US Vs. Ruiz 136 SCRA 487 Facts: The usa had a naval base in subic, zambales.

The base was one of those provided in the military bases agreement between phils. and the US. Respondent alleges that it won in the bidding conducted by the US for the construction of wharves in said base that was merely awarded to another group. For this reason, a suit for specific performance was filed by him against the US. Issue: Whether the US naval base in bidding for said contracts exercise governmental functions to be able to invoke state immunity. Held: The traditional role of the state immunity exempts a state from being sued in the courts of another state without its consent or waiver. This rule is necessary consequence of the principle of independence and equality of states. However, the rules of international law are not petrified; they are continually and evolving and because the activities of states have multiplied. It has been necessary to distinguish them between sovereign and governmental acts and private, commercial and proprietary acts. the result is that state immunity now extends only to sovereign and governmental acts. The restrictive application of state immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign. Its commercial activities of economic affairs. A state may be descended to the level of an individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued. Only when it enters into business contracts. It does not apply where the contracts relates the exercise of its sovereign function. In this case, the project are integral part of the naval base which is devoted to the defense of both US and phils., indisputably, a function of the government of highest order, they are not utilized for , nor dedicated to commercial or business purposes.

Raquiza v. Bradford 75 Phil 50 Nature: Original action in the SC. Habeas corpus. Facts: By virtue of the proclamation issued by General of the Army MacArthur, petitioners were arrested by the 306 CIC and detained under security commitment order No 385. The petitioners Raquiza, Tee Han Kee, and Infante were charged with Espionage activity with the Japanese & active collaboration with the enemy respectively. Power of Commander of the US Army to proclaim by virtue of military necessity is not questioned. He based proclamation on reasons that apprehended have violated due allegiance to US and it is a military necessity. Petitioners move for writ of Habeas Corpus. Issues: 1. WON the war terminated within the meaning of that part in the proclamation? [Note: The power of commander in chief of the US Army to issue a proclamation providing for military measures to be taken upon the apprehension of Filipino citizens who voluntarily have given aid, comfort and sustenance to the enemy, cannot be seriously questioned.] No. The war, in the legal sense, continues until, and terminated at the same time of, some formal proclamation of peace by an authority competent to proclaim it. It is the province of the political dept, & not the judicial dept, to determine if war has ended. Fact that delivery of certain persons under custody of the US Army has already begun doesnt mean that the war has, in the legal sense, already terminated, w/c clearly it hasnt. Delivery w/in power of military authorities to make even before was terminated. 2. WON this court has jurisdiction or legal power to afford relief to the petitioners in the sad and sorry plight to which they have been and are being subjected? No. Civil Courts shouldnt interfere. A foreign army permitted to march through a friendly country or to be stationed in it, is exempt

from civil & criminal jurisdiction of the place. Grant of free passage implies a waiver of all jurisdiction over troops during passage (let them exercise their own discipline). Any attempt by our civil Courts to exercise jurisdiction over US troops would be a violation of our countrys faith. On the other hand, petitioners may have recourse to proper military authorities.

Republic of Indonesia vs. James Vizon G.R. No. 54705, June 26, 2003 FACTS: Petitioner, Republic of Indonesia entered into a Maintenance Agreement in August 1995 with respondent James Vinzon, sole proprietor of Vinzon Trade and Services. The Maintenance Agreement stated that respondent shall, for a consideration, maintain specified equipment at the Embassy Main Building, Embassy Annex Building and the Wisma Duta, the official residence of petitioner Ambassador Soeratmin. The equipments covered by the Maintenance Agreement are air conditioning units, generator sets, electrical facilities, water heaters, and water motor pumps. It is likewise stated therein that the agreement shall be effective for a period of four years and will renew itself automatically unless cancelled by either party by giving thirty days prior written notice from the date of expiry. Petitioners claim that sometime prior to the date of expiration of the said agreement, or before August 1999, they informed respondent that the renewal of the agreement shall be at the discretion of the incoming Chief of Administration, Minister Counsellor Azhari Kasim, who was expected to arrive in February 2000. When Minister Counsellor Kasim assumed the position of Chief of Administration in March 2000, he allegedly found respondents work and services unsatisfactory and not in compliance with the standards set in the Maintenance Agreement. Hence, the Indonesian Embassy terminated the agreement in a letter dated August 31, 2000. Petitioners claim, moreover, that they had earlier verbally informed respondent of their decision to terminate the agreement. On the other hand, respondent claims that the aforesaid termination was arbitrary and unlawful. Respondent filed a complaint against petitioners (RTC) of Makati, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss, alleging that the Republic of Indonesia, as a foreign sovereign State, has sovereign immunity from suit and cannot be sued as a party-defendant in the Philippines. The said motion further alleged that Ambassador Soeratmin and Minister Counsellor Kasim are diplomatic agents as defined under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and therefore enjoy diplomatic immunity. In turn, respondent filed on March 20, 2001, an Opposition to the said motion alleging that the Republic of Indonesia has expressly waived its immunity from suit. He based this claim upon the following provision in the Maintenance Agreement.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Republic of Indonesia can be sued. RULING: The Supreme Court on the matter ruled that the republic of Indonesia cannot be deemed to have waived its immunity to suit. The existence alone of a paragraph in a contract stating that any legal action arising out of the agreement shall be settled according to the laws of the Philippines and by a specified court of the Philippines is not necessarily a waiver of sovereign immunity from suit. The aforesaid provision contains language not necessarily inconsistent with sovereign immunity. On the other hand, such provision may also be meant to apply where the sovereign party elects to sue in the local courts, or otherwise waives its immunity by any subsequent act. The applicability of Philippine laws must be deemed to include Philippine laws in its totality, including the principle recognizing sovereign immunity. Hence, the proper court may have no proper action, by way of settling the case, except to dismiss it. The Court stated that the upkeep of its furnishings and equipment is still part sovereign function of the State. A sovereign State does not merely establish a diplomatic mission and leave it at that; the establishment of a diplomatic mission encompasses its maintenance and upkeep. Hence, the State may enter into contracts with private entities to maintain the premises, furnishings and equipment of the embassy and the living quarters of its agents and officials. It is therefore clear that petitioner Republic of Indonesia was acting in pursuit of a sovereign activity when it entered into a contract with respondent for the upkeep or maintenance of the air conditioning units, generator sets, electrical facilities, water heaters, and water motor pumps of the Indonesian Embassy and the official residence of the Indonesian ambassador. The Supreme Court grants the petition and reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals. public official charged with some administrative or technical office who can be held to the proper responsibility in the manner laid down by the law of civil responsibility. Consequently, the trial court in not so deciding and in sentencing the said entity to the payment of damages, caused by an official of the second class referred to, has by erroneous interpretation infringed the provisions of Articles 1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code. It is, therefore, evidence that the State (GPI) is only liable, according to the above quoted decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain, for the acts of its agents, officers and employees when they act as special agents within the meaning of paragraph 5 of Article

1903, supra, and that the chauffeur of the ambulance of the General Hospital was not such an agent. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment appealed from must be reversed, without costs in this instance. Whether the Government intends to make itself legally liable for the amount of damages above set forth, which the plaintiff has sustained by reason of the negligent acts of one of its employees, be legislative enactment and by appropriating sufficient funds therefore, we are not called upon to determine. This matter rests solely with the Legislature and not with the courts.

Holy See vs Rosario Petitioner: The Holy See Respondent: Hon. Elidberto Rosario, Jr., in his capacity as Presiding Judge of RTC Makati, Branch 61 and Starbright Sales Enterprises, Inc. FACTS: Petition arose from a controversy over a parcel of land. Lot 5-A, registered under the name Holy See, was contiguous to Lot 5-B and 5-D under the name of Philippine Realty Corporation (PRC). The land was donated by the Archdiocese of Manila to the Papal Nuncio, which represents the Holy See, who exercises sovereignty over the Vatican City, Rome, Italy, for his residence. Said lots were sold through an agent to Ramon Licup who assigned his rights to respondents Starbright Sales Enterprises, Inc. When the squatters refuse to vacate the lots, a dispute arose between the two parties because both were unsure whose responsibility was it to evict the squatters from said lots. Respondent Starbright Sales Enterprises Inc. insists that Holy See should clear the property while Holy See says that respondent corporation should do it or the earnest money will be returned. With this, Msgr. Cirilios, the agent, subsequently returned the P100,000 earnest money. The same lots were then sold to Tropicana Properties and Development Corporation. Starbright Sales Enterprises, Inc. filed a suit for annulment of the sale, specific performance and damages against Msgr. Cirilios, PRC as well as Tropicana Properties and Development Corporation. The Holy See and Msgr. Cirilos moved to dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction based on sovereign immunity from suit. RTC denied the motion on ground that petitioner already "shed off" its sovereign immunity by entering into a business contract. The subsequent Motion for Reconsideration was also denied hence this special civil action for certiorari was forwarded to the Supreme Court. ISSUE: Whether or not Holy See can invoke sovereign immunity. HELD: The Court held that Holy See may properly invoke sovereign immunity for its non-suability. As expressed in Sec. 2 Art II of the

1987 Constitution, generally accepted principles of International Law are adopted by our Courts and thus shall form part of the laws of the land as a condition and consequence of our admission in the society of nations.

It was noted in Article 31(A) of the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations that diplomatic envoy shall be granted immunity from civil and administrative jurisdiction of the receiving state over any real action relating to private immovable property. The Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) certified that the Embassy of the Holy See is a duly accredited diplomatic missionary to the Republic of the Philippines and is thus exempted from local jurisdiction and is entitled to the immunity rights of a diplomatic mission or embassy in this Court. Furthermore, it shall be understood that in the case at bar, the petitioner has bought and sold lands in the ordinary course of real estate business, surely, the said transaction can be categorized as an act jure gestionis. However, petitioner has denied that the acquisition and subsequent disposal of the lot were made for profit but claimed that it acquired said property for the site of its mission or the Apostolic Nunciature in the Philippines. The Holy See is immune from suit because the act of selling the lot of concern is non-propriety in nature. The lot was acquired through a donation from the Archdiocese of Manila, not for a commercial purpose, but for the use of petitioner to construct the official place of residence of the Papal Nuncio thereof. The transfer of the property and its subsequent disposal are likewise clothed with a governmental (non-proprietal) character as petitioner sold the lot not for profit or gain rather because it merely cannot evict the squatters living in said property. In view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the complains were dismissed accordingly.

DONALD BAER, Commander U.S. Naval Base, Subic Bay, Olongapo, Zambales, petitioner, vs. HON. TITO V. TIZON, as Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Bataan, and EDGARDO GENER, respondents. FACTS Respondent Edgardo Gener filed a complaint for injunction against Donald Baer, Commander of the United States Naval Base in Olongapo. He alleged that he was engaged in the business of and that the American Naval Base authorities stopped his logging operations. He prayed for a writ of preliminary injunction restraining petitioner from interfering with his logging operations. A restraining order was issued by respondent Judge. Counsel for petitioner, upon instructions of the American Ambassador to the Philippines, entered their appearance for the purpose of contesting the jurisdiction of respondent Judge on the ground that the suit was one against a foreign sovereign without its consent. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss. It was therein pointed out that he is the chief or head of an agency or instrumentality of the United States of America, with the subject matter of the action being official acts done by him for and in behalf of the United States of America. It was added that in directing the cessation of logging operations by respondent Gener within the Naval Base, petitioner was entirely within the scope of his authority and official duty, the maintenance of the security of the Naval Base and of the installations therein being the first concern and most important duty of the Commander of the Base. An opposition and reply to petitioner's motion to dismiss by respondent Gener was filed, relying on the principle that "a private citizen claiming title and right of possession of certain property may, to recover possession of said property, sue as individuals, officers and agents of the Government, who are said to be illegally withholding the same from him, though in doing so, said officers and agents claim that they are acting for the Government." Petitioner made a written offer of documentary evidence, directing immediate investigation of illegal timber cutting in Bataan and calling attention to the fact that the records of the office show no new renewal of timber license or temporary extension permits. Respondent Judge issued an order granting respondent Gener's application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and denying petitioner's motion to dismiss the opposition to the application for a writ of preliminary injunction. ISSUE

Whether or not the doctrine of immunity from suit without consent is applicable HELD The action against petitioner Donald Baer being against the United States government, and therefore, covered by the principle of state immunity from suit. The solidity of the stand of petitioner is evident. What was sought by private respondent and what was granted by respondent Judge amounted to an interference with the performance of the duties of petitioner in the base area in accordance with the powers possessed by him under the Philippine-American Military Bases Agreement. This point was made clear in these words: "Assuming, for purposes of argument, that the Philippine Government, through the Bureau of Forestry, possesses the "authority to issue a Timber License to cut logs" inside a military base, the Bases Agreement subjects the exercise of rights under a timber license issued by the Philippine Government to the exercise by the United States of its rights, power and authority of control within the bases; and the findings of the Mutual Defense Board, an agency of both the Philippine and United States Governments, that "continued logging operation by Mr. Gener within the boundaries of the U.S. Naval Base would not be consistent with the security and operation of the Base," is conclusive upon the respondent Judge. The doctrine of state immunity is not limited to cases which would result in a pecuniary charge against the sovereign or would require the doing of an affirmative act by it. Prevention of a sovereign from doing an affirmative act pertaining directly and immediately to the most important public function of any government - the defense of the state is equally as untenable as requiring it to do an affirmative act." "It is a widely accepted principle of international law, which is made a part of the law of the land (Article II, Section 3 of the Constitution), that a foreign state may not be brought to suit before the courts of another state or its own courts without its consent."

US vs. Guinto En Banc Cruz, February 26,1990 Topic: Sovereignty - Suits not against the state - Failure to raise immunity as defense Facts: In the 4 consolidated suits, the USA moves to dismiss the cases on the ground that they are in effect suits against it which it has not consented On the first suit: On February 24, 1986, the Western Pacific Contracting Office, Okinawa Area Exchange, US Air Force, solicited bids for barber services contracts through its contracting officer James F. Shaw Among those who submitted their bids were private respondents Roberto T. Valencia, Emerenciana C. Tanglao, and Pablo C. del Pilar Bidding was won by Ramon Dizon over the objection of the private respondents who claimed that he had made a bid for 4 facilities, including the Civil Engineering Area which was not included in the invitation to bid The Philippine Area Exchange (PHAX), through its representatives petitioners Yvonne Reeves and Frederic M. Smouse, upon the private respondents' complaint, explained that the Civil Engineering concession had not been awarded to Dizon But Dizon was alreayd operating this concession, then known as the NCO club concession On June 30, 1986, the private respondents filed a complaint in the court below to compel PHAX and the individual petitioners to cancel the award to Dizon, to conduct a rebidding for the barbershop concessions and to allow the private respondents by a writ of preliminary injunction to continue operating the concessions pending litigation Respondent court directed the individual petitioners to maintain the status quo

On July 22, 1986, the petitioners filed a motion to dismiss and opposition to the petition for preliminary injunction on the ground that the action was in effect a suit against USA which had not waived its non-suability On July 22, 1986, trial court denied the application for a writ of preliminary injunction On Oct. 10, 1988, trial court denied the petitioners' motion to dismiss On the second suit: Fabian Genove filed a complaint for damages against petitioners Anthony Lamachia, Wilfredo Belsa, Rose Cartalla and Peter Orascion for his dismissal as cook in the US Air Force Recreation Center at the John Hay Air Station in Baguio City It had been ascertained that Genove had poured urine into the soup stock used in cooking the vegetables served to the club customers His dismissal was effected on March 5, 1986 by Col. David C. Kimball, Commander of the 3rd Combat Support Group, PACAF Clark Air Force Base Genove filed a complaint in the RTC of Baguio The defendants, joined by the United States of America, moved to dismiss the complaint, alleging that Lamachia (the manager) as an officer of the US Air Force was immune from suit for the acts done by him in his official capacity; they argued that the suit was in effect against USA, which had not given its consent to be sued Motion was denied by respondent judge: although acting intially in their official capacities, the defendants went beyond what their functions called for; this brought them out of the protective mantle of whatever immunities they may have had in the beginning On the third suit: Luis Bautisa, who was employed as a barracks boy in Camp O'Donnell, an extension of Clark Air Base, was arrested following a buy-bust operation conducted by the individual petitioners Tomi J. King, Darrel D. Dye and Stephen F. Bostick, officers of the US Air Force and special agents of the Air Force of Special Investigators (AFOSI)

Bautista was dismissed from his employment as a result of the filing of the charge He then filed a complaint for damages against the individual petitioners, claiming that it was because of their acts that he was removed Defendants alleged that they had only done their duty in the enforcement of laws of the Philippines inside the American bases, pursuant to the RP-US Military Bases Agreement The counsel for the defense invoked that the defendants were acting in their official capacity; that the complaint was in effect a suit against the US without its consent Motion was denied by respondent judge: immunity under the Military Bases Agreement covered only criminal and not civil cases; moreover, the defendants had come under the jurisdiction of the court when they submitted their answer On the fourth suit: Complaint for damages was filed by private respondents against the petitioners (except USA) According to the plaintiffs, the defendants beat them up, handcuffed the, and unleashed dogs on them Defendants deny this and claim that the plaintiffs were arrested for theft and were bitten by dogs because they were struggling and resisting arrest USA and the defendants argued that the suit was in effect a suit against the United States which had not given its consent to be sued; that they were also immune from suit under the RP-US Bases Treaty for acts done by them in the performance of their official functions Motion to dismiss was denied by the trial court: the acts cannot be considered Acts of State, if they were ever admitted by the defendants Issue: Whether or not the suits above are in effect suits against United States of America without its consent

In relation, whether or not the defendants are also immune from suit for acting within their official functions. Holding and Ratio: 1st suit: No. The barbershops concessions are commercial enterprises operated by private persons. They are not agencies of the US Armed forces. Petitioners cannot plead immunity. Case should be remanded to the lower court. 2nd suit: No. The petitioners cannot invoke the doctrine of state immunity. The restaurants are commercial enterprises. By entering into the employment contract with Genove, it impliedly divested itself of its sovereign immunity from suit. (However, the petitioners are only suable, not liable.) 3rd suit: Yes. It is clear that the petitioners were acting in the exercise of their official functions. For discharging their duties as agents of the US, they cannot be directly impleaded for acts attributable to their principal, which has not given its consent to be sued. 4th suit: The contradictory factual allegations deserve a closer study. Inquiry must first be made by the lower court. Only after can it be known in what capacity the petitioners were acting at the time of the incident.

US VS GUINTO February 26, 1990

FACTS: These cases are consolidated because they all involve the doctrine of state immunity. 1) US VS GUINTO (GR No. 76607) The private respondents are suing several officers of the US Air Force in Clark Air Base in connection with the bidding conducted by them for contracts for barber services in the said base which was won by a certain Dizon. The respondents wanted to cancel the award to the bid winner because they claimed that Dizon had included in his bid an area not included in the invitation to bid, and subsequently, to conduct a rebidding.

2}

US VS RODRIGO (GR No 79470)

Genove, employed as a cook in the Main Club at John Hay Station, was dismissed after it had been ascertained in an investigation that he poured urine in the soup stock. Genove filed a complaint for damages against the club manager who was also an officer of USAF. 2) US VS CEBALLOS (GR No 80018) Luis Bautista, a barracks boy in Camp ODonnel, was arrested following a buy-bust operation conducted by petitioners who were USAF officers and special agents of the Air Force Office. A trial ensued where petitioners testified against respondent Bautista. As a result of the charge, Bautista was dismissed from his employment. He then filed for damages against petitioners claiming that because of the latters acts, he was removed from his job. 3) US VS ALARCON VERGARA (GR No 80258) Complaint for damages was filed by private respondents against individual petitioners for injuries allegedly sustained by handcuffing and unleashing dogs on them by the latter. The individual petitioners, US military officers, deny this stressing that the private respondents were arrested for theft but resisted arrest, thus incurring the injuries. In all these cases, the individual petitioners claimed they were just exercising their official functions. The USA was not impleaded in the complaints but has moved to dismiss on the ground that they are in effect suits against it to which it has not consented.

without its consent, which clearly imports that it may be sued if it consents. The consent of the state to be sued may be manifested expressly or impliedly. Express consent may be embodied in a general law or a special law. Consent is implied when the sate enters into a contract or it itself commences litigation. When the government enters into a contract, it is deemed to have descended to the level of the other contracting party and divested itself of its sovereign immunity from suit with its implied consent. Waiver is also implied when the government files a complaint, thus opening itself to a counterclaim. The USA, like any other state, will be deemed to have impliedly waived its non-suability if it has entered into a contract in its proprietary or private capacity. 1) US VS GUINTO (GR No 76607) The court finds the barbershops subject to the concessions granted by the US government to be commercial enterprises operated by private persons. The petitioners cannot plead any immunity from the complaint, the contract in question being decidedly commercial. Thus, the petition is DISMISSED and the lower court directed to proceed with the hearing and decision of the case. 2) US VS RODRIGO (GR No 79470) The restaurant services offered at the John Hay Station operated for profit as a commercial and not a government activity. The petitioners cannot invoke the doctrine of self immunity to justify the dismissal of the damage suit filed by Genove. Not even the US government can claim such immunity because by entering into the employment contract with Geneove in the discharge of its proprietary functions, it impliedly divested itself of its sovereign immunity from suit. Still, the court holds that the complaint against petitioners in the lower court be dismissed. There was nothing arbitrary about the proceedings in the dismissal of Genove, the petitioner acted quite properly in terminating the private respondents employment for his unbelievably nauseating act of polluting the soup stock with urine. 3) US VS CEBALLOS (GR No 80018) It was clear that the individually-named petitioners were acting in the exercise of their official functions when they conducted the buy-bust operation and thereafter testified against

ISSUE: bar? Is the doctrine of state immunity applicable in the cases at

HELD: A state may not be sued without its consent. This doctrine is not absolute and does not say the state may not be sued under any circumstance. The rule says that the state may not be sued

the complainant. For discharging their duties as agents of the United States, thay cannot be directly impleaded for acts imputable to their principal, which has not given its consent to be sued. The conclusion of the trial court that the answer filed by the special counsel of Clark Air Base was a submission of the US government to its jurisdiction is rejected. Express waiver cannot be made by a mere counsel of the government but must be effected through a duly-enacted statute. Neither does it come under the implied form of consent. Thus, the petition is granted and the civil case filed in the lower court dismissed. 4) US VS ALARCON VERGARA (GR No 80258) The contradictory factual allegations in this case need a closer study of what actually happened. The record were too meager to indicate that the defendants were really discharging their official duties or had actually exceeded their authority when the incident occurred. Only after the lower court shall have determined in what capacity the petitioners were acting will the court determine, if still necessary, if the doctrine of state immunity is applicable.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA vs. REYES Petition for Certiorari to Annul & Set Aside RTC Cavite Branch 22 Resolution, 1993 FACTS: Respondent Nelia Montoya, an American Citizen, worked as an ID checker at the US Navy Exchange (NEX) at the US Military Assistance Group (JUSMAG) headquarters in Quezon City. Shes married to Edgardo Montoya, a Filipino-American serviceman employed by the US Navy & stationed in San Francisco. Petitioner Maxine is an American Citizen employed at the JUSMAG headquarters as the activity exchange manager. Jan. 22, 1987 Montoya bought some items from the retail store Bradford managed, where she had purchasing privileges. After shopping & while she was already at the parking lot, Mrs. Yong Kennedy, a fellow ID checker approached her & told her that she needed to search her bags upon Bradfords instruction. Montoya approached Bradford to protest the search but she was told that it was to be made on all JUSMAG employees on that day. Mrs. Kennedy then performed the search on her person, bags & car in front of Bradford & other curious onlookers. Nothing irregular was found thus she was allowed to leave afterwards. Montoya learned that she was the only person subjected to such search that day & she was informed by NEX Security Manager Roynon that NEX JUSMAG employees are not searched outside the store unless there is a strong evidence of a wrong-doing. Montoya cant recall any circumstance that would trigger suspicion of a wrong-doing on her part. She is aware of Bradfords propensity to suspect Filipinos for theft and/or shoplifting. Montoya filed a formal protest w/Mr. Roynon but no action was taken. Montoya filed a suit against Bradford for damages due to the oppressive & discriminatory acts committed by petitioner in excess of her authority as store manager. She claims that she has been exposed to contempt & ridicule causing her undue embarrassment & indignity. She further claims that the act was not motivated by any other reason aside from racial discrimination in our own land

w/c is a blow to our national pride & dignity. She seeks for moral damages of P500k and exemplary damages of P100k. May 13, 1987 Summons & complaint were served on Bradford but instead of filing an answer, she along with USA government filed a motion to dismiss on grounds that: (1) this is a suit against US w/c is a foreign sovereign immune from suit w/o its consent and (2) Bradford is immune from suit for acts done in the performance of her official functions under Phil-US Military Assistance Agreement of 1947 & Military Bases Agreement of 1947. They claim that US has rights, power & authority w/in the bases, necessary for the establishment, use & operation & defense thereof. It will also use facilities & areas w/in bases & will have effective command over the facilities, US personnel, employees, equipment & material. They further claim that checking of purchases at NEX is a routine procedure observed at base retail outlets to protect & safeguard merchandise, cash & equipment pursuant to par. 2 & 4(b) of NAVRESALEACT SUBIC INST. 5500.1. July 6, 1987 Montoya filed a motion for preliminary attachment claiming that Bradford was about to leave the country & was removing & disposing her properties w/intent to defraud her creditors. Motion granted by RTC. July 14, 1987 Montoya opposed Bradfords motion to dismiss. She claims that: (1) search was outside NEX JUSMAG store thus its improper, unlawful & highly-discriminatory and beyond Bradfords authority; (2) due to excess in authority and since her liability is personal, Bradford cant rely on sovereign immunity; (3) Bradfords act was committed outside the military base thus under the jurisdiction of Philippine courts; (4) the Court can inquire into the factual circumstances of case to determine WON Bradford acted w/in or outside her authority. RTC granted Montoyas motion for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment and later on issued writ of attachment opposed by Bradford. Montoya allowed to present evidence & Bradford declared in default for failure to file an answer. RTC ruled in favor of Montoya claiming that search was unreasonable, reckless, oppressive & against Montoyas liberty guaranteed by Consti. She was awarded P300k for moral damages, P100k for exemplary damages & P50k for actual expenses. Bradford filed a Petition for Restraining Order. SC granted TRO enjoining RTC from enforcing decision. Montoya claims that Bradford was acting as a civilian employee thus not performing governmental functions. Even if she were

performing governmental acts, she would still not be covered by the immunity since she was acting outside the scope of her authority. She claims that criminal acts of a public officer/employee are his private acts & he alone is liable for such acts. She believes that this case is under RP courts jurisdiction because act was done outside the territorial control of the US Military Bases, it does not fall under offenses where US has been given right to exercise its jurisdiction and Bradford does not possess diplomatic immunity. She further claims that RP courts can inquire into the factual circumstances & determine WON Bradford is immune. ISSUES/RATIO: 1. WON the case is under the RTCs jurisdiction - YES

Intervention of a third party is discretionary upon the Court. US did not obtain leave of court (something like asking for Courts permission) to intervene in the present case. Technically, it should not be allowed to intervene but since RTC entertained its motion to dismiss, it is deemed to have allowed US to intervene. By voluntarily appearing, US must be deemed to have subjected itself to RTCs jurisdiction. 2. WON RTC committed a grave abuse of discretion in denying Bradfords motion to dismiss. - NO Petitioners failed to specify any grounds for a motion to dismiss enumerated in Sec. 1, Rule 16, Rules of Court. Thus, it actually lacks cause of action. A cause of action is necessary so that Court would be able to render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer in the complaint. A motion to dismiss w/c fails to state a cause of action hypothetically admits the truth of the allegations in the complaint. RTC should have deferred the resolution instead of denying it for lack of merit. But this is immaterial at this time since petitioners have already brought this petition to the SC. 3. WON case at bar is a suit against the State. - NO Doctrine of state immunity is expressed in Art. XVI, Sec. 3 of the 1987 Constitution. This immunity also applies to complaints filed against officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by them in discharge of their duties since it will require the state to perform an affirmative act such as appropriation of amount to pay damages. This will be regarded as a case against the state even if it has not be formally impleaded. But this is not all encompassing. Its a

different matter where the public official is made to account in his capacity as such for acts contrary to law & injurious to rights of plaintiff. State authorizes only legal acts by its officers. Action against officials by one whose rights have been violated by such acts is not a suit against the State w/in the rule of immunity of the State from suit. The doctrine of state immunity cannot be used as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice. It will not apply & may not be invoked where the public official is being sued in his private & personal capacity as an ordinary citizen. This usually arises where the public official acts w/o authority or in excess of the powers vested in him. A public official is liable if he acted w/malice & in bad faith or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction. (Shauf vs. CA) Also, USA vs. Guinto declared that USA is not conferred with blanket immunity for all acts done by it or its agents in the Philippines merely because they have acted as agents of the US in the discharge of their official functions. In this case, Bradford was sued in her private/personal capacity for acts done beyond the scope & place of her official function, thus, it falls w/in the exception to the doctrine of state immunity. 4. WON Bradford enjoys diplomatic immunity. - NO

First of all, she is not among those granted diplomatic immunity under Art. 16(b) of the 1953 Military Assistance Agreement creating the JUSMAG. Second, even diplomatic agents who enjoy immunity are liable if they perform acts outside their official functions (Art. 31, Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations).

office. The purpose of the Torture Convention was to provide that there is no safe haven for torturers. Regina v. Bartle and Commissioner of Police, Ex parte Pinochet Procedural History: Appeal from extradition proceedings. Overview: Pinochet (D) claimed that he was immune from prosecution as a former head of state. The House of Lords (P) considered charges that Pinochet (D), the former head of state of Chile, had violated the Torture Convention. Chile, Spain, and the United Kingdom were all parties to the Torture Convention, which became law on December 8, 1988. Pinochet (D) claimed he was immune as a former head of state under principle of international law. In 1998, a Spanish judge for extradition requested that an English magistrate issue a warrant for the arrest of Pinochet (defendant), the former head of state of Chile. The request for a warrant charged that while head of state, Pinochet conspired with others to take hostage, torture, and kill numerous people, including Spanish citizens. Pinochet was arrested and brought before an English court. However, he argued that he was immune from arrest and could not properly be extradited. The English House of Lords considered Pinochets case twice. After issuing its first judgment, the House of Lords reversed itself on the ground that one of its justices had failed to disclose his affiliation with Amnesty International, an organization that had intervened in the case. In considering the case a second time, the House of Lords ruled on the issue of whether Pinochet could claim immunity, and whether the crimes he allegedly committed could be properly considered crimes under English law. Issue: Is the notion of continued immunity for former heads of state inconsistent with the provisions of the Torture Convention? Rule: the notion of a continued immunity for former head of states is inconsistent with the provisions of the torture conventions. Analysis: The court discussed the common law as well. Under common law, a former head of state enjoys immunity for official acts done while in Outcome: -The notion of continued immunity for former heads of state is inconsistent with the provisions of the Torture Convention. If, as alleged, Pinochet (D) organized and authorized torture after December 8, 1988, he was not acting in any capacity that gives rise to immunity because such conduct was contrary to international law. The torture proceedings should proceed on the allegation that torture in pursuance of a conspiracy to commit torture was being committed by Pinochet (D) after December 1988 when he lost his immunity.

THE WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION and DR. LEONCE VERSTUYFT vs. HON. BENJAMIN H. AQUINO, as Presiding Judge of Branch VIII, Court of First Instance of Rizal Facts: The present petition is an original action for certiorari and prohibition to set aside respondent judge's refusal to quash a search warrant issued by him at the instance of respondents Constabulary Offshore Action Center (COSAC) officers for the search and seizure of the personal effects of Verstuyft of the WHO (World Health Organization) notwithstanding his being entitled to diplomatic immunity, as duly recognized by the Executive branch of the government and to prohibit respondent judge from further proceedings in the matter. The Secretary of Foreign Affairs Carlos P. Romulo pleaded to Hon. Aquino that Dr. Verstuyft is entitled to immunity from search in respect for his personal baggage as accorded to members of diplomatic missions pursuant to the Host Agreement and further requested for the suspension of the search warrant. The Solicitor General accordingly joined the petitioner for the quashal of the search warrant but respondent judge nevertheless summarily denied the quash hence, the petition at bar. Issue: Whether or not personal effect of WHO Officer Dr. Verstuyft can be exempted from search and seizure under the diplomatic immunity. Ruling: The executive branch of the Phils has expressly recognized that Verstuyft is entitled to diplomatic immunity, pursuant to the provisions of the Host Agreement. The DFA formally advised respondent judge of the Philippine Government's official position. The Solicitor General, as principal law officer of the gorvernment, likewise expressly affirmed said petitioner's right to diplomatic immunity and asked for the quashal of the search warrant. The unfortunate fact remains that respondent judge chose to rely on the suspicion of respondents COSAC officers "that the other remaining crates unopened contain contraband items" The provisions of Republic Act 75 declares as null and void writs or processes sued out or prosecuted whereby inter alia the person of

an ambassador or public minister is arrested or imprisoned or his goods or chattels are seized or attached and makes it a penal offense for "every person by whom the same is obtained or prosecuted, whether as party or as attorney, and every officer concerned in executing it" to obtain or enforce such writ or process. The Court, therefore, holds the respondent judge acted without jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion in not ordering the quashal of the search warrant issued by him in disregard of the diplomatic immunity of petitioner Verstuyft. The writs of certiorari and prohibition from the petitioners were granted.

INTERNATIONAL CATHOLIC IMMIGRATION COMMISSION vs. HON. PURA CALLEJA IN HER CAPACITY AS DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS FACTS: As an aftermath of the Vietnam War, the plight of Vietnamese refugees fleeing from South Vietnam's communist rule confronted the international community. In response to this crisis, on 23 February 1981, an Agreement was forged between the Philippine Government and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees whereby an operating center for processing Indo-Chinese refugees for eventual resettlement to other countries was to be established in Bataan . ICMC was one of those accredited by the Philippine Government to operate the refugee processing center in Morong, Bataan. It was incorporated in New York, USA, at the request of the Holy See, as a non-profit agency involved in international humanitarian and voluntary work. It is duly registered with the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and enjoys Consultative Status, Category II. As an international organization rendering voluntary and humanitarian services in the Philippines, its activities are parallel to those of the International Committee for Migration (ICM) and the International Committee of the Red Cross On 14 July 1986, Trade Unions of the Philippines and Allied Services (TUPAS) filed with the then Ministry of Labor and Employment a Petition for Certification Election among the rank and file members employed by ICMC The latter opposed the petition on the ground that it is an international organization registered with the United Nations and, hence, enjoys diplomatic immunity. ISSUE: Whether or not the grant of diplomatic privileges and immunites to ICMC extends to immunity from the application of Philippine labor laws? HELD: The grant of immunity from local jurisdiction to ICMC is clearly necessitated by their international character and respective purposes. The objective is to avoid the danger of partiality and interference by the host country in their internal workings. The

exercise of jurisdiction by the Department of Labor in these instances would defeat the very purpose of immunity, which is to shield the affairs of international organizations, in accordance with international practice, from political pressure or control by the host country to the prejudice of member States of the organization, and to ensure the unhampered performance of their functions ICMC employees are not without recourse whenever there are disputes to be settled. Section 31 of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies of the United Nations 17 provides that "each specialized agency shall make provision for appropriate modes of settlement of: (a) disputes arising out of contracts or other disputes of private character to which the specialized agency is a party." Moreover, pursuant to Article IV of the Memorandum of Agreement between ICMC the the Philippine Government, whenever there is any abuse of privilege by ICMC, the Government is free to withdraw the privileges and immunities accorded. Clauses on jurisdictional immunity are said to be standard provisions in the constitutions of international Organizations. "The immunity covers the organization concerned, its property and its assets. It is equally applicable to proceedings in personam and proceedings in rem. ICMC did not invoke its immunity and, therefore, may be deemed to have waived it, assuming that during that period (1983-1985) it was tacitly recognized as enjoying such immunity. Petition is GRANTED, the Order of the Bureau of Labor Relations for certification election is SET ASIDE, and the Temporary Restraining Order earlier issued is made

EBRO III V NLRC (INTERNATIONAL CATHOLIC MIGRATION COMMISSION) MENDOZA; September 4, 1996 NATURE Petition for review on certiorari to set aside the order dated October 13, 1992 and the resolution dated March 3, 1993 of the National Labor Relations Commission. FACTS - Private respondent International Catholic Migration Commission (ICMC) is a non-profit agency engaged in international humanitarian and voluntary work. It is duly registered with the United National Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and enjoys Consultative Status, Category II. It was one of the agencies accredited by the Philippine Government to operate the refugee processing center at Sabang, Morong, Bataan. - On June 24, 1985, private respondent ICMC employed petitioner Jose G. Ebro III to teach "English as a Second Language and Cultural Orientation Training Program" at the refugee processing center. The employment contract provided in pertinent part: Salary: Your monthly salary for the first 6 months probationary period is P3,155.00 inclusive of cost of living allowance. Upon being made regular after successful completion of the six (6) months probationary period your monthly salary will be adjusted to P3,445.00 inclusive of cost of living allowance If either party wishes to terminate employment, a notice of two (2) weeks should be given in writing to the party. - After six months, ICMC notified petitioner that effective December 21, 1985, the latter's services were terminated for his failure to meet the requirements of "1. classroom performance . . . up to the standards set in the Guide for Instruction; 2. regular attendance in the mandated teacher training, and in the schedule team meetings, one-on-one conferences with the supervisor, etc.; and 3. compliance with ICMC and PRPC policies and procedures." - On February 4, 1986, petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, unfair labor practice, underpayment of wages, accrued

leave pay, 14th month pay, damages, attorney's fees, and expenses of litigation. Petitioner alleged that there was no objective evaluation of his performance to warrant his dismissal and that he should have been considered a regular employee from the start because ICMC failed to acquaint him with the standards under which he must qualify as such. He prayed for reinstatement with backwages; P3,155.00 for probationary and P3,445.00 for regular salary adjustments; value of lodging or dormitory privileges; cost of insurance coverage for group life, medical, death, dismemberment and disability benefits; moral, and exemplary, and nominal damages plus interest on the above claims with attorney's fees. - Answering the complaint, ICMC claimed that petitioner failed to quality for regular employment because he showed no interest in improving his professional performance both in and out of the classroom after he had been periodically evaluated; that petitioner was paid his salary up to December 31, 1985, two weeks pay in lieu of notice, and 14th month pay pro-rata; and that his accrued leave balance already been converted to cash. - After the parties had formally offered their evidence, private respondents submitted their memorandum on July 31, 1989 in which, among other things, they invoked ICMC's diplomatic immunity on the basis of the Memorandum of Agreement signed on July 15, 1988 between the Philippines government and ICMC. - The Labor Arbiter held that ICMC's legal immunity under the Memorandum could not be given retroactive effect since "[that would] deprive complainant's property right without due process and impair the obligation of contract of employment." He also expressed doubt on the ground that it was provided for by agreement and not through an act of Congress. Accordingly, the Labor Arbiter ordered ICMC to reinstate petitioner as regular teacher without loss of seniority rights and to pay him one year backwages, other benefits, and ten percent attorney's fees for a total sum of P70,944.85. - Both parties appealed to the NLRC. On August 13, 1990, petitioner moved to dismiss private respondent's appeal because of the latter's failure to post a cash/surety bond. In its order of October 13, 1992, however, the NLRC ordered the case dismissed on the ground that, under the Memorandum of Agreement between the Philippine government and ICMC, the latter was immune from suit. ISSUE

WON the Memorandum of Agreement executed on July 15, 1988 granted ICMC immunity from suit HELD YES Ratio The grant of immunity from local jurisdiction to ICMC . . . is clearly necessitated by their international character and respective purposes. The objective is to avoid the danger of partiality and interference by the host country in their internal workings. The exercise of jurisdiction by the Department of Labor in these instances would defeat the very purpose of immunity, which is to shield the affairs of international organizations, in accordance with international practice, from political pressure or control by the host country to the prejudice of member State of the organization, and to ensure the unhampered performance of their functions. (International Catholic Migration Commission v. Calleja) Reasoning - The grant of immunity to ICMC is in virtue of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of Specialized Agencies of the United Nations, adopted by the UN General Assembly on November 21, 1947, and concurred in by the Philippine Senate on May 17, 1949. This Convention has the force and effect of law, considering that under the Constitution, the Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land. - The scope of immunity of the ICMC contained in the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies of the United Nations is instructive. Art. III, 4 of the Convention provides for immunity from "every form of legal process." Thus, even if private respondents had been served summons and subpoenas prior to the execution of the Memorandum, they, as officers of ICMC, can claim immunity under the same in order to prevent enforcement of an adverse judgment, since a writ of execution is "a legal process" within the meaning of Article III, 4. - Art III 4 of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies of the United Nations requires that the waiver of the privilege must be express. There was no such waiver of immunity in this case. Nor can ICMC be estopped from claiming diplomatic immunity since estoppel does not operate to confer jurisdiction to a tribunal that has none over a cause of action.

- Finally, neither can it be said that recognition of ICMC's immunity from suit deprives petitioner of due process. As pointed out in ICMC v. Calleja, petitioner is not exactly without remedy for whatever violation of rights it may have suffered for the following reason: Section 31 of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies of the United Nations provides that "each specialized agency shall make provision for appropriate modes of settlement of: (a) disputes arising out of contracts or other disputes of private character to which the specialized agency is a party." Moreover, pursuant to Article IV of the Memorandum of Agreement between ICMC and the Philippine Government, whenever there is any abuse of privilege by ICMC, the Government is free to withdraw the privileges and immunities accorded. Disposition Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

impliedly, if not expressly, waived its immunity by belatedly raising the issue of jurisdiction. SOUTHEAST ASIAN FISHERIES DEVELOPMENT CENTER represented by its Chief, DR. FLOR J. LACANILAO, petitioner, vs. DANILO ACOSTA in his capacity as Labor Arbiter of the National Labor Relations Commission, Regional Arbitration, Branch VI, CORAZON CANTO, DAN BALIAO, ELIZABETH SUPETRAN, CARMELITA FERRER, CATHRYN CONTRADOR, and DORIC VELOSO, respondents. VITUG, J.: This is an original petition for certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer for the issuance of a restraining order, to set aside the order of respondent labor arbiter, dated 20 September 1990, denying herein petitioner's motion to dismiss the cases subject matter of the petition for lack of jurisdiction. Two labor cases, docketed as RAB Case No. VI- 0156-86 and RAB case No. VI - 0214-86, were filed by the herein private respondents against the petitioner, Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center (SEAFDEC), before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), Regional Arbitration Branch, Iloilo City. In these cases, the private respondents claim having been wrongfully terminated from their employment by the petitioner. On 22 August 1990, the petitioner, contending to be an international inter-government organization, composed of various Southeast Asian countries, filed a Motion to Dismiss, challenging the jurisdiction of the public respondent in taking cognizance of the above cases. On 20 September 1990, the public respondent issued the assailed order denying the Motion to Dismiss. In due course, a Motion for Reconsideration was interposed but the same, in an order, dated 07 January 1991, was likewise denied. Hence, the instant petition. This Court, on 20 March 1991, issued the temporary restraining order prayed for. The private respondents, as well as respondent labor arbiter, allege that the petitioner is not immune from suit and assuming that if, indeed, it is an international organization, it has, however, The Solicitor General, on his part, filed a Manifestation and Motion, which the Court granted, praying that he be excused from filing his comment for respondent Labor Arbiter, he not being in agreement with the latter's position on this matter. On 30 March 1992, this Court dismissed the instant petition in a resolution which reads: . . . Considering the allegations, issues and arguments adduced in the petition for certiorari as well as the separate comments thereon of the public and private respondents, and the consolidated reply thereto of the petitioner, the Court RESOLVED to dismiss the petition for failure to sufficiently show that the questioned judgment is tainted with grave abuse of discretion. The temporary restraining order issued on March 20, 1991 is hereby LIFTED effective immediately. In time, the petitioner moved for a reconsideration, arguing that the ground for its seeking the allowance of the petition is the labor arbiter's lack of jurisdiction over the dispute. The court is now asked to rule upon the motion for reconsideration. We rule for the petitioner. It is beyond question that petitioner SEAFDEC is an international agency enjoying diplomatic immunity. This, we have already held in Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center-Aquaculture Department vs. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 86773, 206 SCRA 283/1992; see also Lacanilao v. de Leon, G.R. No. 76532, 147 SCRA, 286/1987/, where we said Petitioner Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center-Aquaculture Department (SEAFDEC-AQD) is an international agency beyond the jurisdiction of public respondent NLRC.

It was established by the Governments of Burma, Kingdom of Cambodia, Republic of Indonesia, Japan, Kingdom of Laos, Malaysia, Republic of the Philippines, Republic of Singapore, Kingdom of Thailand and Republic of Vietnam . . . . The Republic of the Philippines became a signatory to the Agreement establishing SEAFDEC on January 16, 1968. Its purpose is as follows: The purpose of the Center is to contribute to the promotion of the fisheries development in Southeast Asia by mutual co-operation among the member governments of the Center, hereinafter called the 'Members', and through collaboration with international organizations and governments external to the Center. (Agreement Establishing the SEAFDEC, Art. 1; . . .). SEAFDEC-AQD was organized during the Sixth Council Meeting of SEAFDEC on July 3-7, 1973 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia as one of the principal departments of SEAFDEC. . . . to be established in Iloilo for the promotion of research in aquaculture. Paragraph 1, Article 6 of the Agreement establishing mandates: 1. The Council shall be the supreme organ of the Center and all powers of the Center shall be vested in the Council. Being an intergovernmental organization, SEAFDEC including its Departments (AQD), enjoys functional independence and freedom from control of the state in whose territory its office is located. As Senator Jovito R. Salonga and Former Chief Justice Pedro L. Yap stated in their book, Public International Law (p. 83,1956 ed.):

Permanent international commissions and administrative bodies have been created by the agreement of a considerable number of States for a variety of international purposes, economic or social and mainly nonpolitical. Among the notable instances are the International Labor Organization, the International Institute of Agriculture, the International Danube Commission. In so far as they are autonomous and beyond the control of any one State, they have a distinct juridical personality independent of the municipal law of the State where they are situated. As such, according to one leading authority they must be deemed to possess a species of international personality of their own. (Salonga and Yap, Public International Law, 83 [1956 ed.] Pursuant to its being a signatory to the Agreement, the Republic of the Philippines agreed to be represented by one Director in governing SEAFDEC Council (Agreement Establishing SEAFDEC, Art. 5, Par. 1,. . .), and that its national laws and regulations shall apply only insofar as its contributions to SEAFDEC of "an agreed amount of money, movable and immovable property and services necessary for the establishment and operation of the Center" are concerned (Art. 11, ibid). It expressly waived the application of the Philippine laws on the disbursement of funds of petitioner SEAFDEC-AQD (Section 2, P.D. No. 292). The then Minister of Justice likewise opined that Philippine Courts have no jurisdiction over SEAFDECAQD in Opinion No. 139, Series of 1984 4. One of the basic immunities of an international organization is immunity from local jurisdiction, i.e., that it is immune from the legal writs and processes issued by the tribunals of the country where it is

found. (See Jenks, Id., pp. 37-44). The obvious reason for this is that the subjection of such an organization to the authority of the local courts would afford a convenient medium thru which the host government may interfere in their operations or even influence or control its policies and decisions of the organization; besides, such objection to local jurisdiction would impair the capacity of such body to discharge its responsibilities impartially on behalf of its memberstates. In the case at bar, for instance, the entertainment by the National Labor Relations Commission of Mr. Madamba's reinstatement cases would amount to interference by the Philippine Government in the management decisions of the SEARCA governing board; even worse, it could compromise the desired impartiality of the organization since it will have to suit its actuations to the requirements of Philippine law, which may not necessarily coincide with the interests of the other member-states. It is precisely to forestall these possibilities that in cases where the extent of the immunity is specified in the enabling instruments of international organizations (jurisdictional immunity, is specified in the enabling instruments of international organizations), jurisdictional immunity from the host country is invariably among the first accorded. (See Jenks, Id.; See Bowett. The Law of International Institutions. pp. 284-285). At its Sixth Meeting held at Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, on 3 to 7 July 1973, the SEAFDEC Council approved the formal establishment of its Aquaculture Department in the province of Iloilo, Philippines, to promote research in Aquaculture as so expressed in the "Whereas" Clauses of Presidential Decree No. 292 issued on 13 September 1973 1. Furthermore, Section 2 of the same decree had provided for the autonomous character of SEAFDEC, thus: . . . .All funds received by the Department shall be receipted and disbursed in accordance with the Agreement establishing the Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center and pertinent resolutions duly approved by the SEAFDEC Council. As aptly pointed out by Associate Justice Isagani Cruz of this Court

Certain administrative bodies created by agreement among states may be vested with international personality when two conditions concur, to wit:, that their purposes are mainly non-political and that they are autonomous,i.e., not subject to the control of any state. 2 Anent the issue of waiver of immunity, suffice it to say at the moment that the petitioner has timely raised the issue of jurisdiction. While the petitioner did not question the public respondent's lack of jurisdiction at the early stages of the proceedings, it, nevertheless, did so before it rested its case and certainly well before the proceedings thereat had terminated. WHEREFORE, our resolution, dated 30 March 1992, dismissing the petition for certiorari, is hereby reconsidered, and another is entered (a) granting due course to the petition; (b) setting aside the order, dated 20 September 1990, of the public respondent; and (c) enjoining the public respondent from further proceeding with RAB Case No. VI-0156-86 and RAB Case No. VI-0214-86. No costs. SO ORDERED.

Department of Foreign Affairs vs. NLRC (G.R. No. 113191) (G.R. No. 113191, 18 September 1996; J. VITUG, Ponente; First Division) Facts: A complaint for illegal dismissal was filed against the Asian Development Bank ("ADB"). Upon receipt of summonses, both the ADB and the DFA notified the Labor Arbiter that the ADB, as well as its President and Officers, were covered by an immunity from legal process except for borrowings, guaranties or the sale of securities pursuant to Article 50(1) and Article 55 of the Agreement Establishing the Asian Development Bank (the "Charter") in relation to Section 5 and Section 44 of the Agreement Between The Bank And The Government Of The Philippines Regarding The Bank's Headquarters (the "Headquarters Agreement"). The Labor Arbiter took cognizance of the complaint on the impression that the ADB had waived its diplomatic immunity from suit, and issued a judgment in favor of the complainant. The ADB did not file an appeal, but the DFA sought a nullification with the NLRC. The latter denied the request. Issue: Whether or not ADB is immune from suit? Ruling: No. Under the Charter and Headquarters Agreement, the ADB enjoys immunity from legal process of every form, except in the specified cases of borrowing and guarantee operations, as well as the purchase, sale and underwriting of securities. The Banks officers, on their part, enjoy immunity in respect of all acts performed by them in their official capacity. The Charter and the Headquarters Agreement granting these immunities and privileges are treaty covenants and commitments voluntarily assumed by the Philippine government which must be respected. Being an international organization that has been extended a diplomatic status, the ADB is independent of the municipal law. One of the basic immunities of an international organization is immunity from local jurisdiction, i.e., that it is immune from the legal writs and processes issued by the tribunals of the country where it is found. The obvious reason for this is that the subjection of such an organization to the authority of the local courts would afford a convenient medium thru which the host government may interfere in their operations or even influence or control its policies and decisions of the organization; besides, such subjection to local

jurisdiction would impair the capacity of such body to discharge its responsibilities impartially on behalf of its member-states." The ADB didn't descend to the level of an ordinary party to a commercial transaction, which should have constituted a waiver of its immunity from suit, by entering into service contracts with different private companies. There are two conflicting concepts of sovereign immunity, each widely held and firmly established. According to the classical or absolute theory, a sovereign cannot, without its consent, be made a respondent in the Courts of another sovereign. According to the newer or restrictive theory, the immunity of the sovereign is recognized only with regard to public acts or acts jure imperii of a state, but not with regard to private act or acts jure gestionis. Certainly, the mere entering into a contract by a foreign state with a private party cannot be the ultimate test. Such an act can only be the start of the inquiry. The logical question is whether the foreign state is engaged in the activity in the regular course of business. If the foreign state is not engaged regularly in a business or trade, the particular act or transaction must then be tested by its nature. If the act is in pursuit of a sovereign activity, or an incident thereof, then it is an act jure imperii, especially when it is not undertaken for gain or profit. The service contracts referred to by private respondent have not been intended by the ADB for profit or gain but are official acts over which a waiver of immunity would not attach. Issue: Whether or not the DFA has the legal standing to file the present petition? Ruling: The DFA's function includes, among its other mandates, the determination of persons and institutions covered by diplomatic immunities, a determination which, when challenged, entitles it to seek relief from the court so as not to seriously impair the conduct of the country's foreign relations. The DFA must be allowed to plead its case whenever necessary or advisable to enable it to help keep the credibility of the Philippine government before the international community. When international agreements are concluded, the parties thereto are deemed to have likewise accepted the responsibility of seeing to it that their agreements are duly regarded. In our country, this task falls principally on the DFA as being the highest executive department with the competence and authority to so act in this aspect of the

LIANG v. PEOPLE [323 SCRA 652 (2000)] November 10, 2010 Facts: Petitioner is an economist for ADB who was charged by the Metropolitan TC of Mandaluyong City for allegedly uttering defamatory words against her fellow worker w/ 2 counts of grave oral defamation. MeTC judge then received an office of protocol from the Department of Foreign Affairs, stating that petitioner is covered by immunity from legal process under section 45 of the agreement bet ADB & the govt. MeTC judge, w/o notice, dismissed the two criminal cases. Prosecution filed writ of mandamus & certiorari and ordered the MeTC to enforce the warrant of arrest. Issues: WON the petitioner is covered by immunity under the agreement and that no preliminary investigation was held before the criminal cases were filed in court. Ratio: He is not covered by immunity because the commission of a crime is part of the performance of official duty. Courts cannot blindly adhere and take on its face the communication from the DFA that a certain person is covered by immunity. That a person is covered by immunity is preliminary. Due process is right of the accused as much as the prosecution. Slandering a person is not covered by the agreement because our laws do not allow the commission of a crime such as defamation in the name of official duty. Under Vienna convention on Diplomatic Relations, commission of a crime is not part of official duty. On the contention that there was no preliminary investigation conducted, suffice it to say that preliminary investigation isnt a matter of right in cases cognizable by the MeTC such as the one at bar. Being purely a statutory right, preliminary investigation may be invoked only when specifically granted by law. The rule on criminal procedure is clear than no preliminary investigation is required in cases falling w/in the jurisdiction of the MeTC. Besides, the absence of preliminary investigation doesnt affect the courts jurisdiction nor does it impair the validity of the information or otherwise render it defective. Case: JEFFREY LIANG (HUEFENG) v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES (GR 125865) Date: March 26, 2001

Ponente: J. Ynares- Santiago Facts: Two criminal informations for grave oral defamation were filed against Liang, a Chinese national who was employed asan Economist by the Asian Development Bank (ADB), by his secretary Joyce Cabal, before the MeTC Mandaluyong City. The MeTC, acting pursuant to an advice from the DFA that Liang enjoyed immunity from legal processes, dismissed thecriminal informations against him. The RTC Pasig City annulled and set aside the MeTCs dismissal. Hence, Liang filed apetition for review before the SC which was denied ruling that the immunity granted to officers and staff of the ADB is notabsolute; it is limited to acts performed in an official capacity. Hence, the present MR. Issue: WON Liang is immune from suit Held: No. Ratio: The Court found no reason to disturb the earlier decision. The slander of a person, by any stretch, cannot beconsidered as falling within the purview of the immunity granted to ADB officers and personnel. The issue of whether ornot Liangs utterances constituted oral defamation is still for the trial court to determine J. Punos concurring opinion: Liang contends that a determination of a person's diplomatic immunity by the DFA is a political question. It is solely within theprerogative of the executive department and is conclusive upon the courts. Furthermore, the immunity conferred under the ADB Charter and the Headquarters Agreement is absolute. It is designed to safeguard the autonomy and independence ofinternational organizations against interference from any authority external to the organizations. It is necessary to allow suchorganizations to discharge their entrusted functions effectively. The only exception to this immunity is when there is an implied orexpress waiver or when the immunity is expressly limited by statute. The exception allegedly has no application to the case atbar. "It is a recognized principle of international law and under our system of separation of powers that diplomatic immunity is essentially a political question and courts should refuse to look beyond a determination by the executive branch of thegovernment, and where the plea of diplomatic immunity is recognized and affirmed by the executive branch of the governmentas in the case at bar, it is then the duty of the courts to accept the claim of immunity upon appropriate suggestion by theprincipal law officer of the government, the Solicitor General in this case, or other officer acting under his direction. Hence,

inadherence to the settled principle that courts may not so exercise their jurisdiction by seizure and detention of property, as toembarrass the executive arm of the government in conducting foreign relations, it is accepted doctrine that in such cases thejudicial department of the government follows the action of the political branch and will not embarrass the latter by assuming anantagonistic jurisdiction." Liang, a bank official of ADB, is not entitled to diplomatic immunity and hence his immunity is not absolute. Under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, a diplomatic envoy is immune from criminal jurisdiction of the receiving State for allacts, whether private or official, and hence he cannot be arrested, prosecuted and punished for any offense he may commit,unless his diplomatic immunity is waived. On the other hand, officials of international organizations enjoy "functional" immunities,that is, only those necessary for the exercise of the functions of the organization and the fulfillment of its purposes. This is thereason why the ADB Charter and Headquarters Agreement explicitly grant immunity from legal process to bank officers andemployees only with respect to acts performed by them in their official capacity, except when the Bank waives immunity. In otherwords, officials and employees of the ADB are subject to the jurisdiction of the local courts for their private acts, notwithstandingthe absence of a waiver of immunity. Liang cannot also seek relief under the mantle of "immunity from every form of legal process" accorded to ADB as aninternational organization. The immunity of ADB is absolute whereas the immunity of its officials and employees is restrictedonly to official acts. He stands charged of grave slander for allegedly uttering defamatory remarks against his secretary. Considering that the immunity accorded to petitioner is limited only to acts performed in his official capacity, it becomesnecessary to make a factual determination of whether or not the defamatory utterances were made pursuant and in relation tohis official functions as a senior economist.