1. G.R. No. L-40502 November 29, 1976 VIRGINIA GARCIA FULE, and HONORABLE SEVERO A.

MALVAR, Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Laguna, Branch Vl, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, * PRECIOSA B. GARCIA and AGUSTINA B. GARCIA, respondents. G.R. No. L-42670 November 29, 1976 VIRGINIA GARCIA FULE, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE ERNANI C. PAO, Presiding Judge of Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City, Branch XVIII, and PRECIOSA B. GARCIA, respondents. Francisco Carreon for petitioners. Augusto G. Gatmaytan for private respondents.

G. Garcia, a property owner of Calamba, Laguna, died intestate in the City of Manila, leaving real estate and personal properties in Calamba, Laguna, and in other places, within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court." At the same time, she moved ex parte for her appointment as special administratrix over the estate. On even date, May 2, 1973, Judge Malvar granted the motion. A motion for reconsideration was filed by Preciosa B. Garcia on May 8, 1973, contending that the order appointing Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix was issued without jurisdiction, since no notice of the petition for letters of administration has been served upon all persons interested in the estate; there has been no delay or cause for delay in the proceedings for the appointment of a regular administrator as the surviving spouse of Amado G. Garcia, she should be preferred in the appointment of a special administratrix; and, Virginia G. Fule is a debtor of the estate of Amado G. Garcia. Preciosa B. Garcia, therefore, prayed that she be appointed special administratrix of the estate, in lieu of Virginia G. Fule, and as regular administratrix after due hearing. While this reconsideration motion was pending resolution before the Court, Preciosa B. Garcia filed on May 29, 1973 a motion to remove Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix alleging, besides the jurisdictional ground raised in the motion for reconsideration of May 8, 1973 that her appointment was obtained through erroneous, misleading and/or incomplete misrepresentations; that Virginia G. Fule has adverse interest against the estate; and that she has shown herself unsuitable as administratrix and as officer of the court. In the meantime, the notice of hearing of the petition for letters of administration filed by Virginia G. Fule with the Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna, was published on May 17, 24, and 31, 1973, in the Bayanihan, a weekly publication of general circulation in Southern Luzon. On June 6, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia received a "Supplemental Petition for the Appointment of Regular Administrator ' filed by

MARTIN, J.: These two interrelated cases bring to Us the question of what the word "resides" in Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules Of Court, referring to the situs of the settlement of the estate of deceased persons, means. Additionally, the rule in the appointment of a special administrator is sought to be reviewed. On May 2, 1973, Virginia G. Fule filed with the Court of First Instance of Laguna, at Calamba, presided over by Judge Severo A. Malvar, a petition for letters of administration, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 27-C, alleging, inter alia, "that on April 26, 1973, Amado

Virginia G. Fule. This supplemental petition modified the original petition in four aspects: (1) the allegation that during the lifetime of the deceased Amado G. Garcia, he was elected as Constitutional Delegate for the First District of Laguna and his last place of residence was at Calamba, Laguna; (2) the deletion of the names of Preciosa B. Garcia and Agustina Garcia as legal heirs of Amado G. Garcia; (3) the allegation that Carolina Carpio, who was simply listed as heir in the original petition, is the surviving spouse of Amado G. Garcia and that she has expressly renounced her preferential right to the administration of the estate in favor of Virginia G. Fule; and (4) that Virginia G. Fule be appointed as the regular administratrix. The admission of this supplemental petition was opposed by Preciosa B. Garcia for the reason, among others, that it attempts to confer jurisdiction on the Court of First Instance of Laguna, of which the court was not possessed at the beginning because the original petition was deficient. On July 19, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia filed an opposition to the original and supplemental petitions for letters of administration, raising the issues of jurisdiction, venue, lack of interest of Virginia G. Fule in the estate of Amado G. Garcia, and disqualification of Virginia G Fule as special administratrix. An omnibus motion was filed by Virginia G. Fule on August 20, 1973, praying for authority to take possession of properties of the decedent allegedly in the hands of third persons as well as to secure cash advances from the Calamba Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc. Preciosa B. Garcia opposed the motion, calling attention to the limitation made by Judge Malvar on the power of the special administratrix, viz., "to making an inventory of the personal and real properties making up the state of the deceased." However, by July 2, 1973, Judge Malvar and already issued an order, received by Preciosa B. Garcia only on July 31, 1973, denying the motion of Preciosa B. Garcia to reconsider the order of May 2, 1973, appointing Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix, and admitting the supplementation petition of May 18,1973.

On August 31, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia moved to dismiss the petition, because (1) jurisdiction over the petition or over the parties in interest has not been acquired by the court; (2) venue was improperly laid; and (3) Virginia G. Fule is not a party in interest as she is not entitled to inherit from the deceased Amado G. Garcia. On September 28, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia filed a supplemental motion to substitute Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix, reasoning that the said Virginia G. Fule admitted before before the court that she is a full-blooded sister of Pablo G. Alcalde, an illegitimate son of Andrea Alcalde, with whom the deceased Amado G. Garcia has no relation. Three motions were filed by Preciosa B. Garcia on November 14, 1973, one, to enjoin the special administratrix from taking possession of properties in the hands of third persons which have not been determined as belonging to Amado G. Garcia; another, to remove the special administratrix for acting outside her authority and against the interest of the estate; and still another, filed in behalf of the minor Agustina B. Garcia, to dismiss the petition for want of cause of action, jurisdiction, and improper venue. On November 28, 1973, Judge Malvar resolved the pending omnibus motion of Virgina G. Fule and the motion to dismiss filed by Preciosa B. Garcia. Resolving the motion to dismiss, Judge Malvar ruled that the powers of the special administratrix are those provided for in Section 2, Rule 80 of the Rules of Court, 1 subject only to the previous qualification made by the court that the administration of the properties subject of the marketing agreement with the Canlubang Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association should remain with the latter; and that the special administratrix had already been authorized in a previous order of August 20, 1973 to take custody and possession of all papers and certificates of title and personal effects of the decedent with the Canlubang Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc. Ramon Mercado, of the Canlubang Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc., was ordered to deliver to Preciosa B. Garcia all certificates of title in

her name without any qualifying words like "married to Amado Garcia" does not appear. Regarding the motion to dismiss, Judge Malvar ruled that the issue of jurisdiction had already been resolved in the order of July 2, 1973, denying Preciosa B. Garcia's motion to reconsider the appointment of Virginia G. Fule and admitting the supplemental petition, the failure of Virginia G. Fule to allege in her original petition for letters of administration in the place of residence of the decedent at the time of his death was cured. Judge Malvar further held that Preciosa B. Garcia had submitted to the jurisdiction of the court and had waived her objections thereto by praying to be appointed as special and regular administratrix of the estate. An omnibus motion was filed by Preciosa B. Garcia on December 27, 1973 to clarify or reconsider the foregoing order of Judge Malvar, in view of previous court order limiting the authority of the special administratrix to the making of an inventory. Preciosa B. Garcia also asked for the resolution of her motion to dismiss the petitions for lack of cause of action, and also that filed in behalf of Agustina B. Garcia. Resolution of her motions to substitute and remove the special administratrix was likewise prayed for. On December 19, 1973, Judge Malvar issued two separate orders, the first, denying Preciosa B. Garcia's motions to substitute and remove the special administratrix, and the second, holding that the power allowed the special administratrix enables her to conduct and submit an inventory of the assets of the estate. On January 7, 1974, Preciosa B. Garcia moved for reconsideration of the foregoing orders of November 28, 1973 and December 19, 1973, insofar as they sustained or failed to rule on the issues raised by her: (a) legal standing (cause of action) of Virginia G. Fule; (b) venue; (c) jurisdiction; (d) appointment, qualification and removal of special administratrix; and (e) delivery to the special administratrix of checks and papers and effects in the office of the Calamba Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc. On March 27, 1973, Judge Malvar issued the first questioned order denying Preciosa B. Garcia's motion for reconsideration of

January 7, 1974. On July 19, 1974, Judge Malvar issued the other three questioned orders: one, directing Ramon Mercado, of the Calamba Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc., to furnish Virginia G. Fule, as special administratrix, copy of the statement of accounts and final liquidation of sugar pool, as well as to deliver to her the corresponding amount due the estate; another, directing Preciosa B. Garcia to deliver to Virginia G. Fule two motor vehicles presumably belonging to the estate; and another, directing Ramon Mercado to deliver to the court all certificates of title in his possession in the name of Preciosa B. Garcia, whether qualified with the word "single" or "married to Amado Garcia." During the hearing of the various incidents of this case (Sp. Proc. 27-C) before Judge Malvar, 2Virginia G. Fule presented the death certificate of Amado G. Garcia showing that his residence at the time of his death was Quezon City. On her part, Preciosa B. Garcia presented the residence certificate of the decedent for 1973 showing that three months before his death his residence was in Quezon City. Virginia G. Fule also testified that Amado G. Garcia was residing in Calamba, Laguna at the time of his death, and that he was a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention for the first district of Laguna. On July 26, 1974, Preciosa B. Garcia and Agustina B. Garcia commenced a special action for certiorari and/or prohibition and preliminary injunction before the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. No. 03221-SP. primarily to annul the proceedings before Judge Malvar in Sp. Proc. No. 27-C of the Court of First Instance of Laguna, or, in the alternative, to vacate the questioned four orders of that court, viz., one dated March 27, 1974, denying their motion for reconsideration of the order denying their motion to dismiss the criminal and supplemental petitions on the issue, among others, of jurisdiction, and the three others, all dated July 19, 1974, directing the delivery of certain properties to the special administratrix, Virginia G. Fule, and to the court. On January 30, 1975, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment annulling the proceedings before Judge Severo A. Malvar in Sp.

Proc. 27-C of the Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna, for lack of jurisdiction. Denied of their motion for reconsideration on March 31, 1975, Virginia G. Fule forthwith elevated the matter to Us on appeal by certiorari. The case was docketed as G.R. No. L-40502. However, even before Virginia G. Fule could receive the decision of the Court of Appeals, Preciosa B. Garcia had already filed on February 1, 1975 a petition for letters of administration before the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. Q-19738, over the same intestate estate of Amado G. Garcia. On February 10, 1975, Preciosa B. Garcia urgently moved for her appointment as special administratrix of the estate. Judge Vicente G. Ericta granted the motion and appointed Preciosa B. Garcia as special administratrix upon a bond of P30,000.00. Preciosa B. Garcia qualified and assumed the office. For the first time, on February 14, 1975, Preciosa B. Garcia informed Judge Ericta of the pendency of Sp. Proc. No. 27-C before Judge Malvar of the Court of First Instance of Laguna, and the annulment of the proceedings therein by the Court of Appeals on January 30, 1975. She manifested, however, her willingness to withdraw Sp. Proc. Q-19738 should the decision of the Court of Appeals annulling the proceedings before the Court of First Instance of Laguna in Sp. Proc. No. 27-C have not yet become final, it being the subject of a motion for reconsideration. On March 10, 1973, Judge Ericta ordered the suspension of the proceedings before his court until Preciosa B. Garcia inform the court of the final outcome of the case pending before the Court of Appeals. This notwithstanding, Preciosa B. Garcia filed on December 11, 1975, an "Urgent Petition for Authority to Pay Estate Obligations." On December 13, 1975, Virginia G. Fule filed a "Special Appearance to Question Venue and Jurisdiction" reiterating the grounds stated in the previous special appearance of March 3, 1975, and calling attention that the decision of the Court of

Appeals and its resolution denying the motion for reconsideration had been appealed to this Court; that the parties had already filed their respective briefs; and that the case is still pending before the Court. On December 17, 1975, Judge Ernani Cruz Pano, who succeeded Judge Ericta, issued an order granting Preciosa B. Garcia's "Urgent Petition for Authority to Pay Estate Obligations" in that the payments were for the benefit of the estate and that there hangs a cloud of doubt on the validity of the proceedings in Sp. Proc. No. 27-C of the Court of First Instance of Laguna. A compliance of this Order was filed by Preciosa B. Garcia on January 12,1976. On February 4,1974, VIRGINIA G. FULE instituted G.R. No. L42670, a petition for certiorari with temporary restraining order, to annul the proceedings in Sp. Proc. No. Q-19738 and to restrain Judge Ernani Cruz Pao from further acting in the case. A restraining order was issued on February 9, 1976. We dismiss the appeal in G.R. No. L-40502 and the petition for certiorari in G.R. No. L-42670 for the reasons and considerations hereinafter stated. 1. Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: "If the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in the province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance of any province in which he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record." With particular regard to letters of

administration, Section 2, Rule 79 of the Revised Rules of Court demands that the petition therefor should affirmatively show the existence of jurisdiction to make the appointment sought, and should allege all the necessary facts, such as death, the name and last residence of the decedent, the existence, and situs if need be, of assets, intestacy, where this is relied upon, and the right of the person who seeks administration, as next of kin, creditor, or otherwise, to be appointed. The fact of death of the intestate and his last residence within the country are foundation facts upon which all subsequent proceedings in the administration of the estate rest, and that if the intestate was not an inhabitant of the state at the time of his death, and left no assets in the state, no jurisdiction is conferred on the court to grant letters of administration. 3 The aforequoted Section 1, Rule 73 (formerly Rule 75, Section 1), specifically the clause "so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of the estate," is in reality a matter of venue, as the caption of the Rule indicates: "Settlement of Estate of Deceased Persons.Venue and Processes. 4 It could not have been intended to define the jurisdiction over the subject matter, because such legal provision is contained in a law of procedure dealing merely with procedural matters. Procedure is one thing; jurisdiction over the subject matter is another. The power or authority of the court over the subject matter "existed and was fixed before procedure in a given cause began." That power or authority is not altered or changed by procedure, which simply directs the manner in which the power or authority shall be fully and justly exercised. There are cases though that if the power is not exercised conformably with the provisions of the procedural law, purely, the court attempting to exercise it loses the power to exercise it legally. However, this does not amount to a loss of jurisdiction over the subject matter. Rather, it means that the court may thereby lose jurisdiction over the person or that the judgment may thereby be rendered defective for lack of something essential to sustain it. The appearance of this provision in the procedural law at once raises a strong presumption that it has nothing to do with the jurisdiction

of the court over the subject matter. In plain words, it is just a matter of method, of convenience to the parties. 5 The Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, confers upon Courts of First Instance jurisdiction over all probate cases independently of the place of residence of the deceased. Because of the existence of numerous Courts of First Instance in the country, the Rules of Court, however, purposedly fixes the venue or the place where each case shall be brought. A fortiori, the place of residence of the deceased in settlement of estates, probate of will, and issuance of letters of administration does not constitute an element of jurisdiction over the subject matter. It is merely constitutive of venue. And it is upon this reason that the Revised Rules of Court properly considers the province where the estate of a deceased person shall be settled as "venue." 6 2. But, the far-ranging question is this: What does the term "resides" mean? Does it refer to the actual residence or domicile of the decedent at the time of his death? We lay down the doctrinal rule that the term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from "legal residence or domicile." This term "resides," like, the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic and should be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed. 7 In the application of venue statutes and rules Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature residence rather than domicile is the significant factor. Even where the statute uses the word "domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the technical sense. Some cases make a distinction between the terms "residence" and "domicile" but as generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term "inhabitant." 8 In other words, "resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence or domicile. 9 Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires

bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make it one's domicile. 10 No particular length of time of residence is required though; however, the residence must be more than temporary. 11 3. Divergent claims are maintained by Virginia G. Fule and Preciosa B. Garcia on the residence of the deceased Amado G. Garcia at the time of his death. In her original petition for letters of administration before the Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna, Virginia G. Fule measely stated "(t)hat on April 26,1973, Amado G. Garcia, a property owner of Calamba, Laguna, died intestate in the City of Manila, leaving real estate and personal properties in Calamba, Laguna, and in other places within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court." Preciosa B. Garcia assailed the petition for failure to satisfy the jurisdictional requirement and improper laying of venue. For her, the quoted statement avers no domicile or residence of the deceased Amado G. Garcia. To say that as "property owner of Calamba, Laguna," he also resides in Calamba, Laguna, is, according to her, non sequitur. On the contrary, Preciosa B. Garcia claims that, as appearing in his death certificate presented by Virginia G. Fule herself before the Calamba court and in other papers, the last residence of Amado G. Garcia was at 11 Carmel Avenue, Carmel Subdivision, Quezon City. Parenthetically, in her amended petition, Virginia G. Fule categorically alleged that Amado G. Garcia's "last place of residence was at Calamba, Laguna." On this issue, We rule that the last place of residence of the deceased Amado G. Garcia was at 11 Carmel Avenue, Carmel Subdivision, Quezon City, and not at Calamba, Laguna. A death certificate is admissible to prove the residence of the decedent at the time of his death. 12 As it is, the death certificate of Amado G. Garcia, which was presented in evidence by Virginia G. Fule herself and also by Preciosa B. Garcia, shows that his last place of residence was at 11 Carmel Avenue, Carmel Subdivision, Quezon City. Aside from this, the deceased's residence certificate for 1973 obtained three months before his death; the Marketing Agreement and Power of Attorney dated November 12, 1971 turning over the administration of his two parcels of sugar land to the Calamba Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc.; the Deed

of Donation dated January 8, 1973, transferring part of his interest in certain parcels of land in Calamba, Laguna to Agustina B. Garcia; and certificates of titles covering parcels of land in Calamba, Laguna, show in bold documents that Amado G. Garcia's last place of residence was at Quezon City. Withal, the conclusion becomes imperative that the venue for Virginia C. Fule's petition for letters of administration was improperly laid in the Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna. Nevertheless, the long-settled rule is that objection to improper venue is subject to waiver. Section 4, Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court states: "When improper venue is not objected to in a motion to dismiss, it is deemed waived." In the case before Us the Court of Appeals had reason to hold that in asking to substitute Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix, Preciosa B. Garcia did not necessarily waive her objection to the jurisdiction or venue assumed by the Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna, but availed of a mere practical resort to alternative remedy to assert her rights as surviving spouse, while insisting on the enforcement of the Rule fixing the proper venue of the proceedings at the last residence of the decedent. 4. Preciosa B. Garcia's challenge to Virginia G. Fule's appointment as special administratrix is another issue of perplexity. Preciosa B. Garcia claims preference to the appointment as surviving spouse. Section 1 of Rule 80 provides that "(w)hen there is delay in granting letters testamentary or of administration by any cause including an appeal from the allowance or disallowance of a will, the court may appoint a special administrator to take possession and charge of the estate of the deceased until the questions causing the delay are decided and executors or administrators appointed. 13 Formerly, the appointment of a special administrator was only proper when the allowance or disallowance of a will is under appeal. The new Rules, however, broadened the basis for appointment and such appointment is now allowed when there is delay in granting letters testamentary or administration by any cause e.g., parties cannot agree among themselves. 14 Nevertheless, the discretion to appoint a special administrator or not lies in the probate court. 15 That, however, is no authority for the judge to become partial, or to

make his personal likes and dislikes prevail over, or his passions to rule, his judgment. Exercise of that discretion must be based on reason, equity, justice and legal principle. There is no reason why the same fundamental and legal principles governing the choice of a regular administrator should not be taken into account in the appointment of a special administrator. 16Nothing is wrong for the judge to consider the order of preference in the appointment of a regular administrator in appointing a special administrator. After all, the consideration that overrides all others in this respect is the beneficial interest of the appointee in the estate of the decedent. 17 Under the law, the widow would have the right of succession over a portion of the exclusive property of the decedent, besides her share in the conjugal partnership. For such reason, she would have as such, if not more, interest in administering the entire estate correctly than any other next of kin. The good or bad administration of a property may affect rather the fruits than the naked ownership of a property. 18 Virginia G. Fule, however, disputes the status of Preciosa B. Garcia as the widow of the late Amado G. Garcia. With equal force, Preciosa B. Garcia maintains that Virginia G. Fule has no relation whatsoever with Amado G. Garcia, or that, she is a mere illegitimate sister of the latter, incapable of any successional rights. 19 On this point, We rule that Preciosa B. Garcia is prima facie entitled to the appointment of special administratrix. It needs be emphasized that in the issuance of such appointment, which is but temporary and subsists only until a regular administrator is appointed, 20 the appointing court does not determine who are entitled to share in the estate of the decedent but who is entitled to the administration. The issue of heirship is one to be determined in the decree of distribution, and the findings of the court on the relationship of the parties in the administration as to be the basis of distribution. 21 The preference of Preciosa B. Garcia is with sufficient reason. In a Donation Inter Vivos executed by the deceased Amado G. Garcia on January 8, 1973 in favor of Agustina B. Garcia, he indicated therein that he is married to Preciosa B. Garcia. 22 In his certificate of candidacy for the office of Delegate to the Constitutional Convention for the First District of Laguna filed on September 1, 1970, he wrote therein the name

of Preciosa B. Banaticla as his spouse. 23 Faced with these documents and the presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage, Preciosa B. Garcia can be reasonably believed to be the surviving spouse of the late Amado G. Garcia. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio.24 5. Under these circumstances and the doctrine laid down in Cuenco vs. Court of Appeals, 25 this Court under its supervisory authority over all inferior courts may properly decree that venue in the instant case was properly assumed by and transferred to Quezon City and that it is in the interest of justice and avoidance of needless delay that the Quezon City court's exercise of jurisdiction over the settlement of the estate of the deceased Amado G. Garcia and the appointment of special administratrix over the latter's estate be approved and authorized and the Court of First Instance of Laguna be disauthorized from continuing with the case and instead be required to transfer all the records thereof to the Court of First Instance of Quezon City for the continuation of the proceedings. 6. Accordingly, the Order of Judge Ernani Cruz Pano of December 17, 1975, granting the "Urgent Petition for Authority to Pay Estate Obligations" filed by Preciosa B. Garcia in Sp. Proc. No. Q-19738, subject matter of G.R. No. L-42670, and ordering the Canlubang Sugar Estate to deliver to her as special administratrix the sum of P48,874.70 for payment of the sum of estate obligations is hereby upheld. IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petitions of petitioner Virginia Garcia Fule in G.R. No. L-40502 and in G.R. No. L42670 are hereby denied, with costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED.

2. G.R. No. L-24742 October 26, 1973

ROSA CAYETANO CUENCO, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DIVISION, MANUEL CUENCO, LOURDES CUENCO, CONCEPCION CUENCO MANGUERRA, CARMEN CUENCO, CONSUELO CUENCO REYES, and TERESITA CUENCO GONZALEZ, respondents. Ambrosio Padilla Law Office for petitioner. Jalandoni and Jamir for respondents.

properties in Cebu and Quezon City. On the same date, the Cebu court issued an order setting the petition for hearing on 10 April 1964, directing that due notice be given to all the heirs and interested persons, and ordering the requisite publication thereof at LA PRENSA, a newspaper of general circulation in the City and Province of Cebu. The aforesaid order, however, was later suspended and cancelled and a new and modified one released on 13 March 1964, in view of the fact that the petition was to be heard at Branch II instead of Branch I of the said Cebu court. On the same date, a third order was further issued stating that respondent Lourdes Cuenco's petition for the appointment of a special administrator dated 4 March 1964 was not yet ready for the consideration of the said court, giving as reasons the following: It will be premature for this Court to act thereon, it not having yet regularly acquired jurisdiction to try this proceeding, the requisite publication of the notice of hearing not yet having been complied with. Moreover, copies of the petition have not been served on all of the heirs specified in the basic petition for the issuance of letters of administration. 2 In the meantime, or specifically on 12 March 1964, (a week after the filing of the Cebu petition) herein petitioner Rosa Cayetano Cuenco filed a petition with the court of first instance of Rizal (Quezon City) for the probate of the deceased's last will and testament and for the issuance of letters testamentary in her favor, as the surviving widow and executrix in the said last will and testament. The said proceeding was docketed as Special Proceeding No. Q-7898. Having learned of the intestate proceeding in the Cebu court, petitioner Rosa Cayetano Cuenco filed in said Cebu court an Opposition and Motion to Dismiss, dated 30 March 1964, as well as an Opposition to Petition for Appointment of Special Administrator, dated 8 April 1964. On 10 April 1964, the Cebu court issued an order holding in abeyance its resolution on petitioner's motion to dismiss "until after the Court of First Instance of Quezon City shall have acted on the petition for probate of that document purporting to be the last will and

TEEHANKEE, J.: Petition for certiorari to review the decision of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 34104-R, promulgated 21 November 1964, and its subsequent Resolution promulgated 8 July 1964 denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration. The pertinent facts which gave rise to the herein petition follow: On 25 February 1964 Senator Mariano Jesus Cuenco died at the Manila Doctors' Hospital, Manila. He was survived by his widow, the herein petitioner, and their two (2) minor sons, Mariano Jesus, Jr. and Jesus Salvador, both surnamed Cuenco, all residing at 69 Pi y Margal St., Sta. Mesa Heights, Quezon City, and by his children of the first marriage, respondents herein, namely, Manuel Cuenco, Lourdes Cuenco, Concepcion Cuenco Manguera, Carmen Cuenco, Consuelo Cuenco Reyes and Teresita Cuenco Gonzales, all of legal age and residing in Cebu. On 5 March 1964, (the 9th day after the death of the late Senator) 1 respondent Lourdes Cuenco filed a Petition for Letters of Administration with the court of first instance of Cebu (Sp. Proc. No. 2433-R), alleging among other things, that the late senator died intestate in Manila on 25 February 1964; that he was a resident of Cebu at the time of his death; and that he left real and personal

testament of the deceased Don Mariano Jesus Cuenco." 3 Such order of the Cebu court deferring to the probateproceedings in the Quezon City court was neither excepted to nor sought by respondents to be reconsidered or set aside by the Cebu court nor did they challenge the same by certiorari or prohibition proceedings in the appellate courts. Instead, respondents filed in the Quezon City court an Opposition and Motion to Dismiss, dated 10 April 1964,opposing probate of the will and assailing the jurisdiction of the said Quezon City court to entertain petitioner's petition for probate and for appointment as executrix in Sp. Proc. No. Q-7898 in view of the alleged exclusive jurisdiction vested by her petition in the Cebu court in Sp. Proc. No. 2433-R. Said respondent prayed that Sp. Proc. No. Q-7898 be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and/or improper venue. In its order of 11 April 1964, the Quezon City court denied the motion to dismiss, giving as a principal reason the "precedence of probate proceeding over an intestate proceeding." 4 The said court further found in said order that the residence of the late senator at the time of his death was at No. 69 Pi y Margal, Sta. Mesa Heights, Quezon City. The pertinent portion of said order follows: On the question of residence of the decedent, paragraph 5 of the opposition and motion to dismiss reads as follows: "that since the decedent Don Mariano Jesus Cuenco was a resident of the City of Cebu at the time of his death, the aforesaid petition filed by Rosa Cayetano Cuenco on 12 March 1964 was not filed with the proper Court (wrong venue) in view of the provisions of Section 1 of Rule 73 of the New Rules of Court ...". From the aforequoted allegation, the Court is made to understand that the oppositors do not mean to say that the decedent being a resident of Cebu City when he died, the intestate proceedings in Cebu City should prevail over the probate proceedings in Quezon City, because as stated above the probate of the will should take precedence, but that the probate proceedings should be filed in the Cebu City Court of First Instance. If the last proposition is the desire of the oppositors as

understood by this Court, that could not also be entertained as proper because paragraph 1 of the petition for the probate of the will indicates that Don Mariano Jesus Cuenco at the time of his death was a resident of Quezon City at 69 Pi y Margal. Annex A (Last Will and Testament of Mariano Jesus Cuenco) of the petition for probate of the will shows that the decedent at the time when he executed his Last Will clearly stated that he is a resident of 69 Pi y Margal, Sta. Mesa Heights, Quezon City, and also of the City of Cebu. He made the former as his first choice and the latter as his second choice of residence." If a party has two residences, the one will be deemed or presumed to his domicile which he himself selects or considers to be his home or which appears to be the center of his affairs. The petitioner, in thus filing the instant petition before this Court, follows the first choice of residence of the decedent and once this court acquires jurisdiction of the probate proceeding it is to the exclusion of all others. 5 Respondent Lourdes Cuenco's motion for reconsideration of the Quezon City court's said order of 11 April 1964 asserting its exclusive jurisdiction over the probate proceeding as deferred to by the Cebu court was denied on 27 April 1964 and a second motion for reconsideration dated 20 May 1964 was likewise denied. On 11 May 1964, pursuant to its earlier order of 11 April 1964, the hearing for probate of the last will of the decedent was called three times at half-hour intervals, but notwithstanding due notification none of the oppositors appeared and the Quezon City court proceeded at 9:00 a.m. with the hearing in their absence. As per the order issued by it subsequently on 15 May 1964, the Quezon City court noted that respondents-oppositors had opposed probate under their opposition and motion to dismiss on the following grounds:

(a) That the will was not executed and attested as required by law; (b) That the will was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence on the part of the beneficiary or some other persons for his benefit; (c) That the testator's signature was procured by fraud and/or that the testator acted by mistake and did not intend that the instrument he signed should be his will at the time he affixed his signature thereto. 6 The Quezon City court further noted that the requisite publication of the notice of the hearing had been duly complied with and that all the heirs had been duly notified of the hearing, and after receiving the testimony of the three instrumental witnesses to the decedent's last will, namely Atty. Florencio Albino, Dr. Guillermo A. Picache and Dr. Jose P. Ojeda, and of the notary public, Atty. Braulio A. Arriola, Jr., who ratified the said last will, and the documentary evidence (such as the decedent's residence certificates, income tax return, diplomatic passport, deed of donation) all indicating that the decedent was a resident of 69 Pi y Margal St., Quezon City, as also affirmed by him in his last will, the Quezon City court in its said order of 15 May 1964 admitted to probate the late senator's last will and testament as having been "freely and voluntarily executed by the testator" and "with all formalities of the law" and appointed petitioner-widow as executrix of his estate without bond "following the desire of the testator" in his will as probated. Instead of appealing from the Quezon City court's said order admitting the will to probate and naming petitioner-widow as executrix thereof, respondents filed a special civil action of certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction with respondent Court of Appeals (docketed as case CA-G.R. No. 34104-R) to bar the Rizal court from proceeding with case No. Q-7898. On 21 November 1964, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision in favor of respondents (petitioners therein) and against the herein petitioner, holding that:

Section 1, Rule 73, which fixes the venue in proceedings for the settlement of the estate of a deceased person, covers both testate and intestate proceedings. Sp. Proc. 2433-R of the Cebu CFI having been filed ahead, it is that court whose jurisdiction was first invoked and which first attached. It is that court which can properly and exclusively pass upon the factual issues of (1) whether the decedent left or did not leave a valid will, and (2) whether or not the decedent was a resident of Cebu at the time of his death. Considering therefore that the first proceeding was instituted in the Cebu CFI (Special Proceeding 2433-R), it follows that the said court must exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of the Rizal CFI, in which the petition for probate was filed by the respondent Rosa Cayetano Cuenco (Special Proceeding Q-7898). The said respondent should assert her rights within the framework of the proceeding in the Cebu CFI, instead of invoking the jurisdiction of another court. The respondents try to make capital of the fact that on March 13, 1964, Judge Amador Gomez of the Cebu CFI, acting in Sp. Proc. 2433-R, stated that the petition for appointment of special administrator was "not yet ready for the consideration of the Court today. It would be premature for this Court to act thereon, it not having yet regularly acquired jurisdiction to try this proceeding ... . " It is sufficient to state in this connection that the said judge was certainly not referring to the court's jurisdiction over the res, not to jurisdiction itself which is acquired from the moment a petition is filed, but only to theexercise of jurisdiction in relation to the stage of the proceedings. At all events, jurisdiction is conferred and determined by law and does not depend on the pronouncements of a trial judge. The dispositive part of respondent appellate court's judgment provided as follows:

ACCORDINGLY, the writ of prohibition will issue, commanding and directing the respondent Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch IX, Quezon City, and the respondent Judge Damaso B. Tengco to refrain perpetually from proceeding and taking any action in Special Proceeding Q-7898 pending before the said respondent court. All orders heretofore issued and actions heretofore taken by said respondent court and respondent Judge, therein and connected therewith, are hereby annulled. The writ of injunction heretofore issued is hereby made permanent. No pronouncement as to costs. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied in a resolution of respondent Court of Appeals, dated 8 July 1965; hence the herein petition for review on certiorari. The principal and decisive issue at bar is, theretofore, whether the appellate court erred in law in issuing the writ of prohibition against the Quezon City court ordering it to refrain perpetually from proceeding with the testateproceedings and annulling and setting aside all its orders and actions, particularly its admission to probate of the decedent's last will and testament and appointing petitioner-widow as executrix thereof without bond in compliance with the testator's express wish in his testament. This issue is tied up with the issue submitted to the appellate court, to wit, whether the Quezon City court acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in taking cognizance and assuming exclusive jurisdiction over the probate proceedings filed with it, in pursuance of the Cebu court's order of 10 April 1964 expressly consenting in deference to the precedence of probate over intestate proceedings that it (the Quezon City court) should first act "on the petition for probate of the document purporting to be the last will and testament of the deceased Don Mariano Jesus Cuenco" - which order of the Cebu court respondents never questioned nor challenged by prohibition or certiorari proceedings and thus enabled the Quezon City court to proceed without any impediment or obstruction, once it denied respondent Lourdes Cuenco's motion to dismiss the probate proceeding for alleged lack of jurisdiction or improper venue, to proceed with the hearing of the petition and

to admit the will to probate upon having been satisfied as to its due execution and authenticity. The Court finds under the above-cited facts that the appellate court erred in law in issuing the writ of prohibition against the Quezon City court from proceeding with the testate proceedings and annulling and setting aside all its orders and actions, particularly its admission to probate of the deceased's last will and testament and appointing petitioner-widow as executrix thereof without bond pursuant to the deceased testator's express wish, for the following considerations: 1. The Judiciary Act 7 concededly confers original jurisdiction upon all Courts of First Instance over "all matter of probate, both of testate and intestate estates." On the other hand, Rule 73, section of the Rules of Court lays down the rule of venue, as the very caption of the Rule indicates, and in order to prevent conflict among the different courts which otherwise may properly assume jurisdiction from doing so, the Rule specifies that "the courtfirst taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts." The cited Rule provides: Section 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. If the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in the Province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance of the province in which he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to theexclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence, of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding,except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record. (Rule 73) 8

It is equally conceded that the residence of the deceased or the location of his estate is not an element of jurisdiction over the subject matter but merely of venue. This was lucidly stated by the late Chief Justice Moran inSy Oa vs. Co Ho 9 as follows: We are not unaware of existing decisions to the effect that in probate cases the place of residence of the deceased is regarded as a question of jurisdiction over the subject-matter. But we decline to follow this view because of its mischievous consequences. For instance, a probate case has been submitted in good faith to the Court of First Instance of a province where the deceased had not resided. All the parties, however, including all the creditors, have submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the court and the case is therein completely finished except for a claim of a creditor who also voluntarily filed it with said court but on appeal from an adverse decision raises for the first time in this Court the question of jurisdiction of the trial court for lack of residence of the deceased in the province. If we consider such question of residence as one affecting the jurisdiction of the trial court over the subject-matter, the effect shall be that the whole proceedings including all decisions on the different incidents which have arisen in court will have to be annulled and the same case will have to be commenced anew before another court of the same rank in another province. That this is ofmischievous effect in the prompt administration of justice is too obvious to require comment. (Cf. Tanunchuan vs. Dy Buncio & Co., G.R. No. 48206, December 31, 1942) Furthermore, section 600 of Act No. 190, 10providing that the estate of a deceased person shall be settled in the province where he had last resided, couldnot have been intended as defining the jurisdiction of the probate court over the subject-matter, because such legal provision is contained in a law of procedure dealing merely with procedural matters, and, as we have said time and again, procedure is one thing and jurisdiction over the subject matter is another.

(Attorney-General vs. Manila Railroad Company, 20 Phil. 523.) The law of jurisdiction Act No. 136, 11 Section 56, No. 5 confers upon Courts of First Instance jurisdiction over all probate cases independently of the place of residence of the deceased. Since, however, there are many courts of First Instance in the Philippines, the Law of Procedure, Act No. 190, section 600, fixes the venue or the place where each case shall be brought. Thus, the place of residence of the deceased is not an element of jurisdiction over the subject-matter but merely ofvenue. And it is upon this ground that in the new Rules of Court the province where the estate of a deceased person shall be settled is properly called "venue". It should be noted that the Rule on venue does not state that the court with whom the estate or intestate petition isfirst filed acquires exclusive jurisdiction. The Rule precisely and deliberately provides that "the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estateof a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts." A fair reading of the Rule since it deals with venue and comity between courts of equal and co-ordinate jurisdiction indicates that the court with whom the petition is first filed, must also first take cognizance of the settlement of the estate in order to exercise jurisdiction over it to the exclusion of all other courts. Conversely, such court, may upon learning that a petition for probate of the decedent's last will has been presented in another court where the decedent obviously had his conjugal domicile and resided with his surviving widow and their minor children, and that the allegation of the intestate petition before it stating that the decedent died intestate may be actually false, may decline to take cognizance of the petition and hold the petition before it in abeyance, and instead defer to the second court which has before it the petition for probate of the decedent's alleged last will.

2. This exactly what the Cebu court did. Upon petitioner-widow's filing with it a motion to dismiss Lourdes' intestate petition, it issued its order holding in abeyance its action on the dismissal motion and deferred to the Quezon City court, awaiting its action on the petition for probate before that court. Implicit in the Cebu court's order was that if the will was duly admitted to probate, by the Quezon City court, then it would definitely decline to take cognizance of Lourdes' intestate petition which would thereby be shown to be false and improper, and leave the exercise of jurisdiction to the Quezon City court, to the exclusion of all other courts. Likewise by its act of deference, the Cebu court left it to the Quezon City court to resolve the question between the parties whether the decedent's residenceat the time of his death was in Quezon City where he had his conjugal domicile rather than in Cebu City as claimed by respondents. The Cebu court thus indicated that it would decline to take cognizance of the intestate petition before it and instead defer to the Quezon City court, unless the latter would make a negative finding as to theprobate petition and the residence of the decedent within its territory and venue. 3. Under these facts, the Cebu court could not be held to have acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of jurisdiction in declining to take cognizance of the intestate petition and deferring to the Quezon City court. Necessarily, neither could the Quezon City court be deemed to have acted without jurisdiction in taking cognizance of and acting on the probate petition since under Rule 73, section 1, the Cebu court must first take cognizanceover the estate of the decedent and must exercise jurisdiction to exclude all other courts, which the Cebu court declined to do. Furthermore, as is undisputed, said rule only lays down a rule of venue and the Quezon City court indisputably had at least equal and coordinate jurisdiction over the estate. Since the Quezon City court took cognizance over the probate petition before it and assumed jurisdiction over the estate, with the consent and deference of the Cebu court, the Quezon City court should be left now, by the same rule of venue of said Rule 73, to exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts.

Under the facts of the case and where respondents submitted to the Quezon City court their opposition to probate of the will, but failed to appear at the scheduled hearing despite due notice, the Quezon City court cannot be declared, as the appellate court did, to have acted without jurisdiction in admitting to probate the decedent's will and appointing petitioner-widow as executrix thereof in accordance with the testator's testamentary disposition. 4. The relatively recent case of Uriarte vs. Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental 12 with facts analogous to the present case 13 is authority against respondent appellate court's questioned decision. In said case, the Court upheld the doctrine of precedence of probate proceedings over intestate proceedings in this wise: It can not be denied that a special proceeding intended to effect the distribution of the estate of a deceased person, whether in accordance with the law on intestate succession or in accordance with his will, is a "probate matter" or a proceeding for the settlement of his estate. It is equally true, however, that in accordance with settled jurisprudence in this jurisdiction, testate proceedings for the settlement of the estate of a deceased person take precedence over intestate proceedings for the same purpose. Thus it has been held repeatedly that, if in the course of intestate proceedings pending before a court of first instance it is found that the decedent had left a last will, proceedings for the probate of the latter should replace the intestate proceedings even if at that state an administrator had already been appointed, the latter being required to render final account and turn over the estate in his possession to the executor subsequently appointed. This however, is understood to be without prejudice that should the alleged last will be rejected or is disapproved, the proceeding shall continue as an intestacy. As already adverted to, this is a clear indication that proceedings for the probate of a will enjoy priority over intestate proceedings. 14

The Court likewise therein upheld the jurisdiction of the second court, (in this case, the Quezon City court) although opining that certain considerations therein "would seem to support the view that [therein respondent] should have submitted said will for probate to the Negros Court, [in this case, the Cebu court] either in a separate special proceeding or in an appropriate motion for said purpose filed in the already pending Special Proceeding No. 6344," 15 thus: But the fact is that instead of the aforesaid will being presented for probate to the Negros Court, Juan Uriarte Zamacona filed the petition for the purpose with the Manila Court. We can not accept petitioner's contention in this regard that the latter court had no jurisdiction to consider said petition, albeit we say that it was not the proper venue therefor. It is well settled in this jurisdiction that wrong venue is merely a waivable procedural defect, and, in the light of the circumstances obtaining in the instant case, we are of the opinion, and so hold, that petitioner has waived the right to raise such objection or is precluded from doing so by laches. It is enough to consider in this connection that petitioner knew of the existence of a will executed by Juan Uriarte y Goite since December 19, 1961 when Higinio Uriarte filed his opposition to the initial petition filed in Special Proceeding No. 6344; that petitioner likewise was served with notice of the existence (presence) of the alleged last will in the Philippines and of the filing of the petition for its probate with the Manila Court since August 28, 1962 when Juan Uriarte Zamacona filed a motion for the dismissal of Special Proceeding No. 6344. All these notwithstanding, it was only on April 15, 1963 that he filed with the Manila Court in Special Proceeding No. 51396 an Omnibus motion asking for leave to intervene and for the dismissal and annulment of all the proceedings had therein up to that date; thus enabling the Manila Court not only to appoint an administrator with the will annexed but also to admit said will to probate more than five months earlier, or more

specifically, on October 31, 1962. To allow him now to assail the exercise of jurisdiction over the probate of the will by the Manila Court and the validity of all the proceedings had in Special Proceeding No. 51396 would put a premium on his negligence. Moreover, it must be remembered that this Court is not inclined to annul proceedings regularly had in a lower court even if the latter was not the proper venue therefor, if the net result would be to have the same proceedings repeated in some other court of similar jurisdiction; more so in a case like the present where the objection against said proceedings is raised too late. 16 5. Under Rule 73, section 1 itself, the Quezon City court's assumption of jurisdiction over the decedent's estate on the basis of the will duly presented for probate by petitioner-widow and finding that Quezon City was the firstchoice of residence of the decedent, who had his conjugal home and domicile therein with the deference in comity duly given by the Cebu court could not be contested except by appeal from said court in the original case. The last paragraph of said Rule expressly provides: ... The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record. (Rule 73) The exception therein given, viz, "when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record" could probably be properly invoked, had such deference in comity of the Cebu court to the Quezon City court not appeared in the record, or had the record otherwise shown that the Cebu court had taken cognizance of the petition before it and assumed jurisdiction. 6. On the question that Quezon City established to be the residence of the late senator, the appellate court while recognizing that "the issue is a legitimate one" held in reliance on Borja vs. Tan 17 that.

... The issue of residence comes within the competence of whichever court is considered to prevail in the exercise jurisdiction - in this case, the Court of First Instance of Cebu as held by this Court. Parenthetically, we note that the question of the residence of the deceased is a serious one, requiring both factual and legal resolution on the basis of ample evidence to be submitted in the ordinary course of procedure in the first instance, particularly in view of the fact that the deceased was better known as the Senator from Cebu and the will purporting to be his also gives Cebu, besides Quezon City, as his residence. We reiterate that this matter requires airing in the proper court, as so indicated in the leading and controlling case of Borja vs. Hon. Bienvenido Tan, et al., G.R. L-7792, July 27, 1955. In the case at bar, however, the Cebu court declined to take cognizance of the intestate petition first filed with it and deferred to the testate proceedings filed with the Quezon City court and in effect asked the Quezon City court to determine the residence of the decedent and whether he did leave a last will and testament upon which would depend the proper venue of the estate proceedings, Cebu or Quezon City. The Quezon City court having thus determined in effect for both courts at the behest and with the deference and consent of the Cebu court thatQuezon City was the actual residence of the decedent who died testate and therefore the proper venue, the Borja ruling would seem to have no applicability. It would not serve the practical ends of justice to still require the Cebu court, if the Borja ruling is to be held applicable and as indicated in the decision under review, to determine for itself the actual residence of the decedent (when the Quezon City court had already so determined Quezon City as the actual residence at the Cebu court's behest and respondents have not seriously questioned this factual finding based on documentary evidence) and if the Cebu court should likewise determine Quezon City as the actual residence, or its contrary finding reversed on appeal, only then to allow petitioner-widow after years of waiting and inaction to institute the corresponding proceedings in Quezon City.

7. With more reason should the Quezon City proceedings be upheld when it is taken into consideration that Rule 76, section 2 requires that the petition for allowance of a will must show: "(a) the jurisdictional facts." Such "jurisdictional facts" in probate proceedings, as held by the Court in Fernando vs. Crisostomo 18 " are the death of the decedent, his residence at the time of his death in the province where the probate court is sitting, or if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, his having left his estate in such province." This tallies with the established legal concept as restated by Moran that "(T)he probate of a will is a proceeding in rem. The notice by publication as a pre-requisite to the allowance of a will, is a constructive notice to the whole world, and when probate is granted, the judgment of the court is binding upon everybody, even against the State.The probate of a will by a court having jurisdiction thereof is conclusive as to its due execution and validity." 19 The Quezon City court acted regularly within its jurisdiction (even if it were to be conceded that Quezon City was not the proper venue notwithstanding the Cebu court's giving way and deferring to it,) in admitting the decedent's last will to probate and naming petitioner-widow as executrix thereof. Hence, the Quezon city court's action should notbe set aside by a writ of prohibition for supposed lack of jurisdiction as per the appellate court's appealed decision, and should instead be sustained in line with Uriarte, supra, where the Court, in dismissing the certioraripetition challenging the Manila court's action admitting the decedent's will to probate and distributing the estate in accordance therewith in the second proceeding, held that "it must be remembered that this Court is not inclined to annul proceedings regularly had in a lower court even if the latter was not the proper venue therefor, if the net result would be to have the same proceedings repeated in some other court of similar jurisdiction." As stressed by Chief Justice Moran in Sy Oa, supra, "the mischievous effect in the administration of justice" of considering the question of residence as affecting the jurisdiction of the trial court and annulling the whole proceedings only to start all over again the same proceedings before another court of the same rank in another province "is too obvious to require comment." 8. If the question of jurisdiction were to be made to depend only on who of the decedent's relatives gets first to file a petition for settlement

of the decedent's estate, then the established jurisprudence of the Court that Rule 73, section 1 provides only a rule of venue in order to preclude different courts which may properly assume jurisdictionfrom doing so and creating conflicts between them to the detriment of the administration of justice, and that venue is waivable, would be set at naught. As between relatives who unfortunately do not see eye to eye, it would be converted into a race as to who can file the petition faster in the court of his/her choice regardless of whether the decedent is still in cuerpo presente and in disregard of the decedent's actual last domicile, the fact that he left a last will and testament and the right of his surviving widow named as executrix thereof. Such dire consequences were certainly not intended by the Rule nor would they be in consonance with public policy and the orderly administration of justice. 9. It would finally be unjust and inequitable that petitioner-widow, who under all the applicable rules of venue, and despite the fact that the Cebu court (where respondent Lourdes Cuenco had filed an intestate petition in the Cebu court earlier by a week's time on 5 March 1964) deferred to the Quezon City court where petitioner had within fifteen days (on March 12, 1964) after the decedent's death (on February 25, 1964) timely filed the decedent's last will and petitioned for letters testamentary and is admittedly entitled to preference in the administration of her husband's estate, 20 would be compelled under the appealed decision to have to go all the way to Cebu and submit anew the decedent's will there for probate either in a new proceeding or by asking that the intestate proceedings be converted into a testate proceeding when under the Rules, the proper venue for the testateproceedings, as per the facts of record and as already affirmed by the Quezon City court is Quezon City, where the decedent and petitioner-widow had their conjugal domicile. It would be an unfair imposition upon petitioner as the one named and entitled to be executrix of the decedent's last will and settle his estate in accordance therewith, and a disregard of her rights under the rule on venue and the law on jurisdiction to require her to spend much more time, money and effort to have to go from Quezon City to the Cebu court everytime she has an important matter of the estate to take up with the probate court.

It would doubly be an unfair imposition when it is considered that under Rule 73, section 2, 21 since petitioner's marriage has been dissolved with the death of her husband, their community property and conjugal estate have to be administered and liquidated in the estate proceedings of the deceased spouse. Under the appealed decision, notwithstanding that petitioner resides in Quezon City, and the proper venue of the testate proceeding was in Quezon City and the Quezon City court properly took cognizance and exercised exclusive jurisdiction with the deference in comity and consent of the Cebu court, such proper exercise of jurisdiction would be nullified and petitioner would have to continually leave her residence in Quezon City and go to Cebu to settle and liquidate even her own community property and conjugal estate with the decedent. 10. The Court therefore holds under the facts of record that the Cebu court did not act without jurisdiction nor with grave abuse of discretion in declining to take cognizance of the intestate petition and instead deferring to thetestate proceedings filed just a week later by petitioner as surviving widow and designated executrix of the decedent's last will, since the record before it (the petitioner's opposition and motion to dismiss) showed the falsityof the allegation in the intestate petition that the decedent had died without a will. It is noteworthy that respondents never challenged by certiorari or prohibition proceedings the Cebu court's order of 10 April 1964 deferring to the probate proceedings before the Quezon City court, thus leaving the latter free (pursuant to the Cebu court's order of deference) to exercise jurisdiction and admit the decedent's will to probate. For the same reasons, neither could the Quezon City court be held to have acted without jurisdiction nor with grave abuse of discretion in admitting the decedent's will to probate and appointing petitioner as executrix in accordance with its testamentary disposition, in the light of the settled doctrine that the provisions of Rule 73, section 1 lay down only a rule of venue, not of jurisdiction. Since respondents undisputedly failed to appeal from the Quezon City court's order of May 15, 1964 admitting the will to probate and appointing petitioner as executrix thereof, and said court concededly

has jurisdiction to issue said order, the said order of probate has long since become final and can not be overturned in a special civic action of prohibition. 11. Finally, it should be noted that in the Supreme Court's exercise of its supervisory authority over all inferior courts, 22 it may properly determine, as it has done in the case at bar, that venue was properly assumed by andtransferred to the Quezon City court and that it is the interest of justice and in avoidance of needless delay that the Quezon City court's exercise of jurisdiction over the testate estate of the decedent (with the due deference and consent of the Cebu court) and its admission to probate of his last will and testament and appointment of petitioner-widow as administratrix without bond in pursuance of the decedent's express will and all its orders and actions taken in the testate proceedings before it be approved and authorized rather than to annul all such proceedings regularly had and to repeat and duplicate the same proceedings before the Cebu court only to revert once more to the Quezon City court should the Cebu court find that indeed and in fact, as already determined by the Quezon City court on the strength of incontrovertible documentary evidence of record, Quezon City was the conjugal residence of the decedent. ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered reversing the appealed decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals and the petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction originally filed by respondents with the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 34104R) is ordered dismissed. No costs.

CANONOY, TEODULO CANONOY, REGINO CANONOY, JR., MARIANITA CANONOY GUINTO and GLORIA CANONOY BASA, respondents. Dominguez & Paderna Law Offices Co. for petitioner. Wenceslao B. Rosales for private respondents.

DAVIDE, JR., J.: Brought to focus in this petition are the following issues: (a) whether the jurisdictional facts that need to be stated in a petition for letters of administration under Section 2(a), Rule 79 of the Rules of Court include the specific assertion that the petitioner therein is an "interested person," and (b) whether the administration court may properly and validly dismiss a petition for letters of administration filed by one who is not an "interested person" after having appointed an heir of the decedent as administrator of the latter's intestate estate and set for pre-trial a claim against the said estate Ricardo M. Gonzalez, District Manager of Shell Philippines, Inc. for Mindanao (hereinafter referred to as Shell), filed on 8 January 1973 a petition entitled "In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of the Deceased Regino Canonoy, Petition for Letters of Administration, Ricardo M. Gonzalez, Petitioner" with the then Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Agusan del Norte and Butuan City, praying therein that he be appointed judicial administrator of the estate of the deceased Regino Canonoy. The case was docketed as SP PROC. No. 343 and was raffled to Branch II of the trial court.

3. G.R. No. L-44888 February 7, 1992 PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. FIDEL P. DUMLAO, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Agusan Del Norte and Butuan City, BONIFACIO CANONOY, Judicial Administrator of the Estate of Regino Canonoy, CARMEN VDA. DE

On 27 January 1973, Judge Vicente B. Echavez, Jr. of Branch II issued an Order (1) setting the hearing on the petition for 23 March 1973 at 8:30 a.m.; (2) directing that the order be published, at petitioner's expense, once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper with a nationwide circulation published regularly by a government agency or entity, or in any newspaper published and edited in any part of the country which is in operation during the existence of the present national emergency and of general circulation in the province of Agusan del Norte and in Butuan City, if any there be; and (3) ordering that copies of the order be sent by registered mail or personal delivery, at the petitioner's expense, to each of all the known heirs of the deceased Regino Canonoy, within the periods prescribed by Section 4, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court. 1 In their Opposition to the issuance of letters of administration to Gonzalez filed on 21 March 1973, 2 private respondents, who are heirs of Regino Canonoy, allege that: Gonzalez "is a complete stranger to the intestate estate" of Regino Canonoy; he is "not even a creditor" of the estate; he is a resident of Davao City and thus if appointed as administrator of the estate, the bulk of which is located in Butuan City, "he would not be able to perform his duties efficiently;" and he is an employee of Shell Philippines, Inc., an alleged creditor of the estate, and so "he would not be able to properly and effectively protect the interest of the estate in case of conflicts." They, however, "propose" and pray that since Bonifacio Canonoy, one of Regino's sons, enjoys preference in appointment pursuant to Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, he should "be appointed administrator of the said intestate estate and the

corresponding letters of administration be issued in his favor." On 25 July 1973, after due hearing, the trial court appointed Bonifacio Canonoy as administrator of the intestate estate of Regino Canonoy, 3 having found him competent to act as such. None of the parties moved to reconsider this order or appealed therefrom. On 23 November 1973, herein petitioner Shell, then known as Shell Philippines, Inc., filed its claim against the estate of the deceased Regino Canonoy. The duly appointed administrator, Bonifacio Canonoy, filed on 9 October 1974 a Motion to Dismiss the claim of Shell 4 which the latter contested by filing an Opposition. Shell likewise filed an amended claim against the estate. 5 On 12 May 1975, the administrator filed his Reply to the Opposition to Motion to Dismiss. 6 On 25 May 1975, he filed an Answer to the amended claim filed by Shell. 7 In the said Answer, he interposes compulsory counterclaims for the estate in the amount of P659,423.49 representing rentals for land occupied by the Shell Service Station, lighting allowances, allowances for salaries and wages of service attendants, sales commission due the deceased Regino Canonoy and reasonable attorney's fees. Petitioner filed an answer to the Counterclaim. Upon joinder of the issues on Shell's claim, the trial court, this time presided over by respondent Judge Fidel P. Dumlao, set the pre-trial for 15 August 1975. 8 This was later re-set to 23 September 1975. 9 On 18 August 1975, petitioner filed a motion to require the judicial administrator to file an inventory of the properties of the deceased. 10

At the pre-trial held on 23 September 1975, counsel for the administrator requested for time to file a Motion to Dismiss the case. In an Order issued on that date, the court granted him ten (10) days to file the motion; opposing counsel was likewise given ten (10) days from receipt of the same to file whatever pleading he may deem proper to file, after which the motion shall be deemed submitted for resolution. 11 The motion was filed on 30 September 1975. It alleges that the court did not acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter and nature thereof because the petitioner therein, Mr. Gonzalez, is not the "interested person" contemplated by Section 2, Rule 79 of the Rules of Court. 12 Shell filed its Opposition to the Motion on 16 October 1975 13 on the ground that the trial court had acquired jurisdiction over the case to issue letters of administration as the interest of Gonzalez in the estate is not a jurisdictional fact that needs to be alleged in the petition. If at all, Gonzalez' lack of interest in the estate of the deceased only affected his competence to be appointed administrator. In an Order dated 8 November 1975, respondent Judge, finding the motion to be well-taken and meritorious, dismissed the case. 14 The motion for its reconsideration having been denied by the trial court on 23 January 1976, 15 Shell filed the instant petition which it denominated as a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. In the Resolution dated 6 December 1976, this Court required the respondents to comment on the petition; 16 the latter complied with the same on 31 January 1977. 17 Thereafter, on 7 February 1977, this Court resolved, inter alia, to treat the petition for review as a special civil action under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court and

require the parties to submit their respective Memoranda; 18 petitioner filed its Memorandum on 4 April 1977 19 while the respondents filed theirs on 3 June 1977. 20 The petition is impressed with merit; it must perforce be granted. Under the peculiar circumstances of the case, the trial court clearly acted with grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed SP PROC. No. 343 after having set for pre-trial petitioner's amended claim against the estate. That said dismissal was predicated solely on the ground that petitioner therein, Ricardo Gonzalez, is not an "interested person," and that, since such interest is a jurisdictional requirement, the trial court acquired no jurisdiction over the case, serves only to compound the error. 1. Section 2, Rule 79 of the Rules of Court provides: xxx xxx xxx Sec. 2. Contents of petition of letters of administration. A petition for letters of administration must be filed by an interested person and must show, so far as known to the petitioner: (a) The jurisdictional facts; (b) The names, ages, and residences of the heirs, and the names and residences of the creditors, of the decedent;

(c) The probable value and character of the property of the estate; (d) The name of the person for whom letters of administration are prayed. But no defect in the petition shall render void the issuance of letters of administration. xxx xxx xxx The jurisdictional facts alluded to are: the death of the testator, his residence at the time of his death in the province where the probate court is sitting or, if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, his having left his estate in such province. 21 These facts are amply enumerated in the petition filed by Gonzalez. 22 The fact of death of the intestate and of his residence within the country are foundation facts upon which all the subsequent proceedings in the administration of the estate rest, and that if the intestate was not an inhabitant of the state at the time of his death, and left no assets in the state, and none came into it afterwards, no jurisdiction is conferred on the court to grant letters of administration in any county. 23 Clearly, the allegation that a petitioner seeking letters of administration is an interested person, does not fall within the enumeration of jurisdictional facts. Of course, since the opening sentence of the section requires that the petition must be filed by an interested person, it goes without saying that a motion to dismiss may lie not on the basis of lack of jurisdiction on the part of the court, but rather on the ground of lack of legal capacity to institute the proceedings.

This is precisely what happened in Saguinsin vs. Lindayag, 24 where the dismissal of a petition for letters of administration was affirmed because the petitioner "is not an heir of her deceased sister and, therefore, has no material and direct interest in her estate." 25 In the said case, this Court defined an interested party as one who would be benefited by the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor; this interest must be material and direct, not merely indirect or contingent. 26 The Saguinsin doctrine is not, however, without exception. An objection to a petition for letters of administration on that ground may be barred by waiver or estoppel. Private respondents herein did not file a motion to dismiss the petition filed by Gonzalez on the ground of lack of capacity to sue; 27 they instead filed an Opposition which, unfortunately, did not ask for the dismissal of the petition but merely opposed the issuance of letters of administration in favor of Gonzalez because, among other reasons, he is a stranger to the estate. The Opposition also proposed that Bonifacio Canonoy, one of the children of the deceased Regino Canonoy, be appointed administrator of the latter's intestate estate. The failure to move for a dismissal amounted to a waiver of the above-mentioned ground. Section 8, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court provides that: A motion attacking a pleading or a proceeding shall include all objections then available, and all objections not so included shall be deemed waived. However, if a motion to dismiss is not filed, as what obtains in this case, any of the grounds available for such a motion,

except for improper venue, may be pleaded as an affirmative defense, and a preliminary hearing thereon may be had as if a motion to dismiss had been filed. 28 Excepted from the above rules are the following grounds: (a) failure to state a cause of action which may be alleged in a later pleading if one is permitted, or by a motion for judgment on the pleadings, or at the trial on the merits; and (b) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action, 29 subject to the exception as hereinafter discussed. In Insurance Company of North America vs. C.F. Sharp & Co., Inc., 30 this Court ruled: Finally, appellant would contend that plaintiff has no capacity to sue and is not the real party in interest. It is now too late to raise these objections here. These should have been asserted in the motion to dismiss filed by defendant below. Not having been included therein, they are now barred by the rule on omnibus motion. By proposing that Bonifacio Canonoy be appointed as administrator instead of Mr. Gonzalez, private respondents have in fact approved or ratified the filing of the petition by the latter. In Eusebio vs. Valmores, 31 We held that: xxx xxx xxx The evidence submitted in the hearing does not satisfactorily prove that the petitioner was legally adopted; hence, he did not have any

interest in the properties of the deceased Rosalia Saquitan. Under ordinary circumstances, such defect would authorize the dismissal of the proceedings especially in view of the fact that the surviving spouse of Rosalia Saquitan had filed an affidavit of adjudication under the provisions of Section 1 of Rule 74 of the Rules. Counsel for Domingo Valmores, however, had not objected to the application for the appointment of an administrator; he only objected to the appointment of the said stranger Eulogio Eusebio as administrator, claiming to have the right as surviving spouse to be appointed as such administrator. By this act of Domingo Valmores, surviving spouse of the deceased, therefore, the fatal defect in the petition may be considered, as cured. In other words, the filing of the petition for the appointment of an administrator may be considered as having been ratified by the surviving husband, Domingo Valmores, and for this reason the proceedings may not be dismissed. 2. There can be no dispute that the trial court had acquired jurisdiction over SP PROC. No. 343. Immediately after the filing of the case, the trial court complied with Section 3, Rule 79 of the Rules of Court by issuing the Order dated 27 January 1973. At the initial hearing on 25 July 1973, petitioner Gonzalez established the jurisdictional requirements by submitting in evidence proof of publication and service of notices of the petition. Thereafter, it heard the evidence on the qualifications and competence of Bonifacio

Canonoy, then appointed him as the administrator and finally directed that letters of administration be issued to him, and that he takes his oath of office after putting up a surety or property bond in the amount of P5,000.00. 32 It is be presumed that Bonifacio Canonoy immediately qualified as administrator because in that capacity, he filed a motion to dismiss petitioner's claim against the estate, 33 a Reply to the Opposition to the motion to dismiss 34and an Answer to the petitioner's amended claim against the estate wherein he interposed a counterclaim, 35praying thus: WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court to dismiss the abovementioned "Amended Claim Against the Estate" and to order the claimant to pay into the intestate estate of Regino Canonoy the said sum of P659,423.49, together with the interest thereon at the legal rate beginning from the date hereof, the reasonable attorney's fees for the prosecution of this counterclaim, and costs; OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, in the event that any sum is found due from and payable by the said intestate estate of Regino Canonoy in favor of the said claimant, the said amount be deducted from the above-mentioned sum and, thereafter, to order the claimant to pay the balance remaining unto the said intestate estate of Regino Canonoy, together with interest thereon at the legal rate beginning from date hereof, the reasonable attorney's fees for the prosecution of this counterclaim, and costs.

Clearly, therefore, not only had the administrator and the rest of the private respondents voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court, they even expressly affirmed and invoked such jurisdiction in praying for reliefs and remedies in their favor, namely: (a) denial of Gonzalez' prayer to be appointed as administrator, (b) appointment of Bonifacio Canonoy as administrator, (c) denial of petitioner Shell's amended claim against the estate, and (d) the granting of the counterclaim. Hence, they cannot now be heard to question the jurisdiction of the trial court. While it may be true that jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, a party who has affirmed and invoked it in a particular matter to secure an affirmative relief cannot be allowed to afterwards deny that same jurisdiction to escape penalty. In Tijam, et al. al. vs. Sibonghanoy, et al., 36 this Court held: It has been held that a party can not invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against his opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction (Dean vs. Dean, 136 Or. 694, 86 A.L.R. 79). In the case just cited, by way of explaining the rule, it was further said that the question whether (sic) the court had jurisdiction either of the subjectmatter of the action or of the parties was not important in such cases because the party is barred from such conduct not because the judgment or order of the court is valid and conclusive as an adjudication, but for the reason that such a practice can not be

tolerated obviously for reasons of public policy. Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering an adverse decision on the merits, it is too late for the loser to question the jurisdiction or power of the court (Pease vs. Rathbun-Jones etc., 243 U.S. 273, 61 L. Ed. 715, 37 S. Ct. 283; St. Louis etc. vs. McBride, 141 U.S. 127, 35 L. Ed. 659). And in Littleton vs. Burgess, 16 Wyo. 58, the Court said that it is not right for a party who has affirmed and invoked the jurisdiction of a court in a particular matter to secure an affirmative relief, to afterwards deny that same jurisdiction to escape a penalty. The respondent Judge should have lent his ears to Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy instead of peremptorily granting the motion to dismiss in an Order which does not even care to expound on why the court found the said motion to be meritorious. He exhibited undue haste in removing the case from his docket and in abdicating judicial authority and responsibility. Howsoever viewed, he committed grave abuse of discretion. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED and the Order of respondent Judge of 8 November 1975 in SP PROC. No. 343 is hereby SET ASIDE. The court below is further ordered to hear and decide petitioner's claim against the estate in said case, unless supervening events had occurred making it unnecessary, and to conduct therein further proceedings pursuant to the Rules of Court until the case is closed and terminated.

Costs against private respondents. IT IS SO ORDERED.

5. G.R. No. 119777 March 26, 1998 THE HEIRS OF PEDRO ESCANLAR, FRANCISCO HOLGADO and the SPOUSES DR. EDWIN A. JAYME and ELISA TAN-JAYME, petitioners, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, GENEROSA MARTINEZ, CARMEN CARI-AN, RODOLFO CARI-AN, NELLY CHUA CARI-AN, for herself and as guardian ad litem of her minor son, LEONELL C. CARI-AN, FREDISMINDA CARI-AN, the SPOUSES PAQUITO CHUA and NEY SARROSA-CHUA and THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, respondents. G.R. No. 120690 March 26, 1998 FRANCISCO HOLGADO and HRS. OF PEDRO ESCANLAR, namely BERNARDO, FELY, SONIA, LILY, DYESEBEL and NOEMI all surnamed ESCANLAR, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, GENEROSA MARTINEZ, CARMEN CARI-AN, RODOLFO CARI-AN, NELLY CHUA CARI-AN, for herself and as guardian ad litem of her minor son, LEONELL C. CARI-AN and FREDISMINDA CARI-AN, and SP. PAQUITO CHUA and NEY SARROSA CHUA and REGISTER OF DEEDS OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, respondents. RESOLUTION

ROMERO, J.: Before this Court are the following motions: (a) [First] Motion 1 dated November 29, 1997, filed by petitioners heirs of Pedro Escanlar and Francisco Holgado; (b) Motion for Leave to File Second Motion for Partial Reconsideration and Clarification 2 dated February 9, 1998; and (c) Second Motion for Partial Reconsideration and Clarification 3 of even date, the latter two motions having been filed by petitioners Edwin and Elisa Jayme (the "Jaymes"). These motions all pertain to this Court's decision 4 promulgated on October 23, 1997, the decretal portion of which states: WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals under review is hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Negros Occidental, Branch 61 for petitioners and private respondents Cari-an or their successors-in-interest to determine exactly which 1/2 portion of Lot Nos. 1616 and 1617 will be owned by each party, at the option of petitioners. The trial court is DIRECTED to order the issuance of the corresponding certificates of title in the name of the respective parties and to resolve the matter of rental payments of the land not delivered to the Chua spouses subject to the rates specified above with legal interest from date of demand. wherein we ruled, inter alia, that the first sale to petitioners Francisco Holgado and the late Pedro Escanlar by the Cari-an heirs (the "Cari-ans") of the one-half portions of Lots 1616 and 1617 pertaining to the share in the conjugal estate of their predecessor Victoriana Cari-an was valid while the subsequent conveyance of the same to respondents Paquito Chua and Ney Sarrosa-Chua (the "Chuas") was not. In particular, petitioners are seeking clarification of that part of the decision which states:

5. Recapitulating, we have held that the September 15, 1978 deed of sale of rights, interests and participations is valid and that the sellers-private respondents Cari-an were fully paid the contract price. However, it must be emphasized that what was sold was only the Cari-an's hereditary shares in Lot Nos. 1616 and 1617 being held pro indiviso by them and is thus a valid conveyance only of said ideal shares. Specific or designated portions of land were not involved. Consequently, the subsequent sale of 8 parcels of land, including Lot Nos. 1616 and 1617, to the spouses Chua is valid except to the extent of what was sold to petitioners in the September 15, 1978 conveyance. It must be noted, however, that the probate court in Special Proceeding No. 7-7279 desisted from awarding the individual shares of each heir because all the properties belonging to the estate had already been sold. Thus it is not certain how much private respondents Cari-an were entitled to with respect to the two lots, or if they were even going to be awarded shares in said lots. The proceedings surrounding the estate of Nombre and Cari-an having attained finality for nearly a decade now, the same cannot be re-opened. The protracted proceedings which have undoubtedly left the property under a cloud and the parties involved in a state of uncertainty compels us to resolve it definitively. The decision of the probate court declares private respondents Cari-an as the sole heirs by representation of Victoriana Cari-an who was indisputably entitled to half of the estate. There being no exact apportionment of the shares of each heir and no competent proof that the heirs received unequal shares in the disposition of the estate, it can be assumed that the heirs of Victoriana Cari-an collectively are entitled to half of each property in the estate. More particularly, private respondents

Cari-an are entitled to half of Lot Nos. 1616 and 1617, i.e. 14,675 square meters of Lot No. 1616 and 230,474 square meters of Lot No. 1617.Consequently, petitioners, as their successors-in-interest, own said half of the subject lots and ought to deliver the possession of the other half, as well as pay rents thereon, to the private respondents Ney Sarrosa Chua and Paquito Chua but only if the former (petitioners) remained in possession thereof . The rate of rental payments to be made were given in evidence by Ney Sarrosa Chua in her unrebutted testimony on July 24, 1989: For the fishpond (Lot No. 1617) From 1982 up to 1986, rental payment of P3,000.00 per hectare; from 1986-1989 (and succeeding years), rental payment of P10,000.00 per hectare. For the riceland (Lot No. 1616) - 15 cavans per hectare per year; from 1982-1986, P125.00 per cavan, 1987 -1988, P175.00 per cavan; and 1989 and succeeding years, P200.00 per cavan. (Emphasis supplied). Petitioners would have this Court take a second look at its supposed automatic award to the Chuas of the other halves representing the late Guillermo Nombre's shares in Lot Nos. 1616 and 1617 on the grounds that: (a) these other halves have never been the subject of the present litigation or the double sale complained of by petitioners; and (b) there are certain undivided interests in these other halves which have been conveyed by some Nombre heirs to Escanlar who in turn sold the same to the Jaymes. In other words, the Jaymes, according to petitioners, are actually entitled to the one-half portions of Lot Nos. 1616 and 1617 previously sold by the Cari-ans to Escanlar and Holgado and the validity of which have been upheld by this Court plus certain portions of the other halves of the same lots sold this time by some Nombre heirs to Escanlar. For these reasons, petitioners argue that there is no basis at all in fact and in law for the Court to award the entire one-half portions of the said lots to the Chuas, as well as to charge the Jaymes rental payments thereon.

Upon closer scrutiny and re-examination of the records, the Court is convinced that there is merit in the above contentions. It is a fact that the other ideal one-half shares of the late Guillermo Nombre in Lot Mos. 1616 and 1617 have never been entirely sold to the Chuas because some of the Nombre heirs who are composed of the descendants of Guillermo Nombre's brothers and sisters 5 likewise sold their undivided shares to Escanlar who in turn conveyed them to the Jaymes. All these transactions are duly evidenced by several deeds of sale 6 and a Memorandum of Agreement 7 dated August 31, 1984, whose validity and authenticity have not been impugned by any party. As a matter of fact, there were also some shares which were not conveyed at all to either Chuas or Jaymes. In any event, these sales by the Nombre heirs to Escanlar whose interests were eventually acquired by the Jaymes had the effect of increasing the latter's ownership beyond the one-half portions of the subject lots originally sold by the Cari-ans. Correspondingly, the Chuas are entitled only to those portions as have been conveyed to them which actually amount to less than the one-half participation of Guillermo Nombre in each of said lots. Mole particularly, these are the ideal shares which they have acquired from Lazaro Nombre, Victorio Madalag, Domingo Campillanos, and Sofronio Campillanos by virtue of the September 21, 1982 deed of sale, as well as from Felicidad Nombre, Potencia Brillas, and Enrique Campillanos, through instruments other than said deed. In view of the foregoing findings, it necessarily follows that there is no justification for the Jaymes to be compelled to turn over one-half of Lot No. 1616 and one-half of Lot No. 1617, and be held liable to pay the Chuas rentals with respect to those portions. On the contrary, we find it equitable instead to hold the Chuas answerable for reasonable rentals to the extent of their possession of portions of Lot Nos. 1616 and 1617 which now properly belong to the Jaymes by virtue of the above findings. ACCORDINGLY, the Court hereby resolves to GRANT the above motions of petitioners heirs of Pedro Escanlar and Francisco Holgado, as well as that of the spouses Edwin A. Jayme and Elisa T. Jayme. The decision of this Court dated October 23, 1997, insofar as it awarded one-half of Lot No. 1616 and one-half of Lot No. 1617 to the spouses

Paquito and Ney Sarrosa-Chua, and which made the spouses Jayme liable for rental payments thereon, is VACATED and SET ASIDE. In lieu thereof, a new one is entered to read as follows: WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals under review is hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Negros Occidental, Branch 61, for petitioners and private respondents or their successors-in-interest to determine exactly the portions which will be owned by each party in accordance with the foregoing resolution, at the option of petitioners. The trial court is likewise DIRECTED to order the issuance of the corresponding certificates of title in the name of the respective parties and to determine how much rentals the Chuas have to pay the Jaymes from the time the former possessed, if they did at all, the portions pertaining to the latter up to the time the same are restored. SO ORDERED.

Juvenal D. Osorio for petitioner-appellee. Anastacio A. Mumar for administrator, oppositor-appellant. REYES, J.B.L., J.: Appeal from judgment of the Court of First Instance of Bohol (Sp. Proc. No. 369) allowing a money claim of appellee Belamala against the estate of the deceased Mauricio Polinar, for damages caused to the claimant. Originally taken to the Court of Appeals, the case was certified to this Court as involving only questions of law. Issue in the case is whether the civil liability of an accused of physical injuries who dies before final judgment, is extinguished by his demise, to the extent of barring any claim therefor against his estate. There is no dispute as to the facts, which were stipulated, in the court of origin, to be as follows (Rec. of Appeal, pp. 4143): STIPULATED AGREEMENT OF FACTS xxx xxx xxx

6. G.R. No. L-24098

November 18, 1967

BUENAVENTURA BELAMALA, petitioner-appellee, vs. MARCELINO POLINAR, administrator, oppositorappellant.

1. That the claimant Buenaventura Belamala is the same offended party in Criminal Case No. 1922 filed before the COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF BOHOL, against the same Mauricio Polinar above mentioned and against other accused, for Frustrated Murder;

2. That the administrator Marcelino Polinar is one of the legitimate children of the above mentioned Mauricio Polinar now deceased; 3. That on May 24, 1954, the complaint for Frustrated Murder was filed in the Justice of the Peace of Clarin, Bohol against said Mauricio Polinar, et al, and when said case was remanded to the Court of First Instance of Bohol, the Information on said Criminal Case No. 1922 was filed on March 12, 1955; 4. That on May 28, 1966, the COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF BOHOL rendered a decision thereof, convicting the said Mauricio Polinar of the crime of serious physical injuries and sentenced him to pay to the offended party Buenaventura Belamala, now claimant herein, the amount of P990.00, plus the amount of P35.80 as indemnity the amount of P1,000.00 as moral damages; 5. That on June 18, 1956, the accused (the late Mauricio Polinar) appealed to the Court of Appeals from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Bohol; 6. That on July 27, 1956, while the appeal of said Mauricio Polinar was pending before the Court of Appeals, he died; and that there was no Notice or Notification of his death has ever been filed in the said Court of Appeals; 7. That the decision of the Court of Appeals in said Criminal Case No. 1922, has affirmed the decision of the Court of First Instance of Bohol, in toto, and said

decision of the Court of Appeals was promulgated on March 27, 1958; but said Mauricio Polinar has already died on July 27, 1956; 8. That the late Mauricio Polinar is survived by his wife, Balbina Bongato and his children, namely: 1. Narcisa Polinar, Davao 2. Geronimo Polinar, Pagadian 3. Mariano Polinar, Clarin, Bohol 4. Ireneo Polinar, Clarin, Bohol 5. Marcelino Polinar, Clarin, Bohol 6. Mauro Polinar, Clarin, Bohol 7. Demetrio Polinar, Clarin, Bohol 9. That the parties have reserved to present in Court evidence on facts not agreed to herein by the parties. It is to be observed that the reservation of additional evidence was waived by the parties at the trial (see Decision of trial court, Rec. App. p. 54). The Court a quo, overruling the contention of the Administrator-appellant that the death of the accused prior to final judgment extinguished all criminal and civil liabilities resulting from the offense, in view of Article 89, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, admitted the claim against the estate in the amount of P2,025.80 with legal interest from the date claim was filed (30 July 1959) until paid. No payment was ordered pending final determination of the sum total of claims admitted against the estate. Not satisfied with the ruling, the Administrator has appealed, insisting on his theory in the Court below.

We see no merit in the plea that the civil liability has been extinguished, in view of the provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines of 1950 (Rep. Act No. 386) that became operative eighteen years after the Revised Penal Code. As pointed out by the Court below, Article 33 of the Civil Code establishes a civil action for damages on account of physical injuries, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action. Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. Assuming that for lack of express reservation, Belamala's civil action for damages was to be considered instituted together with the criminal action, still, since both proceedings were terminated without final adjudication, the civil action of the offended party under Article 33 may yet be enforced separately. Such claim in no way contradicts Article 108, of the Penal Code, that imposes the obligation to indemnify upon the deceased offender's heirs, because the latter acquired their decedents obligations only to the extent of the value of the inheritance (Civil Code, Art. 774). Hence, the obligation of the offender's heirs under Article 108 ultimately becomes an obligation of the offender's estate. The appellant, however, is correct in the contention that the claim should have been prosecuted by separate action against the administrator, as permitted by sections 1 and 2 of Revised Rule 87, since the claim is patently one "to recover

damages for an injury to person or property" (Rule 87, sec. 1). Belamala's action can not be enforced by filing a claim against the estate under Rule 86, because section 5 of that rule explicitly limits the claims to those for funeral expenses, expenses for last sickness, judgments for money and "claims against the decedent, arising from contract, express or implied;" and this last category (the other three being inapposite) includes only "all purely personal obligations other than those which have their source in delict or tort" (Leung Ben vs. O'Brien, 38 Phil. 182, 189-194) and Belamala's damages manifestly have a tortious origin. To this effect was our ruling inAguas vs. Llemos, L-18107, Aug. 30, 1962. Furthermore, it does not appear that the award of the trial Court was based on evidence submitted to it; apparently it relied merely on the findings in the criminal case, as embodied in decisions that never became final because the accused died during the pendency of said case. WHEREFORE, the decision under appeal is hereby reversed and set aside, but without prejudice to the action of appellee Belamala against the Administrator of the Estate of Mauricio Polinar. No costs. So ordered.

7. [G.R. No. 143483. January 31, 2002]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES represented by the REGISTER OF DEEDS OF PASAY CITY, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS (SPECIAL FORMER 3RD DIVISION) AND AMADA H. SOLANO, assisted by her husband ROMEO SOLANO, respondents. DECISION
BELLOSILLO , J.:

theRegional Trial Court of Pasay City. During the proceedings, a motion for intervention was filed by Romeo Solano, spouse of private respondent, and one Gaudencio Regosa, but on 24 June 1987 the motion was denied by the trial court for the reason that "they miserably failed to show valid claim or right to the properties in question." Since it was established that there were no known heirs and persons entitled to the properties of decedent Hankins, the lower court escheated the estate of the decedent in favor of petitioner Republic of thePhilippines.
[1] [2]

This petition for certiorari seeks to nullify two (2) Resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated 12 November 1998 and 4 May 2000 giving due course to the petition for annulment of judgment filed by private respondent Amada H. Solano on 3 February 1997 and denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration. For more than three (3) decades (from 1952 to 1985) private respondent Amada Solano served as the all-around personal domestic helper of the late Elizabeth Hankins, a widow and a French national. During Ms. Hankins' lifetime and most especially during the waning years of her life, respondent Solano was her faithful girl Friday and a constant companion since no close relative was available to tend to her needs. In recognition of Solano's faithful and dedicated service, Ms. Hankins executed in her favor two (2) deeds of donation involving two (2) parcels of land covered by TCT Nos. 7807 and 7808 of the Registry of Deeds. Private respondent alleged that she misplaced the deeds of donation and were nowhere to be found. While the deeds of donation were missing, the Republic filed a petition for the escheat of the estate of Elizabeth Hankins before

By virtue of the decision of the trial court, the Registry of Deeds of Pasay City cancelled TCT Nos. 7807 and 7808 and issued new ones, TCT Nos. 129551 and 129552, both in the name of Pasay City. In the meantime, private respondent claimed that she accidentally found the deeds of donation she had been looking for for a long time. In view of this development, respondent Amada Solano filed on 28 January 1997 a petition before the Court of Appeals for the annulment of the lower court's decision alleging, among other, that [3]

13.1. The deceased Elizabeth Hankins having donated the subject properties to the petitioner in 1983 (for TCT No. 7807) and 1984 (for TCT No. 7808), these properties did not and could not form part of her estate when she died on September 20, 1985. Consequently, they could not validly be escheated to thePasay City Government; 13.2. Even assuming arguendo that the properties could be subject of escheat proceedings, the decision is still legally infirm for escheating the properties to an entity, the Pasay City Government, which is not authorized by law to be the recipient thereof. The property should have been escheated in favor of

the Republic of the Philippines under Rule 91, Section 1 of the New Rules of Court x x x x On 17 March 1997 the Office of the Solicitor General representing public respondents RTC and the Register of Deeds (herein petitioner) filed an answer setting forth their affirmative defenses, to wit: (a) lack of jurisdiction over the nature of the action; and, (b) the cause of action was barred by the statute of limitations. Finding no cogent reason to justify the dismissal of the petition for annulment, the Court of Appeals issued on 12 November 1998 the first of its assailed Resolutions giving due course to the petition for annulment of judgment and setting the date for trial on the merits. In upholding the theory of respondent Solano, the Appeals Court ruled that Herein petitioner invokes lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter on the part of respondent RTC to entertain the escheat proceedings x x x because the parcels of land have been earlier donated to herein petitioner in 1983 and 1984 prior to the death of said Hankins; and therefore, respondent court could not have ordered the escheat of said properties in favor of the Republic of the Philippines, assign them to respondent Pasay City government, order the cancellation of the old titles in the name of Hankins and order the properties registered in the name of respondent Pasay City x x x x The 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure specifically laid down the grounds of annulment filed before this Court, to wit: extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law and this jurisdiction is determined by the allegations of the complaint. It is axiomatic that the averments of the complaint determine the nature of the action and consequently the jurisdiction of the courts. Thus whether or not the properties in question are no longer part of

the estate of the deceased Hankins at the time of her death; and, whether or not the alleged donations are valid are issues in the present petition for annulment which can be resolved only after a full blown trial x x x x It is for the same reason that respondents espousal of the statute of limitations against herein petition for annulment cannot prosper at this stage of the proceedings. Indeed, Section 4, Rule 91 of the Revised Rules of Court expressly provides that a person entitled to the estate must file his claim with the court a quo within five (5) years from the date of said judgment. However, it is clear to this Court that herein petitioner is not claiming anything from the estate of the deceased at the time of her death on September 20, 1985; rather she is claiming that the subject parcels of land should not have been included as part of the estate of the said decedent as she is the owner thereof by virtue of the deeds of donation in her favor. In effect, herein petitioner, who alleges to be in possession of the premises in question, is claiming ownership of the properties in question and the consequentreconveyance thereof in her favor which cause of action prescribes ten (10) years after the issuance of title in favor of respondent Pasay City on August 7, 1990. Herein petition was seasonably filed on February 3, 1997 under Article 1144, to wit: Art. 1144. The following actions must be brought within ten years from the time the right of action accrues: (1) Upon a written contract; (2) Upon an obligation created by law; (3) Upon a judgment. And Article 1456, to wit:

Art. 1456. If property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property comes.
[4]

extrinsic fraud nor a ground to oust the lower court of its jurisdiction. Petitioner also insists that notwithstanding the execution of the deeds of donation in favor of private respondent, the 5-year statute of limitations within which to file claims before the court a quo as set forth in Rule 91 of the Revised Rules of Court has set in. The present controversy revolves around the nature of the parcels of land purportedly donated to private respondent which will ultimately determine whether the lower court had jurisdiction to declare the same escheated in favor of the state. We rule for the petitioner. Escheat is a proceeding, unlike that of succession or assignment, whereby the state, by virtue of its sovereignty, steps in and claims the real or personal property of a person who dies intestate leaving no heir. In the absence of a lawful owner, a property is claimed by the state to forestall an open "invitation to self-service by the first comers." Since escheat is one of the incidents of sovereignty, the state may, and usually does, prescribe the conditions and limits the time within which a claim to such property may be made. The procedure by which the escheated property may be recovered is generally prescribed by statue, and a time limit is imposed within which such action must be brought.
[5]

In its Resolution of 4 May 2000 the Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration filed by public respondents Register of Deeds of Pasay City and the Presiding judge of the lower court and set the trial on the merits for June 15 and 16, 2000. In its effort to nullify the Resolutions herein before mentioned, petitioner points out that the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction (a) in denying petitioner's affirmative defenses set forth in its answer and motion for reconsideration, and in setting the case for trial and reception of evidence; and, (b) in giving due course to private respondent's petition for annulment of decision despite the palpable setting-in of the 5year statute of limitations within which to file claims before the court a quo set forth in Rule 91 of the Revised Rules of Court and Art. 1014 of the Civil Code. Petitioner argues that the lower court had jurisdiction when it escheated the properties in question in favor of the city government and the filing of a petition for annulment of judgment on the ground of subsequent discovery of the deeds of donation did not divest the lower court of its jurisdiction on the matter. It further contends that Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure only provides for two (2) grounds for the annulment of judgment, namely: extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. As such the discovery of the deeds of donation seven (7) years after the finality of the escheat proceedings is an extraneous matter which is clearly not an instance of

In this jurisdiction, a claimant to an escheated property must file his claim "within five (5) years from the date of such judgment, such person shall have possession of and title to the same, or if sold, the municipality or city shall be accountable to him for the proceeds, after deducting the estate; but a claim not made shall be barred forever." The 5-year period is not a device capriciously conjured by the state to defraud any claimant; on the contrary, it is decidedly prescribed to encourage would-be claimants to be punctilious in asserting
[6]

their claims, otherwise they may lose them forever in a final judgment. Incidentally, the question may be asked: Does herein private respondent, not being an heir but allegedly a donee, have the personality to be a claimant within the purview of Sec. 4, Rule 91, of the Revised Rules of Court? In this regard, we agree with the Solicitor General that the case of Municipal Council of San Pedro, Laguna v. Colegio de San Jose, Inc., is applicable at least insofar as it concerns the Court's discussion on who is an "interested party" in an escheat proceeding [7]

those who are not parties or privies thereto. As held in Hamilton v. Brown, "a judgment of escheat was held conclusive upon persons notified by advertisement to all persons interested. Absolute lack on the part of petitioners of any dishonest intent to deprive the appellee of any right, or in any way injure him, constitutes due process of law, proper notice having been observed." With the lapse of the 5-year period therefore, private respondent has irretrievably lost her right to claim and the supposed "discovery of the deeds of donation" is not enough justification to nullify the escheat judgment which has long attained finality.
[8]

In a special proceeding for escheat under sections 750 and 751 the petitioner is not the sole and exclusive interested party. Any person alleging to have a direct right or interest in the property sought to be escheated is likewise an interested party and may appear and oppose the petition for escheat. In the present case, the Colegio de San Jose, Inc. and Carlos Young appeared alleging to have a material interest in the Hacienda de San Pedro Tunasan; the former because it claims to be the exclusive owner of the hacienda, and the latter because he claims to be the lessee thereof under a contract legally entered with the former (underscoring supplied). In the instant petition, the escheat judgment was handed down by the lower court as early as 27 June 1989 but it was only on 28 January 1997, more or less seven (7) years after, when private respondent decided to contest the escheat judgment in the guise of a petition for annulment of judgment before the Court of Appeals. Obviously, private respondent's belated assertion of her right over the escheated properties militates against recovery. A judgment in escheat proceedings when rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive against all persons with actual or constructive notice, but not against

In the mind of this Court the subject properties were owned by the decedent during the time that the escheat proceedings were being conducted and the lower court was not divested of its jurisdiction to escheat them in favor of Pasay City notwithstanding an allegation that they had been previously donated. We recall that a motion for intervention was earlier denied by the escheat court for failure to show "valid claim or right to the properties in question." Where a person comes into an escheat proceeding as a claimant, the burden is on suchintervenor to establish his title to the property and his right to intervene. A fortiori, the certificates of title covering the subject properties were in the name of the decedent indicating that no transfer of ownership involving the disputed properties was ever made by the deceased during her lifetime. In the absence therefore of any clear and convincing proof showing that the subject lands had been conveyed by Hankins to private respondent Solano, the same still remained, at least before the escheat, part of the estate of the decedent and the lower court was right not to assume otherwise. The Court of Appeals therefore cannot perfunctorily presuppose that the subject properties were no longer part of the decedent's estate at the time the lower court handed down its decision on the strength of a belated allegation that the same
[9]

had previously been disposed of by the owner. It is settled that courts decide only after a close scrutiny of every piece of evidence and analyze each case with deliberate precision and unadulterated thoroughness, the judgment not being diluted by speculations, conjectures and unsubstantiated assertions. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated 12 November 1998 giving due course to the petition for annulment of judgment, and its Resolution dated 4 May 2000 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration, are SET ASIDE. The decision of the RTC-Br. 114, Pasay City, dated 27 June 1989, is REINSTATED. SO ORDERED.

8. REPUBLIC OF THE

G.R. No. 158230 Present: PUNO, C.J., Chairperso n, CARPIO, CORONA, AZCUNA, and LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, JJ.

PHILIPPINES, represented by the DIRECTOR OF LANDS, Petitione r,

- versus -

REGISTER OF DEEDS OFROXAS CITY, ELIZABETH LEE, and PACITA YU-LEE, Respondents.

Promulgated: July 16, 2008

x------------------------------------------------- x

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

transferred by succession to their respective wives, Elizabeth The Case review[1] of Lee (Elizabeth) and Pacita Yu-Lee (Pacita).

This

is

petition

for

the

In

the

1956

case

of Dinglasan v.

Lee

Bun

Decision[2] dated 12 July 2002 and the Resolution dated 9 May 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 53890.

Ting,[3] involving Lot

No. 398, the Court held that even

if the sale of the property was null and void for violating the constitutional prohibition on the sale of land to an alien, still the doctrine of in paridelicto barred the sellers from

The Facts

recovering the title to the property. Eleven years later, in the case of Lee Bun Ting v. JudgeAligaen,[4] the Court ordered

In March 1936, Lee Liong, a Chinese citizen, bought Lot No. 398 from Vicenta Arcenas, Francisco, Carmen Ramon, Mercedes, Concepcion, Mariano, Jose, and Manuel, all surnamed Dinglasan. Lot No. 398, with an area of 1,574 square meters, is located at the corner In

the trial court to dismiss the complaint of the Dinglasans for the recovery of Lot No. 398. Applying the doctrine of res judicata, the Court held that the case was a mere relitigation of the same issues previously adjudged with finality in the Dinglasan case, involving the same parties or their privies and concerning the same subject matter.

of Roxas Avenue and Pavia Street in Roxas City.

February 1944, Lee Liong died intestate and was survived by his widow Ang Chia, and his sons Lee Bing Hoo and Lee Bun Ting. On 30 June 1947, the surviving heirs of LeeLiong extrajudicially settled the estate of the deceased and partitioned among themselves Lot No. 398. When Lee Bing Hoo and Lee Bun Ting died, Lot No. 398 was

On 7 September 1993, Elizabeth and Pacita (private respondents) filed a petition for reconstitution of title of Lot No. 398 because the records of the Register of Deeds, Roxas City were burned during the war. On 3

October 2001, the Court held that the trial courts order of reconstitution was void for lack of factual support because it was based merely on the plan and technical description approved by the Land Registration Authority.[5]

The Register of Deeds of Roxas City did not file an answer.

On 7 May 1996, the trial court rendered a decision ordering the reversion of Lot No. 398 to the State.

Meanwhile, on 26 January 1995, petitioner Republic of the Philippines (petitioner), through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed with the Regional Trial Court of Roxas City a Complaint[6] for Reversion of Title against private respondents and the Register of Deeds On appeal, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision[7] dated 12 July 2002, reversing the trial courts decision and declaring private respondents as the absolute and lawful owners of Lot No. 398. Petitioner moved for reconsideration, which the Court of Appeals denied in its Resolution[8] dated 9 May 2003.

of Roxas City, praying that (1) the sale of Lot No. 398 to Lee Liong be set aside for being null and void ab initio; and (2) Lot No. 398 be reverted to the public domain for the States disposal in accordance with law.

Hence, this petition for review.

In their Answer, private respondents invoked as affirmative defenses: (1) prescription; (2) private ownership of Lot No. 398; and (3) Lee Liongs being a buyer in good faith and for value. Furthermore, private respondents claimed that as Filipino citizens, they are qualified to acquire Lot No. 398 by succession. The trial court ordered the reversion of Lot No. 398 to the State. The trial court held that private respondents could not have acquired a valid title over Lot No. 398 because the sale of the lot to their predecessor-in-interest Lee Liong was The Ruling of the Trial Court

null and void. Being an innocent purchaser in good faith and for value did not cure Lee Liongs disqualification as an alien who is prohibited from acquiring land under the Constitution. The trial court further held that prescription cannot be invoked against the State as regards an action for reversion or reconveyance of land to the State.

is deemed valid considering that the objective of the constitutional proscription against alien ownership of lands, that is to keep our lands in Filipino hands, has been achieved.

The Issue

Petitioner raises the lone issue that: The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT REVERSED AND SET ASIDE THE APPEALED DECISION AND DECLARED PRIVATE RESPONDENTS THE ABSOLUTE AND LAWFUL OWNERS AND POSSESSORS OF LOT NO. 398 OF ROXAS CITY CADASTRE CONSIDERING THAT LEE LIONG, WHO IS AN ALIEN, AND THUS, CONSTITUTIONALLY PROHIBITED TO OWN REAL PROPERTY IN THE PHILIPPINES, ACQUIRED NO RIGHT OR TITLE OVER SUBJECT LOT WHICH HE COULD HAVE TRANSMITTED BY SUCCESSION TO PRIVATE RESPONDENTS PREDECESSORS-IN-INTEREST.

The Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court that the State is not barred by prescription. However, the Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred in ordering the reversion of Lot No. 398 to the State. Although the sale of Lot No. 398 to Lee Liong violated the constitutional prohibition on aliens acquiring land, the Court of Appeals noted that Lot No. 398 had already been acquired by private respondents through succession. The transfer of Lot No. 398 to private respondents, who are Filipino citizens qualified to acquire lands, can no longer be impugned on the basis of the invalidity of the initial transfer. The flaw in the original transaction is considered cured and the title of the transferee

The Ruling of the Court

The petition is without merit. Similarly, in this case, upon the death of the original Petitioner argues that since the sale of Lot No. 398 to Lee Liong was void, Lot No. 398 never became part of the deceased Lee Liongs estate. Hence, Lot No. 398 could not be transmitted by succession to Lee Liongs surviving heirs and eventually to private respondents. We do not subscribe to petitioners position. vendee who was a Chinese citizen, his widow and two sonsextrajudicially settled his estate, including Lot No. 398. When the two sons died, Lot No. 398 was transferred by succession to their respective spouses, herein private respondents who are Filipino citizens.

The viable

We now discuss whether reversion proceedings is still considering that Lot No. 398 has already

circumstances of this case are similar to the case of De Castro v.Teng Queen Tan,[9] wherein a residential lot was sold to a Chinese citizen. Upon the death of the alien vendee, his heirs entered into an extrajudicial settlement of the estate of the deceased and the subject land was transferred to a son who was a naturalized Filipino. Subsequently, the vendor of the lot filed a suit for annulment of sale for alleged violation of the Constitution prohibiting the sale of land to aliens. Independently of the doctrine of in pari delicto, the Court sustained the sale, holding that while the vendee was an alien at the time of the sale, the land has since become the property of a naturalized Filipino citizen who is constitutionally qualified to own land.

been transfered to Filipino citizens. In the reconstitution case of Lee v. Republic of the Philippines[10] involving Lot No. 398, this Court explained that the OSG may initiate an action for reversion or escheat of lands which were sold

to aliens disqualified from acquiring lands under the Constitution. However, in the case of Lot No. 398, the fact that it was already transferred to Filipinos militates against escheat proceedings, thus:
Although ownership of the land cannot revert to the original sellers, because of the doctrine of pari delicto, the Solicitor General may initiate an action for reversion or escheat of the

land to the State, subject to other defenses, as hereafter set forth. In this case, subsequent circumstances militate against escheat proceedings because the land is now in the hands of Filipinos. The original vendee, Lee Liong, has since died and the land has been inherited by his heirs and subsequently their heirs, petitioners herein [Elizabeth Lee and Pacita Yu Lee]. Petitioners are Filipino citizens, a fact the Solicitor General does not dispute. The constitutional proscription on alien ownership of lands of the public or private domain was intended to protect lands from falling in the hands of non-Filipinos. In this case, however, there would be no more public policy violated since the land is in the hands of Filipinos qualified to acquire and own such land. If land is invalidly transferred to an alien who subsequently becomes a citizen or transfers it to a citizen, the flaw in the original transaction is considered cured and the title of the transferee is rendered valid. Thus, the subsequent transfer of the property to qualified Filipinos may no longer be impugned on the basis of invalidity of the initial transfer. The objective of the constitutional provision to keep our lands in Filipino hands has been achieved.[11] (Emphasis supplied)

In this case, the reversion proceedings was initiated only after almost 40 years from the promulgation of the case ofDinglasan v. Lee Bun Ting,[12] where the Court held that the sale of Lot No. 398 was null and void for violating the constitutional prohibition on the sale of land to an alien. If petitioner had commenced reversion proceedings when Lot No. 398 was still in the hands of the original vendee who was an alien disqualified to hold title thereto, then reversion of the land to the State would undoubtedly be allowed. However, this is not the case here. When petitioner instituted the action for reversion of title in 1995, Lot No. 398 had already been transferred by succession to private

respondents who are Filipino citizens.

Since Lot No. 398 has already been transferred to Filipino citizens, the flaw in the original transaction is considered cured.[13] As held in Chavez v. Public Estates Authority:[14]
Thus, the Court has ruled consistently that where a Filipino citizen sells land to an alien who later sells the land to a Filipino, the invalidity of the first transfer is corrected by the subsequent sale to a citizen. Similarly, where the alien who

buys the land subsequently acquires Philippine citizenship, the sale was validated since the purpose of the constitutional ban to limit land ownership to Filipinos has been achieved. In short, the law disregards the constitutional disqualification of the buyer to hold land if the land is subsequently transferred to a qualified party, or the buyer himself becomes a qualified party.[15] (Emphasis supplied)

9. G.R. No. L-45460

February 25, 1938

THE MUNICIPAL COUNCIL OF SAN PEDRO, LAGUNA, ET AL., applicants-appellants, vs. COLEGIO DE SAN JOSE, INC., ET AL., oppositorsappellees. Juan S. Rustia for appellants. Araneta, Zaragoza and Araneta for appellee Colegio de San Jose, Inc. Francisco Alfonso for appellee Young. IMPERIAL, J.: This is an appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Laguna of October 29, 1936, which denied the applicants motion questioning the appearance and intervention in the case of the oppositors Colegio de San Jose and Carlos Young, and from the resolution of the 30th of the same month which denied the petition for escheat filed by the said petitioners, with the costs against the latter. This case was commenced in the said by a petition filed by the petitioners in behalf of the municipality of San Pedro, Province of Laguna, wherein they claim the Hacienda de San Pedro Tunasa by the right of escheat. The Colegio de San Jose, Inc., appeared specially and assailed the petition upon the grounds that the court has no jurisdiction to take cognizance and decide the case and that the petition does not allege sufficient facts to entitle the applicants to the remedy prayed for; and asked that the petition be finally dismissed. Carlos Young intervened and filed a motion asking for the dismissal or the petition upon the ground that the Code of

Clearly, since Lot No. 398 has already been transferred to private respondents who are Filipino citizens, the prior invalid sale to Lee Liong can no longer be assailed. Hence, reversion proceedings will no longer prosper since the land is now in the hands of Filipino citizens.

WHEREFORE,

we DENY the

petition.

We AFFIRM the Decision dated 12 July 2002 and the Resolution dated 9 May 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 53890.

SO ORDERED.

Civil Procedure, under which the same was filed, is not applicable because it was not yet in force when the original owner of the hacienda died, which was in April, 1596, and that the petition was irregularly docketed as the applicants had paid at the docket fees which the clerk of court should collect. Subsequently the attorneys for both parties filed another motions of minor importance, almost all of which contains the arguments advanced in support of their contentions. On October 29, 1936, the court overruled the objection to the appearance and intervention in the case by the Colegio de San Jose and Carlos Young, entering the order which is one of those appealed from. And on the 30th of the same moth the court entered the resolution, also appealed from, dismissing the petition for escheat, with the costs to the petitioners. The petitioners attribute to the court the following errors: "(1) In overruling the objection of the appellant of September 2, 1936, and in not excluding the appellees Carlos Young and Colegio de San Jose, Inc., from these proceedings. (2) In sustaining definitely the appellees' petitions to dismiss, without previous hearing and in derogation of the right to amend in any case. (3) In improperly and unseasonably taking judicial notice of certain facts in other judicial records to reinforce the appealed resolutions, and in erroneously distorting those facts judicially taken notice of. (4) In holding that the municipality of San Jose has neither right standing to file a petition for escheat; that the petition does not state facts sufficient a cause of action and that the same does not lie, and that the Court of First Instance of Laguna is without jurisdiction to take cognizance of and decide said petition. (5) In finally dismissing the petition upon the dilatory

exceptions thereto, and the ordering the payment of costs when no hearing has yet taken place." 1. The sworn petition which gave rise to the proceeding is based upon the provisions of section 750 and 751 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the English text of which reads:

1vvphl.nt

SEC. 750. Procedure when person dies intestate without heirs. When a person dies intestate, seized of real or personal property in the Philippines Islands, leaving no heir or person by law entitled to the same, the president and municipal council of the municipality where the deceased last resided, if he was an inhabitant of these Islands, or of the municipality in which he had estate, if he resided out of the Islands, may, on behalf of the municipality, the file a petition with the Court of First Instance of the province for an inquisition in the premises; the court shall there upon appoint a time and place of hearing, and deciding on such petition, and cause a notice thereof to be published in some newspaper of general circulation in the province of which the deceased was last an inhabitant, if within the Philippines Island, and if not, some newspaper of general circulation in the province in which he had estate. The notice shall recite the substance of the facts and request set forth in the petition, the time and place at which persons claiming the estate may appear and be heard before the court, and shall be published at least six weeks successively, the last of which publication shall be at least six weeks before the time appointed by the court to make inquisition.

SEC. 751. Decree of the court in such case. If, at the time appointed for the that purpose, the court that the person died intestate, seized of real or personal property in the Islands, leaving no heirs or person entitled to the same and no sufficient cause is shown to the contrary, the court shall order and decree that the estate of the deceased in these Islands, after the payment of just debts and charges, shall escheat; and shall assign the personal estate to the municipality where he was last an inhabitant in the Islands, and the real estate to the municipality in which the same is situated. If he never was a inhabitant of the Islands, the whole estate may be assigned to the several municipalities where the same is located. Such estate shall be for the use of schools in the municipalities, respectively, and shall be managed and disposed or by the municipal council like other property appropriated to the use of schools. Accordingly to the first of the said sections, the essential facts which should be alleged in the petition, which are jurisdiction because they confer jurisdiction upon the Court of First Instance, are: That a person has died intestate or without leaving any will; that he has left real or personal property; that he was the owner thereof; that he has not left any heir or person who is by law entitled to the property; and that the one who applies for the escheat is the municipality where deceased had his last residence, or in case should have no residence in the country, the municipality where the property is situated. The following section provides that after the publications and trial, if the court finds that the deceased is in fact the

owner of real and personal property situated in the country and has not left any heirs or other person entitled thereto, it may order, after the payments of debts and other legal expenses, the escheat, and in such case it shall adjudicate the personal property to the municipality where the deceased had his last place of residence and the real property to the municipality or municipalities where they are situated. Escheat, under sections 750 and 751, is a proceeding whereby the real and personal property of a deceased person become the property of the State upon his death without leaving any will or legal heirs (21 C.J., sec. 1, p. 848; American L. & T. Co. vs. Grand River Co., 159 Fed., 775; In re Miner, 143 Cal., 194; Johnston vs. Spicer 107 N.Y., 185; Wright vs. Methodist Episcopal Church, Hoffm. [N.Y.], 201; In re Linton's, 198 Pa., 438; State vs. Goldberg, 113 Tenn., 298). It is not an ordinary action contemplated by section 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, but a special proceeding in accordance with the said section and Chapter XXXIX, Part II, of the same Code. The proceeding, as provided by section 750, should be commenced by petition and not by complaint. In a special proceeding for escheat under section 750 and 751 the petitioner is not the sole and exclusive interested party. Any person alleging to have a direct right or interest in the property sought to be escheated is likewise and interest and necessary party and may appear and oppose the petition for escheat. In the present case the Colegio de San Jose, Inc., and Carlos Young appeared alleging to have a material interest in the Hacienda de San Pedro Tunasa; and the former because it claims to be the exclusive owner of the hacienda, and the latter because he claim to be the lessee

thereof under a contract legality entered with the former. In view of these allegations it is erroneous to hold that the said parties are without right either to appear in case or to substantiate their respective alleged right. This unfavorably resolves the petitioners' first assignment of error. 2. The final dismissal of the petition for escheat decreed by the court is assigned by the petitioners as the second error committed by it upon the contention that the demurrer, to which amount the motions for dismissal, is not a pleading authorized by law in this kind of proceeding and because, in any event, the court should have given them an opportunity to amend the petition. Chapter XXXIX of the Code of Civil Procedure, relative to the escheat of properties, does not in fact authorize the filing of a demurrer to the petition presented for that purpose, and section 91 and 99 permitting the interposition of demurrers to the complaint and answer, respectively, are not applicable to special proceedings. But is no reason of a procedure nature which prevents the filing of a motion to dismiss based upon any of the grounds provided by law for a demurrer to a complaint. In such case, the motion to dismiss pays the role of a demurrer and the court should resolve the legal question raised therein. When, for instance, a petition for escheat does not state facts which entitle the petitioner to the remedy prayed from and even admitting them hypothetically it is clear that there are nor grounds for the court to proceed to the inquisition provided by law, we see no reason to disallow an interest party from filing a motion to dismiss the petition which is untenable from all standpoints. And when the motion to dismiss is entertained upon this ground, the petition may be dismissed unconditionally and the petitioner

is not entitled, as in the case of a demurrer, to be afforded an opportunity to amend his petition. 3. The petitioners assign as third error the judicial notice which the court took of the complaint filed in civil case No. 6790, docketed and pending in the same court, wherein the petitioner recognized the personality Colegio de San Jose, Inc., and Carlos Young and the latters' interest in said action of interpleader and in the Hacienda de San Pedro Tunasan which is the same subject matter of the instant proceedings. In general, courts are not authorized to take judicial notice, in the adjudication of cases pending before them, of the contents of the records of the other cases, even when such cases have been tried or are pending in the same court, and notwithstanding the fact that both cases may have been heard or are actually pending before the same judge. (U.S. vs. Claveria, 29 Phil., 527.) The rule is squarely applicable to the present case, wherefore, we hold that the assignment of error is tenable. 4. In the appealed resolution the court held that the municipality of San Pedro, represented by the petitioners, has no personality to institute the petition for escheat that the latter does not state sufficient facts, and that the court is without jurisdiction either to take cognizance of the proceeding or to grant the remedy sought. These legal conclusions are the subject matter of the fourth assignment of error. According to the allegations of the petition, the petitioners base their right to the escheat upon the fact that the temporal properties of the Father of the Society of Jesus, among them, the Hacienda de San Pedro Tunasan, were confiscated by

order of the King of Spain and passed from then on the Crown of Spain. The following allegations of the petition are important and specific and clearly the theory maintained by the petitioners: "11. As a result of the perpetual expulsion of the Jesuits in their dominions, the King also decreed the confiscation of all their properties, estate, rents, foundation, etc., in favor of the Crown of Spain, and the order of the King was thus complied with here in the Philippines. The Hacienda de San Pedro Tunasa from then on passed to the Crown of Spain under the administration and management on its respective here, the Governor-General of the Philippines Islands. 12. As a result of the war between Spain and the United States, the latter acquired by way of transfer, all the properties of the Crown of Spain in the Philippines, under articles III and VIII of the Treaty of Peace entered into in Paris on December 10, 1989, and among which properties was included the Hacienda de San Pedro Tunasan. 13. That the said hacienda thereafter passed to the Government of the Philippines Islands by virtue of the Act of the United States Congress of July 1, 1992 (Philippine Bill), by mere administration for the benefit of the inhabitant of the Philippines; and there after, under the Tydings-McDuffie law approved by the same Congress on March 24, 1934, section 5, the United States, in turn, have ceded to the Commonwealth of the Philippines, upon its inauguration, all the properties, estate, etc., ceded by Spain to the United States as above stated, among them being the Hacienda de San Pedro Tunasan. Said Commonwealth was inaugurated on November 15, 1935." If the hacienda de San Pedro Tunasan,, which is the only property sought to be escheated and adjudicated to the municipality of San Pedro, has already passed to the

ownership of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, it is evident that the petitioners cannot claim that the same be escheated to the said municipality, because it is no longer the case of real property owned by a deceased person who has not left any heirs or person who may legality claim it, these being the conditions required by section 750 and without which a petition for escheat should not lie from the moment the hacienda was confiscated by the Kingdom of Spain, the same ceased to be the property of the children of Esteban Rodriguez de Figueroa, the Colegio de San Jose or the Jesuit Father, and became the property of the Commonwealth of the Philippines by virtue of the transfer under the Treaty of Paris, alleged in the petition. If the municipality of San Pedro believes that it has some other right to the hacienda, distinct from the escheat relied upon in its petition which gave rise to this proceeding, it should bring the proper action, but it cannot avail itself successfully of the remedy provided by section 750 of the Code of Civil Procedure. We, therefore, hold that the court did not commit the error assigned in ruling that the petition does not allege sufficient facts justifying the escheat of the hacienda in favor of the municipality of San Pedro and in finally dismissing the same. Having reached this conclusion we do not believe it necessary to go into further considerations regarding the personality of the municipality of San Pedro and the court's lack of jurisdiction. 5. The last assignment of error does not require any further consideration. The questions raised therein have already been passed upon in the preceding considerations, with the exception of the order to pay costs. With respect thereto, there is no reason why they should not be taxed against the petitioners, they being defeated party (section 487, Code of

Civil Procedure). That no trial was had is not a bar to the imposition of costs under the provisions of section 492. For the foregoing reasons, the appealed order and resolution are affirmed, with the costs of this instance against the petitioners and appellants. So ordered.

On 28 May 1992, Roberto Chua died intestate in Davao City. On 2 July 1992, private respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court of Cotabato City a Petition[1] which is reproduced hereunder:

10.

10. [G.R. No. 116835. March 5, 1998]

IN RE: PETITION FOR DECLARATION OF HEIRSHIP, GUARDIANSHIP OVER THE PERSONS AND PROPERTIES OF MINORS ROBERT RAFSON ALONZO SP. PROC. NO/ 331 and RUDYARD PRIDE ALONZO, all surnamed CHUA and ISSUANCE OF LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION. FLORITA ALONZO VALLEJO, Petitioner. x--------------------------x PETITION COMES NOW the petitioner assisted by counsel and unto this Honorable Court most respectfully states: 1. That she is of legal age, Filipino, married but separated from her husband and residing at Quezon Avenue, Cotobato City, Philippines; 2. That sometime from 1970 up to and until late 1981 your petitioner lived with Roberto Lim Chua as husband and wife and out of said union they begot two (2) children, namely, Robert Rafson Alonzo Chua who was born in General Santos City on April 28, 1977 and Rudyard Pride Alonzo Chua who was born in Davao City on August 30, 1978. A xerox copy of the birth certificate of each child is hereto attached as annex A and B, respectively. 3. That the aforementioned children who are still minors today are both staying with

ANTONIETTA GARCIA VDA. DE CHUA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, (Special Eight Division), HON. JAPAL M. GUIANI, RTC, Branch 14, 12th Judicial Region, Cotabato City, and FLORITA A. VALLEJO, As Administratrix of the Estate of the late Roberto L. Chua. respondents. DECISION
KAPUNAN, J.:

Assailed before us in this Appeal by Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR Sp. No. 33101, promulgated on 19 April 1994 affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, of Cotabato City in Special Procedure Case No. 331. As culled from the records the following facts have been preponderantly established: During his lifetime, Roberto Lim Chua lived out of wedlock with private respondent Florita A. Vallejo from 1970 up to 1981. Out of this union the couple begot two illegitimate children, namely Roberto Rafson Alonzo and Rudyard Pride Alonzo.

herein petitioner at her address at Quezon Avenue, Cotabato City; 4. That Roberto Lim Chua, father of the above-mentioned minors, died intestate on May 28, 1992 in Davao City. 5. That the aforementioned deceased left properties both real and personal worth P5,000,000.00 consisting of the following: a) Lot in Kakar, Cotabato City covered by TCT No. T12835 with an area of 290 sq. m. estimated at .. P50,00 0.00 b) Lot in Kakar, Cotabato City covered by TCT No. T12834 with an area of 323 sq.m. .... .. 50, 000.00 c) Lot in Davao City covered by TCT No. T-126583 with an area of 303 sq.m. ............50, 000.00 d) Lot in Davao City covered by TCT No. T-126584 with an area of 303 sq.m. ...............50, 000.00 e) Residential house in Cotabato City valued at ................................................. ...........300,000.00

f) Residential house in Davao City valued at ............................................................600,000.0 0 g) Car, Colt Lancer with Motor No. 4G33-3 AF6393 .................................................210,00 0.00 h) Colt, Galant Super Saloon with Motor No. 4G37-GB0165 ..........................................545,00 0.00 I) Car, Colt Galant with Motor No. 4G52-52D75248 .............................................110,00 0.00 j) Reo Isuzu Dump Truck with Motor No. DA640-838635 .. ..350, 000.00 k) Hino Dump Truck with Motor No. ED100-T47148 ..............................................350,00 0.00 l) Stockholdings in various corporations with par value estimated at .........................3,335,0 00.00 T o t a l - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - P5,000,000.00 6. That deceased Roberto Lim Chua died single and without legitimate descendants or ascendants, hence, the

above named minors Robert Rafson Alonzo Chua and Rudyard Pride Alonzo Chua, his children with herein petitioner shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased. (Article 988 of the Civil Code of the Philippines). 7. That the names, ages and residences of the relatives of said minors are the following, to wit: Names 1. Carlos Chua Avenue, Relationship Uncle Ages 60 Cotabato City 2. Aida Chua Auntie 55 RosaryHeights, Cotabato City 3. Romulo Uy Uncle 40 c/o Overseas FishResidences Quezon

the rights and interest of Robert Rafson Alonzo Chua and Rudyard Pride Alonzo Chua, both minors and heirs of deceased Roberto Lim Chua, a guardian over the persons and properties of said minors be appointed by this Honorable Court. 7. That herein petitioner being the mother and natural guardian of said minors is also competent and willing to act as the guardian of minors Robert Rafson Alonzo Chua and Rudyard Pride Alonzo Chua both staying and living with her; that petitioner possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications of a guardian. WHREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully prayed: 1. That, upon proper notice and hearing, an order be issued declaring minors ROBERTO RAFSON ALONZO CHUA and RUDYARD PRIDE ALONZO CHUA as heirs to the intestate estate of deceased ROBERTO LIM CHUA; 2. That Letters of Administration be issued to herein petitioner for the administration of the estate of the deceased ROBERTO LIM CHUA; 3. That the petitioner be also appointed the guardian of the persons and estate of minors ROBERT RAFSON ALONZO CHUA and RUDYARD PRIDE ALONZO CHUA; 4. That after all the property of deceased Roberto Lim Chua have been inventoried and expenses and just debts, have been paid, the intestate estate of Roberto Lim Chua be distributed to its rightful heirs, the minors in this case, pursuant to the provisions of Article 988 of the New Civil Code of the Philippines.

ing Exporation Co. Inc., Matina, Davao City 6. That considering the fact that the aforementioned minors by operation of law are to succeed to the entire estate of Roberto Lim Chua under the provisions of Article 988 of the New Civil Code of the Philippines, it is necessary that for the protection of

5. And for such other reliefs and remedies this Honorable Court may consider fit and proper in the premises. Cotabato City, Philippines, June 29, 1992. (Sgd.) FLORITA ALONZO VALLEJO (Petitioner)
The trial court issued an order setting the hearing of the petition on 14 August 1992 and directed that notice thereof be published in a newspaper of general circulation in the province of Maguindanao and Cotabato City and or Davao City. On 21 July 1992, herein petitioner Antoinetta Garcia Vda. de Chua, representing to be the surviving spouse of Roberto Chua, filed a Motion to Dismiss[2] on the ground of improper venue. Petitioner alleged that at the time of the decedent's death Davao City was his residence, hence, the Regional Trial Court of Davao City is the proper forum. Private respondent filed an opposition to the Motion to Dismiss[3] dated July 20, 1992 based on the following grounds:

(4) That deceased Roberto L. Chua died a bachelor. He is the father of the above-named minors with the petitioner in this case; (5) That movant/oppositor Antoinetta Chua is not the surviving spouse of the late Roberto L. Chua but a pretender to the estate of the latter since the deceased never contracted marriage with any woman until he died.
On 6 August 1992, private respondent Vallejo filed a Motion for Admission of an Amended Petition[4] "in order that the designation of the case title can properly and appropriately capture or capsulize in clear terms the material averments in the body of the pleadings; thus avoiding any confusion or misconception of the nature and real intent and purpose of this petition". The amended petition[5] contains identical material allegations but differed in its title, thus:

(1) That this petition is for the guardianship of the minor children of the petitioner who are heirs to the estate of the late Roberto L. Chua and under Section 1, Rule 92 of the Rules of Court the venue shall be at the place where the minor resides; (2) That the above-named minors are residents of Cotabato City: (3) That the movant in this case has no personality to intervene nor to oppose in the granting of this petition for the reason that she is a total stranger to the minors Robert Rafson Alonzo and Rudyard Pride Alonzo, all surnamed Chua.

IN RE: PETITION FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF ROBERTO CHUA, DECLARATION OF HEIRSHIP, GUARDIANSHIP OVER THE PERSONS AND PROPERTIES OF MINORS ROBERT AND RUDYARD, all surnamed CHUA and ISSUANCE OF LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION. FLORITA ALONZO VALLEJO, Petitioner.
Paragraph 4 of the original petition was also amended to read as follows: 4. That Roberto Lim Chua, father of the abovementioned minors is a resident of Cotabato City and died intestate on May 28, 1992 at Davao City.

The petition contains exactly the same prayers as those in the original petitions. Petitioner opposed the motion to amend petition alleging that at the hearing of said motion on 24 July 1992, private respondents counsel allegedly admitted that the sole intention of the original petition was to secure guardianship over the persons an property of the minors. [6] On 21, August 1992, the trial court issued an order[7] denying the motion to dismiss for lack of merit. The court ruled that Antoinetta Garcia had no personality to file the motion to dismiss not having proven her status as wife of the decedent. Further, the court found that the actual residence of the deceased was Cotabato City, and even assuming that there was concurrent venue among the Regional Trial Courts where the decedent had resided, the R.T.C. of Cotabato had already taken cognizance of the settlement of the decedent's estate to the exclusion of all others. The pertinent portions of the order read:

Antonietta Garcia, and a resident of Davao City; Residence Certificates from 1988 and 1989 issued at Davao City indicating that he was married and was born in Cotabato City; Income Tax Returns for 1990 and 1991 filed in Davao City where the status of the decedent was stated as married; passport of the decedent specifying that he was married and his residence was Davao City. Petitioner through counsels, objected to the admission in evidence of Exhibits 2 through 18 if the purpose is to establish the truth of the alleged marriage between the decedent and Antonietta Garcia. The best evidence they said is the marriage contract. They do not object to the admission of said exhibit if the purpose is to show that Davao City was the business residence of the decedent.

At the hearing of the motion to dismiss on August 19, 1992, counsel for movant Antonietta G. Chua presented 18 Exhibits in support of her allegation that she was the lawful wife of the decedent and that the latter resides in Davao City at the time of his death. Exh. 1 was the xerox copy of the alleged marriage contract between the movant and the petitioner. This cannot be admitted in evidence on the ground of the timely objection of the counsels for petitioner that the best evidence is the original copy or authenticated copy which the movant cannot produce. Further, the counsels for petitioner in opposition presented the following: a certification from the Local Civil Registrar concerned that no such marriage contract was ever registered with them; a letter from Judge Augusto Banzali, the alleged person to have solemnized the alleg ed marriage that he has not solemnized such alleged
marriage. Exhibit 2 through 18 consist among others of Transfer Certificate of Title issued in the name of Roberto L. Chua married to

Petitioner through counsels, presented Exhibit A through K to support her allegation that the decedent was a resident of Cotabato City; that he died a bachelor; that he begot two illegitimate children with the petitioner as mother. Among these exhibits are Income Tax Returns filed in Cotabato City from 1968 through 1979 indicating therein that he was single; birth certificates of the alleged two illegitimate children of the decedent; Resident Certificates of the decedent issued in Cotabato City; Registration Certificate of Vehicle of the decedent showing that his residence is Cotabato City. It is clear from the foregoing that the movant failed to establish the truth of her allegation that she was the lawful wife of the decedent. The best evidence is a valid marriage contract which the movant failed to produce. Transfer Certificates of Title, Residence Certificates, passports and other similar documents cannot prove marriage especially so when the petitioner has submitted a certification from the Local Civil Registrar concerned that the alleged marriage was not registered and a letter from the judge alleged to have

solemnized the marriage that he has not solemnized said alleged marriage. Consequently, she has no personality to file the subject motion to dismiss. On the issue of the residence of the decedent at the time of his death, the decedent as a businessman has many business residences from different parts of the country where he usually stays to supervise and pursue his business ventures. Davao City is one of them. It cannot be denied that Cotabato City is his actual residence where his alleged illegitimate children also reside. The place of residence of the deceased in settlement of estates, probate of will, and issuance of letters of administration does not constitute an element of jurisdiction over the subject matter. It is merely constitutive of venue (Fule vs. CA, L40502, November 29, 1976). Even assuming that there is concurrent venue among the Regional Trial Courts of the places where the decedent has residences, the Regional Trial Court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of the decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts (Section 1, Rule 73). It was this Court which first took cognizance of the case when the petition was filed on July 2, 1992, docketed as Special Proceeding No. 331 and an order of publication issued by this Court on July 13, 1992. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the motion to dismiss is hereby denied for lack of merit.
On 31 August 1992, upon motion of private respondent, the trial court issued an order appointing Romulo Lim Uy, a first cousin of the deceased, as special administrator of the decedent's estate.[8]

On the same day, the trial court likewise issued an Order appointing Florita Vallejo as the guardian over the persons and properties of the two minor children.[9] Thereafter, petitioner filed a Motion dated 25 October 1993[10] praying that the letters of administration issued to Vallejo be recalled and that new letters of administration be issued in her . She, likewise, filed a Motion dated 5 Novembeer 1993[11] to declare the proceedings a mistrial. Both motions were denied by the trial court in its Order dated 22 November 1993[12] Petitioners motion for reconsideration of the order was denied by the trial court in an order dated 13 December 1993[13] Assailling the last two orders of the trial court, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition (Rule 65) with the respondent Court of Appeals, docketed as CA G.R. No. Sp. 33101, alleging that the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion in:

(1) unilaterally and summarily converting, if not treating, the guardianship proceedings into an intestate proceeding; (2) summarily hearing the intestate proceedings without jurisdiction and without any notice to herein petitioner whatsoever; and (3) issuing the questioned order (sic) on the alleged pretension that herein petitioner has no personality to intervene in SPL Proc. No. 331 questioning the highly anomalous orders precipitately issued ex-parte by the public respondent R.T.C. without notice to the petitioners.
Petitioner in the main argued that private respondent herself admitted in in her opposition to petitioners motion to dismiss filed in the trial court and in open court that the original petition she filed is one for guardianship; hence, the trial court acted beyond its jurisdiction when it issued letters of administration over the estate of Robert C. Chua, thereby converting

the petition into an intestate proceeding, without the amended petition being published in a newspaper of general circulation as required by Section 3, Rule 79. The Court of Appeals in its decision promulgated on 19 April 1994[14] denied the petition ratiocinating that the original petition filed was one for guardianship of the illegitimate children of the deceased as well as for administration of his intestate estate. While private respondent may have alleged in her opposition to the motion to dismiss that petition was for guardianship, the fact remains that the very allegations of the original petition unmistakably show a twin purpose: (1) guardianship; and (2) issuance of letters of administration. As such, it was unnecessary for her to republish the notice of hearing through a newspaper of general circulation in the province. The amended petition was filed for the only reason stated in the motion for leave: so that the the "case title can properly and appropriately capture or capsulize in clear terms the material averments in the body of the pleadings; thus avoiding any confusion or misconception of the nature and real intent and purpose of this petition", which was for guardianship over the persons and properties of her minor children and for the settlement of the intestate estate of the decedent who was their father. In other words, there being no change in the material allegations between the original and amended petitions, the publication of the first in a newspaper of general circulation sufficed for purposes of compliance with the legal requirements of notice. Moreover, the appellate court ruled that the petitioner's remedy is appeal from the orders complained of under Section 1(f), Rule 109 of the Rules of Court, not certiorari and prohibition. Not satisfied with the decision of the Court of Appeals, petitioner comes to this Court contending that the appellate court committed the following errors:
I

WIT: FOR GUARDIANSHIP AND FOR ESTATE PROCEEDINGS;

II

INTESTATE

THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THERE IS NO NEED TO PUBLISH THE AMENDED PETITION FOR ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE THEREBY CONTRAVENING THE RULES OF COURT AND THE RULINGS OF THE SUPREME COURT
III

THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT NULLIFYING THE ORDERS (Annex P to T) PRECIPITATELY ISSUED EXPARTE BY THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT REGIONAL T RIAL COURT IN THE INTESTATE PROCEEDINGS WITHOUT PRIOR HE ARING OR NOTICE TO HEREIN PETITIONER THEREBY DEPRIVING THE LATTER (ANTOINETTA GARCIA VDA. DE CHUA ) OF DUE PROCESS AND OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD.
IV

THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN SWEEPINGLY HOLDING THAT PETITIONER'S REMEDY IS APPEAL.[15] In support of her first assignment of errors, petitioner submits that the Court of Appeals conclusion that the original petition was one for guardianship and administration of the intestate estate is contradicted by the evidence on hand, asserting that the original petition failed to allege and state the jurisdictional facts required by the Rules of Court in petitions for administration of a decedent's estate, such as: (a) the last actual residence of the decedent at the time of his death; (b) names, ages and residences of the heirs; and (c) the names and residences of the creditors of the decedent. Petitioner also reiterates her argument regarding private respondents alleged admission that the original petition was one for guardianship and not for issuance of letters

THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY AND SERIOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE ORIGINAL PETITION (Annex F, Petition) WAS FOR A TWIN PURPOSE, TO

of administration, pointing to the Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss dated 20 July 1992, where the the private respondent alleged: 1. That this petition is for guardianship of the minor children of the petitioner who are heirs to the estate of the late Roberto L. Chua and under Section 1, Rule 92 of the Rules of Court the venue shall be at the place where the minor resides.[16] As well as to the statements made by counsel for the private respondent during the 24 July 1992 hearing on the motion to dismiss:

2. That Letters of Administration be issued to herein petition for the administration of the estate of the deceased ROBERTO LIM CHUA.
The original petition also contains the jurisdictional facts required in a petition for the issuance of letters of administration. Section 2, Rule 79 of the Rules of Court reads:

ATTY. RENDON:
We filed our opposition to the motion to dismiss the petition because this is a petition for guardianship of minors, not for intestate proceedings. So this is a case where the mother wanted to be appointed as guardian because she is also the litigant here. Because whenever there is an intestate proceedings, she has to represent the minors, and under the Rules of Court in any guardianship proceedings, the venue is at the place where the minor is actually residing.[17]

Sec. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration - A petition for letters of administration must be filed by an interested person and must show, so far as known to the petitioner: (a) jurisdictional facts; (b) The names, ages, and residences of the heirs and the names and residences of the creditors, of the decedent (c) The probative value and character of the property of the estate; (d) The name of the person for whom letters of administration are prayed; But no defect in the petition shall render void the issuance of letters of administration. (underscoring ours).
The jurisdictional facts required in a petition for issuance of letters of administration are: (1) the death of the testator; (2) residence at the time of death in the province where the probate court is located; and (3) if the decedent was a non-resident, the fact of being a resident of a foreign country and that the decedent has left an estate in the province where the court is sitting.[19] While paragraph 4 of the original petition stating:

The petition is devoid of merit.

The title alone of the original petition clearly shows that the petition is one which includes the issuance of letters of administration. The title of said petition reads: IN RE: PETITION FOR DECLARATION OF HEIRSHIP, GUARDIANSHIP OVER THE PERSON AND PROPERTIES OF MINORS ROBERTO ALONZO AND RUDYARD ALONZO, all surnamed CHUA and ISSUANCE OF LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION.[18]

Likewise, the prayer of the petition states:

(4) That Roberto Lim Chua, father of the above mentioned minors, died intestate on May 28, 1992 in Davao City.
failed to indicate the residence of the deceased at the time of his death, the omission was cured by the amended petitions wherein the same paragraph now reads: (4) That Roberto Lim Chua, father of the abovementioned minors is a resident of Cotabato City and died intestate on May 28, 1992 at Davao City. [20] (Underscoring in the original.) All told the original petition alleged substantially all the facts required to be stated in the petition for letters of administration. Consequently, there was no need to publish the amended petition as petitioner would insist in her second assignment of errors. Be that as it may, petitioner has no legal standing to file the motion to dismiss as she is not related to the deceased, nor does she have any interest in his estate as creditor or otherwise. The Rules are explicit on who may do so:

Petitioner was not able to prove her status as the surviving wife of the decedent. The best proof of marriage between man and wife is a marriage contract which Antoinetta Chua failed to produce. The lower court correctly disregarded the photostat copy of the marriage certificate which she presented, this being a violation of the best evidence rule, together with other worthless pieces of evidence. The trial court correctly ruled in its 21 August 1992 Order that: xxx Transfer Certificates of Title, Residence Certificates, passports and other similar documents cannot prove marriage especially so when the petitioner has submitted a certification from the Local Civil Registrar concerned that the alleged marriage was not registered and a letter from the judge alleged to have solemnized the marriage that he has not solemnized said alleged marriage. xxx[22] Under her third assignment of error, petitioner claims that the trial court issued its orders, Annexes P to T without prior hearing or notice to her, thus, depriving her of due process. The orders referred to by petitioner are: Order dated 31 August 1992 appointing Romulo Lim Uy, first cousin of the deceased, as special administrator of the estate; Order dated 31 August 1992 appointing private respondent as guardian over the person and property of the minors; Order dated 5 August 1993, directing the transfer of the remains of the deceased from Davao City to Cotabato City; Order dated 6 September 1993 directing petitioner to turn over a Mitsubishi Gallant car owned by the estate of the deceased to the special administrator; and Order dated 28 September 1993, authorizing the sheriff to break open the deceaseds house for the purpose of conducting an inventory of the properties found therein, after the sheriff was refused entry to the house by the driver and maid of petitioner. Apart from the fact that petitioner was not entitled to notice of the proceedings of the trial court, not being able to establish proof of her alleged marriage to the decease, or of her interest in the estate as creditor or otherwise, petitioner categorically stated in the instant petition that on 25 October 1993 she filed a motion praying for the recall of the letters of administration issued by the trial

Sec. 4. Opposition to petition for administration - Any interested person, may by filing a written opposition, contest the petition on .the ground of incompetency of the person for whom letters of administration are prayed therein, or on the ground of the contestant's own right to the administration, and may pray that letters issue to himself, or to any competent person or persons named in the opposition.
Only an interested person may oppose the petition for issuance of letters of administration. An interested person is one who would be benefited by the estate such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor; his interest is material and direct, and not one that is only indirect or contingent.[21]

court and another motion dated 5 August 1993 praying that the proceedings conducted by the trial court be declared as a mistrial and the court orders relative thereto be set aside and nullified. Petitioner further stated that her motions were denied by the trial court in its Order dated 22 November 21, 1993 and that on 30 November 1993 she filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of denial which in turn was denied by the trial court on 13 December 1993. Due process was designed to afford opportunity to be heard, not that an actual hearing should always and indispensably be held.[23] The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard. [24] Here, even granting that the petitioner was not notified of the orders of the trial court marked as Exhibits P to T, inclusive, nonetheless, she was duly heard in her motions to recall letters of administration and to declare the proceedings of the court as a mistrial, which motions were denied in the Order dated 22 November 1933.[25] A motion for the reconsideration of this order of denial was also duly heard by the trial court but was denied in its Order of 13 December 1993.[26] Denial of due process cannot be successfully invoked by a party who has had the opportunity to be heard on his motion for reconsideration.[27] As to the last assignment of errors, we agree with the Court of Appeals that the proper remedy of the petitioner in said court was an ordinary appeal and not a special civil action for certiorari; which can be availed of if a party has no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Except for her bare allegation that an ordinary appeal would be inadequate, nothing on record would indicate that extraordinary remedy of certiorari or prohibition is warranted. Finally, petitioner further argues as supplement to her memorandum that the ruling of the Court of Appeals treating the Special Proceeding No. 331 as one for both guardianship and settlement of estate is in contravention of our ruling in Gomez vs. Imperial,[28] which the petitioner quotes:

The distribution of the residue of the estate of the deceased is a function pertaining properly not to the guardianship proceedings, but to another proceeding which the heirs are at liberty to initiate.
Petitioners reliance on said case is misplaced. In the Gomez case, the action before the lower court was merely one for guardianship. Therefore said court did not have the jurisdiction to distribute the estate of the deceased. While in the case at bar, the petition filed before the court was both for guardianship and settlement of estate. IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition of petitioner Antoinetta Chua is hereby denied. SO ORDERED.

11.LOLITA ALAMAYRI, Petitioner,

R.

G.R. No. 151243

Present:

- versus-

PUNO, CJ * YNARESSANTIAGO, J. Chairperson, CHICO-NAZARIO,

NACHURA, and REYES, JJ.

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari [1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by petitioner Lolita R. Alamayri (Alamayri) seeking the reversal and setting aside of the Decision,[2] dated 10 April 2001, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 58133; as

ROMMEL, ELMER, ERWIN, ROILER and AMANDA, all surnamed PABALE, Respondents.

Promulgated:

well as the Resolution,[3] dated 19 December 2001 of the same court denying reconsideration of its aforementioned

April 30, 2008

Decision. The Court of Appeals, in its assailed Decision, upheld the validity of the Deed of Absolute Sale, dated 20 February 1984, executed by Nelly S. Nave (Nave) in favor of siblings Rommel, Elmer, Erwin, Roiler and Amanda, all surnamed Pabale (the Pabale siblings) over a piece of land

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION (subject property) in Calamba, Laguna, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-3317 (27604); and, thus, CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: reversed and set aside the Decision,[4] dated 2 December 1997, of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City, Branch 119 in Civil Case No. 675-84-C.[5] The 2 December 1997 Decision of the RTC declared null and void the two sales agreements involving the subject property entered into

by Nave with different parties, namely, Sesinando M. Fernando (Fernando) and the Pabale siblings; and ordered the reconveyance of the subject property to Alamayri, as Naves successor-in-interest.

Corporation who is not a party to the alleged Contract to Sell. Even assuming that said entity is the real party in interest, still, [Fernando] cannot sue in representation of the corporation there being no evidence to show that he was duly authorized to do so. Subsequently, [the Pabale siblings] filed a Motion to Intervene alleging that they are now the land owners of the subject property. Thus, the complaint was amended to include [the Pabale siblings] as party defendants. In an Order dated April 24, 1984, the trial court denied [Naves] Motion to Dismiss prompting her to file a Manifestation and Motion stating that she was adopting the allegations in her Motion to Dismiss in answer to [Fernandos] amended complaint. Thereafter, [Nave] filed a Motion to Admit her Amended Answer with Counterclaim and Cross-claim praying that her husband, Atty. Vedasto Gesmundo be impleaded as her co-defendant, and including as her defense undue influence and fraud by reason of the fact that she was made to appear as widow when in fact she was very much married at the time of the transaction in issue. Despite the opposition of [Fernando] and [the Pabale siblings], the trial court admitted the aforesaid Amended Answer with Counterclaim and Cross-claim. Still unsatisfied with her defense, [Nave] and Atty. Vedasto Gesmundo filed a Motion to Admit Second Amended Answer and Amended Reply and Crossclaim against [the Pabale siblings], this time including the fact of her incapacity to contract for being mentally deficient based on the psychological evaluation report conducted on December 2, 1985 by Dra. Virginia P. Panlasigui, M. A., a clinical psychologist. Finding the motion unmeritorious, the same was denied by the court a quo. [Nave] filed a motion for reconsideration thereof asseverating that in Criminal Case No. 1308-85-C entitled People vs. Nelly S. Nave she raised therein as a defense her mental deficiency. This being a decisive factor to determine once and for all whether the contract entered into by [Nave] with respect to the subject property is null and void, the Second Amended Answer and Amended Reply and Cross-claim against [the Pabale siblings] should be admitted. Before the motion for reconsideration could be acted upon, the proceedings in this case was suspended sometime in 1987 in view of the filing of a Petition for Guardianship of [Nave] with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 36 of Calamba, Laguna, docketed as SP No. 146-86-C with Atty. Vedasto Gesmundo as the petitioner. On June 22, 1988, a Decision was rendered in the said guardianship proceedings, the dispositive portion of which reads:

There is no controversy as to the facts that gave rise to the present Petition, determined by the Court of Appeals to be as follows:
This is a Complaint for Specific Performance with Damages filed by Sesinando M. Fernando, representing S.M. Fernando Realty Corporation [Fernando] on February 6, 1984 before the Regional Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna presided over by Judge Salvador P. de Guzman, Jr., docketed as Civil Case No. 675-84-C against Nelly S. Nave [Nave], owner of a parcel of land located in Calamba, Laguna covered by TCT No. T-3317 (27604). [Fernando] alleged that on January 3, 1984, a handwritten Kasunduan Sa Pagbibilihan (Contract to Sell) was entered into by and between him and [Nave] involving said parcel of land. However, [Nave] reneged on their agreement when the latter refused to accept the partial down payment he tendered to her as previously agreed because she did not want to sell her property to him anymore. [Fernando] prayed that after trial on the merits, [Nave] be ordered to execute the corresponding Deed of Sale in his favor, and to pay attorneys fees, litigation expenses and damages. [Nave] filed a Motion to Dismiss averring that she could not be ordered to execute the corresponding Deed of Sale in favor of [Fernando] based on the following grounds: (1) she was not fully apprised of the nature of the piece of paper [Fernando] handed to her for her signature on January 3, 1984. When she was informed that it was for the sale of her property in Calamba, Laguna covered by TCT No. T-3317 (27604), she immediately returned to [Fernando] the said piece of paper and at the same time repudiating the same. Her repudiation was further bolstered by the fact that when [Fernando] tendered the partial down payment to her, she refused to receive the same; and (2) she already sold the property in good faith to Rommel, Elmer, Erwin, Roller and Amanda, all surnamed Pabale [the Pabale siblings] on February 20, 1984 after the complaint was filed against her but before she received a copy thereof. Moreover, she alleged that [Fernando] has no cause of action against her as he is suing for and in behalf of S.M. Fernando Realty

Under the circumstances, specially since Nelly S. Nave who now resides with the Brosas spouses has categorically refused to be examined again at the National Mental Hospital, the Court is constrained to accept the Neuro-Psychiatric Evaluation report

datedApril 14, 1986 submitted by Dra. Nona Jean Alviso-Ramos and the supporting report dated April 20, 1987 submitted by Dr. Eduardo T. Maaba, both of the National Mental Hospital and hereby finds Nelly S. Nave an incompetent within the purview of Rule 92 of the Revised Rules of Court, a person who, by reason of age, disease, weak mind and deteriorating mental processes cannot without outside aid take care of herself and manage her properties, becoming thereby an easy prey for deceit and exploitation, said condition having become severe since the year 1980. She and her estate are hereby placed under guardianship. Atty. Leonardo C. Paner is hereby appointed as her regular guardian without need of bond, until further orders from this Court. Upon his taking his oath of office as regular guardian, Atty. Paner is ordered to participate actively in the pending cases of Nelly S. Nave with the end in view of protecting her interests from the prejudicial sales of her real properties, from the overpayment in the foreclosure made by Ms. Gilda Mendoza-Ong, and in recovering her lost jewelries and monies and other personal effects. SO ORDERED.
Both [Fernando] and [the Pabale siblings] did not appeal therefrom, while the appeal interposed by spouses Juliano and Evangelina Brosas was dismissed by this Court for failure to pay the required docketing fees within the reglementary period. In the meantime, [Nave] died on December 9, 1992. On September 20, 1993, Atty. Vedasto Gesmundo, [Naves] sole heir, she being an orphan and

childless, executed an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication pertaining to his inherited properties from [Nave]. On account of such development, a motion for the dismissal of the instant case and for the issuance of a writ of execution of the Decision dated June 22, 1988 in SP No. 146-86-C (petition for guardianship) was filed by Atty. Vedasto Gesmundo on February 14, 1996 with the court a quo. [The Pabale siblings] filed their Opposition to the motion on grounds that (1) they were not made a party to the guardianship proceedings and thus cannot be bound by the Decision therein; and (2) that the validity of the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by the late [Nave] in their favor was never raised in the guardianship case. The case was then set for an annual conference. On January 9, 1997, Atty. Vedasto Gesmundo filed a motion seeking the courts permission for his substitution for the late defendant Nelly in the instant case. Not long after the parties submitted their respective pre-trial briefs, a motion for substitution was filed by Lolita R. Alamayre (sic) [Alamayri] alleging that since the subject property was sold to her by Atty. Vedasto Gesmundo as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale, she should be substituted in his stead. In refutation, Atty. Vedasto Gesmundo filed a Manifestation stating that what he executed is a Deed of Donation and not a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of [Alamayri] and that the same was already revoked by him on March 5, 1997. Thus, the motion for substitution should be denied. On July 29, 1997, the court a quo issued an Order declaring that it cannot make a ruling as to the conflicting claims of [Alamayri] and Atty. Vedasto Gesmundo. After the case was heard on the merits, the trial court rendered its Decision on December 2, 1997, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows: 1. Declaring the handwritten Contract to Sell dated January 3, 1984 executed by Nelly S. Nave and Sesinando Fernando null and void and of no force and effect; 2. Declaring the Deed of Absolute Sale dated February 20, 1984 executed by Nelly S. Nave in favor of the [Pabale siblings] similarly null and void and of no force and effect;

3. Recognizing Ms. Lolita P. [Alamayri] as the owner of the property covered by TCT No. 111249 of the land records of Calamba, Laguna; 4. Ordering the [Pabale siblings] to execute a transfer of title over the property in favor of Ms. Lolita P. [Alamayri] in the concept of reconveyance because the sale in their favor has been declared null and void; 5. Ordering the [Pabale siblings] to surrender possession over the property to Ms. [Alamayri] and to account for its income from the time they took over possession to the time the same is turned over to Ms. Lolita [Alamayri], and thereafter pay the said income to the latter; 6. Ordering [Fernando] and the [Pabale siblings], jointly and severally, to pay Ms. [Alamayri]: attorneys fees in the sum of P30,000.00; and b. the costs.[6] a.

of the RTC ordering him and the Pabale siblings to jointly and severally pay Alamayri the amount

of P30,000.00 as attorneys fees.

The Pabale siblings intervened as appellants in CA-G.R. CV No. 58133 averring that the RTC erred in declaring in its 2 December 1997 Decision that the Deed of Absolute Sale dated 20 February 1984 executed by Nave in their favor was null and void on the ground that Nave was found incompetent since the year 1980.

The Court of Appeals, in its Decision, dated 10 April 2001, granted the appeals of S.M. Fernando Realty Corporation and the Pabale siblings. It ruled thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal filed by S. M. Fernando Realty Corporation, represented by its President, Sesinando M. Fernando as well as the appeal interposed by Rommel, Elmer, Erwin, Roller and Amanda, all surnamed Pabale, are hereby GRANTED. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 119 in Civil Case No. 675-84-C is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one rendered upholding the VALIDITY of the Deed of Absolute Sale dated February 20, 1984.

S.M.

Fernando

Realty

Corporation,

still

represented by Fernando, filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 58133, solely to question the portion of the 2 December 1997 Decision

No pronouncements as to costs.[7]

the said guardianship proceedings through their father Jose Pabale. She pointed out that the RTC explicitly named in its orders Jose Pabale as among those present during the

Alamayri sought reconsideration of the afore-quoted Decision of the appellate court, invoking the Decision,[8] dated 22 June 1988, of the RTC in the guardianship proceedings, docketed as SP. PROC. No. 14686-C, which found Nave incompetent, her condition becoming severe since 1980; and thus appointed Atty. Leonardo C. Paner as her guardian. Said Decision already became final and executory when no one appealed therefrom. Alamayri argued that since Nave was already judicially determined to be an incompetent since 1980, then all contracts she subsequently entered into should be declared null and void, including the Deed of Sale, dated 20 February 1984, which she executed over the subject property in favor of the Pabale siblings.

hearings held on 30 October 1987 and 19 November 1987 in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C. Alamayri thus filed on 21 November 2001 a Motion to Schedule Hearing to Mark Exhibits in Evidence so she could mark and submit as evidence certain documents to establish that the Pabale siblings are indeed the children of Jose Pabale.

Atty. Gesmundo, Naves surviving spouse, likewise filed his own Motion for Reconsideration of the 10 April 2001 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 58133, asserting Naves incompetence since 1980 as found by the RTC in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C, and his right to the subject property as owner upon Naves death in accordance with the laws of succession. It must be remembered that Atty. Gesmundo disputed before the RTC the supposed

According to Alamayri, the Pabale siblings should be bound by the findings of the RTC in its 22 June 1988 Decision in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C, having participated in

transfer of his rights to the subject property to Alamayri, but the court a quo refrained from ruling thereon.

In a Resolution, dated 19 December 2001, the Court of Appeals denied for lack of merit the Motions for Reconsideration of Alamayri and Atty. Gesmundo.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE DECISION IN SPECIAL PROCEEDING NO. 146-86-C DATED JUNE 22, 1988 IS NOT BINDING ON RESPONDENTS PABALES.

Hence, Alamayri comes before this Court via the present Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, with the following assignment of errors:

III

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE FINDING THAT NELLY S. NAVE WAS INCOMPETENT IN SPECIAL PROCEEDING NO. 146-86-C ON JUNE 22, 1988 CANNOT RETROACT TO AFFECT THE VALIDITY OF THE DEED OF SALE SHE EXECUTED ON FEBRUARY 20, 1984 IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENTS PABALES.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DENYING PETITIONERS MOTION TO SCHEDULE HEARING TO MARK DOCUMENTARY EXHIBITS IN EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH THE IDENTITY OF JOSE PABALE AS THE FATHER OF [9] RESPONDENTS PABALES.

It is Alamayris position that given the final and executory Decision, dated 22 June 1988, of the RTC in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C finding Nave incompetent since 1980, then the same fact may no longer be re-litigated in Civil

II

Case No. 675-84-C, based on the doctrine of res judicata, more particularly, the rule on conclusiveness of judgment.

jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or final order, may be as follows:

This Court is not persuaded.

xxxx

Res judicata literally means a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon or decided; a thing or matter settled by judgment. Res judicata lays the rule that an existing final judgment or decree rendered on the merits, and without fraud or collusion, by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon any matter within its jurisdiction, is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies, in all other actions or suits in the same or any other judicial tribunal of concurrent jurisdiction on the points and matters in issue in the first suit.[10]
(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors in interest, that only is deemed to have been adjudged in a former judgment or final order which appears upon its face to have been so adjudged, or which was actually and necessarily included therein or necessary thereto. (b) In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with respect to the matter directly adjudged or as to any other matter that could have been raised in relation thereto, conclusive between the parties and their successors in interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action or special proceeding, litigating the same thing and under the same title and in the same capacity; and

It is espoused in the Rules of Court, under paragraphs (b) and (c) of Section 47, Rule 39, which read:

SEC. 47. Effect of judgments or final orders. The effect of a judgment or final order rendered by a court of the Philippines, having

The doctrine of res judicata thus lays down two main rules which may be stated as follows: (1) The judgment or decree of a court of competent jurisdiction on the merits concludes the parties and their privies to the litigation and constitutes a bar to a new action or suit involving the same cause of action either before the same or any other tribunal; and (2) Any right, fact, or matter in issue directly adjudicated or necessarily involved in the determination of an action before a competent court in which a judgment or decree is rendered on the merits is conclusively settled by the judgment therein and cannot again be litigated between the parties and their privies whether or not the claims or demands, purposes, or subject matters of the two suits are the same. These two main rules mark the distinction between the principles governing the two typical cases in which a judgment may operate as evidence.[11] In speaking of these cases, the first general rule above stated, and which corresponds to the afore-quoted paragraph (b) of Section 47, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, is referred to as bar by former judgment; while the second general rule, which is embodied in paragraph (c) of the same section and rule, is known as conclusiveness of judgment.
The second concept conclusiveness of judgment states that a fact or question which was in issue in a former suit and was there judicially passed upon and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, is conclusively settled by the judgment therein as far as the parties to that action and persons in privity with them are concerned and cannot be again litigated in any future action between such parties or their privies, in the same court or any other court of concurrent jurisdiction on either the same or different cause of action, while the judgment remains unreversed by proper authority. It has been held that in order that a judgment in one action can be conclusive as to a particular matter in another action between the same parties or The doctrine res judicata actually embraces two different concepts: (1) bar by former judgment and (b) conclusiveness of judgment.

The Resolution of this Court in Calalang v. Register of Deeds provides the following enlightening discourse on conclusiveness of judgment:

their privies, it is essential that the issue be identical. If a particular point or question is in issue in the second action, and the judgment will depend on the determination of that particular point or question, a former judgment between the same parties or their privies will be final and conclusive in the second if that same point or question was in issue and adjudicated in the first suit (Nabus vs. Court of Appeals, 193 SCRA 732 [1991]). Identity of cause of action is not required but merely identity of issues.

subject matter of the litigation. Thus, it extends to questions necessarily implied in the final judgment, although no specific finding may have been made in reference thereto and although such matters were directly referred to in the pleadings and were not actually or formally presented. Under this rule, if the record of the former trial shows that the judgment could not have been rendered without deciding the particular matter, it will be considered as having settled that matter as to all future actions between the parties and if a judgment necessarily presupposes certain premises, they are as conclusive as the judgment itself.[12]

Justice Feliciano, in Smith Bell & Company (Phils.), Inc. vs. Court of Appeals (197 SCRA 201, 210 [1991]), reiterated Lopez vs. Reyes(76 SCRA 179 [1977]) in regard to the distinction between bar by former judgment which bars the prosecution of a second action upon the same claim, demand, or cause of action, and conclusiveness of judgment which bars the relitigation of particular facts or issues in another litigation between the same parties on a different claim or cause of action.

Another case, Oropeza Marketing Corporation v. Allied Banking Corporation, further differentiated between the two rules ofres judicata, as follows:

The general rule precluding the relitigation of material facts or questions which were in issue and adjudicated in former action are commonly applied to all matters essentially connected with the

There is bar by prior judgment when, as between the first case where the judgment was rendered and the second case that is sought to be barred, there is identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action. In this instance, the judgment in the first case constitutes an absolute bar to the second action. Otherwise put, the judgment or decree of the court of competent

jurisdiction on the merits concludes the litigation between the parties, as well as their privies, and constitutes a bar to a new action or suit involving the same cause of action before the same or other tribunal.

settled in a previous case. The second case, however, may still proceed provided that it will no longer touch on the same fact or question adjudged in the first

case. Conclusiveness of judgment requires only the identity of issues and parties, but not of causes of action.

But where there is identity of parties in the first and second cases, but no identity of causes of action, the first judgment is conclusive only as to those matters actually and directly controverted and determined and not as to matters merely involved therein. This is the concept of res judicata known as conclusiveness of judgment. Stated differently, any right, fact, or matter in issue directly adjudicated or necessarily involved in the determination of an action before a competent court in which judgment is rendered on the merits is conclusively settled by the judgment therein and cannot again be litigated between the parties and their privies whether or not the claim, demand, purpose, or subject matter of the two actions is the same.[13]

Contrary to Alamayris assertion, conclusiveness of judgment has no application to the instant Petition since there is no identity of parties and issues between SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C and Civil Case No. 675-84-C.

No identity of parties

SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C was a petition filed with the RTC by Atty. Gesmundo for the appointment of a guardian over the person and estate of his late wife Nave alleging her incompetence.

In sum, conclusiveness of judgment bars the relitigation in a second case of a fact or question already

A guardian may be appointed by the RTC over the person and estate of a minor or an incompetent, the latter being described as a person suffering the penalty of civil interdiction or who are hospitalized lepers, prodigals, deaf and dumb who are unable to read and write, those who are of unsound mind, even though they have lucid intervals, and persons not being of unsound mind, but by reason of age, disease, weak mind, and other similar causes, cannot, without outside aid, take care of themselves and manage their property, becoming thereby an easy prey for deceit and exploitation.[14]

relative, friend, or other person on behalf of a resident minor or incompetent who has no parent or lawful guardian, or the minor himself if fourteen years of age or over, may petition the court having jurisdiction for the appointment of a general guardian for the person or estate, or both, of such minor or incompetent. An officer of the Federal Administration of the United States in the Philippines may also file a petition in favor of a ward thereof, and the Director of Health, in favor of an insane person who should be hospitalized, or in favor of an isolated leper.

SEC. 2. Contents of petition. A petition for the appointment of a general guardian must show, so far as known to the petitioner:

Rule 93 of the Rules of Court governs the proceedings for the appointment of a guardian, to wit:
Rule 93 APPOINTMENT OF GUARDIANS

(a) The jurisdictional facts;

(b) The minority or rendering the appointment convenient;

incompetency necessary or

SECTION 1. Who may petition for appointment of guardian for resident. Any

(c) The names, ages, and residences of the relatives of the minor or incompetent, and of the persons having him in their care;

(d) The probable value and character of his estate;

SEC. 4. Opposition to petition. Any interested person may, by filing a written opposition, contest the petition on the ground of majority of the alleged minor, competency of the alleged incompetent, or the unsuitability of the person for whom letters are prayed, and may pray that the petition be dismissed, or that letters of guardianship issue to himself, or to any suitable person named in the opposition.

(e) The name of the person for whom letters of guardianship are prayed. SEC. 5. Hearing and order for letters to issue. At the hearing of the petition the alleged incompetent must be present if able to attend, and it must be shown that the required notice has been given. Thereupon the court shall hear the evidence of the parties in support of their respective allegations, and, if the person in question is a minor or incompetent it shall appoint a suitable guardian of his person or estate, or both, with the powers and duties hereinafter specified.

The petition shall be verified; but no defect in the petition or verification shall render void the issuance of letters of guardianship.

SEC. 3. Court to set time for hearing. Notice thereof. When a petition for the appointment of a general guardian is filed, the court shall fix a time and place for hearing the same, and shall cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons mentioned in the petition residing in the province, including the minor if above 14 years of age or the incompetent himself, and may direct other general or special notice thereof to be given.

xxxx

SEC. 8. Service of judgment. Final orders or judgments under this rule shall be served upon the civil registrar of the municipality

or city where the minor or incompetent person resides or where his property or part thereof is situated.

The objectives of an RTC hearing a petition for appointment of a guardian under Rule 93 of the Rules of Court is to determine, first, whether a person is indeed a

A petition for appointment of a guardian is a special proceeding, without the usual parties, i.e., petitioner versus respondent, in an ordinary civil case. Accordingly, SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C bears the title: In re: Guardianship of Nelly S. Nave for Incompetency, Verdasto Gesmundo y Banayo, petitioner, with no named respondent/s.

minor or an incompetent who has no capacity to care for himself and/or his properties; and, second, who is most qualified to be appointed as his guardian. The rules reasonably assume that the people who best could help the trial court settle such issues would be those who are closest to and most familiar with the supposed minor or incompetent, namely, his relatives living within the same province and/or the persons caring for him.

Sections 2 and 3 of Rule 93 of the Rules of Court, though, require that the petition contain the names, ages, and residences of relatives of the supposed minor or incompetent and those having him in their care, so that those residing within the same province as the minor or incompetent can be notified of the time and place of the hearing on the petition. It is significant to note that the rules do not necessitate that creditors of the minor or incompetent be likewise identified and notified. The reason is simple: because their presence is not essential to the proceedings for appointment of a guardian. It is almost a given, and understandably so, that they will only insist that the supposed minor or incompetent is actually capacitated to

enter into contracts, so as to preserve the validity of said contracts and keep the supposed minor or incompetent obligated to comply therewith.

the hearings held on the same dates. However, the said Orders by themselves cannot confirm that Jose Pabale was indeed the father of the Pabale siblings and that he was authorized by his children to appear in the said

Hence, it cannot be presumed that the Pabale siblings were given notice and actually took part in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C. They are not Naves relatives, nor are they the ones caring for her. Although the rules allow the RTC to direct the giving of other general or special notices of the hearings on the petition for appointment of a guardian, it was not established that the RTC actually did so in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C.

hearings on their behalf.

Alamayri decries that she was not allowed by the Court of Appeals to submit and mark additional evidence to prove that Jose Pabale was the father of the Pabale siblings.

It is true that the Court of Appeals has the power to try cases and conduct hearings, receive evidence and

Alamayris allegation that the Pabale siblings participated in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C rests on two Orders, dated 30 October 1987[15] and 19 November 1987,[16] issued by the RTC in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C, expressly mentioning the presence of a Jose Pabale, who was supposedly the father of the Pabale siblings, during

perform any and all acts necessary to resolve factual issues raised in cases falling within its original and appellate jurisdiction, including the power to grant and conduct new trials or further proceedings. In general, however, the Court of Appeals conducts hearings and receives evidenceprior to the submission of the case for

judgment.[17] It must be pointed out that, in this case, Alamayri filed her Motion to Schedule Hearing to Mark Exhibits in Evidence on 21 November 2001. She thus sought to submit additional evidence as to the identity of Jose Pabale, not only after CA-G.R. CV No. 58133 had been submitted for judgment, but after the Court of Appeals had already promulgated its Decision in said case on 10 April 2001.

invoking that the ends of justice would have been best served if she was allowed to present additional evidence is not sufficient to justify deviation from the general rules of procedure. Obedience to the requirements of

procedural rules is needed if the parties are to expect fair results therefrom, and utter disregard of the rules cannot justly be rationalized by harking on the policy of liberal construction.[ 1 9] Procedural rules are tools designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases. Courts and litigants

The parties must diligently and conscientiously present all arguments and available evidences in support of their respective positions to the court before the case is deemed submitted for judgment. Only under exceptional circumstances may the court receive new evidence after having rendered judgment;[18] otherwise, its judgment may never attain finality since the parties may continually refute the findings therein with further evidence. Alamayri failed to provide any explanation why she did not present her evidence earlier. Merely

alike are thus enjoined to abide strictly by the rules. And while the Court, in some instances, allows a relaxation in the application of the rules, this, we stress, was never intended to forge a bastion for erring litigants to violate the rules with impunity. The liberality in the

interpretation and application of the rules applies only to proper cases and under justifiable causes and

circumstances. While it is true that litigation is not a game of technicalities, it is equally true that every case must be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed

procedure to insure an orderly and speedy administration of justice.[ 2 0]

19 November 1987 in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C was the father of the Pabale siblings, they would still not confirm his authority to represent his children in the said

Moreover, contrary to Alamayris assertion, the Court of Appeals did not deny her Motion to Schedule Hearing to Mark Exhibits in Evidence merely for being late. In its Resolution, dated 19 December 2001, the Court of Appeals also denied the said motion on the following grounds:
While it is now alleged, for the first time, that the [herein respondents Pabale siblings] participated in the guardianship proceedings considering that the Jose Pabale mentioned therein is their late father, [herein petitioner Alamayri] submitting herein documentary evidence to prove their filiation, even though admitted in evidence at this late stage, cannot bind [the Pabale siblings] as verily, notice to their father is not notice to them there being no allegation to the effect that he represented them before the Calamba Court.[21]

proceedings. Worth stressing is the fact that Jose Pabale was not at all a party to the Deed of Sale dated 20 February 1984 over the subject property, which was executed by Nave in favor authority, of the Jose Pabale Pabales

siblings. Without

proper

presence at the hearings in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C should not bind his children to the outcome of said proceedings or affect their right to the subject property.

Since it was not established that the Pabale siblings participated in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C, then any finding therein should not bind them in Civil Case No. 675-84-C.

As the appellate court reasoned, even if the evidence Alamayri wanted to submit do prove that the Jose Pabale who attended the RTC hearings on 30 October 1987 and No identity of issues

Neither is there identity of issues between SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C and Civil Case No. 675-84-C that may bar the latter, by conclusiveness of judgment, from ruling on Naves competency in 1984, when she executed the Deed of Sale over the subject property in favor the Pabale siblings.

While both cases involve a determination of Naves incompetency, it must be established at two separate times, one in 1984 and the other in 1986. A finding that she was incompetent in 1986 does not automatically mean that she was so in 1984. In Carillo v. Jaojoco,[22] the Court ruled that despite the fact that the seller was declared mentally incapacitated by the trial

In SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C, the main issue was whether Nave was incompetent at the time of filing of the petition with the RTC in 1986, thus, requiring the appointment of a guardian over her person and estate.

court only nine days after the execution of the contract of sale, it does not prove that she was so when she executed the contract. Hence, the significance of the two-year gap herein cannot be gainsaid since Naves mental condition in 1986 may vastly differ from that of 1984 given the

In the cross-claim of Nave and Atty. Gesmundo against the Pabale siblings in Civil Case No. 675-84-C, the issue was whether Nave was an incompetent when she executed a Deed of Sale of the subject property in favor of the Pabale siblings on 20 February 1984, hence, rendering the said sale void.

intervening period.

Capacity to act is supposed to attach to a person who has not previously been declared incapable, and such capacity is presumed to continue so long as the contrary be not proved; that is, that at the moment of his acting he was incapable, crazy, insane, or out of his

mind.[23] The burden of proving incapacity to enter into contractual relations rests upon the person who alleges it; if no sufficient proof to this effect is presented, capacity will be presumed.[24] Alamayri capitalizes on the declaration of the RTC in its Decision dated 22 June 1988 in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C on Naves condition having become severe since the year 1980.[25] But there is no basis for such a Nave was examined and diagnosed by doctors to be mentally incapacitated only in 1986, when the RTC started hearing SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C; and she was not judicially declared an incompetent until 22 June 1988 when a Decision in said case was rendered by the RTC, resulting in the appointment of Atty. Leonardo C. Paner as her guardian. Thus, prior to 1986, Nave is still presumed to be capacitated and competent to enter into contracts such as the Deed of Sale over the subject property, which she executed in favor of the Pabale siblings on 20 February 1984. The burden of proving otherwise falls upon Alamayri, which she dismally failed to do, having relied entirely on the 22 June declaration. The medical reports extensively quoted in said Decision, prepared by: (1) Dr. Nona Jean AlvisoRamos, dated 14 April 1986,[26] and (2) by Dr. Eduardo T. Maaba, dated 20 April 1987,[27] both stated that upon their examination, Nave was suffering from organic brain syndrome secondary to cerebral arteriosclerosis with psychotic episodes, which impaired her

judgment. There was nothing in the said medical reports, however, which may shed light on when Nave began to suffer from said mental condition. All they said was that it existed at the time Nave was examined in 1986, and again in 1987. Even the RTC judge was only able to observe Nave, which made him realize that her mind was very impressionable and capable of being manipulated,

1988 Decision of the RTC in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C.

on the occasions when Nave visited the court from 1987 to 1988. Hence, for this Court, the RTC Decision dated 22 June 1988 in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C may be conclusive as to Naves incompetency from 1986 onwards, but not as to her incompetency in 1984. And other than invoking the 22 June 1988 Decision of the RTC in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C, Alamayri did not bother to establish with her own evidence that Nave was mentally incapacitated when she executed the 20 February 1984 Deed of Sale over the subject property in favor of the Pabale siblings, so as to render the said deed

subject property in favor of the Pabale siblings. Therefore, the Court of Appeals did not commit any error when it upheld the validity of the 20 February 1984 Deed of Sale.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Review is hereby DENIED. The Decision, dated 10 April 2001, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 58133, is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. Costs against the petitioner Lolita R. Alamayri.

SO ORDERED. void.

All told, there being no identity of parties and issues between SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C and Civil Case No. 67584-C, the 22 June 1988 Decision in the former on Naves incompetency by the year 1986 should not bar, by conclusiveness of judgment, a finding in the latter case that Nave still had capacity and was competent when she executed on 20 February 1984 the Deed of Sale over the 12.G.R. No. L-8532 October 11, 1957

Guardianship of James E. Stegner, et al., minors, JUANITA T. STEGNER, petitioner. PHILIPPINE TRUST CO., guardian-appellee, vs. CATHERINE STEGNER and MILDRED STEGNER, oppositors-appellants.

Feria, Manglapus and Associates for appellee. Marcelino Lontok and Marcelino Lontok, Jr., for oppositors. FELIX, J.: This is an appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Manila approving the consolidated statement of accounts filed by the Philippine Trust Company as guardian of the properties of the minors James, Henry, Ruth, Catherine and Mildred, all surnamed Stegner, and releasing said guardian from its responsibilities. The facts of the case are as follows: W.A. Stegner, a citizen of the United States, was at the time of his demise a resident of Pamplona, Cagayan. He left a will containing the following provisions: I, W. A. Stegner, a lawful age, a resident of the municipality of Pamplona, Province of Cagayan, Philippine Islands, and a citizen of the United States of Minnesota, United States of America, being of sound and disposing mind and memory, and not acting under undue influence or restrained of any kind, do hereby make, publish, and declare this to be my last will and testament, hereby revoking all other wills and testamentary dispositions by me made. xxx xxx III I give, devise and bequeth unto the executor and trustee hereafter named absolutely and in fee simple and of my property, real, personal and mixed of every kind, nature and description whatsoever, of which I xxx

may seized or possesses or to which I may be in any manner entitled, or in any manner interested at the time of my death in trust however, for the use and purposes hereinafter set out and same other, giving unto my said executor and trustee full power and authority to sell any of the property, real or personal, subject to the trust hereby created, and to invest and reinvest the proceeds of any said sales, in such manner as my said executor and trustee my deem proper, all without the legal restrictions otherwise applicable to trustee; to borrow money for the benefit of the trust; to sell, lease, mortgage, pledge, improve or exchange any property, real or personal, hold hereunder for such price and upon such terms and conditions as may be seen advisable; and to deal on behalf of the trust with any subsidiary or affiliate, without increase of liability and as freely as though dealing with an independent third party. xxx xxx IV I nominate and appoint the Philippine Trust Company executor of the trustee under this my last will and testament to serve without bond and as guardian of my children James of my children James E. Stegner, Henry G. Stegner, Ruth H. Stegner, and Catherine Stegner. This testator seems to have left the following properties: xxx

properties be placed in the hands of a solvent trust company P18,972.86 doing business in Manila. Cert. No. 06386, Serie "C", for 1 share of "La Urbana" at The Philippine Trust Company thereafter filed a petition, P200 per share 200.00 which was later amended, praying that in view of the will of Cert. No. 06996, Serie "C", for 1 share of "La Urbana", at A. Stegner appointing said company as guardian for the W. P200 per share 200.00 estates of the minors, letters of guardianship for the properties of James, Henry, Ruth, Catherine and Mildred Cert. No. 07140, Serie "C", for 1 share of "La Urbana", at Stegner be issued upon in its favor, and upon agreement of P200 per share 200.00 the parties, the Court set aside its previous order and appointed Juanita T. Stegner as guardian over the persons of Cert. No. 09161, Serie "D", for three shares of "La the minors and the Philippine Trust Company as guardian of Urbana", at P200 per share 600.00 their properties. James E. Stegner reached the age of (Account receivable)- Balance of Promissory Note dated majority and was consequently released from guardianship May 10, 1935, executed by "La Granja, Inc.," in favor by order of the Court of March 28, 1941, but it appears that of W. A. Stegner 10,000.00 he and his sister Ruth were killed by the Japanese in 1945. Cash TOTAL ASSETS and in addition thereto, the minors were to receive monthly pensions from the U. S. Veterans Administration. Although there is no evidence on record, the decision of the trial Court states that the said will of W. A. Stegner was duly admitted to probate and this statement was never refuted by any of the parties. On November 11, 1936, Juanita T. Stegner, widow of the deceased and mother of the minors, petitioned the Court of First Instance of Manila for the issuance in her favor of letters of guardianship over the person and properties of her children, which petition was granted by the Court in its order of November 13, 1936, upon the filing by the petitioner of a bond in the sum of P500. The Veterans Administration, however, recommended that the guardianship over the P26,672.86, The remaining wards under guardianship having reached the age of majority, the Philippine Trust Company on May 26, 1953, filed a final consolidated statement of account and petition for discharge containing a detailed statement of cash receipts and disbursement made covering the period from June 1, 1942, to May 20, 1953, in the case of Henry Stegner; from June 1, 1941 to May 20, 1953 in the case of Ruth, Catherine and Mildred Stegner. It also showed that the amount of P15,117.29 in Japanese military notes which was invalidated by Executive Orders Nos. 25 and 49 was deducted from the balance of P16,282.32 remaining in favor of the wards; that the participation in the notes of the La Granja, Inc., had been eliminated upon discovery that the balance of the same was duly paid for on January 4, 1940, and was correspondingly noted in the inventory account of July 6, 1940, which was approved by the Court on August

29 of the same year; that the value of the participation in the La Urbana was reduced from P3,200 to P400 in view of the fact that P2,800 had already been paid on April 12, 1938, as stated in the inventory account dated June 29, 1938, and duly approved by order of the Court of November 3, 1948; that the company was entitled to 5 per cent of the total amount received by said guardian as fees. It was, therefore, prayed that the statement of accounts be approved; that it be authorized to collect the sum of P418.77 as fees or commission and the amount of P437.31 as attorney's fees; that it be authorized to deliver the state of the deceased Ruth Stegner to her brother Henry and sisters Catherine and Mildred, in equal shares; that the residuary estates of the wards be delivered to them; that it be relieved from further responsibility as such guardian, and that the proceedings be declared closed and terminated. Catherine and Mildred Stegner opposed this petition alleging, among others, that although the guardianship commenced in 1937, the consolidated statement of accounts submitted by the Philippine Trust Company started only from 1941; that it did not explain why the minors should be prejudiced by the sum of P15,117.29 allegedly invalidated; that despite the absence of previous judicial authorization, the company invested the funds of the wards in the mortgage loans; that said loans were not contested by the wards when they were informed of the same because they were still minors at the time; that as the loans were in the name of the Philippine Trust Company and not in the names of Catherine and Mildred Stegner, these wards should not be prejudiced by the payments made by the mortgagors during the enemy occupation amounting to P15,117.29 which was declared invalidated. They also assailed the validity of Executive

Orders Nos. 25 and 49 on the ground that they were illegal and unconstitutional. Furthermore, oppositors objected to the items listed as the company's commission, attorney's fees, the miscellaneous disbursements allegedly incurred for the wards; and charged that the Philippine Trust Company did not exercise the diligence of a good father of a family to protect the interests of the minors with respect to the participation in La Granja and La Urbana and which negligence resulted in the loss of P9,900 belonging to said minors. Thus, they asked the Court to disapprove the statement of accounts submitted by the company and that it be ordered to present a new one with the objected items eliminated. On July 29, 1954, the Court issued an order finding the opposition interposed by Catherine and Mildred Stegner as groundless and approved the statement of accounts submitted by the Philippine Trust Company, authorizing the collection of its commission and attorney's fees; and delivery to the wards Henry, Catherine, and Mildred Stegner of their respective residuary estates. The motion for the reconsideration of said order filed by oppositors having been denied for lack of merit, the matter was brought to this Court on appeal. Consolidating the related questions raised by oppositors, the main issue in the instant case is whether the Philippine Trust Company could be held liable for the investments of the funds of the wards made without securing the previous authorization of the Court and which resulted in the loss of P15,117.29. In defense of its actuation, petitioner-appellee contends that it relied on the provisions on trust corporations, specifically Section 139 of the Corporation

Law (repealed by Republic act No. 337, known as the General Banking Act) which provides that deposits or moneys received by a trust corporation as guardian or trustee can be loaned and invested in accordance with the provisions governing loans and investments of savings and mortgage banks, unless otherwise directed by the instrument creating the trust. Appellants, on the other hand, maintain that the properties of the wards were received by the guardian in a fidei commissary capacity which partakes of the nature of a" commodatum" for the benefit of said minors, thus requiring court authorization before said funds could be invested. Although the context of the will of W. A. Stegner unmistakably conveys the testator's intention to create a trust and make the Philippine Trust Company a trustee, it must be remembered that upon said company's application and by agreement of the parties, the Court in its order of February 23, 1937, appointed the Philippine Trust Company as guardian (not as trustee) of the properties of the minors, and there is no showing either that when the will of W. A. Stegner was presented and allowed to probate in case No. 49170 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, appellee was appointed as such trustee. Having assumed office as "guardian" of the properties of the wards, the company should be governed, in the management of the funds of said minors, by the provisions of the Rules of Court on guardianship and not by the rules on trust corporations under the Corporation Law. Petitioner-appellee, however, asserts that although it did not secure previous judicial approval of those investments, they were included in the annual accountings which were passed

upon by the court from time to time. In support of such contention, the Vice-president of the Philippine Trust Company took the witness at and and testified that for the investments made in the mortgage of the Tambunting Brothers, the Veterans Administration when notified offered no objection and recommended approval thereof, and such investment was approved by the Court on July 22, 1939; that the investments in the mortgages of Cadsawan and T. de Vera were included in the inventory of July 6, 1940 and duly approved by the Court on October 29,1940 without objection from the Veterans Administration; that on March 8, 1941, the guardian filed a final accounting and a petition for discharge with respect to James Stegner himself confronted in writing. This final accounting which included the investments in the mortgages of Tambunting, and J. Pickering and Co. was approved by the order of the Court on March 28, 1941; that on July 11,1942, an inventory was again filed with the written conformity of the Veterans Administration in it appeared that certain amounts were invested in the mortgage of the Servants of the Holy Ghost and that of J. Pickering & Co., which inventory was approved by the Court on August 4, 1941; and that on June 12, 1943 an inventory with respect to Henry Stegner was filed wherein it showed that he had been paid his share of the investments in the mortgages and which accounting was duly approved by the Court on June 7, 1943. The witness testified that in all these cases the mother and guardian over the persons of the minors, Juanita T. Stegner, was duly furnished copies of the accounting and apparently she offered no objection whatsoever. It was further brought out that the interests accruing out of such investments were duly credited to the wards and formed pact of their funds from which they made withdrawals every now and then. Evidence

was also presented to prove that the corresponding mortgage participation certificates, specifying the amounts invested, were issued in the names of the wards (Exhibits A-1, A-2, A-3, B-2, C-1, D-1, D-2, E-1). It is to be noted in this connection that the mortgages of Cadsawan and Pickering were settled and paid prior to the outbreak of the war and they are not questioned in this case. The mortgages of the Tambunting brothers, Servants of the Holy Ghost, T. de Vera, Hermoso and Francisco, which were also executed before the war were not yet due when the Japanese forces invaded the Philippines, and soon after their occupation of Manila the Japanese Military Command ordered the mortgage debtors of almost all banks herein established to settle their obligations immediately. This, undoubtedly, cause the mortgagors mentioned above to pay the balance of the respective debts in Japanese military notes, which was then the legal tender, amounting to P15,117.29, which after the liberation of the island was declared invalidated by Executive Orders Nos. 25 and 49. Section 5, Rule 96 of the Rules of Court, provides that: SEC. 5. COURT MAY ORDER INVESTMENT OF PROCEEDS AND DIRECT MANAGEMENT OF ESTATE. The Court may authorize and require the guardian to invest the proceeds of sales or encumbrances, and any other of his ward's money in his hands, in real estate or otherwise, as shall be for the best interest of all concerned, and may make such orders for the management investment, and disposition of the estate and effects, as circumstances may require.

Although the authority reffered to in this Section may not have been secured prior to the investment of the properties of funds of the ward, yet We believe that the court's approval of the annual inventories and accounts submitted by the guardian, with the conformity and/or acquiescence of the U. S. Veterans Administration and the mother of the minors, wherein the questioned investment was mentioned and accounted for, amounts to a ratification of the acts of the guardian and compliance with the provisions of section 5, Rule 96 aforecited. Passing upon the same question arising out of practically the same set of facts, this Court, speaking through Chief Justice Ricardo Paras, held: It is not necessary for us to pass upon the applicability of section 139 of Act No. 1459, because we hold that, under section 5 of Rule 96 of the Rules of Court, the investments in question were valid and binding upon appellant's ward. It is noteworthy that in the four previous inventory accounts filed by the appellant with the lower court , the mortgage loans extended by the appellant and the interest collected thereon were plainly reported; . . .We are the opinion that this approval had the effect of impliedly validating appellant's acts and making them binding upon its ward (Philippine Trust Co. vs. Ballesteros, 98 Phil., 1007). Aside from the fact that the participations in La Granja and La Urbana were duly included in the accounts approved by the Court and which We hold to be unassailable, We find no merit in the imputation of negligence on the guardian with

respect to said assets after taking into consideration the satisfactory explanations made by said guardian. Wherefore, the order of the Court, a quo of July 29, 1954, appealed from is hereby affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.

petition for certiorari filed in the Court of Appeals which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 46169. Respondent Judge also claims that contrary to the allegations of complainants-spouses, they were made involuntary parties of the proceedings prior to the issuance of the writ of attachment by the filing of the Motion to Cite Spouses Daracan for Examination dated November 21, 1997.[6] The records disclose that in a decision dated March 4, 1998[7] in CA-G.R. SP No. 46169, the Court of Appeals held that the lower court clearly exceeded its jurisdiction in issuing the writ of preliminary attachment since the case pending with the respondent court was for guardianship and not an action falling under any of the grounds enumerated in Section 1, Rule 57 of the 1997 Rules of Court.[8] A petition for review was subsequently filed with the Court docketed as G.R. No. 134027 entitled Ma. Elissa Velez, et al. v. CA, et al.However, the same was thereafter dismissed and the decision therein became final and executory on January 13, 1999. In its evaluation and report dated April 12, 1999[9] the OCA recommended that 1.] the case be docketed as a regular administrative case; 2.] the parties be required to manifest if they are willing to submit the case for decision on the basis of the pleadings already filed; and thereafter, should they express their willingness that the same be done; 3.] respondent Judge Eli C. Natividad be declared guilty of Gross Ignorance of the Law and that he be fined in the amount of P3,000.00; and 4.] respondent be enjoined to exercise greater care and diligence in the performance of his duties as a judge with a warning that a repetition of a similar offense will be dealt with more severely.

13.

13. [A.M. No. RTJ-99-1447. September 27, 2000]

Spouses LEONARDO DARACAN and MA. TERESA DARACAN, petitioners, vs. JUDGE ELI G.C. NATIVIDAD, RTC, Branch 48, San Fernando, Pampanga, respondent. RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

On December 18, 1998, the Office of the Chief Justice received from the Spouses Ma. Teresa Daracan and Leonardo Daracan a lettercomplaint[1] against Judge Eli G.C. Natividad, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga, Branch 48 for gross ignorance of the law, oppression, gross partiality and knowingly rendering an unjust order for issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment[2]relative to Special Proceedings No. 4183 entitled In the Matter of the Petition for Guardianship of the Spouses Lorenzo G. Francisco and Lorenza D. Francisco.[3] The complaint was indorsed to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) which required respondent to comment within ten (10) days from receipt.[4] In compliance with the OCA directive, respondent filed his comment on May 28, 1998[5] praying for the dismissal of the complaint.Respondent Judge alleges that the writ is the subject of a

In a Resolution dated June 23, 1999,[10] the Court resolved to: a] docket the case as a regular administrative matter; and b] require the parties to manifest if they are willing to submit the case for decision on the basis of the pleadings already filed within ten (10) days from notice.

In a Manifestation dated October 12, 1999,[11] respondent Judge manifested his willingness to submit the case for decision on the basis of the pleadings already filed. However, earlier in a Resolution dated October 6, 1999,[12] the Court considered its Resolution dated June 23, 1999 served upon complainants when the same was returned unserved by the postmaster with a notation moved. In a Resolution dated November 29, 1999,[13] the Court noted respondents manifestation of October 12, 1999 and referred the case to Court of Appeals Associate Justice Salvador J. Valdez, Jr. for investigation, report and recommendation within ninety (90) days from notice. Thereafter, Justice Valdez submitted a Report Recommendation dated April 12, 2000 summing the facts thus: and

furthermore averred that rumors had it that the issuance of the writ of attachment was xxx for a consideration.
[14]

Subsequently, on March 4, 1998, the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. SP No. 46169, entitled: Spouses Leonardo Daracan and Ma. Teresa Daracan, Petitioners vs. Hon. Ely (sic) G.C. Natividad, etc., et al., Respondents declared null and void the writ of preliminary attachment on the finding that the respondent judge clearly exceeded (his) jurisdiction in issuing it. A petition for review on certiorari was thereafter filed with the Supreme Court but the same was dismissed.
[15] [16]

The spouses Ma. Teresa and Leonardo Daracan charged Judge Eli G.C. Natividad, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 48, San Fernando, Pampanga, with gross ignorance of the law, oppression, gross partiality and knowingly rendering [an] unjust order, all for issuing a writ of preliminary attachment in Sp. Proc. No. 4183, entitled In the Matter of the Petition for Guardianship of the Spouses Lorenzo G. Francisco and Lorenza D. Francisco. The complainants alleged that on November 21, 1997, upon motion of the court-appointed guardian, Lina Francisco-Velez, the respondent Judge issued the subject writ of preliminary attachment against their properties even as they are not parties to the guardianship proceedings. In pursuance of the writ, an order to break open was issued and, thus, Deputy Sheriff Edgardo Zabat of RTC, San Fernando, Pampanga, forced open their department store at midnight on November 26, 1997 and once inside, ransacked, looted and appropriated the merchandise found therein with a value of not less than P6 million without making an inventory. The complainants

Explaining his side in the instant administrative case, the respondent judge pleaded that he thought all along that under Section 6, Rule 96 of the Revised Rules of Court, he could issue the questioned writ to protect and preserve the rights of the wards in the light of the sworn assertion of the guardian, Lina Francisco-Velez, that the complainants were indebted to her wards, who were already senile, to the tune of P5 million; that even as the complainants had priorly been cited by the guardian in a motion to require them to appear for examination as debtors of her wards and against whom she (guardian) had initiated the filing of six (6) informations for violation of B.P. Blg. 22, they (complainants) did not appear to oppose the issuance of the writ of preliminary attachment; that the department store of the complainants that the sheriff opened, because the former had abandoned the same, was located at the Franda Mall, a building owned by the wards; and that the opening of the store and the attachment of the items found therein, which were all inventoried, contrary to the claim of the complainants, were done in the presence of a senior police inspector and a kagawad of the barangay. Respondent judge vehemently denied having committed any fraud, dishonesty or corruption. He put forward the submission that, if at all, he
[17] [18] [19]

merely committed an error of judgment and set forth the prayer that: WHEREFORE, it is respectively prayed, and considering that the Respondent Judge will be retiring on November 28, 1999 and who has reached the age of walking under the shadow of death and has no other means in life to support his remaining years of his life except the benefits he may be given by the government for his duties or services, and for humanitarian reasons, the case be dismissed.
[20]

conveyed away any money, goods or interest or a written instrument, belonging to the ward or his estate, the court may cite the suspected person to appear for examination, touching such money, goods, interest or instrument and make such orders as will secure the estate against such embezzlement, concealment or conveyance. In the leading case of Cui vs. Piccio, the foregoing rule was construed as follows:
[25]

At the ensuing investigation, the complainants never appeared despite substituted service and service by mail on them of the notices of investigation. Only the respondent judge appeared and after his oral motion to dismiss had been denied, he adduced evidence as heretofore recapped.
[21] [22] [23] [24]

Justice Valdez differed with the findings of the OCA that respondent judge be fined and warned that similar transgressions in the future would be dealt with more severely and instead recommended that the charges against him be dismissed for lack of merit, reasoning thus:

x x x its purpose is merely to elicit information or secure evidence from the person suspected of having embezzled, concealed or conveyed away any personal property of the ward. In such proceeding the court has no authority to determine the right of property or to order delivery thereof. If after the examination the court finds sufficient evidence showing ownership on the part of the ward, it is the duty of the guardian to bring the proper action.
x x x x x x x x x[26]

Re: The charges for gross ignorance of the law and/or knowingly rendering unjust order or judgment. Section 6, Rule 96 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court under which the respondent judge issued the questioned writ of preliminary injunction provides: Sec. 6. Proceeding when persons suspected of embezzling or concealing property of ward. - Upon complaint of the guardian or ward, or of any person having actual or prospective interest in the estate of the ward as creditor, heir or otherwise, that anyone is suspected of having embezzled, concealed or

x x x the jurisdiction of the court in guardianship proceedings, ordinarily, is to cite persons suspected of having embezzled, concealed or conveyed property belonging to the ward for the purpose of obtaining information which may be used in an action later to be instituted by the guardian to protect the right of the ward; and that only in extreme cases, where property clearly belongs to the ward or where his title thereto has already been judicially decided, may the court direct its delivery to the guardian.
[27]

On the other hand, the respondent judge justified the disputed writ of preliminary injunction he issued in this wise:

The legal guardian filed a verified Motion To Cite Spouses Leonardo and Teresa Daracan To Appear For Examination and Manifestation With Supplemental Motion praying that upon filing of these pleadings a writ of preliminary attachment be issued. It appears from the verified motion that the spouses Leonardo and Maria Teresa Daracan is (sic) indebted to the wards amounting to Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00). That when the said spouses was (sic) was (sic) charged by the ward[s] through the legal guardian of Violation of B.P. 22, said spouses started concealing and taking away all the assets real and personal in order to prejudice the wards and considering that the obligation or indebtedness was incurred through fraud, they have been concealing and disposing the property in order to avoid and frustrate the intention of the ward[s] to attach preliminarily their petition. It was also alleged that Spouses Daracan are leasing a place located at the Franda Mall Building owned by the Franda Corporation of which the wards are the majority stockholders. However, they have been deliberately and by stealth removing all the wares and goods in the said Samut Sari Department Store in order to prejudice the said wards, their creditors. WHEREFORE, a writ of preliminary attachment is hereby issued in this case in order to stop the further concealment or disposal of the assets of [the] Spouses Daracan in order to prejudice the wards herein as their creditors upon [the] filing of a bond in the amount of three hundred thousand pesos (P300,000.00), let a writ of preliminary attachment be issued in this case directing and ordering the Deputy Sheriff of this Court to seize all the personal properties of the Spouses

Daracan and/or real estate within the Province of Pampanga, for safekeeping not to exceed FIVE MILLION PESOS (P5,000,000.00) until further orders from this Court. SO ORDERED.
[28]

It is, therefore, beyond cavil that, as found by the Court of Appeals, the respondent judge clearly exceeded [his] jurisdiction in issuing the writ. Inarguably, a guardianship court exercises but a limited jurisdiction that cannot extend to the determination of questions of ownership. Apart from that, the B.P. Blg. 22 cases filed by the wards against the herein complainants can not be utilized by the respondent judge as basis for the issuance of the writ simply because the cases are not before the guardianship court over which he was then presiding. Similarly, the fact that herein complainants were deliberately and by stealth removing all their wares and goods from their store to the prejudice of the wards to whom they (complainants) were indebted to the tune of P5 million is entirely foreign to the guardianship proceedings; and the guardians remedy was to institute a collection suit against the complainants in the proper court and therein apply for a writ of attachment. Be that as it may, the mind feels ill at ease to conclude that respondent judge is guilty of gross ignorance of the law or of knowingly rendering an unjust order. For it has been held that: x x x if every error of the judge should be punished, then perhaps no judge, however good, competent, honest and dedicated he may be, can ever hope to retire from the judiciary without a blemished record and a tarnished image.
[29]

In Dela Cruz v. Concepcion, later reiterated in Wingarts v. Judge Servillano M. Mejia, this Court had the occasion to
[30] [31]

expound on the nature and the wisdom behind the twin charges of gross ignorance of the law and/or knowingly rendering an unjust judgment. There we declared thus: To constitute gross ignorance of the law, the subject decision, order or actuation of the judge in the performance of his official duties must not only be contrary to existing law and jurisprudence but, most importantly, he must be moved by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption. In the case before us, the administrative complaint does not even allege that the erroneous decision of respondent was thus motivated. Knowingly rendering an unjust judgment is both a criminal and an administrative charge. As a crime, it is punished under Art. 204 of the Revised Penal Code the elements of which are: (a) the offender is a judge; (b) he renders a judgment in a case submitted to him for decision; (c) the judgment is unjust; and (d) the judge knows that his judgment is unjust. The gist of the offense therefore is that an unjust judgment be rendered maliciously or in bad faith, that is, knowing it to be unjust. An unjust judgment is one which is contrary to law or is not supported by evidence or both. The source of an unjust judgment may be error or ill-will. There is no liability at all for a mere error. It is well-settled that a judicial officer, when required to exercise his judgment or discretion, is not liable criminally for any error which he commits, provided he acts in good faith. Bad faith is therefore the ground of liability. If in rendering judgment the judge fully knew that the same was unjust in the sense aforesaid, then he acted maliciously and must have been actuated and prevailed upon by hatred, envy, revenge, greed or some other similar motive. As interpreted by Spanish courts, the term knowingly means sure knowledge, conscious and deliberate intention to do an injustice. Mere

error therefore in the interpretation or application of the law does not constitute the crime. The nature of the administrative charge of knowingly rendering an unjust judgment is the same as the criminal charge. Thus, in this particular administrative charge, it must be established that respondent Judge rendered a judgment or decision not supported by law and/or evidence and that he must be actuated by hatred, envy, revenge, greed or some other similar motive.
[32]

True it is that subsequently, the far stricter norm of allowing only permissible margins of error has been adopted, thus: We need not belabor jurisprudence to accommodate respondents argument which in effect posits that not every judicial error bespeaks ignorance of the law and that, if committed in good faith, does not warrant administrative sanction. So we have ruled and so we have acted, but only in cases within the parameters of tolerable judgment. Where, however, the issues are so simple and the facts so evident as to be beyond permissible margins of error, to still err thereon amounts to ignorance of the law which, hopefully, was not merely feigned to subserve an unworthy purpose.
[33]

Only recently, however, the doctrine of bad faith as the ground for accountability has again come to fore. Mr. Justice Leonardo A. Quisumbing wrote: x x x To establish her guilt, it is indispensable that the checks she issued for which she was subsequently charged, be offered in evidence because the gravamen of the offense charged is the act of knowingly issuing a check with insufficient funds. Clearly, it was error to convict the complainant on the basis of her letter alone.

Nevertheless, despite this incorrect interpretation of a rule of evidence, we do not find the same as sufficiently constitutive of the charges of gross ignorance of the law and of knowingly rendering an unjust decision. Rather, it is at most an error in judgment, for which, as a general rule, he cannot be held administratively liable. In this regard, we reiterate the prevailing rule in our jurisdiction as established by current jurisprudence: We have heretofore ruled that a judge may be held administratively accountable for every erroneous order or decision he renders. To unjustifiably hold otherwise, assuming that he has erred, would be nothing short of harassment and would make his position doubly unbearable, for no one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the process of administering justice can be infallible in judgment. The error must be gross or patent, malicious, deliberate or in evident bad faith. It is only in this latter instance, when the judge acts fraudulently or with gross ignorance, that administrative sanctions are called for as an imperative duty of this Court. As a matter of public policy then, the acts of a judge in his official capacity are not subject to disciplinary action, even though such acts are erroneous. Good faith and absence of malice, corrupt motives or improper considerations are sufficient defenses in which a judge charged with ignorance of the law can find refuge. And in a later case, Mr. Justice Quisumbing was even more trenchant when he said: The other charges, namely ignorance of the law and issuing an unjust judgment, deserve consideration since the direct contempt order of respondent judge, under the attending circumstances it was issued, appears to be clearly

erroneous. The supposedly contemptuous language used in a pleading was not submitted to respondent but filed in another court presided by another judge stationed in Cebu literally miles away from where respondent holds court in Leyte. As this Court ruled in Ang vs. Castro: Use of disrespectful or contemptuous language against a particular judge in pleadings presented in another court or proceeding is indirect, not direct, contempt as it is not tantamount to a misbehavior in the presence of or so near a court or judge as to interrupt the administration of justice. However, administrative liability for ignorance of the law and/or knowingly rendering an unjust judgment does not immediately arise from the bare fact of a judge issuing a decision/resolution/order later adjudged to be erroneous. Otherwise, perhaps no judge, however competent, honest or dedicated he may be, can ever hope to retire from the judiciary with an unblemished record. For liability to attach for ignorance of the law, the assailed order, decision or actuation of the judge in the performance of official duties must not only be found erroneous but, most importantly, it must also be established that he was moved by bad faith, dishonesty, hatred, or some other like motive. Similarly, a judge will be held administratively liable for rendering an unjust judgment - one which is contrary to law or jurisprudence or is not supported by evidence - when he acts in bad faith, malice, revenge or some other similar motive. In fine, bad faith is the ground for liability in either or both offenses. Conversely, a charge for either ignorance of the law or rendering an unjust judgment will not prosper against a judge acting in good faith. Absent the element of bad faith,

an erroneous judgment cannot be the basis of a charge for any said offenses, mere error of judgment not being a ground for disciplinary proceedings.
[34]

In the case on hand, there is not a scintilla of evidence, not even any remote indication, that the respondent judge, in issuing his erroneous writ of preliminary attachment, was impelled by ill-will, malice, revenge, personal animosity, impulse to do an injustice, greed, corrupt consideration or any other similar motive. On the contrary, the testimony of the respondent stands out unrebutted because of the failure of the complainants to appear despite due notice. He declared that he does not know and had never seen the complainants before. He was prompted to issue the assailed writ of attachment only [35]

x x x I have been very careful in dealing with this matter as I was on the verge of retiring at that time. In fact, my last working day fell on November 26, 1999. And on that very day when I attended the last day of my public service, that was the time that I suffered the heart attack and I was hospitalized at the Heart Center for two months and until now, I am still under observation and medication and convalescing from my complicated disease, because my disease were pulmonary disease (sic). I suffer pleurisy of the lungs. However, my kidney again functioned so the dialysis stopped and the only disease now that I am suffering is the lung disease and the pulmonary disease. That is all, Your Honor.
[37]

Because these spouses Daracan were renting a big store in the Franda Mall owned and operated by the ward[s] who are now senile. That is the reason why I granted the petition for judicial guardianship. And when they learned that the wards who are the spouses are no longer handling the business in the mall, and theres already a legal guardian, they took away the most valuable items of their big store dealing in dry goods and the store was then Samut Sari and they left without paying any rentals, without paying their obligation amounting to several millions of pesos padlocked the store and they only left old stocks which are almost valueless and, in fact, the items seized by the sheriff is (sic) intact in the office of the sheriff and despite the notice issued by the sheriff for them to retrieve the same in view of the fact that the preliminary writ of attachment was dissolved, they failed to do so.
[36]

The respondent judge furthermore explained that he was of the impression that the portion of Section 6, Rule 96 of the Revised Rules of Court reading make such orders as will secure the estate against such embezzlement, concealment or conveyance authorized him to issue the writ of attachment to preserve the status quoand the real rights of the wards.
[38]

Under the obtaining circumstances, it is apropos to quote Justice Quisumbing once more: It ought to be remembered that bad faith is not presumed and he who alleges the same has the onus of proving it. In this regard, the complainants have not discharged that burden of proof x x x.
[39]

Re: The charges of oppression and gross partiality. Similarly, there is no factual support to the charges of oppression and partiality. And again, this is for the reason that the complainants, instead of presenting evidence, had played truant from the investigation.
The Court finds the recommendation of Justice Valdez well-taken.

and that -

Anent the charges of gross ignorance of the law and knowingly rendering an unjust judgment or order, the Court in Canson v. Garchitorena[40] restated the oft-quoted dictum that: [A]s a matter of public policy, in the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are generally not subject to disciplinary action, even though such acts are erroneous.[41] In the recent case ofSantos v. Judge Orlino,[42] we held:

affirmatively operating with furtive design or some motive of self-interest or ill-will for ulterior purposes. Evident bad faith connotes a manifest deliberate intent on the part of the accused to do wrong or cause damage.
[50] [51]

The fundamental propositions governing responsibility for judicial error were more recently summarized in In Re: Joaquin T. Borromeo. There the Court stressed, inter alia, that given the nature of judicial function and the power vested in the Supreme Court and the lower courts established by law, administrative or criminal complaints are neither alternative nor cumulative to judicial remedies where such are available, and must wait on the result thereof. Existing doctrine is that judges are not liable for what they do in the exercise of their judicial functions when acting within their legal powers and jurisdiction. Certain it is that a judge may not be held administratively accountable for every erroneous order or decision he renders. To hold otherwise would render judicial office untenable for no one called upon to try the fact or interpret the law in the process of administering justice can be infallible in his judgment. The error must be gross or patent, deliberate and malicious or incurred with evident bad faith.
[43] [44] [45] [46] [47]

The record is devoid of any showing that respondent judge was moved by ill-will or bad faith in issuing the writ of preliminary attachment.Complainants have not, in fact, adduced any proof to show that bad faith attended the issuance of the assailed order. To reiterate, bad faith is not presumed and he who alleges the same has the onus of proving it.[52] Viewed vis--vis the fact that complainants played truant to the investigation instead of presenting evidence to substantiate their charges, the complaint becomes reduced into a bare indictment or mere speculation. Concededly, administrative proceedings are not strictly bound by formal rules on evidence. It needs be pointed out, however, that the liberality of procedure in administrative actions is still subject to limitations imposed by the fundamental requirement of due process. Indeed, [T]he Rules even in an administrative case, demand that, if the respondent judge should be disciplined for grave misconduct or any graver offense, the evidence against him should be competent and should be derived from direct knowledge.[53] The judiciary to which the respondent belongs demands no less. Before any of its members could be faulted, it should only be after the presentation of competent evidence, especially since the charge is penal in character.[54] To hold a judge liable for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment or order, it must be shown beyond reasonable doubt that the judgment or order is unjust and that it was made with a conscious and deliberate intent to do an injustice.[55] In this regard, it is useful to reiterate the ruling inRaquiza v. Castaneda, Jr.[56] which stressed that -

Stated succinctly, for administrative liability to attach it must be established that respondent was moved by bad faith, dishonesty, hatred or some other motive[48] and as defined -

Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence; it imputes a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong; a breach of a sworn duty through some motive or intent or ill-will; it partakes of the nature of fraud. It contemplates a state of mind
[49]

The ground for the removal of a judicial officer should be established beyond reasonable doubt. Such is the rule where the charges on which the removal is sought is misconduct in office, willful neglect, corruption, incompetency, etc. the

general rule in regard to admissibility in evidence in criminal trials apply.

In short, this Court can not give credence to charges based on mere suspicion or speculation.[57] For the foregoing considerations, the allegations of oppression and gross partiality must likewise fall in the absence of factual support to substantiate the charges. WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, the complaint filed by the Spouses Leonardo Daracan and Ma. Teresa Daracan against Judge Eli G.C. Natividad, Regional Trial Court, Branch 48, San Fernando, Pampanga, is DISMISSED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Kapunan, and Pardo, JJ., concur.