified person and asked him if he had a license to possess said firearm, but the answer was in the negative. At this juncture, they immediately effected the arrest, and confiscated from his possession and custody a Caliber 9MM marked "SIGSAUER P299" with 14 live ammunitions with Serial No. AE 25171. The arrested person was identified as Zedric Sayco y Villanueva, a resident of Binalbagan, Negros Occidental. SPO2 VALENTINO ZAMORA, member of the PNP Bais City, testified on February 26, 2002. He was presented to corroborate the testimony of Mariano Labe. He further declared that during the incident, they talked to the accused in Cebuano, but they found out then that the latter is an Ilonggo, so they spoke to him in English. SPO2 VICENTE DORADO also testified on February 26, 2002. He corroborated the testimony of SPO2 Valentino Zamora and PO2 Mariano Labe. The following exhibits were admitted as part of the evidence of the prosecution: Exhibit A - one (1) 9 mm pistol with serial no. 25171. Exhibit B - fourteen (14) pieces live ammunition and one (1) magazine placed in a black plastic bag. Exhibit C - Joint Affidavit of the police officers.10 (Emphasis supplied) For his defense, petitioner does not deny that he was in possession of the subject firearm and ammunitions when he was apprehended on January 3, 1999 in Bais City, but he insists that he had the requisite permits to carry the same, specifically: 1) Memorandum Receipt for Equipment (Non-expendable Property), which reads: Hqs Field Station 743, 7ISU, ISG, PA, Camp Montelibano Sr., Bacolod City, Philippines, 01 January 1999. I acknowledge to have received from MAJOR RICARDO B. BAYHON (INF) PA, Commanding Officer, FS743, 7ISU, ISG, PA the following property for which I am responsible, subject to the provision of the accounting law and which will be used in the office of FS 7431. QTY 1 2 24 UNIT ea ea ea NAME OF DESCRIPTION Cal 9mm (SIG SAUER) SN: AE 25171 Mags for Cal 9mm pistol Ctgs for 9mm Ammo CLASSI FICATION Pistol UNIT PRICE TOTAL

x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x- NOTHING FOLLOWS -x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-xx-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x

Basis: For use of subject EP in connection with his official duties/mission in the AOR. NOTED BY: APPROVED BY:

Nolasco B. James (SGD) RICARDO B BAYHON SSg (Inf) PA (SGD) FS Supply NCO Major (INF) PA Commanding Officer CA Zedric V. Zayco (SGD) Confidential Agent;11 and 2) Mission Order dated January 1, 1999, thus: Mission Orders Number: FS743-A-241 TO: CA Cedric V. Zayco I. DESTINATION Negros Island II. PURPOSE C O N F I D E N T I A L III. DURATION 01 January 1999 to 31 March 1999 IV. AUTHORIZED ATTIRE/UNIFORM GOA ( ) BDA ( ) Civilian (x) V. AUTHORIZED TO CARRY FIREARMS: (x) Yes ( ) No. Caliber 9mm Make Kind Sig Sauer Pistol Serial Nr AE25171 MR/License Nr ISG Prop Nr Ammo 24 rds

VI. SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS: a. For personnel in uniform, the firearms shall be placed in holster securely attached to the belt. Personnel in uniform without holster and personnel in civilian attire will ensure that their firearms are concealed unless in actual and lawful use. xxxx

RICARDO B. BAYHON (SGD) Major (INF) PA FS 743 Commander12 The RTC and MTCC gave no significance to the foregoing documents. The MTCC held that the Memorandum Receipt and Mission Order do not constitute the license required by law because "they were not issued by the Philippine National Police (PNP) Firearms and Explosives Unit, but by the Commanding Officer of the Philippine Army who is not authorized by law to issue licenses to civilians to possess firearms and ammunitions."13 The RTC added that, as held in Pastrano v. Court of Appeals14and Belga v. Buban,15 said documents cannot take the place of the requisite license.16 The CA wholly concurred with both courts. In the present Petition, petitioner insists that he is a confidential agent of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), and it was in that capacity that he received the subject firearm and ammunitions from the AFP. As said firearm and ammunitions are government property duly licensed to the Intelligence Security Group (ISG) of the AFP, the same could not be licensed under his name;17instead, what he obtained were a Memorandum Receipt and a Mission Order whereby ISG entrusted to him the subject firearm and ammunitions and authorized him to carry the same around Bacolod City. Petitioner further argues that he merely acted in good faith when he relied on the Memorandum Receipt and Mission Order for authority to carry said firearm and ammunitions; thus, it would be a grave injustice if he were to be punished for the deficiency of said documents.18 The Solicitor General filed his Comment,19pointing out that good faith is not a valid defense in the crime of illegal possession of firearms.20 The arguments of petitioner are not tenable. The corpus delicti in the crime of illegal possession of firearms is the accused's lack of license or permit to possess or carry the firearm, as possession itself is not prohibited by law.21 To establish the corpus delicti, the prosecution has the burden of proving that the firearm exists and that the accused who owned or possessed it does not have the corresponding license or permit to possess or carry the same.22 There is no dispute over these key facts: first, that the subject firearm and ammunitions exist; second, that petitioner had possession thereof at the time of his apprehension; third, that petitioner is a confidential agent of the ISG-AFP; fourth, that petitioner lacks a license issued by the Firearms and Explosives Unit of the PNP; and fifth, that petitioner holds a Memorandum Receipt and Mission Order covering the subject firearm and ammunitions. Thus, the issue to be resolved is confined to whether petitioner's Memorandum Receipt and Mission Order constitute sufficient authority for him to possess the subject firearm and ammunitions and carry the same outside of his residence, without violating P.D. No. 1866, as amended by R.A. No. 8294.

As correctly cited by the Solicitor General, it is a settled jurisprudence that a memorandum receipt and mission order cannot take the place of a duly issued firearms license,23 and an accused who relies on said documents cannot invoke good faith as a defense against a prosecution for illegal possession of firearms, as this is a malum prohibitum.24 Petitioner interposed no new argument that would convince this Court to abandon a deep-rooted jurisprudence. However, rather than outrightly dismiss the present petition in the light of existing jurisprudence, this Court finds it opportune to examine the rules governing the issuance of memorandum receipts and mission orders covering government-owned firearms to special and confidential civilian agents, in order to pave the way for a more effective regulation of the proliferation of such firearms and the abatement of crimes, such as extra-judicial killings, attendant to such phenomenon. In 1901, the United States Philippine Commission enacted Act No. 175, providing for the organization of an Insular Constabulary. Section 6 vested in the Chief of the Insular Constabulary the following authority over the distribution of firearms: Section 6. The Insular Chief shall prescribe for the Insular Constabulary suitable arms, uniform, and equipment and shall report to the Commission, through the Civil Governor, his action in this regard, together with a statement of the cost, to the end that appropriation may be made to defray the cost thereof. The guns, revolvers, and ammunitions needed to equip the insular and municipal police shall be purchased by the Insular Purchasing Agent on the order of the Chief of Insular Constabulary, by whom they shall be distributed to the provinces and municipalities as they may be needed. The Chief of the Insular Constabulary shall keep a record of the guns and revolvers distributed, by their numbers, to municipalities and provinces x x x. (Emphasis supplied) Firearms owned by the government may therefore be distributed by the Chief of the Insular Constabulary to the members of the insular and municipal police, with merely a record of the distribution being required. Shortly, the Philippine Commission enacted Act No. 178025 regulating possession of firearms: Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, firm, or corporation, for purposes of sale, to import, buy or otherwise acquire, dispose of, possess, or have the custody of any rifle, musket, carbine, shotgun, revolver, pistol, or air rifle, except air rifles of small caliber and limited range used as toys, or any other deadly weapon x x x unless and until such person, firm, or corporation shall secure a license, pay the license fee, and execute a bond and otherwise comply with the requirements of this Act and the rules and regulations issued in executive orders by the Governor-General pursuant to the provisions of this Act x x x. (Emphasis supplied) but exempted therefrom the following government-owned firearms:

Section 16. The foregoing provisions of this Act shall not apply to firearms and ammunition therefor regularly and lawfully issued to officers, soldiers, sailors, or marines of the United States Army and Navy, the Constabulary, guards in the employ of the Bureau of Prisons, the police force of the City of Manila, provincial prisoners and jails when such firearms are in possession of such officials and public servants for use in the performance of their official duties. (Emphasis supplied) The 1917 Revised Administrative Code26retained the foregoing exemption: Section 879. Exemption as to firearms and ammunition used by military and naval forces or by peace officers. - This article shall not apply to firearms and ammunition regularly and lawfully issued to officers, soldiers, sailors, or marines of the Unites States Army and Navy, the Philippine Constabulary, guards in the employment of the Bureau of Prisons, municipal police, provincial governors, lieutenant governors, provincial treasurers, municipal police, provincial governors, lieutenant governors, provincial treasurers, municipal treasurers, municipal presidents, and guards of provincial prisoners and jails, when such firearms are in possession of such officials and public servants for use in the performance of their official duties. (Emphasis supplied) In People of the Philippines v. Macarandang,27 we interpreted Section 879 of the 1917 Revised Administrative Code as applicable to a secret agent appointed by a governor as said agent holds a position equivalent to that of peace officer or member of the municipal police. We reiterated this ruling in People of the Philippines v. Licera.28 In People v. Asa,29 we acquitted a civilian guard from a charge of illegal possession of firearms on the ground that he acted in good faith in bearing the firearms issued to him by his superior. Two years later, in People v. Mapa,30the Court, speaking through Justice Fernando, overhauled its interpretation of Section 879, thus: The law is explicit that except as thereafter specially allowed, "it shall be unlawful for any person to x x x possess any firearm, detached parts of firearms or ammunition therefor, or any instrument or implement used or intended to be used in the manufacture of firearms, parts of firearms, or ammunition." The next section provides that "firearms and ammunition regularly and lawfully issued to officers, soldiers, sailors, or marines [of the Armed Forces of the Philippines], the Philippine Constabulary, guards in the employment of the Bureau of Prisons, municipal police, provincial governors, lieutenant governors, provincial treasurers, municipal treasurers, municipal mayors, and guards of provincial prisoners and jails," are not covered "when such firearms are in possession of such officials and public servants for use in the performance of their official duties." The law cannot be any clearer. No provision is made for a secret agent. As such he is not exempt. Our task is equally clear. The first and fundamental duty of courts is to apply the law. "Construction and interpretation come only after it has been demonstrated

that application is impossible or inadequate without them." The conviction of the accused must stand. It cannot be set aside. Accused however would rely on People v. Macarandang, where a secret agent was acquitted on appeal on the assumption that the appointment "of the accused as a secret agent to assist in the maintenance of peace and order campaigns and detection of crimes, sufficiently put him within the category of a "peace officer" equivalent even to a member of the municipal police expressly covered by section 879." Such reliance is misplaced. It is not within the power of this Court to set aside the clear and explicit mandate of a statutory provision. To the extent therefore that this decision conflicts with what was held in People v. Macarandang, it no longer speaks with authority.31 (Emphasis supplied) We also abandoned the view that good faith is a defense against a prosecution for illegal possession of firearms.32 On June 29, 1983, P.D. No. 1866 was issued, imposing stiffer penalties on illegal possession of firearms. It also added the following separate requirement for carrying firearms: Section 1. Unlawful manufacture, sale, acquisition, disposition or possession of firearms and ammunition or implements used or intended to be used in the manufacture of firearms or ammunition. - x x x The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall carry any licensed firearm outside his residence without legal authority therefor. xxxx Section 7. Unauthorized issuance of authority to carry firearms and/or ammunition outside of residence. - The penalty of prision correccional shall be imposed upon any person, civilian or military, who shall issue authority to carry firearm and/or ammunition outside of residence without authority therefor. P.D. No. 1866 was later amended by R.A. No. 8294,33 which lowered the imposable penalties for illegal possession of firearm when no other crime is committed. However, neither law amended or repealed Section 879 of the 1917 Revised Administrative Code. Even Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as the 1987 Administrative Code,34 left Section 879 untouched. As matters stand, therefore, Section 879, as construed by this Court in Mapa and Neri, and reinforced by paragraph 6, Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866, as amended by R.A. No. 8294, is still the basic law on the issuance, possession and carrying of government-owned firearms. In exercise of its rule-making authority under Section 835of P.D. No. 1866, the Chief of the Philippine Constabulary issued The Implementing Rules and Regulations of P.D. No. 1866, which includes the following provisions salient to the issuance, possession and carrying of government-owned firearms:

Section 1. Definition of terms. - For purposes of Presidential Decree No. 1866, the following terms shall mean and be interpreted as hereinafter defined: xxxx d. "Mission Order" - is a written directive or order issued by government authority as enumerated in Section 5 hereof to persons who are under his supervision and control for a definite purpose or objective during a specified period and to such place or places as therein mentioned which may entitle the bearer thereof to carry his duly issued or licensed firearm outside of his residence when so specified therein. e. "Permit to Carry Firearm Outside of Residence" - is a written authority issued to any person by the Chief of Constabulary which entitles such person to carry his licensed or lawfully issued firearms outside of residence for the duration and purpose specified therein. f. "Residence" - refers to that place where the firearm and ammunition are being permanently kept. It includes the office or house where they are kept and the premises of the house enclosed by walls and gates separating said premises from adjacent properties. For firearms covered by a regular license or special permit, their residence shall be that specified in the license or permit; and those covered by a Certificate of Registration ora Memorandum Receipt, their residence in the office/station to which the grantee belongs. xxxx Section 5. Authority to issue mission order involving the carrying of firearm. - The following are authorized to issue mission orders with provisions which may entitle the bearer thereof to carry his issued/licensed firearm and ammunition for the duration of such mission: a. For officers, men and regular civilian agents of the Ministry of National Defense (MOND)/Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) including members of the ICHDF: xxxx (8) Provincial commanders, METRODISCOM commanders, company commanders and their equivalent in the Philippine Air Force and Philippine Navy. xxxx Section 6. Specific guidelines in the carrying of firearms outside of residence. - The following specific guidelines shall be strictly observed in the carrying of firearm outside of residence:

a. Lawful Holders of Firearm Lawful holders of firearm (regular licenses, special permit, certificate of registration or M/R) are prohibited from carrying their firearms outside of residence except when they have been issued by the Chief of Constabulary a permit to carry firearm outside of their residence as provided for in Section hereof or in actual performance of duty or official mission under Section 4 and 5 hereof. (Emphasis supplied.) Section 6 (a) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations was later amended to read as follows: a-1. Mission Order. - x x x No Mission Order shall be issued to any civilian agent authorizing the same to carry firearms outside of residence unless he/she is included in the regular plantilla of the government agency involved in law enforcement and is receiving regular compensation for the services he/she is rendering in the agency. Further, the civilian agent must be included in a specific law enforcement/police/intelligence project proposal or special project which specifically requires the use of firearm(s) to insure its accomplishment and that the project is duly approved at the PC Regional Command level or its equivalent level in other major services of the AFP, INP and NBI, or at higher level of command. (Emphasis supplied) The Ministry of Justice also issued Memorandum Circular No. 8 dated October 16, 1986, further strengthening the foregoing Implementing Rules and Regulations, to wit: x x x It is unlawful for any person or office to issue a mission order authorizing the carrying of firearms by any person unless the following conditions are met: 1. That the AFP officer is authorized by the law to issue the mission order. 2. That the recipient or addressee of the mission order is also authorized by the law to have a mission order, i.e., he must be an organic member of the command/unit of the AFP officer issuing the mission order.If mission orders are issued to civilians (not members of the uniformed service), they must be civilian agents included in the regular plantilla of the government agency involved in law enforcement and are receiving regular compensation for services they are rendering. (Emphasis supplied) Earlier, a Letter Directive dated May 19, 198436 was issued to the Chief of Staff of the AFP, prohibiting the issuance of government-owned firearms to civilians, viz: 4. The Implementing Rules and Regulations of P.D. 1866 which codifies all the laws on firearms and explosives clarify the following: xxxx b. Section 5 identifies the officials/officers of the MOND/AFP who are authorized to issue Mission Orders to enable AFP officers, men and regular civilian agents carry their firearms in the performance of their duties. Regular civilian agents are those who are covered by Permanent or Temporary Civil Service attested appointments in the plantilla

of civilian employees. Special or confidential civilian agents or the like are not regular civilian agents and are therefore violating the law when they carry firearms (personal-owned or government-issued) with Mission Orders. c. There are no other laws or AFP regulations authorizing the loan of AFP-owned firearms to private firms and individuals. (Emphasis supplied) It is noted that the Implementing Rules and Regulations of P.D. No. 1866, as amended, allude to "memorandum receipts" covering government-owned firearms. While said rules do not define the term, we can derive its meaning from Section 492 of the Government Auditing and Accounting Manual (Volume I: Government Auditing Rules and Regulations)37 to wit: Section 492. Issues of equipment to officers and employees. - Equipment issued by the property officer for official use of officials and employees shall be covered by Memorandum Receipt for Equipment (MR) which shall be renewed every January of the third year after issue. MRs not renewed after three years shall not be considered in making physical count of the equipment. (Emphasis supplied) From the foregoing discussion, therefore, the rules governing memorandum receipts and mission orders covering the issuance to and the possession and/or carrying of government-owned firearms by special or confidential civilian agents may be synthesized as follows: First, special or confidential civilian agents who are not included in the regular plantilla of any government agency involved in law enforcement or receiving regular compensation for services rendered are not exempt from the requirements under P.D. No. 1866, as amended by R.A. No. 8294, of a regular license to possess firearms and a permit to carry the same outside of residence; Second, said special or confidential civilian agents are not qualified to receive, obtain and possess government-owned firearms. Their ineligibility will not be cured by the issuance of a memorandum receipt for equipment covering said government-owned firearms. Neither will they qualify for exemption from the requirements of a regular firearms license and a permit to carry firearms by the mere issuance to them of a government-owned firearms covered by a memorandum receipt; and Third, said special or confidential civilian agents do not qualify for mission orders to carry firearms (whether private-owned or government-owned) outside of their residence. The foregoing rules do not apply to special or confidential civilian agents in possession of or bearing private-owned firearms that are duly licensed and covered by permits to carry the same outside of residence. Set against the foregoing rules, it is clear that petitioner is not authorized to possess and carry the subject firearm and ammunition, notwithstanding the memorandum receipt and mission order which were illegally issued to him. Petitioner is a planter38 who was recruited to assist in the counter-insurgency campaign of the AFP.39 However, as he offered no evidence that he is in the regular plantilla of the AFP or that he is receiving regular compensation from said agency, he

cannot be considered a regular civilian agent but a mere confidential civilian agent as defined under Section 6(a) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of P.D. No. 1866. As such, he was not authorized to receive the subject government-owned firearm and ammunitions. The memorandum receipt he signed to account for said government properties did not legitimize his possession thereof. Neither was petitioner authorized to bear the subject firearm and ammunitions outside of his residence. The mission order issued to petitioner was illegal, given that he is not a regular civilian agent but a mere confidential civilian agent. Worse, petitioner was not even acting as such confidential civilian agent at the time he was carrying the subject firearm and ammunitions. Petitioner testified that at that time, he was not on an official mission in Bais City but had merely visited the place to attend to a family emergency.40 While this Court sustains the conviction of petitioner for illegal possession of firearms, we reexamine the imprisonment term to which petitioner was sentenced by the RTC, as affirmed by the CA. The MTCC imposed on petitioner the penalty of imprisonment for three (3) years, six (6) months and twenty (20) days of prision correccional medium as minimum, to five (5) years, four (4) months and twenty (20) days of prision correccional maximum as maximum.41 Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the RTC lowered the penalty to four (4) months of arresto mayor as minimum, to two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as maximum.42 The CA affirmed the RTC. A further revision of the penalty is warranted in view of the special provision in the Indeterminate Sentence Law applicable to crimes penalized by a special law, to wit: Section 1. Hereafter, in imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by the Revised Penal Code, or its amendments, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence the maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of the said Code, and the minimum which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense; and if the offense is punished by any other law, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the minimum shall not be less than the minimum term prescribed by the same. (Emphasis supplied) P.D. No. 1866 imposed the penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua for illegal possession of firearms. R.A. No. 8294 lowered the penalty, as follows: Section 1. Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended, is hereby further amended to read as follows: Section 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of Firearms or Ammunition or Instruments Used or Intended to be Used in the Manufacture of Firearms or Ammunition. - The penalty of prision correccional in

its maximum period and a fine of not less than Fifteen thousand pesos (P15,000) shall be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess any low powered firearm, such as rimfire handgun, .380 or .32 and other firearm of similar firepower, part of firearm, ammunition, or machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be used in the manufacture of any firearm or ammunition: Provided, That no other crime was committed. (Emphasis supplied.) Under Article 27 of the Revised Penal Code, prision correccional in its maximum period ranges from four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day, to six (6) years. As prescribed under Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the appropriate penalty that can be imposed on petitioner should keep within said range. Thus, there being no attendant mitigating or aggravating circumstance, and considering that petitioner accepted the subject firearm and ammunitions from the government under the erroneous notion that the memorandum receipt and mission order issued to him legitimized his possession thereof, the appropriate indeterminate penalty is four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day as minimum to five (5) years, four (4) months and twenty-one (21) days as maximum. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. However, for reasons stated in the text of herein Decision, the Resolutions dated May 23, 2003 and August 7, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 27228 together with the Decision dated March 14, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court of Bais City are MODIFIED insofar only as the penalty of imprisonment is concerned. Petitioner Cedric Sayco y Villanueva is sentenced to serve an indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum, to five (5) years, four (4) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision correccional as maximum. SO ORDERED.

VICENTE AGOTE Y MATOL, petitioner, vs. HON. MANUEL F. LORENZO, Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 43, Manila and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. DECISION GARCIA, J.: In this appeal by way of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioner Vicente Agote y Matol seeks to annul and set aside the following resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 2991-UDK, to wit: 1. Resolution dated September 14, 1999,[1] dismissing the Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order filed by the petitioner against the Honorable Manuel F. Lorenzo, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Manila, Branch 43 for refusing to retroactively apply in his favor Republic Act No. 8294[2]; and, 2. Resolution dated February 8, 2000,[3] denying petitioners motion for reconsideration. As culled from the pleadings on record, the following are the undisputed factual antecedents: Petitioner Vicente Agote y Matol was earlier charged before the sala of respondent judge with Illegal Possession of Firearms under Presidential Decree No. 1866[4] and violation of COMELEC Resolution No. 2826[5] (Gun Ban), docketed as Criminal Cases No. 96-149820 and 96-149821, respectively, allegedly committed, as follows: CRIMINAL CASE NO. 96-149820 That on or about April 27, 1996 in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully, knowingly have in possession and under his custody and control, One (1) .38 cal. Rev. without serial no. with four (4) live bullets. Without first having secured from the proper authorities the necessary license therefor. CONTRARY TO LAW. CRIMINAL CASE NO. 96-149821 That on or about April 27, 1996, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his possession and under his custody and control one (1) .38 cal. Rev. without serial number, with four (4) live ammunition/bullets in the chamber, by then and there carrying the same along V. Mapa Ext. Sta. Mesa, this City, which is a public place on the aforesaid date which is covered by an election period, without first securing the written authority from the COMELEC, as provided for by the COMELEC Resolution No. 2828, in relation to RA No. 7166 (Gun Ban). CONTRARY TO LAW.

On arraignment, petitioner pleaded Not Guilty to both charges. Thereafter, the two (2) cases were tried jointly. Eventually, in a decision dated May 18, 1999, the trial court rendered a judgment of conviction in both cases, separately sentencing petitioner to an indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to eighteen (18) years eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, in accordance with PD. No. 1866 in Crim. Case No. 96-149820 (illegal possession of firearm), and to a prison term of one (1) year in Crim. Case No. 96-149821 (violation of the COMELEC Resolution on gun ban). Meanwhile, on June 6, 1997, Republic Act No. 8294[6] was approved into law. Pointing out, among others, that the penalty for illegal possession of firearms under P.D. No. 1866 has already been reduced by the subsequent enactment of Rep. Act No. 8294, hence, the latter law, being favorable to him, should be the one applied in determining his penalty for illegal possession of firearms, petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the May 18, 1999 decision of the trial court. In its order dated July 15, 1999,[7] however, the trial court denied petitioners motion, saying: While the law (R.A. 8294) is indeed favorable to the accused and therefore should be made retroactive we are also guided by Art. 4 of the Civil Code which states that laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided. Republic Act 8294 did not so provide that it shall have a retroactive effect. The Supreme Court likewise in the case of Padilla vs. CA declared: The trial court and the respondent court are bound to apply the governing law at the time of the appellants commission of the offense for it is a rule that laws are repealed only by subsequent ones. Indeed, it is the duty of judicial officers to respect and apply the law as it stands. Therefrom, petitioner went to the Court of Appeals on a petition for certiorari with prayer for a temporary restraining order, thereat docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 2991-UDK. In the herein assailed resolution dated September 14, 1999,[8] the appellate court dismissed petitioners recourse on two (2) grounds, to wit: (a) the remedy of certiorari availed of by petitioner is improper since he should have appealed from the July 15, 1999 order of the trial court; and (b) lack of jurisdiction, as the issue involved is a pure question of law cognizable by the Supreme Court. With his motion for reconsideration having been denied by the appellate court in its subsequent resolution of February 8, 2000,[9] petitioner is now with us, submitting for resolution the following issues: (1) whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing his petition for certiorari; and (2) whether the courts below erred in not giving Rep. Act No. 8294 a retroactive application. The petition is partly meritorious.

At the outset, it must be stressed that petitioner never put in issue the factual findings of the trial court. What he questions is said courts legal conclusion that Rep. Act No. 8294 cannot be retroactively applied to him. Unquestionably, the issue raised is one purely of law. As we have said in Macawiwili Gold Mining and Development Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals:[10] For a question to be one of law, the same must not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any one of them. And the distinction is well-known: there is a question of law in a given case when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain state of facts; there is a question of fact when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or the falsehood of the facts alleged. Considering that judgments of regional trial courts in the exercise of their original jurisdiction are to be elevated to the Court of Appeals in cases when appellant raises questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law, while appeals from judgments of the [same courts] in the exercise of their original jurisdiction must be brought directly to the Supreme Court in cases where the appellant raises only questions of law[11], petitioner should have appealed the trial courts ruling to this Court by way of a petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended,[12] pursuant to Rule 41, Section 2 (c) of the same Rules, viz: SEC. 2. Modes of appeal. (a) xxx xxx xxx (b) xxx xxx xxx (c) Appeal by certiorari. In all cases where only questions of law are raised or involved, the appeal shall be to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45. By reason, then, of the availability to petitioner of the remedy of a petition for review under Rule 45, his right to resort to a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 was effectively foreclosed, precisely because one of the requirements for the availment of the latter remedy is that there should be no appeal, or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law,[13] the remedies of appeal and certiorari being mutually exclusive and not alternative or successive.[14] As correctly observed by the Court of Appeals, what petitioner should have done was to take an appeal from the trial courts order of July 15, 1999 which denied his motion for reconsideration of the May 18, 1999 judgment of conviction. Petitioners case is worse compounded by the fact that even his period for appeal had already prescribed when he filed with the Court of Appeals his certiorari petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 2991-UDK. The Rollo of said case reveals that petitioner received his copy of the trial courts order denying his motion for reconsideration on July 20, 1999. As the same Rollo shows, it was

only on August 23, 1999, or after more than fifteen (15) days when petitioner filed his wrong remedy of certiorari with the appellate court. Be that as it may, the Court feels that it must squarely address the issue raised in this case regarding the retroactivity of Rep. Act No. 8294, what with the reality that the provisions thereof are undoubtedly favorable to petitioner. For this purpose, then, we shall exercise our prerogative to set aside technicalities in the Rules and hold the bull by its horns, so to speak. After all, the power of this Court to suspend its own rules whenever the interest of justice requires is not without legal authority or precedent. In Solicitor General, et. al. vs. The Metropolitan Manila Authority,[15] we held: Unquestionably, the Court has the power to suspend procedural rules in the exercise of its inherent power, as expressly recognized in the Constitution, to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts. In proper cases, procedural rules may be relaxed or suspended in the interest of substantial justice, which otherwise may be miscarried because of a rigid and formalistic adherence to such rules. xxx xxx xxx xxx

We have made similar rulings in other cases, thus: Be it remembered that rules of procedure are but mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must always be avoided. xxx Time and again, this Court has suspended its own rules and excepted a particular case from their operation whenever the higher interests of justice so require. We shall now proceed to determine whether the provisions of Rep. Act No. 8294 amending P.D. No. 1866 can be retroactively applied to this case. Here, the two (2) crimes for which petitioner was convicted by the trial court, i.e., (1) illegal possession of firearms under P.D. No. 1866 and (2) violation of COMELEC Resolution No. 2826 on gun ban, were both committed by the petitioner on April 27, 1996. For the crime of illegal possession of firearms in Crim. Case No. 96-149820, he was sentenced to suffer a prison term ranging from ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to (18) eighteen years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, in accordance with P.D. No. 1866, Section 1 of which reads: SECTION 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of Firearms or Ammunition or Instruments Used or Intended to be Used in the Manufacture of Firearms of Ammunition. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess any firearm, part of firearm, ammunition or machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be used in the manufacture of any firearm or ammunition. (Emphasis supplied)

When Rep. Act No. 8294 took effect on July 6, 1997,[16] the penalty for illegal possession of firearms was lowered, depending on the class of firearm possessed, viz: SECTION 1. Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended, is hereby further amended to read as follows: SECTION 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of Firearms or Ammunition or Instruments Used or Intended to be Used in the Manufacture of Firearms or Ammunition. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period and a fine of not less than Fifteen thousand pesos (P15,000) shall be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess any low powered firearm, such as rimfire handgun, .380 or .32 and other firearm of similar firepower, part of firearm, ammunition, or machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be used in the manufacture of any firearm or ammunition: Provided, That no other crime was committed. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period and a fine of Thirty thousand pesos (P30,000) shall be imposed if the firearm is classified as high powered firearm which includes those with bores bigger in diameter than .38 caliber and 9 millimeter such as caliber .40, .41, .44, .45 and also lesser calibered firearms but considered powerful such as caliber .357 and caliber .22 center-fire magnum and other firearms with firing capability of full automatic and by burst of two or three: Provided, however, That no other crime was committed by the person arrested. (Emphasis supplied) Based on the foregoing, petitioner contends that the reduced penalty under Rep. Act No. 8294 should be the one imposed on him. Significantly, in its Manifestation In Lieu of Comment,[17] the Office of the Solicitor General agrees with the petitioner, positing further that the statement made by this Court in People vs. Jayson[18] to the effect that the provisions for a lighter penalty under Rep. Act No. 8294 does not apply if another crime has been committed, should not be applied to this case because the proviso in Section 1 of said law that no other crime was committed must refer only to those crimes committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm and not when the other crime is not related to the use thereof or where the law violated merely criminalizes the possession of the same, like in the case of election gun ban, as here. As early as August 1997, the month after Rep. Act No. 8294 took effect,[19] this Court has pronounced in Gonzales vs. Court of Appeals[20] that said law must be given retroactive effect in favor of those accused under P.D. No. 1866. Since then, this Court had consistently adhered to the Gonzales ruling.[21] For sure, in People vs. Valdez,[22] where the accused was charged with the complex crime of multiple murder with double frustrated murder and illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions under two separate informations, this Court even took a bolder stance by applying Rep. Act No. 8294 retroactively so that the accused therein may not be convicted of the separate crime of illegal possession of firearms, but refused to apply the same retroactively so as to aggravate the crime of murder. The Valdez ruling had been applied in a host of subsequent cases.[23]

Yet, in other cases,[24] although the Court had given Rep. Act No. 8294 retroactive effect so as to prevent the conviction of an accused of the separate crime of illegal possession of firearm when the said unlicensed firearm was used to commit the crime of murder or homicide, the Court did not appreciate this use of such unlicensed firearm as an aggravating circumstance as provided therein, when the use of an unlicensed firearm was not specifically alleged in the information, as required by the Rules on Criminal Procedure. In the light of the existing rulings and jurisprudence on the matter, the present case takes center stage presenting, this time, another twist, so to speak. Petitioner, who was charged of illegal possession of firearms was also charged of another offense: Violation of COMELEC Resolution No. 2826 (Gun Ban), but the unlicensed firearm was not used or discharged in this case. The question then which appears to be of first impression, is whether or not the unlicensed firearm should be actually used and discharged in the course of committing the other crime in order that Sec. 1, Rep. Act No. 8294 will apply so that no separate crime of illegal possession of firearms may be charged. Let us take a look at the jurisprudence once again. In Cupcupin vs. People,[25] the accused was charged and convicted for two (2) separate crimes of illegal possession of firearms, and illegal possession of prohibited drugs. In the more recent case of People vs. Almeida,[26] however, although the accused was acquitted of the separate charge of illegal possession of firearm for lack of evidence, the Court nevertheless made the following clear pronouncement: Furthermore, in any event, the Court has ruled in previous cases that in view of the enactment of Republic Act No. 8294, there can be no separate offense of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition if there is another crime committed such as, in this case, that of illegal possession of dangerous drugs. (Emphasis supplied) In Almeida, it should be noted that the unlicensed firearm was merely found lying around, together with the prohibited drugs, and therefore, was not being used in the commission of an offense. Given this Courts aforequoted pronouncement in Almeida, can the accused in the present case still be separately convicted of two (2) offenses of illegal possession of firearms and violation of gun ban, more so because as in Almeida, the unlicensed firearm was not actually used or discharged in committing the other offense? In People vs. Walpan M. Ladjaalam,[27] this Court, interpreting the subject proviso in Section 1 of Rep. Act No. 8294, applied the basic principles in criminal law, and categorically held: xxx A simple reading thereof shows that if an unlicensed firearm is used in the commission of any crime, there can be no separate offense of simple illegal possession of firearms. Hence, if the other crime is murder or homicide, illegal possession of firearms becomes merely an aggravating circumstance, not a separate offense. Since direct assault with multiple attempted homicide was committed in this case, appellant can no longer be held liable for illegal possession of firearms.

Moreover, penal laws are construed liberally in favor of the accused. In this case, the plain meaning of RA 8294s simple language is most favorable to herein appellant. Verily, no other interpretation is justified, for the language of the new law demonstrates the legislative intent to favor the accused. Accordingly, appellant cannot be convicted of two separate offenses of illegal possession of firearms and direct assault with attempted homicide. xxx xxx xxx xxx

xxx The law is clear: the accused can be convicted of simple illegal possession of firearms, provided that no other crime was committed by the person arrested. If the intention of the law in the second paragraph were to refer only to homicide and murder, it should have expressly said so, as it did in the third paragraph. Verily, where the law does not distinguish, neither should we.(Emphasis supplied). The aforementioned ruling was reiterated and applied in the subsequent cases of People vs. Garcia,[28] where the judgment of conviction of the accused-appellants for illegal possession of firearms was set aside there being another crime kidnapping for ransom which they were perpetrating at the same time; People vs. Bernal,[29] where the Court retroactively applied Rep. Act No. 8294 in accused-appellants favor because it would mean his acquittal from the separate offense of illegal possession of firearms; and People vs. Bustamante,[30] where, in refusing to convict the accused-appellant of the separate offense of illegal possession of firearms, the Court declared that insofar as it is favorable to the appellant, the provisions of Rep. Act No. 8294 should be applied liberally and retroactively in that appellant must be acquitted of the charge of illegal possession of firearms. Guided by the foregoing, the Court cannot but set aside petitioners conviction in Criminal Case No. 96-149820 for illegal possession of firearm since another crime was committed at the same time, i.e., violation of COMELEC Resolution No. 2826 or the Gun Ban. Admittedly, this ruling is not without misgivings considering that it would mean petitioners acquittal of the more serious offense of illegal possession of firearms which carries a much heavier penalty than violation of the COMELEC gun-ban resolution. However, as we have rationalized in Ladjaalam:[31] xxx Indeed, the accused may evade conviction for illegal possession of firearms by using such weapons in committing an even lighter offense, like alarm and scandal or slight physical injuries, both of which are punishable by arresto menor. This consequence, however, necessarily arises from the language of RA 8294, whose wisdom is not subject to the Courts review. Any perception that the result reached here appears unwise should be addressed to Congress. Indeed, the Court has no discretion to give statutes a new meaning detached from the manifest intendment and language of the legislature. Our task is constitutionally confined only to applying the law and jurisprudence to the proven facts, and we have done so in this case. The solemn power and duty of the Court to interpret and apply the law does not include the power to correct by reading into the law what is not written therein. While we understand respondent Peoples contention that the use of the firearm seemed to have been the main

consideration during the deliberations of the subject provision of Rep. Act No. 8294, the fact remains that the word use never found its way into the final version of the bill which eventually became Rep. Act No. 8294. The Courts hands are now tied and it cannot supply the perceived deficiency in the final version without contravening the most basic principles in the interpretation of penal laws which had always leaned in favor of the accused. Under our system of government where powers are allocated to the three (3) great branches, only the Legislature can remedy such deficiency, if any, by proper amendment of Sec. 1 of Rep. Act No. 8294. As written, Sec. 1, Rep. Act No. 8294 restrains the Court from convicting petitioner of the separate crime of illegal possession of firearm despite the fact that, as in Almeida, the unlicensed firearm was not actually used. For sure, there is, in this case, closer relation between possession of unlicensed firearm and violation of the COMELEC gun-ban than the illegal possession of unlicensed firearm to the crime of illegal possession of prohibited drugs in Almeida. WHEREFORE, Criminal Case No. 96-149820 for illegal possession of firearms is hereby DISMISSED while the judgment of conviction in Criminal Case No. 96-149821 for violation of COMELEC Resolution No. 2826 in relation to Rep. Act No. 7166 (Gun Ban), is AFFIRMED. Since petitioner has already served more than the penalty imposed upon him by the trial court in Criminal Case No. 96-149821, his immediate release from custody is hereby ORDERED unless detained for some other lawful cause. SO ORDERED.

.R. No. 84857 January 16, 1998 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RODOLFO DELA ROSA Y AVILES, ANTONIO DELA ROSA Y AVILES, and RODOLFO QUIMSON Y NAVA (At large), accused-appellants.

PUNO, J.: Rodolfo dela Rosa y Aviles appeals the decision of the Regional Trial Court, First Judicial Region, Branch 38, Lingayen, Pangasinan, convicting him of illegal possession of firearms and explosives and imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua. 1 On January 27, 1987, an information for illegal possession of firearms and explosives was filed against RODOLFO DELA ROSA y AVILES, ANTONIO DELA ROSA y AVILES, CRESENCIO REYES y DELA CRUZ and RODOLFO QUIMSON y NAVA, to wit:
That on or about the 9th of December 1986, in sitio (sic) Kadampat, Barangay Bolo, municipality (sic) of Labrador, province (sic) of Pangasinan, New Republic of the Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovementioned accused, conspiring, confederating and helping one another, did then and there wilfully (sic), unlawfully and feloniously have in their possession, custody and control three (3) homemade gauge 12 shotguns and fourteen (14) pieces of dynamite explosives, without first securing the necessary permit/license to possess the same. Contrary to Presidential Decree No. 1866.
2

All accused pleaded not guilty when arraigned on February 3, 1987. On March 12, 1987, the four accused withdrew their plea of not guilty and substituted it with a plea of guilt. After ascertaining that the plea of guilt was not made improvidently, the lower court imposed upon them the corresponding penalty. 3 However, on March 19, 1987, the four (4) accused filed a motion withdrawing their plea of guilt. 4 The lower court granted the motion in a resolution dated March 25, 1987. 5 Thereafter, trial proceeded. However, accused Cresencio Reyes changed his mind again and pleaded guilty to a lesser offense punishable under the last paragraph of Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866. The court accepted the plea and sentenced him accordingly. He was utilized as a witness by the prosecution. The trial proceeded against the three remaining accused. The prosecution established that in the morning of December 9, 1986, Rodolfo dela Rosa, Antonio dela Rosa, Cresencio Reyes and Rodolfo Quimson, surrendered to Kagawad Valeriano Rigor of Sitio Kadampat, Bolo, Labrador, Pangasinan claiming they want to lead a new life. They informed him that Benjamin Nano, alias Kumander Tamang, a member of the New People's Army (NPA), was shot by one of them. The four had with them a short shotgun (Exhibit A) and a bag containing several sticks of dynamite (Exhibit C to C-7). 6 Kagawad Rigor offered them breakfast and afterwards

went to the police station to report the presence of four (4) surrenderees in his house. At the police station, Patrolman Gasline Fernandez recorded the report in the police blotter. Cpl. Crispin Cancino, the station commander, brought along several policemen and proceeded to the house of Kagawad Rigor. When the group arrived, only Kagawad Rigor and Cpl. Cancino entered the house. The other policemen stayed outside to secure the area. Inside the house, Kagawad Rigor introduced the surrenderees to Cpl. Cancino and showed him the short shotgun (Exhibit A) and the bag (Exhibit C to C-7) containing several sticks of dynamite. Then, all accused, except Rodolfo Quimson, who was left behind to guide the police in recovering the body of Kumander Tamang, were brought to the Philippine Constabulary (PC) Headquarters in Lingayen . In Lingayen, they proceeded at the municipal building and called on Mayor Calixto Pancho. The surrenderees had their picture taken with Mayor Pancho and Kagawad Rigor. Afterwards, they were brought to the police headquarters, where their statements were taken by Cpl. Arsenio Paragas and Cpl. Cipriano Castillo. 7 Meanwhile, the charred body of Benjamin Nano was recovered by the police in Sitio Tebel Patar. 8 The following day, Cresencio Reyes informed the police that there were firearms left buried in Sitio Tebel Patar. Reyes pointed to the hiding place which was covered by banana leaves. When the banana leaves were removed, the police unearthed two (2) long barreled shotguns (Exhibits B and D). 9 On the other hand, the three accused contend they were recruited by Kumander Tamang on different dates. Accused Rodolfo dela Rosa testified that he first saw Kumander Tamang on October 28, 1986 at a relative's wake. Kumander Tamang asked him whether he owned a piece of land. He said he did not, for he was only a sawali maker. Kumander Tamang then convinced him to join the New People's Army (NPA). He told Kumander Tamang he would think it over. On November 1, 1986, Kumander Tamang went to his house and reiterated his offer to him. Cresencio Reyes was with Kumander Tamang at that time. Reyes was carrying a bag (Exhibit C) while Kumander Tamang had a shotgun (Exhibit A). On November 10, 1986, Kumander Tamang went to his house and succeeded in persuading him to join the NPA. Kumander Tamang brought him at a hideout in the mountains of Sitio Tebel Patar, Labrador, Pangasinan. On the evening of November 14, 1986, Rodolfo dela Rosa, Kumander Tamang and Cresencio Reyes, descended the mountains and proceeded to the house of Antonio dela Rosa, who was Rodolfo's cousin. At that time, Kumander Tamang was carrying a shotgun (Exhibit A) while Reyes was carrying a bag (Exhibit C). When they arrived at said place, Kumander Tamang and Reyes entered the house and stayed inside for ten (10) minutes. When the two came out, dela Rosa was with them. All of them headed for the mountains afterwards. On November 20, 1986, Rodolfo dela Rosa, Kumander Tamang Cresencio Reyes and Antonio dela Rosa went to the house of Rodolfo Quimson. Again, only Kumander Tamang and Reyes entered Quimson's house. They stayed inside for 15 minutes. When the two came out, Quimson was with them. Afterwards, they returned to their hideout in the mountains. 10

On December 8, 1986, at 10:00 o'clock in the morning, Kumander Tamang called them to a meeting. Kumander Tamang took the bag (Exhibit C) which Reyes always carries and opened it. The bag yielded several sticks of dynamite. Kumander Tamang told them that at five o'clock in the afternoon they would go down Sitio Kadampat and assassinate Kagawad Rigor. 11 He then instructed them on how to use the explosives. After the meeting, they returned to their hut and rested. At two o'clock in the afternoon, they heard a gunshot from the hut of Kumander Tamang. They rushed outside and saw Reyes holding Kumander Tamang's shotgun. He announced that Kumander Tamang was dead. He told them it would be better to surrender themselves to the authorities. He ordered them to gather the shotgun and the sticks of dynamite while he set on fire Kumander Tamang's hut. At five o'clock in the afternoon, they descended the mountains and headed towards Sitio Kadampat. At 7:00 a.m., the following day, they reached the house of Kagawad Rigor. They saw the Kagawad sitting by himself on a bench outside his house. Only Reyes approached the Kagawad, so as not to frighten him. The three others waited by the roadside. After five (5) minutes, Reyes signalled the three to approach the house. Kagawad Rigor let them inside the house and offered them breakfast. Reyes placed the shotgun and the bag on top of the dining table. Kagawad Rigor then left the house and went to the police station. 12 He returned with several policemen. At first, the policemen pointed their guns at the accused but Kagawad Rigor told them there was no need for they were surrendering themselves to the authorities. Kagawad Rigor then showed the policemen the shotgun and the bag containing the sticks of dynamite. The policemen took all the surrenderees to the Municipal Hall, except Rodolfo Quimson, who was left behind, to lead the police to Kumander Tamang' s body. At the Municipal Hall, Mayor Calixto Pancho greeted and congratulated them for coming back to the fold of law. They had their picture taken with Mayor Pancho and Kagawad Rigor. Afterwards, they were brought to the police headquarters. When an investigator started to question them, they asked for a lawyer to assist them but the investigator said they would not need one for they were surrenderees and would soon be freed. Hence, they gave their subscribed statements to the police. After their statements were taken, the police took them back to the police station in Labrador, where they were detained. On January 5, 1987, they were transferred to the provincial jail in Lingayen. They denied ever seeing the two (2) long firearms (Exhibits C and D) which were recovered in Sitio Tebel Patar. They saw said firearms for the first time when the prosecution presented them as exhibits during the trial. 13 When trial concluded, the lower court convicted the three (3) accused. Antonio dela Rosa did not appeal 14 while Rodolfo Quimson escaped 15 from the National Bilibid Prisons (NBP) where he was detained after the lower court convicted him. Only Rodolfo dela Rosa appealed contending that: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT RODOLFO DELA ROSA GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS AND EXPLOSIVES, DEFINED AND PENALIZED UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1866. We find merit in the appeal.

It is undisputed that accused-appellant Rodolfo dela Rosa and his companions were the ones who surrendered the subject firearm (Exhibit A) and explosives (Exhibit C to C-7) to Kagawad Rigor. However, Rodolfo dela Rosa denies that he was in possession of said ammunitions in the manner punishable by law. According to him, his real intention was merely to turn over the ammunitions, which were owned by Kumander Tamang, to the authorities. The trial court perceived otherwise. It declared that since Rodolfo dela Rosa joined the New People's Army (NPA), there is reason to conclude that he provided himself with arms such as Exhibits A, B, C to C-7 and D. 16 And since mere possession is sufficient to convict a person for crimes which are malum prohibitum like illegal possession of firearms, appellant dela Rosa must be convicted. It is of no moment that he surrendered the ammunitions to the authorities. We fail to see how appellant dela Rosa could be convicted of illegal possession of firearms based on the above reasoning. Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866 punishes any person who shall ". . . unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose or possess any firearms, part of firearm, ammunition, or machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be used in the manufacture of any firearm or ammunition." (emphasis supplied) 17 Broken down into its salient elements, illegal possession of firearms is committed when the holder thereof: (i) possesses a firearm; and (ii) lacks the authority or license to possess it. 18 In People v. de Gracia 19, we clarified the meaning of possession for the purpose of convicting a person under PD 1866, thus:
But, is the mere fact of physical or constructive possession sufficient to convict a person for unlawful possession of firearms or must there be an intent to possess to constitute a violation of the law? This query assumes significance for illegal possession of firearms is a malum prohibitum, punished by a special law, in which case good faith and absence of criminal intent are not valid defenses. When a crime is punished by a special law, as a rule, intent to commit the crime is not necessary, it is sufficient that the offender has the intent to perpetrate the act prohibited by the special law. Intent to commit the crime and intent to perpetrate the act must be distinguished. A person may not have consciously intended to commit a crime but he intended to commit an act, and that act is by the very nature of things, the crime itself. In the first (intent to commit the crime), there must be criminal intent; in the second (intent to perpetrate the act) it is enough that the prohibited act is done freely and consciously. In the present case, a distinction should be made between criminal intent and intent to possess. While mere possession without criminal intent, is sufficient to convict a person for illegal possession of a firearm, it must still be shown that there was animus possidendi or an intent to possess on the part of the accused. Such intent to possess is, however, without regard to any other criminal or felonious intent which the accused may have harbored in possessing the firearm. Criminal intent here refers to the intention of the accused to commit an offense with the use of an unlicensed firearm. This is not important

in convicting a person under Presidential Decree No. 1866. Hence, in order that one may be found guilty of a violation of the decree, it is sufficient that the accused had no authority or license to possess a firearm, and that he intended to possess the same, even if such possession was made in good faith and without criminal intent.

In the early case of People v. Estoista 20 , we held that a temporary, incidental, casual, or harmless possession of firearms is not punishable. We stated therein that:
The terms "control" and "dominion" themselves are relative terms not susceptible of exact definition, and opinions on the degree and character of control or dominion sufficient to constitute a violation vary. The rule laid down in the United States courts rule which we here adopt is that temporary, incidental, casual or harmless possession or control of a firearm is not a violation of a statute prohibiting the possessing or carrying of this kind of weapon. A typical example of such possession is where "a person picks up a weapon or hands it to another to examine or hold for a moment."

Also, in People v. Remereta 21, where the question posed was whether an accused who stole a firearm could simultaneously be prosecuted for theft and illegal possession of firearms, we held that transient possession is not sufficient to convict one under the latter crime, thus:
While in stealing a firearm the accused must necessarily come into possession thereof, the crime of illegal possession of firearms is not committed by mere transient possession of the weapon. . . . Thus, stealing a firearm with intent not to use but to render the owner defenseless, may suffice for purposes of establishing a case of theft, but would not justify a charge for illegal possession of firearm, since intent to hold and eventually use the weapon would be lacking.

Hence, the kind of possession punishable under PD No. 1866 is one where the accused possessed a firearm either physically or constructively with animus possidendi or intention to possess the same. 22 It is not enough that the firearm was found in the person of the accused who held the same temporarily and casually or for the purpose of surrendering the same. Admittedly, animus possidendi is a state of mind. As such, what goes on into the mind of an accused, as his real intent, could be determined solely based on his prior and coetaneous acts and the surrounding circumstances explaining how the subject firearm came to his possession. 23 Thus, in People v. Leo Lian 24, we rejected the argument of the accused that the charge against him should be dismissed because there was no animus possidendi on his part. In said case, the accused contended that he was on his way to the municipal hall to surrender the firearm when he met some of his friends. He then forgot about the firearm, until the police officer unceremoniously seized the same from him, affording him no chance to surrender it himself. In rejecting accused-appellant's claim, Justice Regalado wrote that:
. . . , the Court finds it hard to believe that appellant still had to hide the firearm in his waist before setting out to surrender it to the authorities when he could have taken the gun to the town hall in the same bag in which he found it, in which case it would have been safer and would have avoided detection. In fine, the indispensable elements of

possession without the necessary authority or license and the corresponding attendance of animus possidendi have both been convincingly established by the prosecution to warrant appellant's conviction . . . .

That animus possidendi is determinable from the prior and simultaneous acts of the accused is further exemplified while accused by People v. Lubo. 25 In this case, while accused-appellant pleaded lack of animus possidendi, his conduct belied the same. Accused-appellant Lubo was found to have secured a "temporary license" for the subject firearm. Under such circumstance, we held that accused-appellant intended to possess the subject firearm beyond reasonable doubt. Coming now to the case before us it is undisputed that the police officers never really arrested Rodolfo dela Rosa, for the truth of the matter was that there was no need for such arrest. Dela Rosa and his companions had surrendered the ammunitions to Kagawad Rigor even before the police arrived. In fact, the police learned of the surrender because Kagawad Rigor reported it to the police station in Labrador. This is in contrast to People v. Leo Lian, where appellant Lian merely feigned intention to surrender the firearm which the police found in his possession . In the case at bar, appellant dela Rosa's intention to surrender the ammunitions was very clear from the beginning and he was able to execute the same. Corollarily, the Office of the Solicitor General's contention that dela Rosa was in constructive possession of the ammunitions is irrelevant for possession whether physical or constructive without animus possidendi is not punishable. Dela Rosa's possession was harmless, temporary and only incidental for the purpose of surrendering the ammunitions to the authorities. Consequently, the prosecution failed to establish the first element of animus possidendi. Similarly, the records are bereft of sufficient proof that Rodolfo dela Rosa possessed the ammunitions without authority to do so. Except for the preliminary examination of Pfc. Cipriano P. Castillo conducted by Municipal Circuit Trial Judge Benjamin N. Abella, 26 the prosecution offered no other evidence during the trial which showed lack of license. In the preliminary examination, the only relevant question asked by the judge was:
JUDGE ABELLA. Q: Did you or the Stn. Commander ask or verify whether any or all of the above-named suspects have any license to possess the abovementioned firearms and explosives? A: Yes, sir. But they stated that they have no license to possess any of the firearms and explosives which were recovered from their possession, control and custody.

The Office of the Solicitor General offers the extrajudicial statement of accused Rodolfo dela Rosa 27 that Kumander Tamang supplied him with explosives and dynamite in furtherance of subversive activities. 28 According to the Solicitors, the extrajudicial statement is sufficient to prove that the firearms were illegally possessed. The

presumption is erroneous. Aside from the fact that dela Rosa repudiated the extrajudicial statement because it was uncounselled 29 , the same did not contain any admission that he had no license to possess the firearm. And, even if it had contained an admission that he had no license, it still would not have sufficed. In People v. Solayao 30, the prosecution relied only on the testimonial evidence that accused-appellant admitted before the police officer who accosted him that he did not have any authority or license to carry the subject firearm when he was asked if he had one. In acquitting the accused-appellant, we stressed that the prosecution has the burden of proving beyond reasonable doubt the lack of license which is a negative averment. 31 The burden is in consonance with the evidentiary rule that "when a negative is averred in a pleading, or a plaintiff's case depends upon the establishment of a negative, and the means of proving the fact are equally within the control of each party, then the burden of proof is upon the party averring the negative." 32 More importantly, the burden placed on the shoulders of the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt the lack of license is premised on the constitutional presumption of innocence of the accused. 33 Thus, in People v. Solayao, this Court suggested that the prosecution could have, at the very least, presented a certification from the Firearms and Explosives Unit that the accused did not have the license to the gun. But, an extrajudicial admission of the accused, solely, will not suffice. The Office of the Solicitor General contends that for accused-appellant to join the New People's Army and stay in the mountains without arming themselves is highly improbable. Thus, there is reason to believe that they illegally possessed the ammunitions to further their subversive activities even prior to surrendering them to the authorities. We reiterate that mere suspicion will not prove the prosecution's case in court. In a prosecution under Presidential Decree No. 1866, it is incumbent on the Government to prove both elements of the crime: (1) that the accused possessed the firearm and (2) that he had not first obtained a license or permit from the appropriate authorities. 34 As always, mere speculations and probabilities cannot substitute for proof required to establish the guilt of an accused beyond reasonable doubt . The rule is the same whether the offenses are punishable under the Revised Penal Code which are mala in se or in crimes which are malum prohibitum by virtue of special law. 35 We find that such quantum of proof was not adequately presented in this case. IN VIEW WHEREOF, accused-appellant Rodolfo dela Rosa is acquitted in Criminal Case No. L-3616. His immediate release from the National Bilibid Prisons (NBP) is ordered, except if charged and detained for other offenses. SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. WALPAN LADJAALAM y MIHAJIL alias WARPAN, appellant. DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:

Republic Act No. 8294 penalizes simple illegal possession of firearms, provided that the person arrested committed no other crime. Furthermore, if the person is held liable for murder or homicide, illegal possession of firearms is an aggravating circumstance, but not a separate offense. Hence, where an accused was convicted of direct assault with multiple attempted homicide for firing an unlicensed M-14 rifle at several policemen who were about to serve a search warrant, he cannot be held guilty of the separate offense of illegal possession of firearms. Neither can such unlawful act be considered to have aggravated the direct assault.
The Case

Walpan Ladjaalam y Mihajil, also known as Warpan, appeals before us the September 17, 1998 Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Zamboanga City (Branch 16), which found him guilty of three out of the four charges lodged against him. Filed against appellant were four Informations, all signed by Assistant Regional State Prosecutor Ricardo G. Cabaron and dated September 25, 1997. The first Information was for maintaining a den for the use of regulated drugs. It reads as follows: That on or about September 24, 1997, in the City of Zamboanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Walpan Ladjaalam being then the owner of a residential house located at Rio Hondo, this City, conspiring and confederating together, mutually aiding and assisting x x x his co-accused wife Nur-in Ladjaalam and Ahmad Sailabbi y Hajaraini, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, maintain said house as a den, where regulated drug [was] used in any form. The second Information charged appellant with illegal possession of firearms and ammunition. We quote it below: That on or about September 24, 1997, in the City of Zamboanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together, mutually aiding and assisting with one another, without any justifiable reason or purpose other than to use it in the commission of crime, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously have in their possession and under their custody and control, the following weapons, to wit: one (1) M14 rifle with SN 1555225 with magazines and seven (7) rounds of live ammunition; two (2) magazines with twenty (20) and twenty[-one] (21) rounds of live [ammunition]; one (1) homemade caliber .38 revolver with five (5) live ammunition; one (1) M79 (single) rifle with pouch and with five (5) empty shell[s]; one (1) home made caliber .38 with SN-311092 with five live ammunition and one empty shell of [a] cal. 38 x x x Smith and Wesson; two (2) .38 Caliber paltik revolver with Serial Number 311092 and one defaced M79

grenade launcher paltik, without first having obtained the necessary license and or permit therefor from authorities concerned, in flagrant violation of the aforementioned law. The third Information, for multiple attempted murder with direct assault, was worded thus: That on or about September 24, 1997, in the City of Zamboanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused being then armed with M-14 Armalite Rifles, M-16 Armalite Rifles and other assorted firearms and explosives, conspiring and confederating together, mutually aiding and assisting x x x one another and with intent to kill, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously try and attempt to kill SPO1 WILLIAM B. JONES, JR., PO3 ENRIQUE C. RIVERA[,] SPO1 AMADO A. MIRASOL, JR., and SPO1 RICARDO J. LACASTESANTOS, in the following manner, to wit: by then and there firing their M-14 x x x Armalite Rifles, M-16 Armalite Rifles and other assorted firearms and explosives, aimed and directed at the fatal parts of the bodies of the above-named police officers, well known to the accused as members of the Philippine National Police, Zamboanga City Police Office, and as such, agents of a person in authority, who at the time of the attack were engaged in the performance of their duties, that is, on the occasion when said officers were about to serve the Search Warrant legally issued by the Regional Trial Court, this City, to the person of the accused thus commencing the commission of crime of multiple murder directly by overt acts, and if the accused did not accomplish their unlawful purpose, that is, to kill the above-named Police Officers, it was not by reason of their own voluntary desistance but rather because of the fact that all the above-named police officers were able to seek cover during the firing and were not hit by the bullets and explosives fired by the accused and also by the fact said police officers were able to wrestle with two (2) of the accused namely: Walpan Ladjaalam y Mihajil a.k.a. Warpan and Ahmad Sailabbi y Hajairani, who were subdued and subsequently placed under arrest; whereas accused PO2 Nurhakim T. Hadjula was able to make good his escape and has remained at-large. In the fourth Information, appellant was charged with illegal possession of drugs. On December 21, 1997, the cases against Nur-in Ladjaalam and Ahmad Sailabbi y Hajaraini were dismissed upon motion of the Office of the City Prosecutor, which had conducted a reinvestigation of the cases as ordered by the lower court. The accused were consequently released from jail. The arraignment of appellant on all four (4) charges took place on January 6, 1998, during which he entered a plea of not guilty. After pretrial, the assailed Decision was rendered, the dispositive part of which reads: WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused WALPAN LADJAALAM y MIHAJIL a.k.a. WARPAN 1. in Criminal Case No. 14636, GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of Violation of Section 15-A, Article III, of Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended, and SENTENCES said accused to the penalty of RECLUSION

PERPETUA and to pay a fine of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND (P500,000.00) and to pay the costs; 2. In Criminal Case No. 14637, NOT GUILTY of Violation of Section 16, Article III, in relation to Section 21, Article IV, of Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended, and ACQUITS him of said crime with costs de oficio; 3. in Criminal Case No. 14638, GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of the crime of Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunition penalized under Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended by Republic Act. No. 8294, and SENTENCES said accused to suffer an indeterminate penalty of SIX (6) YEARS of prision correccional as minimum to EIGHT (8) YEARS of prision mayor as maximum and to pay a fine [of] THIRTY THOUSAND (P30,000.00) and pay the costs; 4. in Criminal Case No. 14639, GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of the crime of Direct Assault with Multiple Attempted Homicide and SENTENCES said accused to an indeterminate penalty of TWO (2) YEARS and FOUR (4) MONTHS of prision correccional as minimum to SIX (6) YEARS of prision correccional as maximum and to pay a fine of ONE THOUSAND (P1,000.00) and to pay the costs. (emphasis in the original) Hence, this appeal.
The Facts Prosecutions Version

In its Brief, the Office of the Solicitor General presents the facts in this wise: At 1:45 p.m. of September 24, 1997, PO3 Allan Marcos Obut filed an application for the issuance of a search warrant against appellant, his wife and some John Does (Exh. C). After the search warrant was issued about 2:30 p.m. of the same day, a briefing was conducted inside the office of the Anti-Vice/Narcotics Unit of the Zamboanga City Police Office in connection with the service of the search warrant. The briefing was conducted by SPO2 Felipe Gaganting, Chief of the Anti-Vice/Narcotics Unit. During the briefing, PO3 Renato Dela Pea was assigned as presentor of the warrant. SPO1 Ricardo Lacastesantos and PO3 Enrique Rivera were designated to conduct the search. Other policemen were assigned as perimeter guards (TSN, March 3, 1998, pp. 33-36). After the briefing, more than thirty (30) policemen headed by Police Superintendent Edwin Soledad proceeded to the house of appellant and his wife at Rio Hondo on board several police vehicles (TSN, March 4, 1998, p. 32; April 22, 1998, p. 54). Before they could reach appellants house, three (3) persons sitting at a nearby store ran towards the house shouting, [P]olice, raid, raid (Ibid., March 3, 1998, pp. 41, 43-44; April 23, 1998, p. 4). When the policemen were about ten (10) meters from the main gate of the house, they were met by a rapid burst of gunfire coming from the second floor of the house. There was also gunfire at the back of the house (Ibid., March 5, 1998, pp. 14-16).

SPO1 Mirasol, SPO2 Lacastesantos, PO3 Rivera, and PO3 Dela Pea who were with the first group of policemen saw appellant fire an M14 rifle towards them. They all knew appellant. When they were fired upon, the group, together with SPO2 Gaganting, PO3 Obut and Superintendent Soledad, sought cover at the concrete fence to observe the movements at the second floor of the house while other policemen surrounded the house (Ibid., March 4, 1998, pp. 50-51). In front of the house was an extension building connected to the concrete fence (Ibid., pp. 4546, 57-59, 73-76). Gaganting, Mirasol, Lacastesantos, Gregorio, and Obut entered the door of the extension building. Gaganting opened the main (steel) gate of the house. The other members of the team then entered. Lacastesantos and Mirasol entered the house through the main door and went inside the sala of the ground floor while other policemen surrounded the house. Two (2) old women were in the sala together with a young girl and three (3) children. One of the old women took the children to the second floor while the young girl remained seated at the corner (Ibid., pp. 19-21). Lacastesantos and Mirasol proceeded to the second floor where they earlier saw appellant firing an M14 rifle at them through the window. While they were going upstairs, appellant noticed their presence. He went inside the bedroom and, after breaking and removing the jalousies, jumped from the window to the roof of a neighboring house. Seeing this, Mirasol rushed downstairs and asked help from the other members of the raiding team to arrest appellant. Lacastesantos went to the second floor and shouted to the policemen outside not to fire in the direction of the second floor because there were children. Mirasol and SPO1 Cesar Rabuya arrested appellant at the back of his house after a brief chase (Ibid., pp. 21-23). At the second floor, Lacastesantos saw an M14 rifle (Exh. B-3) with magazine on top of the sofa at the sala on the second floor (Ibid., P. 27). The rifle bore Serial No. 1555225. He removed the magazine from the rifle and the bullet inside the chamber of the rifle. He counted seventeen (17) live ammunition inside the magazine. He saw two (2) more M14 rifle magazines on the sofa, one with twenty (20) live ammunition (Exh. G-3) and another with twenty-one (21) live ammunition (Exh. G-4). He likewise saw three (3) M16 rifle magazines (Exh. G-2) in a corner at the second floor (TSN, March 5, 1998, pp. 23-32, 53-57). After Lacastesantos and Mirasol entered appellants house, Rivera, Dela Pea, Gregorio and Obut followed and entered the house. After identifying themselves as members of the PNP AntiVice/Narcotics Unit, Obut presented to the old women a copy of the search warrant. Dela Pea and Rivera then searched appellants room on the ground floor in the presence of Punong Barangay Elhano (TSN, March 3, 1998, pp. 41-43). On top of a table was a pencil case (Exh. J) with fifty (50) folded aluminum foils inside (Exhs. J-1 to J-50), each containing methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. Other items were found during the search, namely, assorted coins in different denominations (Exh. W; TSN, April 28, 1998, pp. 23-25), one (1) homemade .38 caliber revolver (Exh. B-2) with five (5) live [ammunition], one (1) M79 single rifle with [a] pouch containing five (5) empty shells of an M79 rifle (Exh. B-4), and one (1) empty shell of an M14 rifle (TSN, April 23, 1998, pp. 30-32).

Rino Bartolome Locson was an informer of the Anti-Vice/Narcotics Unit of the Zamboanga Police. [O]n the morning of September 24, 1997, he was instructed by SPO2 Gaganting to go to appellants house to buy shabu. Locson knew appellant as a seller of shabu (TSN, April 22, 1998, p. 5) and had been to appellants house about fifteen (15) times before. He went to Rio Hondo and arrived at appellants house at 3:20 p.m. He bought P300.00 worth of shabu from appellant. The latter got three (3) decks of shabu from his waist bag. Appellant instructed Locson to go behind the curtain where there was a table. There were six (6) persons already smoking. There was a lighted kerosene lamp made of a medicine bottle placed on the table. They asked Locson to smoke shabu and Locson obliged. He placed the three (3) decks of shabu he bought on the table (Ibid., pp. 8-15). While they were smoking shabu, Locson heard gunfire coming from appellants house. They all stood and entered appellants compound but were instructed to pass [through] the other side. They met appellant at the back of his house. Appellant told them to escape because the police are already here. They scampered and ran away because there were already shots. Locson jumped over the fence and ran towards the seashore. Upon reaching a place near the Fisheries School, he took a tricycle and went home (Ibid., pp. 17-19). The following day, September 25, 1997, he went to the police station and executed an affidavit (Exh. M) narrating what transpired at appellants house [o]n the afternoon of September 24, 1997. After the search and before returning to the police station, P03 Dela Pea prepared a Receipt for Property Seized (Exh. P & 3) listing the properties seized during the search. The receipt was signed by Dela Pea as the seizure officer, and by Punong Barangay Hadji Hussin Elhano and radio reporter Jun Cayona as witnesses. A copy of the receipt was given to appellant but he refused to acknowledge the properties seized (TSN, April 23, 1998, pp. 11-12). An examination conducted by Police Inspector Mercedes D. Diestro, Forensic Chemist of the PNP Crime Laboratory Service Office 9, on the paraffin casts taken from both hands of appellant yielded positive for gunpowder nitrates (Exh. A-3), giving rise to the possibility that appellant had fired a gun before the examination (TSN, March 3, 1998, p. 11). Gunpowder residue examinations conducted on September 26, 1997 showed that the following firearms were fired (Exh. B-5): a .38 caliber revolver (homemade) with Serial No. 311092 (Exh. B-1), another .38 caliber revolver (homemade) without a serial number (Exh. B-2), a Cal. 7.62 mm M14 U.S. rifle with Serial No. 1555225 (Exh. B-3), and an M79 rifle without a serial number (Exh. B-4). They were fired within five (5) days prior to the examination (TSN, March 3, 1998, pp. 16-21). With respect to the crystalline substances, an examination conducted by Police Inspector Susan M. Cayabyab, likewise a Forensic Chemist of the PNP Crime Laboratory Service Office 9, on the fifty (50) pieces of folded aluminum foils each containing white crystalline granules with a total weight of 1.7426 grams (Exh. J-1 to J-50) yielded positive results for the presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) (Exh. L). However, the examination of one (1) crystalline stone weighing 83.2674 grams (Exh. K) yielded negative results for the presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride (Exh. L).

The records of the Regional Operation and Plans Division of the PNP Firearm and Explosive Section show that appellant had not applied/filed any application for license to possess firearm and ammunition or x x x been given authority to carry [a] firearm outside of his residence (Exh. X)
Defenses Version

Appellant Ladjaalam agrees with the narration of facts given by the lower court. Hence, we quote the pertinent parts of the assailed Decision: Accused Walpan Ladjaalam y Mihajil a.k.a. Warpan, 30 years old, married, gave his occupation as smuggling (tsn, p. 2, May 4, 1998). He used to go to Labuan in Malaysia and bring cigarettes to the Philippines without paying taxes (tsn, pp. 40-41, id). He said that his true name [was] Abdul Nasser Abdurakman and that Warpan or Walpan Ladjaalam [was] only his alias. However, he admitted that more people kn[e]w him as Walpan Ladjaalam rather than Abdul Nasser Abdurakman (tsn. pp. 39-40; 46-47, id). He testified that [o]n the afternoon of September 24, 1997, when he was arrested by the police, he was sleeping in the house of Dandao, a relative of his wife. He was alone. He slept in Dandaos house and not in his house because they ha[d] a sort of a conference as Dandaos daughter was leaving for Saudi Arabia. He noticed the presence of policemen in his neighborhood at Aplaya, Rio Hondo when he heard shots. He woke up and went out of the house and that was the time that he was arrested. He said he was arrested xxx [at] the other side of my house; at the other side of the fence where I was sleeping. xxx. At the back of my house (tsn, p. 7, id.). He does not know who arrested him considering that the one who arrested me does not have nameplate. He was arrested by four (4) persons. Not one of those who arrested him testified in Court. He was handcuffed and placed inside a jeep parked at Rio Hondo Elementary School. According to him, he did not fire a gun at the policemen from [t]he second floor of his house. He said the policemen [were] the one[s] who fire[d] at us (tsn, p. 5, id.). If he fired a gun at the policemen for sure they [would] die [b]ecause the door is very near x x x the vicinity of my house. He does not own the M14 rifle (Exh. B-3) which according to policemen, he used in firing at them. The gun does not belong to him. He does not have a gun like that (tsn, p. 15, id.). A policeman also owns an M14 rifle but he does not know the policeman (tsn, pp. 16-17, id). He said that the M79 rifle (Exh. B-4), the three (3) empty M16 rifle magazines (Exh. G; G-1 to G-2), the two (2) M14 magazines with live ammunition (Exh. G-3; G-4); the two (2) caliber .38 revolvers (Exhs. B-1; B-2), the fifty (50) aluminum foils each containing shabu (Exhs. J-1 to J-50) placed inside a pencil case (Exh. J, the assorted coins placed inside a blue bag (Exh. W) and the white crystalline stone (Exh. K) all do not belong to him. He said that the policemen just produced those things as their evidence. The firearms do not belong to him. They were brought by the policemen (tsn, p. 43, May 4, 1998). Regarding the blue bag containing assorted coins, he said: that is not ours, I think this (is) theirs, xxx they just brought that as their evidence (tsn, pp. 15-24, id.) Walpan Ladjaalam declared there were occupants who were renting his extension house. He affirmed that he owns that house. Four (4) persons were staying in the extension house. He could only recognize the husband whose name is Momoy. They are from Jolo. They left the place already because they were afraid when the police raided the place. (tsn, pp. 8-10, May 4, 1998). He does not know prosecution witness Rino Locson y Bartolome. Although Locson recognized

him, in his case he does not know Locson and he does not recognize him (tsn, p.11, id). He did not sell anything to Locson and did not entertain him. He is not selling shabu but he knows for a fact that there are plenty of person who are engaged in selling shabu in that place, in that area known as Aplaya, Rio Hondo. One of them is Hadji Agbi (tsn, pp.11-14, id). After his arrest Walpan Ladjaalam was brought to the police station where he stayed for one day and one night before he was transferred to the City jail. While at the police station, he was not able to take a bath. He smokes two packs of cigarette a day. While he was at the police station, he smoked [a] cigarette given to him by his younger sister. He lighted the cigarettes with [a] match. From the police station, he was brought to the PNP Regional Office at R.T. Lim Boulevard where he was subject to paraffin examination (tsn, pp. 24-26, May 4, 1998). During the raid conducted on his house, his cousin Boy Ladjaalam, Ating Sapadi, and Jecar (Sikkal) Usman, the younger brother of his wife were killed. Walpan Ladjaalam said that he saw that it was the policeman who shot them[,] only I do not know his name. They were killed at the back of his house. He said that no charges were filed against the one responsible for their death (tsn, pp. 30-33- May 4, 1998). Anilhawa Ahamad, more or less 80 years old, a widow was in the house of Walpan Ladjaalam whom he calls Hadji Id at the time the police raided the house. She is the mother of Ahma Sailabbi. She was together with Babo Dandan, two small children and a helper when soldiers entered the house. (W)hen they arrived, they kept on firing (their guns) even inside the house (tsn, p.5, May 5, 1998). They were armed with short and long firearms. They searched the house and scattered things and got what they wanted. They entered the room of Walpan Ladjaalam. They tried to open a bag containing jewelry. When Anilhawa tried to bring the bag outside the room, they grabbed the bag from her and poked a gun at her. At that time Walpan Ladjaalam was not in the house. Ahamad Sailabbi was also not in the house. A Search Warrant was shown to Anilhawa after the search was conducted and just before the policemen left the place. Anilhawa Ahamad said that it was already late in the afternoon[;] before they left that was the time the Search Warrant (was) given to us by xxx Barangay Captain Hussin Elhano (tsn, pp.6-8, May 5, 1998). Barangay Chairman Elhano arrived already late in the afternoon, almost sundown (tsn, p. 9, id). Anilhaw declared that aside from a bag containing jewelry and a bag full of money, she had not seen anything else that was taken from Walpan Ladjaalams house (tsn, pp. 9-12, id). Akmad (Ahmad) Sailabbi, 37 years old, married testified that about 4:00 oclock [o]n the afternoon of September 24, 1997, ha was standing in front of his house when policemen arrived and immediately arrested him. He was about to go to the City Proper to buy articles he was intending to bring to Sabah. He had around P50,000.00 placed inside a waist bag tied around his waist. The policemen told him to lie down in prone position and a policeman searched his back. They pulled his waist bag and took his DiaStar wrist watch. He was shot three times and was hit on the forehead leaving a scar. His injury was not treated. He was taken to the police station where he was detained for one day and one night. He was detained at the City Jail for three months and five days after which he was released (tsn, pp. 25-29, May 5, 1998). Melba Usma, 20 years old, a widow, testified that [o]n the afternoon of September 24, 1997, she was in the house of her parents lying together with her husband Sikkal Usma. There is only

one house between her parents house and the house of Walpan Ladjaalam. Her husband Sikkal Usman is the brother of Nur-in Ladjaalam, Walpans wife. When Melba heard shots, she went downstairs. A policeman was looking for her husband. The policeman called her husband. When her husband went down, he was instructed by the policeman to lie down in prone position. Then the policeman shot her husband. The policeman had two other companions who also shot her husband while he was lying down in prone position (tsn, pp.2-7, May 5, 1998). Murkisa Usman, 30 years old, married, declared that [o]n the afternoon of September 24, 1997, she was sitting at the door of her house watching her children playing when a motorcyle, driven by a person, stopped near her house. The driver was Gaganting whom she called a soldier. He went down from his motorcycle, pulled a gun and poked it at Murkisa. Murkisa stood up and raised her hands. She got her children and when she was about to enter the room of her house, Gaganting again poked a gun at her and there was a shot. As a result of firing, three persons died, namely, Sikkal Usman, Boy Ladjaalam and Atip Sapali Sali (tsn, pp. 8-10, May 5, 1998). Barangay Captain Hadji Hussin Elhano, 51 years old, testified that about 4:00 o clock [o]n the afternoon of September 24, 1997, he was fetched by two policemen at Catabangan where he was attending a seminar. Because of traffic along the way, they arrived at the Rio Hondo already late in the afternoon. He saw policemen were already inside the house. Upon entering the gate, he saw Walpan at the gate already handcuffed. Walpan called him but the police advised him not to approach Walpan. The search was already over and things were already taken inside the house. When he went inside the house, he saw the things that they (policemen) searched, the firearms and the shabu (tsn, p. 17. May 8, 1998). He did not see the Search Warrant. What was shown to him were the things recovered during the search which were being listed. They were being counted and placed on a table. Upon seeing the things that were recovered during the search, I just signed the receipt (Exh. P; P-1) of the things x x x taken during the search (tsn, pp. 17-18. May 8, 1998). He saw three dead bodies at the side of the fence when he went to the other side of the house. The three persons were killed outside the fence of Walpan Ladjaalam (tsn, p. 18, id).
The Trial Courts Ruling

The trial court observed that the house of appellant was raided on September 24, 1997 by virtue of Search Warrant No. 20 issued on the same day. However, the lower court nullified the said Warrant because it had been issued for more than one specific offense, in violation of Section 3, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court. The court a quo ruled: It should be stated at the outset that Search Warrant No. 20 is totally null and void because it was issued for more than one specific offense x x x contrary to Section 3, Rule 1[2]6 of the Rules of Court which provides that A search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense xxx. In Tambasan vs. People, 246 SCRA 184 (1995), the Supreme Court ruled that a search warrant for more than one offense - a scatter shot warrant violates Section 3, Rule 126 of the [R]evised Rules of Court and is totally null and void.
(emphasis in the original)

Nevertheless, the trial court deemed appellants arrest as valid. It emphasized that he had shot at the officers who were trying to serve the void search warrant. This fact was established by the

testimonies of several police officers, who were participants in the raid, and confirmed by the laboratory report on the paraffin tests conducted on the firearms and appellant. Additionally, the judge noted that Appellant Ladjaalam, based on his statements in his Counter Affidavit, impliedly contradicted his assertions in open court that there had been no exchange of gunfire during the raid. The trial court concluded that the testimonies of these officers must prevail over appellants narration that he was not in his house when the raid was conducted. Prescinding from this point, the court a quo validated the arrest of appellant, reasoning thus: Under the circumstances, the policemen had authority to pursue and arrest Walpan Ladjaalam and confiscate the firearm he used in shooting at the policemen and to enter his house to effect said arrest and confiscation of the firearm. Under Rule 113, Section 5 (a), of the Rules of Court, A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person xxx (w)hen in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. An offense is committed in the presence or within the view of an officer, within the meaning of the rule authorizing an arrest without a warrant, when the officer sees the offense, although at a distance, or hears the disturbances created thereby and proceeds at once to the scene thereof. At the time the policemen entered the house of accused Walpan Ladjaalam after he had fired shots at the policemen who intended to serve the Search Warrant to him, the accused was engaged in the commission of a crime, and was pursued and arrested after he committed the crime of shooting at the policemen who were about to serve the Search Warrant. As a consequence of the legal arrest, the seizure of the following was also deemed valid: the M14 rifle (with a magazine containing seventeen live ammunition) used by appellant against the police elements, two M14 magazines, and three other M16 rifle magazines. The trial court observed that these items were in plain view of the pursuing police officers. Moreover, it added that these same items were evidence [of] the commission of a crime and/or contraband and therefore, subject to seizure since appellant had not applied for a license to possess firearm and had not been given authority to carry firearm outside his residence. For being incredible and unsupported by evidence, appellants claim that the items that were seized by the police officers had been planted was disbelieved by the trial court. It ruled that if the police officers wanted to plant evidence to incriminate him, they could have done so during the previous raids or those conducted after his arrest. To its mind, it was unbelievable that they would choose to plant evidence, when they were accompanied by the barangay chairman and a radio reporter who might testify against them. It then dismissed these allegations, saying that frame-up, like alibi, was an inherently weak defense. The trial court also convicted the accused of the crime of maintaining a drug den. It reasoned as follows: The testimony of Rino Bartolome Locson, corroborated by SPO1 Ricardo Lacastesantos and SPO1 Amado Mirasol, Jr. clearly established that Walpan Ladjaalam operated and maintained a drug den in his extension house where shabu or methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug, was sold, and where persons or customers bought and used shabu or methamphetamine hydrochloride by burning the said regulated drug and sniffing its smoke with the use of an

aluminum foil tooter. A drug den is a lair or hideaway where prohibited or regulated drugs are used in any form or are found. Its existence [may be] proved not only by direct evidence but may also be established by proof of facts and circumstances, including evidence of the general reputation of the house, or its general reputation among police officers. The uncorroborated testimony of accused Walpan Ladjaalam a.k.a. Warpan that he did not maintain an extension house or a room where drug users who allegedly buy shabu from him inhales or smokes shabu cannot prevail over the testimonies of Locson, SPO1 Lacastesantos, and SPO1 Mirasol. He admitted that he is the owner of the extension house but he alleged that there were four (4) occupants who rented that extension house. He knew the name of only one of the four occupants who are allegedly from Jolo, a certain Momoy, the husband. Aside from being uncorroborated, Walpans testimony was not elaborated by evidence as to when or for how long was the extension house rented, the amount of rental paid, or by any other document showing that the extension house was in fact rented. The defense of denial put up by accused Walpan Ladjaalam a.k.a. 'Warpan is a weak defense. Denial is the weakest defense and cannot prevail over the positive and categorical testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. Denials, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are negative and self-serving evidence which deserve no weight in law and cannot be given evidentiary weight over the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters. As between the positive declaration of the prosecution witnesses and the negative statements of the accused, the former deserve more credence. In conclusion, the trial court explained appellants liability in this manner: x x x. The act of the accused in firing an M14 rifle to the policemen who were about to enter his house to serve a search warrant constitutes the crime of direct assault with multiple attempted homicide[,] not multiple attempted murder with direct assault[,] considering that no policeman was hit and injured by the accused and no circumstance was proved to qualify the attempted killing to attempted murder. The accused Walpan Ladjaalam a.k.a. Warpan cannot be held liable [for] the crime of Violation of Section 16, Article III, in relation to Section 21, Article IV, of Republic Act 6425 otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1992, as amended, because the fifty (50) pieces of folded aluminum foils having a total weight of 1.7426 grams all containing methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu allegedly found in his house are inadmissible as evidence against him considering that they were seized after [a] search conducted by virtue of Search Warrant No. 20 which is totally null and void as it was issued for more than one offense, and were not found in plain view of the police officers who seized them. Neither could the accused be held liable for illegal possession of firearms and ammunition except for the (1) M14 rifle with Serial Number 1555225 and with magazine containing fifteen (15) live ammunition and two more M14 rifle magazines with twenty (20) and twenty-one (21) live ammunition respectively considering that the policemen who recovered or seized the other firearms and ammunition did not testify in court. The blue bag containing assorted coins cannot be returned to the accused Walpan Ladjaalam a.k.a. Warpan because according to the accused the blue bag and assorted coins do not belong to him[;] instead the said assorted coins should be turned over to the National Treasury.
The Issues

In his Brief, appellant submits the following Assignment of Errors: I The trial court erred when it concluded that appellant Walpan Ladjaalam y Mihajil [had] fired first at the police officers who went to his house to serve a search warrant upon him which led to an exchange of fire between Ladjaalam and the police officer. II The trial court erred when it denied the appellant the right and opportunity for an ocular inspection of the scene of the firefight and where the house of the appellant [was] located. III The trial court erred when it ruled that the presumption of regularity in the performance of their duties [excluded] the claim of the appellant that the firearms and methamphetamine hydrochloride (i.e. shabu) were planted by the police. In the interest of simplicity, we shall take up these issues seriatim: (a) denial of the request for ocular inspection, (b) credibility of the prosecution witnesses, and (c) the defense of frame-up. In addition, we shall also discuss the proper crimes and penalties to be imposed on appellant.
The Courts Ruling

The appeal has no merit.

First Issue: Denial of Request for Ocular Inspection

Appellant insists that the trial court erred in denying his request for an ocular inspection of the Ladjaalam residence. He argues that an ocular inspection would have afforded the lower court a better perspective and an idea with respect to the scene of the crime. We do not agree. We fail to see the need for an ocular inspection in this case, especially in the light of the clear testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. We note in particular that the defense had even requested SPO1 Amado Mirasol Jr. to sketch the subject premises to give the lower court a fairly good idea of appellants house. Viewing the site of the raid would have only delayed the proceedings. Moreover, the question whether to view the setting of a relevant event has long been recognized to be within the discretion of the trial judge. Here, there is no reason to disturb the exercise of that discretion.
Second Issue: Credibility of Prosecution Witnesses

Appellant, in essence, questions the credibility of the prosecution witnesses. Suffice it to state that the trial courts assessment of their credibility is generally accorded respect, even finality. After carefully examining the records and finding no material inconsistencies to support

appellants claim, we cannot exempt this case from the general rule. Quite the contrary, the testimonies of these witnesses positively showed that appellant had fired upon the approaching police elements, and that he had subsequently attempted to escape. SPO1 Amado Mirasol Jr. testified thus: PROSECUTOR NUVAL: Q: And, this trail is towards the front of the house of the accused? A: Yes. Q: And its there where you were met by a volley of fire? A: Yes, Your Honor. COURT: Q: How far were you from the concrete fen[c]e when you were met by a volley of fire? ... You said you were fired upon? A: More or less, five (5) meters. xxxxxxxxx PROSECUTOR NUVAL: Q: Now, you said you were able to enter the house after the gate was opened by your colleague Felipe Gaganting ... I will reform that question. Q: Who opened the gate Mr. Witness? A: SPO2 Felipe Gaganting, Efren Gregorio and Allan Marcos Obut. Q: And, at that time you were hiding at the concrete fence? A: Yes. Q: Now, when this gate was opened, you said you went inside the house, right? A: Yes. Q: What did you see inside the house? A: I, together with SPO1 Ricardo Lacastesantos, entered the main door of the house of Walfran [sic] Ladjaalam at the ground floor. We went inside the sala on the ground floor of his house[;] I saw two old woman.

xxxxxxxxx PROSECUTOR NUVAL: Q: Now, what did you do with these two old women? A: I did not mind those two old women because those two women were sitting on the ground floor. I was concentrating on the second floor because Ladjaalam was firing towards our group so, I, together with Ricardo Lacastesantos, went upstairs to the second floor of the house. Q: Were you able to go to the second floor of the house? A: Yes. Q: What happened when you were already on the second floor? A: While we were proceeding to the second floor, Walfan [sic] Ladjaalam, noticed our presence and immediately went inside the bedroom [o]n the second floor and he went immediately and jumped from the window of his house x x x leading to the roof of the neighbors house. xxxxxxxxx COURT: Reform. That is leading Q: What happened when you entered and he jumped to the roofing of the neighbors house? A: Immediately, I myself, we immediately went downstairs and asked the assistance of the members of the raiding team to arrest Walfan Ladjaalam. xxxxxxxxx PROSECUTOR NUVAL: Q: Were you able to go down? A: Yes. Q: What happened when you were there? A: We immediately went out and I asked the assistance of the members of the raiding team and the investigator of the unit especially SPO1 Cesar Rabuya. I was able to manage to arrest Walfan Ladjaalam.

What happened thereafter was narrated by Senior Police Officer Ricardo Lacastesantos, as follows: Q: What did you notice [o]n the second floor? A: I went where the firing came from, so, I saw [an] M14 rifle and I shouted from the outside, do not fire at the second floor because there [are] a lot of children here. Q: Now, that rifle you said [was an] M14, where did you find this? A: At the sala set. Q: This sala set where is this located? A: Located [on] the second floor of the house. Q: Is there a sala [o]n the second floor? A: Yes. Q: Can you still identify that M14 rifle which you said you recovered from the sale set? A: Yes. Q: Why can you identify that? A: The Serial No. of M14 is 1555225 and I marked it with my initial. Q: Now, I have here M14 rifle[;] will you please tell us where is the Serial No. of this? A: 1555225 and I put my initial, RJL. FISCAL NUVAL: This is already marked as our Exhibit B-3 with magazine, one magazine and seven round [ammunition]. Q: After recovering this, what did you do with this firearm? A: When I recovered it I removed the bullets inside the chamber[.] I removed the magazine and I turned it over to the investigator. Q: Where did you turn it over? A: At the crime scene.

Q: Now, that magazine, can you still identify this? A: Yes. Q: Why? A: I put x x x markings. xxxxxxxxx COURT: So, a[si]de from the magazine attached to the M14 rifle you found six more magazines? A: Yes, so, all in all six magazines, three empty M16 rifle magazines and three M14. Q: The M16 magazines [were] empty? A: Empty. Q: How about the M14? A: Found with [ammunition]. xxxxxxxxx Q: So, where are the three M16 magazines? A: In the corner. Q: What did you do with [these] three magazines of M16? A: I turned [them] over to the investigator. Q: Can you identify them? A: Yes, because of my initials[.] Q: Where are your initials? A: On the magazines. Q: RJL? A: RJL.

These were confirmed by the results of the paraffin tests conducted on appellant and on the weapons seized during the raid. Both of his hands as well as the weapons, particularly the M-14 which he had used, were positive for gunpowder nitrate. Police Inspector Mercedes DelfinDiestro explained in open court: Q: Okay. Now, what was the result of your examination, Madam Witness? A: The result of the examination [was] that both hands of the subject person, ha[d] presence of gun powder nitrates. Q: What do you mean Madam Witness, what does that indicate? A: It indicates there is presence of powder nitrates. Q: Can we conclude that he fired a gun? A: I cannot conclude that he fired a gun because there are so many circumstances [why] a person [would be] positive on his hands for gun powder nitrates. Q: But, most likely, he fired a gun? A: Yes. xxxxxxxxx PROSECUTOR NUVAL: Q: What about, Madam Witness this Exhibit B-3, which is the M14 rifle. What did you do with this? A: SPO3 Abu did the swabbing both in the chamber and the barrel wherein I observed there [were] black and traces of brown residue on the bolt, chamber and in the barrel. Q: And, that indicates Madam Witness...? A: It indicates that the gun was fired. Q: Recently? A: Because of the traces of brown residue, it could be possible that the gun was fired before the incident x x x. COURT: Q: There is also black residue?

A: Yes. Q: What does it indicate? A: It indicates that the firearm was recently fired. Q: And, where is this swab used at the time of the swabbing of this Exhibit? A: This one. PROSECUTOR NUVAL: May we ask that this be marked as Exhibit B-3-A. COURT: Q: The firing there indicates that the gun was recently fired, during the incident? A: Yes. Q: And also before the incident it was fired because of the brown residue? A: Yes, Your Honor. (emphasis supplied) Duly proven from the foregoing were the two elements of the crime of illegal possession of firearms. Undoubtedly, the established fact that appellant had fired an M-14 rifle upon the approaching police officers clearly showed the existence of the firearm or weapon and his possession thereof. Sufficing to satisfy the second element was the prosecutions Certification stating that he had not filed any application for license to possess a firearm, and that he had not been given authority to carry any outside his residence. Further, it should be pointed out that his possession and use of an M-14 rifle were obviously unauthorized because this weapon could not be licensed in favor of, or carried by, a private individual.
Third Issue: Defense of Frame-up

From the convoluted arguments strewn before us by appellant, we gather that the main defense he raises is frame-up. He claims that the items seized from his house were planted, and that the entire Zamboanga police force was out to get him at all cost. This Court has invariably held that the defense of frame-up is inherently weak, since it is easy to fabricate, but terribly difficult to disprove. Absent any showing of an improper motive on the part of the police officers, coupled with the presumption of regularity in the performance of their duty, such defense cannot be given much credence. Indeed, after examining the records of this case, we conclude that appellant has failed to substantiate his claim. On the contrary, his statements in his Counter Affidavit are inconsistent with his testimony during the trial. He testified thus:

Q Now, Mr. Witness, do you remember having executed an Affidavit/ a Counter-Affidavit? A I could not remember. Q I have here a Counter-Affidavit and it was signed before this representation on the 8th day of December 1997[;] tell us whose signature is this appearing above the typewritten name FISCAL NUVAL: Q . . . . Walpan Ladjaalam, whose signature is this? (Showing) A Yes, Sir. This is mine. Q Now, in paragraph[s] 1,2,3,4,5,6,7 and 8; you stated in this Counter-Affidavit which I quote: that I was resting and sleeping when I heard the gunshots and I noticed that the shots were directed towards our house.. and I inspected and x x x we were attacked by armed persons.. and I was apprehended by the persons who attacked x x x our house; [the] house you are referring to [in] this paragraph, whose house [are you] referring to, is this [what] you are referring to [as] your house or the house of your neighbors [from] which you said you heard gunshots? A Our house. Q Now, in paragraph 6 of your Counter-Affidavit you stated and I quote: that [o]n that afternoon of September 24, 1997, I was at home in my house Aplaya, Riohondo, Bo. Campo Muslim, my companions in my house [were] the two old women and my children, is this correct? A They were not there. Q Now, in that statement Mr. Witness, you said that you were at home in [your] house at Aplaya, Riohondo, Bo. Campo Muslim[;] which is which now, you were in your house or you were in your neighbors[] house at that time when you heard gunshots? A I was in the house near my house. Q So, your statement particularly paragraph 6 of your Counter-Affidavit that you were at home in [your] house at Aplaya Riohondo Bo. Campo Muslim, is x x x not correct? A Yes, Sir. This is not correct.
Crime and Punishment

The trial court convicted appellant of three crimes: (1) maintenance of a drug den, (2) direct assault with attempted homicide, and (3) illegal possession of firearms. We will discuss each of these.

Maintenance of a Drug Den

We agree with the trial court that appellant was guilty of maintenance of a drug den, an offense for which he was correctly sentenced to reclusion perpetua. His guilt was clearly established by the testimony of Prosecution Witness Rino Bartolome Locson, who himself had used the extension house of appellant as a drug den on several occasions, including the time of the raid. The formers testimony was corroborated by all the raiding police officers who testified before the court. That appellant did not deny ownership of the house and its extension lent credence to the prosecutions story.
Direct Assault with Multiple Attempted Homicide

The trial court was also correct in convicting appellant of direct assault with multiple counts of attempted homicide. It found that [t]he act of the accused [of] firing an M14 rifle [at] the policemen[,] who were about to enter his house to serve a search warrant x x x constituted such complex crime. We note that direct assault with the use of a weapon carries the penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, while attempted homicide carries the penalty of prision correccional. Hence, for the present complex crime, the penalty for direct assault, which constitutes the most serious crime, should be imposed and applied in its maximum period.
Illegal Possession of Firearms

Aside from finding appellant guilty of direct assault with multiple attempted homicide, the trial court convicted him also of the separate offense of illegal possession of firearms under PD 1866, as amended by RA 8294, and sentenced him to 6 years of prision correccional to 8 years of prision mayor. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) disagrees, on the ground that the trial court should not have applied the new law. It contends that under the facts of the case, the applicable law should have been PD 1866, as worded prior to its amendment by RA 8294. The trial courts ruling and the OSGs submission exemplify the legal communitys difficulty in grappling with the changes brought about by RA 8294. Hence, before us now are opposing views on how to interpret Section 1 of the new law, which provides as follows: SECTION 1. Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended, is hereby further amended to read as follows: Section 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of Firearms or Ammunition Instruments Used or Intended to be Used in the Manufacture of Firearms or Ammunition. -- The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period and a fine of not less than Fifteen thousand pesos (P15,000) shall be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess any low powered firearm, such as rimfire handgun, .380 or .32 and other firearm of similar firepower, part of firearm, ammunition, or

machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be used in the manufacture of any firearm or ammunition: Provided, That no other crime was committed. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period and a fine of Thirty thousand pesos (P30,000) shall be imposed if the firearm is classified as high powered firearm which includes those with bores bigger in diameter than .30 caliber and 9 millimeter such as caliber .40, .41, .44, .45 and also lesser calibered firearms but considered powerful such as caliber .357 and caliber .22 centerfire magnum and other firearms with firing capability of full automatic and by burst of two or three: Provided, however, That no other crime was committed by the person arrested. If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance. If the violation of this Section is in furtherance of or incident to, or in connection with the crime of rebellion or insurrection, sedition, or attempted coup detat, such violation shall be absorbed as an element of the crime of rebellion or insurrection, sedition, or attempted coup detat. The same penalty shall be imposed upon the owner, president, manager, director or other responsible officer of any public or private firm, company, corporation or entity, who shall willfully or knowingly allow any of the firearms owned by such firm, company, corporation or entity to be used by any person or persons found guilty of violating the provisions of the preceding paragraphs or willfully or knowingly allow any of them to use unlicensed firearms or firearms without any legal authority to be carried outside of their residence in the course of their employment. The penalty of arresto mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall carry any licensed firearm outside his residence without legal authority therefor. Citing People v. Jayson, the OSG argues that the foregoing provision does not cover the specific facts of this case. Since another crime -- direct assault with multiple unlawful homicide -- was committed, appellant cannot be convicted of simple illegal possession of firearms under the second paragraph of the aforecited provision. Furthermore, since there was no killing in this case, illegal possession cannot be deemed as an aggravating circumstance under the third paragraph of the provision. Based on these premises, the OSG concludes that the applicable law is not RA 8294, but PD 1866 which, as worded prior the new law, penalizes simple illegal possession of firearms even if another crime is committed at the same time. Applying a different interpretation, the trial court posits that appellant should be convicted of illegal possession of firearms, in addition to direct assault with multiple attempted homicide. It did not explain its ruling, however. Considering that it could not have been ignorant of the proviso in the second paragraph, it seemed to have construed no other crime as referring only to homicide and murder, in both of which illegal possession of firearms is an aggravating circumstance. In other words, if a crime other than murder or homicide is committed, a person may still be convicted of illegal possession of firearms. In this case, the other crime committed was direct assault with multiple attempted homicide; hence, the trial court found appellant guilty of illegal possession of firearms.

We cannot accept either of these interpretations because they ignore the plain language of the statute. A simple reading thereof shows that if an unlicensed firearm is used in the commission of any crime, there can be no separate offense of simple illegal possession of firearms. Hence, if the other crime is murder or homicide, illegal possession of firearms becomes merely an aggravating circumstance, not a separate offense. Since direct assault with multiple attempted homicide was committed in this case, appellant can no longer be held liable for illegal possession of firearms. Moreover, penal laws are construed liberally in favor of the accused. In this case, the plain meaning of RA 8294s simple language is most favorable to herein appellant. Verily, no other interpretation is justified, for the language of the new law demonstrates the legislative intent to favor the accused. Accordingly, appellant cannot be convicted of two separate offenses of illegal possession of firearms and direct assault with attempted homicide. Moreover, since the crime committed was direct assault and not homicide or murder, illegal possession of firearms cannot be deemed an aggravating circumstance. We reject the OSGs contention that PD 1866, as worded prior to its amendment by RA 8294, should be applied in this case. When the crime was committed on September 24, 1997, the original language of PD 1866 had already been expressly superseded by RA 8294 which took effect on July 6, 1997. In other words, no longer in existence was the earlier provision of PD 1866, which justified a conviction for illegal possession of firearms separate from any other crime. It was replaced by RA 8294 which, among other amendments to PD 1866, contained the specific proviso that no other crime was committed. Furthermore, the OSGs reliance on People v. Jayson is misplaced. True, this Court sustained the conviction of appellant for illegal possession of firearms, although he had also committed homicide. We explained, however, that the criminal case for homicide [was] not before us for consideration. Just as unacceptable is the interpretation of the trial court. We find no justification for limiting the proviso in the second paragraph to murder and homicide. The law is clear: the accused can be convicted of simple illegal possession of firearms, provided that no other crime was committed by the person arrested. If the intention of the law in the second paragraph were to refer only to homicide and murder, it should have expressly said so, as it did in the third paragraph. Verily, where the law does not distinguish, neither should we. The Court is aware that this ruling effectively exonerates appellant of illegal possession of an M14 rifle, an offense which normally carries a penalty heavier than that for direct assault. While the penalty for the first is prision mayor, for the second it is only prision correccional. Indeed, the accused may evade conviction for illegal possession of firearms by using such weapons in committing an even lighter offense, like alarm and scandal or slight physical injuries, both of which are punishable by arresto menor. This consequence, however, necessarily arises from the language of RA 8294, whose wisdom is not subject to the Courts review. Any perception that the result reached here appears unwise should be addressed to Congress. Indeed, the Court has no discretion to give statutes a new meaning detached from the manifest intendment and

language of the legislature. Our task is constitutionally confined only to applying the law and jurisprudence to the proven facts, and we have done so in this case. WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that appellant is found guilty only of two offenses: (1) direct assault and multiple attempted homicide with the use of a weapon, for which he is sentenced to 2 years and 4 months to 6 years of prision correccional; and (2) maintaining a drug den, for which he was correctly sentenced by the trial court to reclusion perpetua. Costs against appellant. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Congress of the Philippines for a possible review, at its sound discretion, of RA 8294. SO ORDERED.