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RESEARCH REPORT:

SAFETY INTERVENTIONS TO
CONTROL HAZARDS RELATED TO
POWER LINE CONTACTS BY
MOBILE CRANES AND OTHER
BOOMED EQUIPMENT
FUNDED BY
THE CENTER TO PROTECT WORKERS’ RIGHTS
Suite 1000
8484 Georgia Ave.
Silver Springs, MD 20910
301.578.8500

DEVELOPED BY

THE HAZARD INFORMATION FOUNDATION, INC.


(HIFI)
705 East Wilcox Drive
Sierra Vista, AZ 85635
520.458.6700
besafe@hazardinfo.com

MARCH 2002
TABLE OF CONTENTS
List of Illustrations ii
Acknowledgements iii
Abbreviations iv
Flow Sheet v
Abstract 1
Introduction 3
Method 10
Analysis 14
Timeline Analysis 14
Critical Analysis by Engineers and Scientists 79
Results 103
Case Studies Charts 104
Standards 110
Court Transcripts 111
Expert Analysis 112
Discussion 115
System Safety Engineering 115
Eliminating the Hazard 118
Guarding Against the Hazard 122
Warning of the Hazard 124
Recommendations 130
Organizational 131
Managerial 134

Technical 136

APPENDICES
A. 50 Case Summaries and Explanatory Note 139
B. Resumes of Participating Engineers and Scientists/ Bibliography 189
C. List of Available Appliances 220

i
PARTICIPATING ENGINEERS AND SCIENTISTS

1. David V. MacCollum: Principal Investigator


2. Rowena I. Davis: Editorial Analyst

3. Jack Ainsworth: Electronic Engineer- Proximity Alarms


4. David Baker: Safety Director, Electric Utility
5. Bob Dey: Consultant, Construction Manager
6. George Karady: Electrical Engineer- Insulating Links
7. Ben Lehman: Retired Admiral, U.S. Navy
8. Melvin L. Myers: Consulting Engineer, Retired Captain, US Public Health Service
9. Jeff Speer: Safety Director, System Safety
10. John Van Arsdel: Consultant, Human Factors

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Illustration I: Warning Label, including the proposed parameters for the mapping of the
Red Danger Zone 76

Illustration II: Danger Zone Diagram showing both overhead and lateral views 77

Illustration III: Aerial Basket Guard 78

AUTHORS

David V. MacCollum P.E., CSP: Hazard Research and Development

Rowena I. Davis: Editorial Analyst

Melvin L. Myers: Technical Review

ii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Special thanks to the following parties for their assistance in making this study possible:

Center for the to Protect Workers’ Rights for the funding of the investigation.

Numerous discussions and insight of the participating engineers and scientists:

Jack Ainsworth,
David Baker,
Bob Dey,
George Karady,
Ben Lehman
Mel Myers,
Jeff Speer,
John van Arsdel

For over fifty years the research of the many concerned and qualified people who
have examined the syndrome of powerline contact has gone overlooked. However, their
wisdom has proved to be prophetic. Neil Chitwood, chief of the safety research
department of the Portland District U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) in the
1950’s, was a profound mentor of the safety engineering profession as a visionary who
recognized that hazards had to be prevented. His logic was that reliance on personnel to
overcome worksite hazards was nothing more than an eventual death sentence. He was
among the early advocates of pre-construction safety planning to eliminate worksite
hazards before the workers and equipment arrived at the worksite. Merril Ely, founder of
the Portland Chapter of the American Society of Safety Engineers (ASSE) in 1940 and
chief of the safety branch for the North Pacific Division, was a strong supporter of
Chitwood’s doctrine. In those early years of safety engineering, Bob Jenkins, the safety
director for Chief of Engineers in Washington was one who made the Army’s safety
manual EM 395-1-1 a respected reference for nearly fifty years. Without these
forerunners and others like them to advocate safe workplaces to preserve human life, this
study would have not been written.

iii
ABBREVIATIONS

A/E architect/engineer
ANSI American National Standards Institute
ASME American Society of Mechanical Engineers
ASSE American Society of Safety Engineers
CIMA Construction Industry Manufacturer’s Association
EMI Equipment Manufacturers Institute
ENG Electronic News Gathering
FIEI Farm Industry Equipment Institute (Currently EMI)
HIFI Hazard Information Foundation, Inc.
HRPS Hazard Reduction Precedent Sequence
MADDDC Mobile Aerial Devices & Digger Derricks Council
MESA Mine Enforcement Safety Administration
MSHA Mine Safety and Health Administration
MOTACC Manufacturers of Telescoping and Articulating Crane Council
NEC National Electric Code
NESC National Electric Safety Code
NIOSH National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health
NSC National Safety Council
OSHA Occupational Safety and Health Administration
PPCP Prevention of Powerline Contact Plan
PSCA Power Crane and Shovel Association (part of CIMA)
SAE Society of Automotive Engineers
USACE US Army Corps of Engineers

iv
ABSTRACT

INTRODUCTION

METHOD

CASES (APPENDIX A) TIMELINE

EXPERT REVIEW

RESULTS

CASE STANDARDS COURT EXPERT ANALYSIS


STUDIES TRANSCRIPTS

DISCUSSION

SYSTEM SAFETY ELIMINATING GUARDING THE WARNING OF THE


ENGINEERING THE HAZARD HAZARD HAZARD

RECOMMENDATIONS

ORGANIZATIONAL MANAGERIAL TECHNICAL

BIBLIOGRAPHY/RESUMES (APPENDIX
B)

APPLIANCE LIST (APPENDIX C)

v
ABSTRACT

The Hazard Information Foundation, Inc. (HIFI) has conducted an investigation to


develop a timeline of historical and current data on powerline contact by cranes and other
boomed equipment. The focus of this investigation is to identify the reasons why existing safety
requirements are not effective by looking beyond the behavior of the victim, job site operating
personnel, and the immediate employer. The study identifies the opportunities missed by the
management of contributing organizations to ensure for detailed safety planning and a safe
worksite before the work crew and equipment arrive for the job. It is the intention of this study to
compile hazard control data from a variety of sources to create an analysis that concludes with
reasonable, enforceable safeguards and guidelines for safe crane and boomed equipment
operation.
Equipment powerline contact has for more than five decades been a prominent source of
worker death as well as crippling injuries and maiming. Time and evolving work practices have
done nothing to reduce this hazard, and the problem of powerline contact today remains the same
is it did when cranes were widely introduced in the 1950’s. This issue is so serious that in
January, 2003, OSHA began to conduct meetings with other representatives from the
construction industry to discuss new standards and alternate solutions to this harrowing situation
(Timeline 04.01.15). At a time when the issue of boom powerline contact is so obviously
important, HIFI believes that the recommendations developed by this study will help to improve
the safety of the worker and the integrity of the employer and equipment.
A key issue in the study shows that the current reliance on the ten-foot “thin air”1
clearance next to, underneath, and above the powerline has proved to be a killer for more than 50
years. This current precautionary measure to avoid powerline contacts is ineffective and deters
other real safety measures from being implemented. The conclusion of this work identifies over
thirty alternative strategies and recommendations that have proved to prevent equipment
powerline contacts; however, their implementation requires industry-wide management

1
The term “thin air” is a phrase coined by the principal author of this study. “Thin air” is a term describing the
nature of the current hazard restraint with deadly accuracy, because to date the only national regulation separating
equipment booms from powerlines is a mandated minimum of ten feet of thin air, with no other visual, physical, or
audible barriers.

1
involvement and cooperation. There exist some positive and hopeful expectations that the trend
may be starting to level out due to, increasingly available technology, government safety
surveillance2, and awareness that liability is the result of negligence. The ability to reduce
powerline contact is within reach, if only management adopts a philosophy of voluntary
acceptance and initiates measures of prevention. This study will illustrate that to achieve a safe
workplace free from the hazard of equipment powerline contact, safety planning needs to start at
the time of design to explicitly involve a Prevention of Powerline Contact Plan that includes
specifications to be initiated by all supporting organizations and is able to be easily monitored
with compliance assured by the project management.

2
Timeline 04.01.15 “ ‘Red Zones’ for Cranes Near Powerlines Discussed by OSHA Rulemaking Committee” News:
Occupational Safety and Health, Vol. 34, No.3. Boom powerline contact is a subject that has been receiving
increasing government notice and is currently the subject of regulation discussions. See also Illustration I.

2
INTRODUCTION

Cranes are used to lift and lower loads, but they vary in configuration, capacity,
operation, and cost. They all use a boom to hoist the loads, and they include mobile cranes. For the
purpose of this study, mobile cranes include a wide variety of boomed vehicles that can be moved
under their own power. The category includes aerial lifts, pumpcrete machines, and news gathering
vans.
NIOSH investigated electrocution incidents that resulted in 244 occupational fatalities
during the period from November 1982 to December 1994. Based upon their analysis of these cases,
NIOSH found that 18% were associated with boomed vehicle contact with an energized power line.
Yenchek (2004) found that 5% of all occupational fatalities result from electrical contact, yet 14%
of construction-related deaths are associated with electrical contact. Of all electrical contact
incidents, one-fifth occur when high-reaching mobile equipment, such as cranes and boom trucks,
contact a power line.
About 150 to 160 people are killed or maimed by power-line contact with cranes each
year. These contacts occur whenever any metal part of a crane touches a bare, uninsulated, high-
voltage line. Most of these contacts occur when the crane’s hoist line, boom, or other parts touch an
energized power line while moving materials. Contact with electrical lines also occurs during the
transport of materials with cranes in “pick and carry” operations.
Some electrocutions occur among the construction workers or rescue workers when a
power line automatically re-energizes. In these incidents, the power lines re-energize at the
transformer after a de-energized ground fault break was “tripped” by contact with a power line.

Objectives
Electrical power line contacts continue to occur, and OSHA is re-examining safety
procedures for possible improvements. Objectives of this study are to:

1. Identify the various parties who could have exercised management authority to prevent the
injury.
2. Evaluate the potential role for electric utility companies to de-energize power lines, provide
temporary insulation, relocate the power lines, and lock-out automatic re-closures at the
transformers to avoid re-energizing lines in the event of contact.

3
3. Identify opportunities for liaison between industries to delegate responsibility to ensure for
minimum contact between equipment and energized powerlines.
4. Evaluate the effectiveness of the 10-foot clearance rule for operations from power lines.
5. Evaluate the distance requirements for using ground marking tape or barricades to mark the
danger zone adjacent to power lines.
6. Evaluate the actual effectiveness in the field or potential field use of alarms to warn of
proximity around a power line.
7. Evaluate the use of and potential for insulated links to prevent electrical transmission in the
event of power line contact as a redundant back up to protect against high voltage exposure.
8. Evaluate the actual field use of a range limiting devices for the boom as an operator aid.

Current “thin air” clearance standards have been ineffective in preventing electrical-
contact injuries regarding cranes, and solutions for preventing these injuries are needed. The
potential effectiveness of possible solutions—power source control, ground marking, proximity
alarms, insulation links, and range limiting devices—need to be evaluated with factual information
to raise the public awareness of the need for improved controls. This awareness should lead to
voluntary adoption of the interventions in consensus standards, national standards, and industry
regulations. Timing of this information is especially critical for use in the current OSHA negotiated
rulemaking for derricks and cranes.
The investigators expect to find that every electrocution case evaluated could have been
prevented by one or more of the aforementioned interventions. Moreover, the investigators expect
to find that crane operators, riggers, and other crew members working in the current organizational
structure cannot prevent power line contacts without specific changes in management priorities for
preparing the site prior to the initiation of work.
In addition, a specific entrenched belief regarding the unreliability of insulating materials,
proximity devices, and range limiting devices needs to be challenged. An example of old
information that this study addresses is the criticism that has been related to monitors for proximity
alarms that use magnetic sensors, which fail to sense energized power in lines that are not
transferring current. New research shows that proximity alarms with electrostatic sensors are
reliable in sensing voltage in energized lines, even when current is not flowing.
Research beyond this study can be expanded to other construction equipment in which
power line contacts have occurred. This equipment includes aerial lifts, backhoes, excavators, pump
concrete machines, and dump trucks.

4
Overview
The overall goal of this study is to identify the practical physical improvements and
operational requirements which increase the opportunity to remove the hazard of equipment
powerline contact before the personnel and equipment arrive at the worksite. It consists of five
phases, which are outlined in the Method section. The Timeline was developed as an aid for the
reader to enhance awareness of how historical sequences crafted current ideas and methodology
regarding equipment powerline contact. It contains case examples, lists of ANSI and OSHA
standards, excerpts from depositions, and articles regarding every aspect of powerline contact. It
also includes studies on safety appliances, worker behavior, and effects of electrical current. HIFI
has taken pains to present as much published literature as possible to provide an opportunity for the
reader to see whole issue surrounding the dangers of powerline contact. By revealing multiple
points of view, the timeline is able to provide context and explain why many different opinions and
erroneous myths concerning the prevention of powerline contact exist. The Results section provides
a broad overview of why current measures are inadequate. The Discussion outlines key points to act
as the basis for a successful powerline contact avoidance plan. It also assimilates and reviews data
presented in the Timeline and paves the way for the Recommendations. The Recommendations
section provides a list of step by step suggestions and actions for management to undertake to
significantly reduce or eliminate the hazard of powerline contact. The Observations section is a
peer review by several engineers and scientists to highlight how the suggestions in the timeline will
reduce human suffering while reducing costs. The three appendixes (fifty examples of powerline
contacts, resumes of peer reviewers, and a list of commercially available safety appliances for the
prevention of equipment powerline contact) all serve to enhance the available information on
powerline contact by providing background information on all facets of the hazard of powerline
contact.
Of the above-mentioned sections, the timeline is by far the more intricate. Information
contained in this section is direct text or text-based, and has been put together with the purpose of
illustrating how both workable and unworkable options have evolved, as well as the choices
available to prevent further carnage. The timeline also reveals the myths and misinformation, which
serve to obstruct, delay and discredit adoption of hazard prevention measures that could prevent
equipment powerline contacts.

5
A crucial part of the timeline of this study incorporates a list of fifty powerline contact
litigation cases. The proposal’s objective to evaluate hazard control depends upon this case file. The
file not only addresses the defect that led to the injury, but it also addresses the state of the art
(technology) for hazard control given the circumstances of the injury. Thus, the case addresses the
cause of the injury and how the injury could have been averted.

Case Studies
Although only fifty cases are presented in Appendix A, HIFI alone is aware of an estimated
1,500 instances of litigation involving equipment powerline contact. The number of actual injuries
and deaths caused by equipment powerline contact is much greater, because often they do not fall
within the reporting requirements of OSHA or MSHA, as many of the victims may be self-
employed and therefore exempt from the reporting requirements of the federal government and
various states’ workers’ compensation boards. (Current Federal reporting does not include injuries
and fatalities of public employees, self-employed workers, or employees under other jurisdiction
such as transportation.) In addition, not all injuries become involved as litigation.3
The listing of fifty occurrences is intended to show the diversity of equipment and hazards
that cause powerline contacts. The occurrences are listed chronologically with hazard prevention
concepts that arose simultaneously. It is important to start the study of cases in the late 1960’s in
order to show both knowledge of and need for various design improvements, a higher safety
standard, and measures taken. The timeline is crafted to reflect this evolution and show why some
design improvements were developed. Even though many cases that have been litigated date back
beyond five years, they are relevant to revisions of the OSHA standard regarding cranes. Including
older cases in the timeline shows the repetitious nature of occurrences and the habit of some
management to neglect powerline contact prevention over a span of nearly fifty years. The
investigators have observed and expect to find in this study that even with the current OSHA
standards, which are dated, that they fail to protect workers from electrical contact injury. The
sample to be used in this study will be drawn from the period that the current OSHA crane
standards have been in effect.

3
Excerpt from the document shown as “Timeline 97.10.00”, Pg. 4: “This study has two main limitations, based on
the use of OSHA data. First, the proportion of all crane-related deaths in construction which OSHA investigates is
unknown and the detail available for analysis in the OSHA report summaries varies. Electronic reports were
sometimes incomplete.”

6
The listing of incidents with older equipment is beneficial to this study for another reason:
the existing inventory of older equipment continues to present an ongoing hazard as dangerous
equipment that is still in use. Since the equipment is the same, (some cranes last for over fifty years)
and existing safety standards have shown little improvement from the requirements of the 1960’s to
the present4, the chronological link between older and present litigation becomes all the more
important. Three-fifths of the 50 example cases, however, occur after 1990, illustrating the severity
of the ongoing hazard as the population of crane and other boomed equipment in use has grown
dramatically.
The case file is a sample listing of real-life tragedies that have taken place over the years
evaluated in this study. These accounts represent a fraction of the cases on record. The cases chosen
here are not intended to represent proportionate percentages of injuries or deaths from specific
causes, but to include all types of equipment and scenarios. Though all these cases were chosen for
specific purposes and lessons, a reader of this study must not look upon this sample pool as a
microcosm of typical powerline contact instances. The following points must be taken into
consideration when assessing the cases:
♦ National statistics suggest that 20-28% of the total equipment powerline contact incidents
result in fatalities5. In the list presented in this study, 48% of the incidences resulted in death.
This decision was made in order to show the gruesome severity of any potential powerline
contact. It is also important to keep in mind that an average of 140 powerline contacts occur
every year.6 The total deaths by electrocution that will occur this year exceeds the total
number of death instances presented in this study.
♦ In his book Crane Hazards and Their Prevention, (ASSE, 1993) David V. MacCollum gives
the statistics that various types of cranes account for over 90% of all powerline contact
instances. While this is true, the occasional occurrence of contacts such as the one involving

4
Starting in the early 1980’s some safety appliances such as anti-twoblocking devices, load measuring systems,
boom angle and boom length indicators began to be provided as standard equipment by the manufacturer even
though the safety standards did not reflect such as requirement.
5
Timeline 1967, “A Survey of Non-Employee Electrical Contacts” (Pamphlet), Research Committee, Utilities
Section, NSC. See also Timeline 1971, “Electrical Work Injuries in California” Division of Industrial Safety, State
of California Human Relations Agency, Department of Industrial Relations
6
According to Crane Hazards and their Prevention (MacCollum, American Society of Safety Engineers) 150 to 160
people are killed or crippled each year by powerline contact. According to OSHA data from 1992-2000,
approximately 19 workers are killed every year from powerline contact. If the average ratio of deaths to total
accidents is 20%, approximately 100 workers are injured every year. It is important to remember that 21 states have

7
the dump truck (see A-23) are all the more damaging because there has been no precaution
against them. All boomed and raised equipment must take precautions against powerline
contact.
♦ Aerial lift contacts, while disproportionately represented in this case list, nonetheless
illustrate a serious epidemic. Proper precaution and insulation for lifts is crucial because this
is the equipment used to execute live line work. In lifts not used by the electric utility, the
danger remains high because of the person’s proximity to powerlines and their nonexistent
escape options.
♦ The listing of all the recent occurrences of injuries and deaths resulting from powerline
contact with the mast of an electric news gathering (ENG) van was included to show that
corporate management should not leave the delegation of ENG van design safety to the
individual network station, as they do not have the expertise to establish design priorities.
The assemblers of ENG vans are installers of various pre-designed communication systems,
and they are too uninformed in the field of engineering safety. In each of the cases, highly
disfiguring or fatal injuries occurred. There is overwhelming evidence by the injureds’
counsel on how the electrostatic proximity detector can be installed to prevent the mast from
being raised when the ENG van is underneath or immediately adjacent to the overhead
powerline. In all cases, the presence of an electrostatic proximity detector would have been
effective in preventing the powerline contact. These cases are a clear example of where the
corporate management needs to provide voluntary leadership and possible funding to ensure
the safety of the TV newsgathering personnel. A relatively high proportion of cases of this
type is represented in the case index to show that this type of incident is an industry- wide,
recurring epidemic that must be addressed.

According to “NIOSH ALERT # 85-111: Preventing Electrocutions from Contact Between


Cranes and Powerlines”, there were approximately 2,300 lost workday occupational injuries in the
U.S. in 1981 which resulted from contact with electrical current by crane booms, cables, or loads,
resulting in 115 fatalities and 200 total permanent disabilities. The importance of these numbers lies
in the fact that one injury can cause the taxpayer thousands of dollars in social security. Though

their own reporting programs and do not report to OSHA, and of those that do, many accidents are not reported or
are reported incorrectly, and final figures are not standardized to any one criterion.

8
silencing orders from many courts prohibit an accurate monetary breakdown of lost funds, a
statistical review of costs of standard implementation and safety devices would be far less than the
money which burdens the economy with medical bills, litigation, lost work time, and damaged
equipment.
Additional information from the case list (Appendix A) has been withheld and changed for
the purposes of the study. The names of the injured have been deleted to protect their privacy. The
identity of most defendants is omitted because this information detracts from the focus on the
appropriate hazard prevention measures that should have been initiated. By necessity, the specific
dollar amounts paid by various defendants to injured parties or their survivors are omitted from this
report, as settlement agreements generally prohibit disclosure of this information. 7
In addition to the prohibition of the mention of specific dollar amounts, information on the
damages awarded by verdict or settlement agreements, ranging from hundreds of thousands to
several million dollars, is not a valid index of the severity of any hazardous condition and serves to
develop biases that tend to compromise the voluntary acceptance of available design improvements,
use of safety appliances, and management priorities of safety. This issue will be discussed further in
the Results section of the study.

7
It is important to recognize that the prolific use of gag orders severely impedes the free flow of hazard information
and denies the basic right of freedom of speech to the public. Gag orders suppress public knowledge and discussion
of the reasons for dangerous conditions and circumstances, allowing them to persist and endangering lives in the
future. Associate General Council for ATLA James Rooks, in “Confidential Settlements Under Fire in 13 States”
(Lawyers Weekly USA, April 30,2001)discourages gag order by saying “The first principle is one of open courts;
there is no recognized right of privacy for corporations. Confidentiality plays a reasonable role in domestic relations
or juvenile cases, but beyond those no-brainers, there should be a presumption of openness. A lot of the requests for
secrecy in settlements are made to all corporations to continue to hide the information that other lawyers
representing clients would like to find.” He goes on to use examples like the secrecy over exploding gas tanks of
Ford Pintos and defective Firestone tires, which could have saved many lives if truth about their products had come
to light earlier. For more information on gag orders see the article “Strictly Confidential” (Massachusetts Lawyers
Weekly, 1993, available in the Important Documents section of the Lawyers Weekly USA website.

9
METHOD

Phase I of this study screens some 1500 equipment powerline contacts that were in the HIFI
computer data bank and select fifty occurrences, which may have met most of the following
criteria:

! Cases that had been a subject of a detailed hazard analysis report.


! Cases with sufficient depositions of various defendants and other personnel who should
have acted to prevent powerline contact.
! Cases that showed the greatest diversity of equipment involved in a powerline contact.
! Cases that showed the greatest number of parties who had the responsibility to ensure a
safe workplace but did not prevent the hazard of equipment powerline contact.
! Those which involved serious crippling injuries or death.
! Those of historical importance to show industry knowledge of alternate methods or use of
appliances to prevent equipment powerline contact (usually revealed by litigation
discovery).

! Two fifths of the cases selected occurred in a twenty-two year period between 1968 and
1990 to include significant landmark cases establishing judicial safety precedents.
! Three fifths of the cases selected occurred after 1990 to illustrate current circumstances
that led to equipment powerline contacts.

Phase II of the study is the preparation of Appendix A, a detailed summary of each of the fifty
cases with the pertinent information that identifies:
! Court and case number
! Date of occurrence
! Equipment and facility involved
! Hazard
! Summary of the occurrence, which briefly describes the scenario, the type of powerline,
and various parties who were involved
! Available hazard prevention

10
! Disposition
! Notes that highlight the key issues

Phase III of the study is analysis process, which relies on the principles of safety engineering.
In today’s world the universal use of heavy equipment presents a continual potential to
come into contact with powerlines. The following tenet should become the basis for developing
alternate rules of management conduct: “Any potential circumstance of equipment usage that will
cause a powerline contact is always unreasonable and always unacceptable when reasonable
powerline contact prevention planning, design modification, or the use of hazard prevention
devices or appliances can be used to eliminate or minimize the possibility of powerline contact.”
This is not an arbitrary tenet for management to fulfill upon the realization that a hazard
is always present, for a hazard is always found in one of three modes8:

♦ Dormant: unable to cause harm


♦ Armed: able to cause harm
♦ Active: causing harm with little chance of escape

This definition has a universal application to all hazards and can be explained in terms that are
pertinent to equipment powerline contact.
An overhead powerline with a well-established clearance of 18 ft or more above the
ground seems not to present a hazard when a crane or other boomed or masted equipment that
can reach it is not present. However, though it is unreachable, the powerline silently carries
dangerous amounts of electricity. It is, however, potentially lethal. Even though there is no
chance of contact under ordinary circumstances, the potential of danger that an energized
powerline presents makes the hazard of powerline contact dormant.
An overhead powerline hazard becomes armed the moment a crane or other boomed or
masted equipment that can reach it is brought into the immediate vicinity. The storage of
materials or construction activity under the powerline arms the hazard and becomes a key factor,

8
This definition of a hazard is expressed by David MacCollum in affidavits and sworn court testimony. He
introduced it to the field in the ASSE Glossary of Safety (1991) as well as in Crane Hazards and their Prevention
(ASSE, 1993). This analysis has been widely accepted by safety engineers and is often used in the process of risk-
hazard analysis.

11
as cranes are used to easily lift the materials in the function of either locating or removing
materials from under or adjacent to overhead powerlines. Even the filling of storage bins on
farms has resulted in raising equipment booms into a powerline and causing electrocution9.
Once the powerline has been contacted the hazard is in the active mode, and for anyone
in the ground fault path10, it is usually too late to escape injury. Powerline contact can most
effectively be prevented by not allowing the hazard to become armed in the first place. If
circumstances are such that it is impossible for crane or other equipment to be physically
separated from the powerlines, available technology in the form of various devices provides
alternatives that can substantially reduce the probability of actual contact by guarding with
insulation or warning of impending danger with an electrostatic proximity alarm. Such devices
should not be used as substitutes for a safe work location, but primarily as backup features that
provide an opportunity to revise the activity in a safer manner.

Phase IV of the study is the development of a historical timeline to place in chronological order
the fifty occurrences, juxtaposing them with publication standards, requirements, studies,
treatises, excerpts of sworn deposition testimony, and use and development of a variety of safety
devices and operational procedures. With this type of overview, both effective and ineffective
hazard prevention measures are identified.

Phase V of the study presents the comments of eight field experts. These comments, entitled
“Peer Reviews” provide specialty testimony and provide knowledgeable perspective to expand
and clarify ideas brought up in the text of the study. These comments are in turn incorporated
into the “Discussion” and “Results” section of the study.

Phase VI of the study utilizes the facts revealed in the timeline to create an evaluation of the
current methods and commonly held opinions regarding the continuing occurrence of boom
powerline contact. The “Discussion” section of the study pinpoints trends in legislation and
accountability that must be reshaped if the hazard of powerline contact is to be successfully

9
See Appendix A7, A8
10
Ground fault is the term for the path of grounding for an electric current. Current flows in the path of least
resistance until it is grounded and the energy dissipates. Ground fault path is the route the electric energy takes to
become grounded. When the path is a human body, serious electrical damage or electrocution can occur.

12
overcome. The “Analysis” section offers sound and logical reasoning regarding the reliability of
commonly proposed safety measures and pinpoints specific situations to perform a situational
analysis.

Phase VII of the study develops a listing of recommendations that would serve as effective,
practical, and reasonable hazard prevention measures for management to initiate. These
recommendations are primarily actions for management to eliminate or minimize the hazards
before they become an issue for operating personnel.

Phase VIII provides a working copy to various professionals who provide a peer review, their
own conclusions and summaries consistent with their own expertise.

13
TIMELINE:

HISTORY AND ANALYSIS


TIMELINE ANALYSIS

The timeline developed for this study was compiled from primary sources and utilizes
direct quotes and documented information to convey an honest account of the progress towards
the adoption of safety guidelines and safety appliances. This includes articles and test accounts
that advocate or prove the effectiveness and durability of such standards and appliances as well
as the accounts that attempt to disprove it. The negative accounts serve to illustrate the reasons
why safety appliances such as insulated links and proximity alarms are today not fully accepted
by manufacturers, purveyors, rental agencies, and contractors. The text of this study may refute
these accounts in order to expose weakness of argument or logic, thus strengthening the case for
adoption of these safe measures and appliances. The primary purpose of the timeline is to
provide a concrete basis for the analysis that leads to the Recommendations. Notes inside the
timeline are written in purple, and are interjections of the authors of this study for the purpose of
clarification and as summarized in the Discussion.
Though a bibliography is present in the study, many citations and footnotes in the text
will be cited directly from the timeline and will contain the date of the quote or article the way it
is presented in the timeline for easy referral. Any additional citations appear in Appendix B in
the Bibliography.

Color Guide

♦ Red- Examples of litigation cases of 50 real-life powerline contacts, chronologically


interjected in order to illustrate the technological advancements and popular beliefs
available at the time of the incident.

♦ Blue- Any standard that can be considered an enforceable mode of regulation; ANSI
and ASCI are portrayed in blue, as well as National Safety Council (NSC) standards
and military-issued regulations pertaining to at least one organized group.

♦ Green- Excerpts from court transcripts and recorded depositions. In providing the
court and case number the study is able to grant access into further research without
biasing the reader by listing plaintiffs or defendants. The authors of this study have
attempted to provide context enough to make the excerpts understandable while
releasing the reader from irrelevant reading. Full transcripts of all depositions used
will be provided upon request.

♦ Purple- Notes that have been interjected into the text boxes by the authors of this
study for the purpose of comment or clarification.

14
A TIMELINE HISTORY OF POWERLINE CONTACT

1951 Accident Prevention Manual for Industrial Operations, 2nd Edition: National Safety
Council (NSC); 12-16:

“Commercial warning devices are available which work by induction from a


powerline, ringing a warning bell in the cab when the boom or cable approaches too
close.”

Note: This is the first published mention of available safety devices that warn of
impending crane powerline contact.

52.10.28 August Albrecht invented a detector for Electrical Powerline for Vehicles with
Extended Booms, Patent # 2,615,969

1953 “Power Line Accidents Kill Men, Ruin Equipment, and Delay the Job” National
Safety Council Memo reminds workers the proper precautions and steps to avoid
powerline contacts.

1954 Data Sheet # 287, Published by the National Safety Council (NSC), 444 N. Michigan
Ave, Chicago, IL

Pg. 2, P.5: “Various alarm devices have been developed to warn the operator when
the boom approaches too closely to the powerlines.”

1955 Accident Prevention Manual for Industrial Operations, 3rd Edition, NSC; 14-12:
OVERHEAD POWER LINES

“Overhead powerlines within the plant area create an electrocution hazard to


workmen when cranes, shovels, and draglines in the vicinity of excavation and other
construction work. An electronic safety device for warning crane operators of
proximity to powerlines should be installed on the construction crane equipment to be
used.”

“Such a device will warn crane operators and workmen of proximity to powerlines
from a distance of 8 inches up to 400 feet from the lines, depending on the voltage in
the lines and the setting of the sensitivity control by the operator. It functions on AC
or DC voltages, lines, and shows shallow-buried underground cables.”

“The device uses special circuits so that it does not depend upon the current being
drawn through the lines to set off the alarm. The presence of voltage is all that is
necessary to cause the device to function at a safe distance. To set the device, the
boom is swung within the desired safe distance from the transmission lines, and the
control is advanced until the horn sounds. The horn will sound again at any time the
boom enters this pre-set danger zone.”

19-22: “Electronic devices are available which can be attached to the boom and
which will sound an alarm if the boom comes within a predetermined distance from a
live wire.”

15
1955 The incident of walking a latticework crane boom into a powerline powering a
concrete batch plant, causing a loss of power when mixing quick-set concrete,
resulted in the requirement to dismantle and replace the two mixers that had become
frozen with cured concrete. No injuries were involved, but the incident prompted the
Portland District Army Corps of Engineers to initiate special conditions for three
dams that would be under construction. The essence of the changes required the
following: All powerlines in the work area will be 90 feet above the ground and all
crane booms will be less than 80 feet long. During the next ten years during the entire
construction cycle no powerline contacts occurred.

See item 58.08.00, where this provision would be in the Contractor’s accident
prevention plan.

56.01.10 James E. Auld invented the Automatic Control System for Hoisting Apparatus, Patent
# 2,730,245

1957 Data Sheet # 448, NSC:

Insulated Hook; An electronic safety device for warning crane operators of proximity
to powerlines is commercially available. Also commercially available are insulated
load-line hooks and insulated crane boom guard.” This reference contains
illustrations of these devices.

57.04.16 Daniel R. Winters invents an “Automatic Approach Alarm”, Patent # 2,789,282

58.08.00 Safety Policy and Procedure Manual, North Pacific Division, US Army Corps of
Engineers, Portland, OR
Pg. 18: Part IV- Accident Prevention On Contract Work:
“The accident prevention provisions are as much a part of the contract as any other
provision set forth in the contract for the control of the work.”
Section II: Planning 1. Contractor’s Accident Prevention Plan: “To insure
cooperation, coordination, and complete understanding in the application of accident
prevention to contract work, District Engineers will address a letter to each contractor
immediately following the making of a contract award. This letter will include a brief
outline of the objectives of the Corps of Engineers in accident prevention and will
stress the importance of the contractual safety obligations of the contract. It should
invite attention to the contractual requirement that a written accident prevention plan
will be carefully reviewed by both operating and safety engineering personnel.
Paragraph 2009.11 O&R, EM 385-1-25. Following this review and prior to the
initiation of work, the contractor will be requested to meet in conference with
appropriate construction personnel to discuss his accident prevention plan and the
inherent and specific hazards of his contemplated operations. The understandings
reached at this conference will be tabulated in writing. One copy will be furnished the
contractor and one copy will be filed in the official contract file.”
Note: This regulation was the first of its kind, and was soon found as a regulation in
general safety handbooks throughout the Corps of Engineers. It was the advent of
designating responsibility and authority to one overseer. The requirement for the
contractor’s accident prevention plan soon became the keystone of the Army Corps of
Engineers’ safety program. Variations of this regulation are repeated throughout the
timeline, as it has evolved into a key safety requirement.

58.10.00 Sheppard, Paul E. “Crane Contacts can Kill”, National Safety News, NSC:

Pg. 130: states “musts” are: crane boom protector, an insulated safety hook, and a
powerline proximity warning device.

16
1959 Accident Prevention Manual for Industrial Operations, 4th Edition, NSC; 19-2:

“Electronic devices are available which can be attached to the boom and which will
sound an alarm if the boom comes within predetermined distance from a live wire.”

“Boom guards of wood or of pipe mounted on 15-kv insulators provide mechanical


protection against contact.”

“If a crane boom comes into contact with a conductor, the hazard is greatest to the
hooker of others who may touch the load or the sling. To protect against this hazard a
load hook with an insulated link, now commercially available, can be used.”

59.07.28 C.B. Ingram invents the Insulated Link, Patent # 2,897,257

59.09.00 Elkins, Sam S. “Crane Booms v. Powerlines”, National Safety News, NSC:

Pg. 121 lists several types of electronic warning devices, crane boom guards, and
insulated hooks.

1960’s The military transition of handling bulk supplies included the use of cranes. Until
older WWI and WWII supply depots could bury or relocate powerlines, they had
considerable success in preventing powerline contacts with boom cages, insulated
links, and proximity alarms. These experiences prompted many of the following
military orders for the use of safety appliances.

See 62.03.00, 64.02.00, 64.02.04, 65.10.01, 66.10.01, 67.01.00, 69.07.28, 69.10.01,


70.04.20, 73.12.00, 74.01.00

1960 “Survey of Contacts with Overhead and Underground Electrical Lines (out of 95
replies received): 1958 National Safety Council Newsletter # 112.03-07030

60.02.09 F.E. Barnes invents the Insulated Tension Link and Method of Making Same, Patent
# 2,924,643

60.03.15 William C. Burnham invents the Electrically Insulated Link, # 2,928,893

60.08.23 Arthur J. Thomas invents the Crane Boom Guard Attachment, Patent # 2,950,016

61.06.20 Arthur J. Thomas invents another Crane Boom Guard Attachment, Patent # 2,989,194

62.03.00 U.S. Department of the Air Force, Dept of Defense, T.O. 36C-1-4: Electroduction
Protective Devices for Cranes and Shovels: Requires the use of di-electric boom
shield and insulated link for all cranes dispatched for use in the vicinity of high-
voltage powerlines.

63.08.00 Construction Safety Standards, Bureau of Reclamation, U.S. Department of the


Interior; P 9.1.11C:

“An automatic warning device has been installed on the equipment and used together
with the utilization of a signalman to warn the operator when the equipment
approaches the 10-foot clearance.”

63.08.13 Stuart A. Coffey invents the Crane Boom Life Guard, Patent # 3,100,575

17
1964 Accident Prevention Manual for Industrial Operations, 5th Edition, NSC: 18-24:

“Electronic Devices are available that can be attached to the boom and will sound an
alarm if the boom comes within a predetermined distance from a live wire.”

“Boom guards of wood or of pipe mounted on 15-kv insulators provide mechanical


protection against contact.

If a crane boom contacts a conductor, the hazard is greatest to the hook-on man and
others who may touch the load or the sling. To protect these men, a commercially
available load hook with an insulated link can be used.”

1964 W.E. Rossnagel, (Consulting Safety and Fire Protection Engineer) Handbook of
Rigging for Construction & Industrial Operations,” 3rd Edition

Pg. 228: “There are on the market several types of electronic devices intended to be
mounted on the top of the boom. Such devices will sound an alarm or stall an engine
if brought within a pre-determined distance from an energized electrical conductor.”

64.02.00 Department of the Army, Cir, 385-1 Safety: Provide a di-electric boom shield and
insulated link in lifting line above the hook.

64.03.17 Daniel R. Winters invents the Proximity Alarm, Patent # 3,125,751

64.02.04 Cir 385-1 “Use of Cranes, Crane Shovels, Draglines, and Similar Equipment Near
Electric Powerlines” Headquarters, Department of the Army

“3 a. The most feasible means of reducing the probability of electrocutions and


injuries as a result of crane booms and their loads contacting energized powerlines is
to equip the crane booms with dielectric shields and to install insulated swivel links in
lifting above the hooks.

4. Commanders will analyze Army crane operations, accident experience, and the
electrocution potential of the equipment involved and will apply such of the
following safeguards as are required to insure safe operations:
a. Provide a dielectric boom shield and an insulated link in the lifting line
above the hook.
b. De-energize powerlines whenever equipment is working close to the lines.
c. Notify the operating utility when cranes are to be used in close proximity to
energized powerlines.
d. Ground the frames of cranes operating in close proximity to energized
powerlines.”
65.02.02 H.W. Volberg invents another Proximity Alarm, Patent # 3,168,729

65.10.01 “Memorandum for Record” Directories of Research , Development, and Engineering,


U.S. Army Military Equipment Command, Fort Belvoir, Virginia

Discusses Ely Mechanical Boom Swing Limiting Devices and SigAlarm™: “[Range
Limiting Devices] provides a positive stop when the stop blocks are set and does not
interfere with operation when the stop blocks are removed from the ring.”
“SigAlarm™- If properly set, this unit can provide warning upon approach to a
powerline.”

66.07.12 H.J. Hirtzer invents the Insulated Connector and Method, Patent # 3,260,796

18
66.10.25 T.O. 36C-1-4: “Electrocution Protective Devices for Cranes and Crane Shovels”
Published under the authority of the Secretary of the Air Force

2 a. “A dielectric boom shield and insulated link in the lifting line at the hook will
provide approximately 90% protection to personnel working with the equipment in
close proximity to high tension electric wires.”

3 c. "Only cranes and crane shovels equipped with the protective device will be
dispatched to operate in the vicinity of high tension lines.”

1967 A Safety Handbook for Mobile Cranes, The Royal Society for the Prevention of
Accidents and Institute of Material Handling (Most respected and prestigious safety
group in Great Britain)

“There are available on the market, proprietary devices designed to give a warning
when the crane jib comes within a predetermined distance of the power cables. These
devices are attached to the head of the jib and in one case, the device actually cuts off
the crane power and prevents its further movement.”

67.01.00 Department of the Army, TB-385-101 Safety: Instructions to equip crane booms with
di-electric shields and links.

67.01.03 A. Stenger, Jr., et al receive a patent for the invention of “Voltage Responsive
Devices and Methods of Voltage Detection”, first filed on June 24, 1963; Patent #
3,296,494

67.03.00 EM-385-1-1, General Safety Requirements, Corps of Engineers, Department of the


Army, P 15.E.09: “Anytime it is necessary to operate a boom-type equipment where
there is a capability of encroachment on specified clearances, the boom shall be
equipped with an insulated cage guard and an insulating link shall be installed on the
load line.”

1968 USAS B30.5, Safety Code for Crawler, Locomotive, and Truck Cranes, American
Society of Mechanical Engineers, (American National Standards, now known as
ANSI)

5.3.4.5b: “Cage-type boom guards, insulating links, or proximity warning devices


may be used on cranes.”

68.04.04 A latticework crane boom was pointed directly underneath a live 7,200 V powerline
that the electric utility lineman failed to disconnect. A worker lost his right arm and
sustained other mutilations when he released the lifting hook from a 60” culvert,
causing the boom to raise three feet into a powerline. An insulated link could have
prevented injury. See Appendix A-1

This case was among the start of a trend that addressed a third party’s duty and ability
to ensure for a safe workplace by de-energizing a powerline to prevent a crane boom
contact when placing culvert pipe under a powerline.

68.05.20 “Contacting Overhead Electrical Powerlines”—Mobile Cranes Technical Bulletin #1


(Study by Liberty Mutual)

Discussed Proximity indicators, boom enclosures, and insulated links as safety


devices.

19
1969 Accident Prevention Manual for Industrial Operations, 6th Edition, NSC:

Pg. 430: “Another device that reduces the hazards involved in crane contacts with
electric lines is a cage-like insulating guard that can be attached to the top side of the
boom. Also available is an insulated safety link that can be installed between the load
hook and load attachment cables, or the line hook and sling, to provide protection to
the hookup men.”

Pg. 560: “Electric devices are available that can be attached to the boom and will
sound an alarm if the boom comes within a predetermined distance from a live wire.
This equipment is subject to failure and should be used only when it is absolutely
impossible to maintain minimum clearances, barricade, or de-energize powerlines.”

“Boom guards of wood or of pipe mounted on 15-kv insulators provide mechanical


protection against contact.

“If a crane boom contacts a conductor, the hazard is greatest to the hook-on man and
others who may touch the load or the sling. To protect these men, a commercially
available load-hook with an insulated link can be used.”

Pg. 1566: “When a mobile crane must be operated near electric powerline, the power
company should be consulted to determine whether the line can be de-energized.
Many fatalities have resulted from contact with powerlines, and often the power
companies’ service is seriously disrupted. Various states have enacted legislation
distances which booms and cables must be kept from powerlines. A minimum of ten
feet is often specified; however, the recommendations of the power company and the
legal requirements of the state should be observed.”

Pg. 1567: “No load may be lifted or moved without a signal. Where the entire
movement of the load cannot be seen by the operator, as in lowering a load into a pit,
a signalman should be posted to guide him.”

1969 “Electrical Work Injuries in California” Division of Industrial Safety, State of


California Human Relations Agency, Department of Industrial Relations

This table reports the total number of accidents involving contact with overhead high-
voltage lines through equipment from 1960-1969 at 572 in the state of California,
with 160 of them fatal. However, we can extrapolate from disclaimers on other
studies that this number represents the bare minimum of occurrences.

1969 “A Survey of Non-Employee Electrical Contacts” (Pamphlet), Research Committee,


Utilities Section, NSC

Detailed Statistics: Fatal- Crane/Boom = 185, Well Drilling Rig = 25, Other
Equipment =186, Total =396 Fatalities; Non-fatal- Crane/Boom 826, Well Drilling
Rig = 110, Other Equipment = 593

Fatalities occurred in about 20% of all occurrences.

Fatalities: 396, Non-fatal: 1529, Total: 1925

69.07.28 Directorate of Research, Development, and Engineering, U.S. Army Mobility


Equipment Command, Fort Belvoir, VA

Investigation of Dielectric Boom Shields , Hook Insulator Proximity Alarms,


Grounding Shields, et al.

20
69.10.01 SMEPB-RDE-KM “Directorate of Research, Development and Engineering: U.S.
Army Mobility Equipment Command, Fort Belvoir, VA”

5 b. SigAlarm™: “If properly set, this unit can provide warning upon approach to a
powerline. The reliability of the system depends upon the electrical circuits, since
there are no mechanical parts. The test circuit provides a quick check of the system
integrity. The exterior howler alarm might prove difficult to hear in a construction
area, however, it was audible to all personnel in the test area, with the crane engine
running.”

1970 Though the city highway moving permit required the involvement of the electric
utility companies while towing a house through city streets with a trailer, no electric
company personnel appeared at the appointed time, and one of the men moving the
house was electrocuted when he attempted to use a stick to improve clearance for the
house. See A-2

This case illustrates the diversity of opportunities that involve powerline contact and
the need for communication and follow-up between contractors and the third party
participant. Cooperation is necessary to ensure for a safe workplace.

1970 Hauf, R., “Requirements For Grounding Practices and Standards- The Revision of
Report 479”

This is a detailed study that examines duration and intensity of electrical shock to
determine the effects of both factors on the human body. Though many factors, such
as where the shock occurred on the body and condition of the skin, yielded differing
results, the report states that frequencies as low as 50/60 Hz are enough to cause
fibrillation in some cases.

70.04.20 AMSME-Z: Dielectric Safety Shielding for Military Cranes and Booms,
Commanding General, U.S. Army Material Command:

“The primary conclusion drawn from the investigation of crane electrocution


accidents was that no “add-on” safety device can replace or minimize the need for
proper action by crane operators, linemen, and supervisors.”

Note: This observation fails to include the experience of AMC in the 1950’s when
updating their supply Depots, which required manual handling of their military
supplies, to using cranes. At the time these warehousing streets were covered in
powerlines as thick as cobwebs, which seriously impeded he use of cranes. Until such
time that powerlines could be relocated or buried, AMC successfully avoided crane
powerline contact injuries with boom cages and insulated links.

21
70.05.27 Research Laboratories: Ottawa, Canada, Division of Radio and Electrical
Engineering:

“Tests on Crane-Truck Mounted High Voltage Protection Devices”

(I) Miller 25 Ton Swivel Insulator Link & (II) Electrowarn overhead powerline
detector.

Results: (I) “Water was poured over the link so as to wet the surface as much as
possible and the test was repeated. Corona was observed on some of the water drops
but no breakdown occurred.

(II) “The warning device functions as described in the literature but its usefulness is
limited by the fact that it only detects the proximity of a powerline to one point of the
crane.”

Note: This report overlooks the fact that the insulated links are a redundant back-up
safety device and the proximity alarm was developed just to warn of the presence of a
powerline and was not designed to be a measuring device to identify the clearance
from a powerline.

70.07.20 One worker was killed, one injured and one permanently disfigured with the loss of
three limbs when their truck mounted crane struck a mid-span, 35,000 V powerline
while guiding a pipe over an eight foot cyclone fence. Both the property owner and
the electric utility company had keys to unlock the gate to the property, but did not
communicate well enough with the construction crew. See A-3

In this case Robert Jenkins, retired chief of safety for the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers, related his experience of extending the 6ft thin air clearance to 10ft, a
change that did not reduce injuries from crane powerline contacts. He further testified
that the use of both links and a boom cage did reduce injuries from crane powerline
contact by approximately 90 percent. See trial testimony of 1972.

1971 “Electrical Work Injuries in California” Division of Industrial Safety, State of


California Human Relations Agency, Department of Industrial Relations

This table reports the total number of accidents involving contact with overhead high-
voltage lines through equipment from 1962-1971 at 594 in the state of California,
with 150 of them fatal. It appears that approximately 25% of powerline contacts are
fatal.

71.03.16 August C. Clark, Charles Christianson, Julius Kaminetsky, Edward P. Duffy invent
another Insulated Connector and Method, Patent # 3,571,492

71.02.00 Proposed Safety and Health Regulations for Construction, Bureau of Labor
Standards, U.S. Department of Labor, Construction Safety Act, Subpart N: Cranes,
Derricks, Hoists, Elevators, and Conveyors, 1518.550, (v):

“Cage-type boom guards, insulating links, or proximity warning devices may be used
on cranes, but the use of such devices shall not alter the requirements of any other
regulation of this pare even if such device is required by law of regulation.”

71.05.00 Occupational Safety and Health Standards; National Consensus Standards and
Established Federal Standards, U.S. Department of Labor, Occupational Safety and
Health Act, 1910.180 (j) (2):

“Boom Guards. Cage-type boom guards, insulating links, or proximity warning


devices may be used on cranes, but the use of such devices shall not operate to alter
the requirements of sub-paragraph (1) of this paragraph.”

22
1972 Court Transcript of Theodore M. Leigh (Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois: see
Appendix A-3)

Cross-examination by Mr. Ozmon, Pg. 354, Ln. 1649:

“My name is Theodore M. Leigh and I live in Cedar Rapids, Iowa. I have been an
employee of Link Belt a total of 29 years and presently am the manager of Product
Safety. I am both an electrical and mechanical engineer and was previously the
Assistant Chief Engineer. Research and development is not in my department but is
in the engineering department. As a staff member, I have direct communication with
that department. I am the Link-Belt man who makes recommendations on safety
programs and fall within my particular job on behalf of Link Belt. I have been aware
for over 20 years of a problem relative to crane boom contacts with electrical
transmission lines, which often result in injury and death. I am aware that the cranes
Link-Belt manufactures are to be used on some occasions in an area where there are
overhead energized electrical lines.

I’ve also been aware at least 10-20 years, in my position at Link-Belt, of devices
developed in relation to this problem. The three major types of such devices are: A
form of cage which had dielectric properties for use on the upper end of the crane
boom; a link, and a proximity device. I have never on behalf of Link Belt obtained
one of the cage-type de ices for testing and examining it myself. In the various
positions I have held at Link-Belt, I have never obtained and brought there for testing
and examination any of the types of devices known as a link or a proximity device. I
have never personally seen a cage-type device, a boom or crane guard, nor a link, nor
a proximity device. I have never requested or caused any other type of testing
organization to test any boom guard, link, or proximity type device. When such
testing is indicated, its initiation by either Link-Belt or an outside organization would
fall within my province as Manager of Product Safety. It would not be a fair
statement at all to say that my research on behalf of Link-Belt into the problem of
crane boom contact with energized lines has been limited to the accumulation of
literature of the various manufacturers into a Link-Belt file. You would have to go
much farther than adding ‘and possibly the looking into some of the specifications of
some of the items’, before I would agree to that statement.”

Court transcript of Robert Jenkins; Recross examination by Mr. Davidson, Pg. 357,
Ln 3382

“I sent this letter out on the date it bears, March 10, 1971, with copies to Mr. Strnad,
the president of the company, Theodore Leigh, Cozad and many others in the usual
course of company business. I expressed the view at that time there was a need for
warning the operators against electrical hazards. I stated that not putting on these
warnings would only increase the possibility of additional accidents that might be
avoided if due warning were given.”

Cross-examination by Mr. Ozmon, Pg. 368, Ln. 1732: “Plaintiff’s exhibit 91 for
Identification has the appearance of a dielectric link. This is the type of item I
initiated testing on within the Corps of Engineers when I became aware of it in the
2950’s. Those would be for tests of the manufacturer’s claims of the dielectric ability
of the particular substance which they were made of. There were also tests of its
strength since it was going to be in the load line.”

Ln 1740: Mr. Ozmon: “Mr. Jenkins, as we recessed I was about to ask you to
consider your background and your experience, your knowledge as a safety man for a
good number of years in relationship to some facts I would like to have you assume,
and if you will just listen to these facts for a few moments and then I will ask you a
question based on those facts. I would like to have you assume back in the year of
1970, assume a crane in operation, a crane with a thirty-foot boom. Assume on a
particular morning in July that this crane was being operated in close proximity to an
overhead
23
continued energized 34.5 kV line. Assume that in this operation that there was required by this
crane the picking up of certain metal, steel pipes, and that these pipes were being
lifted by means of a metal choker with hooks that went into the ends of each pipe and
then the choker lines back to the hook at the end of the load line. Assume that there
were three men on the ground holding this load, one man at the end of the metal pipe
and two men at the other end of the metal pipe all with their hands on the load
guiding and directing as movement was being made by the operator, that in the
course of this movement the boom swung and the boom either came in contact with
the 34.5 energized line or it came close enough that there was an arcing, and assume
the contact point is-looking at Plaintiff’s exhibit #24- here, here and here on this item
at the very head of the boom. Assume that is the contact point. Assume by this
contact that there was transmission of current down the load line into the bodies of
these three men handling the load. Now, assume one other fact. Assume as in
Plaintiff’s Exhibit 86 that there had been within the design of that crane a boom cage
or boom guard similar to that which appears within this Plaintiff’s exhibit 86, and
assume that that cage had been in good operating order, and assume that it had good
operating dielectric insulators. Do you have an opinion as a safety man in relationship
to the construction industry as to whether the presence of that boom cage within the
design of the crane would or would not have prevented the transmission of the current
I referred to down the load line and into the bodies of the three men?
A: “Yes, sir, I do.
Q: What is your opinion relative to that?
A: “It would have prevented it.”
Q: “I would like to have you assume those same facts again up to the point as to when
I asked you to assume the presence of a boom cage in the design of the crane.
Assume all the same facts and assume the contact, assume the transmission down the
load line and into the bodies of the men. Now assume that there was present within
the design of that crane a dielectric safety link within the load line, assume that if you
will. Do you have an opinion as to whether the presence of the dielectric safety link
within the design of the crane would or would not have prevented the transmission of
the electric current down the load line and into the bodies of the three men?
A: Yes, sir, I do.
Q: What is your opinion on that, Mr. Jenkins?
A: It would have prevented it. There are four major categories if safety devices in
relation to this electric contact problem: the boom cage type, the safety link, the alarm
type and the line hose. Electro Alarm and SigAlarm are the two major manufacturers
of the alarm type. The link and cage are designed to prevent transmission of electrical
current if there is a contact. The alarm is a warning type of system rather than
prevention. I am acquainted with the alarm of proximity type device. As Director of
Safety for the Corps of Engineers of the U.S. Army, I have initiated tests of the
manufacturers’ claims regarding this device.
Pg. 379, Ln 1781
“The proximity device requires a setting. This gets it into the area of human error
which I was talking about. The Corps of Engineers require the device I was talking
about only when working in the vicinity of overhead energized wires. Whenever
possible, one of the requirements was to de-energize the powerlines and another was
to notify the operating utility when cranes are to be so used. When working with the
contractors, we have the preliminary conference advising them to get in touch with
the power company. One of the insulating links rates up to 50,000 V. Fifty or sixty
thousand is the highest. There are many power transmission lines in the country that
will exceed that. You can’t tell by looking at a line whether it has that much voltage
or not. If a man is operating a crane in the vicinity of a high powerline instead of
being 34 or 50 is 100,000 or 200,000 volts, the insulating line doesn’t provide
protection for the men holding the load. It only provides protection for the capacity it

24
Continued is designed for and would arc right over it. If a man working in the area of a high
power line with an insulated on there has got a long boom, if the line itself above the
link hits the wire, the wire is energized. The link takes care of what is below
assuming it is below those voltage limits. For the boom guard, the little cage, to
protect the underside of the boom, you have to get an underside section. Normally,
it’s on the top if you want protection. If you have a long boom and are working up
there, you might hit it with the end or you might hit it underneath. Then everything is
energized if you don’t have the guard underneath.
Pg. 380, Ln 1786: “If you have an insulated link and the tip of the boom hits a
powerline- let’s assume it’s a high power line under 50,000 V because we know if it’s
up to 100,000 it will flip over anyway- and the men are holding a long load that is
swinging around and touches the crane, the crane is metal of course and the load will
become energized. The safety link isn’t provided for that purpose. You can get a
contact by touching the crane or if you energize the load through any means.
Recognizing that the crane operator has to operate it and do other things, the
signalman’s function in the vicinity of high power lines is to watch that the crane
doesn’t get that close. There are usually two signalmen on a job. One signals the
operator from the point of operation. He stands where he can observe the men
handling the load, or he may be handling it himself, but he is the one who tells the
operator when to lift and so forth. The other signalman is the watcher whose job and
what he is paid for is to see they don’t get too close to the wires. The Corps of
Engineers could not justifiably see requiring a contractor to pay for something where
you could get better protection not involving human factors for a couple of month’s
wages. A couple of month’s wages would protect the crane for the next eight years. If
the work is for a couple of days, it wouldn’t be worth his time to stand there and
guide these men. It was partial protection. We have found there is a great reliability
factor. This is a man out there in a very boring situation with nothing else to do,
looking up all the time with clouds going over, they get so dizzy they are incapable of
doing it. When the crane isn’t moving, he goes under a tree and sits in the shade and
doesn’t do his job. The foreman on the job is another thing.
Cross Examination by Mr. Peterson Pg. 381, Ln 1790
“It’s very difficult for either a crane operator or a signalman to see the precise
relationship between the end of the boom and an energized overhead wire. That is
one of the reasons I said an operator or a signalman is not as reliable as a sole means
of protection. I didn’t say earlier that the ANSI standards were inadequate. I would
consider any standard that relied solely on the operator or the signalman inadequate
based in my experience. I observed many times that power companies patrol their
lines when cranes are in close proximity and have taken this action whether notified
or not because electricity can kill so quickly.”

1972 “Electrical Work Injuries in California” Division of Industrial Safety, State of


California Human Relations Agency, Department of Industrial Relations

This table reports the total number of accidents involving contact with overhead high-
voltage lines through equipment from 1963-1972 at 587 in the state of California,
with 141 of them fatal.

Note: Again it appears that 24% of powerline contacts are fatal.

72.04.04 James L. Grasby invents the Guard for Insulating Booms, Patent # 3,653,517

25
1973 A lineman lost several fingers in phase to phase contact when the uninsulated aerial
basket he was being lifted in approached a powerline. See A-4

This case addressed the use of insulation to ensure that equipment was safe for its
intended use.

73.03.00 “High Voltage Proximity Warning Systems—Colorado River Storage Project”


Memo, Bureau of Reclamation, Department of the Interior: Found that proximity
alarms provide an excellent alarm system.

73.05.15 H.W. Volberg invents the Proximity Detector and Alarm, Patent # 3,733,597

73.07.10 H.W. Volberg improves his original Proximity Alarm, Patent # 3,725,549

73.12.00 Military Specification MIL-T-62089A (AT), “Truck Maintenance; With Rotating


Hydraulic Derrick, Air Transportable, 34,500 pounds GVW, 6X4,” U.S. Army Tank
Automotive Command, Department of Defense: 3.6.12:

“Proximity warning device. When specified (see 6.2), an automatic electronic


warning device that sounds an audible alarm as the derrick approaches energized
powerlines shall be furnished..”

1974 The mid-span, 7,200 V powerline was in the blind zone of the large crane, and a
worker was severely burned when the operator backed into a powerline while he was
attaching a load to a lifting beam. See A-5

This case shows both the diversity of equipment that can contact powerlines and
inherent blind zones, and highlights the need for safety appliances such as an
insulated link between the headache ball and the hook so that the lifting beam is
suspended. In addition, proximity alarms to provide warning of danger of powerline
contact if removal of the powerlines from the work area cannot be accomplished.

1974 Accident Prevention Manual for Industrial Operations, 7th Edition, NSC; 691: “cage-
type boom guards, insulating links, or proximity warning devices may be used on
cranes, but the use of such devices should not operate to alter the requirements as
spelled out above.”

“If a boom contacts a conductor, the hazard is greatest to the hook-on man and others
who may touch the load or the sling. To protect these men, a commercially available
load hook with an insulated link can be used.”

74.01.00 T.O. 36C-1-4, Electrocution Protective and Proximity Warning Devices for Cranes,
Crane Shovels, and Line Maintenance Derrick Trucks, U.S. Air Force, Department of
Defense: 2.SCOPE a.: “A dielectric boom shield and insulated link in the lifting line
at the hook will provide approximately 90% protection to personnel working with the
equipment in close proximity to high-tension electric lines. Installation of the boom
shield only, will provide approximately 60% to 70% protection against electrical
accidents. This insulated link at the hook provides approximately 30% protection,
primarily to personnel handling the load being lifted…”

b: “A proximity warning device will also enhance optimum operator safety and may
be installed on referenced type equipment instead of the dielectric shield.”

26
74.01.02 Chart: “Powerline Contact Protection” and explanation of chart presented in a study
by Grove Manufacturing Company

Evaluates the effectiveness of appliances such as proximity warning devices,


insulated links, insulated boom cages, combination cage and links and compares them
with methods such as de-energizing or relocating powerlines. The study finds any
appliance less effective than the practice of powerline relocation or de-energization.

Note: The results of this study are absolutely correct. There are no foolproof
measures to avoid powerline contacts except relocation and de-energization.
However, for times when these measures are impossible to achieve, safety appliances
provide an extra measure of safety despite the fact that they are not rated as 100%
failproof.

74.01.15 Melville M. Moffet invents the Electric Field Proximity Safety Alarm, Patent #
3,786,468

74.08.06 SigAlarm™ Test: Included is a letter from the National Research Council Canada,
saying that according to the wishes of the customer they have “blanked out all
reference to his name”.

The tests revealed that water inserted in the reel would interfere with the function of
the device. It is important to note that the reel had been improperly installed upside
down by the testing agency, where it could collect water.

74.09.03 Alvin H. Wilkenson invents the Proximity Differential Control, Patent # 3,833,898

75.04.11 “Evaluation of Electrical Insulating and Warning Devices for Mobile Cranes”
(Volume I) Report to Employers Insurance of Wausau by Packer Engineering

CONCLUSIONS: Insulated Link: “It has been demonstrated that the reliability of a
link to insulate the hook and personnel from serious electrical injury is seriously
absent when only mild contamination is present.” Note that the manufacturer’s
installation required the link to be kept clean. Note also that the test only showed the
conductivity of unnatural contaminants not normal to the work environment.

Proximity Devices: “The proximity device tested exhibits some more favorable
aspects that the devices previously mentioned and further development of this
concept may ultimately have potential as a safety device for operating cranes. This
potential should be enlarged upon.”

75.06.15 “Report of the Interaction Between Crane Mounted Proximity Detectors and
Energized Powerline Systems” prepared for Kirkland and Ellis by Jepperson and
Associates

“It can readily be seen that both the SigAlarm™ and Electro-Alarm supply good
protection except when the boom is above the powerline.”

Note: The boom should never be raised over a powerline, as it intrudes into the
danger zone on each side of the powerline.

75.06.11- “Evaluation of Electrical Insulating and Warning Devices for Mobile Cranes” Packer
20 Engineering
This study reveals that electromagnetic proximity warning devices are very
inefficient in warning of three phase conductors.
Note: The study failed to show that the boom was raised underneath when parallel to
the powerline, which is an unsafe work location that should always be prohibited by
creating a danger zone, which is present on both sides of the powerline.

27
75.06.30 The hoist line of the crane struck a 7,200 V powerline in the danger zone, resulting in
the loss of a worker’s feet and hands. See A-6

This case was the first to introduce human factors considerations regarding the
inability of workers to accurately visually estimate clearance from powerlines and as
a basis for the use of safety appliances such as an insulated link to prevent injury and
electrostatic proximity alarm to warn of impending danger from a powerline contact.

75.09.10 “Reduction of Probability of Electrocution During the Operation of Dico Mobile


Material Handlers (Overview Document)” BEI Job Number BE-192-DCDM

“SigAlarm™ is unique in the art of power line monitoring. It is a proven device


which has been judged as the only reliable, stable, and acceptable device of its type
by the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission and the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation where it
is required. The U.S. Air Force has written a Technical Order (T.O. 360-1-4, Jan 26,
1974) pertaining to Electrocution Protective and Proximity Warning Devices for
Cranes, Crane Shovels, Line Machinery, and Derrick Trucks requiring its use while
working adjacent to overhead powerlines. In addition, SigAlarm™ is cited by the
U.S. Army Tank-Automotive Command as a proximity device in MIL-T (AT) dated
December 15, 1973.”

75.08.22- Preliminary Report, Harnsichfeger Corporation, Field Test Evaluation, Field


Demonstration of Harnischfeger Crane Style W-350 Equipped with SigAlarm™
76.09.15 Proximity Indicator.

“The test procedures which are described in this report make it very apparent that in
order to utilize the proximity indicator, it is necessary for the operator to continuously
give it his major attention and make readjustments in sensitivity with each new
circumstance brought about by changing the crane’s position or when mobile
equipment of high electrical capacitance comes into the operating vicinity.”

Note: Their observation presumes that the proximity device is used to measure the
clearance from the powerline. It should be used as a warning device to alert the users
that they should revise the lifting operation in order to avoid the powerlines.

75.10.14 A worker delivering cattle feed to the farmer’s storage bins was electrocuted when
the boom of the feed truck struck a powerline near the bins. See A-7

This case illustrates the wide variety of equipment capable of contacting a powerline
and the need for involvement of both electric utilities (cooperatives) for location of
the powerlines away from the grain storage bins and the equipment manufacturer for
a safe design of the feed truck.

1976 Reynolds, Richard L., Informational Report 1035- MESA Informational Report: Field
Evaluation of a Proximity Alarm Device, Mining Enforcement and Safety
Administration, Department of the Interior

Page 5: “Field tests for a period of six months demonstrated that the device is rugged
enough for mine use and that it does, indeed, operate with a very good reliability.”

76.10.11 A portable auger conveyor violated the danger zone, and was raised into a 7,200
powerline, resulting in the deaths of two workers and the serious injury of a third.
See A-8

This case illustrated how a portable auger-type grain conveyor can reach overhead
powerlines and the need to remove powerlines from the work area and a non-
conductive cover on the conveyor.

28
77.02.00 Wright, M.D. and Davis, J.H., M.D: “The Investigation of Electrical Deaths: A
Report of 220 Fatalities” Presentation at the 29th Annual Meeting of the American
Academy of Forensic Sciences, San Diego, CA. Accepted for publication on
November 30, 1979. R.K.

“Fifty-eight percent of the high-voltage victims [of the domain of the study]
contacted an overhead wire with a conductive device such as a crane or derrick.”

The value of this study lies in its detailed explanation of how electrocution occurs and
the measures of amperes at which damage occurs. The “effects” table is as follows:
0.001 ampere- barely perceptible tingle
0.016 ampere- “let go” current
0.020 ampere- muscular paralysis
0.100 ampere- ventricular fibrillation
2.000 ampere- ventricular standstill
20.000 ampere- common household fuse blows
Note: To cause fibrillation of the heart takes .100 amperes, and is well above the .005
amperes that activate the ground fault detector.

77.03.11 Letter from the U.S. Department of the Interior to the Corporate Product Safety
Coordinator of Bucyrus-Erie Co., enclosing the results of a proximity alarm test
conducted by the U.S. Department of the Interior. SigAlarm™ passed every test by
responding appropriately with audio and visual signals to every situation.

77.04.13 An Electric Utility Lineman was so badly burned by electric current that both arms
and shoulders had to be removed. The non-conductive hydraulic hoses had been
replaced with hoses reinforced with wire mesh. Maintenance instructions did not
warn of the danger of using substitute high-pressure conductive hydraulic hoses.
See A-9

This case illustrates the need to ensure for safe maintainability in product design
service manual instructions and conspicuous warnings on the non-conductive
hydraulic fluid hoses.

77.06.01 Department of the Army- Corps of Engineers, EM 385-1-1; General Safety


Requirements Manual

01.A.03 “Prior to commencement of work at a job site, an accident prevention


program written by the prime contractor for the specific work and implementing in
detail the pertinent requirements of this manual will be reviewed by designated
government personnel. The prime contractor’s program will include work to be
performed by his subcontractors.”

This requirement first published in the North Pacific Division, which was pioneered
by the Portland, OR District Corps of Engineers and quickly spread throughout the
region. It is a breakthrough regulation in delegating specific authority to ensure for
safety and accountability. See 58.08.00

15.I.17 “When materials or equipment are stored under energized lines or near
energized equipment, applicable clearance shall be maintained as stated in Table 15-1
and extraordinary caution shall be exercised when mobbing materials near such
energized equipment.

29
77.07.06 A latticework crane backed into highway powerlines parallel to the highway it was
working on. The man guiding the gravel bucket with his hands was electrocuted when
he was unable to see that the pinup lines of the boom were going to strike the 7,200 V
powerline mid-span. Either an audible warning from a proximity alarm of the
presence of an insulated link would have prevented this injury. See A-10

This case indicated the beginning of a trend of defendants to present testimony


alleging lack of reliability of safety appliances such as proximity alarms and insulated
links.

77.09.12- George S. Allin, Jack T. Wilson, and Richard E. Zibolski, , “A Practical Review of
15 High Voltage Safety Devices for Mobile Cranes” Paper # 770778: Society of
Automotive Engineers Off Highway Vehicle Meeting and Exhibition

This article provides data and test methods in evaluation on insulators and proximity
warning systems: “These devices are offered as a solution to the problem of crane
booms, loads and load lines accidentally contacting electric power lines. This
discussion shows that insulator devices and electronic warning systems do not solve
the problem of preventing these accidents.”

When testing the insulating link, the testers first cleaned it with laboratory soap and
allowed it to dry. “A hook cleaned and tried in this manner performs well even up to
50,000 V, the maximum voltage for which it is specified.” When carefully
contaminated by grease, water, soil and salt, “It was shown that the salt and other
ionizable contaminant produces a conducting surface which caused spark-over at a
voltage of 22,000 V… A hook tested under these conditions broke down electrically
at voltages between 16,000 and 33,000 volts.”

In the tests conducted on proximity alarms: “The first demonstration used the cement
truck and concrete bucket. crane picked up the bucket and then was positioned so the
boom was parallel to and a distance of thirty feet from the powerlines. The sensitivity
adjustment was set so that if the boom was swung toward the powerline the signal
would rigger when the tip of the boom was ten feet from the line. When the truck was
alongside of the crane, the signal stopped sounding. When the boom was moved
closer to the powerline with the concrete truck remaining stationary, the signal did
not trigger until the sensitivity adjustment was advanced to the maximum setting.”

One of the conclusions stated that “Fields tests for a period of six months
demonstrated that the device is rugged enough for mine use and that it does, indeed,
operate with very good reliability. If installed on equipment with masts and booms, it
will alert the operators of such equipment to the hazards of overhead lines and has the
potential to prevent contact electrocutions and save lives in the future.”

Note: There no cases in HIFI’s records or in the 50 chosen cases that in any way
resemble the scenario in Prox. Test number 1.

Note: Authored by employees of crane manufacturers, this paper attempted to erode


confidence in the reliability of safety devices. Though it was written from a biased
point of view and based on tests designed to fail, it is still frequently cited as “proof”
that safety appliances such as the proximity alarm are unreliable. At the time of
publication, a number of legal complaints had been filed against various crane
manufacturers for failure to provide safety appliances such as the insulated links and
proximity alarms. Because this paper was so widely read, it had the effect of clouding
the acceptance of insulated links and proximity alarms with doubt.

30
77.09.21 Two workers were burned and one lost his life while guiding a load to be lifted on a
construction site adjacent to and under energized 7,200 V mid-span powerlines.
See A-11

This case indicates that the storage of materials under powerlines should be
prohibited.

1978 National Electric Safety Code Interpretations (1961-1977) page 55; request of April
11, 1974 clearly addresses the fact that the eighteen foot clearances of powerlines do
not apply to construction activities where high-clearance equipment is used.

78.03.00 Morse, A.R. and Griffin, J.P.: “Test s of Mobile Crane High Voltage Protection
Devices for Department of National Defense” National Research Council Canada

“The SigAlarm™ is no replacement for an alert operator” but “The tests showed that
the SIGALARM™, when adjusted for a given crane position, was CAPABLE of
being adequately sensitive to any change in position of the boom.”

Note: The authors do not under stand that an alert operator is often distracted.

78.03.24 When the hoist line of a crane struck a 7,200 V powerline mid-span, the operator was
instantly electrocuted because he was able to control the crane from the ground,
creating a current path through him. See A-12

This case illustrates the need for operating controls for a crane to be located where
they cannot be accessible to someone standing on the ground. There are no
requirements in ANSI safety standards for overcoming this hazard.

78.05.17 Letter to Mr. Bernie Enfield, President, Construction Safety Training and Associates
From D.E. Dickey, Manager, Research and Development Department, Construction
Safety Association of Toronto, Canada, stating

“Grounding construction machinery is not an option because a human body is such a


good conductor that it will always carry some percentage of the current.”

78.06.07 A maintenance man died when raising a 25-foot boom in the confined space of a coal
strip mine maintenance area and it contacted an overhead powerline. See A-13

This case illustrates the diversity of equipment vulnerable to powerline contact. It


also reinforces the need for design not to make the controls accessible for someone
standing on the ground.

78.10.00 Middendorf, Lorna: “Judging Clearance Distances in Overhead Powerlines”,


presented and published in the proceedings of the Human Factors Society Annual
Conference

In this study, subjects act as flagmen and try to determine the correct clearance
distance from powerlines from a crane operator’s position and a location which
would be the flagman’s position. The subjects are all skilled safety professionals and
equipment operators with good vision and a minimum of five years relevant
experience. A total of only 15% of critical target clearance judgments were accurate
from the operator’s position, and only 20% were accurate from the flagman’s
position.

31
1979 Data Sheet # 1-287-79 (Revised) NSC:

“Various alarm devices are available to warn the operator when the boom
approaches too closely to the powerlines. The end of the boom can be enclosed by a
wooden frame or a pipe frame insulated from the boom to prevent the flow of current
in case of contact. When possible, power lines nearby should be de-energized. The
frames of the equipment should be grounded. The effectiveness of these various
safety measures, however, vary according to the conditions present.

79.09.09 MacCollum, David V., “Critical Hazard Analysis of Crane Design” Proceedings of
the Fourth International System Safety Conference

Reiteration of the breakthrough in system safety sparked by Robert Jenkins and a list
of litigation of crane powerline contacts where similar testimony stating the necessity
of prevention devices has succeeded in court. “Hopefully, this expertise will be
applied to industrial applications during the next decade to provide the insight which
will substantially reduce the high incidence of severe injuries and death which is
occurring with increased use of production equipment.”

79.09.09 Wessels, Phillip S.: “Electrical and Mechanical Engineering” Proceedings of the
Fourth International System Safety Conference

New Technology: “A human contact with a distribution line need not be fatal.
Modern solid-state switching and signature recognition techniques can be used to
reduce the voltage to a lever that will limit the energy flow to a non-lethal level. A
device could be designed that would save over 400 lives and 6,000 injuries without
interrupting the flow of power.”

79.09.00 Leigh, Theodore M.: “The Construction Machine: Power Line Hazard” Professional
Safety, The American Society of Safety Engineers Journal

This article presents an account of the deadly seriousness of the hazard of powerline
contact, stating accurately: “It cannot be over-emphasized, though, that all electrical
lines must be considered energized and deadly, regardless of their voltage. The only
true safety when charged electrical conductors are involved is distance…. Give any
line whose voltage is unknown plenty of distance: 15-20 feet or more.” The
recommendations to avoid powerline contact presented in this article include strong
emphasis on de-energization or relocation of powerlines and erection of physical
barricades around energized lines to create a danger zone. He recommends the use of
polypropylene taglines for their non-conductive properties. He condemns the act of
storing materials underneath energized lines.

He does not believe that safety appliances such as insulated links, boom cages, or
proximity alarms can contribute to the safety of the worker because “it is well known
that any moisture, dust, dirt, soot or other foreign matter on the surfaces on such
insulators will reduce their insulating properties, sometimes to a very marked degree”
as well as the fact that “insulators are rated for certain maximum voltages. Since
powerline voltages range up to 750,000 volts [570 kV], insulating devices may not be
adequate for the voltages encountered.” He denies the effectiveness of proximity
devices by stating that “Passing vehicles, especially with large metal bodies, loads
lifted, even the crane booms themselves cause major distortions of such fields. This
then requires readjustment of the devices for each position of the boom, load, vehicle,
or other variable condition.*”

*This quotation of Leigh’s article is footnoted and attributed to SAE paper # 770778,
found in the timeline as 77.09.12-15

32
79.09.18 Letter written on September 18, 1979 concerning the publication discussed in
77.09.12-15 to CIMA and the Power Crane and Shovel Association from H.L. White,
President of SigAlarm™, Inc. The letter is written in response to the knowledge that
the members of the association had recently met for the sole purpose of “impeaching”
the use of SigAlarm™, even though the company had “never been presented with any
data to support that contention [that SigAlarm™ was unreliable].” The letter submits
data from third party tests that is favorable to the reliability of SigAlarm™ and offers
to donate a unit and an engineer for the purposes of more testing.

79.10.10 Minutes: MADDDC all-member meeting, Des Plaines, IL

Section V A #6: Evaluate Proximity Warning Devices (as a result of Tozers’ report
on crane case in IV-B)

Test proposed 82.04.19 by J. Derald Morgan and Howard B. Hamilton and


conducted 82.07.06-09 by the same persons.

1980’s National Electric Safety Code raised their clearances for Sailboats. The NESC is not
retroactive; the electric utilities voluntarily raised their lines over sailboat waterways
to prevent electrocution.

1980 Accident Prevention Manual for Industrial Operations, 8th Edition; NSC

Pg. 166: “If cage-type boom guards, insulating links, or proximity warning devices
are used on cranes, such devices must not substitute for the requirements of a
specifically assigned signal person, even if such devices are required by law or
regulation. In view of the complex, invisible, and lethal nature of the electrical hazard
involved, and to lessen the potential of false security, limitations of the devices (if
used) shall be thoroughly understood by operating personnel and tested in the manner
and at intervals prescribed by the device manufacturer.”

80.01.00 MacCollum, David V., “Critical Hazard Analysis of Crane Design” Professional
Safety, American Society of Safety Engineers Journal

This is a groundbreaking article that introduces the idea of system safety in


construction. This article compares the idea of “operator error” with the reality of
“defective design” and takes steps to isolate and address a list of causes for crane
accidents. Many of these concepts are reprinted in the chapter Crane Design Hazard
Analysis in the book Automotive Engineering and Litigation.

80.02.22 “Evaluation of Proximity Warning Devices” Phase I Prepared for the U.S.
Department of the Interior Bureau of Mines by the Southwest Research Institute,
Page 10

“The SigAlarm™ proximity warning device had the greatest dynamic range of
detectable powerline voltages, had very adequate overlapping sensitivity ranges, use
solid-state circuitry exclusively, operated well in temperatures from -60° Fahrenheit
to +160° Fahrenheit, and provided capability for conveniently adjusting the signal
line length as the crane boom length was changed.”

“The investigations performed during Phase I of this contract produces the conclusion
that of the three devices tested, the SigAlarm™ device was the most reliable and
effective unit.”

33
80.03.00 White, H.L., President, SigAlarm, Inc “A Critique of: ‘A Practical Review of High
Voltage Safety Devices for Mobile Cranes’ (Published by the Society of Automotive
Engineers, in the 77.09.12-15 conference as Paper # 70778 by George S. Allin, Jack
T Wilson, and Richard E. Zibolski”)

“This critique, we believe, will focus on the areas of 770778 wherein objectivity was
absent, where the results were misinterpreted, or wherein the test performed did not
relate to the ‘real world’.” These remarks contain clarifications and alternative
reasoning behind some of the behavior of the SigAlarm™ product. This critique also
explains some of the properties of the SigAlarm™ in different words, giving the
original paper a more objective perspective.

80.03.21 Letter written to the president of the Society of Automotive Engineers from H.L.
White, President of SigAlarm™, Inc.

The subject of the letter is Report # 770778, “A Practical Review of High Voltage
Safety Devices for Mobile Cranes”, dated December 15, 1977 (see timeline). Mr.
White states that though this report is frequently used as “proof” that proximity
warning devices are unreliable, the report itself is subjective and therefore cannot be
used as “proof.” Further, White states that he has “spoken to attorneys who advise
that the authors of this report have had their depositions taken many times and in the
opinion of those attorneys the report has been completely discredited as evidence.”

80.04.00 Guidance Note GS6 from the Health and Safety Executive: “Avoidance of Danger
from Overhead Electric Powerlines” Health and Safety Executive, Baynards House,
1 Chepstow Place, London W2 4TF

1. This note has been jointly prepared by HM Factory Inspectorate of the Health
and Safety Executive and Electricity Boards of England, Wales, and Scotland. It
is a guide to compliance with the Construction (General Provisions) Regulation
44 (2) of the Factories Act of 1961.

16. Pre-planning of safe working procedures is essential. In all situations, including


construction sites, specific advice will be necessary if vehicles, plant or
equipment etc. should be allowed to approach or be worked in any position
where it is liable to be within 15 meters of overhead lines suspended from steel
towers or 9 meters in the case of wood poles unless the Electricity Board’s
representative has been approached for advice. Where the Construction
Regulations apply, if the lines are not diverted or made dead as indicated below
then the contractor is required by law to take all practicable precautions by
erecting barriers, etc. to comply with the regulations.

20. The precautions required to prevent accidents involving overhead lines which are
not diverted or made dead depend on the nature of the work at that site. There are
three broad categories of work on site:
a. sites where there will be no work or passage of plant under the lines. Here
barriers are required to prevent close approach.
b. Sites where plant will pass under the lines. Here defined passage-ways in
the barriers must be made.
c. Sites where work will be done beneath the line. Here further precautions
must be taken in addition to the erection of barriers with passageways.

34
80.09.01 Hamilton, Howard B. and Morgan, J. Derald: “Evaluation of Mobile Crane Safety
Devices”

In the summary, the authors of the study utilize the refrain of to much fluctuation in
the electrostatic fields for the devices to be effective. It is true that fluctuation in the
fields around powerlines does affect proximity sensing devices, but the repeated
degree to which it affects the tests performed in this instance suggests that the study
was carefully designed to exaggerate the weak points of the proximity alarms, leading
readers of the study to perceive them as much less reliable than they have been
proven to be in other tests. The exact detail that the authors are careful to document in
the study is impressive to people who are not experts in electrostatic fields, but the
detail exposes the probability that the authors of the study were trying achieve the
results of inconsistency of the devices in order to achieve a pre-purported hypothesis.

Note: The authors had been retained a number of times by various crane
manufacturers as defense witnesses to allege that these devices were unreliable.

80.09.14 A backing forklift was lifting a metal scaffold that struck a 7,200 V powerline mid-
span. The scaffold and the forklift were not insulated, and the forklift operator was
killed when he attempted to leave the forklift. See A-14

This case illustrates the myriad of construction methods that create an opportunity for
powerline contact. It also shows the general contractor’s responsibility to oversee that
the sub-contractor’s equipment is safe for its intended use.

1981 The National Electric Safety Code interpretations (1978-1980) page 77 request of Oct
17, 1980 supports that powerline eighteen foot clearance does not apply to oversize
haulage trucks.

Note: Since the clearance is reduced, this amendment enhances the danger of
powerline contact by oversize trucks.

1981 The National Electric Safety Code ANSI C2 1981, which governs the design of
powerlines from the generator to the user’s meter, deleted rule 210 and 211 which
read:

210: Design and Construction: All electric supply and communication lines and
equipment shall be of suitable design and construction for the service and conditions
under which they are to be operated.

211: Installation and Maintenance: All electric supply and communication lines and
equipment shall be installed and maintained so as to reduce the hazards of life so far
as practicable.

Note: This deletion removed an important safety philosophy.

35
81.02.00 Evaluation of Proximity Warning Devices, Phase II, Prepared for the U.S.
Department of the Interior Bureau of Mines by the Southwest Research Institute.

“The objective of the Phase II program was to develop a microprocessor-based data


acquisition system to collect and measure field strengths at distributed points around
the front boom. The developed equipment group (referred to as the Distributed
Sensor AC Electrometer) is designed to accurately measure the distributed field
strength about a crane boom with obvious error.”

“One of the devices, the SigAlarm, used a distributed sensor and displayed significant
sensitivity variation with boom orientation. As the boom was rotated from a position
parallel to the powerline to a position normal to the powerline, the sensitivity
decreased severely. To minimize the sensitivity fluctuation with boom orientation,
point sensors are recommended.”

82.01.00 Morgan, J. Derald and Hamilton, Howard B.: Final Report on an Evaluation of
Mobile Crane Safety Devices to a major crane manufacturing company. This is the
follow-up to the preliminary testing performed in September, 1980.

Note: They were extremely negative against the use of safety appliances such as the
insulated link and the proximity alarm.

82.10.00 Hamilton, Howard B. and Morgan, J. Derald: “Evaluation of Links for Safety
Applications for Simon Ro Corporation, National Crane”

This test series performed on a variety of insulated links purports them to have too
much leakage to be effective as safety devices. Doubtless, the unknown contaminants
put on the links for test purposes greatly affected their resistance to current. However,
in all of the carefully reported test data, the testers make no mention of the
ingredients in the contaminants or the level of carbon in any of the contaminants, all
of which would increase the ability of current to flow through the link.

36
82.10.04 Deposition of Cecil B. Hickman, (# 279080, 250th Judicial District Court of Travis
County, TX)
Hickman initiated the use of SigAlarm™ in order to prevent crane powerline contact
that may cause serious injury or death.
Pg. 45, Ln 19- Q: “What types of units did you purchase at that time?
A: I purchased a brand called SigAlarm™.
Q: Then after you installed them in early 1970- is that what you said?
A: We started installing them early 1970- yes sir.
Q: How long was it before you actually had all ten units installed?
A: Probably two or three months.
Pg. 47, Ln 24- Q: Can you tell us how these units performed so far as you were
concerned after they were installed?
A: They done the job for me, sir.
Pg. 48, Ln 10- A: We ultimately wound up with somewhere between twenty and
twenty-five units. In 1975 I made another search of the files to see if there had been
any crane contacts from 1970 up to 1975 looking at a ten-year span, five years
previous and five years after, and I found no contacts, so in my opinion, they done the
job for me.
Pg. 51 Ln 3- Q: What was it that they indicated to you was the reason they had taken
these items off the crane?
A: One of the complaints was that they were afraid the operating engineers operating
the cranes might be lulled into a false sense of security, dependant upon a device that,
in their opinion, may or may not work.”
Q: Do you place on credence on that concern?
A: No, sir.
Note: If twenty cranes in Hickman’s fleet used the devices for five years apiece, 100
crane years went by without a powerline contact.

82.12.31 Evaluation of Proximity Warning Devices, Phase III Bureau of Mines open file report
# 100(1)-83 by the Southwest Research Institute

“Analysis of the data indicate that the distances at which a single sensor alarm will
activate vary by a factor of three to 1, due primarily to variations in boom orientation.
The results also indicate that in the case of multiple powerlines, a single electrostatic
field sensor cannot reliably be used to determine the distance from a powerline.”
“Sensor placement was shown to have an influence on the undesirable sensitivity to
boom orientation. In general, sensors located on either side of the boom were much
more sensitive to crane boom azimuth that were sensors placed on top of the crane
boom. In addition, sensors place near the tip of the boom were much more sensitive
to crane boom elevation that were sensors placed near the crane boom pivot point.”
“The data analysis showed that under typical combinations of crane boom elevation
and crane boom azimuth, a best case performance for a single sensor proximity
warning device would produce alarms for distances ranging from 20’-60’ to the
powerline depending on the combination of crane boom elevation and azimuth.”

Note: Even with a critical analysis the report was able to show that the SigAlarm™
was able to detect the presence of powerlines. In an active crane use situation,
workers are often distracted and powerlines are camouflaged by trees, not readily
visible, and their clearance distance frequently misjudged.

37
1983 Bridges, J.E., “Potential Distributions in the Vicinity of the Hearts of Primates
Arising from 60Hz Limb-to-Limb Body Currents,” Ford, G.L.; Sherman, I,A.;
Vainberg, M., editors: “Electrical Shock Safety Criteria” Proceedings of the First
International Symposium on Electrical Shock Safety Criteria, Pergamon Press, New
York

This paper expresses the relationship between body weight and current: the more
mass on a body, the more current it takes to cause heart fibrillation. In dogs with a
mass of 5kg (12 lbs), heart fibrillation started at 40 milliamps. In dogs of 25 kg (55
lbs) heart fibrillation started at 100 milliamps. Imagine the current necessary to cause
heart fibrillation on a healthy, 150 lb man.

1983 A crane was being used to assemble warehouses next to a developing industrial park.
On the day of the event, the south entrance, used by the construction crew, had an
unconnected distribution line conspicuously displayed nearby. The electric utility
company did not inform the crew of any energized lines, though at other parts of the
park the powerlines were already energized. The construction crane contacted a
newly energized 7,200 powerline mid-span and severely burned two workers. See
A-15

This case highlights the need for safety communication between the electric utility
personnel and contractors when power distribution systems are being built and the
energized.

83.03.00 SigAlarm™ sales and endorsements: Even with the overwhelming publicizing against
the use of proximity alarms, a few organizations did make their own workplace
evaluations and installed the SigAlarm™ on a number of their cranes. For a number
of years they all had good results in preventing powerline contact. A listing of
statistics is available upon request.

83.06.21 A crane was working in an unmarked danger zone with a raised boom being used to
pick up materials stored under 7,200 V powerlines backed into a powerline. The
operator, working alone, left the truck cab of the crane to investigate and was badly
burned. See A-16

This case reiterates the fact that storage of building materials under powerlines should
be prohibited and introduces the fact that small hydraulic cranes have the highest
probability of powerline contact. The use of appliances such as the electrostatic
proximity alarm would enhance operator awareness of overhead powerlines.

38
83.09.23 Cunitz, Robert J. and Middendorf, Lorna: “Problems in the Perception of Overhead
Powerlines” Paper Presented at the Sixth Annual International Symposium, System
Safety Seminar:

This paper explicitly states the problems in accurately gauging and perceiving the danger
presented by overhead powerlines, summarized as follows:

♦ Most laymen cannot accurately judge the magnitude of the hazard that powerlines
present, so they do not have the mindset to proceed with the necessary caution
♦ Since people see detail best with their central foveal vision, and powerlines against
the say or camouflaged by buildings and trees can be a small detail, the powerlines
are functionally impossible to see unless being directly looked at.
♦ In addition to seeing the powerlines, the worker is then asked to form a judgment of
a safe distance. Judging an object’s distance by its relationship to the individual is
also nearly impossible.
♦ Awareness of the proximity of the powerline must be maintained at all times if the
hazard is to be managed safely. Usually, everyone involved in the project has other
tasks to accomplish, shifting focus away from the danger presented by the
powerline.
♦ The paper included corroborating results from empirical studies and field tests.

1984 The National Electric Safety Code NESC Handbook by Allen Clapp, page 17,
indicated the change of philosophy to remove the term “practicability” from the text
in section 211, as he believed it led to the extreme requirement of “possibility”:

“The code subcommittees made every effort to emphasize that it is not merely
enough that installation be possible, it must be practical as well- to qualify as a
requirement of the code.”

Rule 211 was deleted in the 1981 edition. It stated “reduce hazards to life as far as
practical” and now states: “it must be recognized that it is not only impractical but is
absolutely impossible to provide special clearances or other construction for every
location where it is possible for a negligent or impaired human to contact a utility
installation with a vehicle or with a crane, antenna, metal ladder, extended paint-
roller handle, irrigation pipe, portable conveyor, or any other special apparatus. The
operators or erectors of such apparatus have a responsibility to take special care to
avoid damaging, or otherwise interrupting the service of, utility installations or other
facilities in the vicinity of their work or operations.”

Note: This change shows a blatant disregard for human safety and effectively denies
the crucial role the electric utility must play in safe construction operations. This
passage minimizes the responsibility of the electric utility (a deadly force that only
trained specialists are qualified to handle) and places the responsibility on the
operator of the equipment, a person who has little to do with safety process or
procedure.

1984 “Effects of Current Passing Through the Human Body” Publication 479-1 (Second
Edition) International Electrotechnical Commission:

This study delves into physiological effects such as voluntary let-go and ventricular
fibrillation as a function of current through the body. At approximately 50 milliamps
fibrillation of the heart may occur.

39
1984 A crane was backing up in order to lower the boom so it could be “safely” driven
forward into an unmarked danger zone underneath the energized 7,200 V powerlines
at the entrance of the site. The operator did not see the powerline behind him when
the crane struck it. See A-17

This case tells how testing after injury occurrences showed how the electrostatic
proximity alarm would have warned all personnel that the crane was being backed
into a powerline. In this case an electrostatic proximity warning alarm was installed
on a similar crane several months after the death of the operator and it was found that
the device would have alerted the workers to the fact that the crane was being backed
into a powerline.

84.07.29 Deposition of Arthur C. Gregr (Case # CI-83-5060, Circuit Court for Orange County,
Florida)
Pg. 8, Ln 24; Q: Would you tell the jury- first of all, this SigAlarm™ device that you
are talking about, is that the same thing as a proximity warning device?
A: Yes. That was our trade name.
Q: SigAlarm™ is a trade name for a proximity warning device?
A: Yes.
Q: Would you tell the jury basically what a proximity warning device is?
A: A proximity warning device establishes the fact that the hazard exists. It helps you
identify the hazard and it helps you maintain a correct and legal distance away from
the hazard my monitoring the electrostatic field that surrounds the powerline.
Q: Now, what hazard are you talking about?
A: The overhead powerlines
Q: What is the theory of how a proximity warning device works?
A: Is senses the electrostatic field that surrounds the powerline.
Pg. 16, Ln 20; Q: Did you ever see a crane with a proximity warning device being
operated in a high humidity area?
A: Yes, I have.
Q: And where was that, sir?
A: In Florida.
Q: What part of Florida?
A: Around the Lakeland area.
Q: And did the device work acceptably in a high humidity area?
A: Yes, it did.

40
Continued Q: Did you have any complaints from customers who used the proximity warning
device in a high humidity area?
A: No, sir.
Q: Did you, in your experience with the company you worked for, ever observe a
crane with a proximity warning device being operated in a high dust area?
A: Yes. Very definitely.
Q: And did you ever note any discrepancy in how the proximity warning device
worked in a high dust area?
A: No, there was no problems with working in that environment at all.
Q: Did you ever receive any complaints from any customers who used the device in
a high dust area?
A: No, not as far as the dust and the dirt affecting the unit’s operation.
Q: Have you ever used or seen a crane with a proximity warning device being used
with other equipment such as trucks being operated between the crane and the high-
tension wires?
A: Yes.
Q: Did the proximity warning device work as it was supposed to work in that
condition?
A: Yes, they did.
Q: Did you ever receive any complaints from any customers, any users of the
proximity warning device, that it would not work because of interference of a truck or
other device.
A: No.
Q: Does the proximity warning device work effectively with the electrical system of
the crane?
A: You can get some errant interference. However, during your installation, that can
be taken care of with resistors and with other equipment such as that, shielding, as so
that it does not affect the operation of the SigAlarm™.
Q: DO C.B. or radio frequency transmissions affect the operation of the SigAlarm™?
A: No, sir.
Q: Do you understand what the term null area means in relationship to the proximity
warning device?
A: Yes, I do.
Q: Would you tell the jury what a null area is?
A: It is a phenomenon that happens with three-phase powerlines, and underneath,
directly underneath or directly above the powerline, the electrical fields are negated
and so you have no electrostatic field directly beneath the powerline or directly
above.
Q: From the study that you company did concerning null areas, are those null
numbers present in all electrical installations?
A: No, they are not.

41
Continued Q: When the null areas do exist, can you tell me where they exist?
A: They only exist directly beneath the power line and/or directly above the
powerline. Basically where the two outside wires or two outside insulators are. It
does not affect the operation of the power line monitoring system because, number
one, you are supposed to maintain a minimum of ten feet away from the powerline,
so you would still be in the electrostatic field outside of the null area. And even if you
were inside the null area, a portion of the antenna would be there to warn you of the
electrostatic field.
Q: Do that if a crane with a proximity warning device starts up outside the warning
area and moves to a null area, it will get a warning before it gets to the null area?
A: Yes, it will. And, of course, it is considered unsafe crane practices to operate a
crane directly beneath or directly above a powerline.
Q: And that’s the only place a null area is?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Have you ever received any complaints from people who actually used this device
in the field of null area problems?
A: Not from customers that were using the units, no.

Pg. 29, Ln 3; Q: While you were in Shady Grove, did you discuss with anyone from
Grove Manufacturing the testing that they had done on the proximity warning device?
A: Yes, we did.
Q: What did those gentlemen tell you about the testing they had done on the
proximity warning device?
A: They said testing was favorable.
Q: Did they have any complaints at all about the proximity warning device at that
meeting?
A: No, they did not.
The next section of the deposition regards a letter written on September 18, 1979 (see
timeline) to CIMA and the Power Crane and Shovel Association from H.L. White,
President of SigAlarm™, Inc. The letter is written in response to the knowledge that
the members of the association had recently met for the sole purpose of “impeaching”
the use of SigAlarm™, even though the company had “never been presented with any
data to support that contention [that SigAlarm™ was unreliable].

Pg. 45, Ln 13; Q: And could you tell us what the purpose of that letter was?
A: Well, Mr. White, date of September 18, 1979, and the subject was their
participation in the studies to impeach the product SigAlarm™.
Q: Your company was asking to be allowed to participate in the test?
A: Yes, we were.
Q: Were you ever allowed to participate?
A: No, sir, we were not.
Q: TO your knowledge, did you ever get a response to that letter?
A: No.
Pg. 50, Ln. 1; Q: Let’s move on, if we could, away from the Power Crane and Shovel
Association Committee and talk about other evaluations that were done by people
other than Bower Industries of this proximity warning device. Are you aware of other
evaluations that were done during the time frame that you were and employee of
Bower Industries and prior to 1977?

42
Continued A: Yes. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation conducted a test. U.S. Bureau of Mines, under
their Mine Safety Enforcement authority, conducted tests. The U.S. Air Force
Evaluated SigAlarms™ and which caused all of their lime maintenance trucks
worldwide to be equipped with SigAlarm™ Power Line Monitoring Systems.
[see timeline 81.02.00]
Q: Let’s take—
A: Also, the state of Minnesota initiated a law requiring powerline monitoring systems
on all cranes that operated within the railroad environment.
Q: And these evaluations all occurred before 1977?
A: Yes.

Pg. 57, Ln. 16; Q: The MESA report which you indicated earlier, is that the type of
report which a person with your experience would rely on in evaluation a proximity
warning device?
A: Yes.
Q: Would you tell us whether the MESA report was favorable or unfavorable for the
proximity warning device?
A: It was favorable.
Q: You mentioned that there was also a report done by the bureau of reclamation?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What type of evaluation was that?
A: It was a similar evaluation, and from that evaluation, they require SigAlarm™ or
power line monitoring systems to be installed on cranes in certain work conditions on
their projects.
Q: And can you tell me whether or not that evaluation was favorable or unfavorable for
the proximity warning device?
A: It was favorable.
Q: You mentioned that there was a technical order by the air force. Is that correct?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Can you tell me how that technical safety order came about?
A: It is a result of an evaluation done by the U.S. Air Force and for line Maintenance
trucks, and the result of it caused all the line maintenance trucks in the U.S. Air Force,
worldwide, as a matter of fact, to have SigAlarm™ installed on them.
Q: And then, finally, you mentioned a state law in Minnesota concerning railroads. Is
that right?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Now, did that state law concern cranes?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What type of cranes?
A: All cranes working within the railroad environment. In other words, all cranes, and
that included both high rail cranes, the rails that- I mean, the cranes that worked in the
rails of the railroads and also cranes working in the vicinity of the rails.
Q: Have various other state and governmental bodies accepted the proximity warning
device as a safety device for cranes?
A: Yes, we have approval for the installation and operation of power line monitoring
within several of those states.
Q: Can you tell the judge and jury some of the ones you have gotten approval for?
A: Connecticut, Massachusetts, Oregon, Washington, Nevada, to name several. Texas.

43
Continued Pg. 59, Ln 24; Q: When did Reynolds Electric in Nevada start to use the SigAlarm™
device?
A: In 1965.
Q: Okay.
A: They bought a unit for test and evaluation.
Q: When did your sales occur?
A: 1970, ’71.
Q: Do they use the units now?
A: No, sir.
Q: Do you know when they stopped using the units?
A: I believe it was 1977 when they removed the units from their cranes.
Q: Do you know why the units were removed?
A: Because it was the opinion of—it was their safety director—that they were not
reliable.
Q: When did you first learn that Reynolds Electric was having a problem with the
safety device?
A: Several—well, I first heard about it in 1975.
Q: Did you cause an investigation to occur?
A: Yes, I did.
Q: What investigation did you do?
A: I went to Las Vegas, Nevada, and in the company of our dealer, American
Equipment in Las Vegas, want on the test site and visited with several people there.
Q: What did your investigation reveal?
A: Our investigation revealed that many of the units had been installed incorrectly on
their cranes.
Pg. 61, Ln 12 Q: And would you train the maintenance people?
A: Yes, and I talked to the operators and discussed it with various people on the test
site, yes.
Q: Was the initial use of the proximity warning device as expected by your company?
A: Yes.
Q: Were the results favorable to the use of the device?
A: Yes.
84.12.14 Deposition of Collin W. Dunnam (Case # 88-043, Twenty-seventh Judicial District
Court, Parish of Landry, State of Louisiana)
Dunnam is the contractor’s safety director for the Mercury Atomic Test Site, a
government facility in Nevada, which performs many tests on atomic weapons. These
tests usually required the use of cranes that had to be driven (walked under their own
power) along roadway test sites. Distribution powerlines infrequently crossed the
roadways. Powerline contacts occurred when the crane operator failed to see the
powerline in time to lower the boom.
Pg. 55, Ln 20- Q: “Did REECo, during its testing of the proximity warning device and
its evaluation, discover any particular hazards that may confront a crane operator that’s
operating a crane with a proximity warning device on it?”
A: “We felt that the operator might have a false sense of security and rely on the
mechanical device that we felt was not reliable to keep him out of trouble.”
Pg. 59, Ln 6- Q: “Have you ever had any contacts with overhead powerlines since you
removed the proximity warning devices off your … cranes?”
A: “ Yes sir.”
Q: “How many, would you tell me, please.”
A: “Two.”

44
84.10.00 Department of the Army- Corps of Engineers, EM 385-1-1; General Safety
Requirements Manual 01.A.03

01.A.03: “Prior to commencement of work at a job site, an acceptable accident


prevention plan written by the prime contractor for the specific work and
implementing in detail the pertinent requirements of this manual, will be reviewed by
designated government personnel. On contract operations, the contractor’s plan will
be job specific and will include work to be performed by subcontractors, and
measures to be taken by the contractor to control hazards associated with materials,
services, or equipment provided by suppliers.”

15.I.17: “When materials or equipment are stored under energized lines or near
energized equipment, clearance shall be maintained [as in Table 15-1] and
extraordinary caution shall be exercised when moving materials near such energized
equipment.

1985 Jack Ainsworth, a U.S. Army Senior Electronics Engineer designed and had
assembled under his supervision some twenty 4-wheel drive surveillance vehicles for
the U.S. Immigration Service. These vehicles transported a night vision system unit
that could be raised on a pneumatic mast capable of reaching overhead powerlines.
The surveillance was done at night, and the driver and operator in the cab of the
vehicles often functioned without headlights to conceal their presence. The
SigAlarm™, an electrostatic detector, was installed and wired to prohibit the mast
from raising when the van was parked under or adjacent to a powerline. This program
has had 18 years of successful use with zero powerline contacts.

Note: This is approximately 360 equipment years of the safe use of SigAlarm™.

1985 MacCollum, David V., “Crane Design Hazard Analysis”, Automotive Engineering
and Litigation, edited by George A. Peters, J.D., P.E., and Barbara J.Peters, J.D.,
Garland Law Publishing, New York and London

This chapter presents a detailed summary of possible reasons for the continuation of
crane hazards and lists 20 common equipment failure modes, explaining each in
detail and using human factors as evidence. The section on powerline presents charts
documenting the alarmingly high death rate of over 150/year of workers by powerline
contact and reviews the availability of preventive devices such as links and proximity
warning devices.

85.05.28 The operator of a leased crane lost both arms while removing a locomotive motor
from a train wreck site and contacted a 7,200 V mid-span powerline in the vicinity.
The leased crane offered no safety options such as insulated link or proximity device.
See A-18

This case clearly illustrates an unequal protection from the hazard of powerline
contacts, as the railroad companies often equip their cranes with an electrostatic
proximity alarm when their contractor’s cranes are unequipped with appliances for
work adjacent to and underneath powerlines. The use of the alarm would create
among operating personnel a strong incentive to call the electric utility company and
have the powerlines temporarily de-energized.

85.07.00 NIOSH ALERT # 85-111: Preventing Electrocutions from Contact Between Cranes
and Powerlines

According to data gathered for this paper., there were approximately 2,300 lost
workday occupational injuries in the U.S. in 1981 which resulted form contact with
electrical current by crane booms, cables, or loads, resulting in 115 fatalities and 200
total permanent disabilities. This data indicates that 36% of powerline contact injuries
are fatal.

45
85.10.05 The worker guiding a load of pre-cast concrete was injured when the hoist line struck
a 7,200 V powerline in an unmarked danger zone. See A-19

This case is a second example of straddle crane powerline contact and the clear need
to remove powerlines from the loading area.

1986 A label is developed with explicit warnings of electrocution and an illustration of the
danger zone by David V. MacCollum (See Illustration I)

86.03.16 Deposition of Collin W. Dunnam (Case # A 246122, Eighth Judicial District Court
for the State of Nevada, County of Clark)
This is an excerpt of deposition by a crane manufacturer’s expert being questioned by
the injured’s attorney.
Pg. 82, Ln 14- Q: Did any of these people that you talked to feel that the system should
not have been abandoned?
A: There was one department manager who had two cranes under his supervision at
that time that felt that the proximity device was a good warning device.
Pg. 85, Ln 14- Q: Were the results of your investigation and testing published in a
national Journal?
A: No,
Q: How was it that all of a sudden lawyers from all over the country started calling you
about the results of that test, do you know how the word got out?
A: Yes, because, as I explained previously, I was asked to give a presentation about
our experience with proximity warning devices to a group of attorneys in Chicago.
Q: And you believe that’s what started the process?
A: I believe it is, yes.
Pg. 88, Ln 15-Q: During this eight-year period, when did you become aware that there
were problems with the SigAlarm System?
A: As I indicated, the case where we had a contact is one that first started causing me to
question the effectiveness. Then the --, well, I believe that occurred in March 1977.
Then I think in September 1977 is when the representatives from our engineering and
operations equipment departments came to me and asked permission to remove them.
Note: These maintenance personnel work closely with manufacturers for the purchase
of spare parts and maintenance services. In such situations it appears that the
manufacturers’ service reps could have an opportunity to suggest removal of safety
devices.

86.09.00 Morgan, J. Derald and Hamilton, Howard B., “Field Test of Rayco Detek-Thor”
Report Prepared for Grove Manufacturing

“The Rayco Company ‘Detek Thor’ powerline proximity warning device was
recently introduced commercially. It operates on the principle of measuring
capacitive current (inversely proportional to distance from powerline) rather than the
principle used by SigAlarm™ and others.”

46
86.09.00 Morgan, J. Derald and Hamilton, Howard B.: “Field Test of Tinsley Overhead
Powerline Detector” Report prepared for Grove Manufacturing; Appendix 1& 2

The test results detail the same system flaws for the Tinsley electrostatic field
detecting device than it does for all other safety appliances: positions of the boom
directly under the powerlines and over the powerlines do not trigger a constantly
sounding signal, and there is a sensitivity discrepancy in certain parts of the
powerline when a power pole crossarms carries lines of different voltages in close
vicinity to each other. The study also mentioned that the Tinsley device was not as
easy to program as the SigAlarm™.

This device detects the electrostatic field in which the field strength is proportional to
the flow; the lower the voltage the weaker the field.

Note: These studies, performed by the same people for the same crane manufacturers
are contained in the timeline in order to show the regularity and increasing lack of
validity of their observations against appliances of this type.

87.10.00 Department of the Army- Corps of Engineers, EM 385-1-1 (Rev); General Safety
Requirements Manual 01.A.03
01.A.03: “Prior to commencement of work at a job site, an acceptable accident
prevention plan written by the prime contractor for the specific work and implementing
in detail the pertinent requirements of this manual, will be reviewed by designated
government personnel. On contract operations, the contractor’s plan will be job specific
and will include work to be performed by subcontractors, and measures to be taken by
the contractor to control hazards associated with materials, services, or equipment
provided by suppliers.”
15.I.16: No materials or equipment shall be stored under energized bus, energized lines,
or near energized equipment, if it is possible to store them elsewhere.
15.I. 17: When materials or equipment are stored under energized lines or near
energized equipment, clearance shall be maintained [as in Table 15.1] and
extraordinary caution shall be exercised when moving material near such energized
equipment.
15.E.02: All electric power or distribution lines shall be placed underground in areas
where there is extensive use of equipment having the capability of encroachment on the
clear distances specified in 15.E.08

47
87.10.27 Excerpt from the deposition of Collin W. Dunnam (Case # 60483, Iowa District Court
for Black Hawk County)
This testimony is an example of more false claims and allegations by the defense
witness for a crane manufacturer.
Pg. 35, Ln 14- Q: Okay. Am I also correct that you had a number of powerline contact
incidents prior to the time that this evaluation of proximity alarms was made?
A: Between 1965 and 1970, yes, sir.
Q: And how many powerline contact incidents were there during that 5-year period?
A: About ten.
Q: And after the proximity warning devices were put on the crane, How many
powerline contact incidents did you have?
A: Only One.
Q : Am I --, did that involve a crane?
A: Yes sir.
Q: Did the boom come into actual contact with the powerline?
A: I don’t know. It either came into contact or close enough to cause an arc.
Q: Was the proximity warning or alarm on at the time that this incident occurred?
A: The operator wasn’t sure whether it was on or not.
Q: Since the time that the proximity alarms were taken off the crane, have you had
some powerline contact incidents since that time, or have you not?
A: Yes, sir, we have.
Q: How many have you had?
A: Two involving cranes.
Q: And have you had some other powerline contacts involving other pieces of
equipment other than cranes?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What types of equipment would this be?
A: Forklift and drill rigs.

88.07.00 Suruda, Anthony “Electrocution at Work” Professional Safety (The American Society
of Safety Engineers Journal)
“The National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS) reports approximately 1,000
electrocutions of all types each year in the U.S.”
However, there is a fair amount of ambiguity of both the sources and the reliability of
the statistics. According to the article, heavy equipment was involved in a greater
number of inadvertent powerline contacts than any other group.

1989 ASME/ANSI Mobile and Locomotive Cranes B30.5:


Includes an illustration of Fig. 17: Radial Distance from Powerlines, which infers that
it is safe for a crane boom to work under or above a powerline. Mentions the use of
cage-type boom guards, insulating links, and proximity alarms as not a substitute for
the 10 foot clearance of 50 kV.

48
1989 “Boom Buoy” 3 Dimensional Range Limiting Device, Rayco System, Ltd.
Brochure on implementation and operation of a high-tech range limiting device. This
device allows the operator to program the envelope in which the boom can be
maneuvered to prevent it from being slued or raised into a powerline.

1989 Price, Dennis L.: “Machinery Operational Safety Near Overhead Powerlines”,
published in Hazard Prevention, the journal of the System Safety Society
This article is an in-depth discussion of bodily mechanisms that indicate balance and
allow fine-tuned perception. The author goes into great detail regarding the ability of
most people with normal vision to perceive and recognize overhead powerlines, with
some account of human error. This article also primes the way for a study regarding
perception of powerlines, the results of which are released in a later paper.

1989 Paques, Joseph-Jean (IRSST), Michaud, Pierre (Centre de recherche industrielle du


Québec) van Dike, Pierre (Centre de recherche industrielle du Québec)
“Development of a Range-Limiting Device for Mobile Cranes”
This piece details development for a more efficient, reliable range limiting device.

1989 Morgan, J. Derald: “Evaluation of Proximity Warning Devices for Cranes” National
Academy of Forensic Engineers Journal
This is a negative evaluation based on previous research made available for various
crane manufacturers.

89.07.00 Price, Dennis L.: “The Detection of Overhead Powerlines” Proceedings of the Ninth
International System Safety Conference
Two studies to determine perceptive ability to overhead powerlines were conducted
for this report. One study required the subjects walking toward the powerline at 90°,
and 65° while looking at the powerline, and observing powerlines directly overhead.
The next study was conducted with a backing truck with a makeshift boom. The
subjects would act as observers and tell the drivers of the truck where to stop.
According to the study, all the trucks stopped before they had crossed underneath the
powerline, leading to the conclusion: “Observers, who are attentive to the presence of
overhead powerlines can detect the line location sufficiently to remain clear.”
Note: He fails to mention that crane operators and signalmen can be “distracted” by
performing the job at hand. It is impossible to focus on a task and keep constant view
of the powerlines. In addition, even in the study, though nobody crossed under a
powerline, as it is known that many violate the ten foot “thin air” clearance required
by law while working in the vicinity of powerlines.

89.07.24 An operator was seriously maimed when he slued the boom of the flatbed crane into a
7,200 V powerline. The controls were attached to the crane with an electric tether,
allowing him to operate while standing in a dangerous position on the ground. The
manufacturer of the crane had faced similar lawsuits for malfunctioning control boxes
that disobeyed the commands of the crane operator, often resulting in serious injury
or death. See A-20
This case summarizes a number of similar occurrences with the use of remote
controlled controls on a wire tether. These controls should be outlawed, as the crane
and the operator are in direct jeopardy in the boom strikes a powerline.

1990’s The manufacturers of sailboats began installing insulating plugs in their masts to
prevent electrocution.

49
1990 Karady ,G.G., “Efficiency of Insulating Link For Protection of Crane Workers” ,
published by the International Society of Electrical and Electronic Engineers (IEEE)
90 SM 338-4 PWRD:
“The paper concludes that in spite of the shortcomings, the insulator link increases
the safety of the crane operation. Furthermore, the developed model and calculation
method can be used for the evaluation of new crane insulator systems.”
Note: The paper concludes that in spite of minor milliamp current leakage or
flashover at high voltages, there are none at 7200 volts, which constitutes 90% of
powerlines. The shortcomings, the insulator link increases the safety of the crane
operation. Furthermore, the developed model and calculation method can be used for
the evaluation of new crane insulator systems.

90.02.23 A seasoned foreman was using a flatbed truck mounted crane to unload steel forms
for concrete paving for a new freeway with powerlines running parallel along one
side. He did not suspect the presence of a single- phase 7,200 V powerline crossing
the road, and died of electrocution when the crane boom contacted it mid-span. After
the incident, Mr. Andrews, the contractor Fred Weber, Inc.’s vice-president of safety,
immediately purchased a proximity warning device for every crane in his fleet. In an
affidavit given on December 29, 1999 (for the case listed in A-27), the same Mr.
Andrews talks about the usefulness and life-saving properties of proximity devices.
See A-21
This case illustrates a reliable and successful use of the electrostatic proximity device
as a warning system.

90.04.00 Pritzker, Paul E., P.E.: “Stopping Construction Sites from Becoming Killing Fields”
Electrical System Design
While researching the death by electrocution of a crane signalman, consulting
engineer Paul Pritzker also finds himself researching lifesaving devices such as links
and proximity warning devices. In the article, he mentions information such as the
fact that every crane moved onto a navy base must be equipped with proximity
alarms, and the fact that there has never been a reported accident on a crane with a
proximity alarm installed. He states definitively that an insulated link on the crane he
studied would have saved the flagman’s life, and likens the disuse of such devices to
the absence of life vests in a boat. “While some safety devices are not 100 percent fail
safe, it does not mean that they should not be used.”

90.04.09 A gruesome death resulted after five minutes of continuous serious burns when the
hoist line of a crane became entangled in a newly energized powerline. See A-22
This case is an example of where the deceased, working alone, was unaware that
utility had energized the powerline. Warning with an electrostatic proximity alarm
would have alerted the operator even though there was no current flow.

50
90.05.22 Testimony of Donald A. Pittenger, Acting Chief of Safety and Occupational Health,
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers on H.R. 4652: The Construction Safety, Health, and
Education Improvement Act of 1990, Before Subcommittee on Health and Safety,
Committee on Education and Labor, United States House of Representatives
Pg. 2: “The first Corps of Engineers safety and health requirements manual was
published in 1941… I also point out that our safety and health requirements manual
formed the basis of OSHA’s construction safety and health requirements. Today, with
over fifty years of experience backing us, the Corps’ safety and health program is a
model in the construction industry. In 1988, the most recent year for which the
Bureau of Labor Statistics records are available, Corps contractors (working within
the United States) had a lost-time accident frequent rate of 1.5- the industry average,
6.8, was over four times higher.”*
A key requirement in the aforementioned manual is the implementation of a Pre-job
Construction Safety Plan. This plan is incorporated into the timeline at 77.06.01,
84.10.00, 87.10.00, and 92.10.00 under U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Safety and
Health Requirements Manual.
*These statistics would no longer be considered accurate due to new statistical
processing methods.

90.06.13 A workman died while hosing down his dump truck in an area designated for
cleaning them. The area contained a 21-foot high 4,600 V powerline in the vicinity.
See A-23

This case illustrates the landowner’s responsibility to designate a safe site for
washing any high-clearance equipment. HIFI has on record some 48 other
occurrences of dump beds raised into a powerline, and undoubtedly there are more.

51
90.11.05 Deposition Excerpt of John H. Crowley (U.S. District Court, State of Kansas, # 90-
2159-0) who was employed by the Equipment Manufacturers’ Institute (EMI),
formerly known as the Farm and Industrial Equipment Institute (FIEI) as the director of
safety
Record deposition on the matter of MACCC/EMI
Pg 19, Ln 7- Q: To your knowledge, did the MADDDC engineering and technical
committee ever develop a reference library for constituent members of MADDDC to
have access to at EMI?
A: No, no.
Q: Are you aware of whether or not that was ever a recommended project?
A: I am not aware. I don’t know that that was.
Q: Is there any type of repository for papers, standards, studies, texts, technical
bulletins, and periodicals pertaining to aerial devices that’s ever been put together for
use of the member companies of MADDDC?
A: Yes.
Q: What is that composition of material identified as?
A: Well, I am not sure exactly what the content is or that it contains everything that you
mentioned, but there is a repository of information for MADDDC members and that
is—I think it’s called a—syllabus is the word that’s used. It’s a syllabus. If the question
is limited to EMI, then the answer is that nothing was prepared at EMI.
Q: Was anything prepared, to your knowledge, for MADDDC that is the equivalent of
a repository of papers, standards, studies, texts, et cetera, relative to the things
pertaining to aerial devices?
A: Yes.
Q: What type of information is contained in that repository?
A: My understanding is that is contains standards like ANSI A92 type standards. It
contains records of closed cases involving aerial devices and digger derricks, I believe.
That’s as much as I know it contains.

52
Q: When you say it contains records of closed cases, what type of cases are you making
continued
reference to?
A: Product liability type cases.
Q: Do you know what the period of time that’s included in this record of closed cases
is?
A: No, I don’t know.
Q: Have you personally ever looked at any records?
A: No. The Standards part, yes, but not the closed cases.
Q: Do you know where these records of closed cases are maintained?
A: Yes.
Q: Where is that?
A: In the office of Lord, Bissell, & Brook, a law firm in Chicago.
Q: Would that include the standards that you earlier referenced?
A: Yes.
Q: Those standards—
A: To the best of my knowledge, that’s correct.
[Defense council: I object. Mr. Crowley has indicated, except for the standards, he’s
never seen this material. I believe he’s now speculating about what might be there and
where it might be, and I object on that basis because it calls for speculation.]
Q: Do you know where at Lord, Bissell, & Brook these documents are contained?
A: You mean physically where?
Q: Yes, physically.
A: No, I don’t.
Q: Do you know which lawyer with that firm is responsible for administering these
documents?
A: At the present time?
Q: Yes, at the present time.
A: Yes, I do.
Pg 23, Ln 1- Q: Are you familiar with any of the various periodicals that may be
contained within this repository of reference materials that we earlier referenced or
made reference to in this deposition?
A: I don’t know what kinds of periodicals are contained in this syllabus, if any.
Q: Does EMI maintain any type of library of publications for use by its constituent
members? I guess it would be better stated for use by members of its constituent
member councils.
[Defense council: That’s been asked and answered, and he said no.]
A: That’s true for all of EMI as well as for MADDDC; we have nothing—we are not a
repository for information.
Pg 31, Ln 20- Q: Maybe I didn’t ask it right. Do you personally know why this separate
repository is maintained at Lord, Bissell, & Brook?
A: Well, the membership of MADDDC told us they wanted to do it that way.
Q: Did they tell you why they wanted to do it that way?
[Defense council: I object to that, and to the extent that this question might call for
attorney/client privileged communications, I instruct the witness not to answer.
A: I decline to answer on the advice of council
Q: To your knowledge, was their reason related to some advice of council?
[Defense council: I am going to object to the question as calling for speculation or
conjecture on the part of the witness.]

53
continued A: I decline to answer on the advice of council.
Q: As I understand it, your council advised you not to respond to an earlier question as
it related to any communications that council may have made to a MADDDC member
that you would be restating based on my inquiry. My question is now whether or not
the reasons that this information is stored at Lord, Bissell & Brook is the product of
some attorney recommendation, if you know that.
Pg 33, Ln 11- Q: I would like for you to look at what’s been identified as Plaintiff’s
exhibit No 11 and identify this document for me please?
[Defense council: Before doing that, is that something that was produced at this
deposition?]
Mr. Cherry [plaintiff’s attorney]: Yes.
Defense: By Mr. Crowley?
Mr. Cherry: That’s correct.
Crowley: There are two documents here.
Q: [Cherry] Would you identify them by the color of the document?
A: One is light brown, and it’s called “Initial Report of Suit” and it’s a form—it shows
MADDDC on the top, and it’s a reporting form.
Q: Is it a reporting form for accidents and the suits that are produced as a result of the
accident; is that your understanding of what the document is?
[defense council: objection]
Q: Do you know what the document is?
A: Yes, I do.
Q: Have you seen the document or something similar to that document before?
A: Yes, I have.
Q: Is it used by MADDDC constituent members in reporting accidents to some
committee for MADDDC?
[defense council: objection]
[defense council: objection]
A: It’s not used to report any data to any committee of EMI.
Q: Do you know what its purpose is?
A: Yes, I do.
Q: What is that?
A: It’s to report information about accidents in which a lawsuit is involved to Lord,
Bissell, & Brook.
Q: And who is to make that report, if you know
[defense council: objection]
A: I can only say what our role is as it has to do with this form, and that is to send the
form to member companies of MADDDC.
Q: That’s what EMI does?
A: That’s what we do, and that’s the extent of it. What we do is simply provide a pad of
these forms to MADDDC members.
Pg 37, Ln 1- A [Crowley]: That the MADDDC members use this to report information
that they know of when there’s a suit.
Q; And based on your personal knowledge of this document and where it is to be
submitted, to whom is this document once it is completed to be submitted to?
A: To John Haarlow of Lord, Bissell, & Brook.
Pg 40, Ln 5- A [Crowley]: The document speaks for itself: Initial report of suit.

54
continued Pg. 42, Ln 6- A [Crowley]: This is a reporting form, and it’s entitled “Report of Closed
Case”, and it’s a blank form with a number of different questions, same as the brown
document we just discussed.
Q: And what is your understanding as to the purpose of that document?
[defense council: objection]
A: I only know what I see here, that it’s to be addressed to John Haarlow, Lord, Bissell,
& Brook, which is clearly stated on the first page of the document. I know nothing
more than that.
Pg. 42, Ln 17- Q: Are you familiar with the fact that there was accident reporting to
Lord, Bissell, & Brook prior to the use of this form?
[defense council: objection]
A: I don’t know.
Q: it is my understanding that you began to work in 1978 with EMI?
A: Yes.
Q: At the time that you first began your position at EMI, did you know whether or not
there was an ongoing accident reporting mechanism for MADDDC constituent
members to Lord, Bissell & Brook?
A: I know that there was a relationship between MADDDC members and Lord, Bissell,
& Brook when I first joined FIEI in 1978, but I don’t know specifically whether or not
it involved reporting of accidents.

91.01.11 Letter to Mr. Norman C. Hargreaves, Koehering Cranes and Excavators, Inc. from
Mr. Timothy J. Pizatella, Chief, Surveillance and Field Investigations Branch,
Division of Safety Research, NIOSH

“Based on the NTOF data, it is clear that crane contact with overhead powerlines is a
problem demanding the attention of crane users, crane manufacturers, federal and
state agencies and others interested in preventing work-related electrocutions.”

91.02.00 “Mobile Cranes and Power Lines” National Safety Council Data Sheet I-743 New 90
Safety and Health

“The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) provides regulations…


in 29 CFR, 1926.550(a)(15)-…. Mentions the use of cage boom type guards,
insulating links and proximity warning devices…”

“The important thing is to call the electric utility company early during the prebid
planning stage. At that stage you will know (1) if the powerline can be de-energized,
or (2) if other precautions will be needed during the job.”

“When construction is to start, there should be a meeting of property owners, general


contractors, subcontractors, the supervisor of crane operations and any other
responsible entities and the electric utility. They need to discuss possible hazards and
agree on measures necessary to ensure that equipment will not be exposed to
accidental contact with energized powerlines. When any crane lift or other operation
is to be done near energized powerlines, the crane operator or job supervisor should
advise the electric utility and should take whatever steps are necessary to ensure
safety throughout the project. Storage under powerlines of any equipment or material
that might be lifted by a crane should be prohibited. A job safety analysis can be
conducted for the anticipated crane operations.”

“The operator may be unable to maintain the required clearance by visual means
because the human eye is not capable of judging with any degree of accuracy the
distance to a smooth horizontal wire in space.”

55
91.02- “Do Insulated Links Help?” Lift Equipment: Yes- Robert J. Mongeluzzi, Plaintiff’s
03.00 attorney; No- J. Derald Morgan, defense witness

Yes: A link must be able to reduce the current traveling through it to less than 50
milliamps. (Heart fibrillation starts at 50-75 milliamps; severe tissue damage occurs
at about 500.) “Tests performed by Harnischfeger and American Hoist and Derrick
Co. show that contaminated links restricted current to no less than eight milliamps,
which would cause a mild shock with no permanent physical injury.” The grand
majority of tested links met or exceeded these criteria.

No: “A further refinement of the criteria [for considered success] was to adopt the
position that any current flow over the link, while possibly limited to non-lethal
levels, which could be felt by an unsuspecting worker that would cause involuntary
shock reactions or reflex actions that could cause a serious accident involving the
reacting worker or their co-workers is considered unsafe. To this end, a maximum
leakage current level of one milliamp was adopted as the acceptable maximum limit
under any test conditions.”

91.03.00 MacCollum, David V., “Hunting Down Crane Hazards” Lift Equipment

This article presents human factors as evidence that crane powerline contacts are not
preventable solely through worker awareness, and stresses management pre-job
planning as the first place to start to overcome the hazard of powerline contact. (See
Illustration II on how to map the danger zone)

91.06.18 Three men were injured when laying pipeline across an electric utility encasement.
The pipeline company had previously contacted the electric company with a request
to temporarily turn off the power, and the request was ignored. See A-24

This shows that the diversity of boomed equipment includes side-mounted booms on
crawler tractors used in pipelines, and all can easily reach powerlines.

91.09.00 Paques, Joseph-Jean “Cranes and Overhead Powerlines” Published at the 13th
International Convention ISSA for Construction, Bruxelles

This paper looks closely at crane powerline contacts and suggests many measures to
prevent them, including communication with the electric utility companies to cut off
power or relocate or bury the lines, grounding the machinery, proximity devices and
ground markings. He also suggests many methods of insulation, including insulating
controls between the control panel and the machinery.

91.09.10 Letter containing incidents of electrocution involving boomed equipment from 1980-
1988. To: Ms. Suzanna E. Ellefson (Kelly, McLaughlin & Foster) from Ms.
Suzanne Kisner, Statistician, Injury Surveillance Section, Division of Safety
Research, NIOSH

Total recorded deaths by electrocution: 34.8*, % construction incidents: 46.6

* “Cases of work-related fatal injuries may be missed……For this reason, the data
presented should be regarded as the absolute minimum number of events.”

56
92.01.28 Last update: Safety Code for the Construction Industry, Quebec, Canada S-2.1, r.6

5.2.1: The employer shall ensure that no one performs work liable to bring any part,
load, machine component or person closer to an electrical line than the minimum
approach distance.

5.2.2: The employer who wishes to carry out work liable to bring any part, load,
machine component or person closer to an electrical line than the minimum approach
distance specified in section 5.2.1, may proceed to such work provided that one of the
following conditions is complied with:

c) extensible construction equipment, such as a backhoe, a power shovel, a crane or a


dump truck shall be equipped with a device that has two functions: i) to warn the
operator or to stop the equipment from operating, so that the minimum approach
distance specified in section 5.2.1 is respected: ii) to stop the equipment from
operating, should the device fail to perform its first function.

92.02.10 Murray, Charles J.: “Remote Control System Reduces Crane Accidents” Design
News

This article informs the public about a new preventive device for cranes. A remote
control system “prevents electrocution by eliminating the conductive path between a
high voltage wire and an operator.” This device allows the operator to limit the range
the boom can be positioned by using a computer system.

New technology to improve safety is appearing all the time. This device presents yet
another option on ways to help eliminate boom powerline contacts.

92.07.00 MacCollum, David V.: “Designing Out Electrical Hazards” CraneWorks

This article places equipment safety first and foremost in the hands of the project
management team. During prejob planning it is key to carefully survey the area for
any hidden hazards and map the Danger Zone on the ground so it is clearly visible to
all personnel. Planners must also work closely with the Electric Utility company, in
compliance with OSHA. It is also a good idea to post the telephone number of the
Utility company on the side of the crane as an added reminder for who to call in the
event that the crane boom needs to be extended into the danger zone under the
powerline. See illustration I

92.09.21 A worker lost both arms during new freeway construction when the hoist line
contacted a powerline mid-span. None of the construction plans included an attempt
to bury or relocate the powerlines, even through the budget allowed for it. See
A-25

This case included testimony that an insulated link would have prevented the
crippling injuries.

57
92.10.00 Department of the Army- Corps of Engineers, EM 385-1-1 (Rev); General Safety
Requirements Manual 01.A.03
01.A.07: “Prior to initiation of work at a job site, an accident prevention plan-
written by the prime contractor for the specific work and hazards of the contract and
implementing in detail the pertinent requirements of this manual- will be reviewed
and found acceptable by designated government personnel.”

Pg. 3: Guidelines for the Preparation of Accident Prevention Plans:

B. Administrative responsibilities for implementing the accident prevention plan;


identification and accountability of personnel responsible for accident prevention.
C. Means for coordinating and controlling work activities of contractors,
subcontractors, and suppliers; responsibilities of subcontractors in effecting the
requirements of the accident prevention plan.
D. Plans for safety indoctrination and continued safety training.

11.E.01(b): All electric power or distribution lines shall be placed underground in


areas where there is extensive use of equipment having the capability to encroach on
the clear distances specified in 11.E.04 (0-50 kV-10’, 51-100 kV-12’)

11E.02: Work activity adjacent to overhead lines shall not be initiated until a survey
has been made to ascertain the safe distance from energized lines.

11.H.11(b): Materials and equipment shall net be stored under energized bus,
energized lines, or near energized equipment if it is possible to store them elsewhere.
If materials or equipment must be stored under energized lines or near energized
equipment, clearance shall be maintained and extraordinary caution shall be exercised
in maintaining these clearances when operating equipment or moving materials near
such energized equipment.

58
1993 MacCollum, David V.: Crane Hazards and Their Prevention, Book published by the
American Society of Safety Engineers, Des Plaines, IL

Chapter 4: Powerline contact- “Cranes and powerlines are not compatible and should
not occupy the same workspace. Powerline contact presents the highest risk in crane
operations. It is probably the most devastating, continually reoccurring type of
personal injury and property damage. A single contact can result in multiple deaths
and/or crippling injuries. From my review of OSHA and MSHA injury data and
injury data available from litigation experience, my best estimate shows that each
year approximately 150 to 160 people are killed or crippled by powerline contact and
about three times that number are seriously injured. On an average, eight out of ten of
those injured were guiding the load at the time of contact.”

Types of cranes involved in 400 powerline contacts were:


1. Truck Carrier, Latticework Boom: 26%
2. Truck Carrier, Hydraulic Boom: 24%
3. Mobile Hydraulic Boom, Rough Terrain 19%
4. Flatbed, Hydraulic Boom 16%
5. Flatbed, Trolley Boom, Remote Control 11%
6. Crawler Carrier, Latticework Boom 4%
The personnel were injured or killed when:
1. Guiding the load 71%
2. Getting on or off crane and/or touching crane 21%
3. Other activity 8%
(See Illustration II)

1993 Paques, Joseph-Jean: “Crane Accidents by Contact with Powerlines”, Safety Science,
16

Studies powerline contacts in Quebec and Ontario, Canada, and the USA. Breaks
down information by type of vehicle or equipment used, and the features of those
pieces of equipment. Recommendations suggest that further precautions can be made
based on type of equipment.

Paques also continues to investigate and improve the usefulness of the range limiting
device.

1993 AS 2550.1 Australian Standard: Cranes- Safe Use

(e) “Where necessary, provide ground barriers to warn operators.”

Note: These barriers are labeled as “Personal Protection Barriers”. The use of these
devices makes the danger zone visible and immutable to all personnel; they are more
likely to be aware of the danger and cannot physically penetrate into the danger zone.

(f) “Use non-conducting taglines when these are required.”

(g) “Do not allow any person, other than the crane operator, to be in contact with any
part of the crane or the load, except with a non-conducting tagline, once the lift has
commenced.”

59
93.02.01 A worker using a non-insulated aerial lift on a movie set raised it into a 7,200 V
powerline while working within the danger zone, sustaining head and shoulder burns
so serious and disfiguring that he had to wear a sack over his head for three years so
as not to frighten his family while he underwent skin grafts. See A-26

This case highlights the many occurrences and also illustrates why uninsulated aerial
lifts cannot be used safely in the vicinity of powerlines. Moreover, this case shows
that the movie lot owner has a duty to provide a safe workplace for any workers who
are employees of movie producers that lease the facility. A safe place for aerial lifts
would most likely entail buried powerlines in the area behind the sets.

93.05.00 MacCollum, David V.: “Cranes and Power Lines make Fatal Combination”
Construction Newsletter

This article reiterates the supreme importance of prejob construction planning,


especially creating, accurately mapping, and remaining aware of a danger zone
surrounding powerlines. The ground must be marked, preferably with barricades, and
operators or managers are encouraged to call the electric utility company if a line or
boom penetrates the danger zone. In ideal situations, power would be turned off or
lines relocated or buried before the job starts.

93.06.26 Excerpt from the deposition of J. Derald Morgan, (Case # CJ92-549-92791 District
County, Grand Forks County, North Dakota)
Q: Well, what is excessive leakage of current in the field? What we’re talking
about is human lives now.
A: Any current over one milliamp.
Note: As illustrated earlier in the debate between Morgan and Mongeluzzi (91.02-03)
and other amperage measures, one milliamp of current can barely be detected by the
human body. There are no documented cases of one milliamp being sufficient to cause
death or damage to human tissue.

93.10.08 A company’s refusal to buy an insulated basket for a crane being used as an aerial lift
resulted in the amputation of a worker’s arm due to a shock sustained when he was
loading materials stored under a 7,200 V powerline onto a truck. See A-27

This case re-iterates the need to prohibit storage of materials under powerlines, as it
only invites the use of cranes in a dangerous location.

93.11.01 “Occupational Safety and Health Standards for the Construction Industry” (29 CFR
Part 1926), newly amended

Subpart N, 1926.550 (15)(iv) “A person shall be designated to observe clearance of


the equipment and give timely warning for all operations where it is difficult for the
operator to maintain the desired clearance by visual means.”

(15) (v) “Cage-type boom guards, insulating links, or proximity devices may be used
on cranes, but the use of suck devices shall not alter the requirements of any other
regulation of this part even if such device is required by law or regulation”

93.11.09 A crane’s boom was rotated in an arc towards a 7,200 V powerline while working in
the danger zone, severely burning the worker guiding the load. Had the crane been
rotated in an arc 180 degrees away from the powerline the contact would not have
occurred. See A-28

This case illustrates one of the many situations where marking the Danger Zone with
ground tape aids the operator in avoiding powerlines, as shown in Illustration II.

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1994 ASME B.30.5a: (Mobile and Locomotive Cranes) Operating Near Electric
Powerlines

Figure 17a (Danger Zone for Cranes and Lifted Loads Operating Near Electrical
Transmission Lines) amends the danger zone to extend to the ground ten feet in either
direction under powerlines. However, Figure 17b nullifies this instruction by
allowing longer cranes to slue their booms into the danger zone ten feet below the
powerlines.

Note: Has no requirements prohibiting the use of crane controls accessible to operator
when standing on the ground or using remote controls on an electric cable tether.

94.02.22 A host of news gathering vans from various networks had assembled for the breaking
of a major news story. The news changed when a news worker sitting on the side of
the van with an open door with his feet on the ground raised the antenna of his van
into trees concealing an overhead 7,200 V powerline. He was instantly electrocuted,
and his gory death was filmed by another news station. Yet the occurrence remained
buried, and the news networks did nothing to circulate news of the danger of
powerline contact or increase safety by insisting on available safety devices as
developed in 1985 by Jack Ainsworth for the immigration service (see pg. 15).
See A-29

This case is the first in a series of Electronic News Gathering Van (ENG) suits that
involved raising a pneumatic mast and antenna into powerlines. It was known that the
U.S. immigration service used electrostatic proximity alarms on their immigration
surveillance vehicles. They were installed to prevent the pneumatic mast from being
raised when immediately adjacent to powerlines.

1994 Q2 MacCollum, David V.: “System Safety Analysis of Workplace Equipment and
Facilities” Hazard Prevention (the System Safety Society Journal)

Included in this piece on equipment safety is a convincing cost-benefit analysis in


favor of implementing system safety. System safety on cranes can be easily
accomplished by installing insulated links and proximity warning detectors to help
prevent powerline contact, saving the manufacturers money through the prevention of
possible litigation.

94.07.05 Inappropriate tools were provided to an electric utility lineman, making it necessary
to raise the boom in order for him to continue working. The raised boom contacted a
7,200 V powerline and the lineman was killed. See A-30

This case illustrates the need for all boomed equipment used near or adjacent to
powerlines should use the insulated models.

94.08.09 Working fast to cover a news breaking story, the mast of a newsgathering van was
raised into an unseen 7,200 V powerline, causing amputation of a worker’s foot.
See A-31

This is the second news gathering van serious injury that HIFI has chosen to report on.

94.11.08 MacCollum, David V.: “Planning Safe Crane Use”, 13th Crane Inspection
Certification Bureau (CICB) Crane Conference, Tropicana Resort and Casino, Las
Vegas, NV, Session 10:

This presentation stresses the importance of sound construction planning and suggests
ways employers can plan to prevent powerline contact. The presentation also
broaches the idea that thorough planning eliminates liability because of their
prevention of injuries often requires more stringent measures than current safety
codes require.

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94.12.28 The boom of a shingle conveyor was rotated into an unseen 7,200 powerline near
dusk one December day. The untrained eighteen-year old worker placing tools into
storage in the side of the truck was electrocuted and died. See A-32

This case resulted in the manufacturer redesigning his boom conveyor to be non-
conductive, and then initiating a recall to retrofit his conveyors, preventing countless
possible powerline contacts.

1995 MacCollum, David V.: Construction Safety Planning, John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 605
3rd Ave, New York, NY, 10158-0012

Pg. 17: Powerline contacts used as an example of manufacturers burying information


after litigation and keeping the hazard open, instead of using the safety information to
make a positive change in the industry and improve safety for all.

Pg. 81: “OSHA requirement 1926.550(a)(15)(v) refers to the much-debated efficacy


of insulated links and proximity alarms. Tests have consistently demonstrated that
any leakage of amperage on insulated links deliberately contaminated for the test is
approximately the same as that acceptable for triggering ground-fault interrupters
(GFI) and well below the paralysis threshold established by the International
Electrotechnical Commission (IEC). An insulated link is capable of protecting a
rigger guiding a load if the boom or hoist line should come into contact with a
powerline. …..No known personal in jury litigation has arisen because of a failure of
an insulated link or proximity alarm when used in accordance with the
manufacturer’s instructions.”

Pg. 88: “Construction planning must include consideration of the power sources
needed on the project. Almost all operations rely upon electric power and its
distribution system…… Because powerlines do not mix with boomed and high-
clearance equipment, the location of existing power distribution systems and
proposed permanent or temporary powerlines on or adjacent to the job site must be
reviewed before any work is commenced.”

“One of the first priorities of the construction manager is to notify the electric utility
so that it can participate; if possible, in project safety planning, the prebid safety
conference, and the pre-notice-to-proceed conference, to create a clear understanding
and firm agreement in the separation of cranes and powerlines.”

Powerline safety plans must be incorporated into any Construction Safety Plan as a
priority sub-plan.

95.04.24 Row houses in a historical community were being restored. Cranes were used to lift
plasterboard through an upstairs front window, though the electric utility had not shut
off nearby powerlines. A crane with a knuckle boom was being operated by an
operator standing on the ground using an umbilical remote control. When the boom
contacted the 13,200 V powerline mid-span the current flowing through the operator
into the ground caused him to lose both hands and sustain other severe burns. See
A-33

This case shows the diversity the various types of crane booms, which is an articulate
knuckle with three or four sections that can be folded up, rather than being retracted
by telescoping. This is also another case of a conductive remote control tether, which
is inherently dangerous in the event of a powerline contact. The architect of the
historical restoration project should have incorporated buried electric utilities into the
restoration project plan; that would have enabled him to portray the buildings as they
were when they were built and would have afforded as safe work site, as the street
was the only access to the area.

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95.04-05 Petit, Ted: “Insulated Links: The Next Generation” Lift Equipment

This article focuses on the benefits of insulated links, especially links made with
polyurethane, a substance very effective in stopping the flow of current. The article
also retells a real-life scenario where a worker guiding the tagline of a load lost his
life when a crane contacted a powerline, and states “At a subsequent civil trial, a
leading opponent of insulated links was discredited. Under cross examination, it
became apparent that in an effort to cause insulated links to fail, the expert subjected
links to a high humidity environment…. [that] far exceeds normal use conditions.”

95.05.00 NIOSH ALERT # 95-108: Preventing Electrocutions of Crane Operators and Crew
Members Working Near Overhead Powerlines

NIOSH describes six electrocutions occurring from crane powerline contact and
states the OSHA recommendations such as de-energizing powerlines, using
independent, insulated barriers, maintaining the minimum clearance between the
crane and the powerline, use a signalman where operator visibility may be
compromised, and using additional safety equipment such as boom guards, insulated
links, as a secondary means of safety while maintaining all other regulations.

95.05.23 While constructing a bridge, the electric utility company agreed to relocate the
powerlines, but they were moved far enough to finish only half the job safely. When
work began on the other side of the bridge, the boom contacted a “newly relocated”
7,200 V powerline mid-span, severely shocking a worker. See A-34

This case provides an additional occurrence among many that the pinup guys on the
“A Frame” supporting the latticework boom are high enough to reach the powerlines,
resulting in severe injury or death.

95.06.00 MacCollum, David V., “Planning for Safe Crane Use” Presentation #927 at the
American Society of Safety Engineers Professional Development Conference and
Exposition, Orlando, FL

This is a checklist for safe crane use, presented by David V. MacCollum, which
includes assessing the site, the load, and the crane itself, including checking insulated
links and proximity alarms. Section IV is dedicated to the responsibilities of the
management personnel involved.

95.07.13 The conductive load, a steel “I” beam, severely burned a worker guiding it when the
boom of the crane lifting it contacted a 7,200 powerline. See A-35

This case provides illustration of the reality of the amount of space powerlines in an
area can take up. The load below the hook rotated into a powerline, proving that there
is never too much powerline clearance. The use of a non-conductive tagline would
have prevented this injury.

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96.01.17 The ladder of a fire truck contacted a 7,200 V powerline mid-span, injuring a fireman
who was connecting a snorkel hose to the fire truck. See A-36

This case again shows that all boomed equipment is vulnerable to powerline contact.
At a later date, fire truck standards required a platform for firemen to stand on to
isolate them from the ground, stating in Paragraph 7.9.2 of NFPA’s standard 1904 for
Aerial Ladder and Elevating Platform Fire Apparatus:

“Provisions shall be made so the pump operator is not in contact with the ground.
Signs shall be places to warn the pump operator of the electrocution hazard.”

However, this standard gave no clue that the design should include a non-conductive
platform and handholds for firefighters who had the task of connecting water hoses to
the aerial ladder and elevating platform apparatus.

1996 Another death resulting from a news gathering van contacting a 7,200 V powerline.
See A-37

(See A-27). The multiple occurrences of this nature show that this is a criminal
situation. Many states, most notably California, held a public forum and decided not
to mandate utilization of the electrostatic proximity alarm, which had proven its
ability to prevent powerline contacts by the U.S. Immigration service in 1985, to save
lives by preventing the news van mast from being raised into a powerline.

96.07.00 “Focus: Equipment Powerline Contact” Hazard Information Newsletter, Volume 1,


Issue 4

This informative article gives a brief list of reasons as to WHY powerlines occur,
mainly as the result of limits of human perception. The list of ways to prevent
powerline contacts includes planning and extensively mapping the danger areas and
guarding cranes with proximity devices and insulated links. This newsletter also
debases myths regarding the reliability of available safety devices.

A helpful list breaks down powerline contact by types of equipment:

Aerial lifts, Antenna installation vehicles, Booms (all types), Conveyors, Cranes (all
types), Crawler tractors (side boom), Delivery trucks with elevating beds, Draglines,
Drilling Rigs (portable), Dump Trucks, Excavators, Feed trucks with boom), Fire
trucks (snorkel units, water towers, and aerial ladders), Flagpole instillation devices,
Forklifts, Grain Elevators (portable), House moving equipment, Kite/model plane
with umbilical cord controls, Power shovels, Pumpcrete trucks, Railroad equipment
(track mounted cranes, salvage cranes), Sailboats, Satellite-link vehicles with
pneumatic masts (ENG vans), Scaffolds (mobile & self propelled), Sign instillation
devices, Tree-trimming equipment (See illustration I and II, figures 1 & 2.)

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96.09.03 Department of the Army- Corps of Engineers, EM 385-1-1 (Rev); General Safety
Requirements Manual

01.A.07: Before initiation of work at the job site, an accident prevention plan-written
by the prime contractor for the specific work and hazards of the contract and
implementing in detail the pertinent requirements of this manual- will be reviewed
and found acceptable by designated Government personnel.
a. The plan will be developed by qualified personnel and will be signed by a
competent person and a representative of the prime contractor’s project
management team.
b. On contract operations the contractor’s plan will be job-specific and will include
work to be performed by subcontractors and measures to be taken by the
contractor to control hazards associated with materials, services, or equipment
provided by suppliers.
11.E.01 (b) All electric power of distribution lines shall be placed underground in
areas where there is extensive use of equipment having the capacity to encroach on
the clear distances specified in 11.E.04 (0-50 kV- 3m, 51-200 kV- 4.5m)
11.H.12 (b) Materials and equipment shall not be stored under energized bus,
energized lines, or near energized equipment if it is possible to store them elsewhere.
If materials or equipment must be stored under energized lines or near energized
equipment, clearance shall be maintained [as in Table 11-5] and extraordinary caution
shall be exercised in maintaining these clearances when operating equipment or
moving materials near such energized equipment.
(c) Taglines shall be of non-conducting type when used near energized lines.

96.10-11 CraneWorks advertisement section: promotional highlights for range limiting devices
and proximity warning alarms state “Keep in mind that alarms are designed to
provide an early warning that powerlines are in the vicinity. They should not be used
as a measuring device to allow lifting close to powerlines.

96.10.11 The electric utility company, contacted to bury powerlines at a job site, did not have
the trenching equipment available and instead decided to move the powerline to right
above an outside doorway. The tip of a crane hauling sheet steel contacted the 7,200
V powerline in an unmarked danger zone, and one victim needed all four of his limbs
amputated while the other lost fingers. See A-38

This again illustrates that the electric utility is a crucial part of safe crane operation.
In this case, if the utility company did not have the equipment available to bury the
powerline, the utility should have given the landowner the option of digging a proper
trench to bury the powerlines and make for a safe workplace.

97.01.21 The signalman, positioned a hundred feet away, failed to maintain safe clearance of
the transmission lines running between two utility poles. The electric utility had
provided an uninsulated basket to lift fiber-optic cable to a delicate position between
the poles. The aerial lift itself was situated in a precarious position on the slope of the
easement, and the operator sustained serious burns to his hands, resulting in the
amputation of several fingers. See A-39

This case illustrates that aerial lifts should not be designed with alternate controls that
are accessible by someone standing on the ground. To date, there are no requirements
that prohibit the design of these controls accessible to someone standing on the
ground.

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97.10.00 Suruda, Anthony, M.D. M.P.H., Egger, Marlene PhD., Liu, Diane, M. Stat., “Crane
Related Deaths in the U.S. Construction Industry”, Rocky Mountain Center for
Occupational and Environmental Health

“For the 11 years 1984-94, 502 deaths occurred in 479 incidents involving cranes in
the construction industry. … Electrocution by powerline contact was the most
common type of incident, with 198 deaths (39%) reported.” Though this study
carefully gathered and assimilated statistical information, it did not mention any of
the most rudimentary causes of crane fatalities and the needed hazard prevention
measures.

97.09.03 A journalism novice attempted to rescue her co-worker when he raised the antenna of
his news gathering van into a 7,200 V powerline and was severely shocked herself,
resulting in injuries to her head and feet. See A-40

Here we are again with the same preventable very serious injury as a result of a total
lack of safety oversight by the major news networks.

97.11.06 Edwards, Robert and Krasny Alex, “Report on Tests Conducted on SigAlarm™
Proximity Warning Device Mounted on a Concrete Pump Placing Boom”, written by
an employer’s trade association of pumpcrete machine users.

Of the five people who participated in the test, four worked for or represented the
crane manufacturer Schwing America, Inc. The duration of the test was three hours.
In the twenty-five tests performed in that time, the device failed significantly on two
tests. The first time it failed, the boom was fully extended ten feet underneath a
powerline, the next time it failed the boom was fully extended up and over the
powerline, both tests attempting to pour concrete on the other side of the powerline.
These actions violate every safety regulation currently associated with crane use. It is
a blatant disregard of a known danger zone, and no pumpcrete operator should ever
attempt to maneuver a machine into either of these positions, as they are both
dangerous and foolhardy.

The first conclusion stated that “these tests demonstrated that the SigAlarm™ PWD
will not protect the workers on or near a concrete pump of the operator relies on it to
be his eyes and attention,” as well as “It cannot be considered a substitute for an
attentive operator.” Safety rules in construction are set up to avoid powerlines first
and foremost.

Note: authors of this analysis never considered that the device was never intended to
replace the importance of pre-job safety planning and on-the-job awareness, but as a
life-saving warning of powerlines and the need to initiate some other safer methods
of concrete placement is required.

1998 A water-well service truck rig contained its boom controls in the back, making
visibility very difficult. It was being used to move a pump engine a short distance and
traveled with the boom raised. The repositioning of the truck caused the boom to be
lowered onto its travel-mode position it contacted a 7,200 V powerline mid-span,
killing the equipment owner and seriously maiming another worker. See A-41

Besides illustrating the infinite variety of equipment at risk of powerline contacts, this
is a classic example of how the landlord, who was overseeing the work, made no
effort to be responsible by contacting the electric utility and requested that the
powerline, which powered only his irrigation wells, be de-energized while work was
in progress next to the powerlines.

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98.03.00 Morgan, J. Derald Ph.D., “Review of ‘Report on Tests Conducted on SigAlarm™
Proximity Warning Device Mounted on a Concrete Pump Placing Boom’ by Robert
Edwards and Alax Krasny of Schwing America, Inc” Note: Edwards and Kransy
conducted the study for the Pumpcrete Trade Association

In this report review, Morgan praises the report for it’s attention to minute technical
detail and its clear reporting of performed tests. He states that “..detection of
powerlines as purposed by SigAlarm™ when working in the proximity of powerlines
is based on a flawed concept and will not work in many circumstances.” The review
of this report corroborates his own findings of fifteen years ago when he ran similar
tests for two other crane manufacturers. It says nothing regarding the evidence of the
reliance of SigAlarm™ in tests run by the Bureau of mines for the U.S. Department
of Interior. All of Mr. Morgan’s reports were for clients who were defendants in
litigation for the failure to provide these safety appliances.

98.05.00 NIOSH Bulletin: Worker Deaths by Electrocution- A Summary of Surveillance


Findings and Investigative Case Reports, U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services

Part of this booklet presents a list called FACE (Fatality Assessment Control
Evaluation) Electrocution Cases for Monograph, and documents a number of
electrocution deaths over the past sixteen years. However, the data they supply on
these 220 cases (of which two involved crane powerline contact and four involved
dump truck powerline contact) is insufficient, as adequate information on both the
circumstances of the accident and listing of the management groups who should have
selected a safe location are not provided. The list fails to show any accountability.

98.05.07 An operator in an uninsulated aerial lift unsafe for such tasks was attempting to install
television cable where overgrown oak trees blocked the view of the 7,200 V
powerline. With his obstructed view, he did not see the mid-span powerline, and died
when the lift contacted it. See A-42

This is an example of the electric-cooperative failing to clear the powerline of brush


before leasing their poles to a cable company creates a condition inherently
dangerous for any use.

98.06.22 In a very cramped construction site, a crane operator was rotating raised cable straps
in an unmarked danger zone near a powerline to avoid hitting other equipment. The
crane cables contacted the 7,200 V powerline and the electricity transferred from the
crane to the wire-encased hose of a drill rig that was dropped over one of the crane’s
outriggers. The drill operator was killed and another worker was injured. See A-43

This case is an example of where an insulated link could have saved a life. As a
further preventative, the area could have been mapped on the ground with barriers or
with tape to identify that it was a dangerous area that a crane should not be rotated
into.

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98.12.00 MacCollum David V., “More on the Nature of Safe Design Profits” Hazard
Information Newsletter, Vol. 3, Issue 9

This article performs a sample cost-benefit analysis on an unidentified product hazard


in order to create an illustrative model of the real cost of a hazard. According to the
model, the cost of lawsuits, recalls, and legal fees of an unchecked hazard could
quadruple the initial cost per unit of the entire production of the particular product,
resulting in a loss of money for the manufacturer and anyone else responsible for the
hazard. The cost of fixing a hazard is substantially cheaper and much more prudent
than assuming that the unsafe product can be defended in court for a lesser amount.
The responsible manufacturer is rewarded by increased reliability, higher profit, and a
product record.

1999 ANSI/SIA A92.6 (for Self-propelled elevating work platforms)

4.6.2: “Lower controls shall be readily accessible from the ground level and shall: 1)
override upper controls for powered functions. 2) Be provided for all type of
powered functions except drive and steering. 3) Be of the type that automatically
return to the “off” or neutral position when released. 4) Be protected against
activation other than that initiated by the operator. 5)Be clearly marked.”

Note: Conspicuously absent in these standards is a clause to prevent the ground


operator from receiving a shock from a ground fault current if one tries to control the
lift while it is contacting a powerline. To prevent shocking a ground operator, ground
controls should be located so the operator can not reach them when standing on the
ground.

99.12.27 A worker lost three limbs when guiding a concrete bucket to pour concrete into a
wastewater channel that ran in easements along the path under powerlines. Most
likely, this job could have been accomplished without the use of boomed equipment
such as a front-end loader, thus eliminating the constant danger of live lines
overhead. See A-44

This case exemplifies first how the design of the waterway was in an unsafe location,
and how a lack of construction safety planning places the workman in serious harm’s
way. A plan detailing alternate methods of concrete placement should have been in
the specifications. There is no excuse to tempt danger with boomed equipment in the
vicinity of powerlines when the job could be easily accomplished without boomed
equipment. Planning is the key to any successful job endeavor.

99.12.29 Affidavit of James R. Andrews, State of Illinois, County of St. Clair

Nine years after the death of the worker listed in the case in Appendix A-21, former
employee of Fred Weber, Inc (a freeway construction contractor) states that his belief
in the safety provided by proximity warning devices continues to increase. As the
retired Vice President Safety and Health of Fred Weber, Inc., James Andrews was
responsible for the installation of the safety devices, and positively testified to the
usefulness and necessity of these appliances for the case listed in Appendix A-27.

Note: At the time of this study there have been no powerline contacts at his company
since the devices were installed on 15 cranes in 1990. To date this approximates
almost 210 crane years of preventing powerline contacts with audible warning
devices.

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2000 ANSI/ASME B30.5: Mobile and Locomotive Cranes

This issue, In section 5-1.6 Controls, and all prior issues have no design suggestions
to limit the hazard of electrical current flow through the body. Standards should
conform to reduce this aspect of powerline contact by prohibiting:

♦ Controls that are accessible to the operator standing on the ground.

♦ Remote controls using an electric cable tether that allows the operator to stand on
the ground,

Section 5-3.4.5.3 suggests the use of non-conductive taglines to further isolate the
individuals guiding the load from the flow of electric current through them in the
event of powerline contact.

Figure 17(a) of section 5-3.4.5.3(c) is an excellent description of where all cranes


should be located in relationship to powerlines. It clearly illustrates placement of the
crane where it cannot reach the danger zone (see Illustration I).

00.04.11 Excerpt of the deposition of John H. Crowley (Circuit Court of Buchanan County,
State of Missouri, division 4, # CV 398-2925 CC)
Pg. 59, Ln 8- A [Crowley]: The syllabus, to my knowledge, secondhand knowledge,
included information related to closed cases.
Q: Now—and we know about the reports of – the accident reports were sent directly to
Lord, Bissell & Brook?
A: Yes
Q: Do you know personally why a separate repository is maintained at Lord, Bissell, &
Brook?
[defense council: objection]
A: I don’t know all the reasons why that is the case.
Q: Is it true that the membership of MADDDC told you they wanted it that way?
A: Yes
Q: Did the membership tell you why they wanted it that way?
A: No.
Q: In your work with the technical and safety committee of MADDDC, did Lord,
Bissell, & Brook ever provide you with any reports or summaries of accidents or
incidents on aerial devices and digger derricks to share with the membership?
[defense council: objection]
A: I was never provided with any direct information for me to give to MADDDC
engineering technical safety committee.
Note: Until the committee’s council shares their hazard data the development of
hazard prevention design features or the use of safety appliances will continue to be
dangerously hindered and continue to expose workers to unequal protection.

00.05.02 After dark, a news van raised its antenna in a parking lot after doing a spot check for
overhead wires. The area surrounding the van was lit and created a glare that made it
virtually impossible to see the 7,200 V wires that the mast contacted, seriously
injuring two people. See A-45

As exemplified from the previous cases, mast powerline contact on ENG vans is a
growing, serious epidemic. The tragedy of this fact is that passing simple legislation
to use the technology that has already been available for at least 20 years could easily
rectify it.

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00.05.19 Southeast Louisiana Urban Flood Control Project, Jefferson Parish, L: Construction
Solicitation and Specifications IFB # DACW29-00-B-0069

3l) Cranes: The Contractor shall have cage boom guards, insulating links, or
proximity warning devices on cranes that will be working adjacent to powerlines.
These devices shall not alter the requirements of any other regulation of this part-
even if law or other regulation requires such a device.

00.05.17 Expert Witness Report: Dr. George G. Karady (District Court, Jefferson County, 13th
district, Texas, #D-157188)

Dr. Karady illustrates how and why safety devices such as insulated links installed on
cranes are invaluable in preventing injuries.

00.05.22 The slight slope of a driveway caused the mast of a news van to tip just to contact the
3,200 V powerline. The plastic antenna dish caught fire and melted, causing a ground
fault. A anchor news casting lady lost one arm, one leg, the other foot and fingers on
her hand when she was told the van was on fire and attempted to escape See A-46

The only pattern to present here is that this is a category of injuries and deaths that
should not have happened. This is the fifth preventable ENG van mast raised into a
powerline causing the loss of parts of all four limbs listed in the timeline.

00.06.01 A worker was electrocuted when he used a crane to move necessary construction
equipment stored mid-span under a 7,200 powerline. Further investigation revealed
that the electric utility company was aware of the practice of storing construction
materials underneath live lines but made no attempt to move the equipment or
relocate the powerlines. The worker had been given no instruction on how to identify
or map a danger zone, and was most likely unaware of the danger. See A-47

This case again illustrates how materials should not be stored under powerlines, and
utility easements should prohibit this practice.

00.06.17 The city had recently received a grant to restore an old building. An eighteen year old
worker was provided an uninsulated lift to retouch the mortar when the lift touched a
7,200 V powerline located three feet from the wall. Because the city did not turn off
the power from the municipal electric company that it owned, the boy is a
quadriplegic who breathes through a ventilator. The grant architect should have
included a requirement to bury the powerlines. See A-48

This case shows the complete absence of a concern for safety by the city management
team who oversaw this project. The employer who rented the boomed equipment
procured equipment unsafe and unfit for the project, and they completely disregarded
the ten foot clearance rule. The aerial lift company, who was aware of where it was
intended to be used, should have refused rental to an incompetent employer. The
powerlines should have been buried before anyone thought about painting the eroded
mortar between bricks.

00.07.14 While building a flood-control pond out of concrete, a concrete finisher was killed
when the boom of a pumpcrete truck contacted a 7,200 V powerline mid-span. The
truck was positioned behind a tree, obscuring the view of the powerlines, and the
deceased was forced to work in a position with his back to the boom while directing
the flow of concrete. See A-49

First, this case shows a complete disregard for the lives and safety of others, when the
settling pond was designed underneath powerlines that should have been relocated.
This case also fully illustrates that the use of pumpcrete machines must be positioned
where the radius of the boom is always outside the danger zone created by the power
company (see illustration of 1986 of the Danger Zone).

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2001 Nietzel, Richard L.; Siexas, Noah S.; Ren, Kyle K., “A Review of Crane Safety in
the Construction Industry” Applied Occupational and Industrial Hygiene, Vol.
16(12): 1106-1117

This article provides an oversight and statistical review of crane safety hazards and
methods that can counter them. It recognizes crane hazards as among the most severe
in the construction industry: “Although the majority (87%) of crane-related deaths
occur among workers other than crane operators, the number of operator fatalities-
while low when considered in terms of absolute numbers- is tremendous when the
relatively small population of operators is considered… The 1996 OSHA study of
502 crane fatalities identified the leading causes of death as electrocution (39%)...”

On anti-current devices: “Testing has shown these [insulated] links to be highly


effective, even when contaminated with mud and other substances, although
contamination does cause some breakdown in their insulating properties.

Proximity alarms can be very effective in pick-and-carry operations… While these


devices provide a secondary means of preventing cranes from becoming energized,
and should be used wherever feasible, they must not be used as a primary method for
avoiding powerlines.”

2001 Homace, G.T.; Crawley, J.C. (Senior Member, IEEE); Yenchek, M.R. (Senior
Member, IEEE); Sacks, H.K. (Member, IEEE), “An Alarm to Warn of Overhead
Power Line Contact by Mobile Equipment” Paper presented to NIOSH

This article focuses on the development of an alarm that sounds during equipment
powerline contact in the mining industry, stating that “Even when excluding injuries
that occur during electrical maintenance work, over one fourth of electrical fatalities
in the mining industry are due to accidental overhead line contacts, and for each
fatality nearly two serious non-fatal injuries occur due to such contacts. In incidents
involving high-reaching mobile equipment, many of the victims touched the
equipment after the fact, unaware that the machine frame had become energized by
the line contact. MSHA data for accidents involving overhead powerline contacts in
the mining industry between 1980 and 1997 reveal that in 57% of the cases personnel
were unaware of the accidental line contact until one or more workers touched the
equipment or a hoisted load and were injured. ...This suggests that a device that alerts
workers when a powerline has been contacted could help prevent many of these
injuries.”

Note: While injuries may be prevented with this device, it is totally ineffective in the
prevention of powerline contact. Incident prevention is the only way to assure fewer
injuries and decreased liability. However, a similar article appears at 02.04.01 of this
timeline in order to offer more information and allow the reader to reach individual
conclusions.

2001 ANSI/SIA 92.2 (Vehicle-Mounted Elevating and Rotating Aerial Devices)

4.3.3: “Lower controls shall be readily accessible and shall provide for overriding the
boom positioning upper controls provided the upper control system is intact. The
override mode shall maintain its function while unattended.”

Note: In 2001 the standards were still not revised to incorporate a non-conductive
ground control system. It is especially important to have isolated non-conductive
parts on the total parts of all aerial equipment.

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2001 Q1 MacCollum, David V., “Hazard Prevention Engineering” Journal of System Safety

Among other points, this article urges people to closely examine the cost-benefit
analysis of system safety. This article contains many strong arguments regarding the
financial soundness of hazard prevention engineering, including the benefit to the
taxpayer in the loss of workers’ compensation claims. Powerline contacts are an
example of hazards recounted.

01.09.10 The hoist line of a crane killed the worker guiding the load around cars in a pick and
carry operation. The employer took no real safety precautions, as he assumed the
1,200 V powerlines were easy to avoid. See A-50

This case clearly shows that the exclusive remedy of the workers’ compensation
laws, removes the active participation of the employer in ensuring for a safe
workplace.

01.11.30 “Hazard Analysis of Unintentional Raising of a Pneumatic Mast of an Electronic


News Gathering Van into Powerlines” The Hazard Information Foundation, Inc.
study (forwarded to the state of California Industrial Safety Board)

The study gives a brief history of boomed equipment powerline contact and its
successful preventative measures, including the failure of the thin air clearance and
the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization service’s utilization of proximity warning
devices on their trucks in 1983. It also provides a list of ENG van manufacturers who
offer equipment with a proximity alarm and a list of television stations that have
installed alarms on their van fleet. It also uses extensive appendixes, including a list
of ENG Van Mast powerline contacts. (see timeline)

Recommendations “to prevent serious injury or death from unintentional raising of


pneumatic masts on ENG vans into overhead powerlines and reliable control this
hazard” are as follows:

1. “ Provide and install an electric (electrostatic) field detector to prevent the mast
from being raised when the ENG van is parked under or immediately adjacent to
overhead powerlines. Such detector should also prevent the mast from being
raised until the van is positioned at least thirty feet lateral distance from the
powerline. Further, the manufacturer shall certify installation is calibrated and
locked into adjustment for that particular van to ensure that the mast cannot be
activated when the ENG van is parked under powerline or immediately adjacent
to them.”

2. “For failsafe redundancy, insulating materials should be incorporated in the


design of accessories that are mounted on the top of the pneumatic mast to
prevent current flow in excess of five (5) milliamps when contact is made with
7,500-volt powerlines.”

3. “Training needs to include (a) a summary of previous injuries due to inadvertent


raising of pneumatic masts on ENG vans into powerlines, (b) the propensity for
error-provocative circumstances during the use of ENG vans and (c) the need for
proven safety accessories on ENG vans as standard equipment.”

Note: On May 10, 2002, this information was Package submitted to Jere W. Ingram:
Chairman, Occupational Safety and Health Standards Board for the State of
California, regarding the discussion on whether to change Title 8 of the California
Code for republications concerning Electronic News Gathering Vans. By providing
the State of California a copy of this study, HIFI hoped the rules to provide equal life
saving protection for users of ENG vans would be adopted. .

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02.02.05 Contracting firm H.B. Zachry (San Antonio, TX) informed Doyle Peeks of
Craneaccidents.com that they are installing SigAlarm™ on over 200 of their cranes.

Note: To date, Zachry has completed 400 accident-free crane years since the safety
appliances were installed.

02.04.01 Homace, Gerald T.; Crawley, James C.; Sacks, H. Kenneth; Yenchek, Michael R.;
“Heavy Equipment Near Overhead Power Lines?” Engineering and Mining Journal

This article focuses on solutions to the hazard of powerline contact, stating that
“Earlier studies point out that while training solutions are often suggested for
electrical hazards, the intervention effort must shift toward engineering control
solutions ‘to reduce the hazard at its source.’ Subsequent studies suggest that a
change in the attitude of behavioral scientists is slowly occurring, placing greater
emphasis on engineering control solutions.” The article then advocates the
development of a device that sounds an alarm when the equipment or vehicle contacts
a powerline, warning personnel to stay in the vehicle or move away. Use of this
device, the article states, will reduce injuries by powerline contact.

Note: A reason for industry rejection of an insulated link stated in the above article
was the fact that not all workers are protected by it. Likewise, few workers would
have the opportunity to be protected by this device, either. It appears to the authors of
this study that this device nullifies the concept of powerline contact prevention, as it
provides no opportunities to prevent such incidents from occurring.

03.09.01 “Crane Accident Kills Three”

A mere highlight on a page mentions the incident that cost three more construction
workers their lives. The crane operator was backing up on an incline and became
entangled in a powerline, was thrown or fell from the crane, and two other workers,
not knowing the crane was electrified, died when they rushed to his aid. This report
gives no details on the crane manufacturer or other specifics, prohibiting the reader
from accurately gauging the identity of the real culprit.

03.10-11 “Readers’ Choice Award” Lift Applications and Equipment

InsulatUS™ Load Insulator was mentioned in the awards for its resistance to extreme
temperatures and black box system that acts like a computer and self-tests the link,
records any contacts and their external conditions, and emits audible warnings if the
unit is not working properly.

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03.11.03 Department of the Army- Corps of Engineers, EM 385-1-1 (Rev); General Safety
Requirements Manual

01.A.11: Before initiation of work at the job site, an APP with appropriate appendices
written in English by the Prime Contractor for the specific work and hazards of the
contract and implementing in detail the pertinent requirements for this manual- will
be reviewed and found acceptable by the GDA.

(a) The plan will be developed by qualified personnel and will be signed in
accordance with Appendix A.1. The contractor shall be responsible for documenting
the qualified person’s credentials.

(b) On contract operations, the Contractor’s plan will be job-specific and will include
work to be performed by subcontractors and measures to be taken by the Contractor
to control hazards associated with materials, services, or equipment provided by
suppliers.

-11.E.01 (b): All electric power or distribution lines shall be placed underground in
areas where there is extensive use of equipment having the capability to encroach on
the clear distances specified in 11.E.04 (0-50kV- 3m, 51-200kV-4.5m)

11.H.12 (b): Materials and equipment shall not be stored under energized bus,
energized lines, or near energized equipment if it is possible to store them elsewhere.
If materials or equipment must be stored under energized lines or near energized
equipment, clearance shall be maintained [as in Table 11-3] and extraordinary caution
shall be exercised in maintaining these clearances when operating equipment or
moving materials near such energized equipment.

(c): Tag lines shall be of a non-conducting type when used near energized lines.

03.11.05 Associated Press, www.mlive.com

Two workers were killed and a third injured in St Clair Shores, MI when a crane
touched a powerline on a house construction site.

03.11.26 Bugbee, John, Evening Sun,


www.eveningsun.com/cda/article/print/o,1674,140%7E9956%7E1792523,00.html

A worker in South Grove, VA was electrocuted while preparing to sandblast and


paint a cement plant. The worker was using the ground controls to position an aerial
lift when it contacted a nearby powerline. This incident directly echoes case A-39 in
the timeline and reinforces the idea that emergency lift controls are dangerous when
they are positioned in a place accessible to a worker standing on the ground.

03.11.28 Husty, Denes III, dhusty@news-press.com, “Construction Accident Kills Worker”


news-press.com

A construction worker belonging to a crew moving cement pipes to be installed along


a road was electrocuted when a backhoe contacted a power pole, causing live lines to
fall. The accident happened in North Naples at 8am.

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04.01.15 “ ‘Red Zones’ for Cranes Near Powerlines Discussed by OSHA Rulemaking
Committee” News: Occupational Safety and Health, Vol. 34, No.3

This article relates the details of meetings that have taken place to amend the national
construction safety rules to try to reduce crane injuries.

“As discussed by the committee, employers would be required to follow strict safety
requirements in a so-called red zone when the crane or is load were within a certain
number of feet from a powerline….. The committee, which includes employers, union
representatives, and crane manufacturers, set out strategies for what safety precautions
would be required and got agreement on them.”

“Noah Connell, the OSHA representative on the committee, said Jan. 12 that under the
proposal discussed, and employer would be required to do certain things if the cranes
load or load line were within a certain specific distance from a powerline, although
there was no final agreement on what that distance ought to be.”

The committee also discussed creating a yellow zone, an area where the crane or part of
a load might intrude into the red zone:

“Committee members discussed what would be required of crane operators and


employees in the various zones. Suggestions included requiring an insulating link to
stop the flow of electricity, a proximity warning device that sounds an alarm when near
a power line, or a dedicated spotter using visual aid. The committee supported the idea
of requiring insulating links in the red zone

“Connell said that requiring the use of some kind of visual aid is related to the fact that
it is difficult for the human eye to judge the distance between a power lie at height and
a crane boom. Visual aids could include a line on the ground to represent a certain
distance from the power line, or a rope with flags on it to indicate to the crane operator
and workers when the crane is getting close to the power line.”

Note: This discussion is current, as crane and construction safety continues to be an


issue of importance.

04.11.00 MacCollum, David V., “Crane Safety on Construction Sites”, Chapter 18,
Construction Safety Management and Engineering, American Society of Safety
Engineers

This paper discusses the ineffectiveness of “Thin Air” clearances and how the
hazards of powerline contact should be removed before the workmen and crane arrive
on the work site.

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ILLUSTRATION I: WARNING LABEL

76
ILLUSTRATION II:
DANGER ZONE DIAGRAM

77
ILLUSTRATION III:
AERIAL BASKET GUARD

78
EXPERT
COMMENTS:
PARTICIPATING ENGINEERS
AND SCIENTISTS

1. Jack Ainsworth
2. David Baker
3. Robert Dey
4. George Karady
5. Ben Lehman
6. Melvin Myers
7. Jeff Speer
8. John van Arsdel
January 2, 2004
Memorandum For: David MacCollum

From: Jack D. Ainsworth

Subject: Peer Review Comments on HIFI Report: Safety Interventions to Control Hazards
Related to Power Line Contacts by Mobile Cranes and Other Boomed Equipment, December
2003.

My comments on subject report stem from experience throughout a 35+ year career as an
engineer, and manager of engineering efforts in the military environments. Not only has that
experience dealt with designing safe electronic systems and safe working environments for
subordinate engineers, it dealt with providing a secure environment for sensitive information in a
highly technical information technology world. My comments introduce the concept of
providing several layers of safety, overlapping sometimes, but integrated to provide an even
higher degree of overall safety, a concept I have chosen to call “Safety in Depth,” then
culminating with a specific application of one of those layers of safety from which I have
personal knowledge and involvement.

Safety in Depth

As with most situations in today’s environment, establishing and maintaining a safe working
environment for industrial workers is a complex issue. Typically no one measure will address
and ensure worker safety. The information technology (IT) industry discovered that protecting
information as it is being recorded, as it is being transported, as it is being stored for future use,
cannot be accomplished through only one initiative. IT coined a phrase, “Security in Depth,” as
a way to acknowledge the complexity of the information security problem. Information is
protected from disclosure, unauthorized manipulation, unauthorized modification, through more
than one capability. In effect protection of the information is provided much like layering of an
onion – each layer providing is own unique protection. Worker safety is improved when several
initiatives are employed. Initiatives come from several different sources, such as: Management;
Training; Contract Terms; Equipment. Contract Terms is addressed in the report annex by Mr.
Robert Dey. The other aspects I address below.

Management

A .Management’s perspective and focus about a safe work environment sets the tone for all.
When management takes a positive, proactive position about safety, employees at all levels
notice that perspective and they reflect a corresponding respect for safe work practices also. If
management is lax and portrays no interest in safe work practices, workers at all levels follow a
lax attitude also. Some of the initiatives management can endorse for providing a safe work
environment include providing safe equipment, providing safety equipment, providing training
on proper, safe operation of equipment whether is be new to the inventory or existing, and

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providing a continuing safety training program to remind and refocus workers upon the safe
work objective.

Training

A. Employees at all levels of an organization should be provided training on safety. They


should be acquainted with safety through classes which teach safe work habits. Safe
work habits include the proper and respected operation of equipment and tools used at the
job site. Training on safe work habits will be reflected through the practice of safe work
habits on and around the work site. The training may require reinforcement by on-site
managers and supervisors who correct unsafe situations and compliment safe conduct. A
sound training program will also teach the proper utilization of safety equipment
provided by employer.

Equipment

A number of physical capabilities are available in the market place to enhance the safe working
conditions of equipment. Some of these are listed and discussed below.

A. Insulated tag lines – Tag lines are typically used to stabilize a payload from rotation
when it is being moved one location to another by a lifting crane of similar piece of
equipment. Since the ends of the tag lines are held by workers who are making contact
with earth, an electrical ground, the tag lines offer an opportunity to complete an
electrical circuit whenever the boom or the lifting cable of the crane, or the payload
makes contact with overhead power lines. The consequence is usually electrocution of
the workers holding the tag lines. As a safety measure, insulated tag lines break the
electrical circuit and provide the workers safety from the electrocution hazard.

B. Insulated Boom Sections – In a similar manner, nonconductive sections of the lifting


boom can be employed to serve as an insulating link in the hazard of the electrical circuit
provided contact is made such that the insulating properties are employed as intended. If
contact occurs in the region of the lifting cable however, workers on the ground holding
tag lines quite possibly will not be protected. Both insulated boom sections and insulated
tag lines would be necessary to provide the essential protection from electrocution – an
example of “Safety in Depth.”

C. Insulated Links – By electrically separating the boom section and lifting cable from the
payload, tag lines, and ground workers, a safe work environment can be established to
protect ground workers from hazardous contact of the crane with overhead power lines.

D. Insulated Sleeves – Under most conditions, electrical power lines should be de-energized
before work begins wherein contact with the lines by service equipment such as a lifting
crane or boom truck is possible. In such situations, installing insulating sleeves is a

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practice which offers protecting from the possible accidental contact with service
equipment and the completion of an electrical circuit. Installation of insulating sleeves
must follow very careful procedures to protect the installers from possible electrocution.
The use of insulated work platforms such a fiberglass buckets (see next) adds to the
safety of such practices.

E. Insulated Work Platforms (Bucket) – Bucket trucks permit workers to elevate to a


position to service established overhead power lines. The work platform is made of
fiberglass, a material which is non-conductive to electrical current, thereby providing the
workers with a safe work environment. Contact of the bucket or the workers with
energized power lines does not complete an electrical circuit, and present the
electrocution hazard. Buckets must be carefully maintained to preserve the
nonconductive properties of the fiberglass.

F. Slew Limiters – Limiting the amount of rotation possible by the boom can also add to
the in-depth aspect of a safe work environment. In this case, the extent a the boom can
rotate can be limited by limit switches so that the boom is prevented from entering the
hazardous zone of the energized power lines. This will require a pre-work safety zone
survey to define where the limits are to be established.

G. . Proximity Sensors – Electrical sensing equipment is available in the marketplace to


sense the presence of energized power lines. This equipment takes advantage of the
physics applicable to electricity to determine when an energized power line is in the
operating proximity. These sensors provide visual and audible alerts to notify the
operator of a crane or boom truck of the close proximity of an electrical hazard. When
fully integrated into the control system of a crane or boom truck, a proximity sensor can
cause the halt of moving the boom or crane into the hazard zone.

H. Installation of SIGALARM

In the mid-1980’s, while managing and supervising an engineering evaluation facility for the
US Army, I was asked to develop a prototype Border Patrol Night Surveillance Vehicle.
Attributes of the vehicle were to be able to deploy in a high aerial position, payloads which
could detect the presence of humans entering the borders of the United States on foot, but not
through one of the controlled entry positions. The concept of operation was to raise a sensing
device such as an infrared camera or a closed-circuit television camera to a height of about 40
to 50 feet and permit agents in the vehicle to monitor an area for presence of suspect
individuals. All equipment, devices and capabilities must be from commercially available
sources if at all possible.

A. Design considerations included stabilizing the vehicle in uneven terrain to prevent possible
roll-over, interchangeability of the payload, overall weight of the vehicle. Since the vehicle
was to usually be deployed during night time hours, protection of the equipped vehicle and

81
operators from accidental contact with aerial power lines must be accommodated. It is this
last mentioned attribute which is of significance in this discussion.

B. The operational concept for the vehicle was: a.) Outriggers were deployed from each of the
four corners of the vehicle to stabilize and level the operating platform; b.) The pneumatic
mast, stored in a horizontal position inside the vehicle during transport, was rotated into a
vertical position; and c.) The pneumatic mast was pressurized to raise the surveillance
payload to the fully deployed position.

C. As system engineers concerned with all aspects of the development, we quickly recognized a
hazard potential that the mast and payload could be deployed into energized overhead power
lines, especially since normal operation was under nighttime conditions.

Research of the marketplace identified a device manufactured by SIGALARMTM which detected


the electrostatic presence of electrical hazards such as overhead power lines. Since the device
detected the presence of electrostatic source, a beneficial by-product was the ability to detect the
possibility of a lightning strike, a condition not uncommon in the southwest United States during
parts of the year.

The SIGALARMTM was fully integrated into the control system of the surveillance vehicle to
that the detection of an electrostatic source in the area would either prevent erection of the
pneumatic mast to deploy the payload to its operating position, or if erection was initiated, the
process would be terminated and the mast returned to the vertical resting position.

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POWERLINE CONTACTS BY MOBILE CRANES

There are several measures that if implemented would reduce overhead powerline contacts from
mobile cranes and other equipment possessing the capability to reach energized powerlines.
Some of these are pro-active actions and some are regulatory reactions. In any case the results of
any effort to reduce these contacts will be directly related to the effort, or lack of, from the
various management entities involved. This includes both the business operating the exposed
equipment and the local electrical utility.

Regulatory statutes and enforceable standards are usually established as a last resort. If all else
fails, get the government involved. That has been the past practice. This is not to say that these
agencies are bad. OSHA and in many cases the state corporation or public utility commissions
have had a positive effect on reducing overhead powerline contacts. The problem is that in order
for someone to follow the rules they must know the rules. Arizona has an “Overhear Powerline
Law” and all electrical contacts with energized overhead powerlines must be reported to the
Arizona Corporation Commission (ACC). The ACC then requires the offending company to
send its exposed employees to an “Electrical Safety Class” given by the electrical utility that
experienced the contact. The thought process is that this will eliminate future contacts from the
same company. It does have some effect on those employees who may stay with that company
for a period of time. But, the key is to educate as many exposed individuals as possible prior to
any unfortunate and potentially deadly contact.

Most electrical utilities currently do, or in the past have, conducted electrical safety programs
within their respective school systems. These proactive programs are usually directed at fourth
or fifth grade classes. The students are intrigued by the potential for disaster and damage an
electrical contact can produce. The message to “Stay Away” is usually learned. In regard to the
adult worker this same approach can be effective if the “Electrical Safety Classes” are designed

83
to cover three general areas; how to prevent an overhead contact, what to do if you experience an
overhead contact, what outcome can you expect from an overhead contact. As with any learning
exercise the use of real scenarios is encouraged. The phrase “Don’t do this or else!” is only
effective when you utilize the “or else” to emphasize the key points.

The ability to properly educate the exposed workers is, as stated earlier, a function of
management. The equipment operators must seek assistance and the local electrical utilities
must actively pursue those who are exposed. One of the more effective methods of mating the
two groups is through trade associations. Most of these associations are renowned for offering
safety classes for either no or a nominal fee. Companies like this economic approach.
Participation in these associations also provides a conduit for the electrical utilities to reach a
large audience of potential energized powerline contactors.

“Safety Days” or similar annual programs are held by a variety of groups. Some are unique to a
particular company while others may be conducted by local government agencies and once again
the trade associations. These activities offer ample opportunities to reach exposed workers and
other individuals. The state “One-Call” centers, Blue-Stake in Arizona, usually offer free
training for everyone. As a stake holder in these centers the local electric utilities can easily
become involved in these exercises. Some communities hold shows for construction equipment.
These are a prime candidate for educational classes. It is easy to convince smaller companies to
hold annual Christmas or Holiday functions with an Electrical Safety program included in the
festivities.

All regulatory required clearance distances, all no entry zones, all company safe work
procedures, all corporate safety manuals, all insulating devices, all warning devices, and any
other method of controlling contact with energized electrical powerlines are of no use unless the
personnel who are exposed to these energized sources are also educated in the proper application

84
and use of the safety methods listed. Although education is key, the management of each
company is still responsible for insuring that their employees adhere to these protections. From
the electric utility perspective, involvement in educational activities that help to reduce the
potential for loss of life, human pain and suffering, damage to others property, damage to
company equipment, customer outages, and adverse public opinion can only be positive.

David B. Baker
Safety Supervisor, Tucson Electric Power
Risk and Business Services
Mail Stop SC214
P.O. Box 711
Tucson, AZ 85702
dbaker@tucsonelectric.com

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December 10, 2003

Memo for Dave MacCollum

From: Robert Dey

Subject: Peer Review Comments on HIFI Report: Safety Interventions to Control Hazards
Related to Power Line Contacts by Mobile Cranes and Other Boomed Equipment, December
2003.

My comments are based upon experience throughout a period of 45 years as a manager of


construction in both military and commercial environments, representing the interests of both an
owner and a general contractor at different times. I have contracted for engineering design and
construction services, and have supervised both design and construction throughout my career.

In my reading of the subject report, I focused primarily on the Voluntary Goals and Guidelines
(Hazard Prevention Options, Part II). I found these specific suggested practices to be sensible
and competent, and their adoption and use would serve to eliminate accidents related to
powerline contacts. Having said that, there is a major issue unresolved regarding major
construction projects, namely, how to assure such safe practices actually are used on a project.
To resolve this issue requires an examination of the contractual processes that control a
construction site, how such contracts evolve, and who is empowered to enforce the contract
provisions. Without an effective implementation strategy, the best goals and guidelines will be
lost in the normal process of project development, and the deaths and injuries will continue.

As background, we must consider the normal process of planning, designing, and constructing a
project. Importantly, an owner may (and normally does) contract with different business entities
for the three separate phases of this process. An Architect Engineer accomplishes the initial
planning, defining the concepts, constraints and scope of design needed to satisfy the owner's
requirement. The detailed design work then proceeds to produce drawings, specifications, and
estimates of cost and time required to construct the facility, including the documents needed to
procure construction services ("contract documents"). This detailed design may be completed by
the originating A/E firm, or, (increasingly) it may be re-competed and performed by another
engineering design firm. In either case, the designer then either hands over the contract
documents to the owner for them to contract directly with a constructor, or the engineering firm
or a construction management firm performs this as a professional service for the owner.

An important concept must be raised at this point. While many engineers and contractors are self
motivated to work safely and prevent accidents, many are not. We cannot assume safety, or rely
on sound safety practices occurring during the design or construction phases of a project unless it
is covered in the contracts between the owner and the firms providing services. Even then, we

86
cannot rely on a contract being enforced unless there is incentive to do so. This is the real world
of the construction industry.

Now to combine the concepts discussed above, I want to go back to the process by which
contracts are produced. The terms of a contract between an owner and A/E, designer, or
contractor are normally drafted and proffered by the engineering professionals. In other words,
the A/E firm will offer a contract form for use by an owner in obtaining planning and design
services. Likewise, the final designer will develop contract provisions and specifications for use
in procuring (contracting for) construction. These contracts tend to be "cut and paste"
throughout the industry, with time- and court-tested versions passed around for use in contracts
worldwide. These versions generally are not adequate to assure a safe jobsite. Here's why.

Unfortunately, unless an owner intervenes and insists on emphasizing certain aspects such as
safety, he will tend to get the standard "plain vanilla version" of a contract, including a safety
program for his project. Furthermore, as engineers and architects act in their own self interest,
the safety burden will generally get dumped on the constructor, ignoring the preventive design
and planning responsibilities of the engineering firms involved. Most specs developed by
engineering firms will simply require the constructor to submit a safety plan as a deliverable.
There may be no standards for such a plan, and no realistic requirement to implement it. Further,
quite often there is no requirement for the plan to define responsibilities for control of jobsite
safety (who's in charge?). In this type of project scenario, the chance of HIFI's guidelines for
avoiding power line contact being incorporated into the design and construction contracts are
very slim.

In order to avoid financial penalties from death and injury, and to prevent such tragedy from the
standpoint of simple respect for the lives of our countrymen, I submit that ALL the parties
involved in the design/construct process must do the following:

" Start the job safety plan from the beginning by insisting it be a requirement in the very first
contract between the Owner and the A/E for concept planning. The intent is to pass this plan on
as a requirement to the designer, who will further develop it during design with special attention
to designing and planning the job in such a way as to eliminate hazards so the constructor will
not have to deal with them. Here is a sample spec I developed for use by a client owner for the
initial planning work on a major rail project:

Design for Safety. Consultant will consider designs and processes that enable the elimination or
control of hazards to persons and property during the construction and operation of the planned
facilities. Consultant will submit a plan to the Contracting officer within 45 days of NTP that
describes Consultant’s process of integrating professional safety engineering, construction
safety, and rail operations advice into the design process. Documentation of the results of this
plan will be a required deliverable to assure continuity of safe design into the final design
process (PS&E).

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• Assure this initial safety plan is fully developed in turn by the final designer such that it can
be incorporated directly into the contract documents that form the basis for contracting with the
constructor. This project safety plan will pass on to the contractor two very important things.
First, it will detail the planner's and the designer's safety considerations that have been
incorporated into the design, especially those that involve a construction process that contains or
has eliminated a hazard. Secondly, the plan will set standards for the required constructor's
safety plan, including such standards as those described by HIFI for avoiding powerline contact.
In other words, it will require that the constructor deal with safety issues such as subcontractor
safety, responsibility on the jobsite, hazard elimination, and other known issues. Such a safety
plan will be an enforceable part of the contract, empowering the construction manager to act
decisively to enforce the sound safety standards that are set out in the plan. A strong
unambiguous contract is a must for good safety. Once a construction manager and/or contractor
is saddled with a weak contract, he is almost powerless to deal effectively with safety or any
other issue on the job.

Without starting a safety plan during the design, and assuring that proper safety standards such as
those suggested by HIFI are set and enforced, there is virtually no chance that the construction
process will consistently and reliably police itself to avoid death and injury. Owner management
is key to preventing injury, damage, and loss of life, and it is clearly in their financial and
humane interests to do so. The other parties to the process (professional engineering and
planning, and constructor management) can also be enlisted to support a continuum of effective
safety planning and execution for a project, however the likelihood of their doing so without
owner support is small. Labor and safety advocates must help create this environment by
working in concert with engineers and constructors to carry this message throughout the
industry. The payoff in terms of lives and dollars saved is enormous, and it's… "the right thing
to do".

88
Insulating Link
George G Karady
The most frequent accident scenario is when a crane works dangerously close to a high voltage
line and the crane load line touches the high voltage conductor and produces a short circuit. The
short circuit current electrocutes workers handling the load. Fig 1 shows the typical accident
scenario.

Crane
line
contact Arrows show
typical current
path

Tiers flashover

Fig 1 typical crane accident scenario

This type of accident can be prevented by using insulating link.

Insulating link description


Fig 2 shows the concept of insulating link application on a crane. The insulating link is a glass
fiber rod, which is inserted in the load line just above the hook. In case of a contact between the
line and the crane the insulating link insulates the worker from the energized crane and prevents
the accident.

89
Boom
Cage

Insulator
Link

Figure 2. Concept of crane protection

Figure 3 shows an insulating link made by Hirtzer in California. The link has metallic hardware
used to insert the link into the crane line. The metallic hardware parts are insulated by fiberglass
and other insulating material. The outer surface has water repellent coating. The manufacturer
specifying the rated voltage of the link and tests each links about twice of this voltage. Also the
permitted mechanical working load is specified for the link.

he

Figure 3. Typical example for insulator link (Hirtzer)

Flashover probability
Several measurements performed by different laboratories on insulator links were reviewed [2, 3,
4, 5, and 6]. The author of this report also performed tests on commercially available links at
Arizona State University.
Tests performed by Morgan, Ontario Hydro, and others show that the flashover voltage of the
presently available insulated links is dramatically reduced when heavily contaminated. The

90
same tests also indicate that the dry and wet flashover voltage remains high. As an example the
report of Mr. Morgan [1] shows that the tested Miller and Hirtzer links withstand more than 57
kV in dry condition and more than 21 kV in wet conditions. The minimum flashover voltage
under salt spray was 25 kV.
Contamination caused insulator flashover is described in literature and is well understood. Dry
contamination is usually non-conducting; therefore it has no effect on the flashover voltage. The
insulator contamination causes flashover only when drizzling rain and fog slowly wet the
insulator. A flashover in contaminated conditions requires the simultaneous occurrence of the
following:
1. Contamination deposit on the link surface in the form of a thin layer (dust layer, mud or tar
like deposit from roads, etc.)
2. The insulated link wetted slowly by fog or drizzling light rain. Normal or heavy rain washes
down the contaminant and eliminates the danger of flashover.
3. The insulated link energized by an accident.
The simultaneous occurrence of these three events is rare.
The contamination on a utility insulator surface is due to airborne deposit. The wind drives dust,
cement powder, industrial exhaust, salt water and other pollutants to the insulator surface. The
amount of pollution depends on the local atmospheric and other conditions. Relatively few
places in the USA experience the heavy pollution used to test insulator links. Fig 4 exhibits the
results of an industrial survey showing the distribution of insulator use at different contamination
levels.

47%
36%

14%
7%

Figure 4. Distribution of insulator use at different contamination levels


This figure indicates that only 7% of the insulators are operating in heavily contaminated
conditions. Cranes are operating all over the USA. Therefore, it is prudent to assume that only
7-10% of the links are subjected to heavy pollution. Furthermore, the manufacturers require that
the insulated links be regularly cleaned and maintained by the operator. Therefore, the build up
of heavy contamination is unlikely. The most probable scenario is negligent dragging of the link
in dust or mud. Experiments performed by ASU show that the rolling of an insulated link in dust
or mud results in medium to light contamination. However, for the sake of argument, let us
assume that 10% of the insulated links are heavily contaminated.

91
The second criterion is the wetting of the insulators, which requires fog or light rain. A survey of
an US meteorological report shows that the number of days with light rain or fog is about 8-90
per year. This number depends on the location. In Arizona, the number of foggy or light rainy
days is significantly less than in Wyoming. Using the maximum (90 days) and minimum (8
days) values, the probability that the link will be wetted is between 8/365 = 2.19% to 90/365 =
24.6%.
The probability that the link is heavily polluted and wetted simultaneously is 10% x 24.6% =
2.46% or less than 3%. This means that, the link will fail to provide protection only less than 3
times out of hundred (100) accidents. Crane to power line contacts, in the USA, cause about 300
fatal accidents yearly. The use of insulated links would reduce this number to 8-10.
The results of this risk analysis re-enforces the conclusion that the insulating link improves crane
safety and that failing to use insulating link, when a crane is working in the vicinity of a power
line is negligent.
Leakage current
The wet insulating link conducts leakage current for a short period of time when the carne
touches a high voltage line. The accident triggers the line protection, which typically switch of
the within 4-10 cycles, which corresponds to a time 83-167 milliseconds. The worst case the
protection operation is delayed when the line is de-energized less than 0.5 second.
The clean or wet insulating links conduct less than 5 mA current when energized without
flashover. ASU measured the leakage current of polluted insulating links [10]. The leakage
current of a Hirtzer link 5T, 50kV, was 0,3 mA at 15kV and in wet and polluted condition the
leakage current was 3.325mA at 1.5kV and 44.9mA at 30 kV. It can be concluded that the
leakage current is less than 50mA below 30kV at light pollution.
The international standard 479 IEC 1994 provides data on current effects on humans. The
standard specifies four zones; AC 1, AC 2, AC 3 and AC 4. The first three zones the sinusoidal,
60Hz current has only transient temporally effects. Fig 5 and explanation is word by word copy
of the IEC 479.
“AC 1 Usually no reaction
AC 2 Usually no harmful physiological effect
AC 3 Usually no organic damage is expected. Like hood of cramp like muscular
contractions and difficulty of breathing for duration of current flows more than 2s.
Reversible disturbances of formation and conduction of impulses in the heart,
including arterial fibrillation and transient cardiac arrest without ventricular
fibrillation increasing with current and time.
AC 4 Increasing with magnitude and time dangerous pahtophysiological effects such as
cardiac arrest, berthing arrest and sever burns may occur in addition to the effects of
zone AC 3.
AC 4.1 Probability of ventricular fibrillation increasing up to about 5%.
AC 4.2 Probability of ventricular fibrillation increasing up to about 50%.
AC 4.3 Probability of ventricular fibrillation increasing above 50%.

92
Fig 5 Current effects on human being (copy from 479 IEC 1994)
The measurement indicated less than 0.5 mA pollution at dry condition, when the link is
energized to 15 kV voltage, this is in AC 1 zone, no harmful effect.
The polluted link current was less than 50mA, when the link is energized to 30 kV voltage for
less than 0.5 second, this is in AC 3, “Reversible disturbances of formation and conduction of
impulses in the heart, including arterial fibrillation and transient cardiac arrest without
ventricular fibrillation increasing with current and time”.
At 15 kV the leakage current is about the half value, which practically eliminates the danger of
deadly electrocution at distribution level.

References
H. B. Hamilton, J.D. Morgan, “Final Report on Evaluation of Mobile Crane Safety Devices”, a
report to Bucyus Eric Inc., 1982.
J. Derald Morgan, Howard B. Hamilton, “Evaluation of Link for Safety Applications”, a report
to R.O. Corporation and National Crane Company, 1982.
J. Derald Morgan, “Evaluation of Insulated Links for Cranes”, unpublished test data prepared for
Grove Manufacturing Inc. 1985, (Not reviewed).
Martin N. Kaplan, “Test of Insulating Links Used on Cranes Under Field Conditions”, 1990.
J. Derald Morgan, Howard B. Hamilton, “Insulating Devices for Cranes. Test Results”,
manuscript containing the summary of tests performed in [1, 2, 3].
J. Derald Morgan, “Insulated Link and Standoff Evaluation for Grove Manufacturing Inc.”, A.B.
Chance Test Laboratories, Centralia, Missouri, 1990.
J. Derald Morgan, “Insulated Link Test Using IEC 507 Artificial Pollution Methods”, A.B.
Chance Company, Centralia, Missouri, 1992.
Ontario Hydro Report No. ET91-94-P, “Electrical Tests on Insulating Crane Links”, August 13,
1991.

93
George G. Karady, “Efficiency of Insulating Links for Protection of Crane Workers”, IEEE
Transactions on Power Delivery, Vol. 6, No 1, Jan. pp. 316-323, 1991.
George G. Karady, “Test of Insulator Links”, report, Arizona State University, 1993.
George G. Karady, Minesh Shah, D. Dumora, “Probabilistic Method to Assess Insulating Link
Performance for Protection of Crane Workers”, IEEE Transactions on Power Delivery,
Vol. I 1, No 1, Jan. pp. 212 -323, 1996.

94
Ben J. Lehman
Rear Admiral [Engineering] US Navy Ret.
Professional Engineer - President, MechElexTex Inc.
David V. MacCollum, Chairman
Hazard Information Foundation, Inc.
P.O. BOX 3962
Sierra Vista, AZ 85636
Dear Mr. MacCollum:
I have read your outline for a study of electrical power line contacts with great interest.
As an expert consultant and witness in at least fifty electrical power line matters since
1976, I have found them to involve many types of equipment. One equipment with
whose hazard of electrical injury I was very familiar was a type of recreational boat.
The passengers in this type of boat could have been protected by known and
economical
means from the time of its original design. However, the argument against the use of
protective devices included the "false sense of security theory" and apparently it had
some influence. The use of the word "theory" is misleading. The argument is simply the
hypothesis that persons who believe themselves to be protected by any device which
decreases the probability of injury to themselves are more likely to expose themselves
to situations involving that risk. I spent many hours in libraries trying to find reports of
incidents in which this hypothesis was correct: I did not find any. On the contrary, I did
find papers reporting psychologist’s efforts to validate the hypothesis: all concluded that
it was incorrect.
Both the major manufacturer of the type of sailboat involved in these mishaps and the
standards and regulatory bodies concerned have taken action to reduced this risk of
injury. As a result, so far as I know, there has been no litigation at all involving this
product since the manufacturer’s last actions about 10 years ago
Briefly, the use of a small catamaran boat having a higher aluminum mast than existed
on previous boats of that size permitted contact between the mast and power lines in
locations where such incidents had not occurred previously. The standards and
regulations for the minimum height of electrical power lines over lakes, bodies of water,
and launching sites did not require sufficient elevation.
First, the standard was changed. While not legally required to, most power companies
quickly raised their lines over water. Second, the manufacturer instituted an aggressive
campaign to notify and educate the owners of existing boats about the hazard. Third,
the manufacturer changed his design to include a protective device.

95
These three actions have apparently eliminated injuries from this hazard. Similar actions
by crane manufacturers and electric power utilities would be very likely to accomplish
the same result.
Original Signed
Ben J. Lehman

96
Melvin L. Myers, MPA
1293 Berkeley Road
Avondale Estates, Georgia 30002-1517

February 23, 2004

David V. MacCollum
Chairman, Board of Governor
Hazard Information Foundation, Inc. (HIFI)
P.O. Box 3902
Sierra Vista, AZ 85636-3962

Dear Mr. MacCollum:

Powerline contact is a significant cause of death among construction as well as other workers,
and I have had an opportunity to review a draft of your report entitled, Safety Interventions to
Control Hazards Related to Power Line Contacts by Mobile Cranes and Other Boomed
Equipment. I am in full agreement with the need and necessity for a “Prevention of Powerline
Contact Plan” as presented in the report.

The elimination of the hazard is possible and should be required on construction sites. Indeed,
many sites such as industrial parks and housing develops are burying their electric lines, which
eliminates the hazards. Likewise, this approach for burying (or relocating) power lines has
become a recognized practice in industrial construction, such as by Jacobs Construction on their
joint venture in the Spallation Neutron Source Project at Oakridge, Tennessee. The HIFI report
addresses the improved technology (boring equipment) and approaches (underground mapping
and pre-dig programs) that augment placing electrical lines underground.

The elimination of the hazard as a first priority is consistent with engineering safety and public
health approaches for controlling hazards. Fundamentally, this priority is to control the problem
at the source as a first line of protection. In safety engineering, this means get rid of the
possibility of electrical contact, and in industrial hygiene, it is to substitute the technology with
something less dangerous.

The second priority in engineering safety and public health is to place a barrier between the
source of the hazard and the person at risk. In the report, distance is a barrier by relocating the
overhead power line. Another barrier is the use of insulating guards to obstruct the path of
current flow in case of an overhead power contact. This secondary line of protection must be
used in anticipation of a power line contact that may arise during the transport of equipment or
where lines are obscured by overcast days or other circumstances.

The third line of protection in engineering safety and public health is to warn of the hazard. The
use of the “Powerline Danger Zone” to mark the ground near overhead power lines is a

97
recognized warning procedure, and the use of proximity warning devises is another approach to
alert the crane operator to the nearby hazard of power lines.

Every worker has a right to safe and healthful working conditions, and the duty to provide a
worksite free of recognized hazards such as overhead power lines is placed upon the employer.
However, the duty chain traces back to the sources of the hazard and its prevention: the planners
of the project, the manufacturers and purveyors of the equipment used, and the utilities that place
the power lines.

No matter the line of protection provided, those planning and engaged in working with or near
mobile-boomed equipment need training related to eliminating, guarding against, and warning of
electrical power line contact. The use of a “Prevention of Powerline Contact Plan,” especially as
related to controlling the problem at the source, is a necessary step in assuring that the worksite
be free of the possibility of power line contact.

Melvin L. Myers

98
Jeff Speer
25 February 2004
P. O. Box 685
Sierra Vista, AZ 85636

Hazard Information Foundation Incorporated


P.O. Box 3962
Sierra Vista, AZ 85636-3962

SUBJECT: Review of Safety Interventions to Control Hazards Related to Power Line


Contracts by Mobile Cranes

This review of the “Safety Interventions to Control Hazards Related to Power Line Contracts
by Mobile Cranes and Other Boomed Equipment” by Hazard Information Foundation
Incorporated (HIFI) incorporates a system safety perspective at time facility and equipment
design. The system safety process involves the application of engineering and management
principles, criteria and techniques to identify and eliminate hazards, recommend risk reduction
techniques and document system hazards, which assist in optimizing all aspects of safety within
the constraints of cost, schedule and design requirements throughout all phases of the system life
cycle. The very nature of construction project activities can be considered a system since it
involves a composite of people, procedures, materials, tools, equipment, facilities, software and
design being used together in an environment to perform a given task or achieve a specific
production, support, or project requirement. Incorporating the system safety process into
construction project management and mobile crane operations will assist in maximizing the
creation of a safer work environment and lessen the potential for power line contracts.

The HIFI study uses both an extensive timeline with selected case studies to provide a systematic
evaluation of the powerline contact hazard and control of the hazard. These design activities
follow the Hazard Reduction Precedence Sequence (HRPS) used within system safety. There is
an order of precedence that HRPS follows to satisfy system safety requirements and resolving
identified hazards: design to eliminate hazard, design to reduce hazard, provide safety devices,
provide warning devices, and provide special procedures and training. The most effective
involves design to eliminate the hazard. Throughout the study, HIFI has shown the powerline
contracts occurrence happen due to poor preplanning and reliance on “thin air clearances”
(procedural control). In the ‘Recommendations’, the combination of ‘Organizational’ and
‘Managerial’ categories identified by HIFI reflect an understanding of how the principles of
HRPS incorporated into effective Construction Safety Plan will eliminate the powerline hazard
contact. .

Elimination of overhead powerlines is the most effective means for reducing powerline contacts
available to management to use. A key element identified in the HIFI study is the role played by
various management levels, summarized in the ‘Recommendations’ under the category of
‘Managerial’. The incorporation of system safety principles within construction and facilities

99
maintenance management programs allows examination of the interrelationship of all
components within these programs, identified hazards and resolution, made available the
management review process for automatic consideration in a total program or project
perspective. It provides management with an effective means of identifying what hazard
elements exist and means of implementing solutions to eliminate or control the hazard prior to
requiring crane operations.

Another key element within system safety is the performance of hazard analyses, both during
design but especially during the operational phases. As HIFI timeline illustrated, an evolution
of a variety of engineering design elements, such as the insulated link and the electrostatic
proximity alarm has occurred within the crane industry to increase operational safety.
Accomplishment of hazard analyses allows identification of hazards, which will require
resolution. HIFI has identified several elements, which need to become integral parts of an
effective safety program, i.e. Powerline Contact Prevention Plan, providing a safe environment
for crane operations. A planned and implemented safety program must integrate safety analyses
with other factors to influence management decisions to ensure a safe work environment prior to
the arrival of equipment and personnel.

An important element within any safety program is feedback. Feedback allows for the
verification of the implementation and effectiveness of hazard control and it can be iterative until
the prevention of an incident or accident event successfully occurs. The HIFI study provides
critical knowledge allowing the reader to learn from the various elements presented and to
translate and implement this knowledge to any activities requiring crane operations to support or
complete required tasks without an incident or accident occurrence. This study represents a
system safety process and recommends implementation of a number of corrective actions before
the task (crane operations) may proceed.

Original signed

Jeff Speer
System Safety Engineer

100
Human Factors Perspective

The research study, with its Thirty (30) recommendations, addresses the frailties of the
ten foot clearance rule, which is the current OSHA guideline for operating personnel. The key
issue lies in gaining the involvement and cooperation of all management; working together to
remove all possible proximity to power lines before the use of equipment commences. If this
cannot be achieved, it becomes the responsibility of management to provide available safety
accessories and to enforce the integrity of the danger zone. The paper focuses upon the hazards
of power lines to various types of equipment and operators, as well as pleasure craft and
operators, all of which are operated by human personnel.
The many facets of electrified overhead power lines, and the hazards to operators of
equipment of several applications and configurations, has been carefully addressed and
effectively presented in the study.

A clearance zone no matter how high, under any power line where operating equipment
or pleasure craft of any description may be moved or operated, is never enough! Various
regulations, rules, and directives that have been developed to date in the matter of power lines
have failed to provide appropriate protection for human beings in their pursuit of human
activities!
I have heard it said, “You cannot legislate morality; it must be learned through better
teaching (whether in the home or in the school)!”
A similar observation may be made about “common sense”!
That is, “Common sense” really means: The application of appropriate methods and
operational procedures performed with ability and proper tools to accomplish a given task safely
and effectively under identified conditions! This is achieved only through fully cooperative
effort from management level, through all levels of the operational hierarchy, to the working
level of skilled tradesmen. This also means training at every level in the operational
organization. Every level of management, down through the ranks, to the machine operator
level, must be trained in his own particular area of proficiency. Every person, at every level in
an organization, must have the training to become more efficient in providing safe operating
conditions at the worker level! This is especially true when the hazard condition involves power
lines.
Review of the study timeline clearly illustrates the reliance by all parties upon the
ineffective ten-foot clearance decree. During the last fifty years, there is evidence of a consistent
absence of management concern to take effective measures such as relocation or de-energization
of power lines, in order to protect workers. This action should be a top priority and, if it is not an
option, the emphasis must be placed on providing boomed equipment with all available
safeguards, such as, insulating materials, proximity detectors, range limiting devices, and non-
conductive taglines.
Check sheets that remind management personnel of the appropriate provisions are
identified in the Hazard Prevention Options Part II; the above suggestions are an effective aid
that an organization can use to ensure effective compliance of all the necessary safety measures.
Every pilot that flies an aircraft safely uses a check sheet before he/she embarks on a flight!

101
Specific focus on Appendix A shows that in nearly every case during the last fifty years, the
primary tendency has been to hold the operating personnel responsible for maintaining a ten-foot
thin air clearance!
This approach has not been successful and is not feasible. Extensive tests were
conducted and carefully documented; it has been well demonstrated, in all validly conducted
tests, that human beings are not able to make the proximity judgments that are required.

A fundamental and primary need is the collective cooperation of management


personnel of the electric utilities, equipment suppliers, and construction management to
remove the powerlines from the worksite before the arrival of the equipment and crew.
Backup equipment, in the form of functional safety appliances, must be included in
the check lists of all required safety measures and actions; this will provide and ensure
optimal effectiveness in the prevention of power line contact.

John H. Van Arsdel, PhD


Human Factors Scientist
Consultant

102
FINDINGS
AND
CONCLUSIONS
1. Identify the various parties who could have exercised management authority to prevent
the injury.
This objective is most clearly illustrated in Table 4, and is used in context to contribute to
the creation of the “Organizational” and “Managerial” sections of the Recommendations.
2. Evaluate the potential role for electric utility companies to de-energize power lines,
provide temporary insulation, relocate the power lines, and lock-out automatic re-
closures at the transformers to avoid re-energizing lines in the event of contact.
This objective is also illustrated in Table 4. It is expanded by David Baker’s expert
comments (See pgs. 79-81).
3. Identify opportunities for liaison between industries to delegate responsibility to ensure
for minimum contact between equipment and energized powerlines.
A comprehensive list of cross-industry delegation of responsibility is found in Table 5.
4. Evaluate the effectiveness of the 10-foot clearance rule for operations from power lines.
The “Standards” subset in the “Results” section discusses the failure of the USACE plan
to prevent more powerline contacts by raising the minimum clearance distance from six
feet to ten feet. It is clearly detailed in the Timeline
5. Evaluate the distance requirements for using ground marking tape or barricades to
mark the danger zone adjacent to power lines.
This is discussed in “Standards” under “Results”. See MacCollum’s 1986 label and
subsequent articles on how to mark the danger zone. The Australian Standard (Timeline,
1993) also covers this issue.
6. Evaluate the actual effectiveness in the field or potential field use of alarms to warn of
proximity around a power line.
The “Warning” subset of the “Discussion” section evaluate the effectiveness of proximity
alarms. Jack Ainsworth’s expert comments (pgs. 75-78) answer any other questions.
7. Evaluate the use of and potential for insulated links to prevent electrical transmission in
the event of power line contact as a redundant back up to protect against high voltage
exposure.
The “Guarding” subset of the “Discussion” section goes into detail about the use of
insulated links. George Karady’s expert comments (pgs. 85-90) provide additional
insight.
8. Evaluate the actual field use of a range limiting devices for the boom as an operator aid.
Range Limiting devices are required in Canada (see Timeline). Additional information
can be found in information on LMI’s as they are usually included in the design.

103
RESULTS

1. Case Studies Charts


For the purposes of discovering trends and similarities in the case file,
information in this section is presented in table format and key points are summarized at
the end of each table.

Table 1 Equipment Capable of Powerline Contact

TYPES OF EQUIPMENT CASES TOTAL

Cranes: Total number of cranes 21

Mobile Hydraulic Telescoping Booms: A6, A11, A15, 12


A18, A20, A25,
These by far are the most frequent types of crane to make contact with A28, A35, A38,
powerlines. A44, A47, A50

Latticework booms A1, A3, A10, 4


A17
This is the fourth most frequent type of crane to make contact with
powerlines.

Flat-bed mounted pedestal hydraulic telescoping booms A12, A16, A22 3

This is the second most frequent crane to make contact with powerlines.

Straddle A5, A19, A34 3

Knuckle Booms A33 1

Electronic News Gathering Vans (pneumatic masts) A29, A31, A37, 6


A40, A45, A46

Aerial Lifts: Insulated A4, A9 2

(These deaths are the result of phase to phase contact, resulting in gaps in
insulation)

Uninsulated A26, A27, A39, 5


A42, A48
Many lifts use hydraulic telescoping booms. Since this is by far the most
frequent type of boom to contact powerlines insulation of this type of lift
becomes a dire necessity.

House moved on trailer truck A2 1

Shingle Conveyors A49 1

104
Forklifts A14 1

Drill Rigs A13, A41, A43 3

Fire truck A36 1

Dump truck A23 1

Agricultural Grain/ feed conveyors A7, A8 2

Pumpcrete booms A49 1

Table 1: No type of boomed equipment is safe from the hazard of powerline contact. While
hydraulic equipment with a telescoping boom is the most susceptible to powerline contacts in
this study, an alarming number of powerline contact occurrences happen without the use of a
crane with a long boom. A more wary relationship with overhead powerlines must be established
for every activity involving masted or boomed equipment. In construction sites, the first pre-job
planning is to eliminate the danger of powerline contact by relocating or burying the powerlines.
As the cases illustrate, the hazard of powerline contact could be dramatically reduced in long
term, on-site jobs with the proper coordination with the owner, leasor or contractor and the
electric utility. However, many aerial lift occurrences involving electric utility linemen, virtually
all fire truck occurrences and portable conveyors and every single ENG van mast powerline
contact take place in environments that provide little opportunity for preventative measures (See
Table 4) such as disconnecting electric power or relocating lines. In these situations electrostatic
warning devices and insulated features are crucial in the avoidance of powerline contacts.

105
Table 2 Types of Equipment Contact With Powerlines
MODE OF EQUIPMENT CONTACT CASES TOTAL

Phase to phase (aerial lift) A4, A9 2

Contacted hoist line of crane A6, A11, A12, 10


A15, A19, A22,
A25, A28, A44,
A47, A50

Point of powerline contact was mid-span of powerline, and the ground A1, A3, A5, 27
personnel were momentarily unaware of closing distance from the powerline A10, A11, A12,
A14, A15, A18,
A21, A22, A23,
A24, A25, A27,
A28, A32, A33,
A36, A39, A41,
A42, A44, A47,
A48, A49, A50

Work was performed in a confined work area, constituting a violation of the A6, A7, A8, 21
danger zone and ten-foot clearance. A16, A17, A19,
A20, A23, A24,
A25, A26, A27,
A34, A35, A38,
A39, A43, A44,
A47, A48, A49

Load contacted powerline A35 1

Contacted back of equipment A5, A10, A16, 4


A17

Moving raised boom directly into powerline A13, A21, A24 3

Sluing (rotating) boom into powerline A20, A32, A34, 5


A39, A43

Raising or lowering boom or mast into powerline A1, A3, A23, 13


A26, A29, A30,
A31, A36, A37,
A39, A41, A45,
A46

Inadequate clearance underneath powerline A2, A14 2

106
Table 2: Several modes of operation that can lead to powerline contact. Though hoist line
contact is the most common, raising or lowering a boom or mast into a powerline happens often.
In over half of the cases the point of contact was mid-span of the powerline where visibility is
low and perception is especially difficult. This statistic proves that the ten-foot of thin air
clearance law is not effective. Workers cannot stay ten feet away from a line that they do not
momentarily see. Further, twenty-one of the cases were caused by work performed within the
boundaries of the danger zone. Some work, such as pick and carry operations along highway
easements, is necessary to be performed within a confined and dangerous space. When workers
are exposed to extremely hazardous conditions such as these, they must be adequately protected.
In the cases of ENG vans, the situation of a possible powerline directly overhead arises.
In this case (which should have been eliminated by other means in any planned site) human
perception of these lines is especially fallible. Proximity warning devices must be utilized as a
“third eye”, equipped with a feature that prevents the mast being raised at all in the vicinity of a
powerline.

107
Table 3 Mode of Victim Contact with Electricity
TYPE OF OCCURRENCE CASES TOTAL

Victim using a tethered electrical umbilical remote control. A7, A8, A12, 7
A13, A20, A29,
A31, A33, A39,
A41,

Equipment stored in appropriate place, such as under a powerline in the danger A11, A16, A27, 4
zone. A47

Victim was guiding the load or the hoist line A1, A3, A5, 14
A6, A10, A11,
A15, A18, A19,
A21, A22, A25,
A28, A34, A35,
A43, A44, A50

Victim touching equipment A2, A17, A23, 4


A42,

Victim on equipment A14, A26, A46 3

Cases involving the use of an insulated link or a proximity warning device. N/A 0

Table 3: Shows the most common situations of powerline contacts. In our case pool, controls
accessible to an operator standing on the ground, storage of materials under powerlines, and
hoistline/guyline contact accounted for 50% of all powerline contact incidents. However, in a
review of all litigated cases the average is approximately 70%.

Each of these three problems can be eliminated by any one of three actions:

♦ Prohibit the storage of material under powerlines by mandating a clear mapping of a 30’
wide danger zone as an “off limits” area around every live powerline.
♦ Installing insulated links and advocating their use would obstruct current to flow to the load.
That could save the lives of many workers.
♦ Eliminate use of cranes with ground-accessible controls by prohibiting their use in the ANSI
standards and government regulations, and design out the hazard by retrofitting cranes with
differently located controls.
These controls are easy to implement, and if they had been taken, half of the cases HIFI has
chosen to study would have been prevented.

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Table 4 The Role of Various Parties in Contribution to Powerline Contact Occurrences

PARTY and SITUATION CASES TOTAL

The immediate employer, usually a subcontractor, was found by the court to be A1, A5, A10, 15
incompetent, as it condoned a dangerous workplace and a lack of safety oversight. A11, A13,
However, state workers’ compensation laws provide immunity from litigation. A14, A16, A17,
A19, A25, A27,
A33, A44, A48,
A49

The crane rental firm rented equipment to a court-declared incompetent contractor A10, A11, A17, 8
and was aware that it would be used in a dangerous location. A18, A25, A26,
A43, A47

The equipment manufacturer failed to offer or provide a crane safe for its intended A4, A7, A12, 6
use, including foreseeable use near powerlines, and did not endorse or suggest the A20, A26, A32
use of safety appliances or preventative design.

The electric utility failed to advise, consult, or prohibit hazardous operations to be A1, A2, A3, 15
conducted on their easement in their danger zone underneath their powerlines. A6, A7, A8,
A15, A21, A22,
A24, A25, A34,
A40, A42, A48

The construction management failed to oversee the work of the various contractors A5, A6, A10, 7
to ensure that boomed equipment would not penetrate the danger zone. A11, A16, A21,
A34

The landowner failed to ensure the relocation or de-energization of powerlines A3, A7, A8, 6
before work began at the worksite or acted otherwise irresponsibly. A23, A41, A48

The designer of the facility made no effective effort to relocate or bury the A13, A25, A33, 4
powerlines. A38

The crane or equipment operator was incompetent, poorly trained, and did not A9, A28, A32, 5
exercise authority to refuse to operate the equipment within the danger zone or in A47, A48
other dangerous situations.

Table 4: Shows the various ways that every party contributes to the epidemic of powerline contact
injuries. Many cases in this table appear in two or more different categories, illustrating neglect from not
just one source but of the industry as a whole. If one landowner had showed more concern, an electric
utility cooperated, management made a bit more of an attempt to “contact proof” the designated work
area, most of these cases could have been prevented. The good news that this table reveals is that there
are many junctures at which management and other involved parties have an opportunity to initiate
measures to prevent powerline contact. The sad news is that the industry has such a lackadaisical
approach to this deadly epidemic that all controls had been neglected, leading to a tragic end for the
workers involved.

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2. Standards

The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (U.S. Army, 1958) have more rigorous standards than
any other body examined in this study. Consequently, they have had markedly fewer injuries and
lost-work hours; about one fourth the national average in 1988 (90.05.22). Starting in 1977, (EM
385:1-1, 01.A.03) these standards include a written pre-construction plan with a “prime
contractor” responsible for all safety operations, including sub-contractors working for him.
The same manual mentioned the danger of storing materials under powerlines in section
15.I.17 and prohibits the practice unless absolutely necessary11. By 1987 (87.10.00)
requirements included 15.E.02: All electric power or distribution lines shall be placed
underground in areas where there is extensive use of equipment having the capability of
encroachment on the clear distances specified. 1996 standards (96.10.01) mandated the use of
non conductive taglines in appropriate situations in section 11.H.12(c).
Because of the stringent guidelines and lower injury rate that is maintained by USACE to this
day, many recommendations are based on standards already implemented in these manuals.
The National Safety Council’s (NSC) first mention of safety devices that warn of potential
powerline contact was published in 1951 (NSC, 1951). In 1955, the National Safety Council
warned of the electrocution hazard from electrical contact with powerlines and recommended
that powerline proximity alarms be installed on construction cranes (NSC, 1955). However,
though the NSC continues to recommend safety appliances, they are not yet mandatory. Indeed,
many standards are set at a baseline, and as history has proven, must be exceeded in order to
offer any measure of ensured safety.
ANSI standards must be regarded in the same light. The 1989 B30.5 standard features a
drawing that shows that booms may be extended horizontally into the 10’ prohibited area as long
as they maintain a ten foot clearance around the powerlines. Since human perception is highly
flawed and expert reports have been written about the perception of powerlines (78.10.00 and
83.09.23) this clause voids any purported protection by relying on visual estimates of a safe
clearance.

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Another problem encountered in ANSI standards can be found in 92.6 (ANSI 1999). The
standard states that emergency controls must be accessible from the ground. However, unless all
parts of the boom are properly insulated or guarded, controls handled by an operator on the
ground can create a electrocuting ground fault circuit in the event of powerline contact. This
clause is also found in ASME standard B30.5a (1994).
By far the most serious violation of public welfare, however, is found in ANSI’s National
Electric Safety Code (NESC). In 1984, the wording of a stringent requirement was altered,
diminishing the responsibility of the electric utility to ensure for public safety. The word
“practicability” was changed, as was the law regarding it. 1977’s NESC handbook rule 211 read
“All electric supply and communication lines and equipment shall be installed and maintained so
as to reduce hazards to life as far as is practical.” By 1984 the rule was eliminated completely,
and placed the responsibility for electric safety during construction on the operator of the
equipment instead of the designs and rules governing the electric utility powerlines(NESC,
1984).

3. Court transcripts

Court transcripts were included in this study because of their link to prominent individuals in
many fields and their value as sworn testimony. Listing these views depicts the beliefs and
biases that shaped the evolution of rejection or acceptance of many safety devices. For instance,
Theodore Leigh (1972) served in the capacity of the head of safety for Link-Belt, a major crane
manufacturer, but had never investigated or inquired about safety appliances. In a later article, he
stresses the importance of burying or relocating powerlines during construction work, but
refused to consider safety appliances as a redundant safeguard (79.09.00). However, Robert
Jenkins, the director of safety of the US Army Corps of Engineers, definitively stated that an
insulated link would have saved the lives and prevented mutilations if it had been employed
during the instance he was questioned about (1972). When asked about the monetary efficiency
of safety appliances as opposed to extra signalmen, he replied “The USACE could not justifiably

11
Perhaps the OSHA accident rate would be reduced further if they prohibited this practice.

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see requiring a contractor to pay for something where you could get better protection not
involving human factors12 for a couple of months wages.” Though appliances are not currently
required in any national standard, the USACE has maintained a stellar record of safety by
drafting their own requirements above and beyond mere compliance13. States Jenkins: “I would
consider any standard that relied solely on the operator or the signalman inadequate based on my
experience.”14
In another instance, Cecil B. Hickman (87.10.27) was in charge of a fleet of cranes that
had been fitted with 25 SigAlarm™ devices. In the five years they were used, not a single
powerline contact occurred. Then they were taken off in order to avoid operators being lulled
into a false sense of security. The “false security” reason mirrors the one given by Collin
Dunnam, as he states that safety appliances decrease the alertness of the operator (82.12.04). In
spite of the supposed heightened awareness of crane operators with no safety devices, the
operators in his jurisdiction sustained two powerline contacts after he removed the devices.
Court transcripts also uncover the intent of some industry guilds to squash knowledge of
hazard encounters and keep them secret from litigators and the public. In depositions taken by
John Crowley in 1990 and again ten years later (90.11.05 and 00.04.11) he reports the existence
of a closed case file, including accident reports and lists of litigations, locked into a room in a
law firm in Chicago. If these documents were made accessible to the public they would help
define the seriousness of construction injuries, raising awareness and motive improve the
situation.

4. Expert Analysis

The following results summarize the comments of the scientists and engineers that
provided a critical analysis for this study. Ainsworth in a tiered approach stressed the need to
assure that employees at all levels of the organization be trained in safety including the proper
use of safety equipment. Similarly, Baker recommends education as key to crane safety methods

12
Italics added
13
See “Standards” section above.
14
Testimony of Rebert Jenkins, Illinois Appellate Court, #59549, page 381, Line 1785.

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including clearance distances, no entry zones, safe work procedures, safety manuals, insulating
devices, and warning devices. Likewise, Van Arsdel emphasized the need to train all
management and each person at every level in crane safety, and Myers emphasized the need to
train any person involved in the planning or use of cranes in the elimination of, guarding against,
and warning of possible powerline contact.
Speer addressed the system safety process as a planning tool by using the Hazard
Reduction Procedure Sequence (HRPS) to eliminate or minimize the hazard at the time of
design. The HRPS is the fundamental building block of system safety engineering, as its
philosophy and implementation are based around elimination of the hazard. Design to eliminate
the hazard is the first concern, followed by design to guard against the hazard and, finally, warn
against the hazard. This aggressive approach to safety is a philosophy HIFI feels would be
effective in elimination of powerline contacts, and Speer writes “Incorporating the system safety
process into construction project management and mobile crane operations will assist in
maximizing the creation of a safer work environment and lessen the potential of powerline
contacts.”
Dey agreed with the recommendations of this report but stressed the need to cover crane
safety in contracts and enforce the conditions of the contracts with owner management as the key
factor. He emphasized the need to insist in the concept planning contract between the owner and
A/E in which designing and planning for elimination of the hazards was paramount. This safety
plan must be incorporated directly into contract documents for the job. It details the safety
considerations for eliminating or containing the hazard. Moreover, it must deal with
subcontractor safety, jobsite responsibility, and hazard elimination as well as other issues that
include the recommendations of this report. Van Arsdel also emphasizes the need to eliminate
the possibility for powerline contact prior to the use of cranes or other boomed equipment. He
also stressed that clearance zones are ineffective in preventing powerline contact and that
regulations requiring clearance zones have failed. He recommends the relocation of or
deenergiztion of powerlines with relocation as the first choice. There should be no option, he
stresses, to this intervention. Myers stressed that the first line of protection is to eliminate the
hazard by burying the powerline.

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With eliminating possible exposure to energized power lines as the first priority, Van Arsdel
recommended as a second priority by various guarding devices such as insulating materials,
proximity alarms, range limiting devices, and non-conductive taglines. Ainsworth suggested a
concept of “Safety in Depth” that, in addition to training, includes several guards against
electrical hazard that result form powerline contact. These guards include insulated taglines,
boom sections, links, sleeves, and work platforms. In addition, he suggested slew limiters (range
limiting devices) to keep the boom of crane from moving into the proximity of a powerline.
Karady addressed insulating links as an intervention to prevent electrocution when a crane load
line touches a high voltage conductor. He reported that about 7% of links are used when heavily
contaminated. Nonetheless, his tests show that even with contamination and the resulting current
leakage, the amperage and duration of current flow are so low that they would have no harmful
physiological effect. Lehman referred to the success of a protective device in aluminum masts on
a particular type of sailboat as effective in preventing injuries from powerline contact. Myers
identified the second line for preventing powerline contact was to relocate the line and use
insulating devices.
Ainsworth also suggested warning systems. These included proximity alarms, which
sounds an audible and visual alarm when the crane boom moves near an electrical hazard. He
identified a product, SigAlarm, which detects the proximity of an electrical contact hazard by
sensing an electrostatic source. Myers identified the third line of defense as the use of proximity
warning devices and the mapping and identification of powerline danger zones.

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DISCUSSION

The following discussion is formatted according to the steps outlined in the HRPS in
order to illustrate how legislation, standards, and industry, have failed to achieve a successful
system safety program in the past and outline the steps it must take as a group in order to achieve
it in the future.

1. System Safety Engineering

Necessity and Overview

Powerlines present an inherent electrical hazard on construction sites and during transport
operations to and from the site. Powerlines present a high likelihood of electrical contact on
construction sites and during lifting or “pick and carry” operations to and from the site. The
injury consequence as a result of contact is serious including electrocution, heart failure, and
severe burns. The combination of the inherent hazard, potential for powerline contact, and
serious injury consequence combine for to present a danger to life and limb for crane operators,
co-workers, and those transporting the crane. The only way to reduce this hazard is to adhere to
the principles of safety engineering and strive to eliminate the chance for powerline contact
through planning and design.
The concept behind system safety engineering creates a system of operations that
decreases the opportunity for close proximity between powerlines and boomed mobile
equipment. From the beginning of a project, A/E staff, construction managers, and other high
authority is responsible for designing out the possibility of powerline contact by creating project
plans and methods that ensure that equipment and workers do not share space with a live
powerline. For instance, planning of crane and other boomed equipment operations should
prohibit storing materials underneath or immediately adjacent to overhead powerlines, as that
situation only becomes an invitation to use cranes in a dangerous and prohibited area. Many
workers have been electrocuted by using boomed equipment to retrieve these dangerously
located materials.

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However, no requirements are drafted to prevent this deadly situation, and such a clause
is rarely found in electric utility easement agreements. Planners must embrace the concept of
safety engineering in the design phase and anticipate ways to avert common situations that lead
to the mixing of powerlines and boomed equipment.

Legislation and Incentive


An important era of minimal and outdated safety legislation was the 1940’s, when the
newly improved crane was increasingly accepted by the construction industry as an ingenious
and invaluable tool. Its cost-effectiveness lay in its efficiency, and despite malfunctions
(sometimes deadly malfunctions) they were still more efficient than using other heavy
construction equipment. The cases listed in Appendix A1 and A3 were landmark litigations, as
they were construction third party lawsuits for the hazard of crane powerline contact injuries.
The case labeled Appendix A3 identified the responsibility for the crane manufacturers to
provide, or at least endorse, the use of the insulated link and proximity alarm. A3 was also the
case where Robert Jenkins, Chief of Safety for the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, testified that
he had raised the mandatory clearance around powerlines from six feet to ten feet, but this action
had been met with little success until the use of proximity alarms. These cases set a precedent for
the safety duty of electric utility and upper management to not place the cause of the powerline
contact on the fault of the personnel on the job site.
The discovery process involved at the liability litigation is a far more intensive fact-
finding process than are conventional investigations, which generally pursue an analysis of the
actions of one party. This process can be allegorically compared to an onion: one must eliminate
many outer layers to identify all the core issues by all parties who could have made a difference.
The first layer to peel away is immunity granted by various state laws in the form of workers’
compensation funds acting as an exclusive remedy for management negligence. The current laws
are so lenient that they offer little incentive to the employer to ensure that cranes and other
boomed equipment are effectively isolated from powerlines so workers are protected.
The second layer is the legal precedents that set limits on disclosure of previous
occurrences. These limits hinder disclosure of errors of the various parties and highlight the

116
behavior of the victim, instead of focusing on the factors contributing to an unsafe workplace.15
The discovery process attempts to identify what incentives placed the injured in jeopardy or
concealed the danger, which the victim had few chances to overcome.
The combination of these two factors can be largely blamed for the continuation of
unsafe practices and management neglect, as both of these laws excuse the employer from
liability when the harmful incident was the result of gross negligence. The balance between
industry and public welfare has been a constant conundrum since the mid-1700’s, when Adam
Smith theorized that the living standards (which include workplace safety) would improve with a
marketplace unfettered by regulation. However, whenever any party is relieved of accountability
a free marketplace does not exist. For the most part, employee’s safety is a paramount
responsibility, but there is a small minority who, through ignorance, incompetence, and greed,
fail to ensure for the welfare of their workers, skew the marketplace with overwhelming costs of
serious injury, death, and property damage.
A solution to overcome the obvious handicaps created by the current workers’
compensation laws is to improve the system when progressive and wise legislators of various
states give their attorney generals a practical and realistic interpretation of gross negligence,
forcing business to be accountable for their gross misconduct and allowing the civil and criminal
justice system to provide a balance of enterprise and the welfare of the people. Active
participation by various states’ attorney generals to hold the small minority of offending
employers at fault in such circumstances would result in substantially reducing workers’
compensation premiums paid by all employers. Prosecution on a criminal level for the most
negligent offenders would create an undeniable precedent to illustrate the consequences of
irresponsible and negligent behavior that claims the lives of workers. This approach would
reduce the cost of workers’ compensation premiums as the small, offending minority of business
who violates the public trust with grossly negligent conduct would be driven to change their
policies or go out of business.
Government can acknowledge standards, but is unable to monitor every workplace all the
time; therefore it is the free marketplace that must rely upon the justice system to ensure for a

15
See Introduction, Pg. 2

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level economic playing field for all employers who uphold the public trust by making safety a
priority. With a system of business accountability, the ignorant, incompetent, and greedy become
liable and are thereby eliminated from the marketplace, as they would have to stand trial for
comparative negligence with all the other defendants in liability litigation. A truly free
marketplace would reward responsible employers with lower premiums, less lost work time, and
fewer costs of lost equipment and medical bills, as there would be fewer injuries and deaths due
to violations such as equipment powerline contact, and little cause for lawsuits. Additionally, the
social security funds would have fewer disability and death claims due to fewer powerline
contacts.
The good news is that public priorities now demand that housing developments and
industrial parks be designed with underground electric power distribution systems. The state-of-
the-art underground insulating materials have been constantly improving since the 1960’s. The
“Blue Stake” underground mapping and pre-dig programs have minimized excavation hazards
and interruptions. Another bit of good news is that modern horizontal direction boring equipment
eliminates the need to dig trenches under roadways. The practicality of buried powerlines is no
longer an issue because the initial added cost eliminates the hazard, lowering cost of insurance,
lost production time, and damage to life and property. Advances in safety engineering such as
those mentioned above are able to utilize technological advances and a priority shift towards
safety to create a workplace free from the hazard of powerline contact.

2. Eliminating the Hazard

Pre-Construction Planning
The ten-foot rule, as well as even greater distances, has proven to be ineffective, as thin air
does not prevent, nor give any warning of, powerline contact. Sole reliance of the work crew on
the job site to ensure for the success of thin air clearance is a dangerous, speculative assumption
that presents a recipe for disaster and has never been a valid method of preventing powerline
contact. A detailed and comprehensive examination of all the facts concerning each equipment
powerline contact reveals that:

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♦ There are usually a variety of parties who were involved in creating hazardous conditions
leading to equipment powerline contact16.
♦ There was ample opportunity for each of these parties to have independently and voluntarily
acted in a responsible manner to initiate controls that would have substantially reduced the
hazardous conditions and the probability of an equipment powerline contact.
♦ These same parties must overcome their inherent professional and trade isolation from each
other and collectively develop a liaison by their safety staffs to ensure that all reasonable
controls are initiated to achieve optimum reduction of equipment powerline contact.

Pre-construction planning starting at the time of design with the active participation of
all parties who oversee the worksite is the primary remedy for prevention of powerline
contacts. The cases listed in Appendix A present a forty-year history of repetitious occurrences
that could have been prevented by careful planning (discussed in the following
Recommendations).
Management of various defendants have attempted to find and rely upon a single silver
bullet of thin air to prevent a wide variety of equipment under a myriad of differing
circumstances from contacting powerlines. There is no such single cure-all that allows
management to delegate the responsibility of avoiding equipment powerline contacts down to the
lowest operating level. The first priority of workers and crane operators at the worksite is to
complete the task in a timely fashion. Management of all the various parties must develop
liaisons to eliminate the danger before the crew arrives at the worksite, and when this cannot be
done, worksite operating personnel must be provided all the tools: appliances, written guidelines,
training and authority to cease operations until management can provide safer alternatives that do
not involve bringing boomed equipment within the danger zone which surrounds all powerlines.
Most importantly, a clear delegation of safety management must be enforced by the site
manager, whether it be the construction manager or the controlling contractor. Owner and
contractor Robert Dey states that “To resolve this [safety] issue requires an examination of the
contractual processes that control a construction site, how such contracts evolve, and who is

16
“Conclusion” Table 4 recaps the immediate negligent action of parties who contributed to the circumstances that
led to powerline contact. In many cases, such as A1 and A26, more than one party engaged in negligent action.

119
empowered to enforce the contract provisions. Without an effective implementation strategy, the
best goals and guidelines will be lost in the normal process of project development, and the
deaths and injuries will continue”.17 This person must have the authority to stop all work in an
unsafe area and perform any other tasks that ensure for the safety of the worker. It is this person
who has the last clear opportunity to bring together each party at a pre-job worksite planning
meeting to discuss and execute all available safety measures for the job. Any person so
delegated would also be directly accountable for any transgressions or violations of safety
protocol, and this direct accountability will make each workplace a more safety-conscious area.
After delegating such a person in the construction done by the Army Corps of Engineers,
statistics for 1988 showed that their lost-time injury rate was one fourth the national average. The
USACE also uses Activity Hazard Analysis to identify potential hazards and their sources. The
“Organizational” section of the “Recommendations” presented in the study focuses on
implementation and designation of authority, accountability, and pre-planning to ensure for
optimum safety before the arrival of any crew.
Equipment powerline contacts are generally a failure of all the parties involved in the
planning of the activity. Manufacturers who produce cranes with unsafe design or a failure to
endorse or produce safety devices are as responsible for the continuation of powerline contacts as
the firm that owns or leases the cranes to incompetent or semi-competent operators. The electric
utility has a responsibility to be a source of expertise to landowners, users, and contractors for
the safe location or de-energization of powerlines. Some utilities are developing communication
with contractors and crane rental firms regarding ways the powerlines can be relocated before
work commences. Lastly, the contracted company is responsible for not making safety more of a
priority.

17
Robert Dey focuses on the subject in further detail in the “Peer Reviews” section of the study.

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Communication
The major cause of contact occurrences is the reluctance of third party executive
management to communicate and collaborate to ensure that cranes and other boomed equipment
do not occupy the same work space. This neglect is a fundamental problem and is shared by the
following groups:
" Landowners and developers who retain the architects, design engineers, and construction
managers.
" Contractors with their sub-contractors, suppliers, and service providers.
" Electric utilities, telephone and TV cable and other systems utilizing power poles.
" Equipment manufacturers and their distribution chain of dealers and rental agencies.
" Various federal, state, and local agencies with administration of applicable safety-related
laws and standards.

In many of the cases in Appendix A, several parties failed to take steps to prevent
powerline contact combined with a practice of delegating responsibility downward to the
worksite personnel, who do not have the authority to improve the layout of the worksite or
secure the applicable safety appliances. In A7, for example, neither the equipment manufacturer,
electric utility company, nor landowner take the proper steps to ensure for complete worker
safety. This fact is further illustrated in Table 4, which gives a breakdown of parties contributing
to powerline contact instances. An obvious solution to this problem is to involve all parties in a
system of written and signed communication with each other. Written contact would not only
verify the time and subject of communication. It would be easy to store in a safety file to serve as
documentation and protection from liability. This file, in turn, would hold management of
electric utilities, construction managers, and other communicants all accountable for their orders
and actions.
The “Managerial” section of the “Recommendations” focuses on enhanced
communication and cooperation, promoting a cross-industry concern and responsibility for a safe
work site.

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2. Guarding Against the Hazard

Standards and Design Mechanics

Many people are familiar with the horrible conditions found in many factories in America
during the turn of the last century18 as well as the lack of labor legislation to protect workers’
rights. By the 1950’s, many improvements had been legislated and complied with, but there were
still many holes in the overall safety system, such as safer machine design.
Many incomplete standards still apply today, and some of the Recommendations are
created as an effort to fortify the patchy protection provided by current legislation. In the early
1890’s, with the enactment of the Railroad Safety Appliance Act, the introduction of self-
couplers and air brakes became mandatory. The enactment of the Occupational Safety and
Health Act provided little leeway to require “safety appliances”, but focused primarily upon
worker safety rules that the employer should administer for compliance. Simple compliance with
standards that fail to address the hazards that lead to worker entrapment is worthless when it
comes to the prevention of equipment powerline contacts.
Industry practices allowing the use of insulated aerial lifts must be closely monitored to
ensure that equipment standards and work routines provide forgiveness of foreseeable human
error. It goes without saying that all work near powerlines such as TV cable and telephone
systems should never use all-metal uninsulated aerial lifts, as they are inherently dangerous for
such use. How many more lives will be taken before management realizes that further safety
measures such as proper insulation or isolation of all possible parts must be voluntarily included
in equipment design? The current and outdated regulations regarding insulation prove that
compliance with legislation is not sufficient to maintain safe workplace operations.
Examination of standards concerning the design of cranes and aerial lifts (self-propelled
elevating work platforms) and even those aerial lifts used by linemen (vehicle mounted elevating
and rotating aerial devices) have no requirements that controls shall not be accessible for an
operator standing on the ground. Appendix A-12, A-29 & A-31 (pneumatic mast) A-41, shows

18
One classic example of unsanitary conditions is Upton Sinclair’s The Jungle. Though it focuses on conditions of
meat packing plants, the work conveys a strong idea of the expendability of employees and the blatantly hazardous
conditions of industry 100 years ago.

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that this faulty design idea has been at least one source of serious injury or death when the boom
of the equipment accidentally contacts a powerline, as the unfortunate operator provides a direct
path for a ground fault current. Further, cranes mounted on a flat bed with a remote control make
no mention that the operational control shall be of a design that is non-conductive. Again, this is
a substantial source of operator injury or electrocution (see Appendix A-20, A-33).

Insulation

Insulation on key parts of the various equipment is a form of guarding and is an effective,
life-saving material. Too many injuries and instances of death continue to occur because of a
manufacturer’s failure to properly insulate. Industries such as electric utilities have long used
insulated aerial lifts. In some cases lack of insulation created design defects that endangered the
lineman; many were identified in litigation, and later insulation was incorporated into with life-
saving results. 19
The vast majority of injuries and death, totaling 70% of all powerline contacts, occurs when
a crane boom or hoist line contacts a powerline and those on the ground guiding the load become
victims. In such instances, an insulated link and non-conductive taglines generally have the ability
to interrupt the flow of current, as most powerlines carry voltages of 7,200 volts to ground. It is
interesting to note that the use of insulated plugs in the masts of sailboats and non-conductive
conveyor booms were not the result of standards. After being identified in litigation as safer design,
real application was found to be able to prevent injury and save lives. Similarly, safety appliances
for boomed equipment have also been proven to save lives, as there have been no reported
powerline contacts with equipment utilizing either a proximity alarm or an insulated link. Such
devices are strong prevention aids and should be used without the mandate of a standard.
Personnel on the ground who are in contact with the crane directly or indirectly account for
approximately another 8% of the victims. It is true that the 8% who touch the crane are not
protected by the insulated link if the powerline contact is made above the link. Yet it is better to

19
The “Technical” section of “Recommendations ” lists broader and more effective uses for insulation.

123
protect 70% of the victims of powerline contact rather than to discard the link because the 8% are
not protected.
The argument that insulated links should be rejected because they are easily contaminated
and do not block sufficient current can be quickly unraveled. While it is true that conductive
contaminants affect a link’s ability to block current, most contaminants found on a construction site
are not strong enough to significantly increase current leakage, and proper daily maintenance to
wipe the link clean will provide insulation to block current to well below the harmful level
(Timeline 91.02-03 and Timeline 82.10.00). Tests conducted by Harnischfeger and American Hoist
and Derrick Co. recorded current leakage that created a mild shock with no permanent
consequences, about eight milliamps. However, critics of the insulated link maintain that any
current leakage above one milliamp could be considered dangerous (Timeline 91.02-03 and
Timeline 93.06.26). The registered amount of harmful current, however, is gauged between 25
milliamps for the beginning of muscular paralysis to 100 milliamps for ventricular fibrillation
(Timeline 1983 [Bridges, J.E.]).
There is also an argument that links cannot block all current flow of 69,000 volt
transmission lines. The truth is that the number of lines carrying power over just 30,000 volts is so
small that it is almost insignificant. The vast majority of powerlines contacted are 7,200 volts to the
ground are less. These facts enhance the value of these safety appliances to the point where they
should be considered indispensable.

3. Warning of the Hazard

Safety Appliance Reliability: Proximity Alarm

However, when courts began to direct responsibility towards upper management and
proper safety planning, crane manufacturers and construction management started to isolate
themselves from safety. The crane manufacturers at this time began to question the reliability of
safety appliances such as the insulated link and proximity alarm. This group undertook to promote
or fund tests and studies to reveal inherent dangerous shortcomings that may exist with the use of
the insulated link and proximity alarms. The minutes of the crane subcommittee of the PCSA

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technical committee of the Construction Industry Manufacturers Association meetings from 1973 to
1975 denoted an “important” agenda to repeatedly and rigorously test crane safety appliances
through the sponsorship of crane and other equipment manufacturers. One letter to the deputy
director of the Construction Industry Manufacturers Association (CIMA) states “[a member of]
Packer Engineering Associates, Inc., and I have joined together to completely test and analyze
various types of alleged safety devices which are supposed to prevent injury in the event of
overhead electrical distribution line contact. We believe we can produce films, photos and facts that
these devices cannot be considered fail-safe, and in fact, can produce an increase rather than a
decrease of contact accidents… At present we have the tentative interest and support of three
manufacturers…20”

These tests overlook the comparison of speculation of the reliability of safety appliances to the
known absence of human reliability, which is the result of work priorities, distractions, absence of
training or supervision, or unsafe workplace equipment. The U.S. 60 cycle powerlines are easily
detectable, as they create both an electrostatic field and a magnetic field. The electrostatic field
strength remains constant with the voltage on line, while the magnetic field varies with current flow
(the less current flow, the weaker the field). In either case, with multiple phase wires the primary
function of the proximity detector is to identify the powerline at a horizontal distance parallel to the
powerline. A common complaint is the fact that proximity alarms do not always sound when
parallel to or directly between the phase lines of a powerline. However, a boom in either of these
positions would be in a strictly prohibited area and would constitute a gross violation of the danger
zone. The argument to reject proximity alarms because of their ability to detect only alternating
current becomes nullified when one considers the fact that direct current transmission lines
constitute only a small fraction of one percent of the powerlines in America.

There is also the speculation to limit the use of proximity alarms because the presence of
immediately overhead powerlines may blur detection, as the electrostatic fields can cancel each
other. But one must remember that the existing rule of a ten foot clearance allows work only in

20
Letter: Bernie Enfield, Safety and Training Associates, 1 S. 646 Fairview, Lombard, Il 60148 to H.T. Larmore,
Deputy Director, Construction Industry Manufacturers Assn, 111 E. Wisconsin Ave, Milwaukee, WI 53202, July 7,
1973.

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areas where live powerlines are sufficiently separated to not interfere with each others’ electrostatic
fields. A forest of power poles is a proven visual warning of a strictly prohibited zone. In
circumstances similar to those encountered in ENG vans, the prevention of raising the mast into
overhead powerlines requires the proximity detectors’ probes (antennas) to be configured in a
manner that is at right angles to the powerlines. This overcomes the cancellation of parallel force
fields inherent to three-phase transmission lines. The vast majority of powerline contacts occur
somewhere in the mid-span of the powerline suspended between the supporting poles where
visibility is the lowest. Only in rare circumstances are there any other powerlines positioned at right
angles or parallel to those that were the point of contact.

Many safety appliance studies are funded by industry guilds and crane manufacturers (Timeline
74.01.02, 75.06.01, 75.08.22). This fact helps to explain the difference of results between seemingly
similar studies. Note the difference in the language of the National Research Council Canada study:
“The SigAlarm™ is no replacement for an alert operator” but “The tests showed that the
SIGALARM™, when adjusted for a given crane position, was CAPABLE of being adequately
sensitive to any change in position of the boom” (Timeline 78.03.00). and the language of “The test
procedures which are described in this report make it very apparent that in order to utilize the
proximity indicator, it is necessary for the operator to continuously give it his major attention and
make readjustments in sensitivity with each new circumstance brought about by changing the
crane’s position or when mobile equipment of high electrical capacitance comes into the operating
vicinity” (Timeline 75.08.22). The Southwest Research Institute puts it yet another way: “One of
the devices, the SigAlarm, used a distributed sensor and displayed significant sensitivity variation
with boom orientation. As the boom was rotated from a position parallel to the powerline to a
position normal to the powerline, the sensitivity decreased severely. To minimize the sensitivity
fluctuation with boom orientation, point sensors are recommended” (Timeline 81.02.00).

These three studies all cover the issue of the sensitivity of the SigAlarm™. The first one
says the device is capable of adequate sensitivity to a change in boom position. The Southwest
Research Institute study says SigAlarm™ “displayed significant sensitivity variation with boom

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orientation.” The study by the Harnschfeger Corp. says this fact makes it “necessary for the operator
to continuously give it his major attention and make readjustments in sensitivity with each new
circumstance”, portraying the amount of device sensitivity in different lights. Throughout the
timeline, there is no study that says SigAlarm™ is failsafe. No device is failsafe. But the continuous
presentation of negative information published by some studies creates the image of a device much
more finicky than exists in reality or on the construction job.

For instance, the 1977 SAE study “A Practical Review of High Voltage Safety Devices
for Mobile Cranes” (Timeline 77.09.12) had the effect of eroding the concept of reliability for
proximity alarms, insulating links, and range limiting devices due to its negative presentation of
fact. Its appearance as an SAE paper hindered the acceptance of safety appliances, as this paper is
frequently cited by litigation as a reason for not adopting equipment safety appliances. The fact that
the SAE paper was authored by employees and associates of crane manufacturers does not make its
data false; however, manufacturer- sponsored or associated documents frequently convey a pre-
arranged point of view. Another example of this conundrum can be found in the Exxon-funded
studies on jury settlements. Thirteen recent papers on the unreliability of jury behavior have been
published in books and journals by prominent psychologists and sociologists. Many of them were
used as new evidence in the appeal of the $5.3 billion Exxon Valdez verdict, arguing that “these
articles present recent social science research demonstrating that jurors are generally incapable of
performing the tasks the law assigns to them in punitive damage cases”21. Exxon refrained to
mention that it was the principal sponsor of the research. However, the studies had their desired
effect. In 2001, the court ruled in Exxon’s favor and lowered the award. Since 1999, judges in ten
cases have invoked studies by Exxon, shaping an aspect of courtroom culture. This newspaper
article illustrates the fact who funds the research can be a factor in the results of the research.

No research has denied that there have been no reported powerline contact incidents
when proximity alarms have been in use, and no recorded injuries during the use of an insulated
link. This study is aware of 1070 crane years (one crane year being the use of one crane for one
year; 200 crane days is the use of 200 cranes for one day) (Timeline 82.10.04, 1985 (Jack

21
Quoted directly from “Funding Studies to Suit Need”, LA Times, December 3, 2003 by Alan Zarembo.

127
Ainsworth), 99.12.29, 02.02.05) that have passed without a contact incident during the use of
proximity alarms. See Table 3. Records of actual absence of powerline contact over a long period of
time with the use of safety appliances is a better measure of safety effectiveness that speculation
based upon unlikely or improper circumstances22.
For many responsible construction managers and workers, safety appliances such as the
proximity alarm, insulated link, non-conductive taglines, and range limiting devices have earned a
reputation in a myriad of work circumstances for being good back-up devices, proven by their use
in the field over a number of years. They are extremely useful in situations such as one-time lifts or
pick and carry activities; as well as other circumstances when the crane will be used near a live
powerline. It has been found that when these appliances are made available the crew seems to
develop greater awareness of the danger of powerline contact, as there is no record of any kind of
injury or failure when these appliances were provided. The “Technical” section of
“Recommendations” addresses the issue of safety appliances in further detail. However, the use of
safety appliances must never replace construction safety planning. Their use must be purely
secondary, as no safety appliance may substitute for competent operators and complete planning.

Cost-Benefit Example
This fact is clearly illustrated by a general breakdown of individual dollar amounts: The cost
of a small, 30-ton, five year-old crane ranges from $115,000 to $150,00023. If powerline contact
occurs, the crane is likely to be severely damaged. If third-party injury liability is filed, defense is
likely range into the tens of thousands, with a verdict of hundreds of thousands to millions of
dollars. The cost to install an insulated link on one crane ranges from $3,000 to $6,00024, depending
on the size of the crane. The cost of installing a SigAlarm™ ranges from $3,000 to $4,00025.
Maximum machine protection through safety appliances costs less than $10,000, or less than one
tenth the initial cost of the crane, and could result in the conservation of hundreds of thousands of

22
In a Study entitled “Report on Tests Conducted on SigAlarm™ Proximity Warning Device Mounted on a
Concrete Pump Placing Boom”, with tests performed by Robert Edwards and Alex Krasny, the SigAlarm™ device
failed when positioned directly over and beneath live powerlines. Both of these positions violate the primary
principle of avoidance of a danger zone. See Timeline 97.11.06.
23
Prices from Crane Hotline, Vol 6, Iss.3, March 2002
24
List prices, Hirtzer™, InsulatUS™
25
SigAlarm™ List Price

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dollars. H.B. Zachry recently equipped 200 cranes with SigAlarm™ (Timeline 02.02.15). The total
estimated cost for this endeavor was probably in the range of $700,000. For about the cost of one
powerline contact incident, this construction firm now has major protection from liability, time lost,
destruction of property, and the invaluable loss of a worker’s well-being. In short, safety appliances
are a sound method of investment protection on many different levels. When an unsafe condition or
circumstance is first identified as the basis of a personal injury liability claim, when the exposure of
hundreds or thousands of similar conditions or circumstances exist, it is a foolhardy business
practice to ignore the installation of the design improvement or the use of a safety appliance, as the
same legal complaint will be made again, repeating itself and growing to result in a monetary tidal
wave of jury verdicts and costly settlements.
These concepts, coupled with the recounting of these tragic occurrences, illustrate the need
for management to voluntarily adopt policies that will foster the elimination of or dramatically
minimize the hazard of equipment powerline contact before the equipment or personnel is exposed
to the hazard. When juxtaposed with information available at the times of litigation, a pattern of
denial and neglect from manufacturers, equipment dealers, rental agencies, landowners, architects,
prime contractors, construction managers, sub-contractors, and others emerges, and the need and
reasonability for a system safety approach becomes obvious.
The lesson apparent in the study is that everybody in the business has a key role to play to
prevent needless deaths and injuries. There is no one solution or “quick fix” to eliminating this
hazard. To prevent equipment powerline contact all parties need to be accountable for their failure
to initiate preventative measures within their span of control. As the following charts will show,
there are many situations that can lead to powerline contact. No one action or design improvement
will eliminate this danger. Yet when management is willing to follow all suggested requirements
and realizes that different measures apply to different situations, substantial progress can be made
towards saving lives, time and money by reducing equipment powerline contact.
The following recommendations list different preventive measures to be taken at different
phases of planning and operation to ensure for a complete system of preventive safety. When
instituted voluntarily by the appropriate parties, these guidelines have the power to make equipment
powerline contacts a thing of the past.

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RECOMMENDATIONS

Construction Safety Plans for the prevention of powerline contacts with cranes and various types
of boomed equipment must be a cooperative effort formed by all pertinent parties of the industry.
These plans should always include representatives of power companies, landowners, architects,
design engineers, building permit agencies, construction managers, and owner/leasors of the
crane or boomed equipment, by designated persons with authority to implement the measures
necessary to eliminate the hazard of electrocution by equipment powerline contact. The plans
must ensure that the operating conditions are such that a crane or boomed equipment will be
positioned only where it cannot be raised, lowered, rotated, intruded underneath or driven into an
area within a ten foot lateral distance of any energized powerline. Additionally, liaison should be
established whereby the worksite personnel are appraised of the measures to be initiated and why
they must be in place before work commences. An Activity Hazard Analysis can clarify
communication between parties and pinpoint specific risks of specific tasks.
Because a comprehensive and effective plan requires attention on many levels from many
arenas, the following suggestions are broken down into three categories: Organizational,
Managerial, and Technical. Organizational guidelines and pre-planning are crucial to reduction
of powerline contacts because they address the hazard in the pre-planning stage, eliminating
many unsafe conditions before they endanger people with hazardous circumstances. Managerial
guidelines are an extension of the plans drafted in the Organizational phase When Organizational
and Managerial plans are implemented correctly, the hazard of powerline contact is practically
eliminated. Technical guidelines directly pertain to on-site activity, and are the practical physical
implementations of pre-planning and construction site safety. They enhance site safety and
ensure an extra margin of safety to compensate for the inevitable human error. Because many
parties are often responsible for safety implementations outside a specific arena, the guidelines
are color-coded to highlight specific responsibility of various industry groups. Green designates
construction management and related activities. Blue designates architectural and design
activities. Black designates governmental administration and oversight. Red designates electric
utility and related communication systems. Purple designates crane manufacturers, dealers, rental

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agencies, inspection services, and operator certification groups. To achieve the maximum effects
from these voluntary guidelines, the following measures should be included into a national
standard or widely adopted by area rulemaking committees and safety overseers and always
incorporated into all worksite Powerline Contact Prevention Plans:

ORGANIZATIONAL:
1. A safety plan drafted by the architect, primary contractor, or construction manager shall
incorporate a clear chain of command and accountable person whose authority affords
constant oversight throughout the length of the construction project.

2. At the time of design a system safety plan should be developed whereby the coordination
with the construction manager to ensure that either the design concept and build or the design
and bid to build provides and opportunity to identify powerline hazards and develop a
construction safety plan that incorporates all of the necessary requirements that may be
applicable. Requirements should include stringent conditions in the contract that affords the
construction manager unquestionable authority to pursue this intent.

3. Architects and engineers shall not design facilities to be located underneath powerlines, and
their plans and drawings shall detail how the powerlines will be relocated or buried to
eliminate the hazard of powerline contact during construction or maintenance. Consistent
with the various states’ Professional Licensing, these drawings shall be stamped and signed
to ensure for the safety of the public.

4. In the event of a change of circumstances requiring a stop-work order, the construction


manager shall reconvene with the project committee if the changes need the participation of
other managers.

5. Contract provisions for highway construction for federal, state, county, and municipal
projects shall include specific requirement for the relocation or burial of powerlines from the
work area whenever it is anticipated that cranes or other boomed equipment will be used. The

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proper government overseer will ensure that powerlines have been relocated before
construction commences by written contact with the controlling contractor or construction
manager.

6. The contract drawing shall identify the “Red Danger Zone26” created by an energized
powerline shall be measured at a minimum of 15 feet on each side of the powerline pole to
create an identifiable Prohibited Operating Area 30 feet wide (see Illustration I & II). This
area shall be identified as a prohibited area for entry with any part of a crane or boomed
equipment. Instructions on the drawings will require marking on the ground by ground
markings, engineer tapes, hazard cones or barricades so that all personnel can easily see the
Danger Zone. For transmission towers, the Danger Zone shall extend 10 feet beyond the
measured vertical clearance from the outmost wires plus the additional clearance of 0.4
inches for every kV over 50 kV, including 345kV, and 16-foot clearance for voltages up to
and including 750kV. This is in accordance to section 1926.550 (a): 15 (i, ii, iii) of the
Federal Code of Regulations (OSHA) for cranes, derricks, hoists, elevators, and conveyors.
See illustration I.

7. Powerlines supplying or adjacent to construction sites shall have the ground fault circuit
recloser devices deactivated by the electric company during the construction period as set
forth in subpart V 1926.995 (e) 5 of OSHA. This measure provides equal protection to
construction workers as provided for Electric Company linemen.

8. The purpose of incorporating these provisions in the contract and the project drawing is to
ensure that the Prevention of Powerline Contact Plan shall be initiated so there will be
sufficient time to implement the agreed upon provisions before either the crane or boomed
equipment or work crew arrives at the work site.

9. The project construction manager or controlling contractor shall be responsible for providing
ANSI B30.5 (Mobile and Locomotive Cranes), A10-33 (Construction and Demolition
Operations- Safety and Health Program Requirements for Multi-Employer Projects) or the
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers EM 385-1-1 Health and Safety Requirements Manual criteria

26
The Powerline Danger Zone, as developed in Illustration I in 1986 by David MacCollum is here termed the “Red”
Danger Zone to echo the terminology used by the OSHA rulemaking committee.

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as a basis for the controlling contractor or construction manager for developing a “Prevention
of Powerline Contact Plan” that is consistent with developing a Job Hazard Analysis.

10. Power Companies should, as far as reasonably practicable, advise their subscribers who are
contractors, owners, and users of cranes and other boomed equipment that their operating
facilities and construction sites must comply with the provisions outlined above. The power
companies’ safety director would be the appropriate coordinator and counselor of such
programs, and would provide all other management personnel with guidelines to ensure for
prompt support. Their easement agreement should prohibit the storage of materials under a
powerline immediately, and include instructions to notify them when boomed equipment is
going to be used at least ten days in advance.

11. Municipalities and other agencies involved in the approval of building permits should
incorporate pertinent provisions requiring that a Powerline Contact Prevention Plan, as
outlined, and be a condition for approval in any construction plans where the use of a crane
or boomed equipment is anticipated.

12. The National Commission for Certification of Crane Operators is considered to be the largest
and most authoritative crane operator licensing organization within the United States. They
should include in their written examination questions pertaining to items 1 through 30. In this
way, every certified operator has a full understanding of how to map the Red Danger Zone
and a clear responsibility to uphold the prohibition of entering the Red Danger Zone with a
crane or other boomed equipment.

13. Training needs to be developed for executive management of electric utilities (including
power, telephone, and cable companies), industrial landowners, architects, and developers of
their own responsibility to ensure within their span of reasonable control that cranes and all
boomed equipment shall be, by design and planning, isolated from energized powerlines.
Executive management must be aware of all options available to the various parties in order
to ensure for the prevention of equipment powerline contacts. This knowledge will further
ensure for a coordinated effort by all parties engaged in planning to incorporate all necessary
measures to prevent equipment powerline contacts.

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MANAGERIAL:
14. Every effort must be made to bury powerlines or relocate them away from the job site.
However, if relocation of powerlines cannot be accomplished, the construction manager
should develop alternate construction methods that do not require the use of boomed
equipment for activities conducted in the danger zone or adjacent to powerlines.

15. Construction utilizing a crane or a boomed vehicle in the Red Danger Zone is prohibited, and
the powerlines shall be relocated or buried before use of the crane or boomed vehicle is
allowed to begin. The construction manager is responsible to ensure for the successful
relocation of powerlines.

16. In the event that work schedule changes arise, the project manager shall be immediately
alerted if dangerous proximity to a powerline exists, and crane operations must immediately
cease until the danger is removed or another method of operation with safe distance can be
established.
17. Only a written permit, co-signed by the project manager and the district manager of the
power company, witnessed on site by a designated individual, will allow a de-energized
powerline to suffice for a compliance with the intent of a Powerline Contact Prevention Plan.
The powerline shall not be re-energized until written authorization stating that all powerlines
are undamaged and all cranes and boomed equipment are located outside the Red Danger
Zone is gained from the power company.
18. The construction site manager and crane operator shall be instructed and tested to be
proficient in the skill of mapping the Danger Zone with the proper identifying markers or
barricades, in the event that a Powerline Contact Prevention Plan was not prepared or
implemented before the crew’s arrival at the work site.
19. Before any crane or boomed equipment commences work, the Prevention of Powerline
Contact Plan shall require that a designated individual responsible and in charge of the work
shall secure from the electric power company a written certificate stating that the automatic
reclosing feature of the circuit interrupting devices has been made inoperative for all

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powerlines adjacent to or servicing the project. This guideline is consistent with section
1926.955, (e) live line barehanded work: 5 of OSHA federal codes and regulations.
20. The Prevention of Powerline Contact Plan shall require that any sub-contractor, leasor, or
other party providing a crane or other boomed equipment will include accurate written
instructions on how to map a powerline Danger Zone (as written in 13 above) in the rental
contract. The contract shall further include a clause wherein the designated crane or boomed
equipment operator agrees to position the equipment in a location as to be impossible in any
boom or mast configuration, extension, angle or rotation to penetrate the Red Danger Zone at
any time. See illustration II
21. When cranes or other boomed equipment are to be used in activities that involve the travel of
the crane with the boom extended on public roads, (e.g. “pick and carry” operations), or any
other situation rendering guidelines 1-18 inapplicable, the use of non-conductive tag lines,
electrostatic proximity warning devices, insulated links or range-limiting devices shall be
written into the project contract by the project engineer and enforced by the controlling
contractor or construction manager to ensure for worker safety. This can be reinforced by
requiring the use of a Job Safety Analysis.
22. When electric utilities lease space on their powerline poles to telephone, TV cable, or other
service or communication companies, to reduce their exposure to liability the following
considerations should be part of such agreements:
♦ Before any lines are to be installed by these parties, notice shall be provided 30 days
in advance so the electric utility can ensure that overgrown vegetation is removed
prior to installation of service communication lines (see appendix A42).
♦ Any party in contact with the power pole or the lines themselves (including those
leasing pole space for service lines, tree-trimmers and maintenance workers, and
installers of utility or communication systems) shall use only properly insulated aerial
lifts with emergency controls not accessible from the ground (see appendix A12,
A39). Further instruction in this clause is found in Guideline # 29. See illustration
III
23. Manufacturers of boomed equipment should adopt system safety as a pro-active method of
identifying all types of circumstances which may arise to afford an opportunity for powerline

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contact. The provision for design modification and or safety appliances is the most
practicable method of preventing injury or death from foreseeable powerline contact.
24. The manufacturers, in order to assist crane and boomed equipment operators and users, shall
prepare and implement a Powerline Contact Prevention Plan to incorporate mapping
instruction and pertinent provisions, as outlined in items 1 through 22 above, in their new
operating manuals, as well as providing a revised supplement for their existing manuals.

TECHNICAL
25. Practical and specific methodology for the placement of concrete needs to be developed and
provided whenever the work is done underneath powerlines. This method will be a working
substitute for either cranes or pumpcrete machines that are prohibited entry into the Red
Danger Zone described in Paragraph 5 (see appendix A44, A49).
26. No materials, supplies, or equipment shall be placed or stored anywhere in the Red Danger
Zone at any time (see appendix A11, A16, A27, A47).
27. Any worker guiding a load shall use a non-conductive tagline attached to the load instead of
touching the load itself (see appendix A3, A6, A11, A15, A19, A25, A50).
28. Crane manufacturers or rental firms have the responsibility to provide range limiting devices,
proximity alarms and insulated links to the crane owners and users as safeguards against
powerline contact every time a crane will be used in the vicinity of powerlines. If the hazard
of powerline contact cannot be eliminated by the assistance of the electric utility company,
workers are entitled to be provided the option of every safety appliance available.
29. Insulated aerial lifts consistent with ANSI standards A92.2 2001- (Vehicle-Mounted
Elevating and Rotating Aerial Devices) have proven to provide reasonable safe work
platforms for trained electrical linemen. These same equipment requirements shall be
extended to personnel doing tree-trimming, workers installing or maintaining telephone and
television cables and those who work with any other systems attached to electric powerline
poles. Aerial lifts used adjacent to powerlines to install, service or maintain advertising signs
and bill boards shall meet ANSI standard A92.2 2001 and shall be equipped with a non-
conductive framework barrier to isolate the individual in the basket from contact with a
powerline. See illustration III See also Guideline # 20.

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30. Aerial lifts which raise the utility lineman or tree-trimmers where they are within touching
distance between phase wires of a powerline shall incorporate sufficient insulation between
and around all metal parts to prevent a phase to phase contact. (See appendix A4, A9).
31. Further equipment used in support of powerline construction and maintenance such as digger
derricks and other similar equipment should be evaluated for foreseeable operating misuse
and provided insulated coverings on boom sections that can be raised into powerlines. Write
specific instructions for the use of short Kelly bars to eliminate the need to raise the boom to
elevations that will reach powerlines (see appendix A30).
32. No boomed or elevating mast equipment shall have controls that are accessible to an operator
while standing on the ground, as it provides a path through the operator for a ground fault
circuit in the event of a powerline contact, which could result in electrocution (see A7, A8,
A12).
33. No boomed or elevating mast equipment shall be controlled with a conductive remote control
on a tether or umbilical cord, as it provides a path through the operator for a ground fault
circuit in the event of a powerline contact. There are remote controlled options which are
non-conductive, such as fiber optic, pneumatic and radio (see appendix A20, A33).
34. Specialized equipment such as news gathering vans or portable lighting mobile
communication systems, which are equipped with a telescoping pneumatic mast to raise
antennas and other communication receptors or floodlights, shall be equipped with an
electrostatic proximity detector attached to the antenna system so that the mast cannot be
raised when the van is located underneath or immediately adjacent to a powerline. The
manufacturers’ authorized installer shall ensure that the electrostatic powerline detector is
properly installed, adjusted, and the probe (antenna) is configured to operate correctly via
individual vehicle inspections and operating certificates. Further, as a redundant safeguard,
the antenna systems or any other devices mounted on top of the telescoping mast shall be
guarded with non-conductive framework, as is necessary to physically prevent a ground fault
in the event of powerline contact (see appendix A29, A31, A40).

137
Table 5 Duty of a variety of entities for electrical safety involving cranes
Entity Organizational Managerial Technical
Owner Require relocation or burial Provide means to
of powerlines away from successfully implement
above the work area, PPCP, such as budgeting
Receive executive training for stop-work time and on-
on the removal of site meetings to avoid
powerline contact hazards unexpected problems.
A/E Safety plan, Hiring of competent
Identify powerline hazards, overseers (primary
Design relocation or burial contractor, construction
of powerlines, manager) dedicated to
Identify “Red Danger safety engineering
Zones” on drawings, principles, assure enough
Receive executive training authority to enforce these
on the removal of goals
powerline contact hazards
Primary Safety plan, Implementation of PPCP, Enforce use of safety
contractor Identify powerline hazards, Availability of proper appliances and insulation
Re-evaluate hazards under materials: barricades, etc. as necessary, hold
each stop-order Assure for written meetings when any
communication between unexpected problems arise
parties
Construction Safety plan Hold enough authority to Enforce use of safety
manager stop work when possibility appliances and insulation
of hazard arises as necessary, hold
meetings when any
unexpected problems arise
Electric utility Deactivate ground fault Assure for written Attend meetings, stipulate
companies (also circuit recloser devices, communication between proper and maximum
telephone and Advise subscribers of parties insulation requirements
cable powerline relocation or
companies) burial necessity and of the
need for a Prevention of
Powerline Contract Plan
(PPCP)
Receive executive training
on the removal of
powerline contact hazards.
Building code Require a PPCP
authorities
Crane operator Require knowledge of
certifier mapping the Red Danger
Zone

138
APPENDIX A:

CASE FILES
APPENDIX A-1

COURT AND CASE NUMBER: Superior Court, Maricopa County, AZ, #228130

DATE OF OCCURRENCE: April 4, 1968

DATE COMPLAINT FILED: 1970

EQUIPMENT/FACILITY: A crawler latticework crane used to lower four-foot diameter


concrete culvert sections in order to construct a surface water drainage system
down the center of a highway.

HAZARD: Inadequate clearance for top of the boom from a 7200 V overhead powerline
which was mid-span in the center of the highway and provided no visual clues on
the ground to warn of an overhead powerline.

SUMMARY OF OCCURRENCE: Pre-job planning overlooked the presence of a single-


phase powerline that extended across the highway to power a well. During
construction, the district service linemen for the utility passed the construction
activity four times a day and was aware of the danger, even gave one oral warning
an hour prior to the contact, but did not temporarily disconnect the power for the
period that the crane would be used under the powerline. The injured worker was in
the trench releasing the lifting hook from a culvert section and the boom, which
was nearly parallel to the ground, was raised approximately three feet into the
powerline upon the release of tension. The injured sustained a loss of his right arm
and other mutilations.

AVAILABLE HAZARD PREVENTION: The pre-job planning with the investor-owned


utility failed to identify this powerline crossing for removal and provide an
underground conduit, which was a pay item for the other powerlines. The utility
district service lineman had not been instructed to de-energize the powerline
whenever a powerline contact was imminent. The contractor was unaware of the
availability of insulated links. As an employer, he was immune to liability.

DISPOSITION: On June 13, 1973, a trial was held by agreement before a judge without a
jury. As workers' compensation benefits were inadequate to support the disabled
and the injured’s family, the judge ruled in behalf of the injured because the utility
had failed to de-energize the powerlines while aware of imminent danger.

NOTES: This case has become a landmark, as it was one of the very few first litigations
that addressed liability of third parties as a defendant who could have eliminated
the hazard. The issue of the adequacy of workers’ compensation benefits and social
security is identified here to show that injury litigation arises to approportion to
other parties who had the ability to prevent injury yet failed to act. This information
generally applies to the other case studies in this appendix.

139
APPENDIX A-2

COURT AND CASE NUMBER: U. S. Court, Oklahoma City, OK, # CJ-70-2177

DATE OF OCCURRENCE: 1970

DATE COMPLAINT FILED: 1970

EQUIPMENT/FACILITY: A house moving activity requiring it being placed on an extra-


wide lowboy trailer towed by a tow truck through the city streets

HAZARD: Inadequate clearance from the house rooftop to powerlines

SUMMARY OF OCCURRENCE: A city moving permit required assistance of the electric


utility companies to raise the powerlines when clearance was inadequate. The
utility personnel failed to appear as agreed. The deceased was electrocuted when he
positioned himself on the roof and attempted to raise the powerline several inches
with a stick to allow passage of the house underneath.

AVAILABLE HAZARD PREVENTION:


♦ The utility company failed to arrive at the worksite at the agreed time. Clearly, a
stronger communication and commitment is needed by both the employer and the
utility.
♦ The electric utility company should have lifted the powerlines for this circumstance.

DISPOSITION: Settled in 1976 for the deceased.

NOTES: This case was listed as representative of other occurrences, as well as to show the
wide diversity of foreseeable construction activities which result in contacts with
powerlines. It also shows the vital importance of good communication and
understanding between house moving construction company and the electric utility.

140
APPENDIX A-3
COURT AND CASE NUMBER: Illinois Appellate Court # 59549

DATE OF OCCURRENCE: July 20, 1970

DATE COMPLAINT FILED: 1974: Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois

EQUIPMENT/FACILITY: A 50-foot latticework boom crane mounted on a truck, working adjacent to a


34,500 volt powerline 35 feet above the ground.

HAZARD: Crane boom was raised directly into an overhead powerline, which was mid-span between power
poles with no ground clues to alert workers to the danger zone created by the powerline.

SUMMARY OF OCCURRENCE: On July 20, 1970, at approximately 9:00 am, a pipefitter was killed and
two others permanently injured. One worker, after eight days in the hospital, lost his right hand and
forearm through the necessity of amputation. By the first week of August, both legs were also
amputated. In addition, the injury caused by electric shock required four operations to remove
cataracts from each eye, leaving him industrially blind. A year after the accident, all of his teeth had
to be removed because of the poor dental hygiene while hospitalized for skin grafts. The incident
occurred while the victim was guiding a pipe over an eight-foot cyclone fence in order to reload the
pipe on another truck. The boom struck the powerline as it was being raised from a 40-degree angle
to a 70-degree angle. Both landowner and power company had keys to the gate of the enclosed area,
rendering the lift unnecessary. If the keys had been utilized, the entire cause of the powerline contact
would have been eliminated.

AVAILABLE HAZARD PREVENTION:


♦ The landowner should have ensured access to the worksite to avoid unloading and reloading of the pipe
over a fence, under a powerline.
♦ The power company was aware of 12 previous crane powerline contacts and should have avoided this
unsafe loading process and made safety planning a priority.
♦ The crane manufacturer was aware of insulated links and boom cages (a wrap-around insulated frame
that prevents direct contact of powerline to a boom) as well as electrostatic proximity alarms. They had
not tested any of them, nor made an attempt to advise crane users of their availability.
♦ It was agreed by both the Power Company and the crane manufacturer that it is difficult to precisely
judge the distance between the boom tip and wires from any vantage point when looking into the sun.
Therefore, the above listed devices could have prevented the boom powerline contact and resulting death
and maiming injuries.

DISPOSITION: The trial court issued a directed verdict in behalf of the plaintiff, which was affirmed in 1978
by the Illinois Appellate Court.

NOTES: This case includes the trial testimony of Bob Jenkins, who retired in 1964 as Chief of Safety for the
entire U.S. Army Corps of Engineers after some 30 years with the agency. In his career, he was
aware of a history of some seven hundred crane powerline contacts, experienced worldwide by
Army Corps of Engineers on their construction projects. His testimony included that the original
clearance of six feet did not appear adequate, so he raised the Corps standard to ten feet and found
that this additional clearance (of thin air) did not reduce the occurrence of crane boom powerline
contact. Additionally, he also developed requirements in the Corps of Engineers for the use of link
and boom cages, all of which are included in this study’s Timeline.
This historical information revealed a pattern of circumstances that is consistent with
powerline contacts. The pattern needs to be broken by examining the specific causes that invite the
crane operating personnel to be entrapped by a dangerous worksite.
(Refer to the 1978 Commerce Clearinghouse, Inc., court reporting service, section 8175).

141
APPENDIX A-4

COURT AND CASE NUMBER: Missouri Circuit Court, Jackson City, # CV75-0950

DATE OF OCCURRENCE: 1973

DATE CASE FILED: 1975

EQUIPMENT/FACILITY/ETC: An insulated utility lineman’s aerial lift as defined in


ANSI A92.2: Vehicle Mounted Elevating and Rotating Aerial Devices, with
specifications for “Insulating devices” was being used with a small metal jib boom
attached to the lineman’s basket, which was not isolated by insulation from an
uninsulated control handle.

HAZARD: A phase to phase fault path for the operator in the lineman’s bucket when
undertaking live hot line work. The boom of the equipment touches a live wire,
which energizes the vehicle but does not allow for a ground fault circuit. When the
utility lineman contacts a different wire, the current energizing the vehicle flows
through him from the first wire into the second, seriously burning him in the
process.

SUMMARY OF OCCURRENCE: The lineman lost several fingers when the boom was
presumed insulated and it brushed against one of three conductors on a power pole
crossarms. The operator was using the boom to lift a transformer and made a fault
current from the phase to phase when he brushed against a powerline with the
boom when using the uninsulated control handle.

AVAILABLE HAZARD PREVENTION:


♦ Absent was complete insulation in a non-conductive boom jib and insulated control
handle.
♦ No warnings of the hazard or advising use of rubber gloves when positioning the aerial
lifts.

DISPOSITION: Settled on February 7, 1978, in behalf of the plaintiff.

NOTES: This was the first of a number of such instances in which the jury was presented
with expert testimony by the defense witness that the use of insulation is not a
reasonable safeguard, as it promotes operator inattention. Several years later this
company initiated a retrofit program to provide insulation on older models and
started to include insulation as standard on newer machines. No design standards
address this hazard.

142
APPENDIX A-5

COURT AND CASE NUMBER: District Court, El Paso County, CO, 80CV2309

DATE OF OCCURRENCE: 1974

DATE COMPLAINT FILED: 1981

EQUIPMENT/FACILITY: A straddle crane approximately 20 feet tall with dimensions of


30 by 40 feet.

HAZARD: Straddle crane of sufficient height to reach the 7200 V powerlines and blind
zones; the operator is unable to see overhead obstructions when traveling, and the
point of contact was mid-span, offering no clear view of either supporting power
pole to warn of imminent danger.

SUMMARY OF OCCURRENCE: The injured was severely burned when while holding a
shackle to attach a load to the lifting beam, the operator backed the straddle crane
into a powerline that crossed the work area of an outdoor plant.

AVAILABLE HAZARD PREVENTION: The removal of overhead powerlines from areas


where high clearance equipment is used. (See National Electric Code
interpretations), which provides no safe clearance for high clearance equipment. An
insulated non-conductive lifting beam assembly and the use of an electrostatic
proximity alarm to warn when powerlines are being approached. There needs to be
a closer inter-dependence of communication between utility companies and
industrial work sites.

DISPOSITION: Settlement in behalf of the injured.

NOTES: This was the first of several occurrences where high-clearance overhead straddle
cranes struck overhead powerlines.

143
APPENDIX A-6

COURT AND CASE NUMBER: Circuit Court, Henry County, IN # 77-C-470

DATE OF OCCURRENCE: June 30, 1975

DATE COMPLAINT FILED: 1976

EQUIPMENT/FACILITY: A mobile rough terrain, 18-ton hydraulic crane with a


telescoping boom, being used to construct a water treatment plant. Powerlines had
not been removed from the work area.

HAZARD: Crane hoist line contact with 7,200 V powerline, as the work area for the crane
violated the danger zone.

SUMMARY OF OCCURRENCE: The foreman lost feet and hands while guiding
materials being unloaded from a truck and the hoist line struck a 13,800 V
powerline.

AVAILABLE HAZARD PREVENTION:


♦ Remove the powerlines from the construction area before work commences.
♦ Use of insulated link and electrostatic proximity alarm as a backup safeguard.
♦ Provide users with instructions on how to map the danger zone created by the
powerline.

DISPOSITION: A jury verdict was decided in behalf of the injured. Case appealed and
upheld by Appellate Court.

NOTES: Dr. Middendorf was the first psychologist to present testimony of inaccuracies of
visual estimates of crane boom or hoist clearances from powerlines.

144
APPENDIX A-7

COURT AND CASE NUMBER: Merced, CA

DATE OF OCCURRENCE: October 14, 1975

DATE COMPLAINT FILED: 1976

EQUIPMENT/FACILITY: Auger/Agricultural feed truck with a boom used to fill a feed


bin at a dairy farm.

HAZARD: Powerlines were strung immediately next to the feed bin, where weekly
deliveries are made and operator is required to stand on the ground operating boom
controls. The bin should have been located outside the danger zone created by the
powerlines.

SUMMARY OF OCCURRENCE: Feed-truck delivery man electrocuted while positioning


a conductive auger boom to load the feed bin and struck a powerline.

AVAILABLE HAZARD PREVENTION:


♦ Electric utility improvement district should have coordinated a relocation of the
powerlines with the landowner (farmer), to provide for safe feed-bin loading.
♦ The controls for controlling the feed truck boom should be totally non-conductive to
prevent a ground fault current flow.
♦ The boom of the feed truck should consist of non-conductive materials

DISPOSITION: Case was settled for the injured in 1975.

NOTES: This case was listed to show the variety of equipment which is capable of making
powerline contact and the need for a greater coordination of hazard identification
between the electric utility and the property owners. Further, the operator’s station
should be designed so the operator cannot operate the controls when standing on
the ground.

145
APPENDIX A-8

COURT AND CASE NUMBER: McAllan, TX

DATE OF OCCURRENCE: October 11, 1976

DATE COMPLAINT FILED: 1978

EQUIPMENT/FACILITY: A portable (wheel mounted) small Auger conveyor used to


load round, 20 foot tall, corrugated grain storage bins. These portable small Augers
can be rolled from one area to another to load grain dumped on the ground. The
work area included a 7,200 V powerline.

HAZARD: This upraised conveyor could be rolled into an overhead powerline. The
powerlines and grain bins instantly create a hazard when they are close to each
other, regardless of the use of boomed equipment. No equipment should penetrate
the powerline danger zone.

SUMMARY OF OCCURRENCE: Two men were electrocuted and one seriously injured
while they were moving the elevating auger to position in order to load another bin.
They misjudged the clearance and the boom struck the powerline.

AVAILABLE HAZARD PREVENTION:


♦ The rural Electric Cooperative should have coordinated powerline location with the
farmer to ensure that it did not pose a danger of conflict with portable auger elevators.
♦ Design of these augers should incorporate an insulating plastic sleeve on the upper
portion of the portable elevator to prevent injury in the event of powerline contact.

DISPOSITION: Settled in 1985 with ample lifetime provision for the two widows.

NOTES: This case was included because it addresses a dire need for electric cooperatives
to work with their member owners to eliminate hazardous powerline locations. It is
also a reminder that no elevating vehicle is exempt from the hazard of powerline
contact.

146
APPENDIX A-9

COURT AND CASE NUMBER: Superior Court, King County, Seattle, WA # 827915

DATE OF OCCURRENCE: April 13, 1977

DATE COMPLAINT FILED: 1982

EQUIPMENT/FACILITY: A utility lineman’s mounted rotating aerial insulated lift, used


to work on energized powerlines.

HAZARD: A phase to phase contact, which often involves utility linemen in aerial lifts
with uninsulated parts.

SUMMARY OF OCCURRENCE: The Electric Utility Lineman lost both arms, which had
to be surgically removed at the shoulders as the aerial lift insulation had been
compromised when insulated hydraulic hoses were replaced with steel re-enforced
conductive hoses in order to overcome the frequent rupture of non-conductive
hoses. Maintenance personnel were not provided adequate information in the
maintenance manual nor specific warnings for the type of authorized
manufacturer’s hoses that were to be used.

AVAILABLE HAZARD PREVENTION:


♦ Parts and components specifically designed to overcome a specific hazard should
include a permanent warning label to ensure that maintenance personnel are aware of
the inherent hazards and danger of the use of unauthorized components.
♦ The manufacturers should identify critical parts with a warning system for design
review to ensure for product safe maintainability.

DISPOSITION: 1978 verdict in behalf of the injured.

NOTES: These lineman’s aerial lifts were the subject of previous litigation concerning lack
of design insulation (see A-4), and this case serves to reveal yet another lack of
insulation failure mode.

147
APPENDIX A-10

COURT AND CASE NUMBER: Cook County, Chicago, IL # 78L 15211

DATE OF OCCURRENCE: July 6, 1977

DATE COMPLAINT FILED: July 31, 1978

EQUIPMENT/FACILITY: A rental crane with a latticework boom being used to place


gravel along a freeway.

HAZARD: The presence of 7,200 volt powerlines parallel to the work area. The point of
contact was mid-span between the power poles.

SUMMARY OF OCCURRENCE: The rental crane was backing into the powerline and
the pinup guylines that support the latticework boom contacted the powerline. The
workman who was in front of the crane guiding the gravel bucket was electrocuted.

AVAILABLE HAZARD PREVENTION:


♦ Pre-job planning to identify adequate space to position the crane with its back to the
powerline.
♦ Use of an insulated link on the hoist line would have interrupted the flow of current to
the worker.
♦ Use of an electrostatic proximity alarm would have provided warning the powerline
was being approached from the rear of the crane.

DISPOSITION: Case settled in behalf of the family of the deceased.

NOTES: The crane rental firm was aware of the location close to powerlines where the
crane was intended to be used and did not offer or provide an insulated link or
proximity device. During litigation, the crane manufacturer and rental council
presented several witnesses who speculated that the insulated link and electrostatic
proximity alarm could not have prevented the death of the worker.

148
APPENDIX A-11

COURT AND CASE NUMBER: 250th Judicial District, Travis City, TX # 279080

DATE OF OCCURRENCE: September 21, 1977

DATE COMPLAINT FILED: 1980

EQUIPMENT/FACILITY: A rental mobile hydraulic crane with a telescoping boom


working at a construction site adjacent to 7,200 V powerlines.

HAZARD: Hoist line struck the powerline somewhere mid-span between the supporting
power poles.

SUMMARY OF OCCURRENCE: One man was killed and two seriously burned when
guiding a load to be lifted. The hoist line struck the powerline when it cleared the
ground. The crane rental firm was aware that the crane would be used in close
proximity to powerlines, but did not offer to equip the crane with safety appliances
nor deny use of the crane to the construction firm.

AVAILABLE HAZARD PREVENTION:


♦ The storage area of construction materials underneath the powerline was unsafe.
♦ Pre-construction planning would have identified an unsafe construction operating area
for cranes, therefore the “Danger Zone” would be breached only with special caution.
♦ An insulated link would have interrupted the flow of current, preventing the loss of life
and the injuries of two men.
♦ Use of an electrostatic proximity alarm would have certainly ensured for greater
worker awareness of a serious life-taking hazard.
♦ The crane rental company should have denied rental of the crane to be used in such a
dangerous location or equipped the crane with an insulated link and proximity alarm.

DISPOSITION: Settlement in behalf of the deceased and injured.

NOTES: This case introduces the need to prohibit storage of construction material under or
adjacent to powerlines. This is also a case where defense presented several
witnesses who speculated that the use of insulated links and proximity alarms could
not have prevented the death and injuries.

149
APPENDIX A-12

COURT AND CASE NUMBER: U.S. Federal Court, Eastern District, Philadelphia, PA
# 79-989

DATE OF OCCURRENCE: March 24, 1978

DATE COMPLAINT FILED: 1979

EQUIPMENT/FACILITY: A truck mounted pedestal crane with the controls accessible to


an operator standing on the ground, used in a construction site.

HAZARD: In the event of a powerline contact the current goes directly through the
operator, who is made the primary ground-fault circuit, as the truck has rubber tires
and its outriggers are on dry wooden pads.

SUMMARY OF OCCURRENCE: The operator was instantly electrocuted when the hoist
line struck the 7,200 V powerline at a point mid-span between the power poles.

AVAILABLE HAZARD PREVENTION:


♦ This type of crane, with controls accessible to an operator standing on the ground, is
inherently unsafe.
♦ A system safety analysis should have been performed at the time of the design.

DISPOSITION: Case settled in behalf of the plaintiff.

NOTES: This type of control arrangement was discontinued, as the various manufacturers
of this type of flat bed mounted pedestal cranes recognized that they were
inherently dangerous. Crane safety standards do not address this hazard nor require
the controls to be located where they cannot be operated by someone standing on
the ground.

150
APPENDIX A-13

COURT AND CASE NUMBER: Circuit Court, Law Division, Cook County, Chicago, IL
# 78L 2395

DATE OF OCCURRENCE: June 7, 1978

DATE COMPLAINT FILED: 1978

EQUIPMENT/FACILITY: Rotating Auger drill rig with a 25-foot mast, used at a coal
mining operation service center located under powerlines.

HAZARD: The mast contacted an overhead powerline.

SUMMARY OF OCCURRENCE: The maintenance man was electrocuted when he raised


the mast of the drill rig in a confined service area and it struck an overhead
powerline.

AVAILABLE HAZARD PREVENTION:


♦ A raised operator’s platform would isolate the operator from a ground fault circuit.
♦ A Proximity alarm would warn of the overhead danger.
♦ Removal of the powerlines from the strip mining operations is the most effective way
to eliminate the hazard.

DISPOSITION: On September 19, 1978, the case was settled in behalf of the injured.

NOTES: Some of the newer machines of this type had an enclosed operator’s cab, which
removed the operator from this hazard. However, this type of contact was not an
isolated occurrence, as in strip mining activities powerlines often cross the mining
area.

151
APPENDIX A-14

COURT AND CASE NUMBER: Circuit Court, 11th Judicial District, Dade County, FL
# 81-12663-CA-30

DATE OF OCCURRENCE: September 4, 1980

DATE COMPLAINT FILED: 1981

EQUIPMENT/FACILITY: A forklift used to create a mobile staging for assembling a


metal building.

HAZARD: A mid-span contact between 7,200 V powerline and staging.

SUMMARY OF OCCURRENCE: Forklift operator, when backing the forklift carrying a


metal scaffold under a powerline, struck the powerline with the scaffold. The
current traveled through the metal scaffold and energized the forklift. Apparently
the operator was electrocuted when he attempted to leave the forklift.

AVAILABLE HAZARD PREVENTION:


♦ Construction safety planning would have identified the limited space for operating a
forklift supporting a scaffold.
♦ The scaffold could have been constructed of non-conductive materials.
♦ Remove or relocate powerlines away from construction work area.

DISPOSITION: The case was settled in 1984 on behalf of the widow.

NOTES: This case was included to illustrate the fact that the use of a forklift can involve a
powerline contact, and stresses the need to relocate or otherwise remove the
powerlines when any equipment with a high clearance is used.

152
APPENDIX A-15

COURT AND CASE NUMBER: 131st Judicial District, Bexar County, San Antonio TX, #84-CI-
04130

DATE OF OCCURRENCE: 1983

DATE COMPLAINT FILED: 1984

EQUIPMENT/FACILITY: A mobile hydraulic crane with a telescoping boom was being used to
help develop an industrial park. Initially, there were many unenergized powerlines in the
alleyways.

HAZARD: Hoist line of crane struck a previously de-energized municipal powerline mid-span
between the poles. It had been re-energized with 7,200 V of power.

SUMMARY OF OCCURRENCE: Two workmen were seriously injured: one lost both legs one
arm while the other had badly burned feet and hands. They were guiding materials to
assemble a roof. The crane was being used by various contractors to assemble tilt-up
warehouses. When the work commenced no powerlines had been strung in the alleyways.
As the development progressed, the powerlines being erected were not available for
service, and contractors were required to use their own portable generators. The industrial
park had two roads from the main highway. The south entry was used by the workmen at
this project, and the pole at this entry had a large coil of distribution line conspicuously
hanging on the cross arms, preparing to connect across the highway to the transmission
line. Unseen by the workers, a half-mile to the north road, the powerlines were attached to
the main transmission line. The municipal electric company did not inform the various
contractors that the powerlines had been energized. The utility lineman’s logic stated that
such a warning was unnecessary, as everyone should consider every powerline to be
energized.

AVAILABLE HAZARD PREVENTION:


♦ The industrial park should have been designed with underground electric utilities.
♦ He municipal utilities should have advised all the contractors when they energized the
powerlines.
♦ An insulated link would have prevented the injuries.
♦ An electrostatic proximity alarm would have alerted the crane operator that the powerlines had
been energized.

DISPOSITION: In December 1984 the utility company settled in behalf of the injured.

NOTES: The defendants presented an expert witness who said it was normal to energize the
powerline when the service was not being provided. The National Electric Safety Code
specifically requires that powerlines not immediately used or abandoned should not be
energized. This case also stresses the vital nature of workplace communication, especially
between independent contractors using cranes. Paragraphs 210 and 211 of NESC 1977
state that all practical measures must be taken to ensure worker safety, and even NESC
1984 tries to promote communication between construction and electric utility. The electric
utility has no excuse for a situation like this.

153
APPENDIX A-16

COURT AND CASE NUMBER: District Court, Columbia Division, SC # 3:84-3141 &
3044-0

DATE OF OCCURRENCE: June 21, 1983

DATE COMPLAINT FILED: 1984

EQUIPMENT/FACILITY: A truck-mounted pedestal hydraulic telescoping boom crane


used in construction.

HAZARD: Backing with a raised boom into the unmarked danger zone of a powerline on
the worksite.

SUMMARY OF OCCURRENCE: The injured, working alone, (loading materials stored


under powerlines) received serious 3rd degree burns from a 7,200 V powerline
when he exited the truck to investigate what had just happened.

AVAILABLE HAZARD PREVENTION:


♦ Use of an electrostatic proximity alarm would have warned the injured that he was
backing into a powerline.
♦ Do not store construction materials under powerlines.
♦ A signalman to guide the operator and map the Danger Zone should have been
provided to work with the operator.

DISPOSITION: The case was settled in June, 1987.

NOTES: A flatbed truck-mounted pedestal hydraulic vehicle has a great deal of utility for
picking up small loads for delivery on the worksite where workmen need building
materials, and because of its versatility should be equipped with an appliance such
as an electrostatic proximity alarm.

154
APPENDIX A-17

COURT AND CASE NUMBER: District Court, Oklahoma County; Oklahoma City, OK
# CJ-84-52

DATE OF OCCURRENCE: 1984

DATE COMPLAINT FILED: 1984

EQUIPMENT/FACILITY: A large truck-mounted latticework boom rental crane, being


used to remodel an electric utility substation.

HAZARD: Powerline contact in an unmarked danger zone, with a frame and pinup guys
that support the boom.

SUMMARY OF OCCURRENCE: The crane was leased with an operator by the contractor
remodeling the substation. The work was completed and crane needed to be backed
to have room to lower the boom so that the crane could be driven off the premises
under the powerlines over the entryway. In so doing, the signalman was unaware
that the crane was being backed into the 7,200 volt powerline to the rear of the
crane. The operator jumped out of the crane to see what was wrong- it is presumed
he believed the circuit breaker had momentarily de-energized the line, and when
attempting to get on the truck to move it forward was electrocuted. At the time of
the occurrence his co-workers were calling a warning not to board the truck until
the arcing had stopped

AVAILABLE HAZARD PREVENTION:


♦ Use of an electrostatic proximity alarm would have warned all of the personnel that the
crane was approaching the powerline to the rear of the crane.
♦ The work area should have been mapped with cranes or other marks to show on the
ground the safe limits of movement of the crane before the crane was to be positioned
in order to cover the boom.

DISPOSITION: The subcontractor settled on behalf of the deceased, but the crane
manufacturer and crane rental firm were found blameless for not providing an
electrostatic proximity alarm.

NOTES: The same model of crane was brought to the work site and an electrostatic
proximity alarm was installed with a sensing antenna inside of the boom. This
location was unique, as there were other powerlines in the immediate vicinity.
When the crane was positioned in the same location the proximity alarm worked
perfectly to warn that the crane was being backed into the powerline to the rear.
Tests were recorded on video and still available. The judge would not allow the
jury to see the tape or hear testimony that the proximity alarm was a lifesaving
device, as the tests were done after the fatality occurred.

155
APPENDIX A-18

COURT AND CASE NUMBER: Circuit Court, Cook County, IL # 85-L-15975

DATE OF OCCURRENCE: May 28, 1985

DATE COMPLAINT FILED: 1985

EQUIPMENT/FACILITY: A rental truck mounted hydraulic crane leased by the railroad


for work on a train wreck site.

HAZARD: Hoist line struck a 7,200 V powerline mid-span.

SUMMARY OF OCCURRENCE: The injured worker lost both arms while removing a
motor from a locomotive for the railroad, and clearance from the powerline was
misjudged.

AVAILABLE HAZARD PREVENTION:


♦ An insulated link would have saved the worker from loss of both arms.
♦ The electric cooperative should have been contacted to de-energize the powerlines.
♦ The use of electrostatic proximity alarm could have alerted the railroad workers to the
fact that the boom and the hoist line were too close to the powerlines.

DISPOSITION: Settled in 1989 in behalf of the injured.

NOTES: Railroad cases do not appear in OSHA reporting. This makes the hazard all the
more dangerous because all such occurrences are not recorded. Fortunately, several
of the larger railroads install the electrostatic proximity alarm on their own cranes.
A number of railroads have installed proximity alarms on equipment that they own,
and have succeeded in avoiding all powerline contacts. In this case the railroad
leased a crane with an operator with no requirements for a link or proximity alarm.

156
APPENDIX A-19

COURT AND CASE NUMBER: 79th Judicial District, Wells County, TX # 24 978

DATE OF OCCURRENCE: October 5, 1985

DATE COMPLAINT FILED: 1986

EQUIPMENT/FACILITY: A large straddle crane used to lift pre-cast concrete beam for
loading on trucks at a pre-cast concrete plant.

HAZARD: 7,200 V powerline contact in an unmarked danger zone in the work area.

SUMMARY OF OCCURRENCE: The truck driver was electrocuted while guiding the
load for placement on his truck’s trailer and the straddle crane struck a powerline
spanning the work area.

AVAILABLE HAZARD PREVENTION:


♦ Remove the powerlines from the work area.
♦ Map the Danger Zone where movement of the straddle crane is prohibited.

DISPOSITION: Jury verdict against the planer owner for a dangerous truck-loading
location.

NOTES: This case example also shows the diversity of types of equipment which contacts
powerlines, and illustrates that this type of equipment has had multiple powerline
contacts (see Appendix A-5).

157
APPENDIX A-20

COURT AND CASE NUMBER: Circuit Court, St. Louis, MO; Division 1
# 902-01524

DATE OF OCCURRENCE: July 24, 1989

DATE CASE FILED: 1990

EQUIPMENT/FACILITY/ETC: Hydraulic raised flatbed mounted cable trolley boom


controlled with an electric tether.

HAZARD: Powerline contact from boom raised approximately 30 degrees and rotated
into the 7,200 V powerline. The boom was controlled by an electric cable remote
control held by an operator who was standing on the ground. The crane was being
used in an unmarked danger zone.

SUMMARY OF OCCURRENCE: The injured lost both hands and feet while using the
tethered cable control as he rotated the boom that brushed against overhead
powerlines. The boom truck was located adjacent to the powerline, requiring the
block to be unloaded from the bed of the truck that the crane was mounted on. The
task required that a pallet of concrete block be rotated under the powerline and
placed on the staging where a building wall was being erected.

AVAILABLE HAZARD PREVENTION:


♦ Relocation of the powerline prior to the commencement of construction
♦ Insulated boom
♦ A non-conductive control system of either fiber optics, radio, or pneumatic

DISPOSITION: settled on behalf of the injured.

NOTES: This incident was part of a cluster of some 32 occurrences involving umbilical
booms made by the same manufacturer. It was also found that some of the relays
were unreliable due to low quality and had caused the control system to not
perform correctly, such as an instance when the control system directed the boom
to lover but the boom continued to raise. When working in the vicinity of
powerlines, this sort of malfunction often resulted in serious burns to the operator.
The crane safety standards have no requirements for remote controls to be non-
conductive.

158
APPENDIX A-21

COURT AND CASE NUMBER: Circuit Court, City of Saint Louis, MO # 912-09826

DATE OF OCCURRENCE: February 23, 1990

DATE COMPLAINT FILED: 1992

EQUIPMENT/FACILITY: A flat bed, truck mounted pedestal hydraulic crane with a


telescoping boom used to unload highway curb forms along a highway construction
project.

HAZARD: Powerline contact mid-span across a freeway being constructed resulted from
raising boom into powerline.

SUMMARY OF OCCURRENCE: The deceased was a longtime foreman who was


assisting the laying out of curb forms for concrete paving of a new freeway. He and
the truck driver would drive a few feet ahead, stop the truck, unload a curb form,
then move on ahead to repeat the task. They visually were aware of a transmission
powerline and avoided raising the crane boom. A half-mile down the highway
under construction, a single-phase 7,200 V powerline (single wire) crossed the
roadway. When picking up the first steel form to be unloaded from the flat bed and
slued the boom to the side and towards the front of the truck, the hoist line struck
the powerline and the foreman who was standing on the ground guiding a curb
form to where it should be placed. Neither he nor the crane operator (the truck
driver) was aware of the powerline crossing the road.

AVAILABLE HAZARD PREVENTION:


♦ Provide an electrostatic proximity alarm.
♦ Provide an insulated link.

DISPOSITION: Settled in 1994 on behalf of the widow.

NOTES: The contractor immediately purchased an electrostatic proximity alarm and an


insulated link and used both of them for a month with an opportunity for each of
their crane operators and crew to use the devices. They then purchased fifteen of
the proximity alarms and installed one on each of their cranes and a pumpcrete
machine. They have used them continuously for the last decade and have had NO
powerline contacts. Each of the crane operators considers the proximity alarm
essential for their safe operations. See timeline for Mr. Andrew’s affidavit on
December 12, 1999.

159
APPENDIX A-22

COURT AND CASE NUMBER: Circuit Court, Hale County, Alabama # CV- 90- 75

DATE OF OCCURRENCE: April 9, 1990

DATE COMPLAINT FILED: 1990

EQUIPMENT/FACILITY: An 8-ton flatbed mounted pedestal crane used to conduct a


one-time off-load aeration machinery for the catfish ponds being constructed.

HAZARD: Contact mid-span with newly installed powerlines presumed not to be


energized, as the facility was still under construction.

SUMMARY OF OCCURRENCE: Deceased was electrocuted when the crane’s hoist line
became entangled with the powerline. The deceased fell down onto the outriggers
and received serious burns for five minutes before the hoist was disengaged from
the powerline.

AVAILABLE HAZARD PREVENTION:


♦ Coordination between the electric utility and the construction company.
♦ An electrostatic proximity alarm would have warned the crane operator and workers
that the powerline was now energized, even if no one else had.
♦ An insulated link would have prevented a fatal flow of current.

DISPOSITION: Settled in 1992 in behalf of the widow.

NOTES: This case example is a reminder of the importance of communication between the
electric utility companies and any site or situation where there could be boomed
equipment. The electrostatic proximity alarm is a reminder that one must always
respect the presence of powerlines.

160
APPENDIX A-23

COURT AND CASE NUMBER: Circuit Court, Muskegon County, MI, # 90-27050- NO

DATE OF OCCURRENCE: June 13, 1990

DATE COMPLAINT FILED: 1990

EQUIPMENT/FACILITY: Sixth wheel semi dump truck bed which could be raised 24 feet
in the air, which was being cleaned at a location designated for cleaning.

HAZARD: The bed was raised somewhere mid-span into a 4,600 V powerline only 21
feet high. The powerline was in a designated work area that was inside a danger
zone.

SUMMARY OF OCCURRENCE: A workman was electrocuted when hosing down the


semi truck bed when it struck a powerline. Workers were unaware that the dump
bed could reach the powerlines.

AVAILABLE HAZARD PREVENTION:


♦ Locate a work area designated for cleaning away from any powerlines.
♦ Provide insulation on the upper rims of the dump bed.
♦ An electrostatic proximity warning device could detect the overhead powerline and be
interlocked to prevent raising the dump bed when under powerlines.

DISPOSITION: Settled in June 1992 in behalf of the widow.

NOTES: This case was selected to be part of the 50 case samples to illustrate the diversity
of types of equipment that comes into contact with powerlines. Though a dump
truck seems an unlikely vehicle to contact powerlines, incidences happen much too
often to be considered a rare occurrence. Records indicate at least fifty cases of
dump beds raised into powerlines, resulting in death and serious injury. Typical of
other occurrences is the delivery of gravel to a residential site and the dump bed is
raised into a powerline. Usually someone is touching the truck (for instance, to pay
the driver) when the bed raises into the powerline.
Presumption that this type of an occurrence is a “freak accident” only
intensifies the need to develop managerial acceptance that the hazard of powerline
contact is their responsibility. The workforce cannot be assumed to be responsible
to avoid the hazard when provided a location under powerlines to wash their trucks.

161
APPENDIX A-24

COURT AND CASE NUMBER: Superior Court, San Bernardino County, CA,
# HBCV008492

DATE OF OCCURRENCE: June 18, 1991

DATE COMPLAINT FILED: 1992

EQUIPMENT/FACILITY: A side mounted tractor boom laying oil pipeline under a


transmission line.

HAZARD: The boom contacted a powerline mid-span in a workplace that was within a
danger zone.

SUMMARY OF OCCURRENCE: Pipeline company requested permission for laying


pipeline across an electric utilities transmission line easement; the utility company
ignored the request and offered no coordination on how the task could be
completed safely. The work proceeded without clearance and three men sustained
serious electrical burns when they were in contact with the pipe when it was being
maneuvered into the trench under the sagging transmission powerline.

AVAILABLE HAZARD PREVENTION:


♦ This case shows the dire need for utility and construction management to ensure for
safety coordination in pre-construction safety planning.
♦ Tractor side-mounted booms should have a warning chart showing the boom elevation
at various angles.

DISPOSITION: Settled in behalf of the injured on April 4, 1995.

NOTES: This case was included to show the diversity of equipment involved in powerline
contact and the importance of management involvement in construction pre-job
safety planning. The tractor manufacturer began providing warning labels for their
tractor pipe laying side booms.

162
APPENDIX A-25

COURT AND CASE NUMBER: Montgomery County, MD, # 117274-V

DATE OF OCCURRENCE: September 21, 1992

DATE COMPLAINT FILED: November 12, 1996

EQUIPMENT/FACILITY: A rental mobile hydraulic crane with a telescoping boom used


to place concrete on a freeway overpass and interchange.

HAZARD: The crane hoist struck the powerline mid-span in a workplace that entered into
the danger zone.

SUMMARY OF OCCURRENCE: A worker, when standing on a partially completed


elevated access ramp underneath another access ramp, was guiding a concrete
bucket to pour paving at ground level, two stories below. An overhead powerline
had not been relocated, as the general contractor believed that the interchange
construction could complete the work without relocating the powerline. Even
highway construction funds authorized such an expense. The electric utility
company at the construction planning meeting made no effort to recommend
burying the powerline before construction commenced. The State Highway
Department did not include powerline relocation as part of the design. Additionally,
the crane rental firm, when monitoring the use of the crane for maintenance
purposes, was fully aware that the crane was being used dangerously close to the
powerlines, but made no effort to intercede. The worker lost both of his arms.

AVAILABLE HAZARD PREVENTION:


♦ Preplanning at the time of design would have included relocating the powerlines
♦ Relocating the powerlines at the time of construction would have been a funded change
order.
♦ The crane rental firm had authority to remove the crane from a dangerous location.
♦ Provision for an insulated link would have prevented the injury.

DISPOSITION: Settled in August 1997 in behalf of the injured.

NOTES: Dr. George Karady presented his test data in deposition that the use of an
insulated link would have prevented the injury.

163
APPENDIX A-26

COURT AND CASE NUMBER: State of North Carolina, General Court of Justice, County of
New Hanover # 94-CVS-997

DATE OF OCCURRENCE: February 1, 1993

DATE COMPLAINT FILED: 1994

EQUIPMENT/FACILITY: Non-insulated aerial lift used in a movie lot to construct and remodel
sets from the service area, which contained overhead powerlines that supplied power to all
the movie sets.

HAZARD: Operator of the aerial lift made contact with a 7,200 volt powerline in a work area that
was in the danger zone.

SUMMARY OF OCCURRENCE: The aerial lift operator sustained serious head, shoulder and arm
burns when he raised the lift into an overhead powerline while working on remodeling a
movie set from the service area at the rear of the set. The injured party’s burns were so
disfiguring that he had to wear a sack over his head for three years so he would not frighten
his wife and children while undergoing numerous skin graft operations. The injured did not
see the powerline, as he was blinded when looking into the sun.

AVAILABLE HAZARD PREVENTION:


♦ The hazard could have been eliminated at the time of construction by simply following the
suggestions of the power company to bury the powerlines.
♦ The aerial lift should have been equipped with a non-conductive boom with an insulated
basket. An insulated basket with a non-conductive frame of plastic piping would have guarded
the operator from contacts with the powerline.

DISPOSITION: The jury verdict in July, 1999 ruled in favor of the injured. The insurer of the lot
appealed the judgment to the North Carolina Supreme Court, and the verdict in behalf of
the injured was upheld. The aerial lift manufacturer and rental agency settled prior to trial.

NOTES: This is an excellent example where the involvement of the landowner was needed to
ensure for buried powerlines, so the movie lot would have been safe for its intended use.
Further, the crane manufacturer and its dealer/rental agency had an aerial lift model with a
non-conductive boom, which was suitable for use. The aerial lift manufacturer’s sales
literature and operating manual showed an illustration of the aerial lift in use under a
powerline. They also made another model of the same lift that incorporated non-conductive
booms, as used by electric utility linemen. Had a crane such as this been used, the
powerline contact would not have caused injury, as the injured would not have been
grounded.

164
APPENDIX A-27

COURT AND CASE NUMBER: District Court, 212th Judicial District, Galveston Co,
TX #94-CV-1233

DATE OF OCCURRENCE: October 8, 1993

DATE CASE FILED: 1994

EQUIPMENT/FACILITY/ETC: A telescoping pedestal hydraulic crane mounted on a


flat-bed truck equipped with a makeshift uninsulated basket.

HAZARD: Mid-span 7,200 V powerline contact with the uninsulated man basket in the
danger zone.

SUMMARY OF OCCURRENCE: The injured sustained the loss of his right arm, which
had to be amputated from a high-voltage shock. He was attempting to hook the
hoist to the lifting straps of a load to be lifted onto the bed of the boom truck. The
materials to be lifted were stored under a powerline. The crane manufacturer
offered for sale an insulated man basket for their crane, but the victim’s employer
had chosen not to purchase it.

AVAILABLE HAZARD PREVENTION:


♦ Materials should not be stored under powerlines.
♦ The use of the manufacturer’s insulated man basket would have prevented contact and
therefore injury.
♦ The use of an insulated link would have prevented the injury
♦ A range limiting device would have prevented the boom from being raised into the
powerline.

DISPOSITION: Settled in 2000 just prior to trial in behalf of the injured.

NOTES: Again, the storage of material under powerlines only invites workers to use a
crane. The practice of storing material under powerlines should be prohibited.
Years later, the plaintiff’s attorney who inherited this case at the time of the
original attorney’s retirement contacted Mr. Andrews (from Case A-21) and
secured an affidavit taken on 99.12.29 (listed in the timeline) attesting to the
benefits of safety appliances.

165
APPENDIX A-28

COURT AND CASE NUMBER: Circuit Court, Saint Louis, MO, # 942-08925

DATE OF OCCURRENCE: November 9, 1993

DATE COMPLAINT FILED: 1995

EQUIPMENT/FACILITY: A rough terrain mobile hydraulic rental crane with a


telescoping boom being used on a construction site.

HAZARD: Hoist line contact with a mid-span powerline.

SUMMARY OF OCCURRENCE: The crane operator chose to rotate the boom 180
degrees East to West on the side towards the powerlines when there was ample
room to rotate the boom 180 degrees on the side away from the 7,200 V powerline.
The worker guiding the load was severely burned.

AVAILABLE HAZARD PREVENTION:


♦ The crane operator/supervisor should have mapped the Danger Zone created by the
powerline and had the area clearly marked, requiring the crane operator to rotate
the crane away from the powerline.

DISPOSITION: The injured settled for a small amount rather than risk a trial and the
inherent harassment by the defense counsel.

NOTES: This is a case where human factors play a large roll. The crane was swung in the
improper direction, but it most likely would not have been if the Danger Zone had
been properly marked. The most obvious warnings that show the location of the
Danger Zone on the ground save the most lives.

166
APPENDIX A-29

COURT AND CASE NUMBER: Superior Federal Court, District of Colombia, Washington, D.C.,
# 000142 b-95

DATE OF OCCURRENCE: February 22, 1994

DATE COMPLAINT FILED: 1995

EQUIPMENT/FACILITY: An Electronic News Gathering Van with a pneumatic mast, owned and
maintained by a major television network.

HAZARD: Raising a pneumatic mast of a News Gathering Van into a 7,200 V powerline.

SUMMARY OF OCCURRENCE: Pending the TV reporting of an important news story, all of the
major network news gathering vans had assembled on the same site. One van pulled into a
parking spot immediately behind another station’s van, whose mast and antenna was
already raised. While sitting on the floor of the van with the side door open, the deceased
raised the pneumatic mast of his van into the parkway shade trees and was apparently
unaware of the overhead powerlines. He was immediately electrocuted, and the terrible
occurrence was videotaped by several of the other TV networks while aid was being rushed
to the victim.

AVAILABLE HAZARD PREVENTION:


♦ Some five years prior to this occurrence, the U.S. Army developed border surveillance SUV’s
with pneumatic masts, but had equipped these vehicles with electrostatic powerline proximity
detectors wired so that the mast could not be raised when parked under or near a powerline.
The reason for this safeguard on some 25 vehicles used along the Mexican border was because
the surveillance was done at night with a quick set-up, with little time to look for powerlines.
The manufacturer of the pneumatic mast had been notified by the army of this safety
development, but had yet to act on it.
♦ The van’s antenna system should have incorporated some type of insulation framework to
prevent the antenna from touching the powerline.
♦ Mast raising controls should be located in the van in such a way that they cannot be
manipulated unless the operator is standing safely inside the van and cannot operate them when
standing on the ground.

DISPOSITION: Some of the parties settled. Others proceeded to a jury verdict in behalf of the
deceased’s dependants.

NOTES: All of the news media is quick to make public the misfortune of other organizations, yet
held information back when an incident struck so close to them. The management of the
major networks had a wonderful opportunity to inform their local stations and subscribers
of the life-saving need for use of the electrostatic proximity warning device, and assist in
funding these necessary appliances. Instead, they kept silent, shirking their responsibility to
ensure for own industry’s workplace safety, which led to additional wrongful injuries of
the same nature (see Appendix A-31, A-37, etc).

167
APPENDIX A-30

COURT AND CASE NUMBER: U.S. District Court, Southern District, IA, #3-96-CV-
70065

DATE OF OCCURRENCE: July 5, 1994

DATE COMPLAINT FILED: May 23, 1995

EQUIPMENT/FACILITY: A digger derrick on a telescoping boom truck, multiple purpose


vehicle used by electric utility linemen.

HAZARD: The truck’s boom contacted a 7,200 V powerline.

SUMMARY OF OCCURRENCE: The deceased utility lineman was instantly electrocuted


when the boom tip struck the powerline while he was using a long Kelly bar to
rotate a screw anchor. He was not provided a short Kelly bar, which would have
prevented the need for raising the boom to begin placing a screw anchor for a
guyline anchor underneath a powerline.

AVAILABLE HAZARD PREVENTION:


♦ Provide a short Kelly bar for installing guy line screw anchors to avoid the need to
raise the boom close to the powerline.
♦ Provide a non-conductive boom tip and a plastic shield for digger derricks as it is
foreseeable that these digger derricks will be operated under powerlines to install screw
anchors and excavate holes for setting new power poles.

DISPOSITION: Case was settled in 1998

NOTES: Previous to the incident, plastic shielding was developed and installed on vehicle
mounted aerial lifts used by linemen to prevent phase to phase injuries to linemen.
The same use of insulation would have redundant backup protection of workmen
from powerline contact by equipment known to be used near powerlines.

168
APPENDIX A-31

COURT AND CASE NUMBER: District of South Carolina, Charleston Division


# 2:96-2106-1

DATE OF OCCURRENCE: August 9, 1994

DATE COMPLAINT FILED: 1995

EQUIPMENT/FACILITY: An Electronic News Gathering Van with a pneumatic mast.

HAZARD: Injured unintentionally raised mast into unseen 7,200 V powerline.

SUMMARY OF OCCURRENCE: The operator, when covering a news breaking story,


was unaware of the overhead powerline and raised the antenna while standing on
the ground and reaching into the van to raise the mast and received burns that
required his foot to be amputated.

AVAILABLE HAZARD PREVENTION:


♦ Since their debut in the Army surveillance unit, proximity warning devices for
pneumatic-masted vehicles have been met with overwhelming popularity as effective
tools against powerline contact. The manufacturer of the van and owner of the news
network should have acquired this appliance for the van.
♦ The van’s antenna system should have incorporated a type of insulation.
♦ Mast raising controls should be located in the van in such a way that they cannot be
manipulated unless the operator is standing safely inside the van.

DISPOSITION: Settled in behalf of the injured.

NOTES: This case was included in the Appendix to show how the management of even a
relatively tight knit, specialized industry is unable to provide a retrofit throughout
the whole industry.

169
APPENDIX A-32

COURT AND CASE NUMBER: Superior Court, State of Washington, County of King,
# 94-2-32501-9 SEA

DATE OF OCCURRENCE: December 28, 1994, 5:00 PM

DATE COMPLAINT FILED: 1994

EQUIPMENT/FACILITY: Truck equipped with a boomed shingle conveyor was


being used in a residential area with overhead 7,200 V powerlines.

HAZARD: Conveyor boom truck curb-side mid-span powerline contact where visibility
was impaired by a cloudy dusk background.

SUMMARY OF OCCURRENCE: Worker was instantly electrocuted when a truck


mounted shingle conveyor contacted a powerline after they had loaded the shingles
onto the roof of the residence and were preparing to leave. The untrained employee
was a recent high school graduate and was placing tools in the storage cabinet on
the side of the conveyor truck. He was unaware that the conveyor boom was being
rotated into the powerline. The boom operator misjudged the clearance of the
boom, as it was approaching nightfall on a cloudy late afternoon in December. A
powerline contact, and the ending of a life, occurred as the operator rotated the
boom back to travel position. The truck was equipped with no safeguards such as
in insulated non-conductive boom or electrostatic proximity warning alarm.

AVAILABLE HAZARD PREVENTION:


♦ The feasibility of designing a non-conductive boom and conveyor was well within the
state-of-the-art at the time of manufacture.
♦ Provide an electrostatic proximity warning device to alert the operator that the boom
was being rotated into a powerline, so he would have the opportunity to avoid the
dangerous collision. Such a device could also have warned the deceased if he had
been trained about the hazards of powerline contact.

DISPOSITION: Settled in favor of Plaintiff on May 17, 1996.

NOTES: One year after settling the case, the defendant conveyor company designed and
installed a non-conductive boom on all new equipment manufactured. They also
initiated a retrofit program to enhance the safety of all of their existing equipment.
The development of a non-conductive conveyor boom was a progressive and
proactive approach to electrical safety, and corroborates the notion that the most
important route to safe workplaces is achieved by design.

170
APPENDIX A-33

COURT AND CASE NUMBER: Court of Common Pleas, Philadelphia County, PA


April Term 1997 # 2386

DATE OF OCCURRENCE: April 24, 1995

DATE COMPLAINT FILED: 1996

EQUIPMENT/FACILITY: Knuckle-boom crane equipped with a hardwire remote control


electrical umbilical cord. Adjacent row houses were being restored in a historic part
of Philadelphia, where overhead powerlines had been installed rather than buried.

HAZARD: A knuckle-boom contact with a 13,200 V mid-span powerline – the conductive


wire remote control system created a ground-fault path to the crane operator.

SUMMARY OF OCCURRENCE: The worker sustained severe disabling injuries including the
loss of both hands, and burns on the legs and stomach. He was holding an electrical
hardwire remote control to a truck-mounted knuckle boom underneath a 13,200 volt
powerline to off-load twelve foot long sheet rock into the upstairs of a row house.

AVAILABLE HAZARD PREVENTION:


♦ Buried electric utilities have been feasible for years, and would have eliminated the
hazard of powerline contact, making safer the foreseeable use of cranes in restoration
projects. In addition, the historical ambiance of the neighborhood would be vastly
enhanced, as there were no powerlines in the early 1800’s when the row houses were
built.
♦ Handheld radio remote controls are safer than hardwire remote controls.

DISPOSITION: Settled in favor of plaintiff in January 1999.

NOTES: Historic district restoration planning should address the issue of buried utilities
for both safety and aesthetic purposes. Safety standards should include
requirements for non-conductive remote controls, as this hazard is the source of
many injuries and deaths.

171
APPENDIX A-34

COURT AND CASE NUMBER: State of Indiana, County of Lake # 45DO5-9704-651

DATE OF OCCURRENCE: May 23, 1995

DATE COMPLAINT FILED: August 9, 1995

EQUIPMENT/FACILITY: A large truck mounted crane with a latticework boom, used for
pile driving for a bridge building project.

HAZARD: Contact with relocated 7,200 V powerlines that were in the work area danger
zone.

SUMMARY OF OCCURRENCE: When attaching the sling to the hoist line hook to lift a
piling into the dragline leads, the workman sustained injuries from severe shock.
The crane was being rotated to position the hook near the pile to be lifted and the
“A” Frame to the rear of the crane cab, which supports the boom’s pinup guys,
brushed against the relocated powerlines. At the time the electric utility had made
plans to relocate the powerlines, but there was no coordination between the utility
and power company and the contractor. The relocation of the lines only provided
safe clearance of the crane from the powerlines when the pilings for the bridge
footings would be driven on the south side of the river. No consideration was given
to the need for safe clearance when driving pilings on the north side of the River.

AVAILABLE HAZARD PREVENTION:


♦ When the power company is notified by a contractor, a safety planning meeting must
be established between the power company and the contractor. It should encompass the
equipment and area that the crane will be using for the entire project, rather than the
decisions made by the utility line personnel, who arrive on the job site when it is
inactive and make a judgment that is inadequate for the jobsite’s needs, such as the
one to relocate the powerlines on the North side of the river because of the assumption
that the crane will remain, and be safe on the South side.
♦ Warning could have been achieved with an electrostatic proximity alarm.
♦ An insulated link would have prevented hazardous current flow to the rigger who was
attaching a sting to the hook.

DISPOSITION: The case was settled in March 2002.

NOTES: Construction safety planning to avoid crane powerline contact requires


management involvement of both the contractor and the electric utility safety
director and the contractor’s safety director to ensure that the powerlines will be
relocated out of harm’s way is time well spent.

172
APPENDIX A-35

COURT AND CASE NUMBER: U.S. District Court, District of South Carolina, Andover
Division # C.A. 8-96-1064-20

DATE OF OCCURRENCE: July 13, 1995

DATE COMPLAINT FILED: 1996

EQUIPMENT/FACILITY: A 35 ton truck-mounted hydraulic crane with telescoping boom


working adjacent to a powerline, next to a facility under construction.

HAZARD: Unwieldy, conductive steel “I” Beam contacted 7,200 V powerline, and there
was nothing to block the flow of current. The crane was being used within the
danger zone.

SUMMARY OF OCCURRENCE: While lifting a steel “I” beam next to a powerline, the
worker sustained serious burns to hands and feet, requiring seven surgeries,
including amputation of toes and fingers, tracheotomy, and skin grafts.

AVAILABLE HAZARD PREVENTION:


♦ Use of non-conductive taglines would have prevented this injury.
♦ Pre-construction powerline safety planning must involve the general contractor, sub-
contractor, and electric utility company in order to relocate powerlines before
construction commences.
♦ An insulated link would have been able to stop the flow of current down the crane, thus
preventing this injury.
♦ An electrostatic proximity alarm would have created awareness of the crane operator
and operating crews. They would have realized that this operation put the crane within
too close a proximity to powerlines, and that other arrangements needed to be taken
before the lifting could proceed.

DISPOSITION: A verdict for the injured was established on December 11, 1996

NOTES: The total area in which to lift large beams was inherently unsafe, too close to
powerlines. The powerlines should have been removed before the work started. The
use of the electrostatic proximity alarm provides the worker an opportunity to
request management for a change to safer methods as well as heightening operator
awareness.

173
APPENDIX A-36

COURT AND CASE NUMBER: Court of Common Pleas, Lackawanna County, PA


# 98-CIV-147

DATE OF OCCURRENCE: January 17, 1996

DATE COMPLAINT FILED: 1998

EQUIPMENT/FACILITY: A fire ladder tank and pumper truck with a snorkel hose, being used to
fight a warehouse fire where people were believed to be living in a converted loft space.

HAZARD: The elbow-style ladder was lowered into a 7,200 V powerline while a fireman on the
ground was trying to make a hose connection. The current traveled through the ladder and
hose and caused severe burns to the fireman. The contact was made somewhere in the mid-
span area.

SUMMARY OF OCCURRENCE: The fire fighting crew arrived at the burning warehouse with
intent to use the snorkel hose to douse the roof fire with water. The snorkel nozzle was
mounted on the personnel basket, which was mounted on the ladder lip, making it possible
for firemen to enter the building to look for occupants presumed to be inside. This
procedure requires the use of water in the tank of the ladder truck until the pumper is
attached to a city fire hydrant. While the snorkel is using water in the truck’s tank, a hose
connection was hurriedly being made when the ladder boom struck an energized
powerline. The fireman making the hose connection while standing on the ground
sustained serious burns. Simultaneous to the construction of this particular fire truck was
the revision of fire truck safety standards. The revised standard included the requirement of
an insulated platform to isolate the fireman from the ground when operating or making
hose connections.

AVAILABLE HAZARD PREVENTION:


♦ An electrostatic proximity alarm would have warned the fireman that the powerline was still
energized, as in the event of fire had not turned the power off.
♦ Provide of a non-conductive platform as now required by the standards, for the firemen to
stand safely on.
♦ Insulation on the lower side of the fire truck ladder would prevent a powerline contact from
causing flow when the ladder is lowered into a powerline.
♦ Develop an automatic call system to alert the electric utility when a fire occurs and establish a
code to identify the location where automatic reclosures could be disconnected.

DISPOSITION: Settled in 2000.


NOTES: Product manufacturers should ensure for a system safety analysis of their products at the
time of design to incorporate the latest available safety standards and technology.
Paragraph 7.9.2 of NFPA’s standard 1904 for Aerial Ladder and Elevating Platform Fire
Apparatus states only: “Provisions shall be made so the pump operator is not in contact
with the ground. Signs shall be places to warn the pump operator of the electrocution
hazard.” However, this standard gave no clue that the design should include a non-
conductive platform and handholds for firefighters who had the task of connecting water
hoses to the aerial ladder and elevating platform apparatus.

174
APPENDIX A-37

COURT AND CASE NUMBER: Circuit Court, Washington County, MS, # C120-0139

DATE OF OCCURRENCE: 1996

DATE COMPLAINT FILED: 2002

EQUIPMENT/FACILITY: News Gathering Van with a pneumatic mast.

HAZARD: The mast of the van was raised into a 7,200 V powerline.

SUMMARY OF OCCURRENCE: Deceased was unaware of the overhead powerline, and


raised the mast and antennas into it.

AVAILABLE HAZARD PREVENTION:


♦ Electrostatic Proximity Warning Sensor wired to prevent raising the mast when under
or adjacent to a powerline.
♦ The van’s antenna system should have incorporated a type of insulation
♦ Mast raising controls should be located in the van in such a way that they cannot be
manipulated unless the operator is standing safely inside the van.

DISPOSITION: unknown

NOTES: There is a conspicuous absence of involvement of the television industry to


ensure for safe equipment using known safeguards and old technology. The U.S.
Army adopted similar methods in 1985, yet an unknown number of ENG vans,
mostly in urban areas, are without this protection.

175
APPENDIX A-38

COURT AND CASE NUMBER: District Court, Jefferson County, 13th District, TX,
# D-157188

DATE OF OCCURRENCE: October 11, 1996

DATE CASE FILED: 1997

EQUIPMENT/FACILITY/ETC: A hydraulic crane.

HAZARD: Contact with a 7,200 V powerline as a result of a work area that was within the
danger zone.

SUMMARY OF OCCURRENCE: One man guiding a sheet of steel eight feet wide and
forty feet long sustained severe burns, requiring amputation on parts of all four
limbs. A co-worker suffered severe burns on one hand, requiring amputation of
several fingers. The workplace had undergone several previous expansions where
the utility company had been requested to bury the powerlines in order to afford
access to cranes to carry materials. The same request was made to bury powerlines
in front of the doorway into a new fabricating shop where the victims were
attempting to guide the sheet of steel when the crane boom tip contacted a
powerline. The powerline had been raised by the doorway rather than being buried
because the electric utility company installing the new powerlines did not have a
trench ditcher immediately available and would have to delay the powerline
instillation. The landowner was not given the option to dig the trench necessary to
bury the powerline so to immediately provide power to the new facility. The
powerlines were not buried. The electric utility company, seeking no one’s
permission, just raised the powerlines in front of the new facility doorway. The
crane was not equipped with an insulated link, nor did the manufacturer
recommend the use of any safety devices.

AVAILABLE HAZARD PREVENTION:


♦ When working with conductive materials it is especially important to bury nearby
powerlines.
♦ An insulated link would have stopped the flow of current and protected the workers
guiding the load.

DISPOSITION: Settled October 2000.

NOTES: This is an incredible instance of the lack of communication that regularly exists
between construction and the utility company. Policy and procedure must be
streamlined to improve efficiency while showing a greater concern for the role
electric utility companies play in construction safety.

176
APPENDIX A-39

COURT AND CASE NUMBER: Court of Common Pleas, Luzenne County, PA,
# 326 of 1999

DATE OF OCCURRENCE: January 21, 1997

DATE CASE FILED: 1999

EQUIPMENT/FACILITY/ETC: An uninsulated aerial lift

HAZARD: 69,000 V transmission powerline contact was made mid-span in a work area
that was in the danger zone.

SUMMARY OF OCCURRENCE: The operator sustained serious electrical burns while


operating the aerial lift when he was standing on the ground using the alternate
emergency control located at the rear of the truck-mounted aerial lift. His task was
to raise the boom, which was raising fiber-optics cable that was supported on the
basket of the aerial lift. The fiber-optics cable was being installed between two
69,000 V transmission lines. Due to its frail nature and the rough terrain the cable
was being lifted in the middle of its span between supporting poles. The electric
utility had selected this uninsulated aerial lift to be used in their narrow easement
space between the two high-voltage transmission lines. The operator had to rely on
a coworker positioned over a hundred feet away who was acting as a signalman to
maintain safe clearance. The signalman failed to estimate safe clearance as the
aerial lift’s telescoping boom was being rotated in the process of aligning the cable
in the center of the narrow easement. The uninsulated boom struck the powerline,
injuring the operator.

AVAILABLE HAZARD PREVENTION:


♦ An uninsulated aerial lift is not intended to be used in locations where it can be raised
or rotated within excess of 10 feet of powerlines as required by OSHA.
♦ The design of insulated aerial lifts for utility linemen by the same manufacturer
provided the alternate controls in a location where they cannot be operated by
someone standing on the ground.

DISPOSITION: Settled in behalf of the injured.

NOTES: Any boomed equipment capable of reaching powerline should not be designed
with controls accessible to someone standing on the ground.

177
APPENDIX A-40

COURT AND CASE NUMBER: U.S. District Court, Southern District of Iowa,
# 4-98-CV-80131

DATE OF OCCURRENCE: September 3, 1997

DATE COMPLAINT FILED: 1998

EQUIPMENT/FACILITY: News Gathering Van with a pneumatic mast at a news story


location.

HAZARD: The mast of the van contacted a 7,200 V powerline and an uninterrupted flow
of current caused mass injuries.

SUMMARY OF OCCURRENCE: A lady news reporter, a recent graduate with a degree


in journalism and new to the job, attempted to rescue a co-worker who was
operating the mast-raising control from outside of the van. The lady journalist
received a severe burn to her skull that caused a lengthy coma and loss of toes.
Recovery required months of painful surgery and skin grafting. Her coworker
sustained serious burns to his arms.

AVAILABLE HAZARD PREVENTION:


♦ In the hazard of possible electrocution, the only prevention measures are necessary
measures that should be immediately taken. Electrostatic Proximity Warning Devices,
available since 1985, as well as controls that can only be used when the operator is
standing inside the van, are the only way to eliminate this deadly hazard.
♦ Insulation on antenna equipment would also lessen the incidence of electrocution.

DISPOSITION: Settlement in behalf of the injured.

NOTES: This case is included because it clearly illustrates the major networks’ lack of top
management awareness, exhibited by their complete lack of action to ensure that all
vans are equipped with an electrostatic proximity system, insulation, and controls
not accessible when standing on the ground. Abdication of the responsibility and
dependence of the local channels poses a compromise of civil rights for those who
work in the TV reporting industry. By this time some 10 to 15 percent of the vans
equipped with pneumatic masts are, according to the manufacturer of the
electrostatic proximity detectors, wired so the mast cannot be raised when parked
under a powerline.

178
APPENDIX A-41

COURT AND CASE NUMBER: 3rd Judicial District, Las Cruces, NM, # CV-99-1135

DATE OF OCCURRENCE: 1998

DATE COMPLAINT FILED: 1999

EQUIPMENT/FACILITY: A water well service truck rig raising a submerged pump had a
boom that, in the travel mode, laid flat over the truck bed and cab. The controls to
raise the boom were at the rear of the truck where the operator stood on the ground
and blocked the view of the boom while being raised or lowered.

HAZARD: Contact of a 7,200 V powerline at the mid-span point while lowering the boom.

SUMMARY OF OCCURRENCE: The equipment owner was electrocuted and a co-


worker lost an arm and a leg while the boom was being lowered. The crew was
using the boom in a near-vertical position to load a pump engine onto a trailer. As
they had to move the engine several feet lateral distance, they would pick the motor
up and move the truck forward so the engine could be lowered onto a trailer. When
they lowered the boom, the new position of the truck did not allow it to clear the
powerline as it did when raised.

AVAILABLE HAZARD PREVENTION:


♦ The land owner should have requested the electric cooperative to turn the power off.
♦ The well service unit needed the controls located where there was a view of the arc any
time the boom was raised or lowered.
♦ Boomed equipment should have the controls located so the operator cannot stand on
the ground.

DISPOSITION: The case was settled in behalf of the widow and the injured.

NOTES: This case was included to show the diversity of equipment that can reach
powerlines and the need for uniform design standards stating that the controls
should not be reached by an operator when standing on the ground.

179
APPENDIX A-42

COURT AND CASE NUMBER: 277th District Court, Williamson City, TX,
# 00-210-277

DATE OF OCCURRENCE: May 7, 1998

DATE CASE FILED: 1999

EQUIPMENT/FACILITY/ETC: A non-insulated aerial lift used to install TV cable


supported by electric utility powerlines.

HAZARD: Mid-span 7,200 V powerline contact.

SUMMARY OF OCCURRENCE: An aerial lift operator was electrocuted while


attempting to install a TV cable where heavily overgrown oak trees blocked the
view of the powerline. Almost immediately, the lift brushed the operator against an
unseen powerline, killing the operator.

AVAILABLE HAZARD PREVENTION:


♦ The electric utility should have cleared the powerline easement through the overgrown
oak trees before leasing space on their poles to install TV cable.
♦ The uninsulated aerial lift should not be used to install TV cable underneath
powerlines.

DISPOSITION: Unknown

NOTES: This case reminds us of the importance of simple maintenance. The oak trees
should always be trimmed to make all powerlines visible.

180
APPENDIX A-43

COURT AND CASE NUMBER: Circuit Court, Perry County, AL, # CV-99-125

DATE OF OCCURRENCE: June 22, 1998

DATE COMPLAINT FILED: 1999

EQUIPMENT/FACILITY: A large hydraulic rental crane with a telescoping boom used at


a bridge construction site.

HAZARD: When the boom was rotated by the 7,200 V powerlines, one contacted steel
cable straps hanging from the hook, causing current to be sent through the entire
crane. The work area was in the danger zone.

SUMMARY OF OCCURRENCE: The construction site was very confining, with


construction equipment making maneuvers difficult. When the operator was
rotating the raised cable straps by the powerlines to avoid striking other equipment,
the steel straps brushed against the powerline causing the crane to become
momentarily electrified. A pneumatic drilling rig was supplied: compressed air
with a hose encased in a wire web sheath to prevent wear. Due to the cramped
conditions, This hose was dropped over one of the crane’s outriggers, and one drill
operator was electrocuted and another was injured.

AVAILABLE HAZARD PREVENTION:


♦ Pre job construction planning to require relocation of the powerlines away from the
bridge construction project.
♦ An insulated link would have prevented death an injury.
♦ An electrostatic proximity alarm would have created a greater job site awareness that
powerlines were too close and should have been relocated.

DISPOSITION: On July 7, 2003 the case was settled in behalf of the widow and injured.

NOTES: This case provides an excellent example of the many ways insulated links can
prevent injury and death by preventing the crane from becoming electrified. Dr.
Karady’s deposition presented testimony that an insulated link would have
prevented death an injury.

181
APPENDIX A-44

COURT AND CASE NUMBER: This case has not been filed.

DATE OF OCCURRENCE: December 27, 1999

DATE COMPLAINT FILED: N/A

EQUIPMENT/FACILITY: A rough terrain hydraulic crane with a telescoping boom used


on a construction project to build a concrete-lined wastewater channel in the St.
Louis area.

HAZARD: The hoist line of the crane contacted a 7,200 V powerline at mid-span in a
work area in the danger zone.

SUMMARY OF OCCURRENCE: A workman lost three limbs when guiding a concrete


bucket to pour concrete in a concrete-lined wastewater channel. The design of this
channel ran directly underneath a transmission line and along its easement. The
construction contract contained no worker provisions requiring the concrete to be
placed without the use of boomed equipment, and require the use of a front end
loader to transport concrete into the Danger Zone under the powerlines.

AVAILABLE HAZARD PREVENTION:


♦ A pre-construction planning meeting to plan alternate methods of moving the concrete
to avoid the use of a crane in this location.
♦ The concrete should have been poured into the bucket of a front-end loader that would
transport it the short distance from the ready-mix truck to the wastewater channel.
♦ An insulated link would have prevented these injuries.
♦ The electrostatic proximity alarm would have provided worker awareness that it was
unsafe to attempt to place concrete underneath powerlines.
♦ The crane operator needed training on how to map the danger zone and should have
been given the authority to decline use of the crane in this inevitably unsafe location.

DISPOSITION: Pending.

NOTES: A key issue in the construction contract should had specific requirements on how
the concrete would be placed without the use of boomed equipment under
powerlines.

182
APPENDIX A-45

COURT AND CASE NUMBER: U.S. District Court, District of Colombia,


C.A. 1:01CV01114

DATE OF OCCURRENCE: May 2, 2000

DATE COMPLAINT FILED: 2000

EQUIPMENT/FACILITY: A news gathering van with a sixty-one foot pneumatic mast


located at a national guard parking lot at night where a 7,200 V transmission line
was located. The line had only 49 feet of clearance from the ground.

HAZARD: The mast of the van contacted the powerline.

SUMMARY OF OCCURRENCE: Two people were seriously injured. The operator


made a visual spot check and did not see overhead powerlines. A human factors
psychologist duplicated the setup at night and found that the area lighting produced
by the van created a glare whereby overhead powerlines could not be seen. A
camera man was also injured, as the cable tether supplying power to the TV camera
conveyed the fault current.

AVAILABLE HAZARD PREVENTION:


♦ In the hazard of possible electrocution, the only prevention measures are necessary
measures that should be immediately taken. Electrostatic Proximity Sensing Devices,
available since 1985, as well as controls that can only be used when the operator is
standing inside the van, are the only way to eliminate this deadly hazard and prevent
the mast from being raised under a powerline.
♦ Insulation on antenna equipment would also lessen the incidence of electrocution.

DISPOSITION: Pending

NOTES: This case was chosen to express the near impossibility of accurately judging
distances in a dark environment. Human eyes, which can make faulty distance
judgments in optimum lighting conditions, cannot possibly be relied upon in the
darkness as the only means of preventing a deadly hazard. By this time some 10 to
20 percent of theses vans are equipped to prevent the mast from being raised into
powerlines and no standard exists to provide this safeguard to all vans in the
industry.

183
APPENDIX A-46

COURT AND CASE NUMBER: Unaware of the present status.

DATE OF OCCURRENCE: May 22, 2000

DATE COMPLAINT FILED: Not yet applicable

EQUIPMENT/FACILITY: A news gathering van with a mast of 40 feet located on a city


street at a business driveway to prepare for a TV news story. The site was beneath a
tree containing powerlines of different voltages.

HAZARD: The mast of the van contacted a powerline.

SUMMARY OF OCCURRENCE: The driveway was at a slight slope, which caused the
mast, while being raised, to tilt into the second layer of powerlines. The dish
antenna mounted at the top of the mast touched a 3,200 V powerline. It took a few
moments for the plastic antenna dish to melt down, thus catching on fire and
causing a ground fault. The injured, an anchor reporter for the TV station, was in
the front of the van at her “desk” preparing her interview notes when alerted that
the van was on fire. When she attempted to escape, the electric current caused
burns that resulted in the loss of a leg, a foot on the other leg, one arm, and the
fingers on the hand of the other arm.

AVAILABLE HAZARD PREVENTION:


♦ Electrostatic proximity warning device to prevent the mast from being raised beneath a
powerline.
♦ Insulation on mast

DISPOSITION: Not yet applicable

NOTES: With a limited population of some 1600 masts on newsgathering vans with some
10 to 20 percent of them already equipped with electrostatic proximity warning
devices, it seems almost a discriminatory violation of civil rights that some workers
have protection and some don not. Due to network absence of safety management,
a majority of newsgathering van users are denied a safe place to work.

184
APPENDIX A-47
COURT AND CASE NUMBER: District Court, 7th Judicial District, Natrona County, WY #80
696-B

DATE OF OCCURRENCE: June 1, 2000

DATE COMPLAINT FILED: 2000

EQUIPMENT/FACILITY: A flat bed truck mounted hydraulic rental crane and operator with a
telescoping boom, being used at an equipment supply yard for oil well drilling rigs.

HAZARD: The crane hoist line contacted an overhead 7,200 V powerline mid-span, where the
stored materials were in the danger zone.

SUMMARY OF OCCURRENCE: On Memorial Day holiday the deceased was at the equipment
depot to load out equipment to be used at a well drilling site. A leased crane and operator
was at the work site and the shipment was ready to leave for delivery. Two short pieces of
pipe, approximately 6 feet long, too heavy to be lifted by hand, were needed. They were
stored in a big steel box, about 6’x 6’x 6’, underneath a powerline. The entire area under
the powerline was designated for heavy equipment storage and the box with the pipe was
behind another box of similar size. The storage yard had a forklift available for moving the
boxes away from the powerline; however, it was presumed that the deceased believed he
could quickly remove the pipe with the crane. He then climbed onto a box and placed a
choker around the pipe and was motioning the crane operator to bring the lifting devices
closer. While reaching for the hook and attempting to put the eye of the choker in the hook,
the hoist line struck the powerline. The deceased became comatose and was flown to Salt
Lake City, where he died the next day. It was found that the electric utility was well aware
of the use of cranes for handling the equipment stored under the powerline. Examination of
the records showed that the power company had not negotiated for locating the powerlines
over the storage yards properly. The crane operator had received no training from his
employer on how to identify a Danger Zone, and no instructions not to lift any materials
within that Danger Zone created by powerlines.

AVAILABLE HAZARD PREVENTION:


♦ The well drilling supply company needed requirements prohibiting storage of equipment in the
danger zone created by powerlines.
♦ The electric utility company needed a program to ensure for easements for their powerlines.
Where such powerlines would be over stored materials, buried powerlines would be required.
♦ An insulated link would have saved the well drilling supply company’s employee’s life.
♦ A proximity alarm could have developed a greater awareness of their immediate hazard of
powerline contact.
♦ The rental company provided an incompetent operator who knowingly extended the boom into
the danger zone. If operators are provided with the equipment it is up to the client renting from
the firm to discover whether the operators are acceptably trained.

DISPOSITION: Settled

NOTES: This case illustrates the need for specific requirements prohibiting storing materials under
powerlines.

185
APPENDIX A-48

COURT AND CASE NUMBER: Lorain County Court of Common Pleas, OH


# 02CV113622

DATE OF OCCURRENCE: June 17, 2000

DATE COMPLAINT FILED: 2002

EQUIPMENT/FACILITY: A steel conductive telescoping boom aerial lift was being used
to lift a workman so he could retouch the mortar on a brick wall of an 1816
building that had 7,200 V powerlines located three feet from the wall.

HAZARD: The lift inevitably touched the mid-span powerline in a danger zone.

SUMMARY OF OCCURRENCE: An eighteen-year-old apprentice working alone was


provided the above described aerial lift with no prior training from his employer.
The city, which owned the municipal utility company, was administering a federal
grant for restoring the 1816 building. The supervising architect/engineer made no
requirements for the powerline to be buried as a condition of the grant. The injured
is now a quadriplegic who requires a ventilator to breathe.

AVAILABLE HAZARD PREVENTION:


♦ The project planning needed to remove the powerlines before the contract for the repair
of the brick walls was negotiated.
♦ The rental firm should not have provided the lift that was unsafe for this use.

DISPOSITION: The disposition of this case is pending.

NOTES: The absence of safety planning to eliminate this work circumstance is


reprehensible. Not only the immediate job supervisor, who allowed an untrained
hand to work in a dangerous situation, but the city planners and grant engineer
showed a gross disregard for worker safety, and are all responsible for the
condition of this young, 19-year old apprentice.

186
APPENDIX A-49

COURT AND CASE NUMBER: District Court, Hidalgo County, TX 322 District
# C-0130-00-F

DATE OF OCCURRENCE: July 14, 2000

DATE COMPLAINT FILED: 2000

EQUIPMENT/FACILITY: Pumpcrete machine with a 28-ft boom being used in the construction of a
concrete flood-control holding pond underneath a powerline.

HAZARD: Pumpcrete boom mid-span 7,200 V powerline contact in a danger zone.

SUMMARY OF OCCURRENCE: Self-employed concrete finisher was electrocuted as he was handling the
hose at the end of a pumpcrete truck boom while pouring wet concrete for the lining of a flood
control improvement district at a construction site in Kingsland, TX. The general contractor at the
site had previously subcontracted with a pumpcrete company to furnish a pumpcrete truck with an
operator, so that the truck’s articulated boom could be used to transfer the wet concrete from ground
level into the excavation site, where the deceased and his finishing crew were working. Three other
workers were also injured when the operator of the pumpcrete truck manipulated the truck’s 28-foot
boom into contact with the powerline. The design of this pond was under a 7200 V powerline made
by an architect/engineer for an improvement district.
The general contractor allowed that the pumpcrete machine would be positioned behind a
tree where the operator was unable to view the position of the boom and its relationship to the
powerline. The deceased was relied upon to act as a signalman while busy directing the flow of
concrete. Because he had to stoop over so his shoulder could push the hose and direct the flow of
concrete, it was necessary for the deceased to have his back to the operator in order to maneuver the
heavy six-inch diameter hose full of concrete. Therefore, he was unable to look up and estimate the
clearance of the pumpcrete machine’s boom from the powerline.

AVAILABLE HAZARD PREVENTION:


♦ The architect/engineer should have relocated the powerline around the flood control area on the property
owned by the landowner. There was a clear need for the project designer to include in the contract
drawing and specifications the relocation of the powerlines on the site of the facility, away from the
settling pond.
♦ The General Contractor should have provided a construction safety plan that designated a positioning of
the pumpcrete machine where the operator would have clear view of the work area.
♦ The pumpcrete subcontractor should have had specific written procedures for the operator to preclude
operation of the boom inside of the powerline danger zone.
♦ The pumpcrete machine should have been equipped with an electrostatic proximity warning alarm, such
as those provided on equipment used by a large pumpcrete firm in California and a construction firm in
the St. Louis area.

DISPOSITION: This case we settled in behalf of the deceased.

NOTES: Safety standards should prohibit the placement of concrete underneath a powerline by boomed
equipment.

187
APPENDIX A-50

COURT AND CASE NUMBER: The case has not been filed.

DATE OF OCCURRENCE: September 10, 2001

DATE COMPLAINT FILED: N/A

EQUIPMENT/FACILITY: A forty ton mobile hydraulic rough terrain crane with a


telescoping boom at a construction site engaging in a pick and carry activity.

HAZARD: The hoist line contacted the 1,200 V powerline mid-span.

SUMMARY OF OCCURRENCE: The deceased was guiding a load to prevent the load
from striking parked vehicles in a pick and carry activity when the hoist line
contacted a 7,200 V powerline which crossed the line of travel. This activity was
conducted under the direction of the employer, who assumed that powerlines could
be avoided.

AVAILABLE HAZARD PREVENTION:


♦ Construction safety planning by the employer (who was a construction contractor) not
to engage in pick and carry operations in the vicinity of powerlines.
♦ Use of an insulated link would have prevented this death.
♦ Use of a proximity alarm would have alerted the crane operator and deceased that they
were approaching a powerline, even when they were distracted by the task of guiding
the load.

DISPOSITION: Case was not filed, as the manufacturer at the time of the accident no
longer exists.

NOTES: The workers’ compensation provided the employer immunity from liability, even
in the case of gross negligence

188
APPENDIX B:

BIBLIOGRAPHY
AND
RESUMES
BIBLIOGRAPHY

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Andrews, James R., ( Case #94-CV-1233 State of Illinois, County of St. Clair: District Court, 212th Judicial
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190
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Grove Manufacturing Company, Chart: “Powerline Contact Protection” and explanation of chart presented in
a Study, January 2, 1974

Harnsichfeger Corporation, Preliminary Report, Field Test Evaluation, Field Demonstration of Harnischfeger
Crane Style W-350 Equipped with SigAlarm™ Proximity Indicator. August 22, 1975 to September
15, 1976

Hauf , R., “Requirements For Grounding Practices and Standards- The Revision of Report 479”, 1970

Hazard Information Foundation, Inc. Study: “Hazard Analysis of Unintentional Raising of a Pneumatic Mast
of an Electronic News Gathering Van into Powerlines” November 30, 2001

Health and Safety Executive, Guidance Note GS6 from the Health and Safety Executive: “Avoidance of
Danger from Overhead Electric Powerlines” Baynards House, 1 Chepstow Place, London W2 4TF:
April, 1980

Hickman, Cecil B., (# 279080, 250th Judicial District Court of Travis County, TX), Deposition, October 10,
1982

Homace, G.T.; Crawley, J.C. (Senior Member, IEEE); Yenchek, M.R. (Senior Member, IEEE); Sacks, H.K.
(Member, IEEE), “An Alarm to Warn of Overhead Power Line Contact by Mobile Equipment”
Paper presented to NIOSH, 2001

Homace, Gerald T.; Crawley, James C.; Sacks, H. Kenneth; Yenchek, Michael R.; “Heavy Equipment Near
Overhead Power Lines?” Engineering and Mining Journal April 1, 2002

Husty, Denes III, dhusty@news-press.com, “Construction Accident Kills Worker” news-press.com Nov 28,
2003

Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers, Inc. National Electric Safety Code Interpretations (1961-
1977) page 55; request of April 11, 1974

Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers, Inc. National Electric Safety Code Interpretations (1978-
1980) page 77: Oct 17, 1980

International Electrotechnical Commission: “Effects of Current Passing Through the Human Body”
Publication 479-1 (Second Edition), 1984

191
Karady ,G.G., “Efficiency of Insulating Link For Protection of Crane Workers” , published by the
International Society of Electrical and Electronic Engineers (IEEE) 90 SM 338-4 PWRD: 1990

Karady: George G., Ph.D, (Case #D-157188, District Court, Jefferson County, 13th district, Texas) Expert
Witness Report, May 17, 2000

Kisner, Suzanne, Statistician, Injury Surveillance Section, Division of Safety Research, NIOSH:
Letter to Ms. Suzanna E. Ellefson (Kelly, McLaughlin & Foster), containing incidents of electrocution
involving boomed equipment from 1980-1988. September 10, 1991

Leigh, Theodore M. (Illinois Appellate Court # 59549, after Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois,)
Deposition, 1972

Leigh, Theodore M.: “The Construction Machine: Power Line Hazard” Professional Safety, The American
Society of Safety Engineers Journal September, 1979

Liberty Mutual: Study, “Contacting Overhead Electrical Powerlines”—Mobile Cranes Technical Bulletin #1
May 20, 1968

Lift Applications and Equipment “Readers’ Choice Award”, October, November, 2003

MacCollum, David V., “Critical Hazard Analysis of Crane Design” Proceedings of the Fourth International
System Safety Conference, September 9, 1979

MacCollum, David V., “Critical Hazard Analysis of Crane Design” Professional Safety, American Society
of Safety Engineers Journal, January, 1980

MacCollum, David V., “Crane Design Hazard Analysis”, Automotive Engineering and Litigation, Edited by
George A. Peters and Barbara J. Peters, Garland Law publishing, New York and London, 1984

MacCollum, David V., “Designing Out Electrical Hazards” CraneWorks, July, 1992

MacCollum, David V.: Crane Hazards and Their Prevention, Book published by the American Society of
Safety Engineers, Des Plaines, IL, 1993.

MacCollum, David V.: “System Safety Analysis of Workplace Equipment and Facilities” Hazard Prevention
(the System Safety Society Journal) 1994 Q2

MacCollum, David V.: “Planning Safe Crane Use”, 13th Crane Inspection Certification Bureau (CICB)
Crane Conference, Tropicana Resort and Casino, Las Vegas, NV, Session 10: Nov. 8, 1994

MacCollum, David V., Construction Safety Planning, John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 605 3rd Ave, New York,
NY, 10158-0012, 1995

MacCollum, David V., “Planning for Safe Crane Use” Presentation #927 at the American Society of Safety
Engineers Professional Development Conference and Exposition, Orlando, FL, June 1995.

MacCollum, David, “Focus: Equipment Powerline Contact” Hazard Information Newsletter, Volume 1, Issue
4, July 1996.

MacCollum, David V., “More on the Nature of Safe Design Profits” Hazard Information Newsletter, Vol. 3,
Issue 9, December, 1998

MacCollum, David: “Cranes and Power Lines make Fatal Combination” Construction Newsletter May, ’93

MacCollum, David V., “Hazard Prevention Engineering” Journal of System Safety, 2001 Q1

192
MacCollum, David V., “Crane Safety on Construction Sites”, Chapter 18, Construction Safety Management
and Engineering, American Society of Safety Engineers, 2004.

“A Survey of Non-Employee Electrical Contacts” (Pamphlet), Research Committee, Utilities Section, NSC,
1969

Middendorf, Lorna: “Judging Clearance Distances in Overhead Powerlines”, presented and published in the
proceedings of the Human Factors Society Annual Conference, October 1978

Mongeluzzi, Robert J. & Morgan, Derald J. “Do Insulated Links Help?” Lift Equipment: Mongeluzzi,
Plaintiff’s attorney, Yes; Morgan, defense witness, No; Feb-March, 1991

Morgan, J. Derald and Hamilton, Howard B.: “Evaluation of Mobile Crane Safety Devices” September 1, ‘80

Morgan, J. Derald and Hamilton, Howard B.: “Evaluation of Links for Safety Applications for Simon Ro
Corporation, National Crane” October, 1982

Morgan, J. Derald and Hamilton, Howard B.: “Field Test of Tinsley Overhead Powerline Detector” Report
prepared for Grove Manufacturing; Appendix 1& 2, September, 1986

Morgan, J. Derald: “Evaluation of Proximity Warning Devices for Cranes” National Academy of Forensic
Engineers Journal 1989

Morgan, J. Derald (Case # CJ92-549-92791 District County, Grand Forks County, North Dakota) Deposition,
June 26, 1993

Morgan, J. Derald Ph.D., “Review of ‘Report on Tests Conducted on SigAlarm™ Proximity Warning
Device Mounted on a Concrete Pump Placing Boom’ by Robert Edwards and Alax Krasny of
Schwing America, Inc” March, 1998

Morse, A.R. and Griffin, J.P.: “Test s of Mobile Crane High Voltage Protection Devices for Department of
National Defense” National Research Council Canada, March, 1978

Murray, Charles J.: “Remote Control System Reduces Crane Accidents” Design News Feb. 10, 1992

Accident Prevention Manual for Industrial Operations, 2nd Edition: National Safety Council (NSC); 1951

Accident Prevention Manual for Industrial Operations, 3rd Edition, NSC; 1955

Accident Prevention Manual for Industrial Operations, 4th Edition, NSC, 1959

Accident Prevention Manual for Industrial Operations, 5th Edition, NSC: 18-24: 1964

Accident Prevention Manual for Industrial Operations, 6th Edition, NSC: 1969

Accident Prevention Manual for Industrial Operations, 7th Edition, NSC, 1974

Accident Prevention Manual for Industrial Operations, 8th Edition; NSC, 1980

Data Sheet # 287, Published by the National Safety Council (NSC), 1954
Data Sheet # 448, NSC, 1957
Data Sheet # 1-287-79 (Revised) NSC, 1979

National Safety Council Data Sheet # I-743 New 90 “Mobile Cranes and Power Lines” Safety and Health,
Feb. 1991

193
National Safety Council Memo: “Power Line Accidents Kill Men, Ruin Equipment, and Delay the Job”, ‘53

National Safety Council Newsletter # 112.03-07030, “Survey of Contacts with Overhead and Underground
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News: Occupational Safety and Health, Vol. 34, No.3: “ ‘Red Zones’ for Cranes Near Powerlines Discussed
by OSHA Rulemaking Committee” Jan 15, 2004

Nietzel, Richard L.; Siexas, Noah S.; Ren, Kyle K., “A Review of Crane Safety in the Construction
Industry” Applied Occupational and Industrial Hygiene, Vol. 16(12): 1106-1117, 2001

NIOSH ALERT # 85-111: Preventing Electrocutions from Contact Between Cranes and Powerlines July,
1987

NIOSH ALERT # 95-108: Preventing Electrocutions of Crane Operators and Crew Members Working Near
Overhead Powerlines, May 1995.

NIOSH ALERT # 95-108: Preventing Electrocutions of Crane Operators and Crew Members Working Near
Overhead Powerlines May, 1995

NIOSH Bulletin: Worker Deaths by Electrocution- A Summary of Surveillance Findings and Investigative
Case Reports, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, May 1998

Occupational Safety and Health Standards; National Consensus Standards and Established Federal Standards,
U.S. Department of Labor, Occupational Safety and Health Act, 1910.180, May, 1971

Occupational Safety and Health Standards for the Construction Industry (29 CFR Part 1926), newly amended
Nov. 1, 1993.

Packer Engineering, “Evaluation of Electrical Insulating and Warning Devices for Mobile Cranes” (Volume
I) Report to Employers Insurance of Wausau, April 11, 1975

Packer Engineering, “Evaluation of Electrical Insulating and Warning Devices for Mobile Cranes” June 11-
20, 1975

Paques, Joseph-Jean (IRSST), Michaud, Pierre (Centre de recherche industrielle du Québec) van Dike, Pierre
(Centre de recherche industrielle du Québec) “Development of a Range-Limiting Device for Mobile
Cranes”, 1989

Paques, Joseph-Jean “Cranes and Overhead Powerlines” Published at the 13th International Convention
ISSA for Construction, Bruxelles, September 1991.

Paques, Joseph-Jean: “Crane Accidents by Contact with Powerlines”, Safety Science, #16, 1993.

Petit, Ted: “Insulated Links: The Next Generation” Lift Equipment, April-May 1995

Pittenger, Donald A: Acting Chief of Safety and Occupational Health, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers on
H.R. 4652: The Construction Safety, Health, and Education Improvement Act of 1990, Before
Subcommittee on Health and Safety, Committee on Education and Labor, United States House of
Representatives, Court Testimony May 22, 1990

Pizatella, Timothy J., Chief, Surveillance and Field Investigations Branch, Division of Safety Research,
NIOSH: Letter to Mr. Norman C. Hargreaves, Koehering Cranes and Excavators, Inc. Jan. 11, 1991.

Price, Dennis L.: “Machinery Operational Safety Near Overhead Powerlines”, Hazard Prevention, the
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194
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Safety Conference July 1989
Pritzker, Paul E., P.E.: “Stopping Construction Sites from Becoming Killing Fields” Electrical System
Design April 1990

Reynolds, Richard L., Informational Report 1035- MESA Informational Report: Field Evaluation of a
Proximity Alarm Device, Mining Enforcement and Safety Administration, Department of the
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Rossnagel, W.E. (Consulting Safety and Fire Protection Engineer) Handbook of Rigging for Construction
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The Royal Society for the Prevention of Accidents and Institute of Material Handling (Most respected and
prestigious safety group in Great Britain), A Safety Handbook for Mobile Cranes, 1967

Safety Code for the Construction Industry, Quebec, Canada S-2.1 r.6, January 28, 1992
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Southwest Research Institute, “Evaluation of Proximity Warning Devices” Phase I Prepared for the U.S.
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Southwest Research Institute: Evaluation of Proximity Warning Devices, Phase II, Prepared for the U.S.
Department of the Interior Bureau of Mines. February, 1981

Suruda, Anthony “Electrocution at Work” Professional Safety (The American Society of Safety Engineers
Journal) July 1988

Suruda, Anthony, M.D. M.P.H., Egger, Marlene PhD., Liu, Diane, M. Stat., “Crane Related Deaths in the
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Letter to CIMA and the Power Crane and Shovel Association, September 18, 1979

White, H.L.: President, SigAlarm, Inc “A Critique of: ‘A Practical Review of High Voltage Safety Devices
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1980

Wright, M.D. and Davis, J.H., M.D: “The Investigation of Electrical Deaths: A Report of 220 Fatalities”
Presentation at the 29th Annual Meeting of the American Academy of Forensic Sciences, San Diego,
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195
PARTICIPATING ENGINEERS AND SCIENTISTS

1. David V. MacCollum: Principal Investigator


2. Rowena I. Davis: Editorial Analyst

3. Jack Ainsworth: Electronic Engineer- Proximity Alarms


4. David Baker: Safety Director, Electric Utility
5. Bob Dey: Consultant, Construction Manager
6. George Karady: Electrical Engineer- Insulating Links
7. Ben Lehman: Retired Admiral, U.S. Navy
8. Melvin L. Myers: Consulting Engineer, Retired Captain, US Public Health Service
9. Jeff Speer: Safety Director, System Safety
10. John Van Arsdel: Consultant, Human Factors

196
DAVID V. MACCOLLUM
1515 Hummingbird Lane
Sierra Vista, AZ 85635
(520) 458-4100 Fax (520) 458-4093
E-mail : MacCollum@theriver.com
Has prepared system safety hazard analyses and safety program
Since 1972, a consultant specializing in safety research and technical management evaluations and given expert court testimony covering a
assistance for high-risk hazards, including hazard analysis and broad range of safety engineering applications, especially as to cranes
evaluation by referencing applicable safety standards, literature, and and other heavy construction equipment, application of rollover
available technology. protective systems (ROPS) on a wide variety of equipment, and
construction safety planning.
1951, B.S. degree, Oregon State University, Corvallis, Oregon. Special
education: System Safety, University of Washington; Safety 1972-76, provided technical assistance for construction of tunnel
Management, New York University; Radiological Safety, Ft. support systems in Europe and the U.S. for Bernold of Switzerland.
McClellan, Alabama; and has attended numerous other Army service 1972-74, served on the advisory body that drafted the Arizona
schools. Occupational Safety Act; was a member of the Arizona Review
Commission of Appeals for state citations.
He is a Registered Professional Engineer (Industrial), AZ; a Registered 1972-73, retained as an instructor by the University of Arizona for a
Professional Engineer (Safety), CA; and a Certified Safety Professional series of courses on System Safety, Safety Management, and Safety
(CSP). Program Evaluation; developed special safety engineering seminars for
1975-76, National President, American Society of Safety Engineers University of Arizona, Michigan Technological Institute, University of
(ASSE). 1961, President, Portland, OR Chapter, ASSE. Oklahoma, University of Wisconsin, and NIOSH (crane safety).
1968, President, Cochise Chapter, AZ, Society of Professional
Engineers. March 1970, testified before a US Senate hearing for the Product
Safety Commission on hazards of unvented heaters; April 1977, before
Member of: US Senate hearings on product liability insurance; and 1984 before a
ASSE US Department of Labor hearing on cranes and derricks.
System Safety Society
National Society of Professional Engineers NSPE 1969-72, served on the US Department of Labor=s Construction Safety
Veterans of Safety. Advisory Committee; was chairman of the subcommittee for Subpart V
of OSHA for power transmission and distribution; and was on the
Past member of: board investigating tunnel disasters.
Society of Mining Engineers 1958-62, was a member of a standards setting committee for the State
National Safety Council of Oregon, for material handling equipment.
Human Factors Society 1956-58, developed design criteria for ROPS --10 years before the
Military Engineers. Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) developed its standard -- that
was adopted by the US Army Corps of Engineers (CofE), US Bureau
1995, author of book, Construction Safety Planning, published by John. of Reclamation, and State of Oregon and later incorporated into OSHA
Wiley & Sons. 1993, author of book, Crane Hazards and their standards; and made studies on cost-effective and safe use of
Prevention, published by ASSE. Is a well-known author of articles scaffolding and on crane load- testing on construction projects that was
appearing in Professional Safety, Western Construction, National
adopted by the CofE.
Safety News, Rural Electrification, Power, Professional Engineer,
Prentice-Hall=s ΑNewsletters,≅ Business Insurance, Journal of EMPLOYMENT
Industrial Hygiene, Hazard Prevention, Control, CraneWorks, Lift, and
numerous other professional and trade journals. 1955 to 1972 employed by the Department of Army:
Director of Safety, Strategic Communications Command, Ft.
He has spoken before international and national groups: the British Huachuca, AZ, a worldwide command with sixteen
Ministry of Technology, the American Medical Association, the Edison subcommands.
Electric Institute, the National Rural Electric Cooperatives Association, Safety Director, Electronic Proving Ground, Ft. Huachuca;
the National Institute of Cooperative Education, the National Safety developed doctrine for product testing for safety.
Council, the American Society of Safety Engineers, the System Safety Safety Director, 4th and 32nd Infantry Divisions and support
Society, and the Crane Inspection and Certification Bureau. functions, Ft. Lewis, WA; responsible for maneuver and
tactical safety in large-scale field exercises for combat
AWARDS training.
Assistant Chief, Safety Branch, Portland, OR District, Corps
1999, elected Fellow by ASSE for superior achievement in the safety of Engineers; developed design criteria for ROPS, reverse
profession. signal alarms, emergency braking systems, and haul-road
1970, Engineer of the Year, AZ Society of Professional Engineers. safety.
1969, First Place for Outstanding Contribution to Safety Engineering 1951 to 1955 employed as a safety engineer by the State of Oregon
Literature; 1983-1984, another First Place; and 1990-91, Third Place,
by Industrial Accident Commission.
ASSE and Veterans of Safety. OTHER
Listed in Who=s Who in Engineering.
Served 9 years on the Board of Directors, Sulphur Springs
ACCOMPLISHMENTS Valley Electric Cooperative, Inc., serving southeastern Arizona.
Past member of Sierra Vista, AZ, Planning and Zoning and
2000, principal founder of the Hazard Information Foundation, Inc., a
nonprofit foundation that maintains a resource library of safety and
Utility Commissions.
hazard information. Married with three grown children.
1995, established the Center for Hazard Information, which published
the monthly Hazard Information Newsletter for three years.

197
LIST OF PUBLICATIONS

David V. MacCollum, 1515 Hummingbird Lane, Sierra Vista, AZ


85635
"Report on the Collapse of the Owyhee Bridge Reconstruction",
1952.
“ How Crane Load Tests Prevent Accidents" Pacific Builder &
Engineer, Mar.1957.
"How Proper Scaffolding Cuts Costs” Western Construction,
Sept. 1957.
“ Tractor Canopies in Rollover Accidents” Study and
Evaluation, January 1958.
"Tractor Canopies” "Pacific Builder & Engineer, October
1958.
“ Testing and System Safety" USAEPG, November 1967.
"A Systems Approach for Design Safety" Professional Engineer,
Nov. 1968.
"Construction Safety", Professional Engineer Letters,
Professional Engineer, December 1968.
"Arizona Cities - Fuel for Firestorms” AZ Professional
Engineer, Jan. 1969.
"Testing for Safety" National Safety News, February 1969.
"A Systems Approach to Safety" Annual Southwest Safety
Congress Exposition, April 1969.
"A Systems Approach to Safety" Proceedings of Seventh Guided
Weapons Contractors' Safety Officers' Conference, British
Ministry of Technology, London, England, Nov. 12, 1969.
Published statement at National Commission on Product Safety
Hearing, Washington, D. C., March 3, 1970.
"Reliability as a Quantitative Safety Factor" ASSE Journal,
May 1969. First Place Technical Paper Award from
ASSE/Veterans of Safety, 1969. Reprinted in Selected
Readings in Safety, Academy Press, 1973. Also reprinted in
Directions in Safety, Charles C. Thomas, publisher, 1976.
"A Systems Safety Approach to Mining" National Safety
Congress and Exposition, Chicago, IL, October 1970.
"Executive Action," Tucson presentation as Director of
Safety, USA STRATCOM, Ft. Huachuca, AZ, 1971.
"Systems Approach to Safety", Oklahoma Center for Continuing
Education, The University of Oklahoma, April 19, 1971.
"Getting Back to the Fundamentals of Safety" Construction
Industry Sessions, 1972.

198
"New Safety Requirements for Power Line Construction" Rural
Electrification, February 1972.
"New Horizons for Safety Engineering" Professional Engineer,
June 1972.
"Coping with OSHA" approximately 108 monthly articles
starting July 1972, Construction Foreman's & Supervisor's
Letter, a Prentice-Hall publication.
"Construction Safety" and "Utility Safety" approximately 68
monthly articles in Construction Foreman's & Supervisor's
Letter and Utility Safety, May 1975 to January 1981.
A series of seven safety articles Arizona Currents, March
thru July 1972, Summer 1974, and June 1975.
"Systems Analysis--The Key to Tunnel Safety" Western
Construction, August 1972.
"What Is the Value of a Disaster?" Valuation, American
Society of Appraisers' Journal, September 1972.
"Federal Safety Act Brings Money to Your State" Rural
Electrification, November 1972.
"What Safety Can Do For Local Government" VOL 8 National
Safety Congress, 1973.
"Diverse Forces Motivate Greater Safety Awareness" Arizona
Review, January 1974.
"Employer Enforcement of Safety - How Tough?" National
Safety Congress, 1974.
"Coping Effectively with Safety & Health Act" 1973-74
Yearbook of Cooperative Knowledge, published by The American
Institute of Cooperation, Washington, D. C.
"Ten Steps Show Way to Plant Safety" Power, McGraw-Hill,
July 1974.
"The Bernold Support System" Western Construction, August
1974.
"Why Professionalism?" Professional Safety, October 1974.
"A Week Without Accidents" Professional Safety, January 1975.
"Has Workmen's Compensation Made for a Safer Workplace?"
IAIABC Magazine, March 1975.
"Guest Comment" Professional Engineer, May 1975.
"A Danger Greater Than Sellout" Rural Electrification, May
1975.
National Emphasis Program, Hazard Prevention, January-
February 1976.
Ten editorials to the membership as President of the American
Society of Safety Engineers (ASSE) Professional Safety, July
1975 to May 1976.
"Tunnel Design ... the Criteria for Safety", Proceedings:
Second International Systems Safety Conference, San Diego,
California, July 1975.
"Fundamentals of Safety" Control, National Safety Council of
Australia, August 1975.
"The Safety Engineer's Viewpoint" NIOSH, 1976.
“ A Bicentennial Look at Safety & Engineering" Professional
Engineer, January 1976.

199
"Safety in the Seventies" National Safety News, January
1976.
"Voluntary' Approach to Safety Needs Incentives" Business
Insurance, January 12, 1976.
"OSHA - A Look Ahead" US Dept of Labor, July 1976.
“ 1975-76, A Year of Change" Professional Safety, September
1976.
"The Safety Engineer's Viewpoint" Health/Safety Teamwork,
July 1977, NIOSH Occupational Safety and Health Symposia,
Sept. 1976.
Statement on Proposed Kansas State Senate Bill 209, March
1977.
"Public Safety", Edison Electric Speech, April 1977.
"Systems Safety and Tunnel Support" National Safety News,
Dec. 1976.
Statement at hearing before Sub-Committee for Consumers of
the Committee on Commerce, Science & Transportation, U. S.
Senate, April 27, 28, and 29, 1977, on Product Liability
Insurance, Serial No. 95-26.
"What Are the Nation's Top Safety Priorities?" Professional
Safety, August 1977.
"Safety: Are We Making Progress?" Professional Safety,
February 1978.
"Accident Reporting--An Exercise in Futility?" National
Safety News, August 1978.
"Freak Accidents?" Hazard Prevention, September/October
1978.
"How Safe the Lift?" Proceedings of the Human Factors
Society--22nd Annual Meeting, October 1978.
"Safe Product Design -The Key to Profitability" ASSE
Professional Conference, June 1979.
"Critical Hazard Analysis of Crane Design" 4th International
System Safety Conference, July 1979.
"Critical Hazard Analysis of Crane Design" reprinted in
Professional Safety, January 1980.
"How Do We Get Workers More Involved in Safety - Authority
Must Be Centralized" National Safety News, September 1979.
"Methodology of Hazard Identification"--ASSE's Consultant's
Conference, June 21, 1980, Houston, Texas.
"Crane Safety" U. S. Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare Training Study, NIOSH, March 1981.
"Methodology of Risk Evaluation" ASSE's Consultant's
Section, Professional Development Conference, June 14-17,
1981, Salt Lake City, Utah.
"Methodology of Hazard Identification" System Safety
Conference, July 26, 1981, Denver, Colorado.
"Fire Hazards", letter to the Editor, The Arizona Daily Star,
October 25, 1982.
"Lessons from 25 years of ROPS” Professional Safety,
January 1984. First Place Technical Paper Award from
ASSE/Veterans of Safety, 1983-84.

200
"Crane Design Hazard Analysis" Chapter 8, Automotive
Engineering and Litigation, Volume 1, by George & Barbara
Peters, Garland Law Publishing, 1984.
Statement for OSHA Hearing on Proposed Standard for Crane or
Derrick Suspended Personnel Platforms September 7, 1984.
"There is no such thing as a liability crisis--it's the
absence of hazard prevention that's hurting us!" 1985
(unpublished).
"Foreword," "Critical Hazard Analysis of Crane Design," and
"Lessons from 25 Years of ROPS," Readings in Hazard Control
and Hazardous Materials, American Society of Safety
Engineers, 1985, (Consulting Editor).
Corps of Engineers Safety Plan, 1986.
Letter to the Editor, Hazard Prevention, September/October
1986.
"The Liability Crisis", Professional Engineer Talk, Austin,
Texas, November 10, 1986.
"Safety Management System Success,", Safety Management
Newsletter, The Merritt Company, December 1986.
"Safety and Its Application to Construction," Massachusetts
Continuing Legal Education, Inc., Conference, Boston, 1987.
"What should we be doing better?", Towards the Millennium, by
Allan St. John Holt, IOSH Publishing Limited, 1987.
"Rollover Protective Systems (ROPS)” , Chapter 1, Automotive
Engineering & Litigation, Volume II, by George and Barbara
Peters, Garland Law Publishing, 1988.
"Hazards of Craning," Crane Inspection & Certification
Bureau, 10th Annual Crane Conference, November 9, 1988, Las
Vegas, Nevada.
"Construction and Industrial Equipment Safety," Chapter 19,
Automotive Engineering and Litigation, Volume 3, by George
and Barbara Peters, Garland Law Publishing, 1990.
“ Cranes and Derricks, The reasons for crane accidents,”
OSHA Instruction CPL 2-2.20B, Directorate of Technical
Support, June 14, 1990.
Liability Project Safety Machine Tools and Heavy Equipment,
The Brookings Institute Conference, Washington, D.C., June 19
& 20, 1990
A Guide to Crane Safety, Division of Occupational Safety and
Health, North Carolina Department of Labor, by David V.
MacCollum, printed October 1991.
"Time for Change in Construction Safety," Professional
Safety, American Society of Safety Engineers, February, 1990.
Third Place Technical Paper Award from ASSE/Veterans of
Safety, 1990-91.
"Hunting Down Crane Hazards," Lift Equipment, February-March,
1992.
"Designing Out Electrical Hazards," CraneWorks, July, 1992.
"Excuses Equal Disaster," CraneWorks, December, 1992.
"Lessons Learned too Late," CraneWorks, December, 1992.

201
"Cranes and Powerlines Make Fatal Combinations," Construction
Newsletter, National Safety Council, May/June, 1993.
Crane Hazards and their Prevention, book published by the
American Society of Safety Engineers, December 1993.
“ Anatomy of an Accident” CraneWorks, March/April 1994
(Pinchpoint).
“ Anatomy of an Accident” CraneWorks, May/June 1994 (Soft
footing).
“ System Safety Analysis of Workplace Equipment and
Facilities," Hazard Prevention, the Journal of the System
Safety Society, Second Quarter 1994.
"Planning Safe Crane Use," presented at the 13th Crane
Conference of the Crane Inspection and Certification Bureau
in Las Vegas, Nevada, November 10, 1994.
Construction Safety Planning, book published by Van Nostrand
Reinhold, New York, NY May 1995.
"Planning for Safe Crane Use," Proceedings of the 34th Annual
ASSE Professional Development Conference & Exposition,
Orlando, Florida, June 17-24, 1995.
“ Avoid pinch point hazards on stand-up rider forklifts,”
Lift Magazine, October/November, 1995.

“ Hazard Information Newsletter,” the newsletter of the


Center for Hazard Information. Published monthly, from April
1996.
The Nature of Hazards/ Equipment Rollover/ Crane Two-
Blocking/ Equipment Powerline Contact/ Moving Parts of
Machinery/ Forklift Hazards/ Blind Zones on Moving Equipment/
Fall Prevention/ Unsafe Equipment Control Systems/ Nuts,
Bolts, Pins and Other Connectors/ Falling Objects/ Large
Truck Hazards/Dangerous Access and Work Platforms/ Trenching/
Fire Prevention/ Fall Protection/ /Hazardous Secondary
Voltages/ Dangerous Compressed and Confined Gases/ Killer
Hooks/ Lockout/ Tagout/ Carbon Monoxide/ Mobile Crane Upset/
Electric ARC Welding/ Conveyors/ Steel Erection/ Ladders/
Construction Management/ Facility Design Hazards/ Confined
Spaces/ Traffic Control for Road Construction and
Maintenance/ Concrete Formwork/ Dust Hazards/ Masonry/ Wood
Framing/ Nature of Hazards - Recap

“ How Can We Be Prepared to Meet Industry’s Need for System


Safety In the 21st Century?” Proceedings, 16th International
System Safety Conference - September,1998.
Keynote Speaker, The Nature of Hazards, Traffic Accident
Reconstruction and Litigation Seminar, Lawyers and Judges
Publishing, November 6, 1998.

202
ROWENA I. DAVIS P.O. Box 1841
ridavis@mtholyoke.edu Bisbee, AZ 85603
(520) 432-6617

EDUCATION
Mount Holyoke College, South Hadley, MA Strong course study in journalism with
Bachelor of Arts, May 2002 emphasis on investigative research;
Major: English Minor: Political Science independent/community based analysis

EXPERIENCE
Research Analyst, Hazard Information Foundation, Inc., Sierra Vista, AZ April 2003-present
Collect, refine, and categorize information from a wide variety of sources, edit all outgoing
material, implement filing and cross-referencing systems, verify factual information,
Urban Alternatives, Mount Holyoke College and Hadley, MA. September-December 2001
Met with members of the Hadley Planning Board, city officials, and concerned citizens;
assessed local urban development in Hadley and created planning alternatives, including a
critique of zoning laws and implementation of Calthorpian ideas.
Tutor, Girls, Inc, Holyoke, MA. August 2001-January 2001
Tutored up to 15 girls, aged 7-12, with homework and reading skills, helped supervise
excursions, mediated conflicts with on the spot creative problem solving.
Data Analysis, Mount Holyoke College and Association of Community Organizations for Reform
Now (ACORN) S. Hadley/Holyoke, MA. October-December 2000
Collected and analyzed data on several major mortgage companies and their
lending patterns in the Holyoke/Springfield by reading census tracts, attempting to
prove predatory lending action.
Server/ Jr. Assistant Manager, Denny’s Restaurant, Tucson, AZ. June 1999-June 2000
Supervised second shift; responsible for money drop and customer/ staff relations.
Developed ability to think quickly under pressure and implement spontaneous solutions.

LEADERSHIP
Co-Chair, Lapidary Club, September 2001-May 2002
Key email contact, recruited members, provided hands-on instruction for stone shaping,
assisted the master silversmith in equipment maintenance and tool instruction.
Co-captain, Mount Holyoke Ice Hockey, October 2001-March 2002
Ran practices in absence of coach, arranged transportation to practices and games,
dissipated team conflicts in and out of practice.

SKILLS
Extensive knowledge in Microsoft Word, Works, WordPerfect, PowerPoint, Microsoft
Excel; experience in Linux and alternate operating systems; Experience as freelance editor,
Conversational knowledge of French

AWARDS
Group winner, Sally Montgomery Prize in Community Based Learning, 2001
Merit Scholarship to Whitman College, 1997
Dean’s Scholarship to Lewis and Clark College, 1997
National Merit quarter- finalist, 1995
Merit Scholarship to attend Green Fields Country Day School, 1993

203
Resume
For
Jack D. Ainsworth

Professional Education
Bachelor of Science, Electronics Engineering with Bio-Medical Option, University of Wyoming, 1966
Master of Science, Bioengineering, University of Wyoming, 1968

Professional Experience
1968: U.S. Air Force Academy, Colorado Springs, CO: Research Engineer, GS-09; Research in
electronics techniques to monitor human physiologic parameters for manned space flight.

1969-1970: U.S. Army, White Sands Missile Range, NM; Research Engineer, Military; Development,
fabrication, installation, test and acceptance of electronics technologies to detect high altitude winds
through the echo of radio waves from ion clouds caused by meteors, and monitoring the movement of the
clouds.

1970-1974: U.S. Army, Langdon, ND; Field and Installation Engineer GS09 thru GS-12; Installation of
communications and electronics equipment in direct support to the SAFEGUARD Anti-Ballistic Missile
Defense System.

1974: U.S. Army, Fort Huachuca, AZ; Staff engineer, GS-12; Design, installation, implementation of
electronic systems for airfield operations- air-to-ground communications and radar tracking; plane-to-
ground (on the ground) communications and radar tracking; safety support systems for fire suppression
and personal protection.

1974-980: U.S. Army, Fort Huachuca, AZ; Project Manager, GS-13; Development, installation, test and
acceptance, implementation of computer based, high reliability electronic message systems.

1980-1985: U.S. Army, Fort Huachuca, AZ; Research and Development Electronics Engineer, GS-13;
Application and adaptation of emerging technology to advance the state of Army communications
capabilities; Test and evaluation of newly developed communications-electronics systems; Development
of fast relocating surveillance system for the U.S. Border Patrol.

1985-1989: U.S. Army, Fort Huachuca, AZ; Research engineer and supervisor, GS-13; Investigation, test,
and evaluation of newly developed systems for application to military communications requirements.

1989-1994: U.S. Army, Fort Huachuca, AZ; Branch Chief, GS-14; Design, development, test and
acceptance, implementation of automation based digital communications systems for military command
and control, administration and logistics support.

1994-1998: U.S. Army, Fort Huachuca, AZ; Senior Systems Engineer, GS-14; Design, development, test
and acceptance, implementation of automation based digital communications systems for military
command and control, administration and logistics support; Application of new technology to improve
effectiveness and efficiency of organizational operations.

1998-2001: U.S. Army, Fort Huachuca, AZ; Director of Information Systems Engineering, GS-15;
Supervised design, development, test and acceptance, implementation of automation based digital
communication systems for military command and control, administration and logistics support; and
ensuring protection of information in transition from disclosure and exploitation.

2001-2002: U.S. Army, Fort Huachuca, AZ; Director of Mission Support, Chief Operating Officer, GS-15;
Supervising the operations for an organization designing, developing, testing and acceptance,
implementation of a wide spectrum of electronics technologies to meet military communications, voice and
data, for the command and control, administration, logistics support for national defense.

Professional Associations

204
Member of Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers since 1964
David Bryant Baker
2115 W. 33rd Street
Tucson, AZ 85713
520-622-0558

BACKGROUND SUMMARY

• Eleven years of experience in development, implementation, evaluation, and


administration of a corporate safety program.

• Fifteen years of technical experience in research and development, systems testing,


engineering support, and industrial systems modification.

• Twelve years of administrative and organizational experience as a volunteer with a


non-profit organization.

ACCOMPLISHMENTS

• TEP’s Public Safety program is based on my concept of utilizing a rattlesnake to


compare the similarities of a downed powerline and a commonly understood danger.

• Designed a root cause accident investigation method that can be utilized at most levels
within an organization.

• Evaluated various Material Safety Data Sheet (MSDS) Systems. Negotiated with
vendor for the best financial arrangement. Supervised the installation of a customized
corporate MSDS system.

• Convinced the state electrical utilities to organize and take a pro-active approach by
working with the Occupational Safety and Health Division of the State Industrial
Commission in the interpretation and implementation of new OSHA standards.

• Directed a research team in the design, construction, instrumentation, and operation of


experimental apparatuses. This work led to several U.S. patents.

• Founded the American Youth Soccer Organization Region 244. Appointed by


National Board of Directors as its first Regional Commissioner

• Applied for and received a $20,000 “Samantha Smith” Grant from the U.S.
Government in conjunction with a Youth Cultural Exchange Program between a
Tucson youth group and a University group in Alma-Ata, Kazakhstan, USSR.

• Received a 2000-2001 “Leader Ahead of the Curve” recognition award from the
Western Energy Institute.

205
EDUCATION/CERTIFICATION

• Received Certified Safety Professional (CSP) from Board of Certified Safety


Professionals, Certificate # 16859. (July, 2001)

• Received Certified Utility Safety Administrator (CUSA) from the National Safety
Council’s Utility Division. Certificate #903. (August, 2000)

• Received Bachelor of Arts Degree in Interdisciplinary Studies incorporating the fields


of Safety, Communication, and Psychology from the University of Arizona
(December, 1999)

• Received Certified Hazard Control Manager (CHCM) designation at Master Level by


Board of Certified Hazard Control Management, Certification # 2730. (July 1998)

• Received Associates of General Studies from Pima Community College. (December,


1997)

• Received certification as an Instructor for Mine Safety and Health Administration


(MSHA) Safety Courses from Federal MSHA. (August 1996)

• Received certification as an Airframe and Powerplant Mechanic from the Federal


Aviation Administration after completion of six quarters (18-months) at Eastern New
Mexico University, Certificate # 2060284. (December 1970)


EMPLOYMENT HISTORY
Tucson Electric Power Co. Safety Supervisor (Risk Man) Sept. 1991 to present
Tucson, AZ Plant Operations July 1986-Sept 1991

IBM Electronic Technician Sept 1985-Apr 1986


Tucson, AZ (temporary position)

ARCO Metals Research Technician Jan. 1982-Apr 1985


Tucson, AZ

Duval Corp Maintenance Mechanic May 1973-Dec 1981


Tucson, AZ Dec 1970-May 1973

US Army Radar Technician Apr 1971-May 1973


Korea MOS 24B20

Robert’s Chevron Night Manager Apr 1970-Dec 1970


Roswell, NM Auto Mechanic June 1969-Apr 1970

Grumman Aircraft Eng. Mechanical Technician July 1968-May 1969


White Sands Missile Range, NM

206
Robert A. Dey
Mr. Dey is a Senior Manager for industrial, engineering, and construction
programs. He is experienced in decision making, operational responsibility, and
leadership-management of large organizations. He was educated at the United
States Military Academy and Stanford University with a M.S. degree in Civil
Engineering (Construction). Mr. Dey has experience across a broad range of
technical, financial, and management issues. During military service he
commanded major military engineer combat and construction units up to Brigade
level. He is trained and experienced in effective communications and leadership
at all levels of government and industry. He was selected as a White House
Fellow in a national competition in 1971 and during that fellowship served as
Special Assistant to the Administrator of the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency. He served as a senior manager for the Morrison Knudsen Company,
Inc., for over thirteen years, specializing in the delivery of professional
management and contracting services for construction, engineering, and industrial
programs. He has operated as an independent consultant since 1997, providing
services in the field of construction management for clients such as Amtrak

EXPERIENCE

• Mr. Dey was hired by Morrison Knudsen (MK) in 1982 as part of a


management team chartered to market and then manage the delivery of
professional engineering and construction management services. He prepared
major proposals for management of programs (engineering, procurement, and
construction by others), acting to represent the best interest of an owner. The
client base was both public and private sector. He was often teamed with
architect-engineer (A/E) firms or major construction companies for proposals.
He was sent to Los Angeles as a consultant under an MK contract with the Los
Angeles County Transportation Commission (LACTC) to assist them in
developing their management plan for engineering procurement, and
construction of the Long Beach to Los Angeles light rail system. Thereafter, he
worked in proposal joint venture with the Fluor Corporation as part of the MK
team to develop the proposal for management of the Los Angeles subway
system construction.

• Mr. Dey led MK’s successful effort to provide a management concept and an
on-site consulting team to supplement the Washington State Department of
Transportation in completing Interstate 90 in Seattle. This program was valued
at $1.3 billion in Federal and State highway funds. He marketed this contract
by directly approaching the State Secretary of Transportation and his deputy
for highways. He helped to provide the management organization concepts,
performed estimates, run the master schedules for engineering contracting and
construction, and provided specialized personnel to the state. He represented
the company as a senior manager, selected the key members and launched
the MK team during startup, developed and negotiated a professional services
Joint Venture with H.B. Lochner (a Chicago-based AE firm). He was then
relocated to Seattle to establish an Area Office with oversight of the project.

207
• As Seattle Area Manager, he assured the quality performance of the I-90 team
and generally monitored compliance with the contract. In addition, he
marketed MK’s highway construction management services on a national basis
providing business development with state highway departments nation-wide.
During this period, he assisted with the reorganization and transfer of
professional management services and international marketing form Boise to
MK’s San Francisco-based engineering company. He acted as the Division
Manager of the Program Management/Construction Management Division of
that company until a successor was assigned. Later, he was the proposal
manager for a major proposal for management of the U.S. Embassy Security
Program, a complex proposal for the U.S. Department of State (DOS) which
involved travel to coordinate the joint venture team as well as visits to the DOS
in Washington, D.C. for marketing purposes.

• When the company reorganized, he returned to Boise where he was assigned


to the Equipment/Manufacturing sector of the company. He performed a
special market analysis study of remanufacturing of Government vehicles and
aircraft, securing both an Army and Coast Guard helicopter component
overhaul contract. He marketed several major proposals to Army Material
Command Agencies (Tank-Automotive Command and Aviation Systems
Command), working with Untied Technologies Corporation as a team to
combine aerospace analytical capability and technology with MK’s
remanufacturing capacity.

• Mr. Dey managed the startup of MK’s contract at the Hornell, New York plant to
remanufacture a major portion of New York Transit Authority’s (NYCTA)
subway fleet of “R46” cars. This contract involved engineering design,
procurement, and remanufacturing plant operations, valued at over $300
million. He coordinated the various MK plant entities and performed liaison
with the NYCTA client. Thereafter, he developed concepts for improved
network scheduling of manufacturing for the successor contract with the
Chicago Metropolitan Transit Authority (METRA).

• Mr. Dey was responsible for the project support functions for the Texas High
Speed Rail Project. These functions included master scheduling, cost control,
contracting, procurement, financial management, and personnel. This project
was valued at $6 billion and would have produced the country’s first 200 mile
per hour high speed train service between major Texas urban centers. The
project was canceled by the sponsors in 1994, due to lack of funding.

• Mr. Dey was part of MK’s Transit Group as the Program Manager designee for
the rebuild of the Bay Area Rapid Transit car fleet. Tasks involved developing
the plans and selecting people to execute this work if awarded. Planning
included the management of design, procurement, system integration, quality
and test programs, and production in MK’s California facilities. The competing
bid was substantially below MK’s price for the work.

208
• Mr. Dey was transferred to Amerail (the spin-off company of MK’s former
Transit Group) as Director of an on-going California Department of
Transportation (CALTRANS) Program valued at over $200 million. The
program included design, development, subcontracting for materials, and
production of 113 commuter and rail cars in eight different configurations. He
was directly responsible for all client relations and negotiations in this program.
The contract was successfully re-negotiated from its initial loss position, and
internal changes made to staff and procedures. He helped to reverse the
previous pattern of late deliveries and cost overruns, resulting in the attainment
of all revised cost and schedule objectives, reducing projected losses by at
least $40 million.

• As an independent consultant, Mr. Dey was retained by Amtrak to provide


project management services to the AMTRAK Los Angeles Engineering Office.
Services included development and construction of major train maintenance
facilities on the west coast (Los Angeles, Oakland, and Seattle). He acted as
Project Manager for the Oakland Maintenance project, and advised and
produced actual models and templates for the establishment of management
teams, schedules and budgets, facility maintenance concepts, and review
processes for other Amtrak projects.

209
Robert A. Dey

EXPERIENCE OUTLINE
General Management:
• Defining and planning function and organizations.
• Maintenance of facilities and equipment.
• Development and execution of capital and operating budgets along functional
and objective alignments.
• Development of network schedules for programs.
• Procurement of goods and services in both government and private sector.
• Effective communications at executive or craft labor level.
• Information architecture.
Industry:
• Rail and transit
∗ Planned the organization and systems to control and administer the Texas
High Speed Rail Project, estimated at over $6 billion.
∗ Served as Project manager for design, procurement and assembly for two
major transit car rebuild programs, each valued at over $300 million.
∗ Framed the organization and management options for the Los Angeles
County Transportation Commission to design and construct the LA Long
Beach light rail system.
∗ Developed concepts and management templates for program management
of rail transit car contracts.
∗ Provided Project Management services to Amtrak for the development and
construction of three major west coast maintenance facilities.
• Vehicle Remanufacturing
∗ Conducted market analysis, developed concepts and proposal which were
presented to the U.S. Army in a teaming arrangement with the United
Technologies Corporation to integrate aerospace technology into military
vehicle remanufacturing.
• Construction
∗ Marketed, organized, and assisted in the startup of professional services
rendered to the Washington State DOT for the Interstate 90 completion
project in Seattle. Services included engineering management, program
scheduling and control systems, and construction management assistance
for this program which cost in excess of $1 billion. The program was
completed by the State DOT on planned schedule and budget.
∗ Managed the proposals for Morrison Knudsen Company on two major
construction management programs of national interest, namely, the Los
Angeles subway system, proposed in joint venture with the Fluor
Corporation, and the U.S. Embassy Security Program of the U.S.
Department of State. These proposals required extensive preparation,
planning, and presentation.

210
• Aviation
∗ Planned, marketed, and participated in the execution of aviation component
rebuild contracts with the U.S. Army and Coast Guard.
∗ Piloted military and civilian aircraft, both rotary and fixed wing, single and
multi-engine for over 2800 hours.

Government:
• White House Fellow
∗ Selected in national competition in 1971 to participate in the White House
Fellowships.
∗ Was appointed as special assistant to the Administrator of the
Environmental Protection Agency.
∗ Participated in representational and national policy development trips to
Africa and Asia.

Military:
• Command
∗ Commanded a combat engineer company and battalion. Commanded the
U.S. Army Engineer Center Brigade of over 2,400 combat, administrative,
and medical personnel.
• Staff
∗ Army General staff experience in the Office of the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army
• Engineering and Construction
∗ Military project construction in the U.S., Germany, Korea, and Vietnam.
∗ Planning and initial engineering of projects through the Corps of Engineers
for middle-eastern governmental agreements with the U.S. Projects were
located in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Jordan, and Egypt.
∗ Facility engineer training at major installation level.

EDUCATION
SUMAC West Point, Bachelors Degree (1958)
Stanford University, Graduate Degree in Civil Engineering/Construction
Management (1963)
The Army War College, Postgraduate Studies in National Security (1980)

INTERNATIONAL
Europe: Assignments in residence in Germany (6 years) and Italy (3 years)
Asia: Tours in Korea and Vietnam (3 years)
Travel on assignments to Japan, Indonesia, and Thailand
Africa: Representational trips to Tunisia, Ethiopia, Tanzania, Malawi, Zambia,
and Zaire.
Middle East: Assignments in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Jordan, and Egypt

211
Arizona State University
Department of Electrical Engineering
GEORGE C. KARADY
Professor, Salt River Chair

Degrees
Doctorate in Electrical Engineering, Technical University of Budapest, 1960
Candidate of Technical sciences, Hungarian Academy of Science, 1959
Diploma in Electrical Engineering, Technical University of Budapest, 1952
Professional Experience
1986-Present Salt River Project Chair Professor, Arizona State University
1977-1986 BASSO Services, Chief Consulting Electrical Engineer Chief Engineer Computer Technologies and Manager
of Electrical Systems
1969-1977 Hydro Quebec Institute of Research, Member of Research Staff, Program Manager and IREQ fellow
1952-1969 Technical University of Budapest, Teaching Assistant, Associate Professor and Deputy Department Head
Membership in Scientific and Professional Studies
IEEE Senior Member, 1969, senior member, 1971, fellow 1978 Canadian Electric Association, 1971-78
CIGRE member, 1981-present Hungarian Association of Electric Engineers, 1952-68
PHI KAPPA PHI, honor society, 1988-present SAE, Society of Aerospace Engineers member, 1988
Professional Society Activities
Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers (IEEE)
Transmission and Distribution committee (T&D) Member, 1977 to present
T&D Committee, Working group on Non-Ceramic Insulators; Chairman, 1978 to present
T&D Committee, Lightning and Insulation Subcommittee, Vice-Chairman 2985-1988; Chairman, 1988 to present
T&D Committee, Working Group on HVDC System Performance; Chairman, 1974 to 1986
T&D Committee, HVDC Subcommittee, Member since 1970 and Secretary, 1978-1982
Fellow Committee, Member, 1983-1986
T&D Committee, Working Group on Flexible AC Transmission Systems, Member, 1991 to present
Power Engineering Education Committee, Member, 1980 to present
Power Engineering Education, Technical Sessions Subcommittee, Chairman 1992 to present
Power Engineering Education, Fellow Committee, Member, 1990 to present
PES, Working Group on Insulation Coordination, Chairman, 1992 to present

CIGRE, International Conference on Large High Voltage Electrical Systems, 1981 to present
Vice President, U.S. National Committee, 1981-1985
Treasurer/Secretary U.S. National Committee, 1981-1985
Technical Committee, Member, 1994 to present
Working Group on Insulators, Member, 1980 to present
Working Group on Insulators Contamination, Canadian Representative, 1973-1976
International Study Committee 22, U.S. Expert Advisor, 1986 to present
Honors and Awards
- IEEE Fellow, 1978
- Working Group Recognition Award (IEEE-PES Education Committee), 1993
- Student Affairs Recognition, ASU, 1992; Student Affairs Recognition, ASU, 1990
- Working Group Recognition Award, IEEE-PES, 1989
- Transmission and Distribution Committee Award for Outstanding Working Group, (IEEE), 1988
- Surge Protective Devices Committee Award for Prize Winning Paper, (IEEE), 1983
- Working Group Recognition Award, (IEEE T&D Committee), 1981, Technical Paper Award (IEEE- India), 1981
- Diploma, College of Relay Engineers (NARM), 1969
Student Graduation
Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D 2), Master of Science (MS) 23

Author of over 22 Professional Journal Papers in the last five years, expert witness on approximately six crane/hoistline
powerline contact litigations.

212
BEN J. LEHMAN, Rear Admiral USN (Engineering) Retired Professional
Engineer, Certified Safety Professional

Registered P.E. in New York 1949, California 1953, Alabama 1976, Louisiana 1976,
Florida 1976 (lapsed). Born 1922.
Certified as a Safety Professional in 1979 by BSCP, Savoy, IL.

Education:
C.C. N.Y. Bachelor of Mechanical Engineering 1942;
Manhattan College 1943 (evening) - Industrial
Psychology and Safety;
Pratt Institute 1943 (evening) – Electronics;
U.S. Naval Academy Post-Graduate School – Electrical and Mechanical
Engineering – 1944 to 1945;
Harvard University, Graduate School of Engineering –
Mechanical and Chemical Engineering – Masters Degree
In Mechanical Engineering 1949;
Stanford University – Design Philosophy and Advanced
Stress Analysis - 1957 to 1959 (part- time).
Editor-in-Chief C.C.N.Y. VECTOR Magazine.
Honorary Fraternity: Tau Beta Phi
Experience:
Student Engineer, Mack Truck Co., Allentown PA 1941;
U.S. Navy Shipyard Management and Contract Administration,
1942 to 1946 & 1950 to 1953;
Engineer, General Electric Co., 1946 to 1948;
Engineer, Bethlehem Steel Co. Shipbuilding Div. Central
Technical Department, Quincy, MA 1949 to 1950;
Engineer, power plant construction and safety,
Refinery design, Bechtel Corp, 1954 to 1955;
Project Engineer: Sylvania Electric, 1955; Kaiser
Electronics, 1956; Beckman Instruments, 1957 to 1959;
Engineering Manager, Lockheed Missiles and Space Co.,
Sunnyvale CA 1959 to 1969;
Director of Engineering, Lockheed Shipbuilding and
Construction Co., Seattle WA 1969 to 1972;
Vice-President of Engineering, Litton Industries Ship
Systems, Los Angeles CA and Ingalls Shipbuilding Div.,
Pascagoula MS 1972 to 1975;
Private Practice, 1975 to present.
Professional Societies:
Systems Safety Society
American Society of Safety Engineers (ASSE)
Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE)
Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers (IEEE)
IEEE Dielectrics & Electrical Insulation Society
American Soc. Of Naval Architects and Marine Engineers
American Society of Naval Engineers
American Boat and Yacht Council
Risk Analysis Society
Mechanics Institute of San Francisco
Panelist, American Arbitration Association

P.O. Box 3480, 169 Juniper Drive, Stateline, NV 89449


PHONE 702/ 588 - 7765 FAX 702/ 588 – 587

213
Melvin L. Myers Phone (404) 288-7085
1293 Berkeley Road Fax (404) 288-7166
Avondale Estates, GA 30002-1517 e-mail: melmyers@bellsouth.net

Education
1967 B.S., College of Engineering, University of Idaho (Agricultural Engineering)
1977 M.P.A., School of Public and Environmental Affairs, Indiana University (International
Environment Policy, Science and Technology Management)

Professional Experience
1982-2002 Consultant
2002-2003 Assistant Professor, Voluntary Faculty, University of Kentucky, Southeast Center for
Agricultural Health and Injury Prevention
1992-2002 Assistant Professor, Adjunct Facility, Emory University, Rollins School of Public Health,
Teach Occupational and Environmental Health Policy
1995-1998 Deputy Director, Office of Extramural Coordination and Special Projects, National
Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), Atlanta, GA
1996-1998 Senior Editor, Encyclopedia of Occupational Health and Safety, 4th Ed. Geneva:
International Labour Office (ILO)
- Chapter Editor, Agriculture and Natural Resource Based Industries, Vol. 3, pp. 64.1-69
- Chapter Editor, Livestock Rearing, Vol.3, pp. 70.1-38
1988-1994 Special Assistant to the Director, NIOSH, Atlanta, GA
- Coordinator, Agriculture Program, NIOSH
- Project Officer for the Surgeon General’s Conference on Agricultural Safety and Health,
1991
- Acting Director, Alaska Activity, NIOSH, 1991
- Member, Agriculture Steering Committee
- Member, Advisory Committee on Construction Safety and Health, OSHA, 1998-1990
- Executive Secretary, Mine Health Research Advisory Committee, DHHS, 1987-1992
- Committee Management Officer, NIOSH, 1987-1994
1981-1988 International Coordinator, NIOSH. Project Officer for Cooperative Agreement with the
World Health Organization
1986-1988 Deputy Assistant Director, NIOSH, Atlanta, GA. Director, Office of Program Planning and
Evaluation, NIOSH, Rockville, MD 1979-81,
Atlanta, GA 1981-86
1975-1979 Technical Assistant to the Assistant Administrator, Office of the Assistant Administrator,
Office of Research and Development, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA),
Washington, D.C.
1971-1975 Center Staff Officer, National Environmental Research Center/Research Triangle Park,
Office of Research and Development, EPA, Research Triangle Park, NC
1969-1971 Engineer-Economist, National Air Pollution Control Administration, U.S. Public Health
Service, Cincinnati, OH and Raleigh, NC
1967-1968 Design Engineer, Hyster Company, Portland, OR
1966 Engineering Aid, Department of Civil Engineering, College of Engineering, University of
Idaho
1963-1967 Engineering Aid, Idaho Department of Highways

Membership in Scientific Societies


American Public Health Association, Occupational Safety and Health Section
American Society of Agricultural Engineers
214
American Society of Safety Engineers
Commissioned Officers Association of the USPHS
National Institute for Farm Safety
Chair, Long-Range Planning Committee
National Safety Council

Honors
2002 NAMIC Engineering Safety Award, American Society of Agricultural Engineers
1998 Outstanding Service Medal, U.S. Public Health Service
1998 Unit Commendation, U.S. Public Health Service
1994 Outstanding Unit Citation, U.S. Public Health Service
1993 Outstanding Unit Citation, U.S. Public Health Service
1992 Unit Commendation, U.S. Public Health Service
1991 Surgeon General’s Exemplary Service Medal, U.S. Public Health Service
1991 Special Assignment Service Award, U.S. Public Health Service
1990 Commendation Medal, U.S. Public Health Service
1989 Public Health Citation, U.S. Public Health Service
1988 Meritorious Service Medal, U.S. Public Health Service
1988 Unit Commendation, U.S. Public Health Service
1987 Special Achievement Award, Centers for Disease Control
1986 Certificate of Appreciation for Contributions to the Success of the Second National
Symposium on Prevention of Leading Work-Related Disease and Injuries, Centers
for Disease Control
1986 Letter of Appreciation from Jimmy Carter for Participation in the Global Health
Consultation, The Carter Center
1986 Superior Work Performance Award, U.S. Public Health Service
1985 Assistant Secretary for Health Award for Exceptional Achievement, Department of
Health and human Services
1985 Certificate of Appreciation for Contributions to the Success of the First National
Symposium on Prevention of Leading Work-Related Disease and Injuries, Centers
for Disease Control
1985 Certificado Assistio al Serninsho, Pan American Health Organization, Paipa, Columbia
1984 Commendation Medal, U.S. Public Health Service
1979 EPA Award, Pioneer of the Nuke Watch, Three Mile Island
1979 EPA Recognition for Outstanding Contribution
1977 Phi Alpha Alpha (Public Affairs and Administration honorary)
1976-77 Education for Public Managers Fellowship
1966-67 Student Honor Award (Idaho Student Branch, American Society of Agricultural
Engineers
1966-67 Alpha Zeta (Agricultural honorary) Chancellor, Idaho Chapter

Significant Performance
Served as Project Officer for the Annual Report to the Congress, The Economics of Clean Air, March,
1971.
Served as the first Project Officer for the Annual Report from the Administrator, EPA to the Congress,
Research Outlook 1978-1982.
Assured in 1978 that expert witnesses were provided to a major enforcement program within the
Environmental Protection Agency covering the utility, iron and steel, pulp and paper, and
chemical industries.
Acted in 1979 as Executive Officer for the Environmental Protection Agencies response to the nuclear
incident at Three Mile Island, PA.
215
Coordinated international activities at NIOSH from 1982 to 1988, over which 17 international documents
and books were published and a system of international, regional, and bilateral coordination was
established.
Served as the project officer on and active sponsor-representative for an Institute of Medicine study that
resulted in the publication of The Role of the Primary Care Physician in Occupational and
Environmental Medicine in 1988.
Managed the planning committee, the convening, and the publication of papers and proceedings from the
Surgeon General’s Conference on Agricultural Safety and Health, 1991.
Opened a field office in Anchorage, Alaska for NIOSH in 1991 to conduct demonstration programs in the
prevention of occupational injuries.
Served as a senior editor for and edited two chapter in the ILO Encyclopedia of Occupational Health and
Safety, which was published in 1998. One chapter was “Agriculture and Natural Resource Based
Industries” and the other chapter was “Livestock Rearing”.
Served as managing editor for a special issue of Statistics in Medicine, in which the proceedings and
papers from the Seventh Biennial Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and Agency for
Toxic Substances and Disease Registry Symposium on Statistical Methods held in 1999 were
published in May 2001.

Mel Myers has also authored over 50 articles for publication.

216
JEFFREY C. SPEER
P.O. Box 685
Sierra Vista, AZ 85636
520.458.8056

SUMMARY: Results oriented individual with strong problem solving experience. Skilled in organizing,
developing, and implementing industrial safety, ergonomic and environmental programs. Strong interpersonal
abilities combined with excellent analytical and management skills.

EDUCATION:
CENTRAL MISSOURI STATE UNIVERSITY- Warrensburg, Missouri 64093
Master of Science- Industrial Safety/Management
UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO- Toronto, Ontario Canada
Honors Bachelor of Arts

EXPERIENCE:
1995 to Present Network Enterprise Technology Command/9th Army Signal Command
(NETCOM) Title: Safety Engineer (1995-1997) Safety Director (1997- present)
Is the principal staff advisor, technical consultant and coordinator to the NETCOM Commander and the staff in
planning, organizing, directing and evaluating all safety and occupational health efforts involving 12,500 personnel
worldwide. Expert in system safety engineering and management to support design, installation, operations,
maintenance and sustainment of worldwide tactical, strategic, and power projection signal support systems for the
Army. Principal activity is to provide safety engineering design assistance to developing engineers of both hardware
and software of electronics and support products to ensure that the end products are safe for their intended use. This
function requires innovation of alternate designs that eliminate or minimize the hazard to the operating personnel
and users. This also includes application of human factors considerations to overcome foreseeable operator and user
error. Established NETCOM safety, occupational health and system safety engineering program and policy and
procedures. Manages and conducts analysis or NETCOM accident data to evaluate hazards and control measures.
Develops safety guides and control procedures for safe design specifications, equipment layouts, facilities,
processes, and personal protective equipment, devices and materials. Assesses the effectiveness of safety and
technical guidance on the integration of risk management processes and MANPRINT safety.
1994 to 1995 Defense Logistics Agency, Defense Contract Management Command
Title: Safety Engineer
Reviewed and evaluated operations, programmatic system safety requirements and techniques in a manufacturing
environment that included concept, design, development, testing and production phases. Assessed and resolved
industrial safety, ergonomic, health physics and industrial hygiene problems. Participated on accident and mishap
investigation teams to assure that safety considerations were inherent in contractors’ programs and activities.
Assured that contractors had properly applied industrial safety and environmental standards to engineering plans,
production operations and maintenance, and hazardous operations. Developed and performed engineering studies,
hazard analyses and risk assessments in the areas of hazard identification and hazard control. Coordinated and
provided safety training classes. Conducted safety inspections, surveys and audits of contractor operations with
authority for immediate work stoppage, if found to be in serious non-compliance with regulatory standards.
1994 Steelcase Incorporated, Athens, AL 35611
Title: Production Line Associate
Performed quality control inspections of production line product and periodic audits for compliance with ISO 9000
requirements. Provided technical and hazard identification assistance to management.
1989 to 1994 Technical Analysis, Incorporated, Huntsville, AL 35806
Title: Safety Engineer

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Mission service contractor to the NASA Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC), Huntsville, AL. NANA Industrial
Safety Office representative for facility design/construction/activation or a 2.7 billion-dollar chemical/manufacturing
processing multi-complex facility. Reviewed facility, equipment and process specifications and design drawings for
compliance with statutory health and safety, ergonomic and environmental (RCRA, TSCA, SARA) requirements.
Assessed applicability, developed and implemented OSHA Process Safety Management Program to MSFC
operations at various locations. Evaluated engineering, technical, process development, manufacturing, or
operational issues for the Space Shuttle program. Revised MSFC safety instructions and manuals to comply with
new OSHA standards. Established a base line questionnaire for evaluating safety and health program compliance.
Evaluated contractor safety program plans, hazard analyses and engineering changes. Performed inspections and
audits of all MSFC contractor facilities and operations.
1986 to 1989 Los Angeles County Department of Public Works, Alhambra, CA 91803
Title: Safety Officer
Developed, implemented, and administered a comprehensive safety and accident prevention program, policies, and
procedures for a newly consolidated Los Angeles County Department of Public Works to ensure compliance with
federal, state, and local health and safety requirements. Reviewed safety reports, investigations, and prepared reports
of industrial and automobile accidents. Inspected and evaluated Department facilities, equipment, work practices,
and safety devices for code compliance. Analyzed work activities and equipment for potential health and safety
hazards and identified personal protective equipment. Prepared and conducted safety training for employees
including: Hazard Communication, Confined Space, Hearing Conservation, Respiratory Protection and Asbestos
Abatement. Generated risk assessment reports for senior management on status of safety program on a monthly,
quarterly, and yearly basis. Provided liaison and technical support for the Department of Safety committees.
Assisted with Preparedness and Emergency Response manual, policies, and procedures.
1985 to 1986 Handyman of California, Incorporated, Santa Maria, CA 93438
Title: Technical Consultant
Responsible for customer assistance and service involving building material selections and purchases. Completed
sales floor maintenance and weekly inventory procedures.
1983 to 1985 Central Missouri State University, Warrensburg, MO 64093
Title: Teaching Assistant
Developed and taught driver education program for high school students and adults including theoretical and
practical aspects of motor vehicle operations. Program instructor for defensive driving, as well as winter driving
techniques and traffic safety programs presented to various State of Missouri police forces. Demonstrated the Seat
Belt Convincer at community functions statewide to encourage seat belt usage.
1979 to 1983 Algoma Steel Corporation, Limited, Sault Ste. Marie, Ontario
Title: Coke Oven Operator Safety Specialist
Assisted the Cokemaking Superintendent in the development and implementation of the department safety program
and the first phase of a Coke oven Battery Emission Control Program to meet government standards. Responsible
for the preparation of the department safety manual, safe maintenance and shutdown procedures, and personal
protective equipment program.

SPECIAL ISO 9000 Inspections System Safety


TRAINING: Industrial Hygiene Certified First Aid
Solid Waste Management Construction Inspection
Accident Investigation/Reconstruction Manprint
Health Hazard Evaluation Hazard Recognition
Confined Space Configuration Management
Hazardous Materials Management Process Safety Management
ORGANIZATIONS: American Society of Safety Engineers
System Safety Society
National Fire Protection Association
Society of Explosive Engineers

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Dr. JOHN H. VAN ARSDEL
P.O. Box 2894
Sierra Vista, AZ 85636-2894
(520) 459-3836
email – jhvanars@theriver.com

EDUCATION

B.S., Industrial Technology, Engineering Major,


Purdue University.
M.A., Ph.D, Post Graduate credits and honors,
University of Denver, Commonwealth University.
Seminars and Technical Training in Operational Areas.

HIGHLIGHTS OF ASSIGNMENTS

* Twenty years experience electronics and human engineer.


* Extensive writing and presentation experience.
* Supervisor particularly in human engineering applications.
* Experience in large scale military oriented projects.
* Eight years computer experience: main frame to micro & mini.
* Project experience in identifying and resolving problems.
* Human factors Scientist – NORAD Computer Systems, Space Comp.
Ctr.

RELEVANT SKILLS and EXPERIENCE

ELECTRONICS ENGINEER
. Developed test plans, conducted tests, wrote test reports: equipment and
aircraft testing, electronic instrument and control systems.
. Developed tables for solar and X-ray data for C-E HF predictions.
. Prepared, coordinated C-E multiservice standardization documents.
. Developed/reviewed C-E standards and practices for effectiveness.
. COR's technical representative in C-E standards efforts.

HUMAN FACTORS ENGINEER (MANPRINT)


. Developed, conducted human engineering tests of pilots and technicians,
non-standard instruments and controls, wrote reports.
. Directed technical teams, extensive missile testing programs.
. Developed Qualitative and Quantitative Personnel Requirements Information
(QQPRI), Human Factors Design Compliance, Personnel System Test
and Evaluation reports.
. Lead human engineer, Minute Man III Post Boost Propulsion System.
. Human Factors Scientist, updating Cheyenne Mountain Space Computational
Center and NORAD computer systems.

SUPERVISORY
. Acting Supervisor in Air Training Command assignments.
. Coordinator of technical, training teams for missile testing.
. Lead human engineer, Minute Man III Post Boost Propulsion System.
. Supervisor Computer Laboratory in University.
Supervising Human Factors Scientist for updating Cheyenne Mountain
Space Computational Center and NORAD computer systems.

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RELEVANT BACKGROUND EXPERIENCE

USAISEC SED-ASQB-SET-N, Electronics Engineer, Fort


Huachuca, AZ.
USAISEC SED-ASQB-SET-T, Electronics Engineer, Fort
Huachuca, AZ.
USAISEC ASBI-SST, Electronics Engineer, Fort Huachuca, AZ.
USACEEIA ASC-CED-CE-TP, Mathematician, Fort Huachuca, AZ.
USACEEIA CCC-EMEO-ECD, Operations Research Analyst, Fort
Huachuca, AZ.
US Army Academy of Health Sciences, Technical Reviewer and
Operations Systems Analyst, Ft Sam Houston, TX.
USAF Contract, Officer Training, Lackland AFB, TX.
USAF Contract, Space Computational Center and NORAD
Computer System 427M Improvement Program, Supervising
Human Factors Scientist, Colorado Springs, CO.
Univ. of Denver, Supervisor Computer Laboratory, Denver,CO.
USAF Contract, Lead Human Engineer, Minute Man III, Post
Boost Propulsion System, Niagara Falls, NY.
US Army Contract, Senior Systems Engineer, Tucson, AZ.
USAF Contract, Senior Development Engineer, Goodyear, AZ.
US Army Contract, Technical and Training Coordinators,
Multisystem Test Equipment Program (missile testing),
Burlington, MA.
USAF Contract, Human Engineer, Dyna-Soar Project, Cherry
Hill, NJ.
US Army Contract, Electronics Engineer and Human Engineer, Electronics
Flight Instrumentation and Controls Testing, USAEPG, Fort
Huachuca, AZ.

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APPENDIX C:

APPLIANCE
LIST
SAFETY APPLIANCES AVAILABLE TO HELP PROTECT AGAINST THE
OCCURRENCE OF POWERLINE CONTACT

♦ Boom Swing Limiting Device: This device employs two spring bumpers mounted on the
revolving superstructure directly below the boom, which are pointed in opposite directions.
These bumpers stop the rotation of the crane when they come into contact with stop blocks
which are connected by two pins to a ring welded to the crane carrier. The stop blocks can be
set to allow as much or as little rotation as is desired or can be removed completely for
normal operation. The unit also is equal with switches which contact the stop blocks about
one foot ahead of the bumpers, activating a bell in the cab to warn the operator that the crane
is approaching the stop blocks. This device varies slightly to fit various models of cranes. It
can be designated to fit most truck cranes and some crawler cranes.

Rayco Boom Ranger


Model R420
Rayco Electronics, U.S.A. Inc. (Wylie Systems)
P.O. Box 225
4323 Lincoln Way East
Fayetteville, PA 17222
717.352.2121
Fax 717.352.8707

Rayco R2420 Range Limiting Device


Rayco Electronic System
2440, Avenue Dalton
Sainte-Foy, Québec, Canada
418.266.6600
Fax: 418.266.6610
Rayco@raycotech.com

Rayco Boom Buoy


Rayco Electronic System Ltd
1370 Chemin Filteau
Berniéresm Qc G7A 2K1
418.831.6137

♦ SigAlarm: This device is equipped with a sensing aerial running the entire length of the
boom. The purpose if the aerial is to pick up electrostatic fields which are present around any
alternating current transmission line. The strength of these electrostatic fields at any point in
space is directly proportional to the power of the transmission line and inversely proportional
to the distances of that point from the powerline. The aerial on a crane is connected to
electrical circuitry which activates a light and a buzzer when the aerial enters a field of a

220
certain strength. This must be adjusted by the crane operator at every site due to the variation
of power carried by transmission lines and to the distances from the line at which the
operator chooses to work. Battery power from the crane is used to operate the warning
devices, and to energize the detector circuit. This device is available with several options
which enable it to be used. With any crane on any type or crane-shovel operation.

647 Progress Way


Sanford, FL 32771
1.800.589.3769
407.328.9479
Fax: 407.328.5889
www.SigAlarminc.com

♦ Other Proximity Warning Devices

Detek-Thor Proximity Warning Device Model R600


Rayco Electronics, U.S.A. Inc. (Wylie Systems)
P.O. Box 225
4323 Lincoln Way East
Fayetteville, PA 17222
717.352.2121
Fax 717.352.8707

Will-Burt ISO 9001 D-TEC Trip


Will-Burt
169 South Main Street
Orrville, OH 44667-0900
330.682.7015
330.684.1190
www.willburt.com

H.J. Tinsley & Co Ltd


Spittlegate Level
Grantham, Lincolnshire
England NG31 7UH
Tel: Grantham (0476) 77297

Wylie Systems (A Hinderliter Company)


1240 N. Harvard
Tulsa, OK 74115-6103
918.832.9035
www.wyliesystems.org.uk

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Saf-T-Boom® Dielectric Shield
Safe-T-Boom Corp.
#1 Skyway Dr.
Little Rock, AR 72201
501.375.3291

♦ Insulating Links:

Load Insulator®
Insulatus
708 Marks Rd, Suite B
Valley City, OH 44280
1.888.323.5623
Fax: 1.888.323.1733
www.insulatus.com

Miller ISO Link


Miller Products
41 Fremont St. Worcester, MA 01603
800.733.7071
www.millerproducts.net

also available through

Safety Products Engineering, Inc.


707 Mullet Dr. Ste. 204
Cape Canaveral, FL 32920
800.589.3769

Safety Link
Safe-T-Boom Corp.
#1 Skyway Dr.
Little Rock, AR 72201
501.375.3291

♦ Other Equipment:

Pneumatic Shock Guard


(Pneumatic Remote Control)
US Truck Cranes Inc. (USTC)
R.D. 6, Box 34-B
York, PA 17404
800.233.1961

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