Justice: Whats the Right Thing To Do? A Public Lecture on Michael J.

Sandels Recent Book Boston University School of Law October 14, 2010, Third Symposium: David Roochnik Sandel invokes many Aristotelian concepts nature, essence, the good, and, of course, telosincluding the meta-Q on the highest good or end: what is political association for. Roochnik asks whether Aristotelian political science/ethics & legal/moral theory is separable from the rest of his philosophy. He claims further that he defers to a sort of moral phenomenologya privileging of experience. Whats missing in light of this is an entire story about why it makes sense to draw on experiencehis theory of perception, & why ordinary narratives have evidentiary value. His cohesiveness is exhibit A against Sandel who will have a harder time grounding these claims. Re: Sandels The Case Against Perfection Book on bioethics that makes a distinction btwn medicine and bioengineering, the latter of which crosses natural bounds, which are presumably normative. Why? Aristotle can answer; Sandel cannot without cleaving more closely to this son of a doctor. Judith Swanson Generally agrees with Sandel but disagrees with interpretation/implications of a paricular passage in NE, dealing w the three varieties of man-made justice: distributive or honorific (nb among those who share a constitution), economic, and punitive or criminal (rectificatory)). The latter is divided into two:

voluntary and involuntary (criminal, punitive; the justice having to do w violence, commonly understood). Sandel wants a culture that takes moral arguments seriously. Swanson identifies four impediments to this aim: 1. Language Babel 2. Technology Webers streetcar^3 (proliferation of distractions) 3. Interests Democracy is not an end or an aim but a method. The Q is whether that method can change the hearts & minds of the majority. 4. Violence Aristotle does not desire divided selvescitizens in one instance and contemplative philosophers in another, ideally, virtuous at all times. However, unlike Prof Sandel, Aristotle recognizes that this coincidence may not be prudent. Self-editing in public may be necessary; not all political climates are friendly to all opinions and arguments (cf case of Socrates). In other words, the populations ought to a) already want to be virtuous and b) have a good chance of success. Until then, the justice dealing with violence is necessary, Aristotle argues, lest things get worse. In short, truth is dangerous. The university is, perhaps, the one exception. Sandel contrasts this Straussian vision with Roochniks interpretation of Aristotle that emphasizes the authority of doxa something more than the appeal to intuition. Philosophy had to address itself to the life of the city for relevances sake, yes, but also because he believed that opinion told us something real and truthful about the world (vs. escaping from the cave and only then, considering returning). One listens not because the opinions are necessarily true but because recognition must be given to passions and convictions of the everymanof, those people. These are

the raw materialsthe gristfrom which the philosopher builds her account. He points out that the obstacles named by Swanson, which seem more Platonic in their cynicism [concern with social goods over individual], would apply to nearly all societies, and preclude the dialectical engagement that Aristotle no less desires.

In his reply to Roochnik, Sandels claims his advocacy of free deliberation with equals also implies that it is necessary in order to be a full human. Political participation and a say in being ruled are indispensible to the full development of human faculties, of human nature.