Operations Linebacker-II

Operations Linebacker-II ........................................................................................................... 1 Day 1 - Dec. 18-19, 1972 ........................................................................................................... 3 Wave One ............................................................................................................................... 5 Wave Two .............................................................................................................................. 7 Wave Three ............................................................................................................................ 8 Day 2 - Dec. 19, 1972 ................................................................................................................ 9 Wave one................................................................................................................................ 9 Wave two.............................................................................................................................. 10 Wave three............................................................................................................................ 11 Day 3 - Dec. 20, 1972 Dien Bien Phu of the Air.................................................................. 12 Wave one.............................................................................................................................. 13 Wave Two ............................................................................................................................ 15 Wave Three .......................................................................................................................... 15 Day 4 - Dec. 21-22, 1972 ......................................................................................................... 19 Day 5 - Dec. 22-23, 1972 ......................................................................................................... 21 Day 6 - Dec. 23-24, 1972 ......................................................................................................... 22 Day 7 - Dec. 24, 1972 .............................................................................................................. 24 Dec. 25, 1972 ........................................................................................................................... 26

Day 1 - Dec. 18-19, 1972

Operation LINEBACKER II began on December 18, 1972, 3,000 sorties, 11 days, and 40,000 tons of bombs penetrated the most concentrated air defense of the war. President Richard Nixon had turned complete control of the Vietnam war over to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Thomas Moorer on December 14, 1972 with orders "to win this war". As a result of this order Operation LINEBACKER II was executed. Eleven days after the B-52's began this operation, America's involvement in Vietnam was over. Peace talks that had came to a stale mate in October 1972 were resumed on January 8, 1973. Within 30 days after the final bomb was dropped Le Duc Tho and Henry Kissinger reached a final agreement and signed the Paris Peace Accords on January 27, 1973. Within 60 days after the signing 591 American Prisoner's of War were released and returned to the United States.

Before the eleven day bombing campaign was over 26 US aircraft would be shot down by North Vietnam's SA-2 Guideline SAM missiles. Fifteen of these aircraft were Boeing B-52 Stratofortresses. Thirty-one of the B-52 crewmembers shot down were captured and held as POWs. At the end of the eleven day mission, ninety-three were listed as Missing In Action. Today all but nine of those B-52 men listed as MIA have been returned home. It took one hour and forty-three minutes for 87 B-52's to taxi, take-off, and become airborne on the afternoon of December 18, 1972 from Andersen Air Force Base in Guam. Later they would be joined by 42 additional B-52 that departed from U-Tapao Royal Thai Airfield, Thailand. Together they would form three attacking waves making this the largest armada of bombers assembled since World War II. Seven targets had carefully been selected for the 129 B-52's concentrate their weapons on.

The 361st Air Defense Division of Hanoi had 3 SAM Regiments The 261st SAM Regiment defended the capital from the North-East. It had 4 SA-75MK Dvina (SA-2F Guideline) batteries 57th SAM battery defending the capital from North-West 59th SAM battery defending the capital from North 93rd SAM battery defending the capital from East 94th SAM battery defending the capital from North-East The 257th SAM Regiment defended the capital from the South-West. It had 4 SA-75MK Dvina (SA-2F Guideline) batteries 76th SAM battery defending the capital from South-East 77th SAM battery defending the capital from North-West 78th SAM battery defending the capital from West 79th SAM battery defending the capital from South-West The 274th SAM Regiment was in the middle of transition from Haiphong. It had 2 SA-75MK Dvina (SA-2F Guideline) batteries ready 86th SAM battery defending the capital from South-South West 88th SAM battery defending the capital from South-South East

Wave One
Made up of a total 48 B-52s, 21 B-52Ds from U-Tapao, and 27 B-52s from Andersen, 12 B52D's and 15 B-52G's, reached their first targets at 7:45 PM, local Hanoi time. As SNOW cell unleashed 324 bombs onto the runway at Hao Lac airfield on the southwestern edge of Hanoi the B-52 tail-gunner in BROWN 03, SSgt Samual Turner, shot down a MiG-21, the first in B52 combat history.

The 361st Air Defense Division launched 20 missiles, against 11 targets. Eighteen minutes later LILAC 03, a B-52D tail number 6768 flying at 38,000 feet, from Andersen was approaching the Kinh No vehicle repair facility to drop its bombs. Fifteen seconds prior to the bomb release point a SAM fired from North Vietnam's SAM Site VN133. LILAC 03 was damaged by the SAM and was unable to make the post-target turn and dropped from the cell formation and continued to fly south from Hanoi. Despite the damage the B-52D was able to land safely at U-Tapao in Thailand.

Eleven minutes later CHARCOAL 01, a B-52G, tail number 8201, at 34,000 feet, was struck by two SAMs fired from SAM Site VN-119. The SAMs approached and detonated on the aircraft just prior to its bomb release point over the target area of the Yen Vien railroad yards. In less than a minute the bomber nosed over and headed to its final resting place, Kim Anh, Vien Phu province Vietnam. The crew of this aircraft was from Blytheville AFB, Arkansas. Three of the six crewmembers successfully exited the and were captured and held at the Hanoi Hilton by the North Vietnamese becoming the Strategic Air Commands first POWs. Wreckage of CHARCOAL 01 shot down by the North Vietnam's Central Army's 59th Missile Battalion on December 18, 1972 is clearly visable in a pile of aircraft wreckage at the Central Army Museum, 28A Dien Bien Phu Street, Hanoi, Vietnam today.

Wave Two
Was made up of 30 B-52D's and G's from Andersen. They were scheduled to begin bombing targets at 12:00 midnight Hanoi time. Targets selected for the second wave were the same as three of those struck earlier by the first wave of bombers, the Yen Vien railroad yard, the Hanoi railroad repair yard, and the Kinh No vehicle repair facility. The 361st Air Defense Division launched 9 missiles, against 4 targets. As PEACH 02, a B-52G tail number 8246, flying at an altitude of 38,500 feet began its posttarget turn a SAM exploded just off its left wing. The explosion had ripped part of the wingtip off and tore the fuel tank from under the wing. Two of the engines were also ripped from the bomber. Flames were trailing the B-52 from every hole made by the damage. The aircraft commander was able to keep the bomber airborne long enough to make it back to the safety provided by the airspace of Thailand. Seven crewmembers successfully bailed out in the vicinity of the Marine base near Nam Phong. Within twenty minutes all of the crew were picked up and flown to U-Tapao. The next day they returned to Guam.

Wave Three
About the same time the crew from PEACH 02 was landing at U-Tapao B-52s that would make up the third and final wave of bombers for the first evening were begining to take to the air. At 2:46 AM local U-Tapao time, ROSE 01, a B-52D tail number 6608, rolled down the runway and climbed out to become part of 51 B-52D's and G's that made up the third and final wave of B-52s to strike Hanoi on December 18, 1972. Twenty-one of these B-52s, all from UTapao were targeted against the Hanoi Radio Tower. These B-52Ds were within lethal range of eleven North Vietnamese SAM sites. The 361st Air Defense Division launched 35 missiles, against 19 targets. At 4:56 AM, Hanoi time, ROSE O1, the lead aircraft in the final cell, dropped its 108, 750 lb bombs on the Hanoi Radio Tower. Numerous SAMs were fired at the bombers as they paraded one by one over the target area. The tail-gunners because of their large canopy in the B-52D's were calling the SAMs as they broke through the overcast below. One SAM pasted between the trailing edge of the right wing and the tail of ROSE 01. The gunner radioed to the aircraft commander, "that's close enough..." Within seconds another SAM approached ROSE 01 as it entered its post-target turn. The SAM fired from North Vietnam's SAM Site VN-549 exploded underneath the bomber on the left side. Immediately, internal communications were lost in the aircraft. The SAM had blown a hole in the side of the fuselage large enough for the navigator to look out and see the bomb pins hanging from the external bomb rack under the wing. Fire broke out in the forward cockpit. ROSE 01 never made it out of the post-target turn. The crew ROSE 01 began exiting the ill-fated aircraft. Four of the six crewmembers were captured before the sun rose the next morning. The wreckage of ROSE 01 fell to the ground approximately 9 kilometers southwest of Hanoi in the village of Oai Than, Hay Tay province Vietnam. In January 1996 a joint field activity conducted the United States JTF-FA and their Vietnamese counterparts unearthed from a pond the wreckage of ROSE 01. The remains of the gunner were excavated from the site and are currently undergoing forensic identification at the Central Identification Laboratory at Hickam AFB in Hawaii. Wreckage recovered by the Vietnamese on December 19, 1972 is on display at the Central Army's Air Force Museum located in southwest Hanoi. One other B-52D, RAINBOW 01, tail number 6583, flying at 34,000 feet was damaged by a SAM as it approached its target the Hanoi railroad repair yard. The RAINBOW cell was within burnthrough range of six SAM sites at the time of its encounter with the SAM. RAINBOW 01 diverted to U-Tapao where it landed safely. During the first evening of Operation LINEBACKER II the North Vietnamese launched 164 SAMs at the B-52 bombers. Of the 129 bombers over Hanoi that night only two were shot down by enemy missiles.

Day 2 - Dec. 19, 1972

Day two of Operation LINEBACKER II had some minor changes in the flight plans of the B52s. The altitudes of the bombers were lowered between 34,000 and 35,000 feet. It was the hopes of the mission planners that this would allow the chaff corridors created by the F-4s laid at 36,000 feet to be more effective against the SA-2 SAMs radar. On the first day of the operation several B-52 pilots were performing evasive maneuvers to avoid SAMs even though an order had been issued not to. On Day 2 the Strategic Air Command's Wing Commander threatened to court-martial any pilot who willingly disrupted the cell formation to evade the SAMs.

Wave one
Was made up of 12 B-52Ds and 9 B-52Gs flying from Andersen AFB, Guam. Their fifteen and a half hour mission concentrated its weapons on the Kinh No vehicle repair complex. They began releasing their bombs at 8:10 PM Hanoi time and for twelve minutes they rained on the Kinh No complex. The 361st Air Defense Division launched 7 missiles, against 4 targets.

Wave two
Was comprised of 36 aircraft. All the B-52Gs, 21 of them, flew in from Guam. Their flight plan called for them to rendezvous with 15 B-52Ds from U-Tapao before proceeding to Hanoi to bomb the Bac Giang transshipment point and the Hanoi Radio tower. The B-52s formed into three ship cell formations separated by 500 feet altitude and trailed the lead ship at one mile intervals, one off the right wing and the other flying off the left wing. Begining at 11:50 PM, local Hanoi time, wave two began dropping bombs simultaneously on both its intended targets. For the next twenty-five minutes bombs fell continuously on the Bac Giang transshipment point. The 361st Air Defense Division launched 6 missiles, against 4 targets. The lead cell over the Hanoi Radio tower was IVORY, made up of 3 B-52Ds from U-Tapao. IVORY cell was within burnthrough range of nine SAM sites. All aircraft employed maximun Track While Scan (TWS) jamming against the SAMs Fan Song radar beams. All the aircraft in IVORY cell maintained good cell integrity throughout the bomb run. Approximately 10 seconds after IVORY 01, B-52D tail number 6592, flying at an altitude of 35,000 feet, released its 108 bombs it began a forty-five degree high-banked 270 degree post-target turn. No one aboard IVORY 01 saw the approaching SAM because of the steep angle of the turn. The SAM detonated approximately 50 to 100 feet off the tail of the bomber causing engine malfunction and severing the right elevator control cable. As IVORY 01 rolled out of the turn and returned to level flight the gunner saw another SAM coming at the aircraft. An evasive turn was made in the opposite direction. This placed the SAM well above IVORY 01 where it detonated without harm to the aircraft. The damaged B-52D continued to fly until it reached Nam Phong base in Thailand where the bomber landed safely. Three cell behind IVORY was HAZEL cell made up of three B-52Gs. Two of the G-models had unmodified ECM equipment on-board. Modified B-52Gs were those equipped with three ALT-22 Modulated ECM transmitters. The unmodified B-52G aircraft possess ALT-6B unmodulated transmitters in place of the ALT-22s. HAZEL cell flew inbound to the Hanoi Radio station target area approximately 9 miles to the left of its intended track. At approximately 13 miles prior to the bomb release point HAZEL 03, a B-52G tail number 8254, flying at 34,500 feet was engaged by a SAM. HAZEL 02 had an inoperative ALR-20 receiver and HAZEL 01 had two inoperative E/F transmitters. All the aircraft jammed the TWS beams although only HAZEL 01 and HAZEL 02 were jamming the down-link frequency with two jammers apiece. Both HAZEL 02 and HAZEL 03 had uplink signals from SAM radar. The damage of HAZEL 03 is contributed to lack of cell integrity, flying off the fragged course, and insufficient down-link jamming capability. Being within burn-through range of several SAM sites was also a contributing factor. HAZEL 03 was the only B-52G to be damaged by a SAM during Operation LINEBACKER II and not forced down.

Wave three
Was made up of 36 B-52s with 15 B-52D's and 6 B-52Gs form Andersen and 15 B-52Ds from U-Tapao. Nine B-52Ds from Anderson were again targeted against the Yen Vien railroad yards on the eastern bank of the Red River. This target received 1116 bombs from the B-52s on the first night of LINEBACKER II. QUILT cell led the attack on this target. BRICK cell was right behind them and the final cell to bomb this target on December 19, 1972 was SCARLET. It took approximately eight minutes for the three cells to unload 594 bombs on the target. No SAMs were reported and no B-52s were damaged over this target. About the time the last explosion took place at Yen Vien railroad yards 27 B-52s were preparing to make a run over a new target thirty-one miles north of Hanoi, the Thai Nguyen thermal power plant. The 361st Air Defense Division launched 7 missiles, against 4 targets. Only one B-52 observed SAMs. PAINT 02 a B-52D from U-Tapao saw four visible SAMs. There was no damage done to any of the aircraft that struck this target but during a post-flight inspection of RAINBOW 01, 30 to 35 holes were noted in the aircraft's skin.

Day 3 - Dec. 20, 1972 Dien Bien Phu of the Air

During the third night of Operation LINEBACKER II the USAF B-52 suffered its heaviest losses of the entire operation. The North Vietnamese had counted on the B-52 attack on the third evening to be using the same altitudes and approach paths to Hanoi as on the previous nights. The SAMs downed four B-52Gs and two B-52Ds. Another B-52D from U-Tapao was severely damaged by a SAM ripping several holes in the right wing. Despite the damage the pilot was able to fly back to Thailand and land safely at U-Tapao. The 361st Air Defense Regiment preparing for a similar attack, relocated against North-West.

Wave one
Was made up of 18 B-52s from Anderson AFB in Guam. There were 6 B-52Ds and 12 B52Gs from Anderson joined by 15 B-52Ds from U-Tapao. The first target to be bombed was the Hanoi Railroad Repair Facility. Two cell of Anderson based B-52s bombed this target while passing within burn-through range of 11 SAM. The nine three-ship cells that followed the initial cells targeted the Yen Vien rail yard and the nearby Ai Mo warehouse. The 361st Air Defense Division launched 10 missiles, against 4 targets.

QUILT cell led the attack at Yen Vien. QUILT cell was made up of B-52Gs. QUILT 03, tail number 6496, was one of two unmodified B-52Gs in the cell flying at 35,500 feet. Unmodified B-52Gs were those equipped with three ALT-22 Modulated ECM Transmitters. The Modified B-52G had ALT-6B Unmodulated Transmitters in place of the ALT-22s. QUILT 3 lost two E/F transmitters at the Initial Point of the bomb run and was only jamming the Track While Scan beams of the Fan Song Radar emulating from the SAM sites. QUILT 01 had lost two E/F Transmitters it committed 3 jammers to the track while scan radar beams with one directed against the down-link. QUILT 02 concentrated all its transmitters against the track while scan signals. QUILT cell penetrated a heavy SAM environment. While QUILT cell was in the post-target turn at a high bank angle, QUILT 03 was hit by a SAM. Factors that lead to the damage of QUILT 03 were all the B-52s in the cell were unmodified G models, the high bank angle of the turn, and they flew within burn-through range of several

SAM sites. About ten seconds after the Radar Navigator closed the bomb-bay doors a SAM crashed into the left side of the aircraft. QUILT 03 began to loose altitude. Hydraulic pressure to the controls in the rear of the aircraft was gone. The aircraft was in a 500 knot high-speed descent at around 20,000 feet when the Pilot illuminated the bailout light. Four of the six crewmembers were captured by the Vietnamese and later released in March of 1973. Two of the crew-members were Killed In Action their bodies have since been returned by the Vietnamese. Four cells behind QUILT cell was BRASS cell. BRASS cell was made up of one modified B52G and two unmodified B-52Gs. As the cell proceeded inbound to the target it had drifted four to seven miles left of its track because of evasive action taken against visual SAMs fired at the cell. As BRASS 01 rolled out of the post-target turn integrity of the cell formation had been lost. BRASS 01 was six miles ahead of BRASS 02 at this point. Approximately 40 seconds after bomb release point BRASS 02, a B-52G, tail number 6481, was successfully engaged by two SAMs fired from SAM site VN-549. One exploded just off the right wing, and the second missile detonated off the right side of the aircraft close to the tail section. A quick assessment by the crew revealed four of eight engines were out. Air speed had dropped to 250 knots because of of strong head winds. Within five minutes of the SAM explosions two more engines showed fire indications and had to be shut down. The pilot managed to glide the crippled aircraft to Nam Phong Marine Base in Thailand where the crew all successfully bailed out and were rescued. The next day the crew was flown back to Anderson AFB on a KC-135 for a debriefing. On Christmas day the crew was returned to the States. Three cells behind BRASS cell was ORANGE cell. It was made up of three B-52D's flying from U-Tapao Air Field. ORANGE 03, a B-52D tail number 6622, flying at 35,500 feet from U-Tapao, was hit simultaneously by two SAMs fired from VN-119 SAM site just prior to its bomb release point over Yen Vien rail-yards. Both ORANGE 01 and ORANGE 02 were in their post-target turn at a high banked angle. This rendered their ECM equipment ineffective against any jamming capability to effectively cover ORANGE 03. After being hit ORANGE 03 went into a flat spin, exploded and crashed just north of Hanoi in Yen Thuong hamlet. Two of the six crew-members were captured and repatriated by the North Vietnamese in 1973. The other four members of the 99th Bomb Wing of West-over AFB crew remain unaccounted for today.

Wave Two
9 B-52Ds and 18 B-52G from Andersen AFB were to strike the Hanoi rail yards, the Bac Giang transshipment points, and the Thai Nguyen thermal power plant. It had become obvious to mission planners that the B-52G model did not have enough electronic countermeasure equipment on board to overcome the radars of the SAM sites. Six of the B-52Gs targeted against the Hanoi rail yards were recalled by SAC officials. The remaining B-52s struck their targets without any impairment or losses from the SAMs.

Wave Three
Would not be so lucky. Within sixteen minutes three B-52s were shot down and another was damaged during their assault. The wave was made up of 39 B-52s. From Andersen AFB were 12 B-52Gs and 9 B-52D. Bombers provided from the base at U-Tapao were 18 B-52Ds. The nine B-52Ds from Andersen were responsible to strike the Hanoi rail yards, the target that the G models were recalled from during the second wave earlier in the evening. The 361st Air Defense Division launched 20 missiles, against 13 targets. STRAW 02, a B-52D, tail number 6669, flying at an altitude of 35,500 feet, was the fifth B52 over the Hanoi rail yards on this evening. The crew reported four SAMs during the ingress with another SAM that detonated just seconds after their bomb release under the aircraft as it was began a large banked post-target turn. It is believed that the SAM that encountered STRAW 02 was fired from North Vietnam's SAM Site VN-549. STRAW 01 had lost one E/F transmitter and STRAW 02 lost two of its transmitters. STRAW 02 lost two engines during the explosion. The aircraft remained flyable for another 30 minutes. This gave the crew enough time to reach the boarder of Laos. There the crew bailed out of the bomber before it exploded and five of the six crew-members were rescued by a HH-53. The radar-navigator of STRAW 02 remains Missing in Action. There have been numerous reports since this incident occurred that this missing individual may still be alive and possibly held in captivity. At the end of the United States involvement in the war in Southeast Asia there were over 500 Americans unaccounted from in Laos. There never was a release of any Prisoners of War from the Laotian government. OLIVE 01, a B-52G, tail number 8198 flying at an altitude of 35,000 feet had a crew of seven on-board. It was the lead aircraft over the Kinh No vehicle repair complex. OLIVE cell approached its bomb release point at 11:12 PM, local Hanoi time, proceeding inbound with two to three nautical miles of lateral separation at the bomb release point. Evasive maneuvers placed OLIVE 03 was approximately two nautical miles ahead of OLIVE 02 at the bomb release point. OLIVE 01 was struck by a SAM believed to be fired from Vietnam's SAM Site VN-119 while in the high banked post-target turn. The cells electronic counter measure equipment consisted of one E/F transmitter on OLIVE 01 and one E/F transmitter on OLIVE 02. Strong track while scan and up-link signals were present throughout the target area. There was maximum jamming applied against the track while scan beams and three jammers were devoted to the down-link frequency. Lack of cell integrity, high bank angle turn and seven SAM sites within burn-through range were all contributing factors to the loss of OLIVE 01. Three of the crew-members were able to successfully eject from the ill fated bomber. Two of these men were returned as POWs in March of 1973. It was not until two years after the war was over when Vietnamese released the remains of the other survivor who had died while in captivity.

Following just eight minutes behind OLIVE cell over the target and a few cells back in the formation was TAN cell. TAN 03 an unmodified B-52G, tail number 8169 flying at 36,000 feet had lost its bombing navigation radar and became separated from the cell. TAN 03 was tracking four nautical miles to the right of its intended track and there was six miles separation between TAN 03 and the rest of TAN cell at the time of the SAM impact. The aircraft disintegrated almost immediately. The gunner was the only crew-member of this B-52 to be released from the Hanoi Hilton in 1973. The final target to be bombed on the night of December 20, 1972 was the Hanoi petroleum products storage area at Gia Thuong. BRICK cell was the last cell to bomb this target. There were four SAMs fired at BRICK cell just as they entered their post-target turn. BRICK 02, a B-52D, tail number 5067 flying at 35,000 feet was damaged by one of these SAMs launched from Vietnam's SAM Site VN-14. Numerous holes were ripped in the right wing of the B52D but the damage was not enough to keep the bomber from returning to U-Tapao. December 20, 1972 will be remembered as the day that the United States lost the most B52 aircraft to hostile fire while performing a combat operation. Four B-52Gs were shot down, two B-52Ds and another receiving severe damage. Several patterns had developed by the end of the third night of Operation LINEBACKER II. One, Six B-52s had been shot down while in a high angle banked post-target turn. Two, five of the seven B-52Gs that had been shot down were unmodified B-52Gs. Because of these factors and the high B-52 losses that occurred on December 20, 1972 SAC planners had to alter their plans if the B-52s valued at $8.0 million each were to continue their raids into the Hanoi area. 18th of December, the 361st Air Defense Division was defending Hanoi. It had 3 SAM regiments, equipped with the SA-75MK Dvina (SA-2F) systems. The 261th SAM regiment were included with the 57th, 59th, 93rd, 94th SAM Battery. The 257th SAM regiment were included with the 76th, 77th, 78th, 79rd SAM Battery. The 274th SAM regiment were included with the 86th, 88th SAM Battery, in the middle of relocation from Haiphong. As the relocation of the 274th SAM regiment was ongoing during Linebacker-II, only two missile technical battery were available to prepare missiles... ... missile shortage were common to the battery commanders. For example 19/12/72, the batteries had the following missile stock available: 261 SAM regiment 57th battery - 4 59th battery - 6 93th battery - 6 94th battery - 8 257th SAM regiment 76th battery - 12 77th battery - 13 78th battery - 7 79th battery - 8 274th SAM regiment

86th battery - 12 88th battery - 8

Night-1, 18th of December During wave-1, the 12 SAM batteries defending Hanoi, launched 20 missiles. During wave-2, 9 missiles. During wave-3, 35 missiles. Night-2, 19th of December During wave-1, the 12 SAM batteries defending Hanoi, launched 7 missiles. During wave-2, 6 missiles. During wave-3, 7 missiles. Night-3, 20th of December During wave-1, the 12 SAM batteries defending Hanoi, launched 10 missiles. During wave-3, 20 missiles.

Day 4 - Dec. 21-22, 1972

By the end of the third evening 58% of all the B-52s that received either damage or were shot down during Operation Linebacker II had occurred. Thus far 315 sorties had been completed on numerous military targets in the Hanoi area. After extensive mission planning the number of chaff delivering aircraft was increased from eight used on the previous nights to a total of twelve. The mission was supported by many of the same type aircraft used during the previous nights, however; the total number of aircraft flying support was increased from 39 to 58 aircraft. A total of 30 B-52Ds were scheduled to strike the Quang Te airfield (6 bombers), the Bac Mai airfield (12 bombers) and the Ven Dien supply depot (12 bombers) in the Hanoi area of North Vietnam between the hours of 3:33 AM and 3:48AM, local Hanoi time. Altitudes of the attacking B-52s had been altered from previous nights. On December 21, 1972, they flew between 33,500 feet and 38,000 feet. The time between cells had been shortened from four minutes to between 90 and 120 seconds. This would allow the entire wave of bombers to pass over the target area in just 15 minutes instead of the 30 to 40 minutes required on the first three nights. Instead of exiting their targets in a large post-target turn the B-52s were routed to continue to fly straight out over the Gulf of Tonkin before turning to head back towards their base in Thailand. At precisely 3:33 AM the first of six B-52Ds released their ordinance on the Quang Te Airfield. The BUFFs reported that only two SAMs were observed fired at the attacking cells. Neither of the SAMs reached the B-52s. Within minutes twelve more B-52Ds began their run over the Ven Dien supply depot. Numerous SAMs were reported to have been fired at the attacking aircraft from almost a dozen SAM sites in the area. Again the SAMs failed to reach their intended targets and the B-52s exited the target area unharmed. The twelve B-52Ds targeted against the Bac Mai airfield were not as fortunate. Flying at 36,500 feet, SCARLET cell was approaching the target area. Just short of the initial point(IP) SCARLET 01, a B-52D, tail number 55-0061, lost its bombing navigation system (BNS). Without this radar a precise fix on the target could not be achieved. The lead aircraft was used as a reference point for the entire cell to release their ordinance to insure the bombs reached the target. SCARLET 01 indicated that it would turn the lead position over to SCARLET 02, whose bombing navigation system was operable, for the bomb run. In order to do this SCARLET cell had to break momentarily from cell formation as SCARLET 01 pulled to the left of the trek and allowed SCARLET 02 and then SCARLET 03 to assume a position in front of it. It was the hopes of the former SCARLET 01, now known as SCARLET 03 as the cell formation changed, to use the Gunner's radar from the SCARLET 02 to guide him to the bomb release (BRL). Normally this procedure known as a "Bonus Deal" worked without incident. During the exchange of cell positions SCARLET 03 was approximately 6 NM behind SCARLET 01 and SCARLET 02. There was one inoperative E/F transmitter in SCARLET 03. SCARLET 01 and SCARLET 02 had numerous AAA, TTR, and uplink signals intermittently from the initial point (IP) through the bomb release (BRL). The cell was penetrating a heavy SAM environment and observed 15 missiles. SCARLET 03 was hit at approximately 3:43 AM local time and lost approximately 60 seconds from the target by a SAM probably fired from SAM site VN-004. Contributing factors to the loss of SCARLET

03 were cell separation and burn through. Three of the six crewmen were captured and held as POWs and were released in March 1973. The other three were listed as MIA. The remains of two of these three have since been recovered and repatriated to the United States. The fate of one remains undetermined. Three minutes later and two cells behind and slightly below SCARLET cell at 34,000 feet was BLUE cell. The crew in BLUE 01, a B-52D, tail number 55-0050 had flown on the first night of LINEBACKER II as ORANGE 03. ORANGE 03 was directly in front of ROSE 01 as it was shot down. In a briefing prior to takeoff on this mission the Aircraft Commander Lieutenant Colonel John Yuill received word that the crew of ROSE 01 had been captured. Learning that there was life after being shot down during a LINEBACKER II mission helped LtCol Yuill make a decision that would save his entire crew. As BLUE cell approached the target area it was engaged by six to seven SAMs. As the SAM hit the bottom of the aircraft a bailout signal was given. BLUE 01 was lost approximately thirty seconds prior to the bomb release point. The SAMs were probably launched from SAM site VN-243. BLUE 03 lost two E/F transmitters in its ECM equipment. Although BLUE 01's jamming tactics are not known, both BLUE 02 and BLUE 03 were employing maximum ECM against the TWS beams and both aircraft devoted three jammers apiece on the down-link frequency. BLUE cell was employing evasive maneuvers on the ingress route, all three aircraft maintained good cell integrity and were generally on the fragged track. Excessive evasive maneuvers and being within burn-through range of nine SAM sites at the time of the engagement were contributing factors to the loss of BLUE 01.

Day 5 - Dec. 22-23, 1972

On the fifth day of Operation LINEBACKER II B-52's did not strike targets in Hanoi. Their focus was more like a LINEBACKER I mission repeat from April of 1972. All the targets selected for B-52 strikes were in the Haiphong area. All the aircraft were from the 307th Strategic Wing out of U-Tapao, Thailand. Planners for the mission devised a route where 30 B-52Ds would bomb two targets in the Haiphong area. Twelve B-52Ds were targeted against the Haiphong railway side tracks. The remaining eighteen bombers struck the Haiphong Petroleum Products Storage facilities.

The B-52s approached Haiphong with a westerly heading from over the Gulf of Tonkin. After bombing their targets they exited the area again over the Gulf of Tonkin. To confuse the Vietnamese the B-52s entered the target area from six different directions crossing the coastline south of Haiphong. None of the routes indicated where their possible target may be. To the Vietnamese it appeared that the B-52s were heading on into Hanoi. At approximately 30 miles south of their intended bomb release points the cells of B-52s turned north and headed to their intended targets in the Haiphong area. Chaff had been effectively laid by 16 F-4 chaff bombers over the intended trek of the B-52s about ten minutes before the BUFFs arrived over their targets. Twenty SAMs were fired into the attacking force. None of the SAMs hit any of the B-52s. Day 5 marks the second day that no B-52s were damaged or lost.

Day 6 - Dec. 23-24, 1972

By December 23, 1972 foul weather had set in over Thailand. Problems in communication had developed between the Strategic Air Command and the Tactical Air Command. Uncertainty arose over rendezvous location of KC-135 tankers to refuel the TAC fighters and other escort planes. By the time all these problems had been resolved the Tacair forces were not able to catch up with the B-52s in time to cover their approaches to their intended targets. Hanoi could once again sleep in this evening. Targets selected for B-52 strikes were far to the north of both Hanoi and Haiphong. Scheduled targets included the Lang Dang rail yards just 18 miles from the Chinese boarder and three nearby Vietnamese SAM sites VN 660, VN537, and VN 900. Flying accuracy was of the essence. If the B-52s drifted too far north they would violate Chinese airspace. This could have developed into something nasty had it happened.

On Day 6 of Operation LINEBACKER II 18 B-52Ds from U-Tapao were joined by 12 B52Ds from Andersen over the Gulf of Tonkin flying in a northwest direction. Plans were for the B-52s to turn more toward the northwest and head inland over their targets. To confuse the Vietnamese who operated the SAM sites the B-52s would drop 2,000 feet in altitude just prior to releasing its ordinance. After releasing their bombs they would change altitude again. The cells of bomber that struck SAM sites would delay their post target turn until the other B-52s had completed theirs. This insured that all the B-52s were not in a turn at the same time and maximized the combined use of the ECM equipment of the B-52s. After bomb release the B52s exited the target area in a southeasterly direction and headed back out over the Gulf of Tonkin.

The Vietnamese were caught by total surprise. They had no expectations that the United States would bring the B-52s that close to the Chinese boarder. Only four SAMs were fired at the B-52s none of which caused any damage. The B-52s were in an out of Lang Dang rail yards within sixteen minutes. Usually the Vietnamese could predict a B-52 attack by the presents of Tacair forces prior to the attack. MiGs were scrambled and vectored to the B-52s. It was reported that two of the B-52 cells were fired upon by air-to-air missiles from the MiGs. None of which reached their targets. On Day 6 again no B-52s were lost or damaged.

Day 7 - Dec. 24, 1972

Christmas Eve 1972--for the past seven nights the United States had sent its B-52 bombers over North Vietnam. A majority of the 405 sorties flown as of December 24, 1972 had been concentrated on military targets in Vietnam's capitol city of Hanoi. The first three evenings of Operation LINEBACKER II nine B-52s had been shot down with another five B-52s damaged by the 114 Soviet made SA-2 Surface-to-Air missiles (SAMS) launched at the fleet. After the third evening, targets in Hanoi was avoided in hopes to prevent further aircraft losses, preserve B-52 crewmen's lives, and raise crew moral. Missions flown on the previous three nights seem to be doing all three. No B-52s had been shotdown or damaged since the early morning hours of December 22, 1972. Missions to be flown on the evening of December 24, 1972 were scheduled following these same tactics. The 307th Strategic Wing at U-Tapao, Thailand provided the 30 B-52Ds necessary to carry out the mission. Twelve B-52Ds were would be the Kep rail yards and the eighteen other B-52Ds would bomb the Thai Nguyen rail yards. Each of these targets were located about forty miles north of Hanoi. Mission plans called for the bomber force to separate, approach the target from multiple directions, and fly at different altitudes while over the target areas. By striking the rail yards, crippled Hanoi's efforts to resupply SAM missiles to their air defense forces. Hanoi was running out of SAM missiles.

The Vietnamese were again caught by surprise. MiGs were scrambled to attack the B-52s. Two cells of B-52s were threatened by a MiG. On December 24, 1972, Airman First Class Albert Moore, the aerial gunner onboard RUBY 03 engaged one of the MiGs and shot it down as it closed within 2,000 yards of his aircraft. This was the second MiG shot down by a B-52 during combat. PURPLE 02, a B-52D, tail number 5051, experienced AAA flak from its initial point (IP) to its bomb release point (BRL) for about five seconds causing only minor damage. Damage to the aircraft was discovered upon completion of the mission after landing safely back at U-Tapao.

Dec. 25, 1972

President Nixon had ordered that bombing of targets in North Vietnam be halted for a period of 36 hours beginning at midnight (Washington DC time). All B-52 missions throughout Vietnam were discontinued.

The purpose of this bombing halt was to allow mission planners to review the events so far, give the B-52 crews some rest, and prepare the aircraft for the mission on December 26, 1972. The North Vietnamese used the opportunity of the bombing halt to restock their dwindling supply of Surface to Air missiles. As Operation LINEBACKER II continued on December 26, 1972 a new bombing plan was put into action. The biggest ever B-52 formation, 120 B-52s, 72 of which were targeted against Hanoi, and the remaining 48, B-52's seeking targets in the Haiphong area. The mission was designed as one massive assault of the entire 120 plane bomber force. The B-52's would deliver their bombs at the simultaneously on 10 different targets in the Hanoi-Hiaphong area. All aircraft would be drop their ordinance within a 15 minute timeframe. In order to do this tactics used during the last three days of the operation were incorporated into the plan.