Hate Crimes
taining that law’s existence is, ultimately, a matter of
social fact and hence susceptible of empirical inquiry.
Second, therefore, in elucidating the nature of law
as a social institution, Hart arguably provides precisely
the sort of legal theory which social scientists need in
incorporating law into broader social analyses. In his
insistence on the structural continuity between legal
and other social rules yet on law’s distinctive mode of
institutionalization, Hart provides a vision that is at
once analytically well delineated yet relatively modest
in terms of its substantive assumptions. Hence, the
feature of his theory which might at first sight seem
least sympathetic from a social science point of
view—its pretension to provide a universal theory of
law—may in fact be argued to be one of its strengths.
For it provides a clear model for the purposes of
testing hypotheses about, for example, the relationship
between legal and other forms of social authority. This
idea of his concept of law as, at root, a social science
model is backed up by his own insistence, in terms
reminiscent of Weber (though, in a significant am-
biguity, also of Aristotle), that he is delineating a
‘central case’ with reference to which other, ‘penum-
bral’ cases can be identified and analyzed rather than
‘banished to another discipline.’
Third, in his insistence on the internal aspect of
rules, and hence on the idea that the social phenom-
enon of law can only be understood by reference to the
attitudes and understandings of the agents who are its
subjects, Hart’s thinking meshed with a cluster of
theoretical developments in disciplines such as so-
ciology and anthropology. In this respect, his theory is
a vast step forward from the cruder empiricism of the
nineteenth-century positivists. Although it is not
something with which Hart himself was centrally
concerned, this feature of his method undoubtedly
opens up the possibility of an analysis of the symbolic
aspects of legal power and authority such as would be
central to any adequate social science account of legal
practices. In his emphasis on the importance of
linguistic usage, moreover, his ideas relate, albeit
obliquely, to the so-called ‘linguistic turn’ in much
social theory of the late twentieth century.
Finally, in his revival of the utilitarian tradition of
systematic critique of law and argument for its reform,
Hart provided an example of the way in which
conceptual analysis can be marshaled in aid of social
policy. Clear thinking and reason—Hart’s deepest
intellectual commitments—are used, in an apparently
modest and sometimes painstaking way, to clear the
confusion in social and political debate, opening up in
often unexpected ways paths forward in the devel-
opment of policy and the construction of social
consensus. Though Hart’s own work is surprisingly
little concerned with empirical—social, psychological,
economic—evidence, his arguments often serve to
clarify the relevance of just this sort of social science
data. Though the fulcrum of his work lay firmly at the
analytical–philosophic rather than the descriptive–
sociological end of the spectrum, he can, therefore,
justly claim a place among those whose thinking has
made a significant contribution to the social and
behavioral sciences.
Bibliography
Bayles M D 1992 Hart’s Legal Philosophy. Kluwer, Dordrecht,
The Netherlands
Gavison R (ed.) 1987 Issues in Contemporary Legal Philosophy:
The Influence of H. L. A. Hart. Clarendon Press, Oxford, UK
Hacker P M S, Raz J (eds.) 1997 Law, Morality and Society:
Essays in Honour of H. L. A. Hart. Clarendon Press, Oxford,
UK
Hart H L A 1955 Are there any natural rights? The Philosophical
Re
iew 64: 175–91
Hart H L A 1961\1994 The Concept of Law, 2nd edn. Clarendon
Press, Oxford, UK
Hart H L A 1963 Law, Liberty and Morality. Stanford Uni-
versity Press, Stanford, CA
Hart H L A 1965 The Morality of the Criminal Law. Oxford
University Press, Oxford, UK
Hart H L A 1968 Punishment and Responsibility. Clarendon
Press, Oxford, UK
Hart H L A 1982 Essays on Bentham. Clarendon Press, Oxford,
UK
Hart H L A 1983 Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy.
Clarendon Press, Oxford, UK
Hart H L A, Honore! A M 1959\1985 Causation in the Law, 2nd
edn. Clarendon Press, Oxford, UK
MacCormick N 1981 H. L. A. Hart. Edward Arnold, London
Martin M 1987 The Legal Philosophy of H. L. A. Hart. Temple
University Press, Philadelphia, PA
Mill J S 1859\1974 On Liberty. Penguin, Harmondsworth, UK
N. Lacey
Hate Crimes
1. What is a Hate Crime?
There is no universally accepted definition of what
precisely constitutes a hate crime, nor agreement as to
the precise conceptual boundaries that delimit hate
crimes from mundane crimes. The sole factor stressed
uniformly is the motivation of the perpetrator. In hate
crimes the principal motivation is one of negative
affect (animus) toward the victim because of his or her
skin color, ethnicity, religion, sex, national origin, or
sexual orientation, for example. It is this animus that
drives the criminal behavior rather than more common
motives of pecuniary gain, retribution, jealousy, or
status seeking. Thus, any crime may become a hate
crime if the perpetrator’s motivation is animus toward
the victim based on some socially constructed cate-
gory.
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Hate Crimes

Some care must be taken to differentiate two In sum, hate crimes can range from killing of
seemingly related circumstances: (a) situations where genocidal proportions perpetrated by a nation state to
the fundamental cause of the behavior is hatred; and verbal harassment by a single actor. They are frequent
(b) situations where hatred is coincident, with the in human societies globally.
primary motivation being something other than
hatred. Presumably, it is only a true hate crime if the
former condition exists. In other words, having ex- 2. Why Hate Crime?
treme negative affect founded on skin color, ethnicity,
Most theories of hate crime involve, implicitly or
religion, sex, national origin, or sexual orientation is
explicitly, the notion of ‘threat’: that hate crime
both a necessary and sufficient condition for a hate
perpetrators perceive members of the target group as
crime.
representing danger or peril to their life chances,
In terms of behavior, hate crimes range from spray-
lifestyles, social status, or belief systems. This threat
paint vandalism and verbal harassment to physical
does not have to be ‘real’ in any demonstratively
assault and murder. The perpetrators may be single
physical sense—it only needs to be thought to be real
individuals, organized or unorganized groups, or
to motivate some persons to commit crimes of hate.
entire nation-states. Similarly, the victims may be
Macropolitico-economic theories emphasize the im-
solitary individuals, small groups, or large aggregates
portance of large-scale changes in the economic,
of human population. In fact, a hate-crime universe
political, or demographic arenas in generating ap-
can be conceptualized in terms of a three dimensional
parent threats to the status quo. Typically these
space: along one dimension is the degree of aggre-
theories postulate that social change brings uncer-
gation or organization of the perpetrator (ranging
tainty, disruption, and competition between dominant
from single persons to nation-states), along another
and emergent groups for economic standing or pol-
dimension is the degree of aggregation of victims
itical power. That contested terrain breeds fear and
(from single persons to nation-states), and the third
motivates some to strike out against members of the
dimension is the degree of severity (extending from
perceived threatening group. The effect of intergroup
vandalism to lethal sanctioning). Within this heuristic
competition (threat) seems to be especially pro-
model, behavior can be located as diverse as a sole
nounced when the target group is culturally dissimilar
actor desecrating a synagogue with swastikas, to
from the dominant one. This is a point emphasized by
nation-states with genocidal policies aimed at despised
cultural explanations of hate crime. Cultural theories
populations. Yet underlying each is the assumption
stress threats to traditional or dominant belief-syst-
that the primary motive is negative affect based on a
ems. Differences between the dominant culture and
socially constructed status such as race or religion.
the target group subculture are seen as incompatible, if
While the term hate crime, and the public notoriety
not totally hostile—the culture and belief systems of
it has received, has been particularly discernible during
the victim group may be viewed as contaminating the
the 1980s and 1990s, the phenomenon is far from
dominant culture and in that sense, representing a
recent and has long been a frequent factor in human
threat to the cultural status quo. It is quite likely, for
societies across the globe. This century alone has
example, that the hate crime directed at guest workers,
witnessed the genocide of Christian Armenians at the
asylum seekers, and refugees in many counties was
hands of Muslim Turks (1915–18), the Nazi attempt
rooted in both the fear that new immigrants would
to exterminate European Jewry and the Roma, the
take jobs away or lower wages of the native labor force
mass murder of Vietnamese and Cham Muslims by the
and in the fear that a ‘foreign’ culture would fund-
Khmer Rouge in Cambodia in the 1970s, the 1994
amentally challenge traditional values and beliefs.
Hutus inspired genocide of Tutsis in Rwanda, and the
Serbian ‘ethnic cleansing’ of Muslims from Bosnia.
These are but a few examples of mass-hate crimes 3. Hate Crime and Hate Speech Laws
involving large numbers of perpetuators and with
their victims experiencing the most severe levels of Hate crime laws often take the form of sentence
sanctioning. Often, however, public attention has been enhancements to penalties for crimes motivated by
drawn to smaller-scale events involving fewer victims: animus. For illustration, in the United Kingdom the
for example, in 1991 skinheads in Hoyerswerda, 1998 Crime and Disorder Act provides that the
Germany attacked several Asians and fire-bombed a maximum sentence for common assault increase from
hostel used by asylum-seekers (similar attacks were 6 months to two years if the assault was racially
made on immigrants and refugees in many, if not motivated. In the USA, the vast majority of states
most, Western European countries during the 1980s have enacted legislation providing for sentence en-
and 1990s)—the burning of some African-American hancements for some hate crimes (but not others). At
churches in the American South during the early the federal level, the Hate Crimes Sentencing En-
1990s—or the 1998 lynching of James Byrd Jr, a 49- hancement Act of 1994 increased sentencing by about
year old African-American in Texas by three white one-third when a crime is proven to have been hate
supremacists. motivated and occurred on federal property.

6480

In many countries, hate speech, as well as hate
crime, is criminalized. In the UK, speech or writings
that may provoke racial animosity are prohibited by
the Public Order Act. Similarly, Section 319 of the
Criminal Code of Canada prohibits deliberately in-
citing or promoting ‘hatred against any identifiable
group.’ There are comparable provisions in the crimi-
nal codes of Austria, Poland, Sweden, France, and
Ireland. The Indian penal code not only criminalizes
racial and religious-hate speech but caste-hate speech
as well. In Germany it is illegal to incite violence or
racial hatred against groups or minorities, and it is a
crime to deny the Holocaust. Likewise, 1995 laws in
both Switzerland and Belgium prohibit denying or
defending genocide. There are no comparable laws
against hate speech in the USA, however.
4. Trends in Hate Crimes
There is considerable rhetoric by advocacy groups
that many countries are undergoing an unprecedented
wave of hate crime, yet there is little undisputed
empirical evidence supporting that claim. All authori-
ties acknowledge that existing data on hate crime are
fraught with errors, so any apparent rise in frequency
of hate crimes may be due to: (a) a more sensitized
public willing to report incidents of hate that had gone
previously unreported; (b) the media and advocacy
groups more frequently publicizing hate crimes; (c) an
actual increase in the incidence of hate crimes; or (d)
some combination of these. Where ‘official’ statistics
are offered, it is suspected that they too may be
seriously compromised because of under reporting of
hate incidents by victims, the reliance upon local
authorities to recognize and define an incident as a
hate crime, and changes and ambiguities in the
definition of what constitutes a hate crime. Given the
shortcomings of official hate crime data and the un-
known reliability and validity of anecdotal data
from advocacy groups, it would seem impossible to
state definitively whether hate crimes are actually
increasing in frequency, decreasing, or remaining the
same.
Given that caveat, what meager empirical data
exists suggests that in the USA the frequency of hate
crime incidents increased from the early 1990s until
1996, and has been declining since. In most of Western
Europe, the trend appears that hate crimes may have
become somewhat less frequent toward the end of the
1990s than they were earlier in the decade, with the
possible exception of the UK.
5. Victims of Hate Crimes
While time trend data on hate crimes are especially
problematic, a cross-sectional inspection of official
reports of hate crime can illuminate who were the
Hate Crimes
victims. In many European countries during the time
1970–2000, reported hate crime has targeted immi-
grants, refugees, asylum-seekers, and guest workers.
Additionally, there have been many attacks on Jewish
cemeteries and synagogues. In the USA, the situation
is somewhat different.
Based on hate crimes reported in 1998 by 10,730
local law-enforcement agencies covering a population
of 216,235 million, the US federal government cites
7,755 incidents of hate crime involving 9,722 victims.
Of these incidents, 56 percent involved race hatred,
and of those over two-thirds were anti-black. While
race-hatred incidents were the most common, inci-
dents of religious hatred were frequent, and 78 percent
of these incidents involved anti-Jewish activity. Re-
ports of sexual orientation bias were also common,
with 67 percent of these incidents targeted at male
homosexuals. Of all the hate crimes reported in 1998,
62 percent (4,832 incidents) were incidents that were
anti-black, anti-Jewish, or anti-gay male. Of those
offenses where the suspected offender’s race was
known, whites committed 76 percent of the hate crime
offenses.
6. Consequences of Hate Crimes
Being a victim of virtually any crime extracts a definite
psychological toll, but there is some evidence that the
emotional mark of hate crimes may be more severe
and longer lasting than the impact of normal (nonhate
motivated) crime. Furthermore, some argue that when
one member of the targeted group is victimized by hate
crime, then all members of the group are adversely
affected—that is, the negative effect of hate crime
permeates the victim community more thoroughly
than other forms of victimization. Because of the very
nature of hate-motivated crime, a poignant and
unmistakable message is delivered to both the victim
and his or her community.
See also: Disgust, Psychology of; Genocide: Anthro-
pological Aspects; Genocide: Historical Aspects;
Heterosexism and Homophobia; Mass Killings and
Genocide, Psychology of; Personality and Crime;
Racism, History of; Racism, Sociology of; Religion:
Morality and Social Control; Religion: Peace, War,
and Violence; Religious Fundamentalism: Cultural
Concerns; Social Trauma; Violence and Media; Vio-
lence: Public; Xenophobia
Bibliography
Berk R A 1994 What is a hate crime? In: Hamm M S (ed.) Hate
Crime: International Perspecti
es on Causes and Control.
Anderson, Cincinnati, OH, pp. v–ix
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Hate Crimes
Grimshaw A D 1999 Genocide and democide. In: Kurtz L,
Turpin J (eds.) Encyclopedia of Violence, Peace, and Conflict.
Academic Press, San Diego, Vol. 2, pp. 53–74
Hamm M S 1994 Conceptualizing hate crime in a global context.
In: Hamm M S (ed.) Hate Crime: International Perspecti
es on
Causes and Control. Anderson, Cincinnati, OH, pp. 173–94
Jones T D 1998 Human Rights: Group Defamation, Freedom of
Expression and the Law of Nations. Martinus Nijhoff, The
Netherlands
Myra H I (ed.) 2000 Ethnic Violence. Greenhaven, San Diego
Jacobs J B, Potter K 1998 Hate Crimes: Criminal Law and
Identity Politics. Oxford University Press, New York
Kelly R J, Maghan J 1998 Introduction. In: J Maghan R J,
Maghan J (eds.) Hate Crime: The Global Politics of Polariz-
ation. Southern Illinois University Press, Carbondale, IL,
pp. 1–21
Lawrence F M 1999 Punishing Hate: Bias Crimes under Ameri-
can Law. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA
Witte R 1995 Racist violence in Western Europe. New Com-
munity 21: 489–500
E. M. Beck
Copyright # 2001 Elsevier Science Ltd.
All rights reserved.
Hayek, Friedrich A von (1899–1996)
Friedrich von Hayek is regarded generally as the most
influential intellectual figure in the twentieth-century
revival of classical liberalism (Kukathas 1990) and as
the most articulate critic of socialist doctrines
(Caldwell 1997). He also deserves recognition as one
of the preeminent social philosophers of that century.
In an age of increasing specialization within the social
sciences and the humanities, he developed an approach
to social analysis and social reform that integrates
insights from economics, law, politics, philosophy,
psychology, and evolutionary theory into an impres-
sively coherent outlook at the foundations and the
evolution of social order. Hayek’s scholarly writings
span more than six decades and include numerous
books and articles, republished in a 19-volume edition
of his collected works (Hayek 1988).
1. Biography
Hayek was born in Vienna on 8 May, 1899. He earned
doctorates in law (1921) and in political economy
(1923) at the University of Vienna, where he became
Pri
atdozent for Political Economy in 1929. Inter-
rupted by a year of study in New York (1923–4) he
worked from 1921–6 as a legal consultant in a
government office in Vienna, directed by his mentor
Ludwig von Mises, in whose famous Pri
atseminar he
participated and with whom he founded, in 1927, the
Austrian Institute for Business Cycle Research, of
which he was director until 1931. A series of invited
lectures that Hayek gave at the London School of
6482
International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences
Economics (LSE) in 1931 led to his appointment to
the Tooke Chair of Economic Science and Statistics at
the LSE, a position Hayek held from 1932 to 1950, the
year he was appointed Professor of Social and Moral
Sciences at the University of Chicago’s Committee on
Social Thought. After retiring from Chicago in 1962
he taught as Professor of Economic Policy at the
University of Freiburg, Germany, until 1967. An
honorary professorship at the University of Salzburg
from 1969 to 1974 brought Hayek back to his native
Austria. In 1977 he returned as professor emeritus to
Freiburg where he died on 23 March, 1992. In 1974
Hayek was awarded the Nobel Prize in Economics.
2. Hayek’s Social Philosophy
About his personal development Hayek (1967, p. 91)
has said that he was led ‘from technical economics
into all kinds of questions usually regarded as philo-
sophical.’ It was his early work on monetary theory,
capital theory, and business cycle theory that earned
him his appointment at the LSE, and it was about
these themes that he engaged in controversies with
John Maynard Keynes, Piero Sraffa and Frank H.
Knight in the early 1930s. An important turning point
in his scholarly interests is marked by his work, in the
mid-1930s, on an English edition of selected contri-
butions to the ‘socialist calculation debate,’ including
Mises’ early (1920) article on the subject (Hayek 1935).
As Hayek has noted in retrospect, in preparing this
edition he began to develop his growing interest in
questions of the nature and unavoidable limitations of
our knowledge, and in the issue of what these
limitations imply for our theoretical efforts at under-
standing the social world as well as for our practical
efforts at organizing our social life. The concern with
these questions, often referred to as the ‘knowledge
problem,’ was to become the core theme of Hayek’s
life work.
In Hayek’s own assessment, the critical step in his
move towards social philosophy was his 1937 article
on ‘Economics and Knowledge’ (1948, Chap. 2), an
article in which Hayek addressed what he describes as
the ‘central question of all social sciences,’ the question
of how the fragments of imperfect knowledge that
exist dispersed in individual minds are coordinated in
the social process to allow for productive cooperation
among multitudes of persons. With his 1945 article on
‘The Use of Knowledge in Society’ (1948, Chap. 4), his
most often cited publication, Hayek restated and
extended his earlier argument, stressing that the
‘problem of what is the best way of utilizing knowledge
initially dispersed among all the people is at least one
of the main problems of economic policy—or of
designing an efficient economic system’ (1948, p. 78).
In these two articles, which he considered his most
ISBN: 0-08-043076-7