Social Scientist

Class, Political and National Dimensions of the State Autonomy Movements in India Author(s): Javeed Alam Reviewed work(s): Source: Social Scientist, Vol. 10, No. 8 (Aug., 1982), pp. 14-31 Published by: Social Scientist Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3516850 . Accessed: 08/12/2011 01:04
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Social Scientist is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Social Scientist.

http://www.jstor.org

JAKEEDALAM*

of Dimensions the Class,Politicaland National in Movements India State Autonomy

THE debateaboutthe natureof the IndianFederationas laid down inthe Constitutionhas gone on for about three decades now. The generaltrendof opinionhas been to treat it as a federalconstitution but with a very strong unitary bias. Its working during the last on threedecades, however,has been pronouncedly unitarylines along of on with a steadyencroachment the powers the States, whichmeans to that the Constitutionprovidesmechanisms the Centreto encroach upon and curtail the rights and powersof the constituent States. Moreover,provisionsthat make the Centre all-powerfulas against the States also tend to strengthen the executive as against the 1 legislature. This trendtowards centralisationendangerscivil llbertiesof the people, as was clearlyshownduringthe Emergency. The issue of State autonomythereforeis clearlytied to the questionof democratic people. rightsand civil libertiesof the common of centralisation power culminatingin the EmerIncreasing gencycannotbe treated just as a constitutional aberration.2 The to inabilityandhesitationsof the Janata gourernment dismantle all provisionsand to overhaulthe Constitutionon demothe Emergency cratic lines, testify to the limitationsof the rulingclassesin Indiain rightsof the people. And after the 1980 the protecting democratic of the threatof authoritarianism course has elections, parliamentary form. The contention of this paperis in a pronounced reappeared danger that the processof centralisation,as well as the authoritarian its roots {n the very path of development it, that accompanies has by pursued the rulingclassesin India. The Indianrulingclasses, withinwhichthe bourgeoisieis the
leading element, have all along sought to develop India along capatalist lines. The specafic features of this path of development are the main determinants of development and consolidation of classes as well as the internal differentiations and conflicts that arise among the
*Centre for Sttldies in Social Sciences, Calcutta.

STATEAUTONOMY

15

rullngclasses. Oneway, or ratherthe more useful way, of understanding both the processof centralisation potiticalpowerandthe of manifestation the counter-tendency the shapeof the demands of in for'State autonomy'is to looScat it, at one levelSthrough this consolidation differentiation rulingclassesand how they seek and of to manage and, at anotherlevel, to relatelt to the growingdemoit cratic aspirations concretestruggles the common people, the and of working class andthe peasantry. Most of the demandsfor State autonomy can, in fact, be traced back to eitherthe contradictions among rulingclassesor the effortsof the working class and the the peasantry fight for and realisea democraticeconomy a demoto and craticpolity. To cometo a preciseunderstanding these demands of for Stateautonomy is essentialto graspthe underlyingforcesthat it providethe pushtowardsthe centralisation politicalpower. of

CentralisationInherent in Capitalist Development

The developmentof capitalism necessitates, as one of its conditions,the formation larger of markets commodity for production. Thisnecessityplus the requiremWntsbig capital demandgrowing of centralisation. The centralisation state poweris in part a reflecof tion of this lawof centralisation inherentin the capitalist development. The consequent erosionof the rightsof the States or denial of autonomy themis not simplya matterof will of this or that to leaderor this or that party in a pure subjective sense, although, as will be shownlater,suchfactorsdo playa role in a givenobjective configuration politicalpower. Hencethe issue of State autonomy of andStaterights is more than a question of simple choice between federalandunitarypreferences a mere constitut on ional level. The issue is closely bound to the sphere of operationof the law of centralisation inherentin the capitalistpath of development. It maynot be out of place here,evenif by way of digression, to note that such a tendencytowards centralisationand concentration of political power has been universal in the constitutional evolution of all 'liberal democracies'. It has been clearly discernible evenin the advanced capitalist states of West Europe andNorthAmerica. Whathas come to be describedby political analystsas the growthin the powersof the federalgovernment the in USA andotherfederations also its concentration and with the executive-President or PrimeMinaster Cabinet is in actualfact the and working of the tendency out inherentin the operations big capital of notedabove. Anyempirical-temporal analysisof the centralisation of politicalpoweror majorshifts in the constitutionalfunctioning in favourof federal governments advancedcapitalist states would in showthat sucha development generallyfolJowedthe rise of big has capitalor monopolies the dominant as element in the economies of thesesocieties.

SOCIALSCIENTIST

Thereis however a speciScally political aspect whichis no less significant. It is, in fact, crucialin of the problem tion of tendencies. It the materialisaworks specificshapeto the working to impede or facilitate and to give a out of inherent terms,in mostof the tendencies. In concrete advanced capitaliststates where survived withoutinterruptionthe democracies have iisationand the centralisation time lag betweeneconomiccentraof aswell as varying politicalpowerhasbeenconsiderable betweendifferent societies. The consensus economists to trace the is among development monopolies to of last centllryand the beginningof the end of lysts wouldtrace concomitant this, whereas constitutional anain 1930's.The time lag as well developments polity to around the as happened been due to the the particular ways sn which this has political conditions the division among the ruling class parties, the extenk and natureof challenge the :ruling to depth of classes by the strength conventionsand revolutionaryforces, the of etc.The waythe process traditions, institutional impediments, worksout in diSerent andneeds societies is complex empirical determinationand therefore cannot be gone into here, althoughI intendto delineatesomeof its concrete in caseof India. the aspects All that needsto be noted here is tl1at the capital s llot the sameas khe centralisation of of two aspectsmay interlockor centralisation state power. These diverge. As a general can that ill the say observation, one 'democracies' the underdeveloped of the advanced world, unlike capitaliststates, the tendency is for the political to proceed aheadas is far aspect evidencedby the latter-day in, fromIndia, apart developments Ceylon, Malaysia, It to be the case seems thePhilippinesand Mexico. that in the crisis-ridden ofthe World, Third containment popular capitalist economies of repression democratic of mass fnovements compel a much greater urges and centralisation powerthan of state degree of necessitatedby the lawsof motion of in themselves. capital It is here in the of specificities of the crisis underdexreloped economies and their political the classesthat the ruling consequencesfor roots response centralised of the authoritarian dictatorical of the state powerlie. This is and a dangerous also whatgives dimension to the against such the moves toward centralisationandputs struggle moves in the forefront of stru$gle. the democratic

16

Nature of Political Cerltralisatiosl

In India in particular, the was facilitated tile moreor less processof poltical centralisation by uninterrupted of the Congress party Srst 30 rule for the years States necessitated both at the Centre and n most of the andwas by the challengesto the Congress rule. Behindthe Congress hegemony the of manoeuvreswerethe desperate moves of an insecure bourgeoisie the face of the in mountingcrisis of

STATE AUTONOMY

17

the capitalist pathof development. In fact, due to the failuresof the economy evenmitigatethe hardships the people,solvingthe to of basicproblems apart,the Indian political systesn beenin a state has of semi-permanent crisis. The politlcal dominance the Congress of andits hegvmonyoverstate power not only helpedjt to containby repression manipulations or the recurrentpolitical crises but also aggravated, the very logic of the situation, tlle tendencytowards by the centralisation and concentration political power. Giventhe of natureof divisionsamongthe rulingclass parties in India, the Congresshad no difficultyin convert,ingthis centralised power into authoritarian in the shapeof the Emergency. The consequence, rule as we have all experiencedin gruesomeform, was not just the a erosionoffederal prsncaples the negation of State rights and and powersbut also a complete negationof the democraticrights and civil libertiesofthe people, including sectionsofthe rulingclasses.
It is in the context of these developmentsof the recent past and the pronounced threat of their recurrencein the immediate future that the struggle aroundtlle demand for State autonomy assumes central importance and its integral link wth the struggle for democratic rights of the people is clearly revealed. Within the perspective given above, I will look at the interconnections between the class and political dimensions in the working out of the process of centralisation of state power. I will also go into the class roots and class needs of different State autonomy movements RDIndia. Given the dlvergent class bases of different movements, eg. the Akalis or different parties representing the Dravidean movement or Jammuand Kashmiror West Bengal etc., it is also necessaryto see if any objective complementarities exist between these movements. Eiinally,in a multinational state like ours, the problem is also closely bound up with questaonsof political unity and therefore is also an aspect of the national question. Before taking up each of these, a few brief remarks about some of the state institutions used by the ruling classes are in order. The constitutions in class divided societies, 1ike those of India, reflect the class relations of those societies, and the shifting emphasis in the workingout of political correlations as well as the underlying class conflicts. Given the existence of the elements of different modes of production in lndia, there is a correspondingmultiplJcit of ruling classes. In such a situatlon, the ruling classes have of necess,ityto function as a:n alliance even if the interests of the different ruling classes do not coincide at specific points of tame, as indeed happens in practice when the type of growth and the economic policies neces sary for capitalist development are not the ones most suitable for the growth or maintenanceof landlordism. But the imperativesof pre-

serving state power force the rUliDg classesinto a compromise and henceinto an alliance.Historically alliarace therulvng an of classes can

18

SOCIALSCIENTIST

function effectively only under the leadership of a certain class. In India, the general consensus among the Marxist scholars and activists has been to assign to the bourgeoisie such a leading role although sersous disagreements persist concerning the nature of the Indian bourgeoisie.3 The leading class in an alliance maintains its leadership by guaranteeingthe general interests of the alliance partners and by seeing to it that {ts own interests are guaranteedby the state. In the ruling class alliance when monopolist forces are in ascendancy, moves resulting in the centralisation of power at tlle Centre become necesfi sary because from there the leading element the big bourgeoisie in the alliance attempts to protect its own specific interests. It also happens that within the state institutions there is a move towards the concentration of power in the executive. lt is possible to see here that centralisation at the Centre and concentration of power in the executive where parties function as the visible instrumentalities, provide a cloak for the bourgeoisie to exercise its leadership within the institutional networks of power as well as to meet more effectively the growing challenge of the working classes and peasantry. ln the process of governancewhen internal conflicts or contradictions emerge or sharpen between the different sections of a class or between different ruling classes within the alliance they are sought to be managedthroughbargainJng, conflicts and compromises.The contradictions among the ruling classes, their internal management and the perceptJonand assessment of these by the political leadership of the ruting classes are critical in understandingthe growth, consolidation and decline of the ruling class parties. These can help to explain, in spite of important discontinuities, the great similarities between the periods 1967-1969 and 1977-1979 with respect to the fortunes of the political partes as well as to the heightened articulation of the demand for State autonomy. Both these periods witnessed the decline of the Congress party and the emergenceof the regional political parties and formations to political prominence. Tn both the situations, apart from one or two States, tlle regional or regionally-basedparties that gained at the cost of the Congressparty were the ruling class regional parties. Similarly, the parties which formedgovernmentsin different States on both these occasions, wereprovidingopposition to the Congress party both at the Centre and in the States within a frameworkof unified-all-Indiaclass-preferences, e.g., Akalis in Punjab, the Bharatiya Kranti Dal ill Uttar Pradesh, the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagamin Tamil Nadu, etc. It is pc)sssbleto argue here that the growth and consolidation of the regionll ruling class parties have been generally conditioned by the interests of the locally placed ruling class groups like the landlords asld kulaks in Punjab, Haryana, western U. P., etc. or the non-big bourgeoisie in Tamil Nadu. It seems to me plausible to argue that

STATEAUTONOMY

19

in differentiation landedinterestsbetweendiSerent States is due to by and distributionof investments concessions the Centre differential on top of the historically inherited consequencesof land tenures, etc. of and landdevelopment productivity land, crop special,isation, the inabilityof the state to dole out ln situationsof economiccrisis atl landedinterestsuniformly over leads to concessions the dominant This is likelyto and consequentdissatisfaction. to discrimination lead to conflictsof interestwithin the same ruling class acrossthe way,the non-bigbourgeonsie regions. Llkewise,thoughin a different by hampered the operation of the market laws maybe objectively and whichfavourbigbourgeoisie thus impedethe growth of locally placed non-big bourgeoisgroups. Such a condition, aloxlg with seemsto provide oppression, feelingsof linguistic-cultural crystallised the materialbasis for non-bigbourgeoisiein certain clearly demarlike composition TamilNado cated regionswith a distinct population to strikean alllance with the landlordsthere in a potent regional like -formation the Dravidian movement. Under circumstances these, the locallyplacedrulingclass groups seek greater powerfor so the through regional parties in power or opposit}on themselves that these can be used to furtber their own interest when their as interestsareperceived not beingbest servedby the all-tndiaruling discontent like Undercircumstances these, the popular classparties. of due to the deepening economiccrisis is availedof by these ruling class groupsto build up oppositionalpolitics within a unified allprovidesone objectile Indiaclass framework. Such a configuratio7 aut07t0mvv and thrt1e seek greater movements on bround whichregional tor theStates. witl] the As a consequenceof the above, during 1967-1969, partyas the politicalmonolithandthe coming declineof the Congress the politicalparties and formations, quesof to prominence regionat relationswas posedwith a new sharpness. The tion of Centre-State of the recurrence the same phenoperiodalso witnessed 1977-1979 and menon. But there is a distlnct differencebetween 1967-1969 the although similaritiesare significant.The 1967defeatof 1977-1979 rule was the Congress only partialanddid not threatenthe Congress at the Centre.Unlike 1977whenthe routwastotal, the 1967elections to by left openthe possibilityof tactical manoeuvres the Congress it then to have overtaken containthe political crisis which seemed operations" defeatof 1967led to "toppling for good. TheCongress with the use of Congresspowerat the Centrealong with a tactcal to shift to the left with recourse radical slogansand rhetoricin a mannerthan ever before. The successof muchmore pronounced these moves depended,among others, on the powerat the Centre whichfacilitated supportiveState actionsin favourof the political of factioll underIndiraGandhi. The split of 1969wasthe beginning ruleof of a newphasethe culnzination which wasthe authoritarian

20

SOCIALSCIENTIST

IndiraGandhi and the proclamation internalemergency. It was of duringthese years that the pace of centralisationand concentration of state powersvas at ts fastest. On the other hand, the natureof the Janatarule later, as distinguished fromthe Congress party,posed the question whether a conglomerationof erstwhile parties with separate party programmes and social constituencies to cater for couldhavetransformed itself into a monolithicpartyas the Congress has beenduring the last decadeandmore. Sucha monolithicparty is a necessary conditionfor crisis management throughcentralisation and authoritarian methods. The conglomeratenatureof the Janata partymadeit diflicultfor it to unify effectivelythe differentsections of the ruling classes underits leadership. This precludedthe possibility of an authoritarianrulein spite of the inherent tendencyof the ruling classesin a crisis-riddeneconomy to meet the growing massmovements throughathoritarian solutions.

What Happenedunderthe Janata Rule

The natureof the Janataruleand the party situation prevailing then provide us with a usefulbasisforexamining concrete in detail the interplay betweenthe powerof the ruling classes and the organised politicat forcesin the actualworking of the specificforms out of class rule. Let us thereforeexaminethe partysituataonprevailing then a bit more closely. The post-Emergency partysitualtion be can summarised follows: as Twomainnational-level parties,the Congress the Janata, and represented interestsof the entirerulingclasses. ThrWe the regional parties representedthe interests of the locally based ruling classesbut they also operated within certainhistorically demarcated nationalityregioIls AIADMK(All lndia AnnaDMK)/DMKin Tamil Nadu,Akali Dal in PunjabandtheNationalConferencein Jammuand Kashmir. The left-democraticforces were crystallesedan the two communist partiesor movements,the CPI(M) and the CPI, with the CPI adopting collaborationist positions from time to time. There were,as now, countless factions of CPI (ML) at loggerheads with each otherbut all of themadoptingadventurist postures. Tnaddition, there werea numberof regionally based smaller parties, both left andright, like the Peasantsand Workers Party,the MuslimLeague,the differentJharkhand Morchas,the Forward Bloc, the Revolutionary Socialist Party, the Socialist Unity Centre, the KeralaCongresses,the Majlis-e-Ittehad-ul-Muslameen, etc. It was not possibleat anypointof timeto sayanything definiteaboutthe .ery anti-Indira Congress faction, givenits predilection for vacillation. The natureof the Janata party in power at the Centre was unlikeany otherparty. It was not only a conglomerate erstwhile of partieswith different programmes noted earlier, but was also an as outcomeof a rapidcomingtogether of disparate opposition groups

STATE AUTONOMY

of the rulingclasses. Onenednot go into the extraordinary situation that broughtthem together. Suffice to point out here that it most of themhadearlierrepresented,as they continued to do after theyfell out, sectionsof the rulingclasses, viz., Jana Sangh of the commericial petty-bourgeoisie feudallandlords certainregions, or in the BLDIBKD/Lok of landlords kulaksin threeor fourStates Dal and of northern India, Swatantra the bourgeoisie erstwhile feudal of and lords;the Congress was the only partythat represented, the (O) like IndiraCongress, interestsof the entire rulng class, and it was the the socialistparties on]ywhichnever represented close identity any with any class exceptto present a vague combinationof petty-bourgeosradicalismand peasant populism. The spectrum interests of represented viewpointspresentedmadeit no different from the and Congressin terms ofthe classinterests.4 Moreover,becauseof the fact of being pushed togetherall of a sudden,it couldnot work out a viablecompromise formula whichcouldprovidea basisfor intra-party conRictmanagement. Consequently,differencesbetween factions alwaysassumedthe shapeof bickerings personality and clashes. Sucha conglomeration ruledat the Centre but its different constituentswerein dominance differentStatesin uneasy alliance in with other constituents. In the absence a viable compromise of formula, theirdifferent social basesandmasssupport forcedthemto horse-trade wthin the Janata so tilt the policies that their mass to supports couldbe sustained. It also happenedthat the Janataparty was muchmoredependent its ruleon the variousregional parties for thanwas the Congress exceptfor a briefwhile during1969-1971.The absenceof internalcohesionas well as intra-party consensuson vital issuesor on modalities handling'crisis' situations madeit diSiof cult for {t to impose its will or to effectively protect or guide the rulingclasses. All this made the federal process in Indianpolitics muchmorefluidandopen to bargaining it alsofacilitatedthe asseras tion of people'spowerin both organised and unorganised ways. Such a situationdid not lead to any alteratJon the rightsof States in a in constitutional-legal sensebut gavea considerable margin politically to States under differentpolitical persuations,like West Bengals to strikean independent pathwithoutthe fear of beingtoppledor excessivelyharassed. Likewise, the toilingpeoplecouldalso, in spite of bulletsas usual, barginbettervia-a-visthe rulingclasspower. I will comebackto this point later again. The partysituationas summarised abovedednot fundamentally alter the divisionof masseson ideologicalgrounds. Ideologicallythe maindivisionof masseswhichrepresentedthe salient political cleavagewas betweenpeoplewho supportedthe two main ruling class parties and thosewho supported various regionallybased ruling the class parties1ike the Akalis, AIADMKIDMK, National Conference, etc. As againstthis therewas and has been a growingnumberof

21

22

SOCIAL SCIENTJST

people who supported partieswhich the providedthe left-democratic alternative the bourgeois to politics. This divesion not, fromall ideologicalpoint of view, fundawas mentally different from what existed earlier. But therewasa very significant fact: the supportfor the rulingclass part-ies became, and was becomingsmoreand mole atomisedand relativelyevenlyspread whereas earlier it was concentratedaroundone ruling class party, the Congress party. Moreover, left forces, especiallythe CPI(M), the became relatively much more powerful than ever before without, however, having become decisivein the all-lndia context. The implications the polatical for processof thisdevelopment the conglomeratenatureof the Janataparty, the atomisation of other ruling class parties and the growthof left forces-were of far-reaching importance. Sucha situation provided conducive a atmospherefor the assertionof people's power mass movements, working class struggles, peasantagitations,etc. as well as for the strugglefor and the consolidationof the rightsand autonomy various constituent of States; the notable example of this was the comparative ease with which the Left Front-led governmentof West Bengal could push through with radicalreforms. Whatneedsto be noted here is the conglomerate natureof the Janatapartyandits inabilityto unifythe rulingclassesunder its leadership; in other words, what became decisivewas the absenceof a monolith like the Congress party. As mentioned earlier,in a crlsisridden situationthe multiplicity ruling of classescalls for a political monolithas one of the conditionsfor the effectiveenforcement their writ. of Thereforewhile the conglomeratenatureof the Janata party andthe fact of atomisationof rulingclass partiesdid not changethe class character the Indian state, it madethe handlingof internal of contradictions amongthe ruling classes rllore difficultand complex. Thefact that the constituent groups within the Janata party were not wholly unidirectionalin termsof their relativeclass preferences between one groupor faction of ruling class or another led to a tussle betweenfactions representing interestsof different the classes. To consolidate their political hold sonze factions, especiallythe BLD/LokDal. soughtto strengthen class interests evenif it was its at the cost of other sections of the ruling classes. This unseemly tussle whichwas simplisticallyreferred as personality conflicts to pureand simple by a number political commentatorswas fully of reflected the economic policy of the Janataparty. It was always ln a resultof heightenedcontrarypulls or pressure therefore,from and time to time, it shovved relativeascendence descendence the the or of interestsof diSerent rulangclass groups. Thishoweverdid not lead to anychangein the essenceof state power; the end{t alwaysgot n workedout as an uneasycompromise balancing preferencesof big the bourgeoisie,foreign monopoly capital and landlordsof all hues.

STATE AUTONOMY

23

Whatmadethe bigbourgeoisie more insecurewas that in a situation wheremassdiscontent was having increasing resortto massaction, thestate's abilityto reeoneile the interests and preferences all of groups withinthe rulingclasseswasgetting further reduced. So, as it always happens erisis-ridden in situations,whenthe stateattempted tO pass on the burdensto the people--Iy exaetinghigher surplus fromthe workin,class andthe peasantry--the resistanee thepeople of in generalandespeeiallyof those in States under differentpolitieal dispensation eouldbe muellmoreeSeetive. Onecan therefore assert withoutfearof contradietionthat eventlloughthe eklsscharacter of the state poweLremaincdth-] same yet the relative snifts in its internalbalallce gaverlse to a kindol polites that was moreeonducive for eertainkindsof Inovements-bothmass andregional. This wasof profoulld significance.

Implications Class Struggle for

In the contextof suchan understanding shiftingconfigurations of of ruling class power, tle tendency of both types of ruling class parties-the nationalas wellas regional to seekmutual compronlises on issues concerningthe vital interestof the rulingclasses,however intensethe prior bargaining,becomes primaryimportance. The of clltiretendencyof thevariousregionaltulitlgclasspartiesas reflected il1their various tacties eanbe categorisedas, for want of a better term,'oppositional' withinthe framewobk unified-all-lndia-ciassof prefeleences.In this sense, the internal colltradictionsof the ruling classes andthe consequealt contlicts andstrains amongthe ruling classpartiesbecome secos1dusy thWir to acceptancen mostlytacit, of tlle all-India-unified-class-preferellces. therefore It llappens that the sincipal contradiction aIwaysbetweellthe ruling classes andthe is people;that isvin the (lialecticsof conflictsand compromises within the rulingclasses,conRictls always secondaryn in otherwords,it or, is alwaysa prelude conlpromisc. It is so also becausewhenevel to a contradictionsharpenswithin the ruling classesit is soughtto be handled both typesof partiestllrough by (wnti-people lneasures. This beingso, the divisionor the political cleavage represeluted the leftby democratictorces becomes, thereforeF primaryor fundamental the contradiction the political process. Tn different terms,the party in polarisation betweenleft forces (wnd rulingclass partiesis the actualisationin politics of the fundanlental sociat contradiction between classesowningthe meansof productionandthe toiling people. The left-democratic forcesoffer policies that are alternatives the path to of development pursuedso far. The oppositionof left-democratic parties can therefore categorlsed 'alternative'andnot merely be as 'oppositional' is the case with tlle ruling classparties. as In certain situationsntle dcepeningeconomic crisis andthe mountingmass discontent nray so strengthenthe left opposition

24

SOCIAL SCIENTIST

parties that they are in a position to give an electoral rebuS to the manipulations of the ruling classes. Whell such parties come to power or can bid for power in certain States then the necessity of fighting for the demand of State autonomy arises because their efforts to seek democratic solutions to the people's problems are obstructed by a centralised state. For the class preferences of the working class and the peasantry to meet with even partial success, effective autonomy is a mlnimum necessary condition. o This is the otXaer objectiveground on whichthe movements State auto,aomy for havegrowe. Needless to add, the class roots and the class needs of the State autonomy movements in these two different cases-those led by the non-big bourgeoisie or landlordson the one handand the ones led by the left-democratic forces on the other- are entirely different. But from this to infer that in the politics of the struggle for State autononzy there is no meeting groundbetween the two is to commit a serious error. Without underestimating the chauvinistic dangers of such movements led by the ruling classes, there are reasons to believe that common ground exists between the two, as I will soon argue.

Classes State Autonomyand DemocraticRights

It follows from the dlscussion of the dynamics of class rule that the big bourgeoisie, being the leading partnerin the class alliance that rules India and exercising its control and operating through the Centre and i ts decision-makingorgan t he Cabinet--will be extremely reluctant to concede greatel powers to the States in any meaningful way. The centralised state remains a prime necessity for its unhindered growth. It is interesting to note here that the leading members of the lndian bourgeoisie organised in FICCt tFederation of Indian Chambersof Commerceand Industry) have alwclbtsfel t alarmed with whatever they thought would strengthen the regiollal or State forces. Their opposition in the 1950's to the formtioll of linguistic States is well-known and needs no elaboration. But what is revealing is the attitude of the big bourgeoisie to the linguistic States even more than a decade after their consolidation. In 1969, the president of FICCI, moving the i'Resolution on National Integration and the Business CDommullity", remarkedtllat the two most serious constltutional and administrative blunders committed by the Indian state were: (1) the adoption of a federal constitution and on top of that, (2) the reorganisation of the federating units into linguistic States. G In India, according to him, the linguistic States have been the cause of emergence of provincialism in its most ugly form.7 Moreover, they found the democratic verdicts of 1967-1969, especially the second victory of CPI(M) in the 1969 mid-ternl poll, as an alarming trend representing a dangerousturn toward regionalism.s To conle back to the main point, given its reluctance to concede anything concerning the State rights as denlocratic, the big bourgeoisie nlay be better able to

STATE AUTONOMY

25

partially meet the demandsfor State autonomyemanatingfrom regionally basedrulingclass partiesby grantinggreater concessions like morefunds, budgetaryallocationsunder planheads,etc. This maybe possibleas the regionallybased rulingclass partiesarenot necessarilylookingfor greater powersfor Statesor worried curbs by on State powers. To the extentthatpartieslikeAIADMK Akali or Dal represent specific interests the rulingclasseswithintheir States, of these parties are likelv to seek greater powerfor themselves the in interestsof locally placed rulingclassgroups, at a time whentheir interestsare not beingbest servedby the centralised state. But these partiesare not in needof real autonomy States. It is therefore for possibleto arguethat a rnere redistribution politicaland economic of decision-making powers and functions from time to time may be enough suit their return-maximising to pursuits. The left-democratic parties, on the otherhand, needreal State autonomyin the interestof democratic economy and democratic polity. Theirsearchfor greaterpowersfor the Statescan be fulfilled only whenthe classpreferences the working of classandthe peasantry can be materialised. Theverylogic of this involvesthe use of State autonomy undermining material for the basesof rulingclass power. The left-democraticconcept of State autonomythereforeposes a challellgeto the structure state poweritself wherethe divisionof of power betweenthe Centreandthe Statesis directly linkedto questions of class domination. What complicatesthe matter is the consolidation the hold of CPI(M)overWestBengalandindications of of the growingstrengthof the left-democratic forces in someother States and parts of the country and in various spheres social of activity. Herelies the greatestdanger the hegemony the ruling to of classand thereforeoneexpectsthemto 1esistthe demandsfor State
autonombr.

But this entireargumentwhichwrites oll the autonomymovementsof regionalrulingclassgroupson the grounds that these can be easilyplacated does not reckonwith the fact of the economic crisis. In a crisis-ridden situationmonopoly capitalmaynot be in a positionto evenmeet the limited demands the regionallyplacedrulingclass of groups.Withinthe recognised constraints the economyas it stands of todayf particularly restrictedhomemarket, the class constraints the on resource mobilisation and the Iimits of export-ledgrowth,the compromise formula itself maycomeunder increasing strains,sharpen ing the contradictions within the ruling class alliance; the recent peasantupsurgW whichthe firstinitiativeswere takenby the upper in stratumof ruralsociety, bothlandlords richpeasants, an imporand is tant bit of evidenceof such a possibility. Moreover, a situationof in stagnation when all sectionsof capitalcannotgrow or expand with equalease, the non-monopolwl capitalconzes underincreasingattacks fromthe monopolycapital. The dilution of the provisions of the

26

SOCIAL SCIENTIST

MRTP (Monopoly and Restrictive Trade Practices) Act or FERA (Foreign Exchange Regulation Act) and policy changes being undertaken by the Governmentof India to fulfil tbe conditionalities of the IMF loan will, in fact, hasten this process.9 In such situations the politically organiscd pressure for mole state protection and pravilegesfor non-monopoly capital or different landed interests may come froln parties or formati ons that are 'oppositional' lout function generally within unified-all-India-class-preferences. Under circumstanceslike these demandsfor greater concesssolls to lecally placed interests may grow mucil stronger. Such demands and the tensions generated by sucil shifts in the relationship between the Central Government and the autonomy movements represented by regional parties or formatio1lslike Akali Dal or AIADMK or National Conference cn .forma complementary objective cowadition the leftJor democraticparties i7Zpowe} of oppositio7t .1o Furt}lermore,such col-lditions that facilitateboth independent and joint lllASS movem2sNts pUt a brake on the inherent tendency of a crisis-ridden bourgeois-landlord state to pass on more and more burdens to the people and can therefore be looked at as temporary safeguards against efforts of the state power to seek authoritarian solutions. The ability to unify different sections of the ruling classes across the regions under a single political command and along with this to culrry mass support seems to me to be of prime importance in the materialisation of the tendency towards centralisation. Its opposite works as a brake on tlle fructification of the tendeI1vy. This is clearly revealed in the politics during the rule of the Janata conglomerate as contrasted with t}lat of the Congress monolith botll before 1977 and after 1980 althollgh the period aftcr l980 is aIso markedby the complete disintegration of the Conbressparty s organisation and growing factionalism of a new type undel petty-tyral1ts out to enrich themselves. The forces that facilitate political centI-alisationalld concentration are also the forces that malce allthorital ianism possible. But it is necessaly to make a distinction between iltltlaoritarian te1ldencies - inllerent in all crisis-ridden, stagnallt capitalist systems and especially so in the Third Wolld countries and authoritarianism as a crystallised form of politscal rule requiring certain political factors as pre-conditions. Therefol e the assertion, nlaeleright in t he beginning, tllat the issue of State .lutollonyis intet,rally tied up with the questions of democratic rights and civil liberties of the common people becomes tenable . Hence the ideological nccessity of treating the struggle for State autonomy as part of the 1>tr,ger issue of political democracy. If this assertion has any validity then it also brings out the utterly simplistic nature of all such analyses that treat, without discrin:zination, all regionally based movemellts of people as "fissiparous" or "threats to laational unity" or "Znti-national". It

STATE AUTONOMY

is absurdto treat with the sanze stick the eforts of Jammu and Kashmir to preserve its autonomy or those of West Bengal to gain a measure of autononzyand the divisive and chauvinistic 'sons-of-thesoil' movement virulently going on in Assam or the contnuing menace of Shiv Sena in Maharastra,etc. In the background of this analysis, when one looks at the prospects of the State autonomy movement one cannor bo eonfident about the possibility of any radical redefinition of the rights c)fthe States on democratic lines. The big bourgeoisie being the leading force behind state power and the crisis of the system becoming more and lnore acute day by day, the subjective predilections of the big bourgeoisie would be to further erode the Stat rights so as to use the centralised state to meet the challenge of mounting discontent. But this in no way implies that one needs to court passivity. The situation of deepening economic crisis throws up 1lnforeseen possibilities for fr!rces representingthe people to avail of, as is evident in the situation now. The foregoing analysis also leads to t}e inescapable conclusion that the fight for democracy in India also invvives a relentless struggle against the big bourgeoisie and its allies and that the concrete satuaiion is pregnant with possibilities.

ilatonomy the NationalQuestion and

To complete the discussion, it is necessary to britfly investigate the inter-relations between the State autonomy movement and the national question or the problem on political unity in the multinational context of India. Why are the regionally based nlovementsof people referred to by rtlanyas fissiparousor divisive sub-nationalisms? And, do the movements for State autonomy belong to the pedigree of'sub' or any other type of 'nationalism'? Let us very briefly examine here this dimension of the problem. The genesis of nationalism in western Europe, schematically for tl:leslke of brevity, was the indigenous growth of capitalism in unilillgual,culturallyhomogeneousand l}istoricallyden)arcated reglons where the emergent bourgeoisie took hold of such communit}esfor the creation of a unifiedIzomemarket for the circulation of comnlou:lities. The consequent consolidation led to the typical nation-state of our times. The market, or the need for it, was the detelmining factor and the language communityin it demarcated region became a means of consolidation. In the central European alld solue e2st European states, due to the same forces but by a diSerent process of fission and separation from larger empires, amalgamationof people and their crystallisation under sovereign states took place. In both cases the phenomenon of a single nation-nationality bounded by (1 state boundary did emerge. In Tsarist Russia national movements of peopk remained subsumed undera multinat30nal revolutionary moveinent and its success ensured a ditferent basis and groundfor the

28

SOCIAL SCIENTIST

growth of political unity. ln multinational the developmentofcapitalism under colonial countries like India, patronageled to the creationof a unified multinational marketanda pan-India bourgeoisie with inter-regionalmobility within the confines the colonial of state. This being so andcoupled with the fact of the absence of oppressor-oppressed nationalityrelationships, numerous'middle the class' leading spokesmen the emerging national of consciousnessthat emerged lso developedstrong all-India a identifications. Thereforethe anti-colonial movement for independence in India was a supra-nationality nataonalism the variousnational movements and of thepeoplebelongingto different nationalgroupsremained subsumed under notwithstanding demand andthe it, the for creationof Pakistan. So the Indian state that came into being with independence a is multinational sovereign state. What is referred to as Indaan nationalism a supra-nationali;ty is phenomenon representingthe multinationalTndianstate and is made up of different national streams that constitute our multinationality. Movements among people constitutingthese different national streams,present for long invarying forms and stages of development, came to the forefront after independence. The main form these assumed to was demand States each of these national streams within the for the nationalmovements the diSerentpeopleof India IndianUnion; of attainedthelr identificition with the creation and consolidation the of States Indiabetween1953and1970's.The protracted linguistic in and, at times, bloody natureof this process an important is indi catorof its relationshipwith bourgeois-landlord the class combinethat rules Indiaand also points to the distnctive featuresof the phase now underway. The phase that beganwith the creation and consolidation of the States within tlle Indian Union comprisingthe different linguistic-cultural of Indiaandis still under wayis marked zones by the aspirations effortsof the people within these States and to achieve material being and cultural advancement.In a well way, it is the struggle overcome the impedimentsto the to unificationof these nationality growps the differentnationalstreams modern, or on secular lines. process, in its essence, is one of the The strugglesfor an all-round democratic advance. thisphase, as earlier, the big In as the leadingrulingclass group, is neither objectivelybourgeoisie, capableof nor subjectively willingto accomplish whatthe bourgeois-democratic revolution requiresfor its completion. Henceits consistent oppositionto and fallaciouscategorisation all such forcesand of struggling State rightsas"provincialism its most movements for in ugl form". Let us take aspectto roundoff the discussion. $his The aspirationsand struggles the different of national groups to achieveall-round development and to be equal with one another are thwartedby the hold of big bourgeoisie and its state powerin India. lts attitude, ranging from one of allies over consistent

STATEAUTONOMY

hostility to the linguistic reorganisation of States at that time to uns easy tolerance and suspicion of the legitimate aspirations of different national streams now, bear testimony to the weaknessesof the leading rulingclassgroup in India. Even as democratic a demandas the linguistic State had to be wrested fromthe state power after protracted and bloody struggles in spite of the Congresscommitment to it since as early as 1920's. Its weaknesses and the consequentfear of the demoi craticaspirations of different national groups seem to be a function chiefly of certain featuresof capitalism in India. The capitalist growth in India both before and after independencehas been characterisedby a self-perpetuatingunevenness, both region-wiise community-wise. and This unevennessoften coincides with regions that representthedifferent national streams that constitute India. Withln these regions themselves uneven development manifests sharplyin relation to communitiesor groups like ScheduledCastes, ScheduledTribes and certain religious minorities; sometimes when such distinct groups like tribes inhabit contiguous districts it complicates the problem further. Moreover, capitalism in India has been markedby its historical incapacity to destroy feudalism in agriculture and establish its overall sway over society. The pervasiveness of bourgeois revolution as in the phase of growing capitalism in Western Europe is thus lost and therefore the Indian bourgeoisieis no longercapableof establishing new social unity on modern, secular grounds. Such a capitalism' as it feels compelled to compromiseand collaborate with imperialism due to its infirmities is also forced to compromisewith and accommodate the remnantsof feudalism for its political survival. In such a situation the bourgeois (liberal) ideology in general and the bourgeois nationalist ideology in particular is historically a played out force oncapable of establishing national unity on its own terms. It falls back upon the pre-capitalist classes like landlords and uses the pre-modernobscurantist ideologies and institutions to prop itself up politically. This more than anything else explains the prevalence and virulence of caste-based movements, communalism,and other narrowdivisive agitations. The bourgeoisie while it vocally condemnsthese movements, surreptitiously uses them also to divide the unity of the people within different national groupsto weaken them and push them towards exclusiveness and chauvinism. Given its incapacity to fight andovercome regional unevenness, it looks at the democratic struggles of such groups for equality and the movements for State autonomy as a struggle waged against its political domination. To disrupt such movements it willingly or unwillinglyconverts its structuralinfirmities and economzic weaknesses to political advantage by using the hold Of landlordsand pre-capitalist ideologies and pre-moden outlook Of masses to encourage, whip up and make use of narrow, sectarian movements. It does not care so long as its political leadership can aggregate the leading elements of the warringgroups in society. It is

30

SOCIALSCIENTIST

therefore an uncommonfeatureto findthe leadersof caste and not communalstrifes on both sides of the social divide unated under the umbrellaof the same ruling class parties. Aretardedand crisisriddencapitalism is alwayspolitically a divisive force, especially so in a multi nationaland socially diverse context, and for such a capitalismthe instinct for political survivalalways takes precedence overnationalunityandpeople's welfare. Therefore,from whichever wayone looksat the problem, the strugglefor State autonomy, for the democratic reorganisation our federalpolity andfor the lasting of 1lationalunitybased on the equalityand voluntary unionof Indian peoplebelonging the variousnationalstreams,is integrallytied up to with a consistentandrelentlessstruggleagainstthe dominance big of bourgeoisie its allies. and
1 Consider, for example,theprovisions relating to the Concurrent List, the system of CentrallyappointedGovernors andtheir power to dismiss elected democraticgovermentsor to manipulate majorities, the powerof the Central Government issue directives to the State goverments,and the right to to issue ordinancesand then get them stamped by Parliamentand, over and aboveeverythingelse, to declare emergencyand abrog-ate basic freedoms the of citizens. 2 This is clearly revealedin the growth and multiplication of para-military forces like the CentralReserve Police (CRP), 13order Security Force (BSF), Centrallndustrial Security Force (CSIF),etc. along with the developments lead ng to an overweening executive out to repress the democraticmovements of t}}epeople with the help of these para-military forces even whencertain State governments may not be so disposed. One shouldnot forget the examples of the central executive arbitrarily deciding to dismiss duly elected governmentsin the States as early as in 1952-53 (PEPSU) or thouse of Governors to prevent the formationof certainministries likein Madrasor Travancore-Cochin, again in 1952. Subsequently behaviourof the Centre the in this respecthas been too blantantto need mention, especially in Keralain 1957or with United Front governmentsin 1967-1959 etc. 3 A veryuseful theoretical summing and still very relevant,iscontained in up, Ajoy Ghosh, '6TheIndianBourgeoise", in Ajoy Ghosh, Articles& Speeches, Moscow, 1962,pp 57-75. The best source to lookat the differences among the communist parties concerning t}}e Indian bourgeoisic is their party programmes. See CPI (M) Programme(adoptedat Seventh Congress at Culcutta, 1964),Amendments (Ninth Congressat Madurai,1972)and Statement of Policy, Calcutta, 1971;CPI, TheProgramme CPI (Seventh Congress, of Bombay,1964), New Delhi, 1965; CPI (M.L.) programmefirst publishedin Liberation, 4, April-June1971, adoptedat their first party congress, 1970. IV, 4 See, Georges KristoSel Lieten, "Janataas a Continuity of the System", SocialScientist, 9, No 5/6, December 1980-January Vol 1981, p 14-35, for a very useful and detailed analysis. 5 At tllis point it is necessaryto makethe distinction clear betweenthe notion of State autonmoyand "decentralisation" which becamea talking point during the rule of the Janataparty. It seems to me that the notion of State autonomy refers to the constitutional rights that guaranteethe political integrityandfinancialviability of the consSituentStates within a federation and tne State autonomy movementsrepresent attempts, on the one hand, to protect the alreadylimited State rights from furtherencroachmentsfrom

STATEAUTONOMY

31

the Centreand, on the other, to extendthroughstrugglethe limited nature extent possible. As against this, 'decentralisaof these rights to whavearer tion', as has been used, refers to a process that flows from within the State or to districts and downwards. lt, therefore, follows that. the programme slogan of decentralisationas beins given now, will not serve tha purpose of movementsto protect the rightsof the States as the decentrathe democratzc as lised constituent States mayremalnas vulnerable ever to the whimsand arbitraryactions of the Centreand the executivepowerthere. 6 Federationof IndianChambersof Commerce and Industry, Proceeding of the 42ndAnnualSession (March15-17,1969, New Delhi): see Kirloskar's speechmovingthe "Resolutionon National lntegration and the Bus ness for p Community", 47. I am indebtedto mycolleagueSelljibMukherjee givlng me these references.
7 lbid, p48. 8 Ibid. G. M. Modi's presidential speech,p 2.

white paperon IMF loan, 1981. For the 9 See the West BengalGovernment's on of consequences the SMFcondKtionalities different sections of the ruling of class, see especially the contributions PrabhatPatnaikandAsim Dasgupta containedin that. Akali Demandfor State Autonomy: 10 Tlleposition of K.R. Bombwall (ssThe Nature, Rationaleand Motivations", Political Science Review,Jaipur, XX, 1981,pp 151-162) that it is difficult to havea S'transregional 2, April-June united front" on this issue due to the variety of sources andmotivationsof (ed.), National is the movemeI1ts difficultto sustain. See also K.R. Bombwall Powerand State Autonomy, New Delhi, 1977.