Alex Michie Political Theory

Sarah Hannan Week 3 - Equality

What kind of equality, if any, is a justified goal of social and political organisation? Equality, like most concepts in political theory, means very different things to different people. For example, some philosophers reject Rawls theory of justice on the ground that it is too egalitarian, whereas others dont consider him egalitarian at all.1 This essay will analyse the varying concepts of equality, namely: formal equality; equality of opportunity; libertarian theories of equality (i.e. Nozick); Rawls theory of justice as fairness; luck egalitarianism (with specific reference to Dworkin and Cohen); and Andersons democratic equality. It will discuss the strengths and weaknesses of each and conclude that: formal equality is justified, but has significant implications that must be stated in order for it to constitute a full theory of equality; similarly, equality of opportunity is almost a broad as the concept of equality itself it needs a stated moral basis and clearly defined limits, and by creating these, it simply becomes a different theory; libertarian theories fail to treat citizens as free and equal, and are consequently unjust and fails to meet the egalitarian plateau; Rawls difference principle is flawed due to the methodology used to arrive at it; luck egalitarianism is flawed beyond reproach, for all the reasons extensively put forward by Anderson and Scheffler; and that Andersons alternative, democratic equality, is roughly correct but that Anderson vastly underestimates the problem that capitalism poses to the grounding of her theory. As an addition to Andersons democratic equality, this essay will argue that for citizens of a society to be truly free and equal, citizens mustnt be able to exploit one another, as exploitation is not constitutive a free and equal relationship. Consequently, it should not be permitted for citizens to profit from another citizens labour without contributing anything themselves (as is the case with hereditary inheritance of capital for example). In order for this goal to be achieved, capitalism as we know it must be radically amended or replaced. This should not be interpreted as arguing for distributive equality. The basis of the argument is that of a relationship of equals between citizens and the main distributive implication is that is of sufficiency, not equality. That said, a condition of equal relationships is sufficient self-respect and self-reliance, which (as Swift notes) may have implications for distributive equality.2 However, this is a consequence, not a goal, of the argument. First, before discussing various conceptions of egalitarianism, we should try and ascertain what egalitarianism is as a concept. Egalitarianism invariably tries to attribute equal amounts of something to some people. What that something is, and how it should be distributed, and to whom, depends on the conception of equality that one chooses to endorse. For example, Nozick would argue that we should all have an equal and undeniable right to autonomy, and consequently the state should treat all subjects equally, with regards to property rights and autonomy.3 Dworkin, on the other hand, would argue that we should all have equal access to resources in a way that is ambition sensitive but endowment insensitive, negating the morally arbitrary distribution of talents and societal positions.4 These two conflicting conceptions of equality are merely the tip of the iceberg even philosophers who agree on broadly the same conception of equality (luck egalitarians for example), can have major disputes and disagreements. What is both interesting and useful, however, is the
1 2

Swift, p123 Swift, p122 3 Swift, part 1 4 Clayton and Williams, 5 Equality of Resources, (Dworkin)

Alex Michie Political Theory

Sarah Hannan Week 3 - Equality

common ground that almost all political philosophers share with regards to equality. Kymlicka identifies this as the Egalitarian Plateau.5 This is the belief that members of a political community should be treated as equals, that the state should treat its citizens with equal concern and respect.6 What is not agreed upon is what this shared principle entails. The rest of this essay then will be spent analyzing various conceptions of what this fundamental egalitarian principle entails. What is important though, I believe, is that each conception is based on this fundamental principle, this apparent shared philosophical belief. As Sheller states any form of distributive egalitarianism, if it is to be at all plausible, must be anchored in some more general conception of equality as a moral value or normative ideal.7 Superficially the least controversial conception of equality, Equality of Opportunity offers no more of a philosophical consensus than the concept of equality itself. Swift offers three interpretations: minimal, conventional, and radical.8 The minimal is simply that a persons race, gender, or religion should not influence their educational or professional opportunities ie the minimal view is simply opposed to discrimination. However, it ignores that the structure of society often means that race, gender, and religion will dictate opportunities regardless of a formal commitment to prejudice. For example, if make the unrealistic assumption that the USA was free from racism and sexism, its very likely that African Americans would still constitute a disproportionate number of prisoners, and females a disproportionately small number of highly paid employees, due to the inherent opportunities (or lack of) in the structure of American society. This conception of equality of opportunity allows for the relationships between citizens to be vastly unequal. An entirely privatized schooling system, for example, could result in extremely limited social mobility the poor remaining illiterate and uneducated and unable to participate fully in the political and civic spaces of society. Unless paired with or grounded in a more comprehensive conception of equality, the minimal interpretation of equality of opportunity is unsatisfactory. This often leads people to hold Swifts conventional view of equality of opportunity. This asserts that educational and professional positions should be granted on capabilities, and that everybody should have an equal opportunity to achieve those capabilities, regardless of social background and upbringing. The conception is that of a meritocracy, where outcome is based on merit, not hereditary. If life is a race, the conventional view holds that everybody should begin at the same starting line. This has extreme implications. Not only does it mean in universal standards for education, but perhaps also universal standards for family life, and consequently the abolishment of the family altogether.9 This would presumably have to be coercively enforced by the state, at least initially. This certainly infringes on what many would regard as a universal right, that to look after your own offspring. I believe the state would have to require near universal approval to embark on such an intrusion into the lives of its citizens. Such a policy would also be putting economic equality of opportunity above values such as family, liberty, and autonomy. This conception conflicts with the egalitarian plateau, and consequently, I find very unsatisfactory.
5 6

Swift, p93 Ibid 7 Scheffler, p28 8 Swift, p99 9 Swift, p101

Alex Michie Political Theory

Sarah Hannan Week 3 - Equality

The Radical conception of equality of opportunity holds that it is not only arbitrary social class and upbringing that affects the outcome of your life, but also arbitrary talents and characteristics. Everyone should have the equal opportunity to the same rewards, regardless of talents. This is nothing short of full equality of outcome, depending on willingness to work. If life is a race, the radical conception wants everybody to end in the same place. This conception could not function under capitalism, since the market system cannot deliver equality of outcome. Whilst I cannot find a moral objection to such a vague notion, the burden of proof is on those who believe in the radical conception to show how such a society could exist. Marx and Marxists have tried, but as yet failed to show how such a society would work. Furthermore, those who agree with the radical conception are open to criticisms of being overly materialistic, and failing to acknowledge the importance of equal social relations. As Swift notes: Unequal social relations lead to oppression marginalization, exploitation, oppression, domination which typically leads to inequalities in the distribution of goods. But it is the oppression and inequality of social relations that is the fundamental problem.10 And so, as we can see, appeals to equality of opportunity are no less problematic than appeals to equality in general. Therefore we cannot justifiably argue that equality of opportunity should be a desirable goal of social/political/economic organization without first grounding the argument with a moral justification. In order to do this, it is important to first discuss the moral grounding for the various conceptions of equality itself. Let us begin with the least egalitarian of our philosophers, Nozick. As mentioned previously, Nozick believes that the state should treat all citizens equally in the sense that it should respect every citizens autonomy and respective property rights. However, this allows for exploitative, oppressive social relations to develop. If segments of society are not free to live an enjoyable life due to societal structures, then the society itself fails to be free, let alone equal. Additionally, Nozicks principles would allow people have vastly undue influence on the state, and consequently vastly unequal coercive powers over each other. Again, Nozicks society fails to be either free or equal. As Anderson states: Societies [such as that proposed by Nozick] that permit the creation of outcasts and subordinate classes can be as repressive as any despotic regime.11 A once dominant theory of equality is that which Anderson describes as luck egalitarianism or equality of fortune.12 Dworkin and Cohen are both advocates of this theory. They note Rawls assertion that peoples innate talents are arbitrary from a moral point of view13, and argue that people should not suffer inequalities as a result of bad brute luck.14 And so, people should be compensated for such things as social upbringing, lack of talent, and disabilities. Consequently, people should end up with outcomes that are endowment insensitive. Conversely, people should also be held responsible for their voluntary actions. If people choose not to work, they should not be rewarded with redistributive transfers. If they choose to take risks, they should
10 11

Swift, p94 Clayton and Williams, p172 12 Clayton and Willaims, p155 13 Mulhall and Swift, p4 14 Clayton and Williams, 5 Equality of Resources, (Dworkin)

Alex Michie Political Theory

Sarah Hannan Week 3 - Equality

suffer the consequences. This line of argument has considerable intuitive appeal. Surely we should not be made to suffer for things that are beyond our control, whilst having a responsibility to deal with the consequences of our actions? However, Anderson (and later Schleffer) delivered a damning and comprehensive critique of luck egalitarianism. Anderson argues that luck egalitarianism allows for the gross inequality, oppression, and suffering of capitalism whilst incorporating some of the most intrusive elements of socialism: equality of fortune is essentially a starting-gate theory: as long as people enjoy fair shares at the start of life, it does not much concern itself with the suffering and subjection generated by peoples voluntary agreements in free markets. The fact that these evils are the product of voluntary choices hardly justifies them: free choice within a set of options does not justify the set of options itself Like the Poor Law regime, it abandons those disadvantaged through their own choices to their miserable fates, and defines the deserving disadvantaged in terms of their innate inferiority of talent, ability or social appeal.15 Andersons criticism is hard to shake. How can it be possible to compensate someone for lack of intelligence or talent, without being condescending, or even insulting? Similarly, how can it be possible to allow people to die due to bad decisions without being cruel and heartless? Surely peoples talents and characters affect their decision-making? Why do we have an obligation to help the unintelligent caviar-eater, but not the courageous fireman? As Anderson rightly points out, pitiful/condescending compensation is not a relationship among equals. Since this contradicts the fundamental principle of equality that all citizens are equal we cannot justify luck egalitarianism as a justifiable goal of political and social organization. Some claim that luck egalitarianism can be traced to Rawls theory of justice as fairness, due to his attempt to negate the morally arbitrary distribution of talents.16 However, the difference principle theoretically allows the fortunately talented to become vastly wealthy, as well as ensuring that the worst off are not left to starve, even as a consequence of bad option luck. Additionally, what is embedded in his theory is the fundamental principle of egalitarianism that people are free and equal the very principle that Anderson shows luck egalitarianism to violate. So, perhaps Rawls conception of equalitys role in the state, is a justifiable goal? Unfortunately, Rawls principles do not protect the political equality of citizens. In Rawls society the wealthy may well have undue influence over political institutions. Additionally, oppressive relationships may occur, despite his liberty principle. Suppose the worse off in Rawls society are the unemployed. Inequality is only permitted then if it benefits the unemployed. However, workers may still have to perform demeaning and humiliating tasks in an oppressive environment, as it is still slightly preferable to being unemployed. Rawls theory gives insufficient weight to the equality of social relationships. For Rawls theory to be sufficiently egalitarian, another principle should be added: material inequality can only be permitted if it doesnt affect political equality. As Anderson says: the stronger the barriers against commodifying social status, political influence, and the like, the more acceptable are significant income inequalities.17
15 16

Clayton and Williams, p168 Scheffler, What is Egalitarianism? 17 Clayton and Williams, p180

Alex Michie Political Theory

Sarah Hannan Week 3 - Equality

It could be said, that since one of our main problems with luck egalitarianism is that it does not provide a sufficient safety net for the worst off in society, our objection is not to inequality but to suffering. What matters, it might be thought, is not that people have equal amounts of whatever is valuable, but that all have enough.18 Swift illustrates this point with a thought experiment. He asks what two-person society would we rather: one with a distribution of 45:80 split (utils, or pounds, or anything); or one with a 30:30?* If the answer is 45:80, then perhaps we do not have a commitment to equality of distribution. If the answer is actually 30:30, then perhaps we are guilty of leveling down. This is the process that reduces the levels of income/welfare/resources/opportunities of the most well off in society towards those of the least well off in order to achieve equality. Let us first deal with the first claim: if wed prefer a 45/80 distribution to a 30/30 one, then perhaps we dont care about equality at all? First it is important to say that, ceteris paribus, many egalitarians would prefer a 45/80 distribution (including myself). But that does not mean we do not care about equality. Lets take Rawls, for example. Ceteris Paribus, Rawls would favour the 45/80 distribution, as it satisfies the difference principle the inequality has benefited the least well off. However, one of Rawls primary goods is self-respect. Intuitively and empirically, inequality is detrimental to self-respect. If the loss in self-respect is greater than the gain in resources, then perhaps a 30/30 distribution would be preferable? Furthermore, if we look at this thought experiment with regards to Andersons notion of democratic equality, it sheds more light on the issue. Anderson asserts that negatively, people are entitled to whatever capabilities are necessary to enable them to avoid or escape entanglement in oppressive social relationships. Positively, they are entitled to the capabilities necessary for functioning as an equal citizen in a democratic state.19 Consequently, if the distributive inequality entail either oppressive social relationships, or prevent the poorer citizen from participating in the democratic state as an equal, then it will contradict our fundamental principle of egalitarianism: that all people are of equal moral worth. And so, simply because distributive equality is not our main goal, nor our only measure of the equality in society, does not mean we do not care about it. As Scheffler puts it: the social and political ideal of equality, as I shall call it, itself has distributive implications.20 Let us discuss this notion of democratic equality. Anderson argues for a conception of equality that ensures the egalitarian plateau (or the founding principles of egalitarianism as I have called it) is articulated in a comprehensive theory, as opposed to being contradicted. Democratic equality guarantees that each citizen be educated and respected enough to participate in the political and civic institutions of a society. It also argues that each citizen must receive a basic level of living so as public life and areas are equally accessible. It also states that each citizen must truly be equal, and thus be free from oppressive, dominant, or exploitative relationships. In order for democratic equality to be achieved, the economy must be viewed as a cooperative venture: From the point of view of justice, the attempt, independent of moral principles, to credit specific bits of output to specific bits of input by specific
18 *

Swift, p121 For the sake of this example, lets assume that 30 units of x is at least enough to survive on. 19 Clayton and Williams, p173 20 Sheffler, p22

Alex Michie Political Theory

Sarah Hannan Week 3 - Equality

individuals represents an arbitrary cut in the causal web that in fact makes everyones productive contribution dependent on what everyone else is doing.21 Anderson highlights this with the example of carers of dependants. By releasing others from their obligations to care for dependents, carers are productive, and deserve compensation for their work. This is a valid point, and undermines potential libertarian counter-arguments based on property rights and autonomy. However, Anderson also views her compatible with markets and capitalism, so long as everybody is able to participate as an equal in public life. This is to misunderstand capitalism. Capitalism allows for unequal relationships in society. Money has influence over politics. Additionally, exploitative relationships are abundant. If I inherit a factory, and do nothing but sit at home and watch Jeremy Kyle earning millions of pounds, my relationship with my factory workers is not one of equals, but one of exploitation and dominance. They have to sell their labour to me, whilst I contribute nothing in return, but profit from their productivity. Similarly, Anderson feels that a conception of reciprocity would squeeze the gap between the highest and lowest paid workers.22 This also misunderstands capitalism. If Anderson is happy to leave distribution to the market system, a conception of reciprocity would have no effect on pay. And so, whilst democratic equality is, I believe, a valid and morally grounded conception of equality Andersons application of it is contains some flaws. This is, I believe, a flaw that is common to many theories of equality. Many philosophers theories read as though they have a conception of equality which they believe is morally just, and then try and make it fit to our current economic system. This is a flawed method. Our economic structures are transient. The ideals of justice and equality shouldnt be. We should try and discover our moral foundations, and attempt to make our societal structures fit as closely as possible to these not vice versa. To conclude, I believe I have shown that Andersons statement of democratic equality is superior to other conceptions, and outlines the types of equality that are justified social goals. However, by stating its compatibility with markets and capitalism, she either misunderstands the threat of exploitative social relations to democratic equality, or misunderstands the nature of capitalism.

21 22

Clayton and Williams, p177 Ibid

Alex Michie Political Theory Bibliography

Sarah Hannan Week 3 - Equality

Clayton and Williams, Social Justice, Blackwell Publishing (2004) Mulhall and Swift, Liberals & Communitarians, Blackwell Publishing (1996) Scheffler, What is Egalitarianism, Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 31, No. 1, (Winter, 2003), pp. 5-39 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Universal Law Publishing Co. (2008) Swift, Political Philosophy, Polity Press (2007)

Alex Michie Political Theory Equality unused notes:

Sarah Hannan Week 3 - Equality

Think about: (i) the different things egalitarians might want us to distribute equally - opportunity, respect, outcome, welfare, resources, primary goods, etc - and how these relate to one another; (ii) whether there are any good reasons to prefer a society in which people have equal amounts (of whatever it is you care about) to one in which they have unequal amounts but even those who have least still have more than they do in the equal society; if not, should we really care about equality?; (iii) whether egalitarians unjustifiably ignore the relevance of desert or differential contribution of talents or effort; (iv) whether equality of opportunity as a social goal is (a) coherent and (b) desirable PRINCIPLES OF EGLAITARIANISM First, such principles must identify certain goods to which all citizens must have effective access over the course of their whole lives. Some goods are more important from an egalitarian point of view than others, within whatever space of equality is identified as of particular concern for egalitarians. And starting-gate theories, or any other principles that allow law-abiding citizens to lose access to adequate levels of these goods, are unacceptable. Second, egalitarians should be able to justify such guarantees of lifetime accessibility without resorting to paternalism. Third, egalitarian principles should offer remedies that match the type of injustice being corrected. Private satisfactions cannot make up for public oppression. Fourth, egalitarian principles should uphold the responsibility of individuals for their own lives without passing demeaning and intrusive judgments on their capacities for exercising responsibility or on how well they have used their freedoms. Finally, such principles should be possible objects of collective willing. They should be capable of supplying sufficient reasons for citizens acting together to collectively guarantee the particular goods of concern to egalitarians. (clayton, 171) INCENTIVES AND INEQUALITY NECESSARY FOR EGALITARIANISM Effective access to a level of functioning means that people can achieve that functioning by deploying means already at their disposal, not that the functioning is unconditionally guaranteed without any effort on their own part. Thus, democratic equality is consistent with constructing the incentive systems needed for a modern economy to support the production needed to support egalitarian guarantees in the first place. p175 WEAKNESS OF ANDERSON Unemployment insurance is a poor substitute for work, given the central importance of participation in productive activity to living life as an equal in civil society. 179 underestimating problem of unemployment? Page 179, the appreciation of low wage labour would have a squeezing affect on distribution: a conception of reciprocity that would squeeze the gap between the highest and lowest paid workers. HOW?! HUMANS ARE TO BLAME FOR INEQUALITYthis helps us see that people, not

Alex Michie Political Theory

Sarah Hannan Week 3 - Equality

nature, are responsible for turning the natural diversity of human beings into oppressive hierarchies. P180 UTILITARIANISM When the position that one ought to maximize aggregate welfare is replaced by the position that one ought to equalize welfare levels, certain objections to the maximizing view are transformed. When utilitarianism is replaced by a welfarist version of luck egalitarianism, the problem of utility monsters Sheffer p 16 SUFFICIENCY ANDERSON equality of fortune fails the most fundamental test any egalitarian theory must meet: that its principles express equal respect and concern for all citizens.