Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 1987, Vol. 52, No.

6, 1087-1098

Copyright 1987 by the American Psychological Association, Inc. 0022-.*5l4/87/$00.'75

Salient Private Audiences and Awareness of the Self

Mark W. Baldwin Clarke Institute of Psychiatry, Toronto, Ontario, Canada

John G. Holmes
University of Waterloo, Ontario, Canada

We used self-awareness and cognitive priming methodologies to test the hypothesis that important aspects of the experience of self derive from the way one would be perceived and responded to by a private audience of internally represented significant others. In the first study, 40 undergraduate women visualized the faces of either two acquaintances from campus or two older members of their own family. Later, when they rated the enjoyableness of a sexually permissive piece of fiction, they tended to respond in ways that would be acceptable to their salient private audience. There was some evidence that this effect was especially pronounced for subjects made self-aware by the presence of a small mirror, whose responsivity to self-image concerns was presumably heightened. In the second study, 60 undergraduate men were exposed to a failure experience, and their resulting self-evaluations were assessed. Self-aware subjects' responses reflected the evaluative style of a recently visualized private audience. Strong negative self-evaluative reactions on a number of measures were evident when the salient audience tended to make acceptance contingent on successful performances, but not when the audience manifested relatively noncontingent acceptance. These results demonstrate the influence of internally represented significant relationships on the experience of self.

A unique aspect of human cognition is the ability of people to be aware of themselves, develop theories about who they are, and evaluate those self-images. Many models have been proposed from diverse theoretical perspectives, identifying factors that shape the self-evaluation process and the related cycle of behavioral self-regulation. One idea that has formed the cornerstone of a number of approaches is that a person's experience of self often takes the form of imagining how the self would be perceived and responded to by significant other people. This idea is most prevalent in the writings of the symbolic interactionists (e.g., Cooley's, 1902, looking-glass self; Mead's, 1934, generalized other), but it is also central to diverse other theories (cf. Sullivan's, 1940, reflected appraisals; Kohut's, 1984, selfobjects; Higgins, Klein, & Strauman's, 1985, standpoints on the self; reference-group theory, e.g., Kelley, 1952, Shibutani, 1955; impression management theory, e.g., Goffman, 1959, Schlen-

ker,

1980,

1985; object relations theory, e.g..

Eagle,

1984,

Greenberg & Mitchell, 1983, Guntrip, 1961, 1971). The common ground shared by these models is the proposition that the self is ultimately a social construction, developed and maintained via inference from experiences with others. A sense of self is experienced in relation to some audience, whether it be of people who are present or only imagined, specific or generalized, actual or fantasized. Some perspectives (e.g., impression management) focus discussion on the public aspects of self observable to actual other people in the immediate environment. Most other writers (including some impression management theorists, e.g., Schlenker, 1985) also stress the important influence of internally represented audiences. Our research is concerned primarily with the impact of such internal referents. For the sake of convenience, we will refer to these representations of others as a private audience. One major domain of self-construal, which is the focus of this work, concerns issues of evaluation. The particular standards of comparison used in the self-evaluation process (e.g., ideals,

This research was supported by Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada doctoral and postdoctoral fellowships to Mark W. Baldwin and was the basis for his doctoral dissertation at the University of Waterloo. Some of the data reported in this article were presented at the June 1984 meeting of the Canadian Psychological Association, Ottawa, Ontario, and at the August 1984 meeting of the American Psychological Association, Toronto, Ontario. We would like to thank Janet Hunt for serving as an experimenter in Study 2. Michael Ross and Mark Zanna for valuable conversations during the earlier phases of the research, and Aaron Brower, Nancy Cantor, John Ellard, Eric Lang, Mary Miller, Paula Niedenthal, Julie Norem, Carolin Showers, and an anonymous reviewer for their helpful comments on drafts of the article. Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Mark W. Baldwin, Cognitive and Behavioural Therapies Unit, Clarke Institute of Psychiatry, 250 College Street, Toronto, Ontario, Canada M5T 1R8.

values, norms), as well as the more general style of evaluation (e.g., a vulnerability to basing global inferences and emotional reactions on single behavioral outcomes), may reflect audience. The actual process whereby the experience of self is shaped through reference to a private audience may take a range of forms. Self-perception and self-evaluation may often involve a deliberate process of consciously imagining the reactions of significant others (e.g., Cooley, 1902). At other times, private-audience dynamics may be quite unconscious: Self-relevant information may simply be processed and elaborated according to emotional and cognitive structures representing how such information would be dealt with in those significant relationships (e.g., Greenberg & Mitchell, 1983). As a general statement of the evaluative standards and styles associated with some private

1087

1088

MARK W. BALDWIN AND JOHN G. HOLMES to more general conclusions about the self may be shaped by structures representing how self-relevant information would be dealt with in significant relationships. Our approach for studying the effects of private audiences is based on the common observation that most people respond at different times to a range of different significant others, often representing quite distinct ways of evaluating the self (Alexander & Lauderdale, 1977; James, 1925; McGuire & PadawerSinger, 1976). When evaluating the self, a person's private audience might include spouse, best friend, or family; it might include religious leaders or business colleagues. We expect that the audience that shapes the experience of self will often be the one that is most salient or cognitively accessible (Bruner. 1957) at the time. However, this influence need not be a conscious one. Research in social cognition (Bargh, 1982; Higgms & King, 1981;Srull&Wyer, 1979,1980) has shown that it is possible to activate or prime categories for interpreting various types of social information apparently without provoking an awareness of the process itself. We sought to apply this principle to an interest in cognitive representations of information about relationships. In the two studies to be reported, a guided visualization technique was used to prime certain types of private audiences, and then self-evaluative dynamics expected to reflect the influence of the salient audience were assessed.

the social construction of self, we hypothesize that important aspects of the experience of self derive from the way one would be perceived and responded to by a private audience of significant others. A second point of general agreement among the writers reviewed earlier is the observation that experiencing self in relation to a private audience can have motivational consequences leading to the self-regulation of behavior. It is generally held that people want to retain some sense that they are accepted by their significant others and so are motivated to act in ways that would engender acceptance in that relationship. However, the hypothesized basis for this desire for acceptance varies greatly across different models. Some approaches, focusing on public aspects of self, hold that it derives from the realization that many resources can be attained through acceptance and recognition by other people (eg., Shibutani, 1955). Other writers suggest that the need for acceptance has its roots in the interpersonal dependency of early childhood, as the child jearas that anxieties and fears can often be relieved by calling up a mental representation of an accepting, supportive significant other (Mahler, Pine, & Bergman, 1975; Sullivan, 1953). To abstract a general principle from these divergent perspectives, we posit that people are often motivated to maintain a sense of being accepted by their private audience of significant others. Our intention with the private-audience notion is not to introduce a new concept into the psychological literature but rather to articulate testable hypotheses from some particularly valuable aspects of a number of recognized theories. Many of these theories of self have been outside the realms of experimental social psychology, however, and they provide few guidelines for translating the ideas into concrete research strategies. To gain some leverage on the problem, we turned to the research literature on objective self-awareness (Duval & Wicklund, 1972; Wicklund & Frey, 1980). More than a decade of research has demonstrated that if individuals' momentary awareness of self is heightened by including in the environment a stimulus that is self-symbolic in some way, individuals typically engage in more self-evaluation and increase efforts to regulate their behavior in ways that maintain a self-image consistent with their attitudes, moral values, and standards of achievement (Wicklund, 1975, 1982). Self-awareness research strategies thus provide a methodology for activating individuals' self-relevant goals and concerns (Carver & Scheier, 1981; Hull & Levy, 1979; Scheier & Carver, I983a). Using self-awareness procedures to initiate self-evaluation would seem a promising approach for investigating how the self-evaluation process is shaped by private audiences. The role of significant relationships in determining standards and evaluative styles, however, has not been a major focus in studies of self-awareness. Much progress has been made by concentrating on the general process of self-regulation and largely avoiding the thorny issues concerning the interpersonal sources of the parameters of evaluation. In our first experiment, we sought to test whether the particular ideals and self-image concerns entering into the self-evaluation process might derive from cognitive structures representing relationships with significant others. In the second study, we examined reactions to a failure experience to assess whether the inferential rules linking specific outcomes

Study 1 Our first objective was to test the basic premise that the standards used by self-aware individuals often derive from salient private audiences. Research has already supported the notion that the behavior of individuals who focus on publicly observable self-aspects tends to conform to the evaluative standards of an audience of onlookers (see Scheier & Carver, 1983b, for a review). There seems to be an increased impact, when individuals are acutely aware of the public self, of the evaluative tendencies of others in the environment (Fenigstein, 1979). In contrast, individuals who instead focus on private aspects of self are observed to respond to internal sources of evaluative standards rather than to the demands of public audiences (e.g., Froming, Walker, & Lopyan, 1982). The goal of the first study was to extend the analysis of audience processes to the more self-definitional, private aspects of self as well and to examine whether personal standards might be influenced by internally represented audiences (cf. Diener & Srull, 1979; Wicklund, 1982). The hypothesis was that subjects, particularly when privately self-aware, would be responsive to evaluative standards linked to some private audience. Guided visualizations were used to prime selected private audiences to see whether this might highlight the evaluative standards associated with those representations. Undergraduate women were asked to indicate their enjoyment of a sexually permissive piece of fiction (cf. Gibbons, 1978) after a subtle manipulation in a separate context that primed either a presumably permissive private audience (campus friends) or a comparatively conservative one (older family members). These two audiences were used because they were expected to be emotionally significant but would represent di-

PRIVATE AUDIENCES AND SELF-AWARENESS vergent values and standards (Fisher, Miller, Byrne, & White, 1980;Newcomb, 1943; Wicklund & Frey, 1980). As the purpose of the study was to determine whether selfevaluative standards would derive from a salient private audience, the priming manipulation was designed to facilitate a vivid experience of the person imagined while avoiding any direct reference to beliefs, attitudes, or values. Theoretically, it was not desirable explicitly to force the subjects to consider the attitudes of their audience (cf. Carver & Humphries, 1981; Charters & Newcomb, 1952; Wicklund &Duval, 1971). Rather, we simply wanted the target audience to be cognitively accessible when self-aware subjects responded to the stimulus materials. The thrust of previous research is that the opinions expressed by self-focused individuals will closely mirror personal attitudes and standards relevant to their self-image (Carver & Scheier, 1981). We predicted that beyond responding to their general system of values, subjects would tend to rate the sexual passage in a way that would be acceptable to the particular private audience that had been primed. Responsivity to the private audience was expected to be especially evident for subjects who were made self-aware by the presence of a mirror, a manipulation that has been shown reliably to increase awareness of private self-aspects (Framing etal., 1982; Scheier & Carver, 1980).

1089

asked if, duringa break in the study, they would mind helping out someone else who needed people to fill out some questionnaires for her study. All subjects agreed to this request. The second (female) experimenter presented her studv js an investigation into what factors make written passages interesting and enjoyable, saying that the students would be asked to read some short excerpts and to answer some questions about them. Subjects were then escorted to the second laboratory, which contained four cubicles arranged around a control area. Each was assigned to a cubicle. In order to manipulate self-awareness, two of the four cubicles contained a small mirror (16 in. X 12 in., or 40.5 cm X 30.5 cm) facing the subject, positioned above the slot through which materials were passed. A number of steps were taken to reduce possible confounding variables. Each experimenter was blind to the subject's condition in the other half of the study. To diminish possible suspicion about the mirrors, the room was described as a communal laborator> and small explanatory signs were attached to the mirrors ("Please do not disturb equipment. Perception experiment No. 1703. Dr. Ci. Zilstein"). Also, the second study was conducted by a second experimenter in a different room, with materials printed in a different typeface. In debriefing, therewas no evidence that subjects were aware of the actual purpose of the procedures. After they read and responded to a filler article about a nearby conservation area, subjects were given the second passage, which was the critical one for the study. This was a sexually permissive piece of fiction, borrowed from a popular women's magazine, depicting a woman having a sexual dream about a man she was attracted to. The passage was se-

Method Subjects
Subjects were 40 undergraduate women enrolled in an introductory psychology course at the University of Waterloo. Participation in the study entitled them to course credits. Random assignment to condition was done before the subjects' arrival. The first part of the study was conducted by a male experimenter in sessions involving 1 to 4 persons.

lected to represent a permissive approach to sexuality without being overly erotic or risque. After 150s, enough time to read the piece carefully, subjects were passed questions similar to those used for the first passage. They were asked to rate on 7-point scales how exciting, clear. enjoyable, well-written, pleasurable, and of what qualitv the passage was. Half of these questions were measures of how much they liked the passage, which was expected to be affected by the private-audience manipulation, and half asked for an evaluation of the quality of the writing style, which was expected to be a dimension not affected by the treatment condition. These questions came roughly 10 minutes after the visualization of the private audience. Following some simple filler questions ostensibly assessing their recall of the story, subjects responded to a set of more general attitude measures. They were asked to report their attitude toward premarital sex on the following 7-point scales: bad-good, unacceptable-very acceptable, and not desirable-very desirable. Subjects in the mirror condition were exposed to their mirror image throughout the time allotted for reading the passage and responding to the questionnaire. All subjects were then debriefed and thanked for their participation.

Procedure
Subjects were firsl informed that the study involved "visualization" and that they would be asked to try to picture in their minds various scenes, people, and situations and later to discuss their visualizations. By printed instructions, half the subjects were confidentially told to think of two people they knew from campus, and the other half were told to select two older members of their family. This served as the manipulation of private audience. They were instructed to sit back, relax, and try to get a visual image in their mind of the people chosen. Subjects' visualizations were guided by the experimenter, who read the following instructions to help them develop their images (instructions were read verbatim, once for each target person selected; ellipsis points represent a pause of approximately 5 s): Focus your attention on this person. . . . Picture the person's face. Really try to get an experience of the person being with you. . . . You may want to remember a time you were actually with the person, or you may already have a clear experience of what this person is like.. . . Just try to get a good image of this person. You may find that you can see the color of their eyes or hair, or maybe hear their voice. . . . Imagine that this person is right there with you. . . Now once you "have an image of the person, try to zoom in and get a close-up, focused impression.. . . Hold this image for a little while.. . . Imagine talking with the person.. . . Try to feel them there with you. After a short discussion about the vividness of the various images and the helpfulness of instructions (to support the cover story), subjects were

Results
The major dependent variable was how much the subjects reported liking the sexually permissive passage. The three measures of how enjoyable, pleasurable, and exciting the passage was were averaged to give a single score of liking. The average pooled within-cell correlation of these measures was satisfactory, r(38) = .79. This score was analyzed in a 2 (private audience: family members, campus associates) x 2 (sclf-awarcncss: mirror, no mirror) analysis of variance (ANOVA). The only significant effect was a main effect for the private-audience visualization, F(\, 36) - 4.46, p < .05, indicating that subjects who had thought of friends from campus reported liking the story more than did those who thought of older family members (campus associates M = 4.82, family members M - 4.02). Even

1090
Table 1

MARK W. BALDWIN AND JOHN G. HOLMES had recently imagined older members of their family rated the story as significantly less enjoyable than did those who had visualized friends from campus. The subtlety of the manipulation makes this finding all the more provocative. The visualizations Private audience Campus associates
4.97 4.67

Liking of Sexually Permissive Passage by Self-Awareness and Private-Aidience Conditions

Self- awareness Mirror No mirror

Family members
3.90 4.13

did not include any mention of attitudes, values, or standards but were limited to merely imagining being with the individuals and picturing what they looked like. Even so, this minimal priming of relationships with certain significant others was sufficient to affect later behavior. In addition, there was some evidence (in the planned contrasts, although not in the overall interaction) that the influence of salient private audiences held particularly for individuals who were self-aware. Presumably, the presence of a mirror heightened these individuals' responsivity to the self-image implications of their behavior, and because the framing of their self-image was influenced by the evaluative structures of their most salient private audience, they adjusted their behavior to be consistent with that audience's standards. Because our goal was to focus on private self-aspects and private audiences, we chose to use the mirror manipulation, which is generally assumed to increase private self-awareness (Froming et al., 1982). It is perhaps possible that for some reason our subjects, although seated alone in cubicles with mirrors, were also sensitized to concerns of impression management in the public domain, and this might explain the influence of socially derived standards (following the studies reviewed earlier, e.g.. Carver & Humphries, 1981). This seems an unlikely explanation for our study, however, given the lack of precedent in the literature for increased concern with public self-images resulting from similarly private mirror-exposure situations. We suggest instead that the private as well as the public self is ultimately a social self and so is influenced by interpersonal factors. One issue that must be left open to interpretation is the motivational status of these effects. Most such findings have been interpreted in the self-awareness literature as resulting from attempts to maintain consistency with standards related to some desired self-image. We are suggesting that to the extent that these processes are motivated, they may serve a desire for a sense of acceptance by a private audience. Moreover, this perspective can address the emotional distress often experienced around negative self-evaluations, because falling short of standards is associated with rejection by significant others. It may be possible, however, to offer a credible account of these types of findings without assuming any self-evaluation process at all. Hull and Levy (1979), for example, argued from a cognitive perspective that self-awareness may simply enhance the information-processing consequences of self-relevant structures. In our study, this would suggest that subjects responded to an image of self associated with the primed relationship structure, as opposed to being motivated to maintain a position that would be acceptable in the context of that relationship. No measures were included that were aimed specifically at teasing these alternatives apart, and it seems likely that both factors arc involved to some extent. An important question for additional research regards the degree of awareness of private-audience dynamics. During the debriefing after the study, subjects overwhelmingly denied awareness that the audiences that were primed might have had

Note Higher numbers represent more liking, n = 10 per cell.

in a different situation with no direct connection to the earlier experience, and after a time interval of over 10 minutes, the private-audience visualization did have an impact on how subjects responded to the sexually permissive passage. The second hypothesis to be investigated involved possible effects of the mirror manipulation. Past research (e.g.. Framing et al., 1982: Gibbons, 1978) has found that this manipulation of private self-awareness typically leads subjects to be more responsive to privately held attitudes and values. The influence of personal attitudes can be tested in this study by comparing liking ratings of the sexual passage with an averaged composite of subjects' attitudinal ratings toward premarital sex. The correlation between general attitude and ratings of the passage was higher for self-aware subjects, pooled within-cell r(18) = .61, p< .01, compared with r( 18) = . 17, ns, for non-self-aware subjects; however, the comparison was only marginally significant, 2 = 1.51, p = .06 (one-tailed). We hypothesized that the tendency of privately self-aware individuals to regulate their behavior according to internal evaluative guides might induce responsivity to a salient private audience beyond this strong tendency to use their more general system of values as an anchor. Although the Self-Awareness X Private Audience interaction was not significant, individual contrasts were used to investigate directly the impact of different private audiences in the two conditions of self-awareness. In the no-mirror condition, although the means reflect somewhat the effect of the visualization, the contrast did not reach significance, Z(36) = 1.01 (see Table 1). In the mirror condition, however, the contrast was reliable, f(36) = 2.00, p = .03 (one-tailed). As predicted, those subjects who were seated in front of a mirror while reading the passages and filling out the questionnaires were affected by a recent visualization of either campus friends or family members. The results of these contrasts should not be considered a substitute for a significant interaction; however, they certainly do suggest that the hypothesis involving selfawareness warrants further investigation. A number of other measures were included to provide some support for the discriminant validity of these findings. As predicted, analyses of the ratings of the first (filler) passage about the conservation area and of the three measures of the writing style of the critical passage did not yield any significant effects.

Discussion
Subjects' responses to the sexually permissive passage were affected by the manipulation of private audience. Those who

PRIVATE AUDIENCES AND SELF-AWARENESS anything to do with their responses to the passage and frequently expressed surprise that we might entertain such a notion. Indeed, there is evidence that categories can be made more accessible and influence social perception outside the field of conscious awareness (Bargh, 1982). The private audience's influence may occasionally be conscious, however, as evidenced by one woman in the family-member visualization, mirror condition. She spontaneously reported that when she went to respond to the statement "I believe that premarital sex is desirable/undesirable," she found herself carrying on, in fantasy, an intense argument with her mother about which number to circle. It would seem that private-audience influences may function across a range of levels of consciousness, from information processing directed by unconscious cognitive structures representing significant relationships all the way to conscious fantasy experiences.'

1091

examined. Subject's self-evaluative reactions to a failure experience were then assessed with a variety of specific measures that, when taken together, could serve as multiple indicators of a more global evaluative style. Predictions were that self-awareness would lead subjects to evaluate their task performance in a way reflecting the noncontingent or contingently accepting style of their salient private audience.

Method Subjects
Subjects were 60 undergraduate men enrolled in an introductory psychology course at the University of Waterloo. Participation in the study entitled them to course credits. They were run in sessions of I to 4 people by a male experimenter. Random assignment to the six experimental conditions took place before the subjects' arrival.

Study 2 Often when people fail to achieve certain standards of performance, they evaluate themselves negatively and experience some degree of emotional distress. The second study was designed to investigate more directly the self-evaluations people make, particularly following a failure experience. Other research has focused on specific parameters of assigning meaning to outcomes, such as social comparison information (Festinger, 1954) and causal attribution (Weiner, 1974). One might predict that the general style of making such construals (e.g., what outcomes and standards are considered, where responsibility is assigned, what conclusions are drawn) may be shaped by implicational rules associated with particular private audiences. The hypothesis of this study was that the self-evaluative style exhibited by self-aware individuals would reflect the style of their most salient private audience. A key factor in this formulation is the degree to which acceptance by the private audience is experienced as ultimately contingent on meeting certain evaluative standards. Specifically, one will take achievement or morality very seriously if he or she is felt to have implications for acceptance by a significant private audience. When acceptance is linked to the success of one's recent endeavors, an appraisal of failure leaves one with a feeling of rejection by the significant other, possibly recapitulating past emotional experiences with similar features (Bower, 1981). Conversely, noncontingent acceptance has been posited as a hallmark of healthy functioning (cf. Rogers, 1959, "unconditional positive regard"). It is generally assumed that this evaluative style essentially buffers a person from the emotional consequences of failure by diluting its meaning in the broader context of life's events. In Study 2 a visualization manipulation was used to prime different audiences, which varied in the degree to which acceptance was made contingent on successful performance. Some subjects visualized an experience of noncontingent acceptance (being with a good friend), some visualized contingent acceptance (being liked because of some positively evaluated performance), and some were presented with a control task (imagining walking down a sidewalk). As in Study 1, half the subjects were seated facing a small mirror so that the nature of the selfevaluative process under conditions of self-awareness could be

Procedure
After reading and signing a consent form, subjects were led to a laboratory containing four cubicles. Half the cubicles contained a small mirror, as the manipulation of self-awareness. As in Study 1. attaching explanatory notes to the mirrors and describing the room as "cluttered with other experimenters' equipment" seemed to allay any concerns about the mirrors, and no subject expressed suspicion. Subjects then donned headphones and received all their instructions from individual tape machines. They were asked to sit back, relax, and keep their eyes closed most of the time while doing a number of visualization exercises. The first exercise then began, in which subjects were instructed to try to get a quick visual image of a number of objects that were named. There were 30 objects in all. presented at intervals of 4 s each. After the final object, as a distractor task, subjects were immediately instructed to try to visualize the letters of the alphabet as they were named at 2-s intervals. The next exercise was made up of the manipulation visualizations of private audience. Subjects' instructions were to imagine being in the situation that was described and to try to experience it as if they were there. After this visualization, there was a 30-s period during which they were asked to think about the final visualization, any feelings that went along with it, and any situations of a similar nature that they had been in. Next came the failure experience. It was explained that one aspect of the visualization process was that it bore close links to memory. For the next exercise they were to try to remember as many words as they could from the list of objects they had heard earlier. They then took the questionnaire folder from the wall in front of them and began to write what words they could remember. (It was only at this point that the mirror became unobstructed for subjects in the self-aware condition.) As they tried to write down the words, they were periodically instructed to draw a line across the page under the words they had written. This served our purpose of making salient the fact that they were remembering very few words. Four min were allotted for this exercise. This task is actually very difficult, and pilot subjects had confirmed that it made them feei incompetent. After completing the recall task, subjects were instructed to turn off

Note that although this woman was conscious of her imagined interaction with her mother, she had not considered that this might have been brought on by the earlier priming visualization. She was therefore not conscious of the determinants of her self-evaluative behavior (Bowers, 1985).

1092

MARK W. BALDWIN AND JOHN G. HOLMES senting such implicational rules may remain as one way of experiencing self in relation to others, creating a vulnerability to the tendency to overgeneralize. An overgeneralization measure was included to assess the degree to which subjects felt that, in some hypothetical situations, they would draw implications from negative information about themselves. Four situations were described, each involving cither a failure or transgression of some kind. For each situation, there were five statements designed to represent an increasing degree of overgeneralization. One situation, for example, was "if I told someone I would do something for them that was very important to them, and then forgot to do it, I might feel . . ." This was followed by implicational statements progressing from "I forgot to do this thing" through "1 acted in an irresponsible way" and "I am a bad person." Subjects were asked to indicate with a check mark any statements that would correspond to how they might typically feel in that situation. Private-audience assessments. To assess whether the audience visualizations were satisfactorily representing different levels of contingency. subjects were asked to indicate on a 7-point scale which idea had been most reflected in their visualization: some people like and accept you for what you are. without evaluating you ( 1 ) to sometimes people like you better if you do something well, if they evaluate you favorably (7), The midpoint of the scale (4) was labeled neither idea was reflected in this visualization. Subjects were also asked how the audience visualization made them feel. On 7-point scales, they were asked to indicate how liked they felt, liked ( 1 ) to not especially liked (7), and how evaluated they felt, not evaluated (1) to evaluated (1), To avoid contamination problems, the private-audience assessment questions came after the various other dependent measures at the end of the questionnaire.

the tape machine and complete the questionnaire containing the dependent measures (to be described). When they were finished the study was explained to them, with emphasis on the fact that the recall task was quite difficult and that it was constructed so that they would not be able to recall many words.

Private-Audience Visualizations
The situations that subjects visualized before the recall task were chosen to vary the level of contingency of the evaluative structure of their salient private audience. Each subject heard only one of three audience visualizations: control, noncontingent, or contingent. The audience visualization lasted approximately 1 min. Control. This visualization was intended to be neutral with respect to self-evaluation processes and to have subjects absorbed in the experiences of the moment. Subjects were instructed to imagine themselves walking down a sidewalk. Their instructions included such statements as "picture the color of the grass" and "try to feel the concrete under your feet." Noncomingem. Subjects in the noncontingent acceptance condition were asked to imagine having lunch with a good friend, someone who would stick by them and support them through good times and bad. They were encouraged to "feel the warmth and acceptance with this person." The intention of this visualization was to have subjects feel liked and accepted noncontingently. Contingent. The contingent-audience visualization was also designed to have people feel liked and appreciated, but this group was to feel that the private audience's acceptance was contingent on performing well. They imagined meeting and chatting with a new acquaintance about a class assignment and then later overhearing this person say "he was really smart. . . . 1 like people like that." The goal of this visualization was to have subjects feel liked and accepted by this person, with the additional meta-level message that they were liked because of their abilities.

Results Private-Audience Assessments

Dependent Measures
Immediately after the recall task, subjects filled out a questionnaire that included the following dependent measures. Mood. The first page of the questionnaire was made up of 10 bipolar mood scales. Each scale consisted of a 100-mm line with endpoints labeled according lo various positive moods and their negative counterparts (e.g., good-bad, contented-discontented, hopeless-hopeful). Subjects were asked to draw a slash across each line to indicate "how you are feeling right now." Self-esteem. Next came the Rosenberg (1965) Self-Esteem Scale, which Robinson and Shaver (1973) have suggested measures the selfacceptance aspect of chronic self-esteem. Performance attributions. Subjects were asked to indicate on a 7-point scale whether they felt that their recall performance reflected "something to do with the situation (e.g., the task, the setting, etc.) or something about yourself (e.g., personal characteristics)." Social comparison. This question asked subjects to estimate how many words on average "some people you know" would recall if they did the memory task. Overgeneralization. Many writers (e.g.. Beck, 1970; Buss, 1980; Carver AGanellen, 1983; Ellis, 1977; Janoff-Bulman, 1979) have noted that a major element in depressive states and in chronic self-esteem problems is the tendency to draw global evaluative conclusions about the self from specific outcomes or behaviors. Although such inferential styles may be magnified in clinical samples, it seems likely that most people have experienced to some degree contingent styles of evaluation from significant others in their personal histories. A cognitive set repre-

Before examining any self-evaluative effects of the different private audiences, it is important to know whether the visualizations adequately portrayed experiences of contingent and noncontingent acceptance. Subjects' ratings of the private-audience visualizations were analyzed in one-way (private audience: control, noncontingent, contingent) ANOVAS to determine whether the manipulations made the desired impression. On the measure of how liked subjects felt during the visualization, there was a significant main effect for audience. F(2, 57) = 6.93, p < .01. As shown in Table 2, both the nonconlingent and contingent groups reported feeling more liked than did the controls: noncontingent /(57) = 2.59, p < .01; contingent 1(57) = 1.72,/> = .09. These feelings of liking were of a different quality in the different groups. On the measure of how evaluated subjects felt during the private-audience visualization, there was again an effect for audience, F(2, 57) = 9.65. p < .01 (see Table 2). On this measure the contingent group felt significantly more evaluated than the controls did, ;(57) = 2.10, p < .05. The noncontingent group felt somewhat less evaluated than controls did but not significantly so, t < 1, ns, Another measure of evaluativeness was the contingency scale, which directly asked subjects the extent to which the manipulated private audience's acceptance was contingent on doing things well. The effect for audience, F(2, 56) = 7.78. p < .01

PRIVATE AUDIENCES AND SELF-AWARENESS

1093

Table 2 Private-Audience Assessments by Prnale-Audience Condition

Private audience Measure Liked" Evaluated11 Contingency' Noncontingent Control Contingent

2.30 2.80 2.85

3.50 3.35 4.2 l d

2.70 4.60 4.45

Note, n = 211 per cell.

a

Lower numbers represent feeling more liked. Higher numbers represent feeling more evaluated. c Higher numbers represent perception that audience's acceptance is contingent on behavior. *n= 19.
b

(see Table 2) 2 indicates that the noncontingent group perceived the audience as significantly more accepting than did controls, 1(56) = 2.14, p < .05. In contrast, the contingent group felt somewhat less accepted than controls did, / < 1 . The three measures of liking, evaluativeness, and contingency taken together indicate that the visualizations successfully manipulated the contingency of the private audience. Compared to controls, both noncontingent and contingent groups felt more liked, but whereas the liking expressed by the former was based on noncontingent acceptance, the liking experienced by the latter group was perceived as evaluative. Self-Esteem Self-esteem scores showed no effects on a 3 (private audience: control, noncontingent, contingent) X 2 (self-awareness: mirror, no mirror) ANOVA, possibly reflecting the scale's high reliability as a measure of chronic self-esteem (Rosenberg, 1965). In this sample, reliability was satisfactory: average interitem r = .32,

/(54) = 2.1 l,p < .05. Because the mood measure was intended as one of a number of multiple indicators of a global self-evaluative style, the interpretation of these effects will be postponed until the Discussion section, where the profiles of results on the various measures can be considered together. Although performance on the task was generally quite poor.3 there was some variability across subjects. An interesting question involves the degree to which mood is determined by number of words recalled. A central assumption of the notion of contingency is that feelings should be tied closely to performance, that is, that mood should correlate with recall. Overall, this correlation was marginally significant: pooled within-cell r(58) = .25, p = .06. A strong association between mood and recall should be expected only in the contingent audience condition, however, and this is what we found: control r( 18) - .05. ns; noncontingent r(!8) - .28. nv, contingent r ( 1 8 ) = .54. p<.05.

Overgeneralization An Overgeneralization score was determined for each subject by coding the most extreme statement endorsed for each hypothetical situation described (i.e., if only the first statement was endorsed, the item was coded /, if the second statement was endorsed the item was coded 2, etc.), and then summing across the four situations. This yielded a score potentially ranging from 4 to 20, where higher numbers represent a greater tendency toward drawing personal implications from negative information about the self. This Overgeneralization scale was of satisfactory reliability given the small number of items: average interitem r = .23, a = .51. Its validity was supported by a negative correlation with scores on the self-esteem scale, pooled within-cell r(56) = -.25. p = .07, indicating that, as we would expect, the process of Overgeneralization was related to lower self-esteem. The 3 X 2 ANOVA revealed no main effect for self-awareness but a marginally significant effect for audience, h(2, 54) - 2.97, p .06. As evident from Table 3, the pattern of means is more appropriately interpreted in terms of the significant Audience X Self-Awareness interaction, F(1. 54) = 4.45. p< .05. This interaction is mostly attributable to the contingent set, mirror group, which showed significantly more Overgeneralization than did the contingent set, no-mirror group. ((54) - 2.73. p< .01. There were no differences within the control and noncontingent groups.

Mood A single mood score was computed for each subject by determining how far (in millimeters) the subject's slashes were from the affectively negative ends of the individual scales. These values were then summed over the 10 items to obtain a score between 0 and 1 ,000, with higher numbers indicating better overall mood. This mood scale was satisfactorily reliable, with an average interitem r of .45 and alpha of .89. A 3 X 2 (Private Audience x Self-Awareness) ANOVA yielded only an Audience X Mirror interaction, F(2, 54) = 3.99, p < .05 (both main effects p> .10). To interpret the means (see Table 3), we considered the effects of each audience in turn when the failure was experienced under no-mirror compared with mirror conditions. Subjects in the control condition reported somewhat higher mood when a mirror was present than when it was not, 1(54) = 1.87, p = .08. The mood ratings by the noncontingent group did not differ between mirror and no-mirror conditions, t < 1 . Individuals in the contingent condition showed a very different pattern. They gave quite high ratings in the absence of a mirror, but their overall mood was significantly lowerwhen a mirror was present,

Degrees of freedom may differ slightly between analyses due to occaA 3 (control, nonconlingenl, contingent) * 2 (mirror, no mirror)

sional instances of missing data.

1

analysis of variance performed on the total number of words recalled by each subject did not yield any significant effects, all /-'s < 1.5. The average was 5.58 words recalled. The lack of recall effects is heartening because it suggests that effects on other measures cannot simply be explained as resulting from performance differences due to distraction by the mirror or some such thing. Also, although recall performance did correlate with a number of the measures to follow, including it as a covariate did not alter any of the effects.

1094

MARK W. BALDWIN AND JOHN G. HOLMES

Table 3 Self-Evaluation Scores by Self-Awareness and Private-Audience Conditions Private audience Noncontingent Measure Mood' Overgeneralizationb Performance attributions e Social comparison Mirror
496 9.60 3.20 5.50

Control Mirror
599 8.90 5.10 7.90

Contingent No mirror
491 10.00 1.60 6.00

No mirror
517 10.00 4.40 8.70

Mirror
528 12.10 5.30 8.11"

No mirror
652 9.70 4.70 6.30

Note, n = 10 per cell. a Higher numbers represent better mood. b Higher numbers represent a greater degree of overgeneralization. c Higher numbers represent attributing failure to something about self.

Performance Attributions
On a 7-point scale ranging from the situation to myself, subjects attributed responsibility for their performance on the recall task. The 3 X 2 ANOVA yielded a main effect for audience, F(2, 54) = 3.92, p < .05. The noncontingent group attributed the least responsibility to the self, M = 3.80, followed by the control group, M = 4.35, with contingent subjects attributing the most responsibility to the self, M 5.00. The individual comparisons between experimental groups and control were not significant, (s < 1.5. The main effect for audience was moderated by an Audience X Self-Awareness interaction, F(2, 54) = 5.13,p < .01 (see Table 3). Simple effects tests show that subjects in the control condition attributed significantly more responsibility for the performance to the self when there was a mirror present than when there was not, ((54) = 2.47, p < .05. In the noncontingent audience condition, the opposite pattern occurred: there was less self-attribution when a mirror was present than when there was not, ((54) = 1.98, p = .06. The contingent group did not differ on this measure between self-awareness conditions, t< 1, as their attributions of blame remained uniformly high.

subjects with different salient private audiences. The various measures did not always show parallel patterns across groups, possibly reflecting the complex, multidimensional nature of self-evaluation. Our strategy was to include a number of different measures, each of which has had an important place in the self-evaluation literature, to triangulate on certain evaluative styles. The prediction was that making subjects self-aware would increase the degree to which their self-evaluations reflected the evaluative style of their salient private audience. We consider each audience condition in turn. In the control group, for whom no specific private audience was primed, there was a significant self-awareness effect on performance attributions. This result is consistent with the finding in the literature that self-awareness often leads to increased selfattribution (Arkin & Duval, 1975; Buss &Scheier, 1976; Duval & Wicklund, 1973). There was no evidence at all. however, to indicate that accepting more responsibility for this particular outcome had negative implications for other, more general facets of the self. There was no relation between actual performance on the task and mood and no tendency to overgeneralize from the experience into a negatively toned style of self-evaluation. Given this apparent ability to compartmentalize the outcome, the marginally (p = .08) higher mood for self-aware control subjects may reflect Wicklund's (1978) contention that selffocused attention to ego-threatening information can lead to increased defensiveness (cf. Cohen, Dowling, Bishop. & Mancy, 1985; Federoff & Harvey, 1976). Perhaps enhanced self-awareness aids the process by increasing access to other, positive selfaspects. In the absence of measures specifically designed to assess the salience of alternate self-esteem domains (Rosenberg, 1968), this issue remains open for future research. The profile of responses to the failure was quite different for subjects who had recently visualized an experience of noncontingent acceptance. Increasing the self-awareness of these subjects appears to have enhanced their tendency to construe the outcome according to the tolerant, nonevaluative set of the audience that had been primed. They displayed less of an inclination to blame themselves for the outcome (p = .06) and suggested a standard of social comparison that was much lower

Social Comparison
To assess social comparison factors, subjects were asked to estimate how many words "some people you know" would remember in the same situation. The average estimate was 7.07 words, or about 1.5 words more than subjects' mean recall. Neither main effect in the 3 X 2 ANOVA was significant, but the interaction again was reliable, F(2, 53) = 5.08, p < .05 (see Table 3). Comparisons within audience conditions indicate that most of this effect was attributable to the noncontingent group, where estimates of others' performance were much lower when the mirror was present than when it was not, ((53) = 2.48, p < .05; control ((53) = 1.47, contingent ((53) = 1.37, both ns.

Discussion
As evident from the means displayed in Table 3, the self-evaluative experience engendered by self-awareness was different for

PRIVATE AUDIENCES AND SELF-AWARENESS

1095

(p < .05) and more lenient than did their counterparts who had not been made self-aware. One could argue that self-focused subjects' social comparison estimate that others would be able to recall 5.5 words is also more reasonable, as it comes close to the actual overall mean recall of 5.58 words. An unexpected finding was the pattern of relatively negative attributions and social comparisons made by subjects in this audience condition who were not made self-aware. It is not obvious to us why there should be these apparently negative consequences of visualizing an accepting friend. When self-awareness was induced, however, the noncontingent visualization did seem to buffer the impact of the failure by inducing a fairly forgiving if not excusing style of self-evaluation. It was as if an internalized friend were saying "don't worry about it, it was a difficult situation, and no one else would have done any better." It is interesting to note that when these subjects were asked in debriefing how they felt their friends would react to their failure, they often suggested that support of this type would be offered. In the contingent-acceptance condition, subjects who were not self-aware reported an elevated mood, probably resulting from the guided fantasy of being admired and liked because of a successful performance. In hindsight, it seems not at all surprising that the positive aspects of this visualization might buffer individuals who are not self-aware against a subsequent failure (see Wright & Mischel, 1982). This result, however, underlines the strategic risk we took in priming contingency with a success experience, because we are then in the position of having to show that the evaluative style of this private audience is capable of undercutting this effect when self-focus is increased by the self-awareness manipulation. The manipulation checks clearly show that experiences other than feeling successful and liked resulted: Individuals also reported feeling more evaluated and sensed that acceptance depended more on doing well, compared with noncontingent subjects. It was these additional aspects of their cognitive set that we hypothesized would leave them vulnerable to negative self-evaluative experiences. Consistent with this notion, subjects in both contingent conditions showed the strongest tendency to blame themselves for their poor performance and to link their reported mood directly to their performance on the task (r = .54). These undercurrents of self-doubt became manifest when subjects' self-focus was increased. Self-aware subjects reported significantly lower moods than did their non-self-aware counterparts (p < .05), presumably as a result of applying the contingent style of self-evaluation to the subsequent poor task performance (i.e., "because I am a failure, people will not accept me"). The most striking evidence of a contingent mode of evaluation comes from the overgeneralization measure: Self-aware subjects were much more likely (p < .01) to overgeneralize from specific negative information about the self. The fact that the overgeneralization measure was made up of a number of different hypothetical situations (e.g., denying a transgression, being unable to learn a new sport) suggests that the insidious effects of a contingently accepting audience might generalize far beyond the particular domain in which it is introduced.4 Although the pattern of the means on the various measures was not always entirely consistent, it did appear to reflect different styles of self-evaluation for subjects with different sa-

lient private audiences under conditions fostering self-awareness. Individuals in the noncontingent group, whose private audiences did not base acceptance on successful performances, did not display overly self-critical responses after the failure on the memory task. Subjects with contingently accepting audiences, in contrast, seemed inclined to accept blame, draw negative evaluative implications about the self, and report moods that closely reflected the adequacy of their performance. A multivariate analysis supported this view of the measures as multiple indicators of the effects of the conditions. An interesting aid in interpreting the findings is to combine algebraically the four measures by standardizing each and then summing for each subject.5 A low score on this general index indicates a tendency, following the failure experience, toward low mood, a high degree of overgeneralization, attributing the failure to something about the self, and estimating that others would be able to perform better on the recall task. Psychologically, a low score would seem to reflect a generally negative self-evaluative reaction to the failure experience; high scores obviously reflect the opposite tendencies. The results of this summary index are displayed in Figure 1.6 The styles of evaluation engendered by private audiences displaying different levels of contingency have implications for a wide range of self-evaluative phenomena. Striving to achieve in order to attain the contingent acceptance of a private audience could be the motivation underlying the psychological perspective that has been termed ego involvement (e.g.. deCharms,

One might wonder if this condition primed other considerations, in

addition to a contingent style of self-evaluation, such as a concern for impression management. Indeed, it is possible that responses in all conditions reflect to some extent a desire to please or impress the experimenter, as is the case in any study where subjects know their responses are being recorded. The extent of contribution of these factors may merit further research or may even be unanswerable (see Tetlock & Manstead, 1985). One argument against an impression-management interpretation is that the effects of the manipulations were strongest under conditions fostering private self-awareness, which is assumed to lead people to respond to personal values and standards rather than to the demands of the situation (Froming, Walker, & Lopyan, 1982).
5

To adjust the social comparison measure to account for the subject's

own performance, this score was first expressed as a proportionaldifference score, that is, own recall minus estimate of others' performance, divided by own recall.
6

Although the summary index is intended primarily as a descriptive

tool, some statistics may be of interest. Our decision to combine the individual measures is supported by a significant interaction term in a multivariate analysis of variance of the four measures, FIR. 102) - 3.5 1, p< .01 (and this multivariate effect held even if recall, self-esteem, and additional exploratory measures were included in the analysis). Support for the index's validity as an indicator of a self-critical style derives from its correlation with the chronic self-esteem measure: pooled within-cell r(56) = .52, p < .01. Parallel to the analyses of the individual measures, the 3 (private audience) X 2 (self-awareness) analysis of variance of the index yielded a significant interaction, F(2, 53) = 6.16, p< .01. Subjects with a noncontingent audience who were self-aware scored higher than their counterparts without a mirror. /(53) = 1.69. p < .05 (one-tailed). In contrast, those with a contingent audience scored lower if they were self-aware, r(53) = 3.09,/> < .01 (one-tailed). The control groups' scores were not significantly affected by the self-awareness manipulation.

1096

MARK w. BALDWIN AND JOHN G. HOLMES

In Study 2, self-aware subjects' self-evaluative reactions to a failure experience reflected the evaluative style of a salient private audience and were negative to the extent that the audience's acceptance was contingent on success. Some interesting issues remain for further study. First, the experiments reported here obviously demonstrate only that salient audiences can affect the behavior of self-aware people but not that they necessarily do have an impact in less contrived situations. It is encouraging in this respect to note that subjects were in no way forced to consider the reactions of the audiences provided. Particularly in Study 1, self-aware individuals were influenced by audiences that were only minimally primed in an ostensibly unrelated context. A second general issue involves the interface between private and public audiences (Froming & Carver, 1981; Scheier & Carver, 1983b; Schlenker, 1980). Behavior is often performed for both types of audiences, as when an actress tries both to earn her public audience's applause and to meet the demands of her internalized drama coach. We have thus far been focusing on the possibility of the evaluative structures of social relationships becoming represented internally; another approach would be to identify cases when private audiences might color the way actual other people are experienced (cf. transference). A contingent private audience, for example, might be projected onto the world, with the result that others are seen asevaluative and judgmental. As these considerations allude, there may be very real benefits in exploring the similarities and relevance of these notions to analytic and neoanalytic models of the superego (e.g., Freud, 1923/1947), ego development (e.g., Mahler et al., 1975), and object relations (e.g., Greenberg & Mitchell, 1983). Are audiences primed outside of awareness perhaps more influential, for example, and is it possible to bring unconscious audiences into focal awareness? If so, would this then allow the individual to defend more actively against undesired influence and therefore function more autonomously? In the studies reported here, we tried to test some fairly basic hypotheses about the experience of self. By abstracting and articulating principles from a number of theories, and integrating these insights with the dynamics of self-awareness, we attempted to establish the basis for a useful perspective on selfprocesses. We see these studies as offering encouraging support for a movement toward studying cognitive representations of significant relationships, which may afford some insight into the issue of how individuals' personal social histories define their sense of self.

Non-Contingent
<a -a c o

<f--"^ Control
0

CO

01

-2'

Contingent

Mirror Absent

Mirror Present

figure 1, Index of self-evaluative reactions by self-awareness and private-audience conditions. (Lower numbers indicate a tendency toward lower mood, a high degree of overgeneralization, self-attributions for failure, and estimates that others would perform better. Means based on n = 10, except contingent audience-mirror condition, for which n = 9.)

1968; Greenwald, 1981). The costs of imposing evaluation on an activity have been well documented elsewhere (e.g., decreased intrinsic motivation. Plant & Ryan, 1985, and Ryan, 1983; decreased flexibility of response, Amabile, 1979, and Hcnchy & Glass, 1968). Also, the pattern of cognitions displayed in the contingent condition, ranging from self-attribution to overgeneralization, has been observed in depressed individuals (Beck, 1970; Seligman, Abramson, Semmel, & von Baeyer, 1979). It would thus be interesting to study the ways in which the evaluative standards and styles of significant others in past social relationships intrude on the present to maintain cycles of depression and low self-esteem (e.g., Higgins, Strauman, & Klein, 1986; Kuiper & Olinger, in press). Such an analysis might include the notion that contingent acceptance can be entrapping (Platt, 1973), as illustrated by the somewhat counterintuitive findings in our contingent audience condition. Individuals may voluntarily adopt audiences offering praise or admiration, but once this contingent way of thinking becomes firmly rooted, it may be difficult to maintain a sense of selfacceptance in the face of subsequent failures or transgressions (see Miller, 1981, for a discussion of the costs of performancecontingent acceptance suffered by gifted children).

References General Discussion

The results of the two studies were consistent with the assumption common to a number of theories that individuals process self-relevant information according to patterns established in the context of significant relationships. In Study 1, people acted in line with values held by audiences that were rendered salient 10 minutes earlier by a short visualization, and there was some evidence to suggest that this effect held particularlv for individuals whose self-awareness had been increased. Alexander, C. N., & Lauderdale, P. (1977). Situated identities and social influence. Sociometry, 40, 225-233. Amabile, T. M. (1979). Effects of external evaluation on artistic creativity. Journal of Persona/icy and Social Psychology, 37, 221-233, Arkin, R. M., & Duval, S. (1975). Focus of attention and causal attributions of actors and observers. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 17,427-438. Bargh, J. A. (1982). Attention and automaticity in the processing of selfrelevant information. Journal of Personality and Soda! Psychology. 43, 425-437.

PRIVATE AUDIENCES AND SELF-AWARENESS Beck, A. T. (1970). Depression: Causes and treatments. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. Bower, G. H. (1981). Mood and memory. American Psychologist, 36, 129-148. Bowers, K. S. (1985). On being unconsciously influenced and informed. In K. S. Bowers & D. Meichenbaum (Eds.), The unconscious reconsidered (pp. 227-272). New York: Wiley. Bruner, J. S. (1957). On perceptual readiness. Psychological Review, 64. 123-152. Buss, A. H. (1980). Self-consciousness and social anxiety. San Francisco: Freeman. Buss, D. M., & Scheier, M. P. (1976). Self-consciousness and self-attribution. Journal of Research in Personality, W, 463-468. Carver, C. S., & Ganellen, R. J. (1983). Depression and components of self-punitiveness: High standards, self-criticism, and over-generalization. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 92, 330-337. Carver, C. S., & Humphries, C. (1981). Havana daydreaming: A study of self-consciousness and the negative reference group among Cuban Americans. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. 40, 545552. Carver, C. S., & Scheier, M. F. (1981). Attention and self-regulation: A control-theory approach to human behavior. New York: Springer- Verlag. Charters, W. W., & Newcomb, T. M. (1952). Some attitudinal effects of experimentally increased salience of a membership group. In G. E. Swanson, T. M. Newcomb, & E. L. Hartley (Eds.), Readings in social psychology (pp. 415-420). New York: Holt. Cohen, J. L., Dowling, N., Bishop, G., & Maney, W. J. (1985). Causal attributions: Effects of self-focused attentiveness and self-esteem feedback. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, II, 369-378. Cooley, C. H. (1902). Human nature and the social order. New York: Schocken. deCharms. R. (1968). Personal causation: The internal affective minant v of behavior. New York: Academic Press. deter-

1097

Froming, W. J., Walker, G. R., & Lopyan, K. J. (1982) Public and private self-awareness: When personal attitudes conflict with societal expectations. Journalof Experimental Social Psychology, AS', 476-487. Gibbons, F. X. (1978). Sexual standards and reactions to pornography: Enhancing behavioral consistency through self-focused attention. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 36. 976-487. Goffman, E. (1959). The presentation of .self in everyday life. New York: Doubleday. Greenberg, J. R., & Mitchell, S. A. (1983). Object relation* in psychoanalytic theory. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Grcenwald. A. G. {1981}. Ego-task analysis: An integration of research on ego-involvement and self-awareness. In A. Hastorf & A. M, Isen (Eds.), Cognitive social psychology (pp. 110-147). New York; Flscvier/North Holland. Guntrip, H. (1961). Personality structure and human interaction. New York: International Universities Press. Guntrip, H. (1971). Psychoanalytic theory therapy, and the self New York: Basic Books. Henchy, T, & Glass, D. C. (1968). Evaluation apprehension and the social facilitation of dominant and subordinate responses. Journal of Personality and Social P.svchologv. 10, 446-454. Higgins, E. T.. & King, G. (1981). Accessibility of social constructs: Information-processing consequences of individual and contextual variability. In N. Cantor & J. F, Kihlstrom (Eds.), Pennnality. cognition and social interaction (pp. 69-121). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Higgins, E. T., Klein, R., &Strauman, T. (1985). Self-concept discrepancy theory: A psychological model for distinguishing among different aspects of depression and anxiety. Social Cognition. 3. 51 -76. Higgins, E. T, Strauman, T, & Klein, R. (1986). Standards and the process of self-evaluation: Multiple affects from multiple stages. In R. M. Sorrentino & E. T. Higgins (Eds.), Motivation and cognition: Foundations of social behavior {pp. 23-63). New \brk: Guilford Press. Hull, J. G., & Levy, A. S. (1979). The organisational functions of the self: An alternative to the Duval and Wicklund model of self-awareness. Journalof Personality and Social Psychology. 37. 756-768, James, W. (1925). The philosophy of William James. New York: Modern Library. Janoff-Bulman, R, (1979). C ha ractero logical versus behavioral selfblame: Inquiries into depression and rape. Journaloj Personality and Social Psychology. 37, 1798-1809. Kelley, H. H. (1952). Two functions of reference groups. In G. h. Swanson, T. M. Newcomb, & E. L. Hartley (Eds.). Rcadini>,\ in ->r)cialpsychology (pp.4] Q-4\ 4). New York: Holt. Kohut, H. (1984). How does analysis cure.'.' Chicago. I nivcrsiU of Chicago Press. Kuiper, N. A., &Olinger, L. J. (in press). Stress and cognitive vulnerability to depression: A self-worth contingency model. In R. W. J. Neufeld (Ed.). Advances in the investigation of p.sichnlngicui stress. New York: Wiley. Mahler, M. S., Pine, F, & Bergman, A. (1975). The pwlwloxical birth of the human infant. New York: Basic Books. McGuire. W. J., & Padawer-Singer. A. (1976). Trait salience in the spontaneous self-concept. Journal oj Personality and Social Psychology. 33, 743-754. Mead, G. H. (1934). Mind, self, and society. Chicago: I fniversity of Chicago Press. Milter, A. (\9%]). Prisoners of childhood. New York: Basic Books. Newcomb, T. M. (1943). Personality and social change New York: Dryden Press. Plant, R. W., & Ryan, R. M. (1985). Intrinsic motivation and the effects of self-consciousness, self-awareness, and ego involvement: An inves-

Diener, E., & Srull, T. K. (1979). Self-awareness, psychological perspective, and self-reinforcement in relation to personal and social standards. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 37,413-423. Duval, S.. & Wicklund, R. A. (1972). A theory of objective self-awareness. New York: Academic Press, Duval, S., & Wicklund, R. A. (1973). Effects of objective self-awareness on attribution of causality. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology. 9, 17-31. Eagle, M. N. (1984). Recent developments in psychoanalysis: A critical evaluation. New York: McGraw-Hill. Ellis, A. (1977). Psychotherapy and the value of a human being. In A. Ellis & R. Grieger (Eds.), Handbook of rational-emotive therapy (pp. 99-112). New York: Springer. Federoff, N. A., & Harvey, J. H. (1976). Focus of attention, self-esteem, and the attribution of causality. Journal of Research in Personality, 10, 336-345. Fenigstein, A. (1979). Self-consciousness, self-attention, and social interaction. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. 3 7, 75-86. Festinger, L. (1954). A theory of social comparison processes. Human Relations, 7, 117-140. Fisher, W. A., Miller, C. T., Byrne, D., & White, L. A. (1980). Talking dirty: Responses to communicating a sexual message as a function of situational and personality factors. Basic and Applied Social Psychology. 1. 115-126. Freud, S. (1947). The ego and the id. London: Hogarth Press. (Original work published 1923) Froming. W. J., & Carver, C. S. (1981), Divergent influences of private and public self-consciousness in a compliance paradigm. Journal of Research in Personality, 15, 159-171.

1098

MARK W. BALDWIN AND JOHN G. HOLMES and implications. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 37. 1660-1672. Srull, T. R., & Wyer, R. S. (1980). Category accessibility and social perception: Some implications for the study of person memory and interpersonal judgments. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. 38, 841-856. Sullivan, H. S. (1940). Conceptions of modern psychiatry New York: Norton. Sullivan, H. S. (1953). The interpersonal theory of psychiatry. New York: Norton. Tetlock, P. E., & Manstead, A. S. R. (1985). Impression management versus intrapsychic explanations in social psychology: A useful dichotomy? Psychological Review, 92, 59-77. Weiner, B. (1974). Achievement motivation and attribution theory Morriston, NJ: General Learning Press. Wicklund, R. A. (1975). Objective self-awareness. In L. Berkowilz (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 8. pp. 233275). New York: Academic Press. Wicklund, R. A. (1978). Three years later. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Cognitive theories in social psychology (pp. 509-521). New York: Academic Press. Wicklund, R. A. (1982). How society uses self-awareness. In J, Suls (Ed.), Psychological perspectives on the self (Vol. I, pp. 209-230). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Wicklund, R. A., & Duval, S. (1971). Opinion change and performance facilitation as a result of objective self-awareness. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 7, 319-342. Wicklund, R. A., & Frey, D. (1980). Self-awareness theory: When the self makes a difference. In D. M. Wegner & R. R. Vallacher (Eds.), The self in social psychology (pp. 31-54). New York: Oxford University Press. Wright, J., & Mischel, W. (1982). Influence of affect on cognitive social learning person variables. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. , 901-914. Received July 15, 1986 Revision received September 11, 1986

tigation of internally controlling styles. Journal of Personality, 53. 435-449. Platt, J. (1973). Social traps. American Psychologist, 28, 641-645. Robinson, J. P., & Shaver, P. R. (1973). Measures of social psychological attitudes. Ann Arbor, MI: Survey Research Center. Rogers, C. R. (1959). Therapy, personality and interpersonal relationships. In S. Koch (Ed.), Psychology: A study of a science (Vol. 3, pp. 184-256). Toronto: McGraw-Hill. Rosenberg, M. (1965). Society and the adolescent self-image. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Rosenberg, M. (1968). Psychological selectivity in self-esteem formation. In C. Gordon & K. J. Gergen (Eds.), The self in social interaction New\brk: Wiley. Ryan, R. M. (1983). Control and information in the intrapersonal sphere: An extension of cognitive evaluation theory. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 43, 450-461. Scheier, M. R., & Carver, C. S. (1980). Private and public self-attention, resistance to change, and dissonance reduction. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 39. 390-405. Scheier, M. R., & Carver, C. S. (1983a). Self-directed attention and the comparison of self with standards. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology. 19. 205-222. Scheier, M. R., & Carver, C. S. (1983b). Two sides of the self: One for you and one for me. In J. Suls & A. G. Greenwald (Eds.), Psychological perspectives on :he self (Vol. 2, pp. 123-157). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Schlenker, B. R, (1980). Impression management. Monterey, CA: Brooks/Cole. Schlenker, B. R. (1985). Identity and self-identification. In B. R. Schlenker (Ed.), The self and social life (pp. 65-99). New York: McGrawHill. Seligman, M. E. P., Abramson, L. Y., Semmel, A., & von Baeyer, C. (1979). Depressive attributional style. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 88, 242-247. Shibutani, T. (1955). Reference groups as perspectives. American Journal of Sociology, 60, 562-569. Srull, T. R., & Wyer, R. S. (1979). The role of category accessibility in the interpretation of information about persons: Some determinants