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The Secretary
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Harry W. Shlauderoan

ARA Monthly Report (Jull) The "Third ~vorld War" and South America

The military regimes of the southern cone of America see themselves as .embattled:

South

on one side by international Marxism and~its terrorist exponents" and on the other by the hostility of the un~omprehending industrial democracies misled by Marxist propaganda.

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In response they are banding together in what may well become a political bloc-pf some cohesiveness. But, more~ ~ I\signifi.cantly, they are joining forces to euadicate II subversion" , ~ a word which increasingly translates into non-violent djssent from the left and center left. The security forces of the southern cone' ,,..
now coordinate intelligence activities closely;

~~I! ~!J ~~f,-, ..;:::

~ ~l ~ ~
vi ,!jQ x
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operate in the territory of one another's countrie~ in pursuit of "subversives~'; have established Operation Condor to find and kill terror ist.sof the Revolutionary Coord inating Commit-tee" in their own countries and in Europe. Brazil is cooperating short of murder operations.
II

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'""! J,he

This siege mentality shading into paranoia is perhaps natural result of the convulsions of recent years in which ~he societies of Chile, Uruguay and Argentina have be~n badly shaken by assault from the extreme left. But the military 'leaders, despite r.eaz decimation of the Harxist left in Chile and Uruguay, alonS' with accele~ating progress toward that goal in Argentina, insist that the threat remains and the war must go on. Some talk of the "Third t']orld tvar", with t.he countries of the southern cone as the last bastion of Christian civilization. r, '-/XGDS-2 __ .....--....,. \'iARNING NOTICE: SE NSIT~TELLIGENCE SOURCES AND HETHODS INVOLVED. DISSEHINATION AND EXTRACTION OF INFORNATION CONTROLLED.
BY ORIGINATOR.

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Somewhat

more ratic~ally,

they consider their counter-terrorism e ve r y bi-t as justi.fied a s Israeliactions against Palestinian .... __ terrorists; and
>'

'

they believe that the criticis:n f~om democracies ~ of their war on terrorism reflects a double standard. The result of this DentaJ j t:l... interna'llXr is to magnify the isolation 6 the military institutions from the civilian sector, thus na.r r ow.i.nq the range 'of political and economic options. ~he broader implications ~ t~ and for future trend are disturbing. The 0se of bloody countert.e r ro r i sm by these regl.:':','2:5 tnre2.-C~ns .. .increa sanq .a 1 i.cn :-----~ ... ~ tr1e:Lr ., error i ac at . from the 'i'lest and the cpe ninq of eep .i deo Loqi.ca-l divisions among the countries of the hemisphere. An.outbreak of PLO-tYP8 terror ism on a worLdw.i e scale in -response d is c?!so. pos sLb i Lity. a The indus ':.rial- democracies vrc uLd be t he ba t.t.Lef LeLd, :

in the hemisohere

::''''0:

'. ":~

This -mon I s t rends' I_)2lpe:c &tt.em.pts for t he first. t.h time t~ focus on long-tern dangers of a right-wing b!oc~ Our :i.~.~~ial policy recl)~;'h:;nc~2.tionsare: ---_ ,- ~- ~ .. ----.- ..- ....~-.-- ".. _--. - .. -_--- .. -._ ----- .. - ..... -_.

..

To ernoh i ze the differences , bet'.'een th e six .'as a countr .::_(:s t- every oppor t.una t:'l.
}.

--

To depcliticize

human rights. of the

To oppose rhetorica2 exagSirations "Third'-\'lorld-\';ar" type.

_':,-:_
<to

To bring the potential b Loc+membe r s back-into our cognitive unive~s~ through systematic

exchanges.

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-3Security Cooperation is a Fa ct There is extensive c ooperation between the security/ intelligence ooetations of six covernments: Araentina, Brazil. Bolivia, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay. Their intelligence. serviCeS hold formal meetings to plan' "Operation Condor." It will include extensive FBI-type exchanges of information on shac y characters. There are plans for a spe cial cozrrnun ca+Lon s ne t.wo , These i zk details are still secret, but broad security cooperation .is net. Officials in Paraguay and Argentina have told us that they find it necessary to cooperate with each other and their neighbo~s against internationally-funded terrorists and "SUbversives."
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The p roblem - bsqins' \'lith the oe z i.n r.c aon o'f' ..subversion" never :the most preci se of t.e ra , One reporter wzi,tes r s tha t subver sion "h~s qrown to inc 1 ude near 19- anyone vILlO opposes gov- ::rnm2:;-~t policy." In countries \.1nereeveryone knows tliat subversives can 0ind up eead or tortured, educa-1::e-d people have an urid e r st.a nde.b concern Le ai:::.out the boundaxi.e s of dissent. The concern doub Le s when t.hore is a chance Of...p81:."3GCl.lt:ion by foreign p olice. ii acting on' indirect, unknown infor!.\a i.cn . Numerous t Uruguayan refug2es have been murde.:ced in ArS8ntina, and there~a~e widesnread accu5~tions that Araenti~e police are doing their Uruguayan colleagues a-favor. These accusations are ~E'least credible,wbether or not they are exact.

The Nature of the Left-Extremo

Threat : A

iUruguayan Foreign Minister Blanco one of the br ighter and no rma Ll.y steadier members or the group - was the first to describe the campaign against terrorists 25 a "Third vlorld tva.I:"." The description is int eresting for two reasQns:
It justifies measures.

harsh

and st!.ee.ping "wa rc Lme " and institutional

c xc z-c.i.cc 'of PU\~.;-2L

It emphasizes
a.. p-ec't, s

the international
j1".!.stif~/ir:g the

the~eb~1

beyond national

borders.

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UN_lEU
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It may be exaggerated. Blanco, who believes -- probably correctly -- that he and his fanily are targeted. One must admire his personal courage.

The threat

is not imaginary.

This is hard to sugg est to a man like

Even by objectiv~ standards, the terrorists h ave had substanfial accomplishments ov er the years: At one time or other, urban and rural g:..1.erril1-c.:.s have creat.ed ssvere problems for a Irao s t; every South P ri12:L ican government, .. including those where democxe cy is s till surviving.
Tr..'~y have pr ovoked repres si v e .r.e act i.ons t

including torture and quasi-governmental d~ath squads. (The guerrillas typicallJ

claimed to vlelcOI~'.2 r ep r-e s s i.on , but.

\:.;e

V:fonde:t:

if -they really

1Lke ""hat they got.)

They still poss a serious threat in A~gentina and - - arguab ly -- u lesser pr ob Lem in b.!O or three othiS.C COuntries. is a +ez r o.r+c.ri.errted "Revolutionarv Coordin.::tir:.g Junta", p o ss i.b Ly he.J.dq':.Ht"te~e.d in Paris, which is both a counterpart of and an incentive fOl: coopere.tion bet,'leen governments;;:.:
Th2.re

Neverthelesst it is 2.1S0 'true t hac , b z o ad Ly i.:errori.sts 2,DC1 tl!.~ P02..c(~::ul left ha ve fai,led. rfhi:; i s true even .i, n theminds- 0'::: studic'-Us' revolutionaries. Che Guevarafs rOIT'.antic fiasco c:;:-ushed hopes for rural revolution. Allende' 5 fall is taKen. (perhaps pessimistically) as proving that the electoral route cannot work. ur ban gu errillas c o Ll.apsed- Ln .. Brazil with C a~los Marighela and in Uruguay with the Tupanaros. The Latt.e.r epresented a h i.q +wat.e mazk , r h r Their solid, efficient s tr uccur e p osed a real "t'Jartima threat:. Prob~bly t. he mi.Li tary be'lieve that torture was indispensable to crack this structure.

speakInCj..both

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-5-There is s till a maj or campaig n in Argenti na. We expect the military pull. up .t.he i r sock s and wi n . They have precedents to guide them, a~d the terrorists have no handy r0fuge in neighboring countries.

to

t'lhat ~.'iill remain. i s a chain of goverrul1ents t started by Brazil in 1964, whose origin was i n battle ag ainst
the e xtreme lef t. It is i mportant to their ego, their salaries, and t heir equiornent-budaets to beli eve in a Third World War. At b ~st, uh8n~Argentina stabilizes, we can hope to convince them that t hey have a lready won. \ T t:! "i.'.Ta r r i.o r s. v.'..L l 'h"" '. t"~l nc t Li.ke t.h i.s........ '"'.l.J-.C\T a...LJ_ -( ad v s n.i.cke ,.:_.!~ a Lr e ...... :'l .. L. 1':'~.... ~. !_,_v,:.. r at us for bein g wor r i ad a bout kid s tuff lik e drug smuggling when t.he r e is a real mili tary c aripa i qn g oing on. They accuse_us of ~pplauding the defeat pf terrorism in Ent ebbe but not in: Montevideo. Our differing percenticns of the th reat are raisi!".S" st<spi~ons-abol]_t our "reli.:tbili!.'L:...."
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r1"hat

the

Rig ht-~iing

!-',egirres Ea.ve i~

COIT:.Ilion

These governments -2-_r ereactive.: they derived th.-ei:t leg i c i.macy ~_i11" a r eaction a erain s t; . tGrrot~ism. Lefc+e xti r em.i.rsm , Lnst.abi.Li.t y , and (Qs~ 'i:hey s ee it) Ha.rxism. Thus, "c_nti-:,'la:c:x.isn'(.i;s a mcre L a nd l)olit:.ical initial
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There is also an_,' ideoloq.y t~;~<:~::s ~F') i .in orlc:rin: t; ha i: 0 f c 2. ~~loni:~ (2 '3 t.~?:::e n 1.: 1
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,. The vision o f nac i.on ha s been a s e f f ec t Lve in South Ame Lca as it vra s in E ur op e , r (It m ay yet turn out to b e a s de structive; t his'pap~~ looks o nly bri efly at the po tential for cqnflicts between L atin nations and blocs.) Military es tabli s hrr.eri ts , traditional p rocec t ors of
a posi-tion

boundaries a~d national integr~tYI ai~ into profit from the nf.?l'.7 nationalism.

.::

EconOluic dev~lopment is -a pressing n eed a nd a public demand. Disciplined military estabLi.shmen ts can work \'li th t ech~ocrats t o pxodu ce economic developme~t. I n the co untries we are c on s i.de r i nq , the military is always 'the
strongest n c c i cria L in'st.itut.ion - somet.Lme s

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the only one. It has, typically, saved the nations from civilian C:haos
r:

National de velopmentalism is t !~erefore r eal medicine closer to r.10st citiz8!1S then. trendy left o}-:"riaLl .. -,jing t causes. '1'o.this ex t en t , milit~ry po wer can fi~d a -popu Laz base.

National

dG velopmen-talism

bothersome pClr.3_11els to L\1'(!ticnal of the military regimes call them effective pej6rative, the more so said to be t~chnically apcurate. These days, to call a man fascist
describe 'his econom i,c v i.ews ,
r . the

ha s o bvious and Soc i a Li.era . Opponcnt.s

fascist. It is an " tscause it can ba But it is a pejorative. is not primarily to

mili tary regirr:es t.end i;.o be full of the same inconsistencies that c haracterize. rion-militarj,' pragreaticr non-ideolcgical regimes. Local political institutions are (reas6nablyl considered to have been a failure, and it i s
sucraes ced tha "t- "democrac,.r dc es rr rc "i"lor;~ for
U2. "

In. practice

Le;2ers want t~ build mo~e efficient institutio~~;to organize the.ir !:Oocieticos E::1tirely differer::-t.ly:.. Yet there is, at some level of consciousness, . an accei?::a.nce tha.t democracy is the id eal eventually to be sought.
No other inst.itution is a Ll.ov.ed to chal lenge military pow~r, yet politicel parties ~nd courts often exist and perf'o m some valid r functions. Brazilts tootbless parliarneni, for example, does cautiously articulate public opinion and provide a dor3ant alternative to military rule. a Ll.ow substantial exp r e s s i.on ,

J:

Insecure, repressive govern.r:-:ents nevertheless "democratic" freedoms r including varying degrees of f::-eedom. of
T he amh iente is rnor e like
Yo;; ca n buy a goo d

Hashi:1gton than Moscm"l. .

newspaper~ a pair of ae~a~~ntly-flQwered blue jeans: a girlie magazir..e, or a. modern painting.

UNClASSIFIED

UKel_to
-7- ,.
These military regimes do not expect to la~t forever.' There is' no t hought-of 'a-'Thousand~'---~-:-'~ear Reich, no pretense of having arrived at

ultimate Marxist-style truth. From the stand!;)oint our policy, the Ulost of im,,?ortant long-term c ;;i.ract.~r i,stic of tl:ese rE:gi!TIES may be precisely th.atthey are r eversib12, in both theory and practice. They know it. But they do uot know what to co about: it. -Political and social development lag. Long after left-wing threats are squashed, the regimes are still terrified of them. Fighting ,the absent pinY..os remains a central goal of naticnal security_ ,Threats and plots are discovered. Some "rni st.ake s " are m2.a.e by the t.oz t ur e.rs , who have difficulty finding logical v i.ct i.ms t1urder s" qua.ds . kill harmless people and petty thie<,,-es. t':hen _ eLec t i.ons are he ld, the pe r ver se cl ectorateshoVls a desire tG put the rnilita~y out of ~ower. officers ,see the trend ending.with their 'own bodies on the rack. No more e Lec t Loras for
d

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wh i Le ,

He do no t suggest t hat ther8 is a hopoLess Ly ~ vicious circle. Since some of these re~irnes are producing really solid economic successe~ The officers may everrcual.Ly' trust c Lvi.Li.an s to'; succeed them and providG an honorable. exit. So fai, the military has fo und it easier to ride the tiger than to dismount. {'lhen an altern,J.'c:Lvs government eventually has to be found, it'ICight be that t he only one ava Ll.abLe ~-lill at t}).(2.' far le ft. 08 But ,There Are Also Leading Differences. In discussing the gene.ral characteristic~ of., the southern military regimes, we have ffiade some indefensibly broad generalizations. The following is an attempt to corrstt the worst disiortions, country-by-country. It is important to be clear about the differences because, for reasons vIe shall develop later, our oo Li.cv shOl1.1.d h8 t-Q (:>.p1ph2.siz,= T,rhat the countries _do not hav;; in common rat.ber than ',.;hat they do,
The front-burner cases are Arg-entinar Ch iLe jand

Uruguay.

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Argentina l's the most. interesting r .both".because....,.,-....-it is important and because the directions of the new regime are not clear~ The Argentines are politically sophisticated like the Brazilians, but unlike the Brazilians, the Argentines lack social and even mili t.a ry uni.t y , To re cover economically r they rnust break the power of traditional struc tures, and esp~cially of the labor movement. Th~re is also a genuine challenge from left-wing terrorists and right-wing
zr o r The p ro hLem r app o ac eh s c Lvi L-wa r 'Ne believe that the 3razilian. model will prevail. I n the Lcnq r'un , t hus, we think the mili t.az y w i.Ll, i n , Videla -- or his successor "": '\-.'ill w have mo re trouble with hard-line nilita.ry officers and rigl1t-H ing terro r than with the Le f t , . Fo::eces courrce r-cce

di.mens i.ons ,

. ::~
"

probably connected to t.he :regii-r;;; have already been killing exiles arid priests, among o t.he s . r __
I

Chile

ha s

been. the

subject

of so

much ac t.i.on

latelykhaL you probably do not need to hear any more. The Chileans have smashed the L eft almost
as t.horo uchLv ,'5 th,---B;~"''74'';a''''',. bu t tl:e repzessiV0 ' ~:::.r='". 't- '(.1c- ;;".1:5-';' l_V. r;-:o-~~ u-:n~::::; "1'~ ~.... _ _ r.-' ".~: -'~1 Il . , ' !:'v. ,:;, ~.t.:: " . c.... ... '-._ .1',! l.L1ere J.. S no ap

'1;;; -

one at the

top Li.ke Go;;isel who.even S8f~H1S to'i'lisl1 to mod cr;J.te h;' m.::tn-:!:' ights e.buse s ~,: Th~ S?.nti a.go regif.1.2 pz ov i.dc s the arcLl:::tYf):S of the reasoning that cr ic i.c i sm of tOi:-tJ)1:8' can corne ori Ly from

in~ernationEl Marxist plotters. The military see~ particularly insecure and isolated, even with respect to the Chilean public. Uruguaz is the third p. ressih-g ca se ("lith and Chile). Foreign l'~irliste::::- Blanc;:) was the fi rst, to t.e k about the "'J~hird~',Torld ~";ar/" andl he still: insists that. the t.hz ea t; corrt.Lnuc s h igh in his oo unc r y , Given -this picture 1 Urv.guay Ls 1 of course, eager to coop~ra~e with its neighbors in defensive measures. Nevertheless, unlike the Chileans, the Uruguayans have maintain~d some" sense of proporticn about human righ~s and international publi.c op i.ni.ori, Civilians a z e up fJ.: on1::, in th e gove1:'!lmsnt, .:;:rive militar:y t he sub scanc i.a L supportl and interact relatively well.
Argentina

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Brazil: We c ~n and should relate to Brazil as an emerging world power rather th an as a trouble-spot. Yet ! its 1964 "revolution" is the basic mode L f or its neighbors. The biggest problem is that, despite re-' .markable successes I the B rc_zilD:m . armed se rvices still cannot f ind a wa.y to relax the ir held on powez, on " . the other hand, they are not much worried about it. They have be en abl e to ta o civilian talent for economic purposes. ~he Left is sm~shed. but it i6 not clear . ftlhether the President can contro l the zeal of his secur ity forces. F_tt empts at polit.ical distensa.o have largely f lopped. (The word carries bo th the English sense of "distending", or enlarging authority from a narrO'l:l militarv bese , an d the French sense of flrelaxingll. Better than' detente?) Brazi l, like the other large countries, does see itself as & world actor, and this inhibits extremism.

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Boli~ia is an interesting case but no t a hot problem. 'l'his is th e scene of one of th e t!tree genuine soc:l_al z evo Luui.on s in Latin Ar,~er Lea -- \ ;hich makes ii all the more puzzling th~t Che Guevara though~ he h ad a con tribution to make. Despite his failure, he ieft lasting worries. Tha Ecli~ians still
cori ai.de r U;_a~ Che
r

_
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s ~.=-,.i:h

2al:2~'3

thE:::1 a t. 0.:::get. of

revGnge for Lnt.eznat.LonaL tsrrorists"

~.:.2. cannot

qui te perceive the sarne menace ~.. In :so li vi an "i:er:ms I the govern~ent is notably st~bl~ and economically successful. It h as been mcdo:J:'D_t_(~ on hu man rights. ria igh.bo!::;-rn~t.is a mU_8 be hi.nd, Thi_s is the kind of ni!leb~2nth--:,::c!.i.ltury mili tary regir(le t;"'at looks good en . the ca rtoon paae. Pa r a qu ay , howeve z , has eminently sou~d reason3 io r being ba~~ward'~nd is not in the least apologetic. The ParaguCty2..D.S remember that, in t he Chaco v:ar f they ~C1J..gh.t ff th e maas i.ve Ly o superior armed forces of three neighbors for a ridiculousl....,~ long time. ~ Pride w as saved. if rrothinc ~ else. There is no d erncc r e t .Lc t:r:2.dit.ion; whace ve r , The government has reacted to f ea~c of the left rather than the kind o f specific challclge posed in the ot hcr
(

! pe._rEl.guav is

marching

to

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as

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co un t.r Le s ,

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. A Political
.

-.

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evolves'~-i'nfO"fOi:matlon
.

Bloc In Formation?
c------:---~-

,'__--r-f-poTiEe::fype coo'peration

of a political bloc, our interests will b~ involved in way s that ar e ne\'l for South P.m~r iea. Such a blcc is" not her:e 'let.. The conditions for i ts l:o :!,.""Ti:o,'\:ion are
largely pres~nt:

The conviction that an international leftist: threat. amounts to a "VJo::c ltl ';arH and hence ~ requi::ccisn allianc~. a Highly cornJatib~e philosophies and political objectives in.other respects. Irnproved .transport and commun Lcati.on 9<?tt:,reen neighboring count~ies,-which previously had better links w i.t.h he U ~S. and Euro~ tha!l t with each other.
A suspicion tb<!t e ven t.he U.S. has "lost it.s vrill" -to stand firm a.gainst c ommun i.sm baceuce

...~.

of Vie t-I-tC'.m detente: and social ,

decay'~

Resentment of human -right~.:; tici ;-;;n, w!'J.,icil, c ri is often taken as justone Dore sign of the:
commie encirclement. ExoLus ion by t.he rn.iLi,tcLry of the ci vilian r dernocz e t Lc interplay vzhi ch helps to maLnt a Ln a sense of proportion. There are a f ew inhibitions on formation of' a bloc. Nationalistic thinking is the obvious one~ Traditional feuds have largely shaped the sense of nation. Nith th e excep-:'ion of the PerU/Chile tension .. howcver , border di sputes ~ are n.o longe~ an. oveir iding factor in the southern conc. To predict a political bloc ~ould still be speculative. Commonsense could assert it.self. There is plenty of it available in these coun t rLes a.ndeven some in their arrai.e \:'12 do t.h i.nxthat t.ne trend s. toward bloc thinking is present, clear, and troublesomG.

UNClASSifiED

.. -.
-. . ">:

&ASSIFIED
-11-

If a Bloc Dces Form.

'In t he e3.r~,y stages r ~!e~,;illbe a "c asue L bene':':' fie iary" (as one rep orter put.s i t) f or reasons t~o,t are too obvious to need elaboration here. On the main East-~~st stage, .right-wing regimes can hardly tilt t.owa rd the Soviets and Cuba ns. The fact that w e are ; an. apparent benefi.c i axy can ez s i Ly lull us into trouble as has h Lst.or a.caI Ly bG8n the c ase in th is henri spher e .

r
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But we would e~pect a range of growirig problerns~ 86me are already with us. Internationally; the Latin generals look like our guys. We are especially identified ,lith Chils=. It .cannot do us any good. _. L:.n:opeans r certainly, hate Pinochet ,& Co~ with a passion that rubs off on us. __ More ~roblems are on th e seh~dule: ::cigh'l.:s se s 1 as you kuovr, are a bu more and mor e p.robLenis of conscience, d i.p Lome.c y c ........ ,.
HUITl.o.!'1

e:cs,3_ i:.ing

la~'i( a'~~(r

iI

Chile' s b lac~~-she(::p s-ta'cus has already m.:".aetrouble for i b, economic recovery. The fa1:'the.r to the ri ght the ..drift g oes in o ,ther, count r i es, the more difficulties' we can exp~ct in our economic links with them. We:wo~ld like to ~hare_with, say, the Brazilia~~ a perception that we are. natural allies. Brazilian participation in a right-~ing blo6' wcuLd make t.hi s u nlikely. Eventually, ~.'C could even se e s e r ious,_s t.ra i.n s with th e demo cracies f'a r c her north. OriLla has told u s that he thinks a c onfrontation is possible. U1:'uguayand Vene~uela have just broken z eLaLions over c:~c Ln c.i.d t; involving cn political asylum. A precedent?

UNCLASSIFIED

-.

_SlfiEn

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'.'

Over the horizcn, there is a chance of se rious vlorld-scale t.rouble. This is .ape cu La t.Lvejbut; ..nq...Lon ger._._. __ ._ .... ridiculous. The Re~.rolutionary Coordinating Junta now .... seems to have its headquarters in Paris, plus consi~erable activity in other European capitals. With ter~0ristfu being forced out of Argentina, their concentration in Europa (and'possibly the U.S.) will increase. The South funerican regimes kno~ about this. Thev are i ncr -the i:c --' p LannArgsrd.:ine., 0(\'11 COu.:l/:.:.er::'tcr::::or o ce ra t i on s inlead; --. .' . -___,--:--;---.,;EuropG.. Cn i, le, and UruSi2ai are in the Brazil is wary but is pr oviding so~e technical support.

-"I

The n ext sten mic~t be for the terrorists to undertake a worldwide-attack' on embassi~~ and interests of the six hated regi.r:-:es. The FLO has shown the. tlay. H2 can p i.c.ur s ou+h ]'.neric8.D activitiss on a e-errpa.:;:-able t e scale I agai.,;;"1 the industrial using d erno c i es as a cz-a battLefield. The impossibility .of ~eaceful change ~'ill. rad Lca Li ze exile's who might, in earlier days, 'have looked forward to returning h028 peacefully.
M

.J

Till now, though we have t~ied

to exercise a
.

mode;:'ai:ing

i.nfh!enC8, we have not. c aken a long-:t.err~ s t za teg ic v i.evr of tl1e pr-obJ.ems t.hat. a r ight-\.'ing b],o c

.,

would create. This priper has "tried for ~ sharper focus. Voi'e sbaJ.l ha \7.2 raoze recorr::n~ndation5 in m onch s to c orao , but. th0 following are a fair stnrt: , 1) Distinguish bet0een cou~~ries with special .. care. If He treat:-Eh8lT:-asa "\I)11:")].e( we "Jill be encoU):':c,ging' them to view therns~lves as an e~battled bloc. In our dealings with each country and in Congression~l testimony, we should, for example 1 reflect reccgnition t.tla"t :..
. .~

11..rg-8ntina, "lith. its virtual civil we:c , fa.cBs a pr ob Lera much diffcl:Gn':_ from its nei'}htors. Uruguay, wi t.h i ts
s ubs t.arrti.e L r emna nt.s
... 1.'-'

of

military/civilian to cnile.
v.'Orld-

interpla.y,is

-.J ....

I...

co:-aparable

Brazil has the weight, sophistication, and perspec t.i.ve to share l,~2.n'y of our concexns .

UNClASSIfiED

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-tlUSS\HEO
-13Our military-sales programs nay also;provide an opportunity for distinction. Aid no longer provides significant.leverage. Thereis vast interest in overall economic re la t ions -- bu t not much freedom ();; movemenc ,
2) . Try t.o get the T?oli_~ics an? ideology ou:.:of. humar; :ciCjh"(:~.;. Tilis obj ecti ve ,.'ill be il~r.d to :r~econcile w.i.th the equally pressing need to rauLt.Lla t er a Li.ze our concern. To. a.void charges of "int0rvention, II "\:e
musc .i.ncr ea s i.r.e-Ly \-lark i:h.l.:-ough the

I:lter-J. .. er i.can Human m

the:t support
vie

RiS'hts

Co mm.i s i on . s

The countries

us k0t::l?

. .,

there, however, will tend to be democracies one or t vlO z ad i c a L Car ibJ?ean govern ments).
regirG.cs vri.Ll, feel cesieged.. one or mor e of th em w ith us. Idc:ally:

(and perhaps Righ t-v;ing

should

If th2.:: is .impos s i.bLe (as now s e:ems lik121y),we sl'~2ul.d t;;.ke s pe c i a L "'care to make clear that authoritari~n regimes of the right h.;:>. no r:!c;:<?.~")ol ve '[_~ abl1.se S ~ (You::: S,"t::.tiagQ~p~ec h had the rig~t balance).

--

liake c lea r if'..... ~ou:c Soutll AI;K:r i.c2.11. d e a Li.nq s t.ha t the "Third 1901.:-2.d 'i7a:;:-" ic.c.::l .is o ve r dz- awn

i1

.artd lea ds

to dan garous

cons2~~c~ces~

.:

In Congressional testimony he~e, stress that the threa.t is rea.l for a cour.t y like' ArgE:n'tina. r
4} ~l: i....::_~ _!:~~8ml.J<}.(;];: to our C00!1j- ti \-,,2 ~ni ve.~ .. .. .. ~.g_."_ EUi: how? OUJ:" Er:,.oas s v .i ~1 Let I?2.Z has n~co:,;.!,:(::r~d.ecl that. 'de . '. e xcb ano e in'cellig-C:l-..ce briefiJ:cgs v.:1:th the Bolivians. This mig ht provi de a I'lay to reach sc s pi.c i.ou s military officers and v oxk on their "Thi rd F orld \ ')'ar" syndro~T'.e . But t he ire <3.. ':-eazards. h \\12 wou Ld f ail to p roduce illf crmation sustai~ing their t)ls4_is: and t.hey mighi:::-cOl"~:clud~ t!1a t we ";ere badly inforined or uncoope re "t:i ire. Instead i we hink t we sno u Ld t'lcrk on syst eraa"i:.ic Ld+LeveJ, e xc e.nqe rn h s -- something rr.o e +han exc hariqe s o f info:cmat~,-o~J. n r o terrorists. ~ ';eneed to achieve a pe rc epc i.on that n e i t.Ler'

detente ncr distens~o frien~ly r8SJS~S.

is

a threat

to th e

legi~im~cy

of

'.

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...

~-

......
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-.

_-_.-

~--~----'.....

e~

... -

UNClASSIfiED

.......

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'

_IFIED
-14In time, perhaps we"can, convince them that a Third

World War is undesirable .

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J.1
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J:. J..J,- 5\ A M I _""'''' DCproper/WHLt.>ezx-29192 8/2/76

if

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UNCLASSIFIED