Yegor LanovenkoIB History

Is there a stronger case for Stresemanns success than for his failure in his foreignpolicy? Stresemann came to be the Foreign Minister of the Weimar Republic in the times thatwere very hard for the foreign policies: Germanys international position in politics wasweak, as Germany was treated with suspicion by the Allies, and the common people inother West European countries had not yet overcome the post-war bitterness andresentment towards Germany, whom everyone blamed for starting the war, and this viewwas accepted as the true one by the Allies. Stresemann not only had to re-establishfriendly relations with other powers, but also had to deal with the severe opposition fromthe Right.To judge the successfulness of his Stresemanns foreign policy, one must decide whatexactly his aim was. Most would say that it lied in reviewing the Treaty of Versailles. Butthis could not be done without brining Germany up to the position of a powerful country.Stresemann decided to get concessions via establishing friendly relations with the Alliedcountries by letting them see that Germany is willing to follow the Treaty of Versaillesand cooperate.A country cannot be powerful when its economy is ruined by the hyperinflation in 1923and with the passive resistance towards the French troops in its most important industrialarea of the Ruhr. Stresemann was undoubtedly a skilled politician, and he called off the passive resistance, which saved the economy and eased the tensions with the Frenchtroops. He was also unarguably successfull in negotiating international loans from theU.S., resulting in the Dawes plan which made a vital contribution to the economicalrecovery. The following Young plan eased both the annual reparations and the total burden. The fact that the reparations cause which cause so much bitterness among theGerman people, was revalued by the Allies made it more likely for the payments to befully implemented in the future. This gave Germany more hope. However, the acceptanceof the Young plan was seen by the Right-wing opposition as a betrayal of the futuregenerations of Germany, as German economy became s dependent on the U.S., and in thelong-term the Plan would end up disastrously (which it did in 1929), but the question is:what else there was to do? Stresemann found the best solution at the time and acted tosave Germany in the present, as without nobody knows how things would go for Germany if there had been no loans.The relations with the Allies softened greatly after Stresemann signed the Locarno pact,accepting the Western borders drawn by the treaty of Versailles. This was followed bythe withdrawal of French troops and German entry into the League of Nations. All thiscreated the mood called the Locarno Honeymoon, full of international optimism aboutGermany and European co-operation. Meanwhile in Germany itself, the Right-wingextremists saw this as a further betrayal, as it was yet another acceptance of the Treaty of Versailles, and they stressed how much Germany was losing by signing t. In fact,

Yegor LanovenkoIB HistoryGermany lost nothing but its Alsaisse-Lorraine claims, however, Germany never reallyregarded that area as important. Furthermore, it made France feel more secure, which

wasneeded if Germany wanted to recover fully. In addition, it left the East open for Germany.The entrance to the League meant that Germany was becoming trustworthy in the eyes of other countries, which was exactly what Stresemann wanted. This was followed by thedecrease of occupational forces in Germany, and perhaps contributed to the fact that evenwhen Germany was breaking the demilitarization terms, it was in a way ignored. While inthe League, Stresemann posed discomforting questions about the German minoritiesliving in other states. Two treaties with USSR were signed the Treaty of Rapallo andthe Treaty of Berlin, giving Germany more reassurance and confidence, as it avoidedanother encirclement.However, the solid gains of Stresemann were little. The occupational troops werereduced, but still remained in Germany. The economy did recover with the help of theAmerican loans, but that put Germany under dependency on the U.S. and some historianssee that as an unwise move. Regardless of the improvements in the European relations,Germany was still treated with healthy suspicion by the Allies. The whole idea of following the terms of the Treaty, regardless of the aim of it, angered the extreme groupsin the Republic, every event or a mistake, an inaccuracy was used by the extremeopposition to undermine the government. Stresemann did not achieve much, but he builta base for the future developments which never took place, as the Weimar was crushed by the Wall Street Crash in 1929. If the softened relations with the Allies and the slowlyincreasing economy, encouraged by Stresemann's foreign policy, would have been used,it might have resulted in a stable government. He was working in a time when his everymove was being watched carefully by his bitter opponents, and this made it hard for the people to see the actual vistas, opened by Stresemann.The conclusion about the fulfillment of Stresemann's aims can be drawn: his policies, bythe time that he stopped acting as the Foreign Minister, had not yet given its yield, asmost of his actions had investments in long-term projects, that would work in a politicallyand economically stable country, but in the Weimar Republic, rocked by aggressivecriticism from its own people, weakened by the division within the government and kneltdown by economical complications, long-term investments did not have time to give itsoutcomes.