Somaliland: The Challenges of a Hybrid State

An essay exploring leadership effectiveness in political settings within the context of a developing society.

Quinn Zimmerman Leadership & Society Fall 2012 Kings College London

Word Count: 2995 (excluding cover page & bibliography)

Introduction There can be little argument when considering the developing world that Somalia is a very troubled place. Topping The Fund for Peaces Failed States Index every year since 20081, the country has been considered to be virtually without governance, showing incredible resistance to international and domestic efforts at statebuilding. Yet, from within that troubled environment a political entity exists that bears much resemblance to a state: The Republic of Somaliland, in northwestern Somalia. Home to functioning government institutions, active civil society actors, democratic elections, an army, and clearly defined borders, Somaliland has managed to maintain a level of relative peace and stability amidst the turbulence of the larger Somali landscape. Why? This paper will explore Somaliland in greater deal, specifically through the lens of leadership. How has leadership played a role in the successes of Somaliland? What aspects of Somaliland and the greater Somali environment contribute to effective leadership, and how have Somalilands leaders adapted accordingly? Who are the key leadership players within the quasi-state? In beginning to answer such questions about leadership in Somaliland, it may be possible to uncover specific approaches that could be applicable to other parts of Somalia when considering solutions to the problems facing the country and its people. Throughout this paper, any reference to leadership will be referring to the definition given specifically to political leadership by Cooper and Nirenberg, who define it as the successful exercise of personal influence attempts by one or more people that results in accomplishing organizational objectives congruent with a mission while earning the general approval of their constituencies.2 While Somaliland political leadership comprises both modern political actors and traditional societal actors, the political definition given by Cooper and Nirenberg is appropriate for both. Furthermore, any reference to a developing society or developing country will adopt Aronsons definition, which states that a developing country is one with a relatively low standard of living, undeveloped industrial base, and moderate to low placement on the Human Development Index (HDI).3 Somaliland, despite its successes relative to greater Somalia, still falls firmly in this category. In explaining why Somaliland has succeeded in statebuilding, the successful union of traditional Somali society, ideology and customs to the institutions and infrastructure of a modern nation is often the reason given.4 Effective leadership practice was a key component in creating that union. As such, this paper will focus on the unique nature of the Somaliland hybrid state, and how leadership players and initiatives helped create such a state, strengthen it, and ultimately, try and move beyond it. Organized in two parts, it will first explore the roots of Somaliland and the leadership players, motivations, and actions that brought it into existence. It will then highlight leadership challenges in maneuvering the hybrid state, and discuss recent developments that would suggest Somalilands leaders are attempting to move past hybridism in an effort to secure international recognition and bring Somaliland in line with the model of a truly modern nation-state.

1 2

Messner (2012), p. 1 Cooper & Nirenberg (2004), p. 1 3 Aronson (2006), p. 2 4 Jhazbhay (2009), pp. 50-51

Part I: War, clan, and the foundation of the hybrid state. Charles Tilly famously linked war and statebuilding5 and the case of Somaliland certainly looks to support his theory. While its ideological origins can be traced back to Somali independence from Britain and Italy in 1960, the present Republic of Somaliland polity began in 1991, after a successful rebellion by insurgents in the region following ten years of conflict against the Siad Barre dictatorship. Contributing to that victory were decisions made by leaders of the insurgent Somali National Movement (SNM), which, having been founded by diaspora actors in 1981, quickly realized the importance of local Somali clan support for their war6. In exchange for the moral, logistic and military backing of elders of the dominant Isaaq clan in northwestern Somalia, SNMs leadership gave those elders a voice in their movement. With the creation of an advisory board of clan heads, the Guurti, which represented various Isaaq sub-clans and was active politically beyond traditional clan matters, the foundation for the hybrid state of Somaliland was laid.7 Effective leadership practice since the creation of Somaliland kept clan a central consideration, as clans and their elders brought a level of legitimacy and traditional, effective societal functions that the state under the Barre regime did not provide. Somalias patriarchal, group-led traditions, and its continued practice of xeer - the governing ideology amongst clans that existed in pre-colonial times and survived through the Barre regime (which actively sought to end it) - found renewed usefulness in the fallout caused by the collapse of that regime.8 The lack of formal state structure resulted in emergent leadership that was well positioned to meet the needs of Somalilanders, who required a new structure to replace the one theyd toppled. The process was communal, coming organically from engaged social actors as opposed to being forced upon them from above or created through the willpower of a few dominant players, therefore going against the traditional understanding of leadership highlighted by Burns, which tends often unconsciously to be elitist; it projects heroic figures against the shadowy background of drab, powerless masses.9 Not so in Somaliland. As explained by Kyed and Buur, traditional leaders have often asserted their authority informally to execute state functions in local settings which in some contexts has replaced or complemented state functions.10 In the case of Somaliland, that has gone a step further, where top-down, formal types of legislation, decrees and reforms have (re)incorporated traditional leaders officially into state hierarchies in recognition of their ongoing influence as local players.11 This was most clearly demonstrated during the 1993 Boorama Conference, when Guurti leadership broke from traditional, localized initiatives and moved toward the creation of a national level political initiative for Somaliland.12 Leaders in Somaliland have succeeded in statebuilding where others have failed elsewhere in Somalia because they have been sensitive to deep-rooted clan traditions that, in many ways, supersede most attempts at power and control by a centralized state authority. Aware that an attempt to dominate or eliminate clanship in Somaliland would be highly unlikely if not impossible, Somalilands early SNMbased leaders opted instead to accept and integrate the clan and its traditions. A key aspect of those
5 6

Tilly (1975), p. 42 Jhazbhay (2010), p. 54 7 Renders (2007), p. 444 8 Ibid., p. 443 9 Harter, Ziolkowski & Wyatt (2006) p. 288 10 Kyed & Buur (2006), p. 2 11 Ibid. 12 Renders (2007), p. 446

traditions in the context of Somaliland were mediation practices that allowed post-Barre intra- and interclan conflict within the quasi-state to be resolved quickly and with minimal violence. As Kibble and Walls point out, Somalilands success has been built on customary traditions in conflict resolution, resulting in sustained peace and stability in stark contrast with Somalia to the south, and representing a hybrid system that harnesses both traditional (clan-based) and party-political institutions.13 The leaders of those institutions both traditional and modern recognized the power that could be leveraged over their constituencies when operating through embedded and culturally accepted norms, and exercised it. In discussing traditional leadership models within Somaliland there exists an assumption that they are static, functioning much as they have since pre-colonial times despite their recent politicization. This is not entirely true. As Renders highlights, neither informal or formal institutions are empty of political elements. They are part of a larger political process. In that process, formal and informal actors and institutional spheres overlap, co-operate and compete. Borders are not fixed. Indeed, Kibble and Walls argue that it is the political pragmatism practiced by traditional leaders in the creation of the Republic of Somaliland that has made the system effective. Tradition, they state, is invented and reinvented as negotiations take place and agreements are reached.14 In this manner, Somalilands leaders have managed to navigate the divide separating traditional, male-dominated Somali politics from modern forms of representative, democratic governance that also exist in the hybrid state. This does not come without significant challenges, however, as it is becoming increasingly difficult to maintain the institutionalization of a system that combines elements of traditional pastoral male democracy in the context of the Westphalian and Weberian nation-state.15

Part II Tradition, modernity, and legitimacy: the challenges of hybridism. Osam Edim Temple, writing on the challenges of ethical leadership in Africa, highlights the metaphysical elements at play in clans as a central deterrent to the emergence of moral, effective African leaders.16 While much of what he discusses is not entirely applicable to Somaliland (but certainly is to greater Somalia and other troubled African states), his probing into clan dynamics and the metaphysical needs they seek to meet for their members, which often work against integrative, modern governance, helps to better understand the difficulties in the hybrid model of statehood. Calling the clan a product of biological pedigree and spiritual solidarity,17 Temple rightly emphasizes the powerful effect clanship has on members who are also leaders. Trapped between the values of the clan and the ideals of the modern state, he argues that African leaders have to grapple with competing definitions of reality, notions of sovereignty concepts of personal identity and the Supreme Being public and private space. The result? A schizophrenia of leadership.18 Better understanding this result is critical in getting greater insight into how leadership manifests, and the results it seeks to bring about, in Somaliland. To help in providing a framework for doing so, this essay will adapt leadership types outlined by Oran Young in his 1991 article Political Leadership and Regime Formation.

13 14

Kibble & Walls (2009), p. 9 Ibid., p. 1 15 Ibid., p. 2 16 Temple (2012), p. 47 17 Ibid., p. 48 18 Ibid., p. 47

Writing about the role of leadership during establishment of international institutions, Young defines three key leadership types that are central to that process: structural, entrepreneurial, and intellectual.19 According to Young, structural leaders translate power resources into bargaining leverage; entrepreneurial leaders negotiate to frame issues, devise mutually acceptable formulas, and broker interest from key players to support those formulas; and intellectual leaders rely on the power of ideas to shape thinking.20 While his article does not discuss statebuilding in the developing world, his leadership categories hold relevance to Somaliland, where the hybrid nature of its governmental system sees many different actors - with varied and often contradictory viewpoints and goals - seeking to fill the leadership roles he outlines. It is here that the challenges of metaphysical clan-based traditions married to modern nation-state ideologies begin to manifest. This essay argues that within Somaliland politics there are three primary internal leadership actors: traditional clan elders (best represented by the Guurti), modern political players (elected officials), and influential diaspora actors (both returned and abroad). Structural, entrepreneurial and intellectual leadership roles have been filled by leaders from across these groups pastoral clan elders as well as wealthy European-based diaspora members - based on needs at the time. As an example, this essay contends that clan elders served as the primary entrepreneurial and intellectual leaders during and immediately after Somalilands founding, bringing their significant societal influence to bear to keep peace in the region, supported by structural leaders within the SNM leveraging their position of power following a significant military victory. However, while interchange of leadership motivations and methodologies between these groups has clearly resulted in successes, it is nevertheless problematic given the distinct and often divergent ideologies of traditional societal and modern governmental institutions. As needs change, so to must leadership, and here is where the metaphysical challenges of clanship come to the forefront. Simply put, the metaphysical nature of clan ideology makes clans highly resistant to certain forms of change. As Renders highlights, it becomes clear that the scope for straightforward instrumentalization of informal institutions as tools to fix failed states is limited. In contrast to tools, informal institutions as such cannot be readily manipulated.21 In their paper Leadership and Inequality, Harter, Ziolkowski and Wyatt state that, Leadership always arises in response to purpose. We are reluctant to call it leadership when there is no real purpose to domination.22 The challenge in Somaliland is that purpose, and the dominant leadership that emerges to pursue it, is in regular transition. This causes friction, as leaders work to identify and define both purpose and their own leadership roles, which often brings competition. In the early stages of Somalilands emergence, following the collapse of the Barre regime, the most pressing purpose was clear to all: conflict mediation and prevention so as not to sabotage the emergence of a fledgling Somaliland by a descent into violence that crippled greater Somalia. However, once having established a viable and functioning quasi-state, Somalilanders and their leaders sought a new purpose: international recognition of Somaliland as a legitimate sovereign nation.23 This fundamentally altered perceptions of what

19 20

Young (1991), p. 307 Ibid. 21 Renders (2007), p. 442 22 Harter, Ziolkowski & Wyatt (2006), p. 288 23 Kibble & Walls (2009), p. 9

leadership was needed in pursuing such a purpose, and resulted in a radical shift in the power structure of the quasi-state, with the clan once again a central topic in the discourse. While Somalilands leadership history is one of groups and communal-led initiatives, there is one leader arguably most influential in the shaping of modern Somaliland: Mohamed Ibrahim Egal, its second president. Brought to power largely through the support of the Guurti during the Boorama Conference, it is somewhat ironic that he, more than any other political actor in Somaliland, was responsible for a shift away from clan dominance to one of centralized, institutionalized state power.24 Originally Prime Minister during independence following the end of colonial rule in Somalia, Egal was first viewed with skepticism by influential senior SNM staff, who believed he would work against their desire for Somaliland to secede from Somalia and pursue independence. Aware of the desire for such independence, Egal instead proved a powerful actor in advancing that cause. Central to that goal was recapturing power given to clan elders in the immediate aftermath of the civil war. Considering clan traditions - particularly the exclusive, male-only patriarchal system of rule - as detrimental to the realization of a truly modern, democratic state, Egal worked to marginalize clan influence while still leveraging it when needed. Of Isaaq clan descent himself, Egal was nevertheless capable of moving beyond Temples schizophrenia of leadership and metaphysical ties to clan in pursuit of more secular interests. In this he, like the majority of modern political actors in Somaliland, was heavily influenced by the intellectual leadership provided by another powerful player in the quasi-state: the diaspora. The influence of the diaspora on Somaliland cannot be overstated. Indeed, as of 2011, over one million Somalis (14% of the population) lived in the diaspora.25 The experience of diaspora actors, particularly those in the Western world, has been the driving force behind reform within Somaliland. As outlined by Ismail: They [diaspora actors] both directly and indirectly present the experiences they accrued while in the host countries. They repeatedly initiate ideas for discussions and it is these ideas that often stimulate the local thinking and in many cases result actual developmental gains. In the debates, those from the diaspora often refer the leadership culture of their host countries and how institutions operate there There is a conflict of views between the diaspora and the local on the best political leadership practices and the diaspora position is often the stronger.26 The diaspora is strong not only in their influence ideologically, but also in their presence within Somalilands government. A growing proportion of the Somalilands politicians are returned diaspora actors, with 31.8% representation in 2011, up from merely 3.8% in 2001.27 Given the significant financial advantages diaspora leaders can leverage against local counterparts, and the international networks they can court in pursuit of recognition of independent Somaliland nationhood, it is unlikely their influence and dominance will diminish. In contrast to clan, the diaspora is seen by many in Somaliland as holding the key to modernity, and therefore legitimacy. It is through diaspora leadership that many Somalilanders feel their desire for a sovereign, internationally-recognized Somaliland can be realized.

24 25

Renders (2007), p. 448 Ismail (2011), p. 29 26 Ibid., p. 35 27 Ibid.

Conclusion In considering leadership and its effectiveness within the context of Somaliland a unique and promising developing society it becomes clear that leadership processes within such a context are dynamic, varied, contradictory and intimately interconnected. The hybrid nature of Somaliland necessarily brings many of the complicated and relevant issues facing developing countries - particularly in Africa - to the forefront: post-colonial fallout, clan ties and their metaphysical influences, and the challenges of adopting the model of modern nation-state. Effective leaders must have the cultural awareness and insight to navigate such issues. To date, it seems Somalilands leaders do, if comparing their results to those of greater Somalia and many other troubled states in that global neighborhood. The question their success begs, then, is obvious: is it right to expect Somaliland to change in order to secure that which it wants most: international recognition as a functional, legitimate, independent nation? The divide between the traditional and modern elements of Somalilands hybrid state is widening, but at what cost? Can Somaliland effectively shed its hybrid label while still maintaining the stability created by that hybridism, which allowed it to come into existence to begin with? Is the pressure leveraged both internally and from abroad to reject problematic traditional elements within Somaliland governance valid, or simply an assertion that outside models work best? Could Somaliland benefit from abandoning many of the elements that brought its initial success, or will doing so simply result in a repetition of what is all too common to the Somali people: yet another failed state? While the answer to that question is as of now unknown, one thing is certain: should there be any hope for success going forward, committed, effective leaders must emerge and, with the same pragmatism and creativity that has defined their efforts to date, continue to engage the varied and challenging purposes set before them.

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