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2. Who can ask for legal separation FC 55, compare with NCC 99 Art. 55.

A petition for legal separation may be filed on any of the following grounds: (1) Repeated physical violence or grossly abusive conduct directed against the petitioner, a common child, or a child of the petitioner; (2) Physical violence or moral pressure to compel the petitioner to change religious or political affiliation; (3) Attempt of respondent to corrupt or induce the petitioner, a common child, or a child of the petitioner, to engage in prostitution, or connivance in such corruption or inducement; (4) Final judgment sentencing the respondent to imprisonment of more than six years, even if pardoned; (5) Drug addiction or habitual alcoholism of the respondent; (6) Lesbianism or homosexuality of the respondent; (7) Contracting by the respondent of a subsequent bigamous marriage, whether in the Philippines or abroad; (8) Sexual infidelity or perversion; (9) Attempt by the respondent against the life of the petitioner; or (10) Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable cause for more than one year. For purposes of this Article, the term "child" shall include a child by nature or by adoption. Art. 99. No person shall be entitled to a legal separation who has not resided in the Philippines for one year prior to the filing of the petition, unless the cause for the legal separation has taken place within the territory of this Republic. 3. When may petition be filed FC 57, compare with NCC 102, NCC 99 Art. 57. An action for legal separation shall be filed within five years from the time of the occurrence of the cause. Art. 102. An action for legal separation cannot be filed except within one year from and after the date on which the plaintiff became cognizant of the cause and within five years from and after the date when such cause occurred. (4a, Act 2710) Art. 99. The absolute community terminates: (1) Upon the death of either spouse; (2) When there is a decree of legal separation; (3) When the marriage is annulled or declared void; or

(4) In case of judicial separation of property during the marriage under Articles 134 to 138. (175a)

Lapuz v. Eufemio August 18, 1953: Camen Lapuz Sy filed a petition for legal separation against Eufeimo S. Eufemio, alleging: September 21, 1934: Civil Marriage September 30, 1934: Canon Marriage Lived together until 1943 when Eufemio abandoned Lapuz No children Lapuz found out Eufemio was cohabiting with Go Hiok on or about March 1949 Prayed for issuance of legal partnership and that Eufemio should be deprived of his share of the conjugal partnership of profits Eufemios answer: Declaration of nullity ab initio of his marriage with Lapuz on the ground of his prior and subsisting marriage, celebrated according to Chinese law and customs with Go Hiok alias Ngo Hiok During pendency of case, Lapuz died in a vehicular accident (May 31, 1969) June 9, 1969: Eufemio moved to dismiss petition for legal separation on 2 grounds: that the petition for legal separation was filed beyond the one-year period provided for in Article 102 of the Civil Code; and that the death of Carmen abated the action for legal separation. June 26, 1969: Counsel for Lapuz moved to substitute the deceased by her father, Macario July 29, 1969: Court dismissed the case Carmen Lapuzs cause of action has not survived Did not act on the motion for substitution Eufemio acquiesced in the dismissal of said counterclaims by praying for the affirmance of the order that dismissed not only the petition for legal separation but also his counterclaim to declare the Eufemio-Lapuz marriage to be null and void ab initio. ISSUE: WON death of the plaintiff before final decree, in an action for legal separation, abate the action? If it does, WON abatement also applies if the action involves property rights? HELD: (1) YES, - action for legal separation is purely personal (1) made by innocent spouse (2) can still stop proceedings if they reconcile - the death of one party to the action causes the death of the action itself (2) YES - solely the effect of the decree of legal separation; hence, they can not survive the death of the plaintiff if it occurs prior to the decree o Art 106 of civil code provides for rights and disabilities that, by the very terms of the Civil Code article, are vested exclusively in the persons of the spouses thus cannot be transferred to anyone after their death o rights are mere effects of decree of separation, their source being the decree itself; without the decree such rights do not come into existence, so that before the finality of a decree, these claims are merely rights in expectation. - enumeration of the actions that survive for or against administrators in Section 1, Rule 87, of the Revised Rules of Court do not enumerate actions for legal separation

or for annulment of marriage - even actions of bigamy, when one has died all actions cease. o the action for annulment should be brought during the lifetime of any one of the parties involved questions of property are now carried out not in nullity of marriage proceedings but intestate proceedings. Matubis v. Praxedes 109 Phil 789 Facts: Socorro MatubisZoilo Praxedes (1/10/43). But from 5/30/44 they lived separately from each other. They had an agreement on4/3/48 where: They relinquish their rights over each other as h & w That they cannot prosecute each other for concubinage or adultery (condonation) That each is no longer entitled to support from the other spouse Neither can claim anything from each other On Jan 1955, Zoilo cohabited with Asuncion Rebulado who gave birth on Sept. 1955 and recorded as Zoilos. they also publicly appeared as h&w. Socorro then filed on 4/24/56 @CFI CamSur for legsep and change of surname against husband due to abandonment and concubinage. TC declared that Zoilos acts constitutes concubinage but dismissed complaint due to: CC 102 said action for legsep can only be filed a year after such grounds have arisen. Socorro said to have known cohab of Zoilo since Jan 1955 but action was filed on 4/24/56 which was outside reglementary period CC 100 legsep can be invoked by innocent spouse, i.e. that there was no condonation. But agreement b/w Zoilo and Socorro showed that there was condonation (Exhibit B of their agreement) Therefore this petition. ISSUE: WON TC erred in saying that petitioner filed her case for legal separation out of time and cannot claim it since she is not an innocent spouse HELD: YES - knew of legal separation on Jan 1955 but only made the complaint on April 24, 1956 o Art 102 of NCC provides for time one can file for legal separation - As shown in the agreement she condoned and consented to (1) living separately (2) can commit grounds for legal separation ie concubinage Condonation and consent are expressed thus cannot claim to be innocent spouse which law provides for (NCC 100) 4. Court procedure in legal separation FC 58-60; Sec 19, RA 9262 A.M. No. 02-11-11-SC. March 4, 2003 Art. 58. An action for legal separation shall in no case be tried before six months shall have elapsed since the filing of the petition. (103)

Art. 59. No legal separation may be decreed unless the Court has taken steps toward the reconciliation of the spouses and is fully satisfied, despite such efforts, that reconciliation is highly improbable. (n) Art. 60. No decree of legal separation shall be based upon a stipulation of facts or a confession of judgment.

Sec 19, RA 9262 FC 58 says that no action for legal will be tried before 6 months after the filing of petition (6 months cooling off period) Sec 19, RA 9262 says that when violence is alleged as reason for legal separation, we need not wait for six months. trial will start immediately A.M. No. 02-11-11-SC (Sec2): A petition for legal separation may be filed only by the husband or the wife, as the case may be within five years from the time of the occurrence of any of the following causes... (Sec6): Investigation Report of Public Prosecutor. - ... the public prosecutor shall submit a report to the court on whether the parties are in collusion... if the court finds collusion, petition is dismissed (Sec13): Prohibited compromise. -no compromise on the ff. (1) The civil status of persons; (2) The validity of a marriage or of a legal separation; (3) Any ground for legal separation; (4) Future support; (5) The jurisdiction of courts; and (6) Future legitime. Araneta vs Concepcion 99 Phil 709 FACTS: 1) Petitioner filed action against his wife for legal sep ground: adultery 2) Defendant filed an omnibus petition to secure custody of their three minor children, a monthly support of P5000 for herself and said children and the return of her passport to enjoin plaintiff from ordering his hirelings from harassing and molesting her as well as pay for attorneys fees 3) Plaintiff denied misconduct imputed to him and alleging that defendant has abandoned the childrenconjugal properties were worth only P80,000 - contends defendant is not entitled to the custody of the children as she has abandoned them and had committed adultery, that by her conduct she had become unfit to educate her children, being unstable in her emotions and unable to give the children to love, respect and care of a true mother and w/o means to educate them CFI: granted custody of the children to defendant and a monthly allowance of P2300 for support for her and the children, P300 for a house and P2000 as attorneys fees; reconsideration denied DECISION OF SC; Writ prayed for is ISSUED and the respondent judge or whosoever takes his place is ordered to proceed on the question of custody and support pendent elite in accordance with this opinion. The ocurts order fixing the alimony and requiring payment is REVERSED

RATIO: 1) main reason given by judge for refusing plaintiffs request that evidence be allowed to be introduced: art 103 of CC6 months allowancecooling off period 2) provision of code is mandatorycourt understands that the introduction of any evidence, be it on the merits of the case or on any incident, is prohibitedstatus quo to be preserved for this time 3) it may be noted that since 6 mos have elapsed since the filing of the petition may not be allowedreasons for granting the preliminary injunction should be given tat the scope of the art cited may be explained 4) cooling off period to make possible a reconciliation 5) but this practical expedient, necessary to carry out legislative policy does not have the effect of overriding other provisions such as the determination of the custody of children and alimony and support pendent elite according to the circumstances 6) the law expressly enjoins that these should be determined by the court according to the circumstances, if these are ignored or the courts close their eyes to actual facts, rank in justice may be casued 7) allegations of adultery letter of authenticity as evidenceabandonment of conjugal abodeevidence of all these disputed allegations should be allowed that the discretion of the court as to the custody and alimony pendent elite may be lawfully exercised 8) the rule is that all the provisions of the law even if apparenty contradictory, should be allowed to stand and given effect by reconciling them if necessary 9) thus determination of custody and alimony should be given effect and force provided it does not go to the extent of violating the policy of the cooling off period evidence not affecting the casue of the separation, like the actual custody of children, the means conducive to their welfare and convenience during the pendency of the case, these should be allowed that the court may determine which is best for their custody Ocampo v Florenciano 107 Phil 35 - 1938 - marriage - 1951 - plaintiff discovered on several occasions that his wife maintaining illicit relations with Jose Arcalas - June 1951 - sent her to Manila study beauty culture, where she stayed for one year; - 1952 - defendant had finished studying her course, she left plaintiff and since then they had lived separately - June 18, 1955 - wife in the act of having illicit relations with another man by the name of Nelson Orzame; signified his intention of filing a petition for legal separation, to which defendant manifested her conformity provided she is not charged with adultery in a criminal action - July 5, 1955 - the complaint for legal separation was filed ISSUE: WON husband can file for legal separation based on adultery when (1) wife confessed to the adultery (2) did not actively search for wife when she left conjugal home HELD: YES on both instances - 1. what is prohibited is using ONLY the confession as grounds for legal separation since this may be evidence of collusion between the two. However in this case, there is strong evidence other than the confession to prove the adultery of the wife o def of collusion: the agreement between husband and wife for one

of them to commit, or to appear to commit, or to be represented in court as having committed, a matrimonial offense, or to suppress evidence of a valid defense, for the purpose of enabling the other to obtain a divorce. This agreement, if not express, may be implied from the acts of the parties. It is a ground for denying the divorce o merely prohibits a decree of separation upon a confession of judgment. Confession of judgment usually happens when the defendant appears in court and confesses the right of plaintiff to judgment or files a pleading expressly agreeing to the plaintiff's demand - 2. not his duty to search for her to bring her home. Hers was the obligation to return. o Wife was the one who left the husband. - Agreed with CA - his action was not filed within one year from March 1951 when plaintiff discovered her infidelity. But still pushed through with proceedings and reversed CAs decision Lapuz v. Eufemio August 18, 1953: Camen Lapuz Sy filed a petition for legal separation against Eufeimo S. Eufemio, alleging: September 21, 1934: Civil Marriage September 30, 1934: Canon Marriage Lived together until 1943 when Eufemio abandoned Lapuz No children Lapuz found out Eufemio was cohabiting with Go Hiok on or about March 1949 Prayed for issuance of legal partnership and that Eufemio should be deprived of his share of the conjugal partnership of profits Eufemios answer: Declaration of nullity ab initio of his marriage with Lapuz on the ground of his prior and subsisting marriage, celebrated according to Chinese law and customs with Go Hiok alias Ngo Hiok During pendency of case, Lapuz died in a vehicular accident (May 31, 1969) June 9, 1969: Eufemio moved to dismiss petition for legal separation on 2 grounds: that the petition for legal separation was filed beyond the one-year period provided for in Article 102 of the Civil Code; and that the death of Carmen abated the action for legal separation. June 26, 1969: Counsel for Lapuz moved to substitute the deceased by her father, Macario July 29, 1969: Court dismissed the case Carmen Lapuzs cause of action has not survived Did not act on the motion for substitution Eufemio acquiesced in the dismissal of said counterclaims by praying for the affirmance of the order that dismissed not only the petition for legal separation but also his counterclaim to declare the Eufemio-Lapuz marriage to be null and void ab initio. ISSUE: WON death of the plaintiff before final decree, in an action for legal separation, abate the action? If it does, WON abatement also applies if the action involves property rights? HELD: (1) YES, - action for legal separation is purely personal (1) made by innocent spouse (2) can still stop proceedings if they reconcile - the death of one party to the action causes the death of the action itself (2) YES

- solely the effect of the decree of legal separation; hence, they can not survive the death of the plaintiff if it occurs prior to the decree o Art 106 of civil code provides for rights and disabilities that, by the very terms of the Civil Code article, are vested exclusively in the persons of the spouses thus cannot be transferred to anyone after their death o rights are mere effects of decree of separation, their source being the decree itself; without the decree such rights do not come into existence, so that before the finality of a decree, these claims are merely rights in expectation. - enumeration of the actions that survive for or against administrators in Section 1, Rule 87, of the Revised Rules of Court do not enumerate actions for legal separation or for annulment of marriage - even actions of bigamy, when one has died all actions cease. o the action for annulment should be brought during the lifetime of any one of the parties involved questions of property are now carried out not in nullity of marriage proceedings but intestate proceedings. Samosa vs Vamenta Jr. FACTS On June 18, 1971 petitioner Lucy Samosa filed for legsep forconcubinage and attempt against her life. She alsosought for writ of preliminary mandatory injunction forthe return to her of what she claimed to be herparaphernal and exclusive property (under admin andmanagement of priv resp). Clemente Ramos (privresp) opposed such saying that hearing the pet forinjunction would only make the prospect ofreconciliation dim.CFI Judge Vamenta Jr granted such motion tosuspend hearing on the injunction. And thus this certiorari. ISSUE: WON preliminary mandatory injunctionapplied for as an ancillary remedy on exclusiveproperty of wife that is currently being administered byher husband can be tried in court even before the 6-month period allotted in cases of legal separation HELD: YES - Article 103 the Civil Code is not an absolute bar to the hearing motion for preliminaryinjunction prior to the expiration of the six-month period. - Art 103 provides that in cases where court deems proper, it can appoint another tomanage property between husband and wife. In this case her paraphernal property Would show that it is not anaggravating circumstacnce to theprescribed 6-month period deemedas the cooling off periodIn any case, more than 6 months have alreadypassed thus court can hear both legal separtion andmandatory injunction. In any case, more than 6 months have alreadypassed thus court can hear both legal separtion andmandatory injunction. Pacete v. Cariaga 231 SCRA 321 Priv Resp Concepcion AlanisPetitioner Enrico Pacete on 4/30/38 which produced a daughter (Consuelo). Pacete contracted 2nd marriage in 1948 with Clarita de la Concepcion. She learned of such marriage only in 8/1/79. She averred that during their union, Pacete acquired vast properties (lands, fishponds, several motor vehicles), that he fraudulently placed several properties under his name or Claritas or children with Claritas, and other dummies.

On 10/29/79 Alanis filed @ CFI Cotabato for the dec of nullity of the marriage b/w Enrico and Clarita dela Concepcion as well s for their legal separation, accounting and separation of their properties. PAcete filed beyond the original period given. Plaintiff filed for motion to declare PAchete in default which the court granted. On 3/17/80 CFI Cotabato I decreed legsep of enrico and concepcion alanis and held marriage between clarita and enrico as null and void. ISSUE: WON petition for certiorari can rightfully be claimed by petitioner who missed the deadline for submission of answer. HELD: YES - As stated in Art 101, at the non-appearance of defendant the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to inquire whether or not a collusion between the parties exists. If there is no collusion, the prosecuting attorney shall intervene for the State in order to take care that the evidence for the plaintiff is not fabricated. o In this case there was no state intervention thus petition for certiorari is granted and proceedings before it are set aside o Need for state intervention and compliance with other statutory requirements when legal separation is filed for even when other remedies such as of land are attached to it. petition for certiorari is allowed when the default order is improperly declared, or even when it is properly declared, where grave abuse of discretion attended such declaration 5. Effect of pendency of the petition (a) cooling-off period, FC 58 (b) right of consortium, FC 61 par. 1 (c) administration of property, FC 61 par. 2 Art. 58. An action for legal separation shall in no case be tried before six months shall have elapsed since the filing of the petition. Art. 61. After the filing of the petition for legal separation, the spouses shall be entitled to live separately from each other. The court, in the absence of a written agreement between the spouses, shall designate either of them or a third person to administer the absolute community or conjugal partnership property. The administrator appointed by the court shall have the same powers and duties as those of a guardian under the Rules of Court.

De Ia Via v. Villareal 41 Phil 13 Narcisa Geopano filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance: divorce; partition of the conjugal property, and alimony pendente lite in the sum of P400/month 1) adultery; husband ejected her from conjugal home and thus she established her residence in Iloilo, that she had no means of support and was only living at the expense of one of her daughters 2) preliminary injunction restraining her and prohibiting her husband from conjugal property since defendant was trying to alienate or encumber said property CFI granted preliminary injunction but respondent appealed claiming that CFI Iloilo has no jurisdiction since wife should follow his domicile and that the judge has

exceeded his power in granting the preliminary injunction. ISSUE: 1. WON a married woman ever acquire a residence or domicile separate from that of her husband during the existence of the marriage 2. WON the wife may obtain a preliminary injunction against the husband restraining and prohibiting him from alienating or encumbering any part of the conjugal property during the pendency of the action HELD: - 1. YES, when the husband has given enough reason for her to do so as example, cause of divorce. - The law will recognize a wife as having a separate existence, and separate interests, and separate rights, in those cases where the express object of all proceedings is to show that the relation itself ought to be dissolved - The law making the domicile of the husband that of the wife is applicable only to their relations with third parties, and has no application in cases of actual separation and controversy between themselves as to the temporary or permanent severance of the marriage ties by judicial proceedings 2. YES, in protection of her share in the property - Section 164 of Act No. 190 provides: - A preliminary injunction may be granted when it is established, in the manner hereinafter provided, to the satisfaction of the judge granting it: 1. That the plaintiff is entitled to the relief demanded and such relief, or any part thereof, consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the acts complained of either for a limited period or perpetually; 2. That the commission or continuance of some act complained of during the litigation would probably work injustice to the plaintiff; 3. That the defendant is doing, or threatens, on is about to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act probably in violation of the plaintiff's rights, respecting the subject of the action, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual. - is a logical and necessary incident of the general powers conferred upon Courts of First Instance - law making the husband the sole administrator of the property of the conjugal partnership is founded upon necessity and convenience as well as upon the presumption that, from the very nature of the relating between husband and wife, the former will promote and not injure the interests of the latter. when that relation ceases and, in a proper action, the wife seeks to dissolve the marriage and to partition the conjugal property, it is just and proper, in order to protect the interests of the wife, that the husband's power of administration be curtailed, during the pendency of the action, insofar as alienating or encumbering the conjugal property is concerned. - , if the defendant should dispose of all or any part of the conjugal property during the pendency of the action for divorce, and squander or fraudulently conceal the proceeds, that act "would probably work injustice to the plaintiff," or that it would probably be "in violation of the plaintiff's rights, respecting the subject of the action, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual RESULT: judge acted within his jurisdiction (d) Support and custody pendente lite FC 62 cf. FC 49, FC 198 Art. 62. During the pendency of the action for legal separation, the provisions of Article 49 shall likewise apply to the support of the spouses and the custody and support of the common children. Art. 49. During the pendency of the action and in the absence of adequate

provisions in a written agreement between the spouses, the Court shall provide for the support of the spouses and the custody and support of their common children. The Court shall give paramount consideration to the moral and material welfare of said children and their choice of the parent with whom they wish to remain as provided to in Title IX. It shall also provide for appropriate visitation rights of the other parent. (n) Art. 198. During the proceedings for legal separation or for annulment of marriage, and for declaration of nullity of marriage, the spouses and their children shall be supported from the properties of the absolute community or the conjugal partnership. After the final judgment granting the petition, the obligation of mutual support between the spouses ceases. However, in case of legal separation, the court may order that the guilty spouse shall give support to the innocent one, specifying the terms of such order. (292a) Araneta vs Concepcion 99 Phil 709 FACTS: 1) Petitioner filed action against his wife for legal sep ground: adultery 2) Defendant filed an omnibus petition to secure custody of their three minor children, a monthly support of P5000 for herself and said children and the return of her passport to enjoin plaintiff from ordering his hirelings from harassing and molesting her as well as pay for attorneys fees 3) Plaintiff denied misconduct imputed to him and alleging that defendant has abandoned the childrenconjugal properties were worth only P80,000 - contends defendant is not entitled to the custody of the children as she has abandoned them and had committed adultery, that by her conduct she had become unfit to educate her children, being unstable in her emotions and unable to give the children to love, respect and care of a true mother and w/o means to educate them CFI: granted custody of the children to defendant and a monthly allowance of P2300 for support for her and the children, P300 for a house and P2000 as attorneys fees; reconsideration denied DECISION OF SC; Writ prayed for is ISSUED and the respondent judge or whosoever takes his place is ordered to proceed on the question of custody and support pendent elite in accordance with this opinion. The ocurts order fixing the alimony and requiring payment is REVERSED RATIO: 1) main reason given by judge for refusing plaintiffs request that evidence be allowed to be introduced: art 103 of CC6 months allowancecooling off period 2) provision of code is mandatorycourt understands that the introduction of any evidence, be it on the merits of the case or on any incident, is prohibitedstatus quo to be preserved for this time 3) it may be noted that since 6 mos have elapsed since the filing of the petition may not be allowedreasons for granting the preliminary injunction should be given tat the scope of the art cited may be explained 4) cooling off period to make possible a reconciliation 5) but this practical expedient, necessary to carry out legislative policy does not have the effect of overriding other provisions such as the determination of the custody of children and alimony and support pendent elite according to the circumstances 6) the law expressly enjoins that these should be determined by the court according to the circumstances, if these are ignored or the courts close their eyes to actual

facts, rank in justice may be casued 7) allegations of adultery letter of authenticity as evidenceabandonment of conjugal abodeevidence of all these disputed allegations should be allowed that the discretion of the court as to the custody and alimony pendent elite may be lawfully exercised 8) the rule is that all the provisions of the law even if apparenty contradictory, should be allowed to stand and given effect by reconciling them if necessary 9) thus determination of custody and alimony should be given effect and force provided it does not go to the extent of violating the policy of the cooling off period evidence not affecting the casue of the separation, like the actual custody of children, the means conducive to their welfare and convenience during the pendency of the case, these should be allowed that the court may determine which is best for their custody

Art. 56. The petition for legal separation shall be denied on any of the following grounds: (1) Where the aggrieved party has condoned the offense or act complained of; (2) Where the aggrieved party has consented to the commission of the offense or act complained of; (3) Where there is connivance between the parties in the commission of the offense or act constituting the ground for legal separation; (4) Where both parties have given ground for legal separation; (5) Where there is collusion between the parties to obtain decree of legal separation; or

Lerma v. CA 61 SCRA 440 - May 1951 Lerma (P) and Diaz (R )get married - Aug 1969 P files a complaint for adultery vs. R and her lover Teodoro Ramirez - Nov 1969 R files for legal separation and / or separation of properties, custody of children and support pendente lite (during pendency of action) for youngest son, Gregory on the grounds of concubinage and attempt against her life CFI (1970) R is entitled to support pendente lite from the date of Rs filing the complaint, the amount would be a monthly support of Php 1, 820 - P raised the petition to the CA CA (1971) - initially issuing a preliminary injunction on the decision of the lower court to give the respondent the opportunity to present evidence to the lower court, the CA dismissed the petition after the respondent asked for a reconsideration saying that he were not asking for a chance to present evidence to the lower court CFI (1972) R and Ramirez are convicted of adultery, this decision was appealed to the CA - P files a new case of adultery against R and new lover, Manila policeman Jose Gochangco - P raises the petition against the giving support pendent elite to the SC, claiming, among others, that R did not ask for the enforcement of the CFI orders until he filed a second adultery charge against R ISSUE: WON respondent can still claim for support even though she has already been convicted of adultery HELD: NO - Adultery is recognized as a defense for support o CC Article 303 - obligation to give support shall cease "when the recipient, be he a forced heir or not, has committed some act which gives rise to disinheritance o CC 921 - one of the causes for disinheriting a spouse is "when the spouse has given cause for legal separation - If allowed one would only need to file a case of legal separation no matter how groundless in order to get support Mere filing would not set Art 292 of FC to action. Still preclude loss of such right in certain cases. 6. Defenses in actions for legal separation FC Article 56

(6) Where the action is barred by prescription. (100a) (a) Consent FC 56(2); NCC 100 Art. 56 (2) Where the aggrieved party has consented to the commission of the offense or act complained of;

Art. 100. The legal separation may be claimed only by the innocent spouse, provided there has been no condonation of or consent to the adultery or concubinage. Where both spouses are offenders, a legal separation cannot be claimed by either of them. Collusion between the parties to obtain legal separation shall cause the dismissal of the petition. (3a, Act No. 2710)

MARIANO vs SANSANO

Mariano Ventura and Ursula Sansano gotmarried and had a child. Shortly after that, Mariano disappeared to Cagayan and abandoned his family. Ventura left Sansano for 3 years without writing to her or sending support. Wife did not have any means of survival so she resorted to cohabiting with Marcelo Ramos.

1924: Mariano returned and filed for adultery, to whichboth Sansano and Ramos were sentenced. After conviction, Ursula begs for forgiveness and for Mariano to take her back.-The latter denied and told her to go do what she wants to do, so she returned to Ramos while he went to Hawaii and stayed there for 7 years. When Mariano returned back

to the Philippines he filed a second charge for adultery and filed a case for legal separation.

ISSUE: WON husband consented to adultery and therefore barred from action

HELD: YES. Because he gave wife freedom to do whatever she would like to do. Ventura consented to the adulterous relations of his wife. He is therefore barred from instituting a case for adultery. The solepurpose of filing the charge is to use it as a ground for legal separation.

People v. Schneckenberger 73 Phil 413 FACTS: 1) May 15, 1926: accused Rodolfo married the complainant Elena Ramirez Cartagena 2) After 7 years, agreed for reason of alleged incompatibility of character to live separately from each other 3) May 25, 1935: they executed documentagreement 4) June 15, 1935: accused w/o leaving the phils secured a divorce decree from civil court of Juarez, bravos dist of Chihuahua mexico 5) May 11, 1936: he contracted another marriage with co-accused Julia medel in the justice of peace court of malabon, rizal and lived together as husband and wife in manila 6) Because of the nullity of the divorce decree, complainant herein instituted two actions against the accused one for bigamy and another for concubinage CFI: first culminated in the conviction of accusedsentenced to a penalty of two months and one day of arresto mayor 7) on the trial for concubinage, accused interposed the plea of double jeopardy and the case was dismissed CA: the Court held that the dismissal before trial to be premature and without deciding the question of double jeopardy, remanded the case to the trial court for trial on the merits TC: accused was convicted of concubinage through reckless imprudence and sentenced to penalty of two months and one day of arresto mayor -this appeal DECISION OF SC; Judgment is reversed and the accused is ACQUITTED RATIO: 1) plea of double jeopardy, it need only be observed that the defense of bigamy for which he was convicted and that of concubinage for which he stood trial in the court are two distinct offenses in the law 2) BIGAMY: celebration of second marriage while the first is still existingoffense against civil status which may be prosecuted at the instance of the state 3) CONCUBINAGE: mere cohabitation by the husband with a woman who is not his wife; offense against chastity and may be prosecuted only at the instance of the offended party 4) DOUBLE JEOPARDY: test is not whether the defendant has already been tried for the same act, but whether he has been put in jeopardy for the same offense

5) the accused should have been acquitted of the crime of concubinage 6) the document executed by and between the accused and the complainant in which they agreed , while illegal for the purpose for which it was executed , constitutes nevertheless, a valid consent to the act of concubinage within the meaning of sec 344 of the RPC 7) there can be no doubt that by such agreement, each party clearly intended to forego the illicit acts of the other 8) consent bars the offended party from instituting a criminal prosecution in cases of adultery, concubinage, seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness given expressly or impliedly after the crime has been committed 9) PARDON: refers to the offense after its commission 10) CONSENT: refer to offense prior to its commission 11) Both means that offended party has chosen to compromise with his/her dishonor, he/she becomes unworthy to come to court and invoke its aid in the vindication of the wrong 12) Prior consent is as effective as subsequent consent to bar the offended aprty from prosecuting the offense If these is morally condemnatory in a situation of this character, the remedy lies not with the court but with the legislative dept of the govtwhat the law is, not what it should be, defines the limits of the courts authority (b) Condonation FC 56(1) Art. 56. The petition for legal separation shall be denied on any of the following grounds: (1) Where the aggrieved party has condoned the offense or act complained of; Ginez v. Bugayong 100 Phil 616 FACTS: August 27, 1949: Bugayong married Ginez Bugayong serviceman in the US Navy Bugayong began receiving letters from his sister-in-law informing him of alleged acts of infidelity of his wife October 1951: Bugayong sought the advice of Navy chaplain as to the propriety of a legal separation August 1952: Bugayong went to Pangasinan and sought for his wife Bugayong and Geniz proceeded to the house of Pedro Bugayong (cousin) and stayed and lived together for 2 nights and 1 day as husband and wife. They repaired Bugayongs house and again passed the night therein as husband and wife. 2nd day: Bugayong tried to verify from his wife the truth of the information he received that she had committed adultery. Instead of answering, Geniz packed up and left, which Bugayong took as a confirmation of the acts of infidelity imputed on her November 18, 1952: Bugayong filed a complaint for legal separation against Geniz Geniz vehemently denied the averments of the complaint Motion to dismiss on the following grounds: (1) Assuming arguendo the truth of the allegations of the commission of "acts of

rank infidelity amounting to adultery", the cause of action, if any, is barred by the statute of limitations; (2) That under the same assumption, the act charged have been condoned by the plaintiff-husband; and (3) That the complaint failed to state a cause of action sufficient for this court to render a valid judgment. Court ordered the dismissal of the case on the 2nd ground (condonation) Assignment of errors brought to CA: Premature dismissal of case; In finding that there were condonation on Bugayongs part; and in entertaining condonation as a ground for dismissal inasmuch as same was not raised in the answer or in a motion to dismiss. Case lifted to SC Question of law ISSUE: WON Act of sleeping with wife for two days was already a sign of condonation to the infidelity she allegedly committed HELD: YES - definition: conditional forgiveness or remission, by a husband or wife of a matrimonial offense which the latter has committed; forgiveness of a marital offense constituting a ground for legal separation o may be express or implied o US jurisprudence shows that one single act of sexual intercourse implies condonation condonation is implied from sexual intercourse after knowledge of the other infidelity. such acts necessary implied forgiveness. It is entirely consonant with reason and justice that if the wife freely consents to sexual intercourse after she has full knowledge of the husband's guilt, her consent should operate as a pardon of his wrong." - In this case slept with her for 2 nights and 1 day after almost ten months after he came to know of the acts of infidelity amounting to adultery. Thus falls under exemptions in Article 100 of NCC: The legal separation may be claimed only by the innocent spouse, provided there has been no condonation of or consent to the adultery or concubinage (c) Recrimination FC 56(4) (4) Where both parties have given ground for legal separation; Brown v. Yambao 102 Phil 168 FACTS: July 14, 1955: Brown filed suit for legal separation from Yambao Alleged under oath: While he interned by the Japanese invaders from 1942 5o 1945 at UST interment camp, Yambao engaged in adulterous relations with one Carlos Field of whom she begot a baby girl that Brown learned of his wifes misconduct only in 1945, upon his release from internment that thereafter the spouse lived separately and later executed a document liquidating their conjugal partnership and assigning certain properties to the erring wife as her share. Complaint prayed for confirmation of the liquidation agreement; for custody of the children; that the defendant be declared disqualified to succeed the plaintiff; and for their remedy as might be just and equitable. Court directed City Fiscal or his representatives to investigate (CC101)

Through the City Fiscals questioning, it was revealed that after liberation, Brown lived maritally with another woman and had begotten children by her Court denied petition for legal separation on the ground that while the wifes adultery was established, Brown had incurred in a misconduct of similar nature that barred his right of action under CC100 (Where both spouses are offenders, a legal separation cannot be claimed by either of them) that there had been consent and connivance Browns action had prescribed under CC 102 (An action for legal separation cannot be filed within one year from and after the date on which the plaintiff became cognizant of the cause and within 5 years from and after date when such cause occurred. ISSUE: WON findings of City Fiscal Rafael Jose that Brown lived with another woman after war and had children with her can stop him from legal separation proceedings HELD: YES Define collusion: the act of married persons in procuring a divorce by mutual consent, whether by preconcerted commission by one of a matrimonial offense, or by failure, in pursuance of agreement to defend divorce proceedings" - legitimate for the Fiscal to bring to light any circumstances that could give rise to the inference that the wife's default was calculated (emphasis of marriage as more than mere contract) o NCC Art 100 now bars him from filing legal separation since he is also guilty of concubinage o NCC Article 102 also bars him since he filed out of time. Brown did not petition for legal separation proceedings until ten years after he learned of his wife's adultery, which was upon his release from internment in 1945 can not be filed except within one (1) year from and after the plaintiff became cognizant of the cause and within five years from and after the date when such cause occurred (d) Collusion/Mutual Consent FC 60 FC 56(3), (5), compare with NCC 101 and 221(3) Art. 60. No decree of legal separation shall be based upon a stipulation of facts or a confession of judgment. In any case, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that the evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. Art 56 (3) Where there is connivance between the parties in the commission of the offense or act constituting the ground for legal separation; (5) Where there is collusion between the parties to obtain decree of legal separation; Art. 101. No decree of legal separation shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment. In case of non-appearance of the defendant, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to inquire whether or not a collusion between the parties exists. If there is no collusion, the prosecuting attorney shall intervene for the State in order to take care that the evidence for the plaintiff is not fabricated.

Art. 221. The following shall be void and of no effect: (3) Every collusion to obtain a decree of legal separation, or of annulment of marriage; Ocampo v Florenciano 107 Phil 35 - 1938 - marriage - 1951 - plaintiff discovered on several occasions that his wife maintaining illicit relations with Jose Arcalas - June 1951 - sent her to Manila study beauty culture, where she stayed for one year; - 1952 - defendant had finished studying her course, she left plaintiff and since then they had lived separately - June 18, 1955 - wife in the act of having illicit relations with another man by the name of Nelson Orzame; signified his intention of filing a petition for legal separation, to which defendant manifested her conformity provided she is not charged with adultery in a criminal action - July 5, 1955 - the complaint for legal separation was filed ISSUE: WON husband can file for legal separation based on adultery when (1) wife confessed to the adultery (2) did not actively search for wife when she left conjugal home HELD: YES on both instances - 1. what is prohibited is using ONLY the confession as grounds for legal separation since this may be evidence of collusion between the two. However in this case, there is strong evidence other than the confession to prove the adultery of the wife o def of collusion: the agreement between husband and wife for one of them to commit, or to appear to commit, or to be represented in court as having committed, a matrimonial offense, or to suppress evidence of a valid defense, for the purpose of enabling the other to obtain a divorce. This agreement, if not express, may be implied from the acts of the parties. It is a ground for denying the divorce o merely prohibits a decree of separation upon a confession of judgment. Confession of judgment usually happens when the defendant appears in court and confesses the right of plaintiff to judgment or files a pleading expressly agreeing to the plaintiff's demand - 2. not his duty to search for her to bring her home. Hers was the obligation to return. o Wife was the one who left the husband. - Agreed with CA - his action was not filed within one year from March 1951 when plaintiff discovered her infidelity. But still pushed through with proceedings and reversed CAs decision Ocampo v Florenciano 107 Phil 35 - 1938 - marriage - 1951 - plaintiff discovered on several occasions that his wife maintaining illicit relations with Jose Arcalas - June 1951 - sent her to Manila study beauty culture, where she stayed for one year; - 1952 - defendant had finished studying her course, she left plaintiff and since then they had lived separately - June 18, 1955 - wife in the act of having illicit relations with another man by the

name of Nelson Orzame; signified his intention of filing a petition for legal separation, to which defendant manifested her conformity provided she is not charged with adultery in a criminal action - July 5, 1955 - the complaint for legal separation was filed ISSUE: WON husband can file for legal separation based on adultery when (1) wife confessed to the adultery (2) did not actively search for wife when she left conjugal home HELD: YES on both instances - 1. what is prohibited is using ONLY the confession as grounds for legal separation since this may be evidence of collusion between the two. However in this case, there is strong evidence other than the confession to prove the adultery of the wife o def of collusion: the agreement between husband and wife for one of them to commit, or to appear to commit, or to be represented in court as having committed, a matrimonial offense, or to suppress evidence of a valid defense, for the purpose of enabling the other to obtain a divorce. This agreement, if not express, may be implied from the acts of the parties. It is a ground for denying the divorce o merely prohibits a decree of separation upon a confession of judgment. Confession of judgment usually happens when the defendant appears in court and confesses the right of plaintiff to judgment or files a pleading expressly agreeing to the plaintiff's demand - 2. not his duty to search for her to bring her home. Hers was the obligation to return. o Wife was the one who left the husband. - Agreed with CA - his action was not filed within one year from March 1951 when plaintiff discovered her infidelity. But still pushed through with proceedings and reversed CAs decision 7. Effects of decree of legal separation (a) On personal relations, FC 63 (b) On the custody of children FC 63(3); FC 213 NCC 106(3) P.D. 603 (CYWC) Art. 17 par. 3 Art. 63. The decree of legal separation shall have the following effects: (1) The spouses shall be entitled to live separately from each other, but the marriage bonds shall not be severed; (2) The absolute community or the conjugal partnership shall be dissolved and liquidated but the offending spouse shall have no right to any share of the net profits earned by the absolute community or the conjugal partnership, which shall be forfeited in accordance with the provisions of Article 43(2); (3) The custody of the minor children shall be awarded to the innocent spouse, subject to the provisions of Article 213 of this Code; and (4) The offending spouse shall be disqualified from inheriting from the innocent spouse by intestate succession. Moreover, provisions in favor of the offending spouse made in the will of the innocent spouse shall be revoked by operation of law. (106a) Art 63 (3) The custody of the minor children shall be awarded to the innocent spouse, subject to the provisions of Article 213 of this Code; and

Art. 213. In case of separation of the parents, parental authority shall be exercised by the parent designated by the Court. The Court shall take into account all relevant considerations, especially the choice of the child over seven years of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit. (n) Art. 106. The decree of legal separation shall have the following effects: (3) The custody of the minor children shall be awarded to the innocent spouse, unless otherwise directed by the court in the interest of said minors, for whom said court may appoint a guardian;

adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board, or officer as the law requires, with costs. - "SEC. 2. Petition for prohibition. - When the proceedings of any tribunal corporation board, or person, whether exercising functions judicial or ministerial, are without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the defendant to desist from further proceedings in the action or matter specified therein, with costs." Petition is denied. (c) On property relations FC 63(2), FC 64, FC Art. 102 (4), 129 (7) Art 63 (2) The absolute community or the conjugal partnership shall be dissolved and liquidated but the offending spouse shall have no right to any share of the net profits earned by the absolute community or the conjugal partnership, which shall be forfeited in accordance with the provisions of Article 43(2); Art. 43. The termination of the subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding Article shall produce the following effects: (2) The absolute community of property or the conjugal partnership, as the case may be, shall be dissolved and liquidated, but if either spouse contracted said marriage in bad faith, his or her share of the net profits of the community property or conjugal partnership property shall be forfeited in favor of the common children or, if there are none, the children of the guilty spouse by a previous marriage or in default of children, the innocent spouse; FC 64: REVOKING DONATIONS after decree of legal separation Innocent spouse may revoke the donations made by him/her in favour of the offending spouse, as well as the designation of the latter as beneficiary in any insurance policy even id such is stipulated as irrevocable. It shall be recorded in the registries of property in the places where the properties are located. Alienations, liens and encumbrances registered in good faith before the recording of the complaint for revocations shall be respected. The revocation as beneficiary in insurance shall take effect upon written notification thereof to the insured. The action to revoke donation must be brought within 5 years from the time the legal separation has become final. Art. 102. Upon dissolution of the absolute community regime, the following procedure shall apply: (4) The net remainder of the properties of the absolute community shall constitute its net assets, which shall be divided equally between husband and wife, unless a different proportion or division was agreed upon in the marriage settlements, or unless there has been a voluntary waiver of such share provided in this Code. For purpose of computing the net profits subject to forfeiture in accordance with Articles 43, No. (2) and 63, No. (2), the said profits shall be the increase in value between the market value of

P.D. 603 Child and Youth Welfare Code Art 17 (3) Joint Parental Authority In case of separation, no child under five years old shall be separated from his mother unless the Court finds compelling reasons to do so. Matute v. Macadaeg 99 Phil 340 Facts: - Armado Medel filed legal separation form Rosario Matute after finding out her relationship with his brother, Ernesto Medel. Custody of children was granted to him - When he left for US, he left children to care of sister. Rosario also lived there too. - March 1955 children moved to Cebu to live with Father - April 1955 Rosario asked for permission to bring children to Manila to attend her fathers funeral. Armado said okay as long as they come back after two weeks - Rosario filed for custody of children and support for them. o Court of First Instance denied her request and ordered her to give back children o Asked for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction to to cease and desist from enforcing in any way the order of the respondent Court dated June 19, 1965, and after hearing, to annul the said Order and to award the custody of the children to your petitioner. ISSUE: WON she can be granted custody of children HELD: NO - Reasons given: 1) she is their legitimate mother and they wish to stay with her, not their father Armando Medel; (2) three (3) of the children are over ten (10) years of age, and, hence, their aforementioned wish must, pursuant to Rule 100, section 6, of the Rules of Court, be heeded, unless "the parent so chosen be unfit to take charge" of them "by reason of moral depravity, habitual drunkenness, incapacity or poverty"; (3) the act of infidelity of which she had been found guilty in the decision of November 6, 1952, does not involve "moral depravity"; (4) in any event, it is a thing of the past, not a present reality; (5) respondent Armando Medel is now unfit to have the children under his care, for he is living maritally with a woman by the name of Paz Jesusa Concepcion; and (6) although he had married the latter, after securing in the United States a decree of divorce dissolving his marriage with petitioner herein, said decree is null and void and, accordingly, he is guilty of bigamy. - Custody of children she has now was only given by Armado thus he is free to ask for them back. The abuse of discretion given is not a very grave one and she is poor and as said living under the charity of her brothers. - sections 1 and 2 of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, reading: - "SECTION 1. Petition for certiorari. - When any tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial functions, has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, end

the community property at the time of the celebration of the marriage and the market value at the time of its dissolution. Art. 129. Upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership regime, the following procedure shall apply: (7) The net remainder of the conjugal partnership properties shall constitute the profits, which shall be divided equally between husband and wife, unless a different proportion or division was agreed upon in the marriage settlements or unless there has been a voluntary waiver or forfeiture of such share as provided in this Code. (d) On support, FC 198 Art. 198. During the proceedings for legal separation or for annulment of marriage, and for declaration of nullity of marriage, the spouses and their children shall be supported from the properties of the absolute community or the conjugal partnership. After the final judgment granting the petition, the obligation of mutual support between the spouses ceases. However, in case of legal separation, the court may order that the guilty spouse shall give support to the innocent one, specifying the terms of such order. (292a) (e) On the use of surname NCC 372 Art. 372. When legal separation has been granted, the wife shall continue using her name and surname employed before the legal separation. Laperal v. Republic 116 Phil 672 Facts: Elisea Laperal married Enrique Santamaria. They are now legally separated. Elisea wants to resume the use of her maiden name. Petition was opposed by the City Attorney on the ground that it violates Art. 372 of the CC and that is not sanctioned by the Rules of Court. The lower court originally dismissed the petition but changed its mind and granted it on the ground that it was merely for a change of name. It also reasoned that the use of the married name would give rise to confusion in the womans finances and the eventual liquidation of the conjugal assets. Issue: WON a wife can use her maiden name after a decree of legal separation has been granted. Held/Ratio: No. Legal Separation alone is not a ground for wifes change of name. Art 372 specifically mandates the wife to continue using name and surname employed before the legal separation. Her marriage status is unaffected by the separation. Rule 103 (provision for a change of name in general) does not prevail over the mandatory provision of Art. 372. (f) On hereditary rights, FC 63(4) Art. 63. The decree of legal separation shall have the following effects: (4) The offending spouse shall be disqualified from inheriting from the innocent spouse by intestate succession. Moreover, provisions in favor of the offending spouse made in the will of the innocent spouse shall be revoked by operation of law. (106a) (g) Solo Parents Act RA 8972 Republic Act No. 8972 Solo Parents' Welfare Act of 2000 ( Promulgated November 7, 2000) Section 1. Title. - This Act shall be known as the "Solo Parents' Welfare Act of 2000." Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy. - It is the policy of the State to promote the family as the foundation of the nation, strengthen its solidarity and ensure its total development. Towards this end, it shall develop a comprehensive program of services for solo parents and their children to be carried out by the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), the Department of Health (DOH), the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS), the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG), the Commission on Higher Education (CHED), the Technical Education and Skills Development Authority (TESDA), the National Housing Authority (NHA), the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) and other related government and nongovernmentagencies. Sec. 3. Definition of Terms. - Whenever used in this Act, the following terms shall mean as follows: (a) "Solo parent" - any individual who falls under any of the following categories: (1) A woman who gives birth as a result of rape and other crimes against chastity even without a final conviction of the offender: Provided, That the mother keeps and raises the child; (2) Parent left solo or alone with the responsibility of parenthood due to death of spouse; (3) Parent left solo or alone with the responsibility of parenthood while the spouse is detained or is serving sentence for a criminal conviction for at least one (1) year; (4) Parent left solo or alone with the responsibility of parenthood due to physical and/or mental incapacity of spouse as certified by a public medical practitioner; (5) Parent left solo or alone with the responsibility of parenthood due to legal separation or de facto separation from spouse for at least one (1) year, as long as he/she is entrusted with the custody of the children; (6) Parent left solo or alone with the responsibility of parenthood due to declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage as decreed by a court or by a church as long as he/she is entrusted with the custody of the children;

(7) Parent left solo or alone with the responsibility of parenthood due to abandonment of spouse for at least one (1) year; (8) Unmarried mother/father who has preferred to keep and rear her/his child/children instead of having others care for them or give them up to a welfare institution; (9) Any other person who solely provides parental care and support to a child or children; (10) Any family member who assumes the responsibility of head of family as a result of the death, abandonment, disappearance or prolonged absence of the parents or solo parent. A change in the status or circumstance of the parent claiming benefits under this Act, such that he/she is no longer left alone with the responsibility of parenthood, shall terminate his/her eligibility for these benefits. (b) "Children" - refer to those living with and dependent upon the solo parent for support who are unmarried, unemployed and not more than eighteen (18) years of age, or even over eighteen (18) years but are incapable of self-support because of mental and/or physical defect/disability. (c) "Parental responsibility" - with respect to their minor children shall refer to the rights and duties of the parents as defined in Article 220 of Executive Order No. 209, as amended, otherwise known as the "Family Code of thePhilippines." (d) "Parental leave" - shall mean leave benefits granted to a solo parent to enable him/her to perform parental duties and responsibilities where physical presence is required. (e) "Flexible work schedule" - is the right granted to a solo parent employee to vary his/her arrival and departure time without affecting the core work hours as defined by the employer. Sec. 4. Criteria for Support. - Any solo parent whose income in the place of domicile falls below the poverty threshold as set by the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) and subject to the assessment of the DSWD worker in the area shall be eligible for assistance: Provided, however, That any solo parent whose income is above the poverty threshold shall enjoy the benefits mentioned in Sections 6, 7 and 8 of this Act. Sec. 5. Comprehensive Package of Social Development and Welfare Services. - A comprehensive package of social development and welfare services for solo parents and their families will be developed by the DSWD, DOH, DECS, CHED, TESDA, DOLE, NHA and DILG, in coordination with local government units and a

nongovernmental organization with proven track record in providing services for solo parents. The DSWD shall coordinate with concerned agencies the implementation of the comprehensive package of social development and welfare services for solo parents and their families. The package will initially include: (a) Livelihood development services which include trainings on livelihood skills, basic business management, value orientation and the provision of seed capital or job placement. (b) Counseling services which include individual, peer group or family counseling. This will focus on the resolution of personal relationship and role conflicts. (c) Parent effectiveness services which include the provision and expansion of knowledge and skills of the solo parent on early childhood development, behavior management, health care, rights and duties of parents and children. (d) Critical incidence stress debriefing which includes preventive stress management strategy designed to assist solo parents in coping with crisis situations and cases of abuse. (e) Special projects for individuals in need of protection which include temporary shelter, counseling, legal assistance, medical care, selfconcept or ego-building, crisis management and spiritual enrichment. Sec. 6. Flexible Work Schedule. - The employer shall provide for a flexible working schedule for solo parents: Provided, That the same shall not affect individual and company productivity: Provided, further, That any employer may request exemption from the above requirements from the DOLE on certain meritorious grounds. Sec. 7. Work Discrimination. - No employer shall discriminate against any solo parent employee with respect to terms and conditions of employment on account of his/her status. Sec. 8. Parental Leave. - In addition to leave privileges under existing laws, parental leave of not more than seven (7) working days every year shall be granted to any solo parent employee who has rendered service of at least one (1) year. Sec. 9. Educational Benefits. - The DECS, CHED and TESDA shall provide the following benefits and privileges: (1) Scholarship programs for qualified solo parents and their children in institutions of basic, tertiary and technical/skills education; and (2) Nonformal education programs appropriate for solo parents and their children. The DECS, CHED and TESDA shall promulgate rules and regulations for the proper implementation of this program.

Sec. 10. Housing Benefits. - Solo parents shall be given allocation in housing projects and shall be provided with liberal terms of payment on said government low-cost housing projects in accordance with housing law provisions prioritizing applicants below the poverty line as declared by the NEDA. Sec. 11. Medical Assistance. - The DOH shall develop a comprehensive health care program for solo parents and their children. The program shall be implemented by the DOH through their retained hospitals and medical centers and the local government units (LGUs) through their provincial/district/city/municipal hospitals and rural health units (RHUs). Sec. 12. Additional Powers and Functions of the DSWD. The DSWD shall perform the following additional powers and functions relative to the welfare of solo parents and their families: (a) Conduct research necessary to: (1) develop a new body of knowledge on solo parents; (2) define executive and legislative measures needed to promote and protect the interest of solo parents and their children; and (3) assess the effectiveness of programs designed for disadvantaged solo parents and their children; (b) Coordinate the activities of various governmental and nongovernmental organizations engaged in promoting and protecting the interests of solo parents and their children; and (c) Monitor the implementation of the provisions of this Act and suggest mechanisms by which such provisions are effectively implemented. Sec. 13. Implementing Rules and Regulations. - An interagency committee headed by the DSWD, in coordination with the DOH, DECS, CHED, TESDA, DOLE, NHA, and DILG is hereby established which shall formulate, within ninety (90) days upon the effectivity of this Act, the implementing rules and regulations in consultation with the local government units, nongovernment organizations and people's organizations. Sec. 14. Appropriations. - The amount necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act shall be included in the budget of concerned government agencies in the General Appropriations Act of the year following its enactment into law and thereafter. Sec. 15. Repealing Clause. - All laws, decrees, executive orders, administrative orders or parts thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed, amended or modified accordingly. Sec. 16. Separability Clause. - If any provision of this Act is held invalid or unconstitutional, other provisions not affected thereby shall continue to be in full force and effect. Sec. 17. Effectivity Clause. - This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days following its complete publication in the Official Gazette or in at least two (2) newspaper of general circulation. 8. Reconciliation, FC 65-67 Art. 65. If the spouses should reconcile, a corresponding joint

manifestation under oath duly signed by them shall be filed with the court in the same proceeding for legal separation. (n) Art. 66. The reconciliation referred to in the preceding Articles shall have the following consequences: (1) The legal separation proceedings, if still pending, shall thereby be terminated at whatever stage; and (2) The final decree of legal separation shall be set aside, but the separation of property and any forfeiture of the share of the guilty spouse already effected shall subsist, unless the spouses agree to revive their former property regime. The court's order containing the foregoing shall be recorded in the proper civil registries. (108a) Art. 67. The agreement to revive the former property regime referred to in the preceding Article shall be executed under oath and shall specify: (1) The properties to be contributed anew to the restored regime; (2) Those to be retained as separated properties of each spouse; and (3) The names of all their known creditors, their addresses and the amounts owing to each. The agreement of revival and the motion for its approval shall be filed with the court in the same proceeding for legal separation, with copies of both furnished to the creditors named therein. After due hearing, the court shall, in its order, take measure to protect the interest of creditors and such order shall be recorded in the proper registries of properties. The recording of the ordering in the registries of property shall not prejudice any creditor not listed or not notified, unless the debtor-spouse has sufficient separate properties to satisfy the creditor's claim. (195a, 108a) 9. Effect of death of one of the parties Lapuz v. Eufemio August 18, 1953: Camen Lapuz Sy filed a petition for legal separation against Eufeimo S. Eufemio, alleging: September 21, 1934: Civil Marriage September 30, 1934: Canon Marriage Lived together until 1943 when Eufemio abandoned Lapuz No children Lapuz found out Eufemio was cohabiting with Go Hiok on or about March 1949 Prayed for issuance of legal partnership and that Eufemio should be deprived of his share of the conjugal partnership of profits Eufemios answer:

Declaration of nullity ab initio of his marriage with Lapuz on the ground of his prior and subsisting marriage, celebrated according to Chinese law and customs with Go Hiok alias Ngo Hiok During pendency of case, Lapuz died in a vehicular accident (May 31, 1969) June 9, 1969: Eufemio moved to dismiss petition for legal separation on 2 grounds: that the petition for legal separation was filed beyond the one-year period provided for in Article 102 of the Civil Code; and that the death of Carmen abated the action for legal separation. June 26, 1969: Counsel for Lapuz moved to substitute the deceased by her father, Macario July 29, 1969: Court dismissed the case Carmen Lapuzs cause of action has not survived Did not act on the motion for substitution Eufemio acquiesced in the dismissal of said counterclaims by praying for the affirmance of the order that dismissed not only the petition for legal separation but also his counterclaim to declare the Eufemio-Lapuz marriage to be null and void ab initio. ISSUE: WON death of the plaintiff before final decree, in an action for legal separation, abate the action? If it does, WON abatement also applies if the action involves property rights? HELD: (1) YES, - action for legal separation is purely personal (1) made by innocent spouse (2) can still stop proceedings if they reconcile - the death of one party to the action causes the death of the action itself (2) YES - solely the effect of the decree of legal separation; hence, they can not survive the death of the plaintiff if it occurs prior to the decree o Art 106 of civil code provides for rights and disabilities that, by the very terms of the Civil Code article, are vested exclusively in the persons of the spouses thus cannot be transferred to anyone after their death o rights are mere effects of decree of separation, their source being the decree itself; without the decree such rights do not come into existence, so that before the finality of a decree, these claims are merely rights in expectation. - enumeration of the actions that survive for or against administrators in Section 1, Rule 87, of the Revised Rules of Court do not enumerate actions for legal separation or for annulment of marriage - even actions of bigamy, when one has died all actions cease. o the action for annulment should be brought during the lifetime of any one of the parties involved questions of property are now carried out not in nullity of marriage proceedings but intestate proceedings. Macadangdang v. CA 100 SCRA 73 - FACTS: o Mejias is married to Anahaw o Majias allegedly had intercourse with Macadangdang sometime in March 1967 o Due to the affair, she and her husband separated in 1967 o October 30, 1967: Mejias gave birthday to a boy (Rolando Macadangdang) o April 25, 1972: Mejias filed a complaint for recognition and support against Macadangdang o Macadangdang opposed claim and prayed for its dismissal o Court dismissed the complaint o CA reversed the judgment and declared Rolando to be an illegitimate son of

Antonio Macadangdang. - ISSUES: o Whether or not the child Rolando is conclusively presumed the legitimate issue of the spouses Elizabeth Mejias and Crispin Anahaw; and o Whether or not the wife may institute an action that would bastardize her child without giving her husband, the legally presumed father, an opportunity to be heard. - HELD: o YES The birth of Rolando came more than one hundred eighty 180 days following the celebration of the said marriage and before 300 days following the alleged separation between aforenamed spouses. Art. 255: Rolando is conclusively presumed to be the legitimate son of Mejias and Anahaw Rolando was born on October 30, 1967. Between March, 1967 and October 30, 1967, the time difference is clearly 7 months. The baby Rolando could have been born prematurely. But such is not the case. Respondent underwent a normal nine-month pregnancy. Presumption of legitimacy becomes conclusive in the absence of proof that there was physical impossibility of access between the spouses in the first 120 days of the 300 which preceded the birth of the child the fact remains that there was always the possibility of access to each other same province Physical impossibility: (1) impotence of husband; inability of the male organ to copulation, to perform its proper function (2) living separately in such a way that access was impossible; and (3) serious illness of the husband. o NO. Art. 256 provides that the child is presumed legitimate although the mother may have declared against its legitimacy Art. 257: adultery on the part of the wife, in itself, cannot destroy the presumption of legitimacy of her child, because it is still possible that the child is that of the husband Only the husband can contest the legitimacy of a child born to his wife Art. 220 PETITION GRANTED. JUDGMENT REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.