Speech: Inherency The war in the Middle East is failing. All we do in the Middle East is failing.

We must rethink our foreign policy and then go back if we must, starting with Kuwait since the troops there are not as significant as the ones in other Middle Eastern countries. Journo 09 (Elan, fellow at the Ayn Rand Institute, Winning the Unwinnable war, May 2009)
http://winningtheunwinnablewar.com/intr oduction-an-unwinnable-war/ SYL

Across all fronts U.S. soldiers are made to fight under the same, if not even more stringent, battlefield rules. Prior to the start of the Afghanistan War and the Iraq War, for instance, the militarys legal advisors combed through the Pentagons list of potential targets, and expansive nostrike lists were drawn up.[3] Included on the no-strike lists were cultural sites, electrical plants, broadcast facilitiesa host of legitimate strategic targets ruled untouchable, for fear of affronting or harming civilians. To tighten the ropes binding the hands of the military, some artillery batteries
were programmed with a list of sites that could not be fired on without a manual override, which would require an OK from the top brass.[4] From top to bottom, the Bush administration consciously put the moral imperative of shielding civilians and bringing them elections above the goal of eliminating real threats to our security. This book shows how our own policy ideas led to 9/11 and then crippled our response in the Middle East, and makes the case for an unsettling conclusion: By subordinating military victory to perverse, allegedly moral constraints, Washingtons policy has undermined our national security.

Only by radically re- thinking our foreign policy in the Middle East can we achieve victory over the enemy that attacked us on 9/11.

Thus the plan: The United States Federal Government should withdraw all troops from Kuwait that are not transient.

Advantage 1 Kuwait- Iraq relationship US presence in Kuwait causes tension between the two countries. Terril, Middle East Specialist for the Strategic Studies Institute, 07
(Andrew, Strategic Studies Institute, KUWAITI NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE U.S.-KUWAITI STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP AFTER SADDAM http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub788.pdf.)

Another problem that has sometimes bothered Kuwaitis is the perception that the United States does not make a serious effort to consult them or their Gulf neighbors on regional issues. Pique over this issue was apparent in a remark by Kuwaiti Foreign Minister Mohammad Sabah stating, Yes we are allies of the U.S. but we are not its puppies . . . . Our interests compel transparency in delivering our concerns . . . and to cooperate with the U.S. only where this is needed.189 This demand for respect is especially compelling since it comes from one of Kuwaits most pro-American political figures. The Kuwaitis have also made it clear that they do not like to be harshly scolded by the United States over such issues as the price of fuel for the U.S. military. The Kuwaitis supplied free fuel to the military during the 2003 war
against Saddam, but did request payment for some fuel at a preferential rate of $21 per barrel as the conflict in Iraq continued. The U.S. leadership agreed to pay $7 per barrel, but they did so only after the Kuwaiti leadership received a letter from the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) scolding them for their ingratitude for the 1991 liberation.190 This matter could have been settled satisfactorily without such harshness which is often more painful when a powerful state

Other problems exist as well, including a past tendency of some policymakers to stop in Kuwait on the way to Iraq without spending any time there. This approach has sometimes caused the Kuwaitis to feel their views are not appreciated. Recently, significant progress was made in reversing this perception when the United States helped to organize a January 2007 conference with Americas Gulf allies (and Egypt and Jordan) to discuss Iraq and Iraq-related problems. The U.S.
addresses a weaker ally, since it implies a subordinate status relationship. Secretary of State attended this conference to present President Bushs priorities and to listen to the concerns of the attending Arab states. While some disagreement occurred on the issue of Iran (discussed later), all parties considered the discussions important, and the value of these

sorts of activities should not be underestimated.191 Additionally, congressional delegations are showing a much increased interest in Kuwaiti opinions on regional security, probably as a result of ongoing problems in Iraq.

Previously, Kuwaitis would at times become irritated at U.S. political leaders who would call for a strategic redeployment of U.S. forces from Iraq to Kuwait without any hint that the Kuwaitis might seek input into such a matter.

And the US- Kuwaiti relationship is crucial. Kuwait Times 2/22/10(daily in the Arabian Gulf, US-Kuwait rlationship foundational:
Jones) SYL

The US-Kuwaiti relationship has become foundational, dating back to the founding of the American Hospital in Kuwait and later solidifying and maturing in the wake of the invasion and the liberation of the Gulf state, said
KUWAIT: US Ambassador to Kuwait Deborah Jones. "The US-Kuwaiti relationship has become foundational.

And Dramatically reducing military presence solves

Kenneth M. 20 , Pollack is an expert on national security, military affairs and the Persian Gulf. He was Director for Persian Gulf affairs at the National Security Council. He also spent seven years in the CIA as a Persian Gulf military analyst. Foreign Affairs, Vol. 82, No. 4 (Jul. - Aug., 2003) Securing the Gulf JSTOR In this approach,

Pollack 03

the United States would dramatically reduce its military footprint in the region, leaving only the bare minimum of the current
arrangements in place. The headquarters of the 5th Fleet would remain in Bahrain (where a U.S. Navy flag has been wel-come for 50 years), but fewer American warships would ply the waters of the Gulf. The air force would retain its huge new base at Udeid in Qatar, again because the Qataris seem pleased to have it there. The army, might keep some prepositioned equipment in Kuwait and and might regularly rotate in battalions to train on itif those states were comfortable with such guests. In addi-tion, if a future Iraqi government were amenable, the United States might retain an air base and some ground presence there. Alternately, army bases in the region might be dispensed with altogether, and instead the United States could simply rely on equipment stored on container ships stationed at Diego Garcia, in the Indian Ocean. On the political level, the United States would preserve its informal relationships with the gcc states and possibly add a similar associ-ation with a friendly new Iraqi government. It would continue to contain Iran by making clear that any Iranian aggression would be met by an American military response. And it would continue its efforts to secure European, Japanese, and Russian support in pressuring Tehran both economically and diplomatically so as to end Iran's support for terror and its

This smaller military footprint would go a long way toward alle-viating the internal problems caused by the presence of U.S. combat forces in the Persian Gulf regionso not surprisingly, this is the strategy that the Gulf Arabs themselves favor. With Saddam gone, their overriding goal now is to minimize domestic discontent, and they believe that the United States can keep peace in the region with a minimal presence. This approach
unconventional weapons programs. would also be popular in certain quar-ters of the American military which would be glad to shed the burdens of policing an inhospitable and less than luxurious region far from home

And US military withdrawal fixes Kuwait- Iraq relations. Terril, Middle East Specialist for the Strategic Studies Institute, 07
(Andrew, Strategic Studies Institute, KUWAITI NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE U.S.-KUWAITI STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP AFTER SADDAM http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub788.pdf.)

Kuwait is clearly safe from an Iraqi conventional military attack even without the U.S. alliance.
At the time of this writing, The Bagdad government is currently unable to control its own capital and is certainly not in a

The Iraqi Army is weak and divided, and the Iraqi Air Force has very little offensive capability (beyond a few helicopters).158 Nevertheless, the Kuwaitis are psychologically
position to undertake foreign military adventures. unable to rule out a future threat from Iraq. The current Iraqi political system is widely viewed in Kuwait and the world as transitional, and it is not impossible that a strong and dictatorial government will once again emerge. This may occur only after a prolonged civil war in which a victor emerges and consolidates power. While Iraq is in turmoil now, it may eventually become much stronger. Moreover, if the future of Iraq is defined by intense and protracted civil war, the parties left standing are likely to be radical, militarized, and inclined to violent confrontation. Radical Iraqi cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, for example,

is a strong Iraqi nationalist who could conceivably threaten Kuwait in the future, although he would almost certainly be deterred from a direct conventional invasion. Sadr has called upon Kuwait to end its relationship with the United States and evict the U.S. troops currently in that country on the grounds that they are no longer necessary to protect the emirate from Saddam.

Advantage 2 Foreign Aid Foreign aid is not important and not needed. Milner and Tingley 10 (Helen V. Milner and Dustin H. Tingley, The Political Economy
of U.S. Foreign Aid: American Legislators and the Domestic Politics of Aid, July 2010, vol2(2))

Foreign economic aid, like all other economic policies, has distributional consequences (Peltzman, 1984; Przeworski, 2009; Stigler, 1971). The U.S. gave over US $20 billion in foreign development assistance in 2004, the most of any donor country. While a small fraction of American GDP, this amount was regularly close to, or even greater than, funding for other major budget items in American politics. In the 1990s, for instance, foreign aid
claimed on average 0.5% of the U.S. government budget, while much talked about spending categories, like farm income support and higher education funding, took up roughly the same

Aid is not an insignificant part of American foreign policy. Nor is aid spending small compared with several major domestic policy areas.
magnitude of spending (eat ac 0.9%) (GBO, 2007).

And Foreign aid is not as widely supported as most people think Sogge 2000 (David, fellow at Transnational Institue in Amsterdam, Christian Century, pg.
206-209) SYL As the crusade against communism waned, foreign aid programs had to find new reasons for

the public wants the government to help end poverty and injustice, it increasingly doubts that aid really helps. Powerful global financial institutions like the International Monetary Fund, hitherto
existing, which is not easy. Though indulgent of aid agencies and their micro-projects, today prefer to act at the macro level: they want to fix the rules by which poor and "transitional" countries manage their entire economies and workforces, run their governments, and take their places in the world system. Criticism

of

foreign aid is not new, but it is now getting acrimonious. More

intensive efforts to steer the debate have been coming lately from ideological heavy-hitters like the OECD Development Center in Paris and the World Bank in Washington, as well as from exvolunteers and ex-staff at aid agencies. In the 1980s books appeared with titles such as Giving Is Taking, Deadly Help and Lords of Poverty. Those titles sound rather timid when stacked against titles that appeared in the late 90s: The Road to Hell: The Ravaging Effects of Foreign Aid and International Charity; Famine Crimes: Politics and the Disaster Relief Industry in Africa; and Aiding Violence. The Development Enterprise in Rwanda.

Moreover, foreign aid it is not favored by Kuwait who view the U.S. as a threat. Encyclopedia of the New American Nation 2011 (a new encyclopedia,
E-N) Attacks on globalization and its supporters in the foreign aid establishment, interestingly, resembled earlier excoriations of the imperialistic taint of foreign aid programs. In a 1987 study, Michael Hunt contended that "development was the younger sibling of containment" and "drew its inspiration from the old American vision of appropriate or legitimate processes of social change and an abiding sense of superiority over the dark-skinned peoples of the Third World." Writing in

aid has enabled former colonial powers, such as the United Kingdom and France, to maintain their historic political, economic, and cultural ties with former colonies it is precisely this network of Atlantic-European domination and imperialism that forms the basis of the current aid programs." This assessment was echoed by the World Trade Organization protesters in Seattle, who accused the United States and other Western countries of perpetuating a mechanism of worldwide economic imperialismne globalism. In the view of globalization's critics, this process is just another way for rich countries like the United States, with only a fraction of the world's population, area, and natural resources, to manipulate the global money market, to control much of the world's trade, and to reserve most of the world's raw materials for its own use.
1978, Ian J. Bickerton noted that

"foreign

Kuwaitis blame the US for mismanaged occupation sparking public opposition Terril, Middle East Specialist for the Strategic Studies Institute, 07 (Andrew, Strategic
Studies Institute, KUWAITI NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE U.S.-KUWAITI STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP AFTER SADDAM http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub788.pdf.) The Iraqi insurgency, which began in 2003, introduced a major new element into the U.S.-Kuwaiti strategic relationship in which both parties retain a stake. Despite overwhelming Kuwaiti

some Kuwaitis for a considerable time have blamed the United States for what they describe as a mismanaged occupation.160 This blame is often private, and some Kuwaitis also
enthusiasm for Saddams ouster, temper it with a belief that Iraq is an inherently violent society that is almost impossible to rehabilitate. Additionally, the Kuwaiti leadership has been especially reluctant to criticize the United States in public on this issue. In 2004, for example, Speaker of the Parliament Jasem al Kharafi responded to Kuwaiti public criticisms of U.S. actions in Falluja by calling upon citizens to stay out of other states business to spare [Kuwait] unwarranted and uncalled for tensions and confrontations.161 Kuwaiti

leaders did, however, feel compelled to speak out in the aftermath of the Abu Ghraib scandal.162 Saddam had previously held a number of Kuwaitis at the prison, leaving Kuwaitis especially sensitive about human rights abuses there.

Kuwaiti claims US military caused disaster in the region equivalent to damage from Iranian radiation leak Tourni(Habib, August 11 2010, Kuwaiti claims US military caused disaster in the region equivalent to damage from Iranian)PS A Kuwaiti environment watchdog that has accused the US military of causing a disaster in the region almost equivalent to the damage that may occur by a radiation leak from Irans nuclear reactors, has deplored the lack of official reactions in both Kuwait and the US. Khaled Al Hajri, chairman of Green Line Environmental Group (GLEG), on Saturday warned against the impact of the US Armys radioactive waste on the region, accused the American administration of having double standards in dealing with environmental issues and urged the Gulf countries to take appropriate action on the issue. He issued the charges and warnings amid reports that the US planned to take a radioactive shipment from Iraq, across Kuwait, and bury it in Adeed military base in Qatar. However, Al Hajri said that the groups recent revelations about the radioactive waste left by the US Army in Iraq, which it reportedly plans to ship through Kuwait for storage at a site in Qatar, have so far received no response from the Kuwaiti government, although other parties have already expressed interest in the news. Many international environmental organizations have contacted us and asked about the information we have published, Al Hajri told Kuwait Times in an interview published on Wednesday. We also received inquiries from people in Qatar who were looking into this issue, but the weirdest thing is that we have not seen any interest on behalf of the Kuwaiti government in this regard so far. The activist said that the press release issued by GLEG on Saturday included actual steps that can be taken by the Kuwaiti government to prevent any potential risks to the health of Kuwaits population by these shipments.

We hope we could be of help in this regard because that is what we aim to do, he said, according to the Kuwaiti daily. GLEG said that the White House was guilty of double standards and that it acted very selfishly while dealing with after effects of environmental disasters. The US Administration made a very big noise about the oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico. However, it has made the American army the biggest violator of environmental human rights, not only in the whole world, but also in the whole of history, and this is especially apparent in the damage done to the environment in the Arabian Gulf, the watchdog said. The US military in Iraq decided to transfer and store radioactive waste, consisting of iron scrap and remnants of destroyed military vehicles contaminated with radioactive particles, to Qatar, making it the biggest store of radioactive waste in the Gulf region. GLEG said that thanks to the help of environmental activists in the region, we received official information that the waste will be transferred from there during the month of Ramadan. In his statement, Al Hajri warned about the consequences of not exercising tight environmental control on the US military after it has caused massive damage to environment and public health in Iraq. He said that the Gulf region could be exposed to nuclear disasters if the regions governments do not take necessary precautions and measures, especially in the face of deepening radioactive waste crisis in Kuwait and Iraq, and the presence of warships, carriers and nuclear-powered aircrafts, besides the prospects of getting atomic reactors in the region. Gulf governments need to take a strict environmental position to ensure an end to the US militarys environmental destruction in its military operations. Qatar today has become the largest store of munitions outside the US and it is storing items with depleted uranium besides the radioactive waste, which makes the issue extremely dangerous, Al Hajri said. Green Line has notified environmental authorities in Qatar to take measures to prevent the US military from storing radioactive waste in Qatar and called on Gulf states to review

security and military agreements with the US military and include clauses prohibiting it from causing environmental pollution and obliging it to bear the expenses of waste treatment. Environmental authorities in the Gulf States should conduct a comprehensive environmental survey of all US military bases, especially after the scandal caused by hazardous waste in Iraq came to light, the activist said. The activist warned that waste from the US military in Kuwait was being leaked to scrap markets such as Amghara where Green Line activists found a variety of military waste more than once. The Green Line also did a survey of the desert north of Kuwait and found remnants of many US military equipment that were left behind after entering Iraq. The US administration need not deny or confirm the information obtained by Green Line, but it should collect the radiation contaminated waste and ship it from Iraq to the United States and deal with it there under the control and supervision of international environmental organizations, especially because it used internationally banned weapons, he said. The GLEG chairman said that his organization, in cooperation with other parties interested in environmental protection, will follow up on this issue. We are very interested in pursuing this serious matter. At the same time, we understand the sensitivity of this issue, and that is why we understand how important it is to deal with it with patience and wisdom because we need the government to understand that we are talking about an actual threat, and that we are not simply playing cat and mouse with them, said Al Hajri.

Besides, Aid has no effect on growth and may, in fact, even undermine growth. Radelet 06 (Steven, Center for Global Development, A Primer on Foreign Aid, working paper
number 2, July 2006) SYL

First, aid simply could be wasted, such as on limousines or presidential palaces, or it could encourage corruption, not just in aid programs but more broadly. Second, it can help keep bad governments in power, thus helping to perpetuate poor economic policies and postpone reform. Some argue that aid provided to countries in the midst of war might inadvertently help finance and perpetuate the conflict, and add to instability. Third, countries may have limited absorptive capacity to use aid flows effectively if they have relatively few skilled workers, weak infrastructure or constrained delivery systems. (Aid could help redress these
weaknesses, but it may not be aimed to do so).

Fourth, aid flows can reduce domestic saving, both private saving (through its impact on interest rates) and government saving (though its impact
on government revenue).

Fifth, aid flows could undermine private sector incentives for investment or to improve productivity. Aid can cause the currency to appreciate, undermining the profitability of the production of all tradable goods (known as the Dutch disease). Food aid, if not managed
appropriately, can reduce farm prices and hurt farmer income.

Finally, Of those rare times when aid leads to growth on some countries, the results diminish as the volume of aid increases. Radelet 06 (Steven, Center for Global Development, A Primer on Foreign Aid,
working paper number 2, July 2006) SYL

First, the classic view is that aid augments saving, finances investment, and adds to the capital stock. In this view, poor countries are unable to generate sufficient amounts of saving to finance the investment necessary to initiate growth, or at best only enough for very slow growth. In the strongest version of this view, the poorest countries may be stuck in a poverty trap in which their income is too low to generate the saving necessary to initiate the process of sustained growth (Sachs, et. Al., 2004).