PEOPLE V. BAYOTAS G.R. No. 102007.

September 2, Topic: Criminal Procedure, Rule 111 FACTS: In Criminal Case filed before RTC Roxas City, Rogelio Bayotas y Cordova was charged with Rape and eventually convicted. Pending appeal of his conviction, Bayotas died at the National Bilibid Hospital due to cardio respiratory arrest secondary to hepatic encephalopathy secondary to hipato carcinoma gastric malingering. Consequently, the Supreme Court in its Resolution, dismissed the criminal aspect of the appeal. However, it required the Solicitor General to file its comment with regard to Bayotas' civil liability arising from his commission of the offense charged. In his comment, the Solicitor General expressed his view that the death of accusedappellant did not extinguish his civil liability as a result of his commission of the offense charged. The Solicitor General, relying on the case of People v. Sendaydiego insists that the appeal should still be resolved for the purpose of reviewing his conviction by the lower court on which the civil liability is based. Counsel for the accused-appellant, on the other hand, opposed the view of the Solicitor General arguing that the death of the accused while judgment of conviction is pending appeal extinguishes both his criminal and civil penalties. In support of his position, said counsel invoked the ruling of the Court of Appeals in People v. Castillo and Ocfemia which held that the civil obligation in a criminal case takes root in the criminal liability and, therefore, civil liability is extinguished if accused should die before final judgment is rendered. ISSUE/HELD: WON death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his civil liability? AFFIRMATIVE RATIO DICIDENDI: 'ART. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. Criminal liability is totally extinguished: 1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to the pecuniary penalties liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment; Article 30 of the Civil Code provides: "When a separate civil action is brought to demand civil liability arising from a criminal offense, and no criminal proceedings are instituted during the pendency of the civil case, a preponderance of evidence shall likewise be sufficient to prove the act complained of." What Article 30 recognizes is an alternative and separate

1994. civil action which may be brought to demand civil liability arising from a criminal offense independently of any criminal action. In the event that no criminal proceedings are instituted during the pendency of said civil case, the quantum of evidence needed to prove the criminal act will have to be that which is compatible with civil liability and that is, preponderance of evidence and not proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Citing or invoking Article 30 to justify the survival of the civil action despite extinction of the criminal would in effect merely beg the question of whether civil liability ex delicto survives upon extinction of the criminal action due to death of the accused during appeal of his conviction. This is because whether asserted in the criminal action or in a separate civil action, civil liability ex delicto is extinguished by the death of the accused while his conviction is on appeal. Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code is clear on this matter. In pursuing recovery of civil liability arising from crime, the final determination of the criminal liability is a condition precedent to the prosecution of the civil action, such that when the criminal action is extinguished by the demise of accused-appellant pending appeal thereof, said civil action cannot survive. The claim for civil liability springs out of and is dependent upon facts which, if true, would constitute a crime. Such civil liability is an inevitable consequence of the criminal liability and is to be declared and enforced in the criminal proceeding. This is to be distinguished from that which is contemplated under Article 30 of the Civil Code which refers to the institution of a separate civil action that does not draw its life from a criminal proceeding. The Sendaydiego, however, failed to take note of this fundamental distinction when it allowed the survival of the civil action for the recovery of civil liability ex delicto by treating the same as a separate civil action referred to under Article 30. Surely, it will take more than just a summary judicial pronouncement to authorize the conversion of said civil action to an independent one such as that contemplated under Article 30. Ironically however, the main decision in Sendaydiego did not apply Article 30, the resolution of notwithstanding. Thus, it was held in the main decision: "Sendaydiego's appeal will be resolved only for the purpose of showing his criminal liability which is the basis of the civil liability for which his estate would be liable." In other words, the Court, in resolving the issue of his civil liability, concomitantly made a determination on whether Sendaydiego, on the basis of evidenced adduced, was indeed guilty beyond reasonable doubt of committing the offense charged. Thus, it upheld Sendaydiego's conviction and pronounced the same as the source of his civil liability. Consequently, although Article 30 was not applied in the final determination of Sendaydiego's civil liability, there was a reopening of the criminal action already extinguished which served as basis for Sendaydiego's civil liability. We reiterate: Upon death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction, the criminal action is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused; the civil action instituted therein for recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal. Applying this set of rules to the case at bench, we hold that the death of appellant Bayotas extinguished his criminal liability and the civil liability based solely on the act complained of, i.e., rape.

Barredo vs Garcia and Almario

At about 1:30am on May 3, 1936, Fontanillas taxi collided with a kalesa thereby killing the 16 year old Fausti-

no Garcia. Faustinos parents filed a criminal suit against Fontanilla and reserved their right to file a separate civil suit. Fontanilla was eventually convicted. After the criminal suit, Garcia filed a civil suit against Barredo the owner of the taxi (employer of Fontanilla). The suit was based on Article 1903 of the civil code (negligence of employers in the selection of their employees). Barredo assailed the suit arguing that his liability is only subsidiary and that the separate civil suit should have been filed against Fontanilla primarily and not him. ISSUE: Whether or not Barredo is just subsidiarily liable. HELD: No. He is primarily liable under Article 1903 which is a separate civil action against negligent employers. Garcia is well within his rights in suing Barredo. He reserved his right to file a separate civil action and this is more expeditious because by the time of the SC judgment Fontanilla is already serving his sentence and has no property. It was also proven that Barredo is negligent in hiring his employees because it was shown that Fontanilla had had multiple traffic infractions already before he hired

him something he failed to overcome during hearing. Had Garcia not reserved his right to file a separate civil action, Barredo would have only been subsidiarily liable. Further, Barredo is not being sued for damages arising from a criminal act (his drivers negligence) but rather for his own negligence in selecting his employee (Article 1903).

CASE DIGEST ON MENDOZA V. ARRIETA For more case digests visit http://www.pinaylawyer.com case digest, case digests, supreme court case digests, supreme court case digest, pinaylawyer.com, www.pinaylawyer.com, case digest, case digest of, case digest on, supreme court case digest, supreme court case digests CASE DIGEST ON MENDOZA V. ARRIETA [91 S 113 (1979)] - Where in a multiple highway accident involving a truck which hit a jeep which then hit a Mercedes Benz coming from the opposite direction, two criminal actions for reckless imprudence was filed against the drivers of the truck and jeep, and the driver of the truck was found guilty and the driver of the jeep acquitted, a civil action for damages against the owner of the truck would prosper as

there is no res judicata, the parties and causes of action being different. Furthermore, under Art. 31 of the Civil Code, When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from crime, the civil action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings regardless of result of the latter. Citing Garcia v. Florido, "As we have stated at the outset, the same negligent act causing damages may produce a civil liability arising from crime or create an action for quasi-delict or culpa extracontractual. The former is a violation of the criminal law, while the latter is a distinct and independent negligenc, having always had its own foundation and individuality. Some legal writers are of the view that in accordance with Article 31, the civil action based upon quasi-delict may proced independently of the criminal proceeding for criminal negligence and regardless of the result of the latter. Hence, the proviso in Section 2 of Rule 111 (requiring reservation of civil actions) with reference to Articles 32, 33, and 34 of the Civil Code, is contrary to the letter and spirit of the said articles, for these articles were drafted and are intended to constitute as exceptions to the general rule stated in what is now Section 1 of Rule 111. The proviso, which is procedura, may also be regarded as an unauthorized amendment of substantive law, Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the Civil Code, which do not provide for the reservation required in the proviso." However, a civil action for damages against the ownerdriver of the jeep would not prosper because civil liability arising from crime co-exists with criminal liability in criminal cases. Hence, the offended party had the option to prosecute on civil liability arising from crime or from quasidelict. His active participation in the criminal case implies that he opted to recover the civil liability arising from crime. Hence, since the acquittal in the criminal case, which was not based on reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages can no longer be instituted.