(16) REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (PCGG) v. SANDIGANBAYAN, BIENVENIDO R. TANTOCO, JR. and DOMINADOR R.

SANTIAGO, for and in his own behalf and as counsel for respondent Tantoco, Jr. FACTS: Private respondents, together with Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos, Bienvenido R. Tantoco, Sr., Gliceria R. Tantoco, and Maria Lourdes Tantoco-Pinedaare defendants in Civil Case No. 0008 of the Sandiganbayan. The case was commenced by the PCGG)in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines was a complaint denominated as one "for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution and damages," and was avowedly filed pursuant to Executive Order No. 14 of President Corazon Aquino. After having been served with summons, the respondents, instead of filing their answer, jointly filed a "MOTION TO STRIKE OUT SOME PORTIONS OF THE COMPLAINT AND FOR BILL OF PARTICULARS OF OTHER PORTIONS." The PCGG filed an opposition thereto but the Sandiganbayan gave PCGG 45 dayd to expand its complaint to make more specific certain allegations. Respondents then presented a "motion for leave to file interrogatories under Rule 25 of the Rules of Court." Basically, they sought an answer to the question: "Who were the Commissioners of the PCGG (aside from its Chairman, Hon. Ramon Diaz, who verified the complaint) who approved or authorized the inclusion of Messrs. Bienvenido R. Tantoco, Jr. and Dominador R. Santiago as defendants in the . . case?" The PCGG responded by filing a motion to strike out said motion and interrogatories as being impertinent, "queer," "weird," or "procedurally bizarre as the purpose thereof lacks merit as it is improper, impertinent and irrelevant under any guise." After PCGG has filed an Expanded Complaint, respondents filed a motion for bill of particulars, through a Manifestation, and such motion was denied by the Sandiganbayan. Respondents then filed an answer and the case was set for pretrial. Respondents then filed with the Sandiganbayan a pleading denominated "Interrogatories to Plaintiff," and, an "Amended Interrogatories to Plaintiff"' as well as a Motion for Production and Inspection of Documents. The amended interrogatories chiefly sought factual details relative to specific averments of PCGG's amended complaint, through such questions, for instance, as What specific property or properties does the plaintiff claim it has the right to recover from defendants Tantoco, Jr. and Santiago for being ill-gotten?

What specific act or acts were committed by defendants in "concert with" defendant Ferdinand Marcos and in furtherance or pursuit, of the alleged systematic plan of said defendant Marcos to accumulate ill-gotten wealth?" What specific act or acts of the defendants were committed by said defendants as part, or in furtherance, of the alleged plan to conceal assets of defendants Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos? Is it plaintiff's position or theory of the case that Tourist Duty Free Shops, Inc., including all the assets of said corporation, are beneficially owned by either or both defendants Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos and that the defendants, as well as, the other stockholders of record of the same corporation are mere "dummies" of said defendants Ferdinand and /or Imelda R. Marcos?

The Sandiganbayan admitted the Amended Interrogatories and granted the motion for production and inspection of documents. The PCGG filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution but said MR was denied. Hence, this petition for certiorari. ISSUE: Whether there was grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction when the Sandiganbayan allowed both the amended interrogatories to the plaintiff and for production of documents of the respondents. HELD: The petitioner's objections to the interrogatories served on it in accordance with Rule 25 of the Rules of Court cannot be sustained. Petition was DENIED. As regards the private respondents "Motion for Leave to File Interrogatories," it was correct for them to seek leave to serve interrogatories, because discovery was being availed of before an answer had been served. In such a situation, i.e., "after jurisdiction has been obtained over any defendant or over property subject of the action" but before answer, Section 1 of Rule 24 (treating of depositions), in relation to Section 1 of Rule (dealing with interrogatories to parties) explicitly requires "leave of court." But there was no need for the private respondents to seek such leave to serve their "Amended Interrogatories to Plaintiff" they had filed their answer to the PCGG's complaint, just as there was no need for the Sandiganbayan to act thereon. Petitioners first contention: Interrogatories are defective because they (a) do not name the particular individuals to whom they are propounded, being addressed only to the PCGG, and (b) are "fundamentally the same matters . . (private respondents) sought to be clarified through their aborted Motion . . for Bill of Particulars"

Courts Answer: The first part of petitioner's submission is adequately confuted by Section 1, Rule 25 which states that if the party served with interrogatories is a juridical entity such as

"a public or private corporation or a partnership or association," the same shall be "answered . . by any officer thereof competent to testify in its behalf." There is absolutely no reason why this proposition should not be applied by analogy to the interrogatories served on the PCGG. That the interrogatories are addressed only to the PCGG, without naming any specific commissioner o officer thereof, is utterly of no consequence, and may not be invoked as a reason to refuse to answer. As the rule states, the interrogatories shall be answered "by any officer thereof competent to testify in its behalf." Second Contention: That the matters on which discovery is desired are the same matters subject of a prior motion for bill of particulars addressed to the PCGG's amended complaint Courts Answer: A bill of particulars may elicit only ultimate facts, not so-called evidentiary facts. The latter are without doubt proper subject of discovery. Third Contention: Interrogatories lack specificity. Courts Answer: The interrogatories are made to relate to individual paragraphs of the PCGG's expanded complaint and inquire about details of the ultimate facts therein alleged. What the PCGG may properly do is to object to specific items of the interrogatories, on the ground of lack of relevancy, or privilege, or that the inquiries are being made in bad faith, or simply to embarass or oppress it. But until such an objection is presented and sustained, the obligation to answer subsists.

in the dark; and the Rules of Court make this ideal possible through the deposition-discovery mechanism set forth in Rules 24 to 29. The deposition-discovery procedure was designed to remedy the conceded inadequacy and cumbersomeness of the pre-trial functions of notice-giving, issue-formulation and fact revelation theretofore performed primarily by the pleadings. The various modes or instruments of discovery are meant to serve (1) as a device, along with the pre-trial hearing under Rule 20, to narrow and clarify the basic issues between the parties, and (2) as a device for ascertaining the facts relative to those issues. The evident purpose is, to repeat, to enable parties, consistent with recognized privileges, to obtain the fullest possible knowledge of the issues and facts before trials and thus prevent that said trials are carried on in the dark. The field of inquiry that may be covered by depositions or interrogatories is as broad as when the interrogated party is called as a witness to testify orally at trial. The inquiry extends to all facts which are relevant, whether they be ultimate or evidentiary, excepting only those matters which are privileged. The objective is as much to give every party the fullest possible information of all the relevant facts before the trial as to obtain evidence for use upon said trial. The principle is reflected in Section 2, Rule 24 (governing depositions). What is chiefly contemplated is the discovery of every bit of information which may be useful in the preparation for trial, such as the identity and location of persons having knowledge of relevant facts; those relevant facts themselves; and the existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and location of any books, documents, or other tangible things. Hence, "the deposition-discovery rules are to be accorded a broad and liberal treatment. No longer can the time-honored cry of "fishing expedition" serve to preclude a party from inquiring into the facts underlying his opponent's case. Mutual knowledge of all the relevant facts gathered by both parties is essential to proper litigation. To that end, either party may compel the other to disgorge whatever facts he has in his possession. The depositiondiscovery procedure simply advances the stage at which the disclosure can be compelled from the time of trial to the period preceding it, thus reducing the possibility, of surprise. In line with this principle of according liberal treatment to the depositiondiscovery mechanism, such modes of discovery as (a) depositions (whether by oral examination or written interrogatories) under Rule 24, (b) interrogatories to parties under Rule 25, and (c) requests for admissions

Fourth Contention: That the interrogatories deal with factual matters which will be part of the PCGG's proof upon trial. Courts Answer: As already pointed out, it is the precise purpose of discovery to ensure mutual knowledge of all the relevant facts on the part of all parties even before trial, this being deemed essential to proper litigation. This is why either party may compel the other to disgorge whatever facts he has in his possession; and the stage at which disclosure of evidence is made is advanced from the time of trial to the period preceding it. SOME DOCTRINES ON TWO MODES OF DISCOVERY: Interrogatories to parties and Production and inspection of documents and things. "Evidentiary matters" may be inquired into and learned by the parties before the trial. Indeed, it is the purpose and policy of the law that the parties before the trial if not indeed even before the pre-trial should discover or inform themselves of all the facts relevant to the action, not only those known to them individually, but also those known to adversaries; in other words, the desideratum is that civil trials should not be carried on

under Rule 26, may be availed of without leave of court, and generally, without court intervention. The Rules of Court explicitly provide that leave of court is not necessary to avail of said modes of discovery after an answer to the complaint has been served. It is only when an answer has not yet been filed (but after jurisdiction has been obtained over the defendant or property subject of the action) that prior leave of court is needed to avail of these modes of discovery, the reason being that at that time the issues are not yet joined and the disputed facts are not clear. On the other hand, leave of court is required as regards discovery by (a) production or inspection of documents or things in accordance with Rule 27, or (b) physical and mental examination of persons under Rule 28, which may be granted upon due application and a showing of due cause.

Court of the opportunity to ask clarificatory questions, if any, on the proposed deponent (Teope) who appears to be a vital witness. Its motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner filed an original action for certiorari before the Supreme Court. However, in a resolution dated May 20, 1992, this Court referred the case to the Court of Appeals for consideration and adjudication on the merits. The CA also dismissed the petition on the ground that the right of a party to take depositions as means of discovery is not absolute. Thus, as held in the case of Caguiat vs. Torres, the Court indicated at least 3 reasons for it not to order the deposition. First, that the proposed deponent had earlier responded to the written Interrogatories; Second, that the proposed deponent had signified his availability to testify in court; and Third, that to allow the deposition would deprive the trial court of the opportunity to ask clarificatory questions, if any, on the proposed deponent who appears to be a vital witness. ISSUES: (1) Whether appeal or certiorari is the proper remedy of the petitioners when its MR was denied; (2) Whether the depositions can still be taken by the petitioner notwithstanding the fact that interrogatories have already been answered by the respondent. HELD: ON WHETHER CERTIORARI OR APPEAL IS THE PROPER REMEDY: On the basis of the circimstances obtaining in the case at bar, Certiorari may be availed of to review the questioned order or the trial court. The rule is that certiorari will generally not lie to review a discretionary action of any tribunal. Also, as a general proposition, a writ of certiorari is available only to review final judgments or decrees, and will be refused where there has been no final judgment or order and the proceeding for which the writ is sought is still pending and undetermined in the lower tribunal. Pursuant to this rule, it has been held that certiorari will not lie to review or correct discovery orders made prior to trial. This is because, like other discovery orders, orders made under Section 16, Rule 24 are interlocutory and not appealable, considering that they do not finally dispose of the proceeding or of any independent offshoot of it. However, such rules are subject to the exception that discretionary acts will be reviewed where the lower court or tribunal has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, where an interlocutory order does not conform to essential requirements of law and may reasonably cause material injury throughout subsequent proceedings for which the remedy of appeal will be inadequate, or where there is a clear or serious abuse of discretion.

(17) FORTUNE CORPORATION v. CA AND INTER-MERCHANTS CORPORATION FACTS: An action for breach of contract was filed by petitioner Fortune Corporation against respondent Inter-Merchants Corporation, before the RTC of San Pablo City. After Respondent Corporation had filed its Answer, petitioner served the former with written interrogatories pursuant to Rule 25 of the Rules of Court. The interrogatories were answered by respondent corporation through its board chairman, Juanito A. Teope. The pre-trial conference was thereafter scheduled. Petitioner served upon private respondent a Notice to Take Deposition Upon Oral Examination dated March 26, 1992, notifying the latter that on April 7, 1992, at San Pablo City, petitioner would take the deposition of said Juanito A. Teope, in accordance with Section 15, Rule 24.Private respondent filed an Urgent Motion Not To Take Deposition/Vehement Opposition to Plaintiff's Notice to Take Deposition Upon Oral Examination, alleging inter alia that : (a) herein petitioner has previously availed of one mode of discovery, that is, the written interrogatories which practically covered all the claims, counterclaims and defenses in the case; (b) there is absolutely no sound reason or justification advanced for the taking of the oral deposition; (c) such taking would cause annoyance, embarrassment and oppression upon the prospective deponent, Juanito A. Teope; (d) Mr. Teope has no intention of leaving the country; and (e) the intended deponent is available to testify in open court if required during the trial on the merits. The RTC ruled in favor of the respondents and disallowed the requested deposition on the ground that such request appears unwarranted since the respondent had earlier responded to the written interrogatories of the petitioner and has also signified his availability to testify in court. To allow the deposition will deprive the

ON WHETHER DEOPOSITIONS MAY STILL INTERROGATORIES HAVE BEEN OBTAINED

BE

TAKEN

EVEN

AFTER It is quite clear, therefore, and we so hold that under the present Rules the fact that a party has resorted to a particular method of discovery will not bar subsequent use of other discovery devices, as long as the party is not attempting to circumvent a ruling of the court, or to harass or oppress the other party. As a matter of practice, it will often be desirable to resort to both interrogatories and depositions in one or the other sequence. Additional lines of inquiry may come to light after the deposition has been taken, as to which written interrogatories probably would be adequate, and there is no reason why the examining party should not be entitled to obtain all the relevant information he desires if no substantial prejudice is done to the party from whom discovery is sought. On the other hand, interrogatories may well be used as a preliminary to the taking of depositions, in order to ascertain what individuals have the information sought. And, of course, if the answers to interrogatories are evasive and unsatisfactory, the interrogating party should be able to utilize the more effective method of oral examination rather than have to reframe interrogatories. Ordinarily, however, there will be no occasion for a party to use both methods at the same time, at least to obtain the same information. DOCTRINES: Written interrogatories are most valuable as a device to compel admissions and the disclosure of major factual matters not concerned with details; the deposition is the best device suited to compel disclosure of detailed information. The other principal benefits derivable from the availability and operation of a liberal discovery procedure are the following: 1. It is of great assistance in ascertaining the truth and in checking and preventing perjury. The reasons for this are: (a) The witness (including a party) is examined while his memory is fresh: (b) The witness (including a party) is generally not coached in preparation for a pretrial oral examination with the result that his testimony is likely to be more spontaneous. Where the examination is upon written interrogatories, however, it appears that some lawyers furnish the witness with copies of the interrogatories and thereby enable him to prepare his answers in advance. (c) A party or witness whose deposition has been taken at an early stage in the litigation cannot, at a later date, readily manufacture testimony in contradiction to his deposition; (d) Testimony is preserved, so that if a witness unexpectedly dies or becomes unavailable at the trial, his deposition is available. 2. It is an effective means of detecting and exposing false, fraudulent, and sham claims and defenses.

The liberty of a party to make discovery is well-nigh unrestricted if the matters inquired into are otherwise relevant and not privileged, and the inquiry is made in good faith and within the bounds of law. However, limitations inevitably arise when it can be shown that the examination is being conducted in bad faith or in such a manner as to annoy, embarrass, or oppress the person subject to the inquiry. Also, further limitations come into existence when the inquiry touches upon the irrelevant or encroaches upon the recognized domains of privilege. Section 16 of Rule 24 clearly states that it is only upon notice and for good cause that the court may order that the deposition shall not be taken. The matter of good cause is to be determined by the court in the exercise of judicial discretion. Good cause means a substantial reason one that affords a legal excuse. Whether or not substantial reasons exist is for the court to determine, as there is no hard and fast rule for determining the question as to what is meant by the term "for good cause shown." The requirement, however, that good cause be shown for a protective order puts the burden on the party seeking relief to show some plainly adequate reasons for the order. A particular and specific demonstration of facts, as distinguished from conclusory statements, is required to establish good cause for the issuance of a protective order. What constitutes good cause furthermore depends upon the kind of protective order that is sought. All motions must be supported by "good cause" and a strong showing is required before a party will be denied entirely the right to take a deposition. A mere allegation, without proof, that the deposition is being taken in bad faith is not a sufficient ground for such an order. Neither is an allegation that it will subject the party to a penalty or forfeiture. The mere fact that the information sought by deposition has already been obtained through a bill of particulars, interrogatories, or other depositions will not suffice, although if it is entirely repetitious a deposition may be forbidden. The allegation that the deponent knows nothing about the matters involved does not justify prohibiting the taking of a deposition, nor that whatever the witness knows is protected by the "work product doctrine," nor that privileged information or trade secrets will be sought in the course of the examination, nor that all the transactions were either conducted or confirmed in writing. As a general rule, the scope of discovery is to be liberally construed so as to provide the litigants with information essential to the expeditious and proper litigation of each of the facts in dispute. Moreover, it cannot be disputed that the various methods of discovery as provided for in the Rules are clearly intended to be cumulative, as opposed to alternative or mutually exclusive.

3. It makes available in a simple, convenient, and often inexpensive way facts which otherwise could not have been proved, except with great difficulty and sometimes not at all. 4. It educates the parties in advance of trial as to the real value of their claims and defenses, thereby encouraging settlements out of court. 5. It expediates the disposal of litigation, saves the time of the courts, and clears the docket of many cases by settlements and dismissals which otherwise would have to be tried. 6. It safeguards against surprise at the trial, prevents delays, and narrows and simplifies the issues to be tried, thereby expediting the trial. 7. It facilitates both the preparation and trial of the cases. 9 (19) DASMARIAS GARMENTS, INC. vs. REYES (Judge, RTC Manila)and AMERICAN PRESIDENT LINES, LTD. FACTS: American President Lines sued Dasmarinas Garments to recover a sum of money. The case was scheduled for trial and American presented its first witness whose testimony was completed. The case was reset to another date for the reception of the testimony of two more witnesses in American's behalf. At the hearing however, instead of presenting its witnesses, American's filed a motion praying that it intended to take the depositions of the two witnesses in Taipei, Taiwan and for this purpose, prayed a "commission or letters rogatory be issued addressed to the consul, vice-consul or consul agent of the Republic of the Philippines in Taipei." 5 days later American amended their motion stating that since the Philippine Gov't has no consulate office in Taiwan, it therefore prayed that the commission or letters rogatory be issued addressed to the Executive Director of Asian Executive Center (AEC). This motion was opposed by Dasmarinas. It contended that (a) the motion was "fatally defective in that it does not seek . . . that a foreign court examine a person within its jurisdiction;" (b) issuance of letters rogatory was unnecessary because the witnesses "can be examined before the Philippine Court;" and (c) the Rules of Court "expressly require that the testimony of a witness must be taken orally in open court and not by deposition." After due trial, the trial court resolved the issue in favor of Americans. It granted the motion to take the testimonies of the Taiwanese witnesses in Taiwan by deposition. The Court opined that "the AEC being the authorized Philippine representative in Taiwan, may take the testimonies of plaintiff's witnesses residing there by deposition, but only upon written interrogatories so as to give defendant the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses by serving cross-examination. Dasmarinas sought reconsideration challenging the authority of the AEC to take

depositions of the Taiwanese witnesses. But the MR was denied for it was filed out of time. In a special civil action of certiorari in the CA, the court upheld the challenged orders of the trial court and denied Dasmarinas' petition. Subesquent MR was once again denied. ISSUE: Whether CA erred in allowing American President Lines to take the deposition of its witnesses in a foreign jurisdiction before a private entity not authorized by law. HELD: Yes, deposition of any person may be taken wherever he may be, in the Philippines or abroad. If the party or witness is in the Philippines, his deposition "shall be taken before any judge, municipal or notary public" (Sec. 10, Rule 24, Rules of Court). If in a foreign state or country, the deposition "shall be taken: (a) on notice before a secretary or embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent of the Republic of the Philippines, or (b) before such person or officer as may be appointed by commission or under letters rogatory" (Sec. 11, Rule 24). Where the deposition is to be taken in a foreign country where the Philippines has no "secretary or embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent," then obviously it may be taken only "before such person or officer as may be appointed by commission or under letters rogatory (Section 12, Rule 24). In the case at bar, the RTC has issued a commission to the Executive Director of AEC to take the testimonies of two Taiwanese witnesses by deposition (upon written interrogatories). It appears that said Center may, "upon request and authority of DFA, issue a Certificate of Authentications attesting to the identity and authority of Notaries Public and other public officers of the Republic of China, Taiwan a prima facie showing not rebutted by petitioner. (20) AUTOGRAPHICS, INC. vs. CA and PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC. FACTS: Petitioner (AGI for brevity) and private respondent (PAL), entered into several contracts which would provide support services to PAL's operations. While the contract was still in force, PAL notified AGI of their termination inasmuch as said contracts were prejudicial to PAL's interest and wiolative of its franchise. AGI filed a complaint to recover a sum of money. When the trial started, the trial court had to reset the hearing because of the non-availability of PAL's witnesses. Later, PAL filed a motion stating that the witnesses it intended to present by reason of distance and personal matters had expressed willingness to testify by deposition. PAL was constrained to avail of Rule 24 and made a manifestation for the scheduled hearing to be cancelled. No action was taken by the trial court on this

manifestation. On the date of the scheduled trial only PAL Cebu's counsel appeared and the principal counsel was absent. The former sought to reset the hearing due to this fact but AGI objected and moved that PAL's right to present evidence be considered waived and the case be deemed submitted for decision. In open court, the trial court granted 7 the oral motion of counsels for AGI and declared the case submitted for decision, PAL having been considered to have waived its right to present evidence. In open court, the trial court granted the oral motion of AGI and rendered its decision adverse to PAL. Despite not having received a written order of the decision, PAL filed an MR but this was denied. PAL filed a petition for certiorari before the CA claiming that the respondent Judge gravely abused its discretion. The CA found the petition sufficient in form and substance, hence, issued a TRO and a writ of preliminary injunction. AGI's MR was denied by the CA. ISSUE: Whether the trial committed a grave abuse of discretion in issuing an oral order and in rendering a judgment without giving PAL the chance to present evidence. HELD: The answer is in the affirmative. The proceedings in the court a quo were indeed manifestly inequitable and irregular involving as it does a claim in damages against PAL. In its haste to comply the court's Administrative Order, the trial court prodded PAL to present its evidence within a period of one (1) month. Perhaps, this arrangements could have been proper had both litigants been given equal opportunity to ventilate their respective claims. Unfortunately, this was not the case. With AGI's voluminous exhibits/annexes and the limited period alloted to it by the trial court within which to present its evidence, PAL's resource to Sec. 1 Rule 24, of the Rules of Court is well-taken. Under this provision, a party, without a court intervention, can take a deposition of any person after answer has been served. This right, however, is not absolute. The trial court may, in its discretion, order that a deposition shall not be taken. The trial court's discretion on his matter must nonetheless be exercised not arbitrary, capriciously, or oppressively, but in a reasonable manner and in consonance with the spirit of the law. (21) LOURDES CAMUS DE LOPEZ and her minors vs. HON. CIRILO G. MACEREN, CFI Judge of Davao and MARIA N. VDA. DE LOPEZ and her minors FACTS: Petitioner, Lourdes Camus de Lopez is the widow of Salvador Lopez. Prior to their union, there was a subsisting marriage between the deceased and respondent Maria de Lopez. The previous marriage was unknown to the petitioner.

The latter, on her behalf and as a guardian ad litem of her minor children is the plaintiff in a civil case in the CFI of Davao. And the respondents are the defendants of the said case. The purpose of the case is to secure delivery of some property of the deceased claimed to be the share of petitioner as the widow of the latter. After the filing of the answer of said respondents, as defendants in the civil case, the petitioner through her counsel filed a notice for the taking of her deposition and some Pilar Crsitobal. But the respondent Judge prohibited the taking of said deposition upon the urgent motion of the defendants. Contention of the petitioner: Petitioner maintains that respondent Judge committed a grave abuse of discretion in forbidding the taking of said deposition, she being entitled thereto as a matter of right, without leave of court, after the filing of the answer of the defendants in said civil case (Section 1 of Rule 18 of the Rules of Court). Contention of the respondent: Respondent invokes Section 16 of the same rule which explicitly vests in the court the power to "order that the deposition shall not be taken" and, this grant connotes the authority to exercise discretion. ISSUE: Whether the respondent Judge committed a grave abuse of discretion in forbidding the taking of deposition. HELD: Yes, a grave abuse of discretion was committed by respondent Judge. National Bondholders Corp. vs. McClintic - It is well-settled, that the discretion conferred by law is not unlimited; that it must be exercised, not arbitrarily, capriciously or oppressively, but in a reasonable manner and in consonance with the spirit of the law, to the end that its purpose may be attained. Referring to the objective of section 16 of Rule 18 of the Rules of Court. The insufficiency of this circumstance to justify the interdiction of the taking of a deposition becomes apparent when we consider that, otherwise, no deposition could ever be taken, said objection or handicap being common to all depositions alike. In other words, the order of respondent Judge cannot be sustained without nullifying the right to take depositions, and, therefore, without, in effect repealing section 1 of Rule 18 of the Rules of Court, which, clearly, was not intended by the framers of section 16 of the same rule. The decision of respondent Judge is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. (24) GERONIMO CAGUIAT, RUFINA CAGUIAT, FELICIDAD CAGUIAT, FABIAN CAGUIAT, and APOLONIA CAGUIAT v. HONORABLE GUILLERMO E. TORRES and FRANCISCO CAGUIAT FACTS: Respondent judge presided over the civil case between the parties in the CFI of Rizal.. After defendant had filed his answer with counterclaim, and the

plaintiffs, their reply to defendant's answer, petitioners served on Caguiat a notice to take his deposition. The latter filed an urgent motion to prevent the taking of the deposition or to restrict its scope. The respondent judge order to hold in abeyance the resolution of his Caguiats motion until after the pre-trial is set to give the parties time to consider an amicable settlement. The parties however failed to arrive at an amicable settlement. Petitioners again served on respondent Caguiat a second notice for the taking of his deposition upon oral examination. The latter filed an urgent motion and affirmed that he has already revealed practically his entire defense, even to the extent of naming his witnesses during the pre-trial, so that the necessity of a deposition has been precluded. Respondent Judge granted said motion and ordered the petitioners to refrain from taking the contemplated. Petitioners MR was denied. ISSUES: (1) W/N the CA erred in making its decision depend on the unsupported conclusion that 'since the respondent francisco caguiat had practically disclosed all his evidence during the pre-trial conference' the necessity of a deposition through oral examination by the petitioners was precluded. (2) W/N the disclosure by Caguiat of all his evidence at the pre-trial and the danger of heightening the animosities between the parties during the proposed taking of the deposition of appellee are enough to warrant the trial court's order preventing completely the taking of said deposition. HELD: (1) The finding of that appellate court to the effect that appellee has already disclosed all his evidence during the pre-trial and that personal animosities between the parties "might endanger the peaceful and objective conduct of the deposition upon oral examination" proposed appears well substantiated in the records before Us. The fact that the controverted orders were issued only after the pre-trial supports respondent Caguiat's affirmation that he had revealed his defense during the trial, and that the respondent Judge had satisfied himself that after such revelation there was no more need to take the former's deposition upon oral examination. (2) The right of a party to take depositions as means of discovery is not exactly absolute. Sections 16 and 18 of Rule 24 are precisely designed to protect parties and their witnesses, whenever in the opinion of the trial court, the move to take their depositions under the guise of discovery is actually intended to only annoy, embarrass or oppress them. In such instances, these provisions expressly authorize the court to either prevent the taking of a deposition or stop one that is already being taken. In the case at bar, aside from having practically disclosed all his evidence at the pretrial, Caguiat expressed his willingness to enter into a stipulation of facts but was rejected by the petitioners.. Moreover, according to CA, the parties herein filed a joint motion for hearing on the merits even before the orders in question were issued. Under these circumstances, it is inevitable to conclude that there was indeed no further need for the deposition desired by petitioners. It could have served no useful purpose, for there was nothing anymore to discover. They have not shown any real concrete reason for such deposition.

(25) PRISCILLA SUSAN PO v. CA, HON. JUDGE JULIAN LUSTRE, AND JOSE P. MANANZAN FACTS: Petitioner filed in 1971 a complaint for P35,000 damages against Jose P. Mananzan as operator of a banca service for shooting the rapids at Pagsanjan Falls, arising from an accidental spill into the water, which she and her friend suffered when the banca in which they were riding capsized during their trip back to town. After Mananzan had answered the complaint, petitioner served upon him a request for admission. Mananzan asked for an extension of time to answer the request for admission. The petitioner opposed the motion for extension of time on account of alleged defects in the notice of hearing. It then filed a motion for summary judgment on the ground that there exists no genuine or substantial controversy on any issue of fact raised in the complaint because the defendant, by failure to answer her request for admission within the reglementary period is deemed to have admitted the facts set forth in the request. Mananzan filed an opposition to the petitioner's motion for summary judgment, which was denied by the respondent judge observing that "the interrogatories are but a reiteration of a portion of the plaintiffs allegations in the complaint, which have already been answered and denied by the defendant in his answer" hence, they "need not be answered again if asked in the form of interrogatories." Both the RTC and CA denied petitioners MR. The CA held that with the absolute denial of private respondent in his answer to the complaint, petitioner's subsequent request for admission of the same facts already denied does not serve the purpose of Rule 26 as a mode of discovery. Rule 26 contemplates interrogatories that would clarify and tend to show light on the truth or falsity of the allegations of the complaint, and does not refer to a mere reiteration of what has been alleged in the complaint and unconditionally denied in the answer. Petitioner's request constitutes an utter redundancy and a useless, pointless process which private respondent should not be subjected to and which the lower court should not countenance. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: W/N the request for admission is not essential in this case. HELD: A party should not be compelled to admit matters of fact already admitted by his pleading and concerning which there is no issue, nor should he be required to make a second denial of those already denied in his answer to the complaint. A request for admission is not intended to merely reproduce or reiterate the allegations of the requesting party's pleading but should set forth relevant evidentiary matters of fact, or documents described in and exhibited with the request, whose purpose is to establish said party's cause of action or defense. Unless it serves that purpose, it is, as correctly observed by the Court of Appeals, "pointless, useless," and "a mere redundancy." (26) SALVADOR D. BRIBONERIA v. CA, GERTRUDES B. MAG-ISA, married to and assisted by PEDRO MAG-ISA FACTS: Petitioner Salvador D. Briboneria filed a complaint for Annulment of Document and Damages, with prayer for preliminary injunction and/or TRO against

private respondent Gertrudes B. Mag-isa before the RTC of Pasig alleging that he, together with his wife Nonita, were the registered owners of a parcel of land with a residential house located at 59 Amsterdam Street Provident Village, J. de la Pea, Marikina. Salvador was surprised to learn that his wife sold to Gertrudes by the said house and lot since he never authorized or empowered Nonita. Gertrudes then leased the premises to another who in turn had prohibited Salvador from entering the premises. Gertrudes filed her answer and admitted the age of plaintiff but denied the rest of the allegations for lack of knowledge and/or information sufficient to form a judgment as to the truths thereof. After issues had been joined, Salvador served on Gertudes a request for admission of the material facts in the complaint. Private respondents filed with the court a quo their Answer to Request for Admission, alleging that most if not all the matters subject of petitioner's request for admission had been admitted, denied and/or clarified in their verified answer. Petitioner filed a Motion for summary Judgment, which was denied claiming that the Answer to Request for Admission was filed by private respondents beyond the 10 day period fixed in the request and that the answer was not under oath; that, consequently the private respondents are deemed to have admitted the material facts and documents subject of the request for admission, pursuant to Section 2, Rule 26 of the Rules of Court. The private respondents filed an opposition to the motion for summary judgment, while the petitioner filed a reply to said opposition. The trial court denied the motion for summary judgment. MR was granted, but it was set aside upon Motion for Clarification and Reconsideration filed by private respondents and a pre-trial conference was set. Petitioner thereupon filed with the CA a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus to annul and set aside the said order but it was dismissed. ISSUE: W/N Gertrudes is deemed to have admitted the facts and documents subject of the request for admission for having failed to file her answer thereto within the period fixed in the request. HELD: To begin with, a cursory reading of the petitioner's complaint and his request for admission clearly shows that "the material matters and documents set forth in the request for admission are the same as those set forth in the complaint which private respondents either admitted or denied in their answer." The respondent court therefore correctly held that this case falls under the rule laid down in Po vs. Court of Appeals that a party should not be compelled to admit matters of fact already admitted by his pleading and concerning which there is no issue, nor should he be required to make a second denial of those already denied in his answer to the complaint. A request for admission is not intended to merely reproduce or reiterate the allegations of the requesting party's pleading but should set forth relevant evidentiary matters of fact, or documents described in and exhibited with the request, whose purpose is to establish said party's cause of action or defense. Moreover, under Section 1, Rule 26 of the Rules of Court, the request for admission must be served directly upon the party; otherwise, the party to whom the request is directed cannot be deemed to have admitted the genuineness of any relevant

document in and exhibited with the request or relevant matters of fact set forth therein, on account of failure to answer the request for admission. In the present case, it will be noted that the request for admission was not served upon the private respondent Mag-isa but upon her counsel. Therefore, she cannot be deemed to have admitted the facts and documents subject of the request for admission for having failed to file her answer thereto within the period fixed in the request. (27) PSCFC FINANCIAL CORPORATION (NEW PSCFC BUSINESS CORPORATION) v. CA, HON. HERMINIO I. BENITO, Presiding Judge, RTC, Br. 132, Makati, Metro Manila, NOTARY PUBLIC ENRIQUE I. QUIASON, and BANCO FILIPINO SAVINGS & MORTGAGE BANK FACTS: PSCFC filed a complaint against Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank (Banco Filipino) for annulment of foreclosure proceedings and damages with the RTC of Makati and alleged that as land developer it availed of the Home Financing Plan of Banco Filipino and borrowed from the latter the amount of P6,630,690.00 as "developer loan." As security, it constituted a mortgage over several lots in Pasay City which properties were not yet sold at that time to third parties. It was agreed that under the Home Financing Plan, the "developer loan" would mature only after the lots shall have been subdivided and improved and then sold to third persons who would then be substituted as mortgagors to the extent of the loan value of the lots and houses bought by them. However, without the loan having matured, the mortgage was extrajudicially foreclosed and a certificate of sale was executed in favor of Banco Filipino. Banco Filipino admitted the loan of P6,630,690.00 but denied that petitioner had availed itself of Banco Filipino's Home Financing Plan. Petitioner served upon Banco Filipino a written request for admission of the truth of the matters, alleged in the complaint. Petitioner received Banco Filipino's answer to its request for admission signed by its counsel. Counsel admitted petitioner's mortgage loan as well as the fact that Banco Filipino was engaged in land development loans. However, it denied that petitioner availed itself of the Home Financing Plan, including the agreement that the maturity of the debt would depend on the resale of the mortgaged subdivision lots. Petitioner made a second request for admission on respondent Banco Filipino impliedly objecting to the first reply having been made by its lawyer. Banco Filipino objected to the matters requested on the ground of irrelevancy and denied all the rest. The RTC was not persuaded. On appeal to the CA, the latter affirmed the RTC ruling. Hence, the petition. ISSUE: W/N the answer to the request for admission under Rule 26 should be made by the party himself and not by his lawyer. HELD: Petitioner has not shown that the case at bar falls under any of the recognized exceptions as found in Art. 1878 of the Civil Code which enumerates the instances when SPA are necessary, or in Rule 20 of the Rules of Court on pre-trial where the parties and their attorneys are both directed to appear before the court for a conference; so that for counsel to appear at the pre-trail in behalf of the client,

he must clothe the former with an adequate authority in the form of a special power of attorney or corporate resolution. Section 23 of Rule 138 provides that "(a)ttorneys have authority to bind their clients in any case by any agreement in relation thereto made in writing, and in taking appeals, and in all matters of ordinary judicial procedure ..." Thus, when Rule 26 states that a party shall respond to the request for admission, it should not be restrictively construed to mean that a party may not engage the services of counsel to make the response in his behalf. Nonetheless, even assuming arguendo that Atty. Philip Sigfrid Fortun overstepped his authority, it is only his client, respondent Banco Filipino, which has the prerogative to impugn his acts and not petitioner, the adverse party. Interestingly, Banco Filipino has not objected to the response made by its counsel in its behalf. (28) RAUL ARELLANO v. CFI and SANTIAGO UY-BARRETA FACTS: Barreta filed a civil case with respondent court against Arellano and Emilio B. Bayona for reconveyance, with damages, of a certain parcel of land, alleging as cause of action that the defendants had successfully maneuvered in bad faith, thru a supposedly false extrajudicial partition, to secure the issuance of a certificate of title which enabled them to ultimately have the cancellation thereof by a TCT in the name of Arellano. After being served with summons, Arellano filed a motion to dismiss, instead of an answer, based on the ground of failure of the complaint to state a cause of action. Simultaneously, pursuant to Rule 25 of the Rules of Court, he sent written interrogatories to Barreta. Since Arellano did not receive any answer, his counsel filed a motion praying that defendant's Motion to Dismiss be postponed to such date fixed by the Court if plaintiff shall send his Answers to defendant's Written Interrogatories. As nothing was heard from Barreta, Arellano filed a motion reiterating "his prayer for the dismissal of plaintiff's complaint pursuant to Section 5, Rule 29 and Section 3, Rule 17", alleging that Barreta had failed to serve answers to the interrogatories sent to him despite the periods previously given to him by the court. The lower court dismissed the complaint against Arellano. 3 months later, Barreta filed a "Motion for Reinclusion of Raul Arellano as Indispensable Party Defendant" and added that "is now ready with the copies of the documents needed to answer the queries of Arellano in his quest for interrogatories." But the motion was denied. A year after, Barreta filed a "Motion to Set Aside Orders Dismissing Complaint against Arellano". But it was dismissed. However, Barretas "Motion for Admission of Amended Complaint" was granted even before Arellano could object to it or be heard. Arellano moved to set aside this order. After it was opposed by Barreta, the trial court issued an order of denial which counsel for Arellano claims he has never received. Arellano filed a MR insisting that the case insofar as he was concerned had long been terminated and could no longer be revived. The Court denied the MR and ruled that the dismissal of Raul does not constitute res judicata considering that from the records of the case, it appears that the written interrogratories sent to the plaintiff was done without leave of Court and in violation of Section 1, Rule 24 of the New

Rules of Court which prescribes that leave of Court is required for said written interrogatories after jurisdiction has been obtained over any defendant or over property which is the subject of the action and that his dismissal was based on the erroneous assumption that the written interrogatories for the sent by the Raul Arellano was proper even without previous leave of court. It is to be noted further that there is nothing in the records to show that the court had granted leave to file the written interrogatories. ISSUES: (1) W/N the dismissal of the complaint as against Arellano in view of Barretas failure to answer the written interrogatories" is proper; (2) W/N the dismissal of Barreta's complaint as against Arrelano has the attributes of res adjudicate on which case Barreta's amended complaint admitted by the same trial court should be barred. HELD: Yes as justified in Section 5 of Rule 29 which provides: Failure of party to attend or serve answers. If a party or an officer or managing agent of a party willfully fails to appear before the officer who is to take his deposition, after being served with a proper notice, or fails to serve answers to interrogatories submitted under Rule 25, after proper service of such interrogatories, the court on motion and notice, may strike out all or any part of any pleading of that party, or dismiss the action or proceeding or any part thereof, or enter a judgment by default against that party, and in its discretion, order him to pay reasonable expenses incurred by the other, including attorney's fees. Section 1 of the same rule together with its Section 3(c), is not applicable here. What these provisions refer to is a situation where a particular question in the set of written interrogatories served upon a party is concerned, but where the whole set of written interrogatories is ignored and none of the questions is answered the sanction is found in Section 5 above. Moreover, Section 3 of Rule 17 provides that if plaintiff fails to appear at the time of the trial, or to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time, or to comply with these rules or any order of the court, the action may be dismissed upon motion of the defendant or upon the court's own motion. This dismissal shall have the effect of an adjudication upon. In this case, Barreta contributed actively to the unreasonable and unexplained delay of the preliminary incidents. (2) Yes, which is justified by Sections 3 of Rule 17. Although the order does not say so expressly, the dismissal ordered thereby should be deemed to be for failure to prosecute. In effect, said order resolved all his motions which were to the same end and still unacted upon. But all these is not to say that dismissal under Section 5 of Rule 29 does not constitute res adjudicata. The purpose of discovery procedures is to provide means by which both parties in an action may acquire, without waiting for the trial, knowledge of material facts and evidence which otherwise would be peculiarly within the knowledge only of the other. In that way, surprises and deceptions are avoided and the litigants must have to depend no longer on the

techniques and tactics of trial lawyers but must win or lose on the basis of the bare facts constituting their causes. It is thus important that the rules on discovery should be duly observed and violations thereof, correspondingly dealt with. It was clearly erroneous on the part of respondent court to have admitted the amended complaint of private respondent. And it being apparent that the said amended complaint is validly barred by res adjudicata insofar as petitioner is concerned, the said admission constitutes grave abuse of discretion.