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The United States vs Torcuata Gomez and Ramon Coronel Facts: Torcuata Gomez was lawfully married to Fabiano

o Martinez Lao. Although his marriage was not dissolved, he lived with Narciso Coronel and had marital relations in the same house in Oroqueta, Misamis. In this case it has been fully proven that Ramon Narciso Coronel, by reason of his living in the house of Torcuata Gomez, a woman lawfully married to Fabiano Martinez, contracted with her illicit and hence adulterous relations which lasted for a period of seventeen months, from April, 1906, to September, 1907. Under RPC: Article 434 of the said code reads: No penalty shall be imposed for the crime of adultery except upon the complaint of the aggrieved husband. The latter can enter a complaint against both guilty parties, if alive, and never, if he has consented to the adultery or pardoned either of the culprits. lawphil.net The crime in question was committed prior to the enforcement of Act No. 1773 of the Philippine Commission, which went into effect on the 11th of October, 1907.


WON, in view of the fact that no complaint was brought by the aggrieved husband, Fabiano Martinez Lao, it would be lawful to sustain the proceedings and the condemnatory judgment appealed from, merely by virtue of the complaint presented by the provincial fiscal of Misamis. Held: The crime in question was committed prior to the enforcement of Act No. 1773 of the Philippine Commission, which went into effect on the 11th of October, 1907. Although the complaint was filed by the fiscal on the 18th of January, 1908, it is not lawful to attribute retroactive effects to the said Act of the Philippine Commission for the reason that, even though it refers to a matter of procedure, it does not any clause making it retroactive in its effects, and furthermore, the provisions thereof if applied now are prejudicial to the accused.

Alejandor Katigbak and Mercedes K Katigbak vs The Solicitor General et al Facts: The central issue involved is the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 1379, "An Act Declaring Forfeiture in Favor of the State of Any Property Found To Have Been Unlawfully Acquired by Any Public Officer or Employee and Providing for the Proceedings Therefor. Petitioner contends that said statute be declared unconstitutional in so far as it authorizes forfeiture of properties acquired before its approval.


Is the character of R.A. No. 1379 as an ex-post facto law, principally because it imposes the penalty of forfeiture on a public officer or employee acquiring properties allegedly in violation of said R.A. No. 1379 at a time when that law had not yet been enacted. Held: The forfeiture of property provided for in Republic Act No. 1379 being in the nature of a penalty; and it being axiomatic that a law is ex-post facto which inter alia "makes criminal an act done before the passage of the law and which was innocent when done, and punishes such an act," or, "assuming to regulate civil rights and remedies only, in effect imposes a penalty or deprivation of a right for something which when done was lawful," it follows that penalty of forfeiture prescribed by R.A. No. 1379 cannot be applied to acquisitions made prior to its passage without running afoul of the Constitutional provision condemning ex post facto laws or bills of attainder.