Classical Philosophies

Classical Philosophies of India and the West Author(s): Kalidas Bhattacharyya Reviewed work(s): Source: Philosophy East and
West, Vol. 8, No. 1/2 (Apr. - Jul., 1958), pp. 17-36 Published by: University of Hawai'i Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1397419 . Accessed: 30/01/2013 05:37
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KALIDAS BIHATTACHARYYA
Classical PlolphiSs
the Indiaand West of
CREATIVE THOUGHT IN Indiaended with Udayanain the we with A.D.' By "creative tenth century thought" meanserious struggle the clarification of as fromformalistic of problems life and existence, distinct ofIndiawere decided. issues Post-Udayana pre-eminentphilosophers already and always weremoreinserious, Occasionally they lyformalistic. original had But Indianphilosophy in thanin matter. classical terested form always was that concern profoundly, content always and life placed problems genuine or whether of aboveform.Every work, original ofthenature a commentary, of or had to whether a widerange sectional, a contributionthefund truths of therecertainly and refutation discovered. were,as in all Analysis, proof, But wereneverapotheosized. soundphilosophy. these Logicwas usedonly was for Even inference employed thedisof as an instrument discovery. of truths. covery schooLThere to Nyiya-VaiSesika were other schools belonged the Udayana in classical India,of course.The veryearlyschoolsin India are Sidhkhya, and of someforms Buddhism, Nyiya,Vaisesika, Jainism, Yoga, Mimirbsi, schools Different Vedintic a form thephilosophy Grammar. of of developed there theseearlierand laterschools laterin classicalIndia;' and between forms of the werethephilosophies thegaivas, Vaisnavas, andadditional etc., ofthephilosophy Grammar. of of Indianphilosophy The problems classical formulated cannotbe neatly as ethical, etc. A precise metaphysical, theological, logical,psychological, of division philosophy these"departments" unknown the Inwas into to as and in dians, evenin theWestin earlier days, ifwiththeRenaissance the under and this Westwe find practice beingrecognized presgrowing finally is such sureofworkit is stillan openquestion whether division desirable.
'The period may be extended by another century to accommodate Riminuja and a few others. 'The Upanisads were not works of systematic philosophy.
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18
KALIDASBHATTACHARYYA
Ethicsand metaphysics inextricably Problems existence are connected. of arisebecauseof man'sconsciousness freedom. manwerea mereitem If of of Nature, wouldhave no problem all Questioning at Naturepresuphe he has aside and is conscious poses transcendence; who questions stepped of thattranscendence. is This consciousness Equallyfree onewho answers. of freedom degrees, course.Thoughconscious freedom, may has of one of to feel an interest it. As a freebeingone mayturn Naturein a in notyet it to it theoretical a practical or either study or reorganize in a way attitude, thatis notpossible a mereitemofNature.This is whatman does. But for four the of and toward very consciousness freedom, then one mayalso turn thisfreedom in to themselves: manmaytry realize (1) possibilities present in thetheoretical (2) he may, thetheoretical attitude, attitude; re-interpret realize freedom thepractical in attitude, Nature; (3) he maytryto realize from himself will as in Nature;or (4) himself, other words, free dissociating as he may, thepractical realize himself freely in attitude, by willing reorganizfree to hisself-conscious wilL Nature ing according wouldbe all as of If freedom suchwere thekeynote ethics, philosophy conthat we are toldthatthefreedom ethics ethic-centric. Often, however, wouldgo freedom is of siders onlyfreedom will. If so,theselfas cognitive be and to overto another might some discipline be calledmetaphysics, there of freedom from ethics provided metaphysics, good groundforseparating Indianand clasClassical freedom. of will is entirely independent cognitive in freedom bothsenses, sical Western but,except interpreted philosophers3 ethics nonein Indiaunderstood and theMimirmsakas the earlier Buddhists, more insisted and in thesecondsense.The Advaita Ved~ntins theS~hkhyas of freedom will (vairsgya, and freedom regarded on cognitive detachment) are The Saivas held thatthetwo freedoms the inward as onlyancillary.' Aclevelof purity.5 of thesameselfat a superior and theoutgoing aspects The are the to RiAminuja, twofreedoms intertwined." Yoga thesis cording on this is point notunivocal." Even from ethics None of these metaphysics. when separated philosophers so the is theemphasis on cognitive freedom, moralact,which faris subordito conducive thisfreedom and, as nate,is understood what is necessarily ethics. is as in somewayinspired it. Thusthere no independent by therefore,
'We mean philosophersprior to the eighteenthcentury. 'Krishnachandra Bhattacharyya, Studies in Philosophy, Vol. I (Calcutta: Progressive Publishers, 1956), section on "Studies in Yoga Philosophy," chap. 1. sHistory of Philosophy--Eastern and Western, S. Radhakrishnan, et al., eds. (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1952), VoL I, pp. 374, 384, 387-389, 404-406, 410. 'Cf. the theory of jfiinakarmasamsuccay (knowledge-cum-will approach). 'Krishnachndra Bhattacharyya, op. cit.
CLASSICALPHILOSOPHIES OF INDIA AND THE WEST
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we of is Neither metaphysics independent ethics.Metaphysics, have seen, and freedom is bornof the desireto attain self-consciously, thisis equally of of and thefountain-head theultimate objective ethics.Attainment comis freedom called moksa(liberation).Details of ethics only emerge plete conduct. is applied empirical to when metaphysics The wereexceptions. and The Mimirihsakas theearly Buddhists, however, for latter, reasonsto be seen later,discouraged metaphysical speculation, aloneforthespiritual as almost modern ethics do, positivists and prescribed was of amelioration man." The Mimidisaprocedure different.9 Unambiguof attitude the to ouslyit subordinated cognition act. The fundamental with ethical (vidhi); (theselfas free)is toactin accordance principles spirit is of into and,if it is said thatinquiry thenature theseprinciples cognitive, is this two theMImi-ilzs wouldoffer replies.First, inquiry only philosopher thisis in of forthepurpose usingthoseprinciples acts,and,second--and is one of theseprinciples an injuncthemoreimportant every point--since exist do do or in "Do this" "You should this," they notalready tion, theform realization Theirvery in to be discovered knowledge. beingis butpotential are truths relevant acts. Even metaphysical in concrete onlyin thecontext held of someact-actual or possible.The extreme Mimiriasakas thatthe a is whichis said to revealthesetruths itself subtleaction.It is knowledge A Western difficult finda parallelto thisin classical to philosophy. near is American analogue pragmatism. between Nor did Indianphilosophy (of logicand psychology distinguish and analyzedin detaildifIt knowledge)exceptoccasionally. classified their of ferent ways knowing (pramana)and demonstrated interconnections. another than logic. Even inference--and But thiswas more psychology method viz., closelyallied to it, but not alwaysdistinguished, postulation new as understood primarily a methodof discovering (arthhpatti)--was or or not )'o (confirmationrejection. Not that truths, a wayofproof disproof to was theconcept proof unknown thesephilosophers. of Rather, they, parit and Mimirhsi, AdvaitaVedinta,developed in ticularly Nyiya-Vaisesika, the herewas whether provedness But meticulous detail."1 themainproblem and apriminya) of a and and therejectedness, truth falsity i.e., (primarnya and of characters thatcognition also are cognition, or are not additional as or the of whether knowledge thistruth falsity, thecase maybe, is or is
Outlinesof IndianPhilosophy 'M. Hiriyanna, (London: GeorgeAllen & Unwin Ltd., 1951), pp. 136-138. on Sutra1. i. 1, 2, 4. 'Cf. amikara's commentary Brahma StudiesI (Mysore:Kavyalaya 'oM. Hiriyanna, Publishers, Indian Philosophical 1957), pp. 65-70. & and Studies Philosophy Rtligion(Calcuttz: Chakravarti in US. K. Maitra, Chatterjee Co., 1956), pp. 151-164.
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notcausedby theverysame factors causethatcognition.2 that Exceptin these theories truth of and also in another viz., (prdmmnya) concept, tarka, thatis, merecorroboration,1" is little "logic"in Indianphilosophy. of there less subordinate and,therefore, is always to, 'Tarkd' as merecorroboration, in importance than, discovery. If logicis concerned with we of inference, haveseenhowmuch it was only in it and permitted Indianphilosophy, in whatway. In theWest,however, in is often withjudgment concept, whichare also and concerned, addition, in as regarded theworkof reason.Evenin thissenselogicwas notwanting classicalIndian philosophy. therewas carefully analyzed, Everyconcept and withother The Indianmindwas consticlassified, compared concepts. was of logicalin thissense. Clarity a keynote Indianthinking. rutionally and of or however, Throughout, logic,whether inference of judgment was only applicative subordinate. Indiansnever and, therefore, concept, intoa self-complete theoretical logic by itself study.Therewas developed as a never formal said,the study, logicas an independent although, already to formal Somedistant Indianmindwas constitutionally logical. analogues found thestudy purelanguage theGrammarian in of by logicare,however, and comMim-itsakas, manySaivas. But thesewerehardly philosophers, with Aristotelian offormal the type logic. parable in to what aprioristic thinkers theWest It willnotbefar the wrong saythat these Purelanguage, is would purelanguage. call call "thought" what Indians and It is to according theseIndianphilosophers, autonomous universal. is and which clothethespokenlanguage, purein thesensethatgrosssounds whenitis spoken, notmerely are itinthemind theimages which accompany to of thinkers-and have arguedout accidental; according many these they and images(and,according some,evenconcrete case-these sounds to their of of things the world) are self-concretionspure language. Words have Thattheword 17 meansthefactF in either semantic syntactical or import. a of but theworld indeed matter convention, thata wordmeanssomefact is of a is is certain priori. This meaning onlya priorianticipation facts, whichfacts, are notso farindependent purewords;and these of therefore, a And thesame is truewithregard mayalso be classified priori. meanings that for relations. Particular words to words stand syntactical conventionally factual but are for stand particular relations, there also a priori anticipations
"1Three stages oi vdk (speech) were recognized. They are vaikhari (gross), madbyyam (intermediate), and paiyanti (pure). Some stretched this philorophy to the limit and admitted a fourth stage, viz., pari (ultimate). S. Radhakrishnan, ed., History of Philosophy-Eastern and Western, VoL I, pp. 374, 412-418, 422, 423.
Sri Munsichandra Sinha,1955).
f"S. Bagchi, Inductive Reasonang--A Study of Tarks and its Role in Indian Logic (Calcutta:
a discussion LogicalPositivism. in a We find parallel
CLASSICAL OF PHILOSOPHIES INDIA AND THE WEST
21
of relations, whichrelations therefore, priori.4This semantic and a are, somewhat thetraditional with study syntactical ofpurelanguage corresponds Western this and an logicofterms judgmentBut,first, was never independentstudy, in theinterest (ethicsand) metaphysics, of and, beingalways was The no formal second, logicofthe study syllogism everdeveloped. entire doctrine Logos,and,to some of of purelanguage the suggests old Western and are Kant'stheory thea priori; of and,ifthought purelanguage extent, as it Indianline of thinking taken identical, maybe saidthatthisparticular the in tradition classical Western rationalistic suggests entire philosophy. wereunsympathetic, sometimes Other and even Indiansystems, however, of to and hostile, this language.Nyiya-Vai"esika Yoga (and, philosophy pure we therefore, presume, abjuredall transSithkhya also) unceremoniously and it. cendental of language,15 Vedintic systems quietly ignored philosophy Averseto all transcendental studied Nyiya-VaiSesika philosophy, language de novoand developed newgrammar linewithitsownmetaphysics. a in It is onlythe philosophers theMimamisi of in of school, thewholetradition Indianphilosophy, adhered purelanguage.But to orthodox who systematic in coulddo this because their central interest thestatus ethical of of they only to them, had theironly and nisedha),which, (vidhi according principles that in source scriptures hadto be properly Naturally, never they interpreted. formal considered logic. in ClassicalIndianphilosophers, interested then,were neversufficiently to the formal is logic. With regard material logic,however, situation difwas interest that But,evenso,their in had attitude ferent-they abundant from following: the This fundamentally psychological. will be evident "With theprobableexception a few Buddhists, of Indianphilosophers is hold thatinduction a matter perception. of WiththeGreeksalso, as is evident from Aristotle's treatment it,itis intuited, in modern of and Western we find problem the resuscitated. Modern have thinkers asked Western logic whether is induction a form inference, if so, how. They naturally of and, it tendto treat as inference-though formal. not beTheycall it inference cause observed to form, according cases-positiveor negative--somehow a and for them, ground thegeneral they proposition, thisground, pointour, increases decreases strength accordance or in in with number quality the and of thecasesobserved. Indian But almost linewithAristotle, in philosophers, thattheobserved have argued casesare onlypsychological to the disaids nota logicalground, and ofthegeneral connection covery (arundhati-nyiya), casescan at most taken contributingthepsychologthese as addedthat be to
Nydya Sutra I. 4, in S. Radhakrishnan and 'Yoga Satra I. 42; Yoga Bhisya I. 42, paragraph 2; 21aso C. A. Moore, eds., A Source Book in Indian Philosophy (Princeton: Princeton UniversityPress, 1957).
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the The of ical strength our conviction regarding generalproposition. as error in they strength, hold,increases proportion the chanceof possible of the diminishes. Diminishing possibility erroris not logic. Whatever Chances asserted or is asserted-perceptuallynon-perceptually--is absolutely. concern for need aresubstantiated, notlogically unless oferror, us, that they if The wouldlead to unfounded skepticism. logicof probability, it is logic, of are not is onlythelogicof error:we meanthere degrees error, of truth. of of is which positive, merely theabsence of If logicis a criterion truth not assertion which an absolute is withdiscovery, (until coalesces it error, either forms the or through traditional contradicted), is thelogicof confirmation ofinference."'6 did ThoughIndianphilosophers notcaremuchforwhatin theWest is of to sensitive thetruth falsity) cogniwere (or calledlogic, they particularly we confirmedness which as this (of understood truth either tions.But they had concerned the have already spoken) or merely factthatthecognition we meantthe former, have not been contradicted (abidhita). When they Whenthey to as subordinated psychology. admitted though seen,they logic, to from it the meant latter, however, wasall psychology beginning end. True, a that particwith content thesimplefact wereriot evenpsychologically they had psychological ularcognition notbeencontradicted. also prescribed They not that contradiction in measures order might occur.Specificprecautionary that in thecase of induction, prescribed it mustbe knownas unthey ally condition the defined limiting and they carefully conditional (nirupfdhika), meansthe study prescriptions correct for of If by "logic" one a (upfdthi). one knowledge, hasto admitthathereat leasttheIndianshad developed are it more: thenorms dealswith either is something logic.Butlogicproper if The onlylogic, it is logic,thattheIndians or over-empirical postulates. logic is with in connection induction parallelto theassociational developed ofHumeandJ.S. Mill. II alreadymentioned) (with the exceptions ClassicalIndianphilosophers like into metaphysics, didnotdivide compartments ethics, philosophy air-tight was for developing study and logic.Philosophy, them, a unitary psychology, in the but kindsof problems dovetailing solutions the over-all different of of context therealization freedom. in is as withPlato and Aristotle, philosophy said to have originated If,
"A in and of my "Indian Concepts Knowledge Self"-Fifth Instalment, Our quotedfrom passage Bulletin 2. IV, Research Heritage,
CLASSICAL OF PHILOSOPHIES INDIA AND THE WEST
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wonder if somelaterWestern and havesubstituted or thinkers question unfor Indianthinkers unanimous believing are in that derstanding thiswonder, theorigin philosophy man'surgeforrealizing of is freedom. Mutewonder leads nowhere, question are and and understanding possibleonlythrough someconsciousness freedom. of Consciousness freedom ipso factoreflective. is of Different of grades this consciousness therefore takenas stages thedevelopment reflecin be of may tion. At whatever the of is elements stage, business reflection to distinguish to were which prior thatreflection givenin a complex.At thelowest stage, where is reflectionno morethanempirical whatis distinguished in analysis, a form generally as having is felt beenalready known thatform, in though But oftendevelops as indistinctly. eventhisempirical analysis difficulties, whenthetic-tic soundof a clockis distinguished after has ceased, it or only whena picture-puzzle is solved after someexercise attention. such of In cases it is difficult assert to thatwhatis now distinguished a certain in form was known exactly same form.Different in the already sciences, including psyhavetried overcome to thesedifficulties havesucceeded least and at chology, But someelements cometo be partially. at a stageofreflective analysis may whichare not,at thatstageof reflection, as having felt been distinguished knownin thatexactform.Space,time,number, previously logicalforms, and the different that is categories metaphysics said to deal with, including thecategories selfandGod,belongto this of which disgroup.The analysis But immediately thesemay be called philosophical. withthe tinguishes of from empirical its a new separation philosophical analysis counterpart, of arisesforphilosophy. realforus,unless The problem crucial importance we are sophisticated,theactualempirical is calledNature, world, including the worldof mind. If theelements distinguished philosophical by analysis are notfeltas having in in beenknown Nature theforms which in are they nowdistinguished,- cannot calledreal. But,sincewe areas yet be unable they to denythem, their status peculiar.Theyonlydemand be real-they is to but to be realonly, are notrealas yet.As such, are feltas whait ought they or seema partof maybe calledidealities demands.Also,theynecessarily thereflective that consciousness distinguishes them, they though equally apare own. As they notreal and yetarenot to claimobjectivity their of pear be of Like unrealities, cannot spoken impersonally. thefalse they complete of these snakewhichcannotbe spoken exceptas the snake-as-it-is-for-me, are to idealities be referred onlyas whatthey forme.17 may in findsitselfinitially, This is the predicament whichphilosophy and
'"Me" meansthedistinguishing reflection.
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KALIDAS BHATTACHARYYA
fromwhichin variouswaysit has tried extricate to itself.The history of in of philosophy, Indiaand theWest,is thestory theseatempts. Broadly there foursucharttempts, one or twomayhavesub-types. are and speaking, One attempt to treattheseidealstructures transcendent is as objects.Even in reflection, we though theynow have existence the distinguishing they, are told,nevertheless demand transcendence, somekindofindependent ie., status objects.In the West,Plato and all philosophers follow as who him thisalternative. India,we find in Sirhkhya, In the it accept 8aivism, Yoga, of of and In philosophy Grammar, someforms Buddhism. India,however, thesetranscendent in objectsare notthoserecognized the West. Theyare and not always and never number, spaceand time, logicalforms, thecatein The idealities(tattvas) normally Western goriesadmitted philosophy. which these Indian are as material, inSibkhya philosophers recognized either and Yoga (and also in someforms Buddhism), forms purelanof or of as in thephilosophy Grammar, both, inSaivism.The material as of or guage, idealities (1) five are elements, earth, fire, viz., water, air, (gross mahabhditas and ether-as-the-essence-of-sound), tanmitras cor(subtleessences (2) five to the (sensibilities), responding these),(3) elevenindriyax including prinassociates sensations is called mind (mnars), and ciple thatunreflectively as (4) thehalf-reflective (5) ego-sense (ahbarhkra), thought theprinciple of reflection at (buddhi), and (6) theinchoate primalstuff therootof all these (pradhina)).None of thesetattvas, manas,abhakika,and including is in senseof the term;theyare all objects buddhi, subjective theproper are as the they known(introspectively, casemaybe) as other (jada), because thantheknowledge is revealing that them.s8 III So muchforthefirst to menattempt getoutof the initial predicament tioned page 23. The second on is exactly opposite.It is to hold its attempt thatidealities demandmerger withpureconsciousness. the West,the In clear mention pure consciousness foundin Neo-Platonism of is first and, as is that,in Descartes; long after and, whenthisconsciousness preferred thetrue(or final) essence, thisis always the groundthatit is a clear on and distinct essence.Theremight also be other clearand distinct, essences, butnoneso clearand distinct consciousness, thattheirclarity disas so and tinctness be as of It notion thatlies attheroot might taken borrowed. is this all idealism, whether be thatof Berkeley Kant or Fichte.Different or it
8"The knowledge (introspection), however, which reveils the taitvw nos. 3, 4, and 5, particularly no. 5, is subjective in the proper sense of the term. It is cailed purus..
CLASSICALPHILOSOPHIES OF INDIA AND THE WEST
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idealists have onlybeenin disagreement, in his own way,as to why each and in whatsenseconsciousnessmost and underis clearand distinct, in their of idealists takeit as only of standing the nature consciousness. Empiricist a events-themental to states-and add,at most, substratum these, psychic a substratum as event.But which, is understood onlya moreenduring too, the Kantians and Fichtreans understand as over-natural, thatwhichis it as never objectlikemental an or but states their enduring substrata, eversuban autonomous that,running act the mentalstates, holds jective, through thesetogether systematic as objects.Kant tookit as a cognitive Fichte act;, it identifiedwith wilL to and the Kantio-Fichteans, have we Roughly corresponding Berkeley in IndiatheVijfianavida and Buddhists:9 theAdvaitaVedintins.Bothpreon ferred subjective theground--only among the one whilethe many--that is contingent, is consciousness indubitable. object But,whileto the Vijiiithe navidaBuddhists subjective equivalent mental was to the states, Advaira as these objects(mentalobjectsrevealedbypureconVedintins, treating calledsaksin),insisted autonomous on as sciousness, pureconsciousness subin sense theterm.This pureconsciousness never of is an jective theproper but the as object, eversubjective. Theydefined subjective thatwhichis reflectively self-illuminating (svaprakdla). The Vijiiinavdda Buddhists differed Berkeley someimportant also with on mentalstates self-revealing as they points.UnlikeBerkeley, tookthevery (svaprakaia),and did notbelievethattheseare knownby a self. The second pointof difference thattheyneverdeniedexternality. is With them, even as externality, subjective, that,according them, is so to externality, of there twokinds mental are states(vijnanas)--external (pravrttivij-ana) 2 and non-external us of (ilayavijniana). This reminds of Kant's doctrine as and of sense. space (externality) subjective timeas theform internal wouldneverhave admitted mental that states as The AdvaitaVedintins are suchare self-illuminating. states, is true, noticed These it immediately as they doesnotprove that are they notobjects(to introspecocutr.Butthat a with kindofprimitive and tion). Theyareobjects self-evidence, ail depends on whatthisprimitive to. self-evidence believed reallyamounts Siriikhya thatit is due to thedominance a peculiar of calledsaitva-guna, character,
transcen"9Asinterpreted the Hindus.Genuineand full-fledged by Viiiinavida was undoubtedly different Advaita from W-e arenot referring rhat. dental(though to Vedinca). is not the sdksin(pure consciousness) Advaita Vedinta. It is indeedthe inner of "Alayauviiina self-contained but nevera definite frommentalstatesit is being.Conceivedas dissociated I-feeling, In but moresubjective. themrelatively whollyindefnite, as the innertone of thesestatesit renders it is in otherwords, as undeniable yetwhollyexhausted thesestaces. Kant's transcendental apperception he woulddrawa distinction between act of as puresubjective is verynearly thisstatus, pure exceptthat and sensibility thought.
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whichtendsto make whatever Advaita objectit belongsto incandescent. notdenying addsthatit is onlytheunreflective ofintrothis, Vedinta, stage as is reflective. (which however, always which, genuine, Introspection spection stands thisstageas undistinguishedly at is siksin, fused consciousness) pure with muchlikefire a red-hot ball. Not thatit is imin mental iron states, there. is thinkers plicity present "Implicit" a vagueword. WhattheAdvaita is is meant thatit in its fullcharacter present, though undistinguished, ie., confusion. To reflective mental states presented objects. as are Relative introspection, to extra-mental these mental states be calledsubjective, the but objects, may to relative these is itself, states, at leastmore introspection subjective. Advaim adds that behindthisintrospection is no further that there introspection holdit as an object.Thiswouldinvolve regressru infinitum, a ad and might of thereis no introspection introspection. of Hence also, as a matter fact, as suchis subjective theproper in sense theterm. of introspection Between Kant and AdvaitaVedintathere a difference. is Kant did not takepureconsciousness and (reason)-the transcendental apperception its itself real (existent).Pure consciousness, held,is various he by forms--as real by itself as realized.Otherwise, theoretical onlywhenas will it stands is it by itself onlya transcendental "transcenpresupposition, (cognitive), ideal." The attitude Advaita of Vedintais different. an essence If dentally is reflectively a as of it distinguished, is distinguished demanding reality its own. True,thereality started we withis Nature, yet,sinceit is distinfrom ofthisNature, reality demands out the Nature cannot that be it guished is Kant, too, couldnot again. What is demanded a transcendent reality. in of where, denyit and actually spokein itsfavor his metaphysics morals, itwasall a will-approach. Advaita The wouldwonder Vedintin however, why thecognitive to be should banned. approach (jifzna-mrarga)theover-natural is there equally possibility purecognition, pure the and of Likepurewilling, is to object-inand, cognition first self-illuminating, second,refers freely as is which, not Natureand notthispure cognition general, itself, wholly indefinite (anirvacya). Once this indefinite object-in-general (aj/fana)is it another admitted, is of no valueto admit viz.,Nature, independent object, is which notmerely be bracketed, as reducible i.e.,as wholly to intelbut, to, in terms this object-in-general, is nothing one who would for of, ligible realize purecognition. As a transcendental Advaita to Vedintahas a merit philosophy, rarely be
"Reflection alone posits it as distinct introspection.
covered by nescience (aj~ina);21
and whereverthere is nesciencethereis
OF PHILOSOPHIES INDIA AND THE WEST CLASSICAL
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werefully aware in in found anysimilar system theWest. TheseVedintins
A and or between of thedistinction (ideality essence). actuality demand it to is demand what try ought be,butnotyetis. Philosophers to realize in in order. of as an actuality, But, themeantime,other though a higher wedded different of to orders remain until haverealized they words it, they of solid Thisis theas-yet-unavoided existence their natural life, actuality. to. called an must submittedThis, be reality" which, "provisional though evil, was to come nothing asit. has nottranscendedThatultimatelywould it it the this to sured these infer or learn from Vedintins; couldeither they a and ithas But meantime tobeput with, insuch manup scriptures. inthe realization be notmerely march thefinal to not nerthat onward the may if accelerated. can be donebest in this This probut hampered positively These and of the life visional we observe rules correct cognition conduct. shadows the alsocontain of are rules notmere they working hypotheses; assumes that the are ultimate (and reality reality. They theforms ultimate and of of in and reality cognition freely falsely) thecontext theempirical stations are as Theserules conduct. vary. vary thecontexts There various Thisis theIndian to various appropriatethem. rules and in life therefore of and duties theory station its (adhikara).
must (vybvahsarika-sattd), be made the bestuse of wiselyso long as one
IV
mentioned page23 is The third on out wayof coming of thetangle at same as time. and the totreat demands (essences) subjective objective the is and other kinds: isthe ofdualism the one This solution, way again, oftwo is dualism So thewayofmonism. longas philosophytranscendental, is a absolutes. Destwo view. toaccept independent difficult It is difficult Yet,
of the andLeibniz offered ingenious harmony, theory pre-established Simthe The andYoga understood relation teleologically." subject only khya
This idea of the thatthe subject it mayexperience in appropriate ways.24 in was by subject's experience notimplanted thesubject theobject.Indeed,
reason and the thing-in-itself, also be includedin thisgroup. may "Kant, withhis subjective "M. Hiriyanna,Outlinesof Indian Philosophy, 273, 274, 281; A Source Book in Indian pp. Kiriki LVII. Phbilosophy--Simkbya is his by 24Theappropriateness determined the desertof the subject acquired through deeds in of theprevious aspectof theIndiantheory karma. cycleof life.Thisis an important
and cartesin the West and Sidrikhya Yoga in India were transcendental twoabsolutes wereat painsto relatetheir WheretheCartesians dualists." to influence (purusa) and the object(pradhina) do not,according them,
in into rich and the moves develops this world order eachother; latter only
28
theobject couldhave no idea until had developed it intobuddhi(roughly, whatWestern call philosophers mind). The idea as eventhe nisusof the as is to very primary development to be likened one thatserves theguiding of It movements. is thetelosof a movement, wholly principle biological in neither nor consciously from outside present that spontaneous, coming which moves. So much thequestion for whether twoabsolutes-subject objectthe and influence each otheror not. S~ikhya and Yoga recognized another relation between them." When the absoluteobject-the primalstuff (praa beintobuddhi, there of dhina)-has developed appears relation identity tween thisnew form and puresubjectivity. feelsthathis mindis Everyone the of himself, subject.At lowerstagesalso thereis the appearance such The on and thesenses and thebody, the on identity. subject, theone hand, with other, appearidentified eachother.Sitikhya and Yoga, and also AdvaitaVedinta, this as The subregarded identificationa falseappearance. are and one an but jective theobject entirely disparate: is never object always the self-illuminating but whiletheother nevera subject always is subject, or could revealed, to be revealed, (and also to) thissubject.Hencethere by never a real identificationthetwo. be of Whatever the defects thisphilosophy Sitzhkhya Yoga, it is be of of and not lessintelligible thephilosophies than from Descartes Leibniz.These to in to philosophers theWest wereequallyat painsto relatethought extenall for sionanddevised sorts hypotheses thispurpose. of The Sizikhya-Yoga it is account notmerely another suchhypothesis: can claiman additional merit thatit refers concrete in and elucidates itself means to by experience of clearanalogies. Prior Descartes, there to was notmuchof subjectivity theWest. This in is whytheproblem thepresent in form notgenerally did arisein pre-Carthat was earlier there another tesian Europe.Butevenin those days problem was equallydifficult solution. concerned relation between essences It of the and this (ideas= idealities) Nature.Fundamentally, was alsoa majorproblem forthe pre-Kantians, These latter only Kant,and thepost-Kantians. and Naturewiththatbetween essence confounded distinction the between and puresubjectivity object.'"
'2M. Hiriyanna, Outlinesof IndianPhilosophy, 293, 294; A Source Bookof IndianPhilosophypp. XX. KarikA SJimkhya
"'Descartes was probably the frst confounder. It is through his influence that the word "idea" came to mean subjectivity.
CLASSICAL PHILOSOPHIES INDIA AND THE WEST OF V
29
If in Spinoza's the of and do system attributes thought extension belong to Substance, wouldbe a form inclusive this But can they so of monism. belong? Pureconsciousness (thought)as neveran object(extension)and (thought) excludeeach object (extension) as neverpure consciousness entities could belongto a third other. Suchmutually exclusive if, entity and onlyif,they had something common, in other in were there words, if, classunder which some higher couldbe subsumed. But it is doubtful they a ifpureconsciousness object and serious stand under higher anda more class, in is that commost those-Spinoza, example--who of for believe this point have heldat thesametimethatthese also belongto it as atmoncharacter tributes as some of them or, hold,as parts. Thereis definite antagonism, is Whatever the so far,between two,and so their unity unity impossible. a to there appears be is only semblance. of Hegel in theWest andphilosophers theSirikhya, Yoga, and Advaita Vedinta schoolsin India wereawareof thisantagonism. But,whilethis all of and had led theIndiansto dismiss unity pureconsciousness objectas a unity contradictories.savior A of illusory, proclaimed Hegel,undaunted, his in forabouthalfa century (and stillso considered somequarters), days the of arenowover, particularly days hisdialectic. either Otherphilosophers the monistic of groupnow to be considered a the to or it ignored antagonism struggled disprove orprescribedcondescendthat Leibnizwas one who on ing indifference borders dangerously nihilism. of was guilty ignoring antagonism of involved.Withhisconcept knowlthe as a creative he believed couldsilently overtheantagonism. he act, edge pass But thiswas deliberate if over-simplification. Schelling--and, Spinozais in understood a certain as of he, too-proposedindifferencea method way, the But is neither consciousness transcending opposition. as thisindifference a nor objectit is hardly morethana blank. If notexactly blank, is at it
rFor Bhiskar2, see Yogendranach Tarka-Vedinta-Tirtha, the Absolute, in Our Heritage I. 2. The World as a Real Modification of
and Rimrnuja.2
In section we have considered dualistic IV of the systems transcendental Therewerephilosophers, bothin India and theWest, however, philosophy. who understood as With essences monistically subjective-objective. all their and Schelling also to differences, Spinozaand Hegel belonged thisgroup, and do in a way; and if in Spinoza attributes thought extension not of the In he belongto Substance too falls in line withSchelling. India,we find of monists many in 8aivasand theVedintins theschoolsof Bhiskara such
30
leastthequintessence indefiniteness. Midhyamika in The of Buddhists India as known Sinyavida. and Chinaheldthis view. Theirviewis technically there no opposition. is to Others, Riminuja however, struggled showthat But to him,is self-illuninating. is one of them.Consciousness, according was this he so carefully defined self-illumination consciousness notdethat withthefactthata pastconsciousfrom barred beingan object. He started or is man'sconsciousnessonlyremembered inferred nessof mineor another of couldnothaveitstheory eternal and as an object, heldthatevenAdvaita whether as were this unless consciousness known an object, pureconsciousness is to him,theself-illuminating or of introspection of inference. According to revealed itsown locus.28(The stands of thatwhichbyvirtue itsexistence is locusofcognition theself.) the could overcome antagonism only becausehis notionof Riminuja was self-illumination conveniently naive. He hardlywent beyondwhat what we earliercalled "primitive called "enjoyment," Alexander beyond of of self-evidence mentalstates."Like the thinkers the Nyiya-Vaisesika other is that he school, assumed there no consciousness-in-general thanmenas states themselves seif-illumihe tookthese unlike and tal states, yet, them, is in error histheory thatreflective The fundamental introspection nating. of self-evidence mentalstates.Once from was not distinguished primitive in Vedintins it is distinguished, as the Advaira claimed, it, positsitself at the and, once it is so posited, mentalstates least problematic autonomy; not cannotbutbe takenas objects, themselves self-illuminating. and between contradiction to another We find subject obiect, attempt deny of in and in in a way, Cartesianism explicitly thephilosophy Bhiskara.Their or thereis a contradiction whether idea was that, theoretically not,it is a like thetwodo standrelated.WhiletheAdvaitaVedintins, the factthat factas an illuthisso-called wouldtherefore in ancient Eleatics reject days, there hand,hold thattherefore sion,and whileHegel would,on theother and the itself the is no clashbetween contradiction and thefact, Cartesians How farthese as this Bhiskara"putup with strange unity a divine mystery. of on were capacity God depends howfartheinfinite philosophers justified he could be used to workout in could be stretched, words, whether, other evencontradictions. the The was TheSaiva30 claim more rational. wayinwhich Saivasanalyzed of a revealed new phase,a self-transcending aspect, consciousknowledge Meintimes which KantandHegel,and in modern Brentano, Husserl, ness,
"A pp. 387, 388. "Bhiskara tried, of course, to substantiate his thesislogically. "3We mean those !aivas who were monists of the type we are here considering. Outlinesof Indian Philosophy, SourceBookin IndianPhilosophy, 546, 547; M. Hiriyanna, pp.
CI.ASSICAL PHILOSOPHIES INDIA AND THE WEST OF
31
have profitably if their ong,and Royce, might incorporated onlyto render theories more The analysis as follows: is plausible. Thereis no knowledge is notof someform speech(vik), gross of that or subtle,31 speech theonly(cognitive)situation we and where areaware is which ofthesubjective of we In proper. speech, again, areawareequally that as is spokenof, thatwhichis meant,and thismeaningis apprehended a whichwas alfunction speechitself, its intention, as something of not as for is now,hasvarious ready known, every knowledge speech.Speech, stages of purirty--through its variousstagesit dissociates itself from accompaniitself etc.--andat each higher viz.,sounds, ments, images, stageit reveals as theessence thelower. Yet, at every of the one, stage, including highest its self-transcendence,meaning, intention, the continues. the The subtlest the the has, undoubtedly subjective excellence, therefore, inevitaspeech, par which ble self-transcendence is objectivity thesubtlest. at If Saivism an intelligible is to transcendental demands attempt understand as monistically there another is which, though subjective-objective, attempt moreintelligible. is to take It line is along a different altogether, probably as thesubjective Critique," unambiguously will Kantdid thisin thesecond In andFichte it metaphysics. IndiatheMimirhsakas developed intosystematic view. Withthem, transcendental of the demands aretheonly champions this haveonlyto be madereal. As are onlyprinciples work, of which principles is are theseprinciples necessary priori),theironlyimport thatNature (a to to them. The phrase"according them" mustbe reorganized according are not already real does not implythattheysubsist They Platonically. lies to out, (bhbtavastu) be known.Theironlystatus in beingworked and are haveno being.Thatwe haveto reorganize before out they worked they that does not also presuppose there to Natureaccording theseprinciples status of which The a to wasalready Nature next be reorganized. very happens It which is Nature to be so reorganized. is only means relevant, pragmatically someto thaninstrumentalwill. (The Mimirisakas is that cognition no more the of is timesheld thatcognition even a form will.) Neither principles nor what is called "given Nature" can subsistalone. What so subsists whichis subjective-objective. is thereorganized Nature, to doctrine in fundamentals, similar AmeriAs we havealready said,this is, The held can pragmatism, withone seriousdifference. Mimirhsakas but to is instrumentalwill. Onemayprovisionalthat knowledge onlyultimately interested cognition in at and, ly blink thisinstrumental charaicer remaining
5"The corresponding Western doctrine is chat all knowledge is judment. The merit of the gaiva theory is that speech is a simpler and more comprehensible concept than judgment (thought). "3Wich Kanc, of course, will was an act of withdrawl. So, he is out of the picture in this section.
32
as such,developcognitive But it and metaphysics. ultimately will science haveto be givenup,or theentire is to be translated the into study cognitive the of is, language will. The Mimiihsiposition in thisrespect, exactopof of ethics Metaphysics will is really positeof thatof AdvaitaVed-inta. is at Vedintathis ethics to be surrendered and conduct bottom, forAdvaita a of for finally cognitive attempted synthesis the RUiminuja metaphysics. but two, itwasas naiveas hisother attempts. All the Indianthinkers who wereforunderstanding transcendental the as theprinciple idenof demands monistically subjective-objective preached or in someform other,33 and,muchas we tity-in-difference (bhedabheda) tenable not. whether was logically or at in it find theWest,discussed length thatoncetheprinciple identity-inof Muchas in theWest,again,we find was fromthe transcendental of viewit cameto difference admitted point evenempirical to usedas a master-keyunlock be tooeasily mysteries. VI of in In thehistory philosophy, bothIndiaand theWest,we comeupon to made bya goodnumber philosophers getoutof of stillanother attempt on to thetanglementioned page 23. It is deliberately denythetranscentwo forms. has of dentalcharacter the demands.This attempt assumed the some have deniedonly the transcendental character admitted debut mands(at least manyof these) inevitably actualsthatcan be arrived as the at through simple neither oughtthe of Theyrecognize process inference. intuition. nor to-becharacter thesedemands anykindof transcendental of a of of over-natural forthem, matter inference. is, Metaphysics theso-called them and Thereare others, altogether treat again,who denythedemands as either or only crude, linguistic commonly though accepted, postulates to and or instrumental science common forms, merely life--inanycase,not as of anymetaphysical logicalpositivists, well as philosimport.Modern one and of of ophers the schoolof Analysis thepragmatists America--and to add Locke,Berkeley, Hume,Mill,and Comte--belong thelatter might the wereprobably onlyphilosthe group. AmongIndians, earlyBuddhists Either who might classedwiththem. be the dismissed demands ophers they laterBuddhists as moonshine, some of them, or included, many regarded themas whollyindefinite therefore and to and, unamenable philosophy for thatmatter, anyserious SomeCarvikasand thephilosophers to discipline. to this calledVaitandins carried lineof thinking theextreme point.All of
"RIminuia, ic is true, openly abjured bhedibbeds, but when he did this he had in mind the in spite of difference bhedjibbeda of the Mimizrisakas. He admitted substanciveaiffecciveunity (viis.ta) (bbeda).
OF PHILOSOPHIES INDIA AND THE WEST CLASSICAL
33
subtlearguments it offered them, staggeringly however, shouldbe noted, and analyses. to one beit Western In classical philosophy is difficult find who might weremany.All mentioned above. Butin Indiathere group longto thefirst the thinkers, Vedintinsof the Midhva and Riminuja Nyiya-Vaisesika so and developed provisionschools," theMimirisiphilosophers longas they in this al cognitive also, group.Siraikhya as distinguished belong philosophy that to from Yoga,proclaimed itstaskwastoargue theover-natural tattvasr." as of later We consider theNyiya-Vaiiesika philosopher typical thisgroup. calledphenomenological, to (sometimes Correspondingthetranscendental on in method theWest,we had in Indiareliance scripsometimes intuitive) did or of But Nyiya-Vaisesika notrelypritures sources similar authority. wereconcerned. It truths evenwhensupersensuous on marily suchsources and on out always perception argued itscase strictly thebasisof chastened itself of inference. wentevento theextent justifying It authority thorough and Throughthesemethods---perception inferby meansof inference."8 and a of ence-it developed systematic every theory knowledge metaphysics, touch.As in all goodempiricism, was freefrom mystic the of which point it was held thateverythingan objectin thesenseof beingrevealable is by in is in is which, itsturn, also an object thesamesense--it equally cognition, as as was recognized purely revealed introspection. by Nothing subjective, standsin a thatknowledge It however, self-illuminating. was admitted, of revealed it, on account whichit was to by uniquerelation the content calledsubjective, thething and revealed object.Hencepramina, (cogan the an of was as nitional)instrument discovery, regarded equally objectamong are which things, are onlyusedin a way,muchas weights, objects, though was used as measures weighing for otherthings.This general standpoint intoelaborate of and theories perception (material)inference, developed inchrational. Some of the details whichwereevery of theoverwhelming thatmight edifying modern be to Western thinkers thetheories are details of indeterminate (nirvikalpa) and determinate (savikalpa) perception, whichroughly to of notions acquaintance perand correspond the modern the of and and ceptual judgment,3 theories induction causation, theanalysis of language.This analysis languageand similar of analyses, though along
solutionsof this problemraised on page 23 are not mutuallyexclusive. The "3The different schools of philosophy overlap,unless,of course,one solutionis the corresponding may therefore of exact opposite another. & Chakravarti, Y'tidiPpik (Calcutza: Metropolitan ed., Printing Publishing 3SCf. Pulinbehari verses nos. I a.rdI5. HouseLtd.,1938), opening and withthe a~tude of theVedintins thetaivas. 'sThiswasin sharpcontrast thatit is perception inwould generally iL judgmental caul "Indian thinkers insisting perception, thantheconverse. volving thought, rather
34
and other lines,by theMim~msithinkers theGrammarian philosophers38 as modern semantics theWest. as in were self-complete is and and well-knit, solid, thorough, metaphysicsequally and All of Nyiya-Vai.esika through perception inference. entities the worlddeveloped classified under several with internal external-were and categories, theconas that stant however, these categories suchareonlynominal groups, warning, and universals. Entities transcendent, somenotevenempirical nothing being are substances oftheworld either or motion (dravya),or attributes orinherence orfinal oruniversals (g.ua), (karma), (sdmimnya), unique(samavdya), ness (vilesa), or negation(abhiva)." Each of theseconcepts then was as as and were analyzed thoroughly conceivable, all metaphysical questions with allowed crop andbe dealt to up accordingly. VII Almost problems--ethical, all and metaphysical, religious, psychological, were tackledin classicalWesternphilosophy, many and logical-which morethatare dealtwithin themodern of reduction West,viz.,positivistic the of were etc., complex concepts, study semantics, phenomenological study, treated thoroughly possible classicalIndia. True,someof theimas as in of did the portant problems Western philosophy not even strike Indians. of Theseare theproblems formal of logic,thedetailed study all phenomor thatare thoseidealities enological a priori presuppositions, particularly with formallogic,and the philosophical that have connected problems of out development science.But thiswas quitenaemerged of themodern in Indian interested value (puruwere tural. Classical philosophers superbly in considered highest the value,viz.,freedom particularlywhatthey srtha)., that from interest. this (moksa),anddiscussed those only problems emerged diThis explains whyformal logicand the transcendental presuppositions withit wereexcluded.In Indianphilosophy seldom we connected rectly of and Theirplacewas ocmeetwiththenotion apriority its implications. were those theapriorities of of verdicts scriptures. Naturally only cupiedby were in which found scriptures. considered is or there So faras theempirical positivistic outlook concerned, is scarcely betweenIndian and Westernphilosophies, difference except any serious in thatmodern and its implications wereunknown India. Indians science basedon inferior the modern, to had theirown science, though evidently different altogether. postulates
"'8 e may add Indian rhetoricians. '"S. Bhaduri, Studies in Nyiya-Vaiiieka stitute, 1947). Metaphysics (Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research In-
CLASSICAL PHILOSOPHIES OF INDIA AND THE WEST
35
of difference approach.The transcendental in philosophers theWest were first and all seer-speakers. manner, discovered in apriorities They, whatever In or thenexpressed them, systematically unsystematically. India,on the a intent on was attitude thatof a hearer, learner, other hand,thedominant themor discovered but not havingyet discovered discovering apriorities, themfully.This is whythey relied muchon scriptures. so Evento acquire a a right listen scriptures had first undergo training to suchthat to to they wouldnotbe distorted, also,that might thetruths be discovered one to and, This listening, called not submitblindly be hypnotized. or technically transcendental as was understood alreadyconstituting intuition, fravana, was notconsidered But in enough.The hearer though themaking. eventhis the was required go on continuously to half substantiating truths, realized, by means of arguments and con. (This secondprocesswas called pro manana.) But thiswas again to be followed by a third viz., up process, was a which to serve double called thatof deepconcentration, nididhyisana, if the subconscious doubts, purpose.It was to dissipate philosopher-hearer's was of a and,second, sustained deepening concentration anywerestillleft, and the considered deeperimplications ultimately capable of disclosing knownas jinanaThis last process, whole system relevant of apriorities. at was Platohinted andKantdeveloped a degree to which scidhana, a process in treated all seriousness phenomenologists, and which in modern is times by This logic of the transcendental and vicariously manyexistentialists. by and was elaborated detailby the Yoga of Patafijali, all Indiantranscenin and unlessthey had in themeantime dentalists, swungoverto feeling will this adopted Yoga method. philosophies,4o practically of truths also self-demonstrative: The discovery transcendental was,thus, a own. Indian of evinced system their theinner dialectic these of apriorities and that wereconscious, however, thislogicwas esoteric valid philosophers them to turned expressing for the initiated. When, therefore, they only never shrank from common they through logic. True, publicdemonstration some of theIndianthinkers, that for insisted thesuperSazhkara, example,
we a Whenwe consider transcendental however, find basic philosophy,
us cannot proved ordinary sensuous be reminding of Kantand by logic, at leastbe corroborative added that Hegel. Butthey logic empirical may truths even (anagrahakatarka) wayof halfestablishing supersensuous by views. andrefuting contrary on for reliance testimony and Except this by (Iabda-pram~na), that only
until the end of msnans,had so swungover thoroughrationalists 'Many Indian philosophers, at the last stage. had done that,and Riminula partially. Patauijali openlysuggested it as an alternative. Nyiya-Vsiesi.ka
36
andcycles birth, of if of these, substantiable, addtothefund Western may much exwithout and, loss, may philosophy, ifunsubstantiable, be ignored for inIndia. cept ethical speculations need The The traffic, however, notbe one-way. old Indian philosophy enriched (1) formal into maybe equally by logic,(2) itsdevelopment thetranscendental ofa wholesystem idealities, science, of and (3) study materials way either of The ofnewer (4) philosophyscience. introduction meansnewer clashes here and and outlooks, there inevitably mayoccur there. truth to be faced, skill philosophy precisely lies in But has in and proper adjustment. Rational is local. Butitmay that be philosophynever peoples particular haveparticular ofmind, bents for particular types likings specific ofphilosthe of by may ophy.Thisliking be rational, product age-long thinking a alsobe irrational, circumdeterminedhistorical it particular people; may by stances. may even that different ofphilosophy infundathe It be are, types alternative from them and mentals, among genuine possibilities, thechoice be is therefore irrational merely but not existential. may local Philosophy in anyofthese senses. is doubtful, It this of if from point however,even is view there a philosophy Indian: has millenniums specifically India through almost types philosophy. only all in the The of developed point which hisIndian with torical stand philosophies in sharp contrast thescience-inspired is of therefore,(erroneously) rWest, andwhich, philosophies themodem their is that taken thedistinctive ofIndian as thinkers, philosophies genius
But were dominantly anthropocentric. was thisnot also the characteristic with of course, the untilthe days of Descartes, of Westernphilosophies
transcendental is there hardly serious difference between the thinkers, any attitudes classical in in India,on theone hand,and those the philosophical in as West,on theother.As in theWest,we find Indiaalmost many types ofphilosophy areconceivable. Indians spoken thelaw ofkarma as If had of
last pointto note is that whichever philosophy way proceeds--anthropohas or centrically not--eachcomplete philosophy equallyto facetheproband in order mostappropriate lemsof manand existence, whichever proves of truth. productive
doubtful of of exception the halfmythical philosophy the pre-Sophistic was In in Greek world? India, there anexceptionNyiya-VaiSesika. The too,

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Classical Philosophies of India and the West Author(s): Kalidas Bhattacharyya Reviewed work(s): Source: Philosophy East and

the Indiaand West of

CLASSICALPHILOSOPHIES OF INDIA AND THE WEST

Sri Munsichandra Sinha,1955).

a discussion LogicalPositivism. in a We find parallel

CLASSICAL OF PHILOSOPHIES INDIA AND THE WEST

CLASSICAL OF PHILOSOPHIES INDIA AND THE WEST

CLASSICALPHILOSOPHIES OF INDIA AND THE WEST

covered by nescience (aj~ina);21

and whereverthere is nesciencethereis

OF PHILOSOPHIES INDIA AND THE WEST CLASSICAL

werefully aware in in found anysimilar system theWest. TheseVedintins

CLASSICAL PHILOSOPHIES INDIA AND THE WEST OF V

CI.ASSICAL PHILOSOPHIES INDIA AND THE WEST OF

OF PHILOSOPHIES INDIA AND THE WEST CLASSICAL

CLASSICAL PHILOSOPHIES OF INDIA AND THE WEST

we a Whenwe consider transcendental however, find basic philosophy,

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