CITIZENSHIP CASE DIGESTS VICENTE CHING October 1, 1999 Facts: Vicente Ching is born from a Filipino mother and

a father of Chinese national on April 11, 1964. He took the bar exam subject upon submission of proof of his Phil. Citizenship. He passed the bar at the age of 35 years old. There was a question regarding his citizenship therefore he was not allowed to take oath. The Solicitor General was asked to give comment on the case at bar. ISSUE: WON Ching can be admitted to take oath in consideration of the status of his citizenship.

RULING: The court ruled that Ching, being the "legitimate child of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother born under the 1935 Constitution was a Chinese citizen and continued to be so, unless upon reaching the age of majority he elected Philippine citizenship" 1 in strict compliance with the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 625 entitled "An Act Providing for the Manner in which the Option to Elect Philippine Citizenship shall be Declared by a Person Whose Mother is a Filipino Citizen." He should elect his Phil. Citizenship within a reasonable period of time upon reaching the age of majority which is 21 years old at that time. With almost 14 years that elapsed upon reaching his age of majority, Ching failed to exercise such right of citizenship election beyond a reasonable period of time therefore he cannot be admitted in the Phil. Rolls of atty. for being a Chinese citizen.

In re: Florencio Mallare A.M. No. 533, April 29, 1968 The affidavit of Esteban Mallare, besides being self-serving, is not a substitute for a duly recorded election of Philippine citizenship, assuming that the affiant was qualified to so elect. When Esteban executed it, he was already thirty-six (36) years old and he executed it for the purpose, stated in the last paragraph, of making a change in a miscellaneous lease application wherein he had previously stated that he is a citizen of China. Nor can it be regarded as a re-affirmation of an alleged election of citizenship, since no such previous election was proven to have existed. Esteban Mallare's registration as a voter indicates his desire to exercise a right appertaining exclusively to Filipino citizens but this does not alter his real citizenship, which, in this jurisdiction, is determinable by his blood ( jus sanguinis). Against these pretensions of Philippine citizenship, all the five (5) known children of the spouses Esteban Mallare and Te Na Artemio, Esperanza, Florencio, Paciencia and Raymundo, were registered at birth as children of a Chinese father and a Chinese mother and with the added detail that their parents were born in China. The birth certificate of Esperanza Mallare who was born on 25 October 1939, is particularly significant in this regard, because it bears the father's own signature. If Esteban Mallare was indeed a Filipino by choice, as stated by him in his aforementioned affidavit, then he should have so stated in this birth certificate of his daughter, instead, he admits, against his own interest, that he is a Chinese. Esteban Mallare's own death certificate, over the signature of his son, Artemio Mallare, shows against Artemio's own interest that Esteban was a Chinese, born in Fookiang, China; that he died on 5 June 1945, at the age of 42 and is buried at the Chinese cemetery, having resided in the Philippines for 28 years. The entire family, consisting of the father, mother and their four (4) children (Raymundo was not yet born) were registered as aliens in 1942 in the then Division of Alien Statistics, pursuant to the proclamation of the Commander-in-Chief of the Imperial Japanese Forces in the Philippines and Executive Order No. 25 of the then Executive Commission. .

In addition, the respondent himself was again registered as an alien in 1950, his application thereto bearing his thumbprints and stating therein that he is a Chinese; that he belongs to the yellow race and that he had used these other names: "Tan Jua Gae", "Enciong" and "Jua Gac". He had been a teacher in the Candon Chinese School. His explanation that it was his mother who registered him as an alien is flimsy; and, as stated hereinbefore, he did not present his mother as a witness. The evidence is thus clearly preponderant, if not overwhelming that the respondent's father, Esteban Mallare or "Mallari", also known as "Esteban Dy", "Esteban Dy Mallare" and "Esteban Tan", was and remained a Chinese until he died; consequently, the respondent's mother, admittedly a Chinese, retained her original citizenship and their offspring, respondent, Florencio Mallare, together with his brothers and sisters, are likewise Chinese nationals, through and through.

CO VERSUS HRET G.R. No. 92191-92, July 30, 1991 Facts: Petitioner Antonio Co ran for Congressman of the 2nd District of Samar. Private respondent Jose Ong, Jr. was declared winner. Although Ongs mother is a natural bornFilipina, his father was only naturalized as a Filipino when the respondent was already nine years old. Given these facts, petitioner contends that Ong is not a natural-born Filipino citizen and therefore disqualified from being elected Congressman. Issue: WON Ong is a natural-born Filipino citizen. Ruling: Affirmative. Section 15 of the Revised Naturalization Act squarely applies its benefit to him for he was then a minor residing in this country. Concededly, it was the law itself that had already elected Philippine citizenship for Ong by declaring him as such. The petitioners argue that the respondents father was not, validly, a naturalized citizen because of his premature taking of the oath of citizenship. The Court cannot go into the collateral procedure of stripping Mr. Ongs father of his citizenship after his death and at this very late date just so we can go after the son. In our jurisdiction, an attack on a persons citizenship may only be done through a direct action for its nullity. Bengson III vs The House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal G.R. No. 142840, May 7, 2001 Bengson and Cruz were rivals in the 1998 elections in the 2nd District of Pangasinan. They were running for Congress. Cruz won by a significant margin over the incumbent Bengson. Bengson then filed a Quo Warranto proceeding in the HRET alleging that Cruz is not a natural born citizen, as defined by law; hence he should be disqualified from holding office. The HRET subsequently declared and affirmed Cruz as the winner. Bengson filed a motion for reconsideration alleging that Cruz was indeed born a Filipino and he is defined under the 1935 Constitution as a natural born citizen. Cruz however lost his citizenship when he enlisted in the US Army in 1985. He also swore allegiance to the US without consent from the Philippines. Cruz, on the other hand, argued that he regained his Filipino Citizenship by virtue of RA 2630 which provides that Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship by rendering service to, or accepting commission in, the Armed Forces of the United States, or after separation from the Armed Forces of the United States, acquired United States citizenship, may reacquire Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. Bengson insists that Article IV, Section 2 of the Constitution expressly states that natural-born citizens are those who are citizens from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect such citizenship. ISSUE: Whether or not Cruz is a natural-born citizen. HELD: Petitioners contention that respondent Cruz is no longer a natural-born citizen since he had to perform an act to regain his citizenship is untenable. As correctly explained by the HRET in its decision, the term natural-born citizen was first defined in Article III, Section 4 of the 1973 Constitution as follows: Sec. 4. A natural-born citizen is one who is a citizen of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship.

As defined in the same Constitution, natural-born citizens are those citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship. In respondent Cruzs case, he lost his Filipino citizenship when he rendered service in the Armed Forces of the United States. However, he subsequently reacquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 2630. Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.

TECSON VS. COMELEC 424 SCRA 277; G.R. No. 161434; 3 Mar 2004 Facts: Victorino X. Fornier, petitioner initiated a petition before the COMELEC to disqualify FPJ and to deny due course or to cancel his certificate of candidacy upon the thesis that FPJ made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by claiming to be a natural-born Filipino citizen when in truth, according to Fornier, his parents were foreigners; his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and his father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject. Granting, petitioner asseverated, that Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen, he could not have transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child of an alien mother. Petitioner based the allegation of the illegitimate birth of respondent on two assertions - first, Allan F. Poe contracted a prior marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez before his marriage to Bessie Kelley and, second, even if no such prior marriage had existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie Kelly only a year after the birth of respondent. Issue: Whether or Not FPJ is a natural born Filipino citizen. Held: It is necessary to take on the matter of whether or not respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen, which, in turn, depended on whether or not the father of respondent, Allan F. Poe, would have himself been a Filipino citizen and, in the affirmative, whether or not the alleged illegitimacy of respondent prevents him from taking after the Filipino citizenship of his putative father. Any conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo Pou could only be drawn from the presumption that having died in 1954 at 84 years old, Lorenzo would have been born sometime in the year 1870, when the Philippines was under Spanish rule, and that San Carlos, Pangasinan, his place of residence upon his death in 1954, in the absence of any other evidence, could have well been his place of residence before death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from the "en masse Filipinization" that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. That citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would thereby extend to his son, Allan F. Poe, father of respondent FPJ. The 1935 Constitution, during which regime respondent FPJ has seen first light, confers citizenship to all persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of whether such children are legitimate or illegitimate.

But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on hand still would preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he cannot be held guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in violation of Section 78, in relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus Election Code.

MERCADO VS. MANZANO 307 SCRA 630; G.R. NO. 135083; 26 MAY 1999 Facts: Petitioner Ernesto Mercado and Private respondent Eduardo Manzano are candidates for the position of Vice-Mayor of Makati City in the May, 1998 elections. Private respondent was the winner of the said election but the proclamation was suspended due to the petition of Ernesto Mamaril regarding the citizenship of private respondent. Mamaril alleged that the private respondent is not a citizen of the Philippines but of the United States. COMELEC granted the petition and disqualified the private respondent for being a dual citizen, pursuant to the Local Government code that provides that persons who possess dual

citizenship are disqualified from running any public position. Private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration which remained pending until after election. Petitioner sought to intervene in the case for disqualification. COMELEC reversed the decision and declared private respondent qualified to run for the position. Pursuant to the ruling of the COMELEC, the board of canvassers proclaimed private respondent as vice mayor. This petition sought the reversal of the resolution of the COMELEC and to declare the private respondent disqualified to hold the office of the vice mayor of Makati. Issue: Whether or Not private respondent is qualified to hold office as Vice-Mayor.

Held: Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states. For instance, such a situation may arise when a person whose parents are citizens of a state which adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Private respondent is considered as a dual citizen because he is born of Filipino parents but was born in San Francisco, USA. Such a person, ipso facto and without any voluntary act on his part, is concurrently considered a citizen of both states. Considering the citizenship clause (Art. IV) of our Constitution, it is possible for the following classes of citizens of the Philippines to posses dual citizenship: (1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries which follow the principle of jus soli; (2) Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the laws of their fathers country such children are citizens of that country; (3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latters country the former are considered citizens, unless by their act or omission they are deemed to have renounced Philippine citizenship. Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an individuals volition.

By filing a certificate of candidacy when he ran for his present post, private respondent elected Philippine citizenship and in effect renounced his American citizenship. The filing of such certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce his American citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification he might have as a dual citizen. By declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant of another country; that he will defend and support the Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that he does so without mental reservation, private respondent has, as far as the laws of this country are concerned, effectively repudiated his American citizenship and anything which he may have said before as a dual citizen. On the other hand, private respondents oath of allegiance to the Philippine, when considered with the fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood, received his education, practiced his profession as an artist, and taken part in past elections in this country, leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine citizenship.

REPUBLIC VERSUS DELA ROSA 232 SCRA 785 On July 6, 1960, Santiago Gatchalian, grandfather of William Gatchalian, was recognized by the BOI as a native born Filipino citizen. Santiago Gatchalian testified that he has 5 children. On June 27, 1961, William Gatchalian then a twelve year old minor arrived in Manila and sought admission as Filipino citizen which was eventually granted by the board of special inquiry. However, the Secretary of Justice issued a memorandum setting aside all decisions and directed the Board of Commissions to review all cases where entry was allowed among which was that of William Gatchalian. ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage of Gatchalian in China is valid in accordance with Philippine law.

HELD: The Supreme Court held that in the absence of the evidence to the contrary foreign laws on a particular subject are presumed to be the same as those of the Philippines. This is known as Processual Presumption. In this case, there being no proof of Chinese law relating to marriage, there arises a presumption that it is the same of that of Philippine law the said marriage then is declared valid. Therefore, William Gatchalian following the citizenship of his father is a Filipino citizen.

FRIVALDO VS. COMELEC 174 SCRA 245; G.R. NO. 87193; 23 JUN 1989 Facts: Petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor-elect of the province of Sorsogon on January 22, 1988, and assumed office in due time. On October 27, 1988, the League of Municipalities, Sorsogon Chapter, represented by its President, Estuye, who was also suing in his personal capacity, filed with the COMELEC a petition for the annulment of Frivaldo; election and proclamation on the ground that he was not a Filipino citizen, having been naturalized in the United States on January 20, 1983. In his answer dated May 22, 1988, Frivaldo admitted that he was naturalized in the United States as alleged but pleaded the special and affirmative defenses that he had sought American citizenship only to protect himself against President Marcos. His naturalization, he said, was "merely forced upon himself as a means of survival against the unrelenting persecution by the Martial Law Dictator's agents abroad." He added that he had returned to the Philippines after the EDSA revolution to help in the restoration of democracy. In their Comment, the private respondents reiterated their assertion that Frivaldo was a naturalized American citizen and had not reacquired Philippine citizenship on the day of the election on January 18, 1988. He was therefore not qualified to run for and be elected governor. They also argued that their petition in the Commission on Elections was not really for quo warranto under Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code. The ultimate purpose was to prevent Frivaldo from continuing as governor, his candidacy and election being null and void ab initio because of his alienage. Speaking for the public respondent, the Solicitor General supported the contention that Frivaldo was not a citizen of the Philippines and had not repatriated himself after his naturalization as an American citizen. As an alien, he was disqualified from public office in the Philippines. His election did not cure this defect because the electorate of Sorsogon could not amend the Constitution, the Local Government Code, and the Omnibus Election Code. He also joined in the private respondent's argument that Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code was not applicable because what the League and Estuye were seeking was not only the annulment of the proclamation and election of Frivaldo. He agreed that they were also asking for the termination of Frivaldo's incumbency as governor of Sorsogon on the ground that he was not a Filipino.

Issue: Whether or Not petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo was a citizen of the Philippines at the time of his election on January 18, 1988, as provincial governor of Sorsogon.

Held: The reason for this inquiry is the provision in Article XI, Section 9, of the Constitution that all public officials and employees owe the State and the Constitution "allegiance at all times" and the specific requirement in Section 42 of the Local Government Code that a candidate for local elective office must be inter alia a citizen of the Philippines and a qualified voter of the constituency where he is running. Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that a qualified voter must be, among other qualifications, a citizen of the Philippines, this being an indispensable requirement for suffrage under Article V, Section 1, of the Constitution. In the certificate of candidacy he filed on November 19, 1987, Frivaldo described himself as a "natural-born" citizen of the Philippines, omitting mention of any subsequent loss of such status. The evidence shows, however, that he was naturalized as a citizen of the United States in 1983 per the following certification from the United States District Court, Northern

District of California, as duly authenticated by Vice Consul Amado P. Cortez of the Philippine Consulate General in San Francisco, California, U.S.A. The Court sees no reason not to believe that the petitioner was one of the enemies of the Marcos dictatorship. Even so, it cannot agree that as a consequence thereof he was coerced into embracing American citizenship. His feeble suggestion that his naturalization was not the result of his own free and voluntary choice is totally unacceptable and must be rejected outright. This Court will not permit the anomaly of a person sitting as provincial governor in this country while owing exclusive allegiance to another country. The fact that he was elected by the people of Sorsogon does not excuse this patent violation of the salutary rule limiting public office and employment only to the citizens of this country. The qualifications prescribed for elective office cannot be erased by the electorate alone. The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly believed, as in this case, that the candidate was qualified. Obviously, this rule requires strict application when the deficiency is lack of citizenship. If a person seeks to serve in the Republic of the Philippines, he must owe his total loyalty to this country only, abjuring and renouncing all fealty and fidelity to any other state.

It is true as the petitioner points out that the status of the natural-born citizen is favored by the Constitution and our laws, which is all the more reason why it should be treasured like a pearl of great price. But once it is surrendered and renounced, the gift is gone and cannot be lightly restored. This country of ours, for all its difficulties and limitations, is like a jealous and possessive mother. Once rejected, it is not quick to welcome back with eager arms its prodigal if repentant children. The returning renegade must show, by an express and unequivocal act, the renewal of his loyalty and love. Petition Dismissed. Petitioner JUAN G. FRIVALDO is hereby declared not a citizen of the Philippines and therefore disqualified from serving as Governor of the Province of Sorsogon. Accordingly, he is ordered to vacate his office and surrender the same to the duly elected Vice-Governor of the said province once this decision becomes final and executory.

LABO VERSUS COMELEC 176 SCRA 1 Mayor of Baguio City; Australian citizenship; bigamous marriage Res judicata does not apply to questions of citizenship; Modes by which Philippine citizenship may be lost: a. naturalization in a foreign country b. express renunciation of citizenship c. subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the Constitution or laws of a foreign country; annulment of Labos Australian citizenship as a result of finding that his marriage to an Australian national was bigamous did not automatically restore his Philippine citizenship; Philippine citizenship may be acquired by direct act of Congress; by naturalization or by repatriation.

Yu v. Defensor Santiago 169 SCRA 364 Portuguese passport Yus act of applying for a Portuguese passport despite his naturalization as a Philippine citizen and his act of declaring his nationality as Portuguese in commercial documents, constitute an EXPRESS renunciation of his Philippine citizenship acquired through naturalization; Philippine citizenship is not a commodity or ware to be displayed when required and suppressed when convenient

Aznar v. Commission on Elections 185 SCRA 703 In this case, Emilio Lito Osmea filed his certificate of candidacy with the COMELEC for the position of Provincial Governor of Cebu in the 18 January 1988 elections. Petitioner, Jose B. Aznar, filed with the COMELEC a petition for the disqualification of Osmea on the ground that he is not a Filipino citizen since he is a citizen of the United States. COMELEC en banc decided to suspend the proclamation. Osmea maintained that he is a Filipino citizen, alleging that (1) he is the legitimate child of Dr. Emilio D. Osmea, a Filipino and son of the late President Sergio Osmea, Sr., (2) that he is a holder of a valid and subsisting Philippine Passport, (3) that he was continuously residing in the Philippines since birth and has not gone out of the country for more than six months, and (4) that he has been a registered voter in the Philippines since 1965. The court held that the Aznars contention was not meritorious. Aznars argument that Osmea is not a Filipino citizen and therefore, disqualified from running for and being elected to the office of Governor of Cebu, is not supported by substantial and convincing evidence. Aznar failed to provide proof that Osmea has lost the citizenship by any of the modes provided for under C.A. No. 63, these are: (1) by naturalization in a foreign country, (2) by express renunciation of citizenship, or (3) by subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the Constitution or laws of a foreign country. Osmea did not lose his Philippine citizenship in any of the modes provided. By virtue of his being a son of a Filipino father, the presumption that Osmea is a Filipino remains. In this case, Osmea denies having taken the oath of allegiance of the United States. He is a holder of a valid and subsisting Philippine passport and has continuously participated in the electoral process in this country since 1963. The court held that the dissent of Mr. Justice Teodoro Padilla, that because Osmea obtained certificates of Alien Registration as an American citizen, the first in 1958 when he was 24 years old and the second in 1979, he should be regarded as having expressly renounced Philippine citizenship, does not hold water. The court in this case held that Osmea is still a Filipino citizen. It may also be noted he was not even declared a dual citizen. TALAROC VERSUS UY 92 Phil 52 Application of res judicata [abandoned with finality in Tiao Tiam versus Republic 101 Phil 195 Facts: Alejandro Uy was elected as Municipal Mayor of Manticao, Misamis Oriental on Nov 13, 1951 . One of the losing candidates (TALAROC) fild a petition for quo warranto vs. Uy [allegedly, Uy is a CHINESE CITIZEN]. The court granted quo warranto petition and the position was deemed vacant. Uy filed an appeal and alleged that: (1) father was a subject of China (Uy Piangco) but had a Filipino mother (2) born in Iligan, Province of Lanao in 1912 (so at the time this case was filed he was around 40 y.o. (3) never been to China (4) voted in previous elections, held offices in the government (inspector of Bureau of Plant Industry, public school teacher, filing clerk, acting municipal treasurer) (5) her mother was born a Filipino citizen but was only required to be a Chinese citizen by reason of his father's national laws. Upon the death of Uy's father (in 1917), his mother reacquired her Filipino citizenship WON: Uy is a Filipino Citizen HELD: YES He was already a Filipino citizen by reason of his birth - he was born in RP, and jus soli was followed at the time of his birth Though his father is Chinese, his mother is Filipina. Upon death of his father, his mother reacquired her Filipino citizenship and he thus followed the nationality of his mom. He already exercised rights of a Filipino citizen