Circulars 2007 To 2009: Airbus Atr B737 B777 Quality Airbus Atr B737 B777 Quality Airbus Atr B737 B777 Quality

Airbus Atr B737 B777 Quality Airbus Atr B737 B777 Quality Airbus Atr B737 B777 Quality
01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01
02 02 02 02 02 02 02 02 02 02 02 02 02 02 02
03 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 03
04 04 04 04 04 04 04 04 04 04 04 04 04 04 04
05 05 05 05 05 05 05 05 05 05 05 05 05 05
06 06 06 06 06 06 06 06 06 06 06 06 06
07 07 07 07 07 07 07 07 07 07 07 07 07
08 08 08 08 08 08 08 08 08 08 08
09 09 09 09 09 09 09 09 09 09 09
10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11
12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13
14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15
16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16
17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17
18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18
19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19
20 20 20 20 20 20 20
21 21 21 21 21 21
22 22 22 22 22 22
23 23 23 23 23
24 24 24
25 25
26 26
27 27
28 28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
2007 2008 2009
Circulars 2007 to 2009
Applicability : All Flight Management Guidance and Envelope Computer
(FMGEC) installed on A330 and A340 airplanes.
Supersedes
:
_n
Subject
:
FMGEC Pegasus standard reliability issue
Authority Ref
:
AIRBUS OIT: SE 999.0140/06/BB Dt: 21st December 2006
Background
:
The AIRBUS OIT highlights an issue affecting the Flight Guidance and
Information Envelope Computer (FMGEC) PIN: C12858xAxx installed on A330 and
A340 airolanes.
Content
:
The FMGECare made up of FMpart manufactured by Honeywell and the
Flight Guidance (Envelope) part manufactured by Thales. The FMGEC
Pegasusstandard contains two batteries on each FMkit. These batteries
are used to supply hold-up power to the Static RandomAccess Memory
(5RAM) when the FMGECis powered OFF. A theoretical battery life
analysis has determined that under typical aircraft operating conditions,
these batteries will have on average a life span of 4 to 6years. Following
an SRAMbattery fault, a Class 1 fault message is recorded in the Post
Flight Report (PFR) without cockpit effect. During the following
Automatic Flight System (AFS) test a low voltage of the FMS SRAM
battery is then detected and a trouble shooting data (TSD) is triggered.
This does not mean that the FMGECis out of order; the aircraft can still
be operated with this type of fault only if associated with this particular
snapshot. Nevertheless, as the FMS SRAMbatteries are used for data
retention while the aircraft is powered down, a low voltage would
prevent the FMGECto pass its power up test during a future aircraft
power-up.
Action
:
The following is a typical TSD report (Ref: AMM 22-91-00 for TSD
access)triggered in caseof a too low battery voltage:
SOURCE: FM1COM001000
FAIL TYPE, STATUS: 01, 1
SUSPECTS: 432/ 000/ 000
028D0100 03150000 0000
0000
This TSD shows a hard failure during power-up on FMGEC(code 028D
where the event "D" means power-up). The associated fault code on
Word 2 is 031S (or 03/15); this code indicates that there is an FMSRAM
battery 1fault on the FMGEC1.
_N_o_te_: Other codes are 0317 for battery 2 fault and 0319 in case of
battery 1and 2 fault.
For the above reasons, in case of FMGEC Class 1 fault message
associatedwith this snapshot, it is recommended to have subject FMGEC
replacedat the first convenient opportunity.
Jet Airways (I) Ltd
TechnicalInstruction No. 01/ 2007
A J l , A 3 3 0
Date
03-01-2007
03-01-2007
03-01-2007
Revision
00
Sub ATA
83
Page 1of 1
Mr. P.S.R. Krupakar
Mr. C.S. Tomar
Name
--
Ms. Arti Gurunathan
ATA
22
Date
03-01-2007
Prepared By
Checked By
Approved By
Jet Airways (I) Ltd
Technical Instruction No. 0 2 I 2007
A 330
Date
04fJanf2007
A TA
79
Sub A TA
22-11
Revision
o
A pplicability
,
RollsRovceTrent 700 enaines
Supersedes
:
None
Subiect
,
Trent 700IFSD due to loss of oil pressure
A uthority
,
Rolls-Roycepic- DerbyWorldwideCommunicotion.RefNo.WVV/I0510/1/3J on07.
Ref
Background
,
On9th December 2006, aTrent 700 powered A irbus A 330 of some other
Information
operator experienced an "ENG1all lO PR"ECA Mwarning during takeoff.
A pproximately 2 minutes after the warning, the engine was shut down and an
uneventful air-turn back was performed.
Content
,
Initial troubleshooting confirmed that the oil pump drive shear neck had
fractured. Inspection of the engine oil scavenge filter identified several small
brass flakes. Basedon this evidence, seizure of one of the oil pump brass
journal bearings is suspected. The pump has been removed. and is currently in
transit to the manufacturer for investigation.
Theengine and oil pump life since new is 2831 hours and 864 cycles.
A ction
,
For maintenance information.
Prepared By
Checked By
A pproved By
Name
YOGESH SHA RMA
J OE J A COB
C.S.TOMA R
Page 1 of 1
Date
04fJanf2007
04fJanf2007
04fJanf2007
Page 1 of 3
Jet Airways (I) Ltd
Technical Instruction No. 03 / 2007

Date ATA Sub ATA Revision
16-Jan-2007 00 -- 00

Applicability
:
VT-JWE
Supersedes
:

Subject
:
VT-JWE Differences
Authority Ref
:
Technical Services & Airbus delivery documents.
Background
Information
:
Jet Airways is inducting a new A330-200 aircraft VT-JWE (MSN 807) into
its fleet.
This Technical Instruction is issued to highlight the salient features of
aircraft VT-JWE and differences with the existing A330-200 aircraft in Jet
Airways fleet.
Content
:
Aircraft VT-JWE has the following salient features:-
1. Maximum Take-Off Weight 2,33,000 kg
2. Max T/O Thrust 71100 lbs.
3. PAX Configuration 30 Club Premier + 196 Economy
4. Seats:-
Club Premier Sicma Aero [model 1504]
Economy Ricaro [model 3510B376]
5. IFE System- Panasonic 3000i.

The following table provides the P/Ns of new components and their
Interchangeability with existing P/Ns on existing A330 airplane VT-JWD.

Component P/N on VT-JWD P/N on VT-JWE Interchangeability
Vent Controller 600634-03AD 600634-04AE
2 Way
interchangeable
Avionics Equipment
Ventilation Computer
(AEVC)
785-611-3 785-611-4
2 Way
interchangeable
Audio Management
Unit (AMU)
AMU4031LA110101 AMU4031LA120102
1 Way
interchangeable
SMOKE
DETECTION
CONTROL UNIT
(SDCU)
RAI2811MO104 RAI2811MO105
1 Way
interchangeable
Smoke Detector PPA2100-00 PPA1203-00 Not available
Halon Filter QA06753-02 QA06753-03
1 Way
interchangeable
THS Actuator 47172-300 47172-510
1 Way
interchangeable
SLAT/FLAP
CONTROL
COMPUTER (SFCC)
065-50000-0509 84333-00-0304
2 Way
interchangeable

Page 2 of 3

:

Component P/N on VT-JWD P/N on VT-JWE Interchangeability
Backup Control
module (BCM)
418-00877-101 418-00877-102
1 Way
interchangeable
APU aft fuel pump P93A19-203 P93A19-204
2 Way
interchangeable
System Data
Acquisition
Concentrator (SDAC)
LA2E50700C70000 LA2E50700C80000
1 Way
interchangeable
Landing gear System
Electrical
Deactivation Box
D23119550 D23809000
2 Way
interchangeable
Anti Collision/ Strobe
lights Power supply
units
8ES455012-00 8ES455012-06
2 Way
interchangeable
Cockpit Door Locking
System Toggle
switch
ASNE0062A7L4ADOA ABS1551A7L4ADOA
2 Way
interchangeable
FMGEC* C12858CA02* C13039CA01 Not Interchangeable.
Multipurpose Control
and Display Unit*
4077880-962* C19266BA01 Not Interchangeable.
FMS Software PS4087700-902 G2604AAD02 Not interchangeable
ATSU FANS A
software
LA2T0K20000H0F1 LA2T0K20000F0F1 Not Interchangeable.

* VT-JWE is installed with the Thales Smiths FMGEC system, which is
different from the FMGEC currently installed on VT-JWD. VT-JWD will be
modified as per Airbus SBs A330-22-3050, A330-22-3051 and A330-22-
3052 to install Thales Smiths FMGEC system, very shortly.

Thales / Smiths FMS2

The Thales / Smiths FMS2 is an advanced system which provides better
functionality (enhanced crew interface),better technology(large nav
database capacity of 2.5 mega words(5 Mb), dual processors and MCDU
with improved LCD screen)
Some useful features are:

1. Faster cross-loading bus for synchronization and maintenance. It
requires less than 2 minutes cross-load for a typical navigation database
Cross loading pages for FMS softwares and databases are accessed from
the A/C STATUS page.
All elements (softwares / databases)can be cross-loaded individually
Operational program software
Navigation database
Airline modifiable information
Operational program configuration
Aircraft performance database
Magnetic variation database
An FMS UPDATE page allows simultaneous update of all elements
using a single prompt.

3. Digital brightness and ON/OFF mechanism.

4. PERF page managed predictions remain displayed in addition to
selected when in the selected mode

5. Full polar area navigation capability

Page 2 of 3

Page 3 of 3

Page 1 of 5
Jet Airways (I) Ltd

05-Feb-2007 31 36 00

Applicability
: AIRBUS A330 & A340
Supersedes
: NIL
Subject
:
ANALYSIS OF ACMS LOAD REPORT 15 FOR CONFIRMATION OF
HARD/OVERWEIGHT LANDING.
Authority Ref
: AMM 31-36-00-200-803.
Background
Information
:
Jet Airways has recently experienced two events on two Aircraft, which Crew
reported to refer to Load Report 15 generated by ACMS for hard landing.
Maintenance had difficulties in the analysis of the Load Report.
This Technical Instruction is issued to provide guidance to Maintenance
Engineers for analysis of Aircraft Condition Monitoring System (ACMS) Load
Report 15 for confirmation of Hard/Overweight landing.

Content
:
The intent of this Technical Instruction is to provide the trigger condition for
generation of Load Report 15 and a guideline for analysis, in cases of
Triggering of Load Report 15 without Pilot confirmation, in order to
confirm Hard/Overweight Landing and perform subsequent Inspection in
accordance with AMM 05-51-11-200-801.

AMM 31-36-00-200-803 describes how to read a load report 15 with aid of
Flow Chart for analysis.

An ACMS Load Report 15 is generated, when the following List of Trigger
Codes appear;
a) 4100: Excessive Radio Altitude Rate (RALR). During +"Y15.1"-"Y15.2"
before/after landing.
b) 4110: Excessive Radio Altitude Rate (RALR) compared to Gross Weight (GW)
(compare GWL1). During +"Y15.1"-"Y15.2" before/after landing.
c) 4120: Excessive Radio Altitude Rate (RALR) compared to Gross Weight (GW)
(compare GWL). During +"Y15.1"-"Y15.2" before/after landing.
d) 4200: Excessive Body Pitch Rate (PTCR) (compared to positive limit). "Y15.1"
to 0 sec. before landing.
e) 4300: Excessive Body Pitch Rate (PTCR) (compared to negative limit). 0 to
"Y15.2" sec. after landing.
f) 4400: Excessive Body Normal Acceleration (VRTA) (compared to limit at
landing including bounced). At first touchdown and at bounce +"Y15.1"/-"Y15.2"
sec.
g) 4500: Excessive Body Normal Acceleration (VRTA) (compared to limit at
landing). During +"Y15.1"/-"Y15.2" sec. before/after landing.
h) 4600: Excessive Body Longitudinal Acceleration (LONA).During +"Y15.1"/-
"Y15.2" before/after landing.
i) 4700: Excessive Body Lateral Acceleration (LATA) at landing. During +"Y15.1"/-
j) 4800: Excessive Gross Weight (GW) compared to Body Normal Acceleration
(VRTA). During +"Y15.1"/-"Y15.2" before/after landing.
k) 4900: Excessive Gross Weight (GW) compared to Vertical Energy Limit (VEL).
During +"Y15.1"/-"Y15.2" before/after landing.

Note: +"Y15.1"-"Y15.2" represents Time Lapse of One Second.
Page 2 of 5

Content
(Continued)
:
The Abbreviations for the Parameters used in ACMS Load Report 15, are listed
below;

Parameter Description
VRTA Body Normal Acceleration.
LONA Body Longitudinal Acceleration.
LATA Body Lateral Acceleration.
ROLL Roll Angle.
ROLR Body Roll Rate.
PTCH Pitch Angle.
PTCR Body Pitch Rate.
RALR Radio Altitude Rate.
RALT Radio Altitude.

Action
:
When an ACMS load report 15 is generated with trigger code 4xxx,the decision
to confirm a hard landing event can be based on the following criteria:

For a hard landing(GW <= MLW):
RALR < -10 ft/s AND DELTA VRTA > 0.75 g OR
DELTA VRTA > 1.0 g OR
RALR < -13 ft/s
For an overweight landing (GW > MLW):
RALR < -9 ft/s
Where;
Delta VRTA = Vertical acceleration Increment (DELTA VRTA): It is the
difference between the Vertical Acceleration (VRTA) before the aircraft touch
down (representing the aircraft actual lift) and the peak of VRTA after touch
down.
RALR = Radio Altitude Rate (RALR): It represents the aircraft vertical rate
of descent.

Case 1:

If a hard landing is confirmed following the analysis of the ACMS load report 15
OR
In case of pilot report of hard landing with no load report 15 printout generated
to confirm it or not,
The aircraft must be inspected as per AMM 05-51-11.

Case 2:

Maintrol / Line Maintenance must Contact AIRBUS AOG desk before
releasing aircraft for further flight under any one of the following
conditions;
If; (i) RALR < -13 ft/s with GW <= MLW, OR
(ii) RALR < -9 ft/s with GW > MLW, OR
(iii) DELTA VRTA >1.2 g with GW <= MLW, OR
(iv) DELTA VRTA >0.8 g with GW > MLW,
AIRBUS to be Contacted for assessment of the event, along with a
copy of the DFDR raw data and load & trim sheet in addition to the
load report 15 printout for analysis of the event.

Page 3 of 5

Format of the Load Report-description, Event Sequence and Flow Chart as shown in
AMM 31-36-00, are provided below for guidance;

LOAD REPORT- DESCRIPTION;

Page 4 of 5

LOAD REPORT- EVENT SEQUENCE;

A340 LOAD REPORT <15> PAGE 02 OF 02

ACID: XXXXXXX DATE: 99AAA99 FLT: XXXXXXXXXX CODE: 999X CNT: 999
. . .
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LOAD REPORT- FLOW CHART (PARAMETERS CHECK);
Name Date
Prepared By
Mr. J aswin Sood Singh OS-Feb-2007
Checked By
. \<-
Mr. Majeed Walele OS-Feb-2007
Approved By
Mr. C. S. Tomar OS-Feb-2007
Page 5 of 5
J et Airways(I) ltd
A 330
Date
16-Feb-2007
A ' f A
22
SubA TA
80
Revision
00
A pplicability : A 330 A irplane VT-J WD
Supersedes : Not A pplicable
Subject
: THA LES/SMITHS FMS2 (REV 2+) INSTA LLA TION.
A uthority Ref : A irbus SBs: A 330-22-3050, A 330-22-3051, A 330-22-3052 and Thales
SIL: THA V/SIL-1170.
Background : A irplane VT-J WD was delivered with the Honeywell Pegasus FMGEC
Information
installed. J et A irways has decided that all A 330 airplanes will have the
THA LES/SMITHS FMS2 (REV 2+).
The THA LES/SMITHS FMS2 (REV 2+) was production installed on VT-
J WE. To standardize the A 330 fleet VT-J WD has been modified and the
THA LES/SMITHS FMS2 (REV 2+).has been installed.
Content : The retrofit modification on VT-J WD has been carried out in accordance
with the following A irbus SBs.
1. A 330-22-3050 - A uto Flight - FMGEC - Install
Thales/Smiths FMS2 (Rev 2+) T2CD8 for PW & RR engines.
2. A 330-22-3051 - A uto Flight - FMGEC - Install and upload
OPC disk (Configuration 05 - FMS2 Thales/Smiths).
3. A 330-22-3052 - A uto Flight - MCDU - Install MCDU
Thales/Smiths compatible with FMS2 for PW & RR engines.
The new Part numbers of the various components are as follows
1. FMGEC - C13039CA 01*
2. MCDU - C19266BA 01
* This FMGEC Part Number is for A 330 with RRlPW engines only.
The part numbers of the FMGEC softwares are as follows
SOFTWA RE SOFTWA RE PIN MEDIA PIN
Operational Software G2604A A D02
F1420484
Magnetic Variation G1748A A B01
F1420470
database
Performance Data G8252A A A 02 F1420313
Base (PDB)
Operational Program G8281A A F01 F1420225
Configuration(OPC)
The A uto pilot and Flight Management systemconfiguration on VT-J WD and
VT-J WE is nowsame.
Page 1 of 2
Action
: 1. Thales/Honeywell FMGEC (PIN: C12858CA 02) and MCDU
(PIN: 4077880-962) cannot be installed on VT-J WD and VT-J WE.
2. Nav database supplied by J eppesen is to be used on all A 330
airplanes. Nav database supplied by Honeywell is to be used for A 340
airplanes.
3. Whenever FMGEC is replaced. ensure that the software part numbers
mentioned in this Technical Instruction are installed.
Name Date
Prepared By RAKESH R DIXIT 16-Feb-2007
Checked By UJAGAR LALL 16-Feb-2007
Approved By S.KESKAR 16-Feb-2007
Page 2 of 2
Page 1 of 5
Jet Airways (I) Ltd

Date ATA Sub ATA
01-Mar-2007 31 36

Applicability
: AIRBUS A330 & A340
Supersedes
: Technical Instruction No. 08 / 2007
Subject
:
ANALYSIS OF ACMS LOAD REPORT 15 FOR CONFIRMATION OF
HARD/OVERWEIGHT LANDING.
Authority Ref
: AMM 31-36-00-200-803.
Background
Information
:
Jet Airways has recently experienced two events on two Aircraft, which Crew
reported to refer to Load Report 15 generated by ACMS for hard landing.
Maintenance had difficulties in the analysis of the Load Report.
This Technical Instruction is issued to provide guidance to Maintenance
Engineers for analysis of Aircraft Condition Monitoring System (ACMS) Load
Report 15 for confirmation of Hard/Overweight landing.

Content
:
The intent of this Technical Instruction is to provide the trigger condition for
generation of Load Report 15 and a guideline for analysis, in cases of
Triggering of Load Report 15 without Pilot confirmation, in order to
confirm Hard/Overweight Landing and perform subsequent Inspection in
accordance with AMM 05-51-11-200-801.

AMM 31-36-00-200-803 describes how to read a load report 15 with aid of
Flow Chart for analysis.

An ACMS Load Report 15 is generated, when the following List of Trigger
Codes appear;
a) 4100: Excessive Radio Altitude Rate (RALR). During +"Y15.1"-"Y15.2"
before/after landing.
b) 4110: Excessive Radio Altitude Rate (RALR) compared to Gross Weight (GW)
(compare GWL1). During +"Y15.1"-"Y15.2" before/after landing.
c) 4120: Excessive Radio Altitude Rate (RALR) compared to Gross Weight (GW)
(compare GWL). During +"Y15.1"-"Y15.2" before/after landing.
d) 4200: Excessive Body Pitch Rate (PTCR) (compared to positive limit). "Y15.1"
to 0 sec. before landing.
e) 4300: Excessive Body Pitch Rate (PTCR) (compared to negative limit). 0 to
"Y15.2" sec. after landing.
f) 4400: Excessive Body Normal Acceleration (VRTA) (compared to limit at
landing including bounced). At first touchdown and at bounce +"Y15.1"/-"Y15.2"
sec.
g) 4500: Excessive Body Normal Acceleration (VRTA) (compared to limit at
landing). During +"Y15.1"/-"Y15.2" sec. before/after landing.
h) 4600: Excessive Body Longitudinal Acceleration (LONA).During +"Y15.1"/-
i) 4700: Excessive Body Lateral Acceleration (LATA) at landing. During +"Y15.1"/-
j) 4800: Excessive Gross Weight (GW) compared to Body Normal Acceleration
(VRTA). During +"Y15.1"/-"Y15.2" before/after landing.
k) 4900: Excessive Gross Weight (GW) compared to Vertical Energy Limit (VEL).
During +"Y15.1"/-"Y15.2" before/after landing.

Note: +"Y15.1"-"Y15.2" represents Time Lapse of One Second.
Page 2 of 5
Content
(Continued)
:
The Abbreviations for the Parameters used in ACMS Load Report 15, are listed
below;

Parameter Description
VRTA Body Normal Acceleration.
LONA Body Longitudinal Acceleration.
LATA Body Lateral Acceleration.
ROLL Roll Angle.
ROLR Body Roll Rate.
PTCH Pitch Angle.
PTCR Body Pitch Rate.
RALR Radio Altitude Rate.
RALT Radio Altitude.

Action
:
When an ACMS load report 15 is generated with trigger code 4xxx,the decision
to confirm a hard landing event can be based on the following criteria:

For a hard landing(GW <= MLW):
RALR < -13 ft/s

For an overweight landing (GW > MLW):
RALR < -9 ft/s

Where;
Delta VRTA (Vertical acceleration Increment) is the difference
between the Vertical Acceleration (VRTA) before the aircraft touch down
(representing the aircraft actual lift) and the peak of VRTA after touch
down.

Delta VRTA or VRTA= VRTA max VRTA min
- VRTA max = Maximum Value of VRTA between Lines S9 to 0S of
ACMS Load Report 15.
- VRTA min = Minimum Value of VRTA between Line S9 and Line of
VRTA max of ACMS Load Report 15.

RALR (Radio Altitude Rate represents the aircraft vertical rate of
descent.
RALR = Minimum Value of RALR between Lines S0 to 0S of ACMS Load
Report 15.

Following are the Two Cases that may result after analysis of the ACMS Load
report 15 on basis of the above mentioned criteria and using the Flow Chart as
shown on Page 5 of 5 of this Technical Instruction;

Case 1:

If Flight Crew has reported hard landing with no load report 15 printout
generated to confirm it or not,
OR
If Analysis of the ACMS load report 15 confirms Hard Landing
The aircraft must be inspected as per AMM 05-51-11.

Page 3 of 5

Case 2:

Maintrol / Line Maintenance must Contact AIRBUS AOG desk before releasing
aircraft for further flight under any one of the following conditions;
If; (i) RALR < -13 ft/s with GW <= MLW, OR
(ii) RALR < -9 ft/s with GW > MLW, OR
(iii) DELTA VRTA >1.2 g with GW <= MLW, OR
(iv) DELTA VRTA >0.8 g with GW > MLW,
AIRBUS to be Contacted for assessment of the event, along with a copy of
the DFDR raw data and load & trim sheet in addition to the load report 15
printout for analysis of the event.

Format of the Load Report-description, Event Sequence and Flow Chart as shown in
AMM 31-36-00, are provided below for guidance;

LOAD REPORT- DESCRIPTION;

Page 4 of 5

LOAD REPORT- EVENT SEQUENCE;

A340 LOAD REPORT <15> PAGE 02 OF 02

ACID: XXXXXXX DATE: 99AAA99 FLT: XXXXXXXXXX CODE: 999X CNT: 999
Page 5 of 5

LOAD REPORT- FLOW CHART (PARAMETERS CHECK);

Page 1 of 2
Jet Airways (I) Ltd

Date ATA Sub ATA
29-Mar-07
24 / 36/ 49
-

Applicability
:
A330 and A340 aircraft
Supersedes
:
Technical Instruction 13/2007 dated 15 March 2007
Subject
: APU Generator Burst
Authority Ref
:
EASA AD No: 2007-0080-E dated 26
th
Mar07, AOT A330-24A3042,
A340-24A4056 and A340-24A5020 dated 22
nd
Mar07, OIT/FOT: SE
999.0036/07/BB dated 14
th
Mar07.

Background
Information
:
Two uncontained APU Generator failures occurred on ground on
two A330 aircrafts, with different operators. Both the aircrafts were
fitted with Honeywell P/N: GTCP332-350 APU and Goodrich P/N:
BA04104 APU Generator.

In both the events, a loud noise was heard, followed by an
automatic APU shutdown. First investigations confirmed an
uncontained APU Generator failure with subsequent aircraft
structural damage to the APU compartment in one case and to the
stabilizer compartment in the other case.
The aim of this Technical Instruction is to advise about the
inspections recommended by Airbus to prevent occurrence of APU
burst.

Content
:
Two operators experienced uncontained APU generator failures.
In the first event the Differential Pressure Indicator for the APU
generator scavenge oil filter was found extended but a visual
inspection of the filter did not confirm contamination. The oil
contamination was identified during a Metal chip Detector (MCD)
inspection after maintenance message 49-91-11 Oil chip
Detection was triggered.

The APU was replaced but the same APU Generator was re-
installed on the newly installed APU. Subsequently Generator burst
was experienced.

During the investigation, fragments of what appears to be parts of
the APU Generator drive end bearing were found in the Inlet
Screen for the APU Generator Scavenge Oil Pump of the APU. The
cage of the APU Generator drive end bearing was also absent from
the APU generator, which was sent to Goodrich for investigation.
Airbus suspects that the APU generator accumulated at least 50 FH
between the APU Generator drive end bearing first damage and
the uncontained failure of the APU Generator. The reason for the
bearing cage breakage remains unexplained.

In the second event, no particular histories of APU or Generator
issues have been reported. The Generator findings are very similar
to the first event. The most probable scenario is that the drive end
bearing failed first. The reason for the bearing failure remains
unexplained. The APU has been sent to Honeywell, where a
teardown investigation is being conducted.

Page 2 of 2

Airbus has recommended vide AOT A330-24A3042 dated 22 March
2007, one time accomplishment of AMM task 49-91-45 - Inspection
of the Inlet Screen (Last Chance Filter) for the Generator Scavenge-
Oil Pump for signs of debris.
If debris is found, the AMM Task 24-23-51 Replacement of APU
Generator and the AMM task 49-91-41 Check of the APU Oil
System for APU Generator Debris are to be performed.
Technical Services has issued workorders for all the five airplanes to
comply with the above requirements.

Information regarding the possible final fix will be provided through
a dedicated TFU 24.20.00.005.

Action
:
1. For Airbus A330 airplanes: Whenever MEL provisions 24-22-01
"AC main generation" or 36-11-01 "Bleed Air supply system for
failure" are invoked below mentioned additional action is mandated
by EASA AD no: 2007-0080-E prior to release of aircraft.

Before each flight, perform a check of the differential
pressure indicator button on the APU lube filter and the APU
generator scavenge filter in accordance AMM Task 49-91-
41.

Make an entry in Notice to Crew page to ensure compliance
of above task before each flight as long as MEL 24-22-01
and / or 36-11-01 is / are invoked.

Airbus A340 aircrafts do not have such restrictions for application of
MEL provisions 24-22-01 "AC main generation" or 36-11-01 "Bleed
Air supply system for failure".

2. In case maintenance message "49-91-11 OIL CHIP DETECTION" is
triggered, do not re-start the APU for fault confirmation when
accomplishing troubleshooting as per corresponding TSM 49-00-00 -
OIL CHIP DETECTION FAULT. Check the differential pressure
indicator button on the lube filter and generator scavenge filter and
if they are popped-out accomplish TSM 49-00-00 - APU OIL
FILTER(S) CLOGGED.

3. If one of the above events results in an APU removal, the APU
Generator must also be replaced along with the APU. The
removed Generator must be sent to the shop for inspection/repair.
4. If "APU GEN FAULT" ECAM warning is triggered during ground
operation of the APU, immediately switch off the APU. Do not re-
start the APU until troubleshooting has been performed.
The APU must not be re-started to perform troubleshooting.

Page 1 of 6
Jet Airways (I) Ltd

Date ATA Sub ATA
06-06-2007 32 10

Applicability : A330
Supersedes : Nil
Subject : Dispatch guide lines after activation of secondary gland seal due leak
from MLG shock absorber
Authority Ref : Messier Dowty SL A33-34 A4
Background
Information
:
A330-200 Aircraft landing gears have experienced gland seal leaks due
production anomaly and other defects. Several modifications have been
introduced to correct this defect. Airbus has initiated additional
maintenance inspection actions and dispatch guidelines in the event of
seal leakage and activation of secondary seal to prevent operational
disruption.
Content :
Where there is an evidence of marginal leakage, additional inspection
procedure should be performed to confirm whether or not the shock
absorber gland seals are leaking. It will help to identify where red colour
grease is being used to service the landing gear or if shock absorber
fluid spillage inside the main fitting may have occurred.

NOTE 1: Shock absorber fluid spillage can occur during shock absorber
servicing.

NOTE 2: With regular greasing of joints, the grease will collect inside the
main fitting which over a period of time can migrate down to
the main fitting drain hole.

NOTE 3: Mobil 28 is red grease, the oil from which is similar in colour to
most approved shock absorber fluids. Oil from this grease does
not indicate a shock absorber leak if found.

Action :
When ever fluid leak is noted from MLG shock absorber, confirm if leak
is from shock absorber gland seals.

Refer to AMM Sub Task 32-11-13-869-052 to prepare for inspection.

Procedure for additional inspection (Refer chart on page 3):

1. Clean any oil or grease deposits from inside the drain hole. Refer to
figure 1.

2. After cleaning inside the drain hole, monitor drain hole for 7 days
for any signs of a continuous shock absorber fluid leakage i.e. the
formation of fluid drops. The location of the main fitting drain hole is
shown in Figure 1.

Page 2 of 6

3. If drops of shock absorber fluid form and drip continually from the
drain hole or from the lower bearing (between the main fitting and
sliding piston) or down the chromium plated surface on the sliding
piston, carry out following:

A. Remove the inspection panel assembly. Refer to figure 2.

B. Flush the lower bearing with 2 liters of white spirit (CML 11-002
or 11-008A) twice all around the circumference using pump-can
with a flexible nozzle to remove:

(1) Excess shock absorber fluid from around the diameter of the
gland seal housing between the housing and the upper
piston.

(2) Excess grease from the internal surfaces of the main fitting
that may have collected in the base of the main fitting.

NOTE: The excess fluid or grease will extrude through the drain
hole.

4. After following chart on page 3, if leak is confirmed, activate
secondary gland seals per AMM Task 32-11-13-860-051.

The secondary gland seal should only be activated when there is
fresh evidence of shock absorber fluid found around the external
diameter of the sliding tube or dripping from the main fitting drain
hole.

Follow inspection flow chart for limitation in activation and
reactivation of primary seal.

CAUTION: DO NOT OVERTIGHTEN THE PUSH ROD IN THE CHANGE
OVER VALVE IF YOU NEED TO CHANGE OVER TO THE
SECONDARY GLAND SEAL. OVER TORQUEING CAN CAUSE
DAMAGE TO THE CHANGEOVER VALVE.

5. If Item 3 is performed, Lubricate Lower Bearing (Figure 3).

Page 3 of 6

Flow Chart for Additional Inspection.

Page 4 of 6

Location of Main fitting Drain hole

Page 5 of 6

Figure 2

Figure 2

Change over
valve inspection
panel
Page 6 of 6

Shock Strut Assembly

Figure 3
Location of
lower bearing
Page 1 of 2
Jet Airways (I) Ltd
Technical Instruction No. 18/ 2007

Date ATA Sub ATA
03-08-2007 24/36/49 --

Applicability : A330 airplanes

Supersedes : TI 15/2007

Subject : APU GENERATOR BURST

Authority Ref : EASA AD: 2007-0188R1 Dt: 24
th
July2007, AOT: A330-24A3044 Rev 1
Dt: 20
th
July2007.

Background
Information
: Two uncontained APU Generator failures occurred on ground on two
A330 aircrafts with different operators. Both the aircrafts were fitted
with Honeywell APU PN: GTCP331-350 and Goodrich PN: 5912833/
5910139 APU Generator. A third uncontained failure occurred at APU
start during landing phase. The flight crew noticed an APU FAULT on the
ECAM and the APU start sequence stopped. The maintenance crew
discovered an uncontained APU Generator failure. This was a low energy
event without structural damage in the APU compartment.

The purpose of this Technical Instruction is to advise the maintenance
crew about the inspections recommended by AIRBUS and highlight the
MEL requirements to prevent occurrence of APU burst.

Content : Investigations to date have not determined the root cause of the APU
Generator failure. It is known that the root cause initiates a collapse of
the Drive End Bearing, which in turn can lead to an uncontained failure.
Evidence shows that the Drive End Bearing failures were not
instantaneous and therefore the detection of small debris could indicate
early stage of bearing failure. The EASA AD: 2007-0188R1 mandates the
one-time inspection of the APU Generator Scavenge filter and APU
Generator Drain plug as per AIRBUS AOT: A330-24A3044 before
10
th
Aug2007. Same inspection has to be repetitively performed at an
interval of 450FH until and unless advised otherwise.

A procedure sheet No: JA330-49-DVI-001-01 has been prepared to
perform the required inspection. A330 DDPG will be amended during
next revision to include the EASA AD requirement.

Page 2 of 2

Action : For A330 airplanes, whenever MEL item 24-22-01 (AC Main Generation)
and/or MEL item 36-11-01 (Bleed Air Supply System) are invoked below
mentioned actions are mandated by EASA AD: 2007-0188R1 prior to
release of the aircraft:
1. Inspection of APU Generator Scavenge filter and APU Generator
drain plug as per the Procedure sheet No: JA330-49-DVI-001-01 or
DDPG Rev 1 must be performed before the first flight of the MEL
interval.

Note: A330 DDPG in the process of revision and will be released shortly.
DDPG Rev 1 is not available at the time of release of this Technical
Instruction.

2. The MEL item has to be rectified at the first opportunity.

Note: In outstations, a thin, clean mesh cloth can be used to filter the
debris from the residual oil, if there is no filter media with 280 micron
available.

These two above precautions do not apply if the APU Generator is
deactivated or removed.

Upon inspection of the APU Generator Scavenge filter and APU
Generator Drain plug as per the procedure sheet if metallic debris is
found outside the acceptable criteria then take pictures of the identified
metallic debris and attach the pictures with the task card. Additionally,
send them to Engineering Quality and Technical Services. Remove the
APU Generator as per AMM 24-23-51 and clearly indicate the reference
of this AOT on the removal tag.

Page 1 of 1
Jet Airways (I) Ltd

Date ATA Sub ATA
21-08-2007 28 21

Applicability : A330-202/243
Supersedes : NIL
Subject : Pylon Engine Fuel Feed Pipe Connector Leak
Authority Ref :
SIL No. 28-073 Rev.02
TFU 28.21.00.034
TFU 28.27.00.012
IPC 28-21-06
Background
Information
:
Few operators reported Several cases of fuel leak on Pylon Engine Fuel Feed
line connectors have been reported. Examination of ABS0108-150A or
ABS0108-200A connectors (Refer IPC 28-21-06) showed some wear traces on
their inner surface.
Content :
Some wear traces on ABS0108-150A/200A connectors were found. This is due
to the coupling flexing, resulting in side loads & transient metal to metal
contact. Metal to metal contact results in the partial removal of the dry
lubrication & corrosion protection layer.
Inspected connector P/N: ABS0108-150A/200A revealed a chaffing on the inside
surface & damaged PTTE coating. Investigation revealed that this phenomenon
is due to quality of one production batch.
Action :
If fuel leak is experienced on the Trim or Engine Feed Line, please report it to
Technical Services & Airbus for necessary action.
Page 1 of 2
Jet Airways (I) Ltd
Technical Instructions No: 21 /2007

Date ATA Sub ATA
17-10-2007 32 40

Applicability
:
Main Wheel & Nose Wheel Assemblies installed on A330-200 airplanes

Supersedes
:
Not Applicable

Subject
:
Introduction of In-house Part Numbers for Main Wheel & Nose assemblies

Authority Ref
:
Clarification from Airbus pertaining to Wheel Assembly Part Number
definition.

Background
information
:
Currently Jet Airways is using Goodrich - Messier Hub Assemblies P/N: 3-
1546 for Main Landing Gear & P/N: 3-1596 for Nose Landing Gear. The
same P/Ns are also used for Wheel Assemblies comprising of Hub
Assembly & Tire. This is not a certified P/N for a complete Wheel
Assembly. This Technical Instruction is issued to introduce In-house P/Ns
for Wheel Assemblies to distinguish Hub Assembly P/Ns from Wheel
Assembly P/Ns.

Content
:
As Hub Assembly P/Ns 3-1546 and 3-1596 cannot represent a complete
Wheel Assembly, the matter was taken up with Airbus for further
clarification.
Airbus has agreed that Operators can use Hub Assembly P/N + a two digit
suffix (such as 52, 54 etc) to identify Wheel Assembly (Comprising of Hub
Assembly & Tire). P/N of Wheel Assembly will be same for different makes
of tyres installed on them, i.e, same P/N should be used for Wheel
Assemblies installed with Bridgestone Tires & Michelin Tires.
The following Main & Nose Wheel Assembly will be identified in AMOS with
specific Part Numbers.
Main Wheel Assembly:
Main Wheel Assembly P/N : 3-1546-52
Main Wheel Hub Assembly P/N : 3-1546
Main Wheel Tyre P/N - Bridgestone : APR06911
Main Wheel Tyre P/N - Michelin : M05102

Page 2 of 2
Nose Wheel Assembly:
Nose Wheel Assembly P/N : 3-1596-54
Nose Wheel Hub Assembly P/N : 3-1596
Nose Wheel Tyre P/N - Bridgestone : APR06500
Nose Wheel Tyre P/N - Michelin : M07601

Action
:
All concerned personnel should make note of this information and action
accordingly. Wheels & Brakes Shop should release the serviceable Wheel
Assembly with applicable P/Ns mentioned above on the Serviceable Tag.

Page 1 of 2
Jet Airways (I) Ltd

Date ATA Sub ATA
13-11-2007 28 11

Applicability :
A330 airplanes in the fleet.

Supersedes :
Technical Instruction No. 10 of 2007 and 22 / 2007.

Subject :
Draining of Accumulated Water from Center, Inner, Trim Tank and Trim
Vent Surge, Outer and Wing Vent Surge Tanks.

Authority Ref :
Technical Services.

Background
information
:
Numerous Post Flight reports pertaining to APU aft pumps, Fuel Tank
Densitometer and Refuel Isolation valve were observed on the A330
airplanes. In order to reduce these Post Flight reports numerous tasks were
introduced at various intervals. Technical Instruction No. 10 of 2007
highlighted such tasks.

Content :
Since introduction of Technical Instruction No. 10 of 2007 a significant
reduction in Fuel system related Post Flight Reports is observed.
Due to sub zero fuel temperatures, constrains have been reported whilst
performing the below mentioned tasks at intervals specified.
This Technical Instruction addresses constrains reported whilst performing
the fuel draining issues and revises cold weather procedures to fuel
temperatures less than 5C (+41F)

4 Task AMM 12-32-28-281-801-Operate Water Drain Valves to Drain
Accumulated water from the Center, Inner, Outer and Wing Vent Surge
Tanks.
4 Task AMM 12-32-28-281-803-Operate Water Drain Valves to Drain
Accumulated Water from Trim tank and Trim Vent Surge.
4 Task AMM 12-32-28-281-807-Operate drain valve of the fuel air
separator to drain any accumulated water.

Action :
In order to continue to achieve the desired results, it is decided to continue
to carry out above maintenance tasks during Transit, Extended Transit and
whenever opportunity exists (Airplane on ground for more than 2 hours) as
per below.

Transit: Drain accumulated water from Center, Inner, Outer and Wing Vent
Surge Tanks prior refueling of the airplane as per above mentioned tasks.

Note: If the fuel temperature is less than 5C (+41F), do the cold weather
maintenance practice for the fuel system as per Task AMM 12-31-28-660-
801 (Refuel aircraft with warm fuel) time permitting.
Fuel temperatures below 5C (+41F) may cause accumulated water to
freeze and prevent drain valves to open.

Page 2 of 2

Extended Transit and when opportunity exists: Drain accumulated
water from Center, Inner, Outer and Wing Vent Surge Tanks , Trim Tank
and Trim Vent Surge, prior refueling of the airplane as per above mentioned
AMM tasks.

Note: If the fuel temperature is less than 5C (+41F), do the cold weather
maintenance practice for the fuel system as per Task AMM 12-31-28-660-
801 (Refuel aircraft with warm fuel).
Fuel temperatures below 5C (+41F) may cause accumulated water to
freeze and prevent drain valves to open.

At any station if any of the above tasks are not performed raise Notice to
Crew Entry perform the task at next suitable station.

Page 1 of 3
Jet Airways (I) Ltd

Date ATA Sub ATA
05-Dec-2007 00 --

Supersedes :
Subject : VT-JWH Salient features
Authority Ref : Technical Services & Airbus Delivery Documents. Airbus Technical Note
EYDC_G36ME0732277
Background
Information
: Jet Airways has inducted a new A330-202 aircraft VT-JWH (MSN 882) into its
fleet.
This Technical Instruction is issued to highlight the salient features of the new
aircraft and differences with the existing A330-200 aircraft in Jet Airways fleet.
Content : VT-JWH has the following salient features:-

1. Maximum Take-Off Weight 2,33,000 kg
2. PAX Configuration 30 Club Premier + 190 Economy
3. Engines Model: - CF6-80E1 A4/B.
4. Max Operating thrust 70000 lbs.
Max thrust with Bump 72000 lbs.
5. Seats:
Club Premier Contour Seats (F12600-XXX-XXX).
Economy Keiper Ricaro Seats (3610A45-XX-XXX).
6. IFE System- Panasonic eX2.

VT-JWH has the following differences with VT-JWG

7. New T2CAS Computer P/N: 9000000-11111. The T2CAS computer has
the following improvements:
a. Excessive descent alerting. (Mode 1)
b. Robustness of TAWS in case of large position or database error
(Mode 2 is conditionally activated).
c. Premature Descent Alerting (PDA) function: a dedicated Too Low
Terrain function is added.
d. Cold temperature compensation improved in order to further
correct barometric altitude data.
e. Improvement of TAWS availability regarding external peripheral
failures.
f. Improvement of Mode 4 alerts.
g. Flight Management System (FMS) Landing System (FLS)
operational compatibility.
8. New Zone Temperature controller P/N: 978C0000-05 which improves the
cabin and duct regulation. The main improvements of the ZTC are:
a. New wording of the Duct Temp Limitation menu of the ECS on
the Multipurpose Control and Display Unit (MCDU).
b. Deletion of the TEMP SENSOR CABIN AREA 6 message, in case
of cabin temperature sensor 6 disconnection.
c. Alternative cabin control to be activated via Cabin Assignment
module Bit (CAM).
d. Deletion of LDF BOX indication on the ECAM, if no Dock on Crew
Rest (DCR) is installed.

Page 2 of 3

Content : e. Introduction of air outlet heater fault messages.
f. On the CIDS interface, transmission of labels 153-156, 171-174,
enables indication of actual Lower Deck Facility (LDF)
temperature on Flight Attendant Panel (FAP).
g. Sensor voltage supply fault corrected.
9. New FCSC P/N: LA2B00300A40000. The main improvements of the new
P/N are as follows:
a. Modification of other computers monitoring.
b. New elevator position monitoring function.
c. Correction of spurious alarm of Pedal Feel and Trim Unit.
d. Modification of parameters recorded when there is a computer
fault.
10. New FWC P/N: LA2E20202T10000. The main improvements of the new
P.N are as follows:
a. New audio board with data-loading capability from the OBRMs.
b. Correction of soft pin programming initialization.

The following table gives a list of components installed on VT-JWH and its
interchangeability with the components installed on VT-JWG.

COMPONENT P/N on JWG P/N on JWH INTERCHANGEABILITY
TEMP SELECTOR 777A0000-01 777B0000-02
2 WAY
INTERCHANGEABLE
ZONE TEMP
CONTROLLER
978C0000-04 978C0000-05
1 WAY
INTERCHANGEABLE
AUDIO
MANAGEMENT
UNIT
AMU4031LA130103 AMU4031LA140204
2 WAY
INTERCHANGEABLE
FIRE P/B SW 330VZ01Y02 334VZ01Y00
INTERCHANGEABLE IN
SHIPSETS
FCSC LA2B00300A30000 LA2B00300A40000
INTERCHANGEABLE IN
SHIPSETS
RUDDER SERVO
CONTROL
31115-070 31115-080
1 WAY
INTERCHANGEABLE
ADAPTER PPU
ASSY
521A0200-01 521B0200-01
2 WAY
INTERCHANGEABLE
FUEL FEED
PUMP
P93A19-204 P93A19-203
2 WAY
INTERCHANGEABLE
FWC LA2E20101K90000 LA2E20202T10000
NOT
INTERCHANGEABLE
ECAM CONTROL
PANEL
LA2E90606HM0100 LA2E90707HM0100
2 WAY
INTERCHANGEABLE
BTMU LA2H60300HM0100 4305740091
2 WAY
INTERCHANGEABLE
DDRMI 63543-253-4 NO DDRMI NOT APPLICABLE
RADIO
ALTIMETER
9599-607-19503 9599-607-19504
2 WAY
INTERCHANGEABLE
MMR 822-1152-130 822-1152-131
1 WAY
INTERCHANGEABLE
T2CAS
COMPUTER
9000000-10110 9000000-11111
1 WAY
INTERCHANGEABLE
MMR 822-1152-130 822-1152-131
1 WAY
INTERCHANGEABLE

Page 3 of 3

:
COMPONENT P/N on JWG P/N on JWH INTERCHANGEABILITY
HP BLEED VALVE 6763C070000 6763C080000
2 WAY
INTERCHANGEABLE
CMC LA2G007001A0000 LA2G007001C0000
1 WAY
INTERCHANGEABLE IN
SHIPSETS
PRINTER K282AAM0305 K282AAM0406
2 WAY
INTERCHANGEABLE

On the A330 aircraft, it is reported that the PRV1 can be shown open amber on
the ECAM bleed page under the following conditions with cold outside
temperature:
4 A/C on ground
4 APU ON
4 APU BLEED OFF
4 PACKS ON
4 ENG 1 not running

This behaviour is due to an APU bleed residual upstream pressure that is a bit
higher than the 8 psi value under which the PRV will fully close. With cold
outside temperature conditions, the ECB activates the APU ice protection mode
to precent ice accretion at the Inlet guide vanes (IGV). The IGVs will open
leading to a residual bleed pressure in the bleed system upto 10 to 12 psi, thus
leading to the PRV shown open. This behaviour of the APU is normal as per the
implemented ECB logic and is not a deficiency. PRV 1 will close as soon as ENG 1
Bleed 1 pushbutton is set to OFF or APU Bleed is set to ON.

Action : All AMEs to note that this behaviour is as per design and is linked to a APU bleed
residual upstream pressure that reaches 10 to 12 psi when the APU ice
protection is active.
To show proper functioning of the APU in this case, it is recommended to run
the APU in this configuration for about 10 minutes to heat up the load
compressor and to cycle the bleed pushbutton at the overhead panel to return
to normal position.
Page 1 of 1
Jet Airways (I) Ltd
Technical Instruction No. 25/2007

Date ATA Sub ATA
10-Dec-2007 00 --

Supersedes :
Subject : VT-JWJ Salient features
Authority Ref : Technical Services & Airbus Delivery Documents.
Background
Information
: Jet Airways has inducted a new A330-202 aircraft VT-JWH (MSN 885) into its
fleet.
aircraft.
Content : Aircraft VT-JWJ is delivered with the same configuration as VT-JWH.

VT-JWJ has the following salient features:-

4 Maximum Take-Off Weight 2,33,000 kg
4 PAX Configuration 30 Club Premier + 190 Economy
4 Engines Model: - CF6-80E1 A4/B.
4 Max Operating thrust 70000 lbs.
4 Max thrust with Bump 72000 lbs.
4 Seats:
4 IFE System- Panasonic eX2.

4 Approved by DGCA for:
o ETOPS: Diversion time-180 min/120 min, Speed 0.84M /330 kts
in ISA conditions.
o ILS Category III B.
o RNP-10, RVSM, B-RNAV and NAT-MNPS operations.
Page 1 of 3

Jet Airways (I) Ltd

12/Dec/2007
72 65 0

Applicability : All Airbus A330 A/C Powered by CF6-80E1A4/B ENGINES.

Supersedes : None

Subject : CF6-80E1 Hydraulic Pump Adapter Loosening

Authority
Ref
: - PRESENTATION, CF6-80 TECHNICAL SYMPOSIUM OCT, 2007
- A330/CF6-80 AMM R7, Dated 01/Oct/2007.

Background
Information
: CF6-80E1 has experienced 21 occurrences of hydraulic pumps
loosening from the AGB world wide and is an industry issue.
Out of total occurrences there has been significant oil loss in
two cases.

Hydraulic Pad Adapter is of cast aluminum Material. Studs are
threaded and keylocked into the adapter. Wear occurs
between the steel threads and the aluminum adapter (Fig 1).
Content : 1. Four possible causes have been identified by GE & anyone of
it can result in insufficient clamping force in joint :

Micro movement due to inadequate initial clamp load
The adapter threads are subjected to fatigue load
from pump vibration
Pump flange yields under vibration load
Stack up concern with adapter stud and nut.

(Please refer the figures on page 2 & 3 for more details).

2. AMM A330/CF6-80E1revised to include adapter assembly
replacement (Oct-2007).

Action : 1) Carry out visual inspection of the area around Hydraulic Pump
adapter pad & look for oil wetting whenever the engine cowling
is
opened.

2) If oil wetting is observed, carry out inspection of Hydraulic
Pump
Adapter studs for loosening as per A330/CF6-80E1 AMM 72-65-41-
200-801& take the necessary action.
Page 2 of 3

FIGURE 1

FIGURE 2

Page 3 of 3

FIGURE 3

FIGURE 4

/
J et Airways (I ) Ltd
A TR 7 2
Date
02- J an-2007
A TA
09
Sub A TA
11
R evision
o
A pplicability
: A TR 72
Supersedes
: Nil
Subject
: Towing Standard Practices
A uthority R ef
:
A TR A ll Operators Message(A OM) 42-72{2006{10, SL A TR 72-09-6000 &
A MM(]IC) 09-11-00....
Background
:
Information
A TR has observed on in-service aircrafts damage to Nose landing gear
(NLG) and components fitted thereon. During investigation performed by
A TR , it was observed that incorrect towing practices were identified as
contributing factors to nose landing gear damage.
Content
:
This technical instruction gives recommendations and precautions to be
followed during aircraft towing to avoid any landing gear and door
damages.
A ction
:
- Towing with towbarless system is strictly prohibited.
- Do not perform pivoting (sharp turns) upon a landing gear with fully
braked wheels except in case of emergency.
- Ensurethat correct shear pins are used.
- Ensurethat there is no interference between the tow bar { nose gear
door lower surface at any wheel angle. This can be ensured by using
tractors with hook height 16 inches above ground. Use of standard
tractors with height greater than 16 inches may interfere with the
lower surface of the doors beyond a wheel deflection angle of 45.
(R efer attached figure)
It is advised that all Maintenance Personnel should strictly adhere to the
precautions given in A MM (J Ie) 09-11-00 in addition to the precautions
given above during aircraft towing to avoid any landing gear component
and door damages.
Si nature Name Date
Prepared By
~
Sojin N J 02-01-2007
Checked By Majeed Walele I 02-01-2007
A pproved By C S Tomar I 02-01-2007
Page 1 of 2
~
Towing angle to be used to avoid nose gear doors

Page 2 of 2

A T R 7 2
Date
03- J AN-07
ATA
25
Sub ATA
60
Revision
o
Applicability : ATR 72-212A AIRCRAFTS
Supersedes : TI/ ATR/25/006
Subject : LIFE VESTSTANDARDISATION
Authority Ref : TECHNICALSERVICES
Background
:
The objective of this Technical Instruction is to apprise all that the ATR
Information Aircrafts are in the process of being merged to group "A".
All group "C" Life vests would be replaced by group "A".
Content : Part Numbers applicable to Group "A" Life Vest
521850-6300, 521850-6301, 511851-1300, P0723E105P, P01074-101,
3505-101,63600-101, 3S0S-171W21 (New part number).
All Maintenance personnel are hereby advised to refer to the Notes to
Crew entry to ensure correctness of Part Number of Life Vest to be
Action
installed till suchtime that all Aircrafts have been standardised.

:
This issue is to apprise all personnel that Aircrafts VT-J CA, J CB, J CC,
J CD, J CE,J CFand J CGhave already beenconfigured to group "A".
I
Name Date
Prepared By J ITESH R. KATKAR
(J5, 01 () 7-
Checked By MAJ EED WALELE
=(0\ 10t-
Approved By C. S. TOMAR
(' J 5.1(Y/?J )-
Page 1 of 1
A T R 7 2
Date
03- J AN-07
ATA
25
Sub ATA
60
Revision
o
Applicability : ATR 72-212A AIRCRAFTS
Supersedes : TI/ ATR/25/006
Subject : LIFE VESTSTANDARDISATION
Authority Ref : TECHNICALSERVICES
Background
:
Information Aircrafts are in the process of being merged to group "A".
All group "C" Life vests would be replaced by group "A".
Content : Part Numbers applicable to Group "A" Life Vest
521850-6300, 521850-6301, 511851-1300, P0723E105P, P01074-101,
3505-101,63600-101, 3S0S-171W21 (New part number).
All Maintenance personnel are hereby advised to refer to the Notes to
Crew entry to ensure correctness of Part Number of Life Vest to be
Action
installed till suchtime that all Aircrafts have been standardised.

:
This issue is to apprise all personnel that Aircrafts VT-J CA, J CB, J CC,
J CD, J CE,J CFand J CGhave already beenconfigured to group "A".
I
Name Date
Prepared By J ITESH R. KATKAR
(J5, 01 () 7-
Checked By MAJ EED WALELE
=(0\ 10t-
Approved By C. S. TOMAR
(' J 5.1(Y/?J )-
Page 1 of 1
J et Airways(I) ltd
Date
I
28-Mar-07
ATA
25
Sub ATA
60
IATR 721
Applicability : ATR 72-21 2A AIR CR AFT5
Supersedes : ATR TI 1 0 of 2004, ATR TI 02 of 2007 R ev 1 .
Subject : LIFE VEST STANDAR DI5ATION
Authority R ef : TECHNICAL SER VICES
Background
:
Information Aircraft have been converted to Group "Au type of Life-Vests.
:
The below mentioned Part Numbers are applicable to Group "A"
Life Vests,
521 850-6300, 521 850-6301 , 51 1 851 -1 300, P0723E1 05P, POI074-1 01 ,
Content 3505-1 01 ,63600-1 01 , 3S0S-1 71 W21 (New part number).
These Life-Vests are now fitted on all ATR Aircraft, all 8737-400 / 800 /
900 Aircraft, all Airbus A330 Aircraft and a few 8737-700 Aircraft.
:
All Maintenance personnel are hereby advised that all ATR Aircraft have
Action
been standardised to Group "Au type to Life-Vests. Use only the Part
Numbers mentioned above.
Name Date
Prepared By J ITESH R .KATKAR
28-Mar-07
Checked By
MAJ EEDWALELE
28-Mar-07
Approved By
SHIR ISH A.KESKAR
28-Mar-07
Page 1 of 1

Page 1 of 1
Jet Airways (I) Ltd

Date ATA Sub ATA
16-08-2007 23 51

Applicability
:
ATR 72 212A
Supersedes
:
N/A
Subject
:
INSTALLATION OF NEW COCKPIT LOUDSPEAKER
P/N: HP3520AA01

Authority Ref
:
SB : ATR72-23-1058

Background
Information
:
ATR72 airplanes in Jet Airways fleet are equipped with cockpit loudspeaker
P/N: 866-210-951 .The manufacturer BECKER FLUGFUNKWERK GMBH
has stopped the production of the cockpit loudspeaker .
ATR has approved installation of EADSAIRBUS P/N: HP3520AA01 on
ATR72 airplanes vide SB: ATR72-23-1058.

Content
:
The Alternate P/N: HP3520AA01 cockpit loudspeaker can be installed on the
aircraft provided the SB: ATR72-23-1058 has been embodied. Jet Airways has
already modified aircraft VT-JCA [MSN 572] and will be progressively
modifying the remaining airplanes.

The modification consists of
1. Replacement of wires from connector 79VC to loudspeakers.
2. Wires to loudspeakers are connected using terminal P/N: DAN387-01.
3. Wires are connected to connector 79VC using terminal Part no:
EN3155-018M2018.
4. Replacement of speakers with new p/n HP: 3520AA01.

Action
:
The new P/N: HP3520AA01 loudspeaker can be installed on airplanes
modified in accordance with SB:ATR72-23-1058. The SB embodiment
can be identified by looking at the part no of the speaker.
Modified aircraft will be installed with new Part no: HP3520AA01 .

Page 1 of 6
Jet Airways (I) Ltd

Date ATA Sub ATA
18-Sep-2007 34 40

Applicability : ATR 72
Supersedes : Not Applicable
Subject : Weather Radar System Troubleshooting.
Authority Ref : Honeywell Technical News Letter (TNL) A23-2000-018, Honeywell
System Description and Installation Manual (SDIM) for WR-800 and WU-
660 and Honeywell WR-800 Pilots manual.
Background
Information
: ATR airplanes, currently in Jet Airways fleet are equipped with two
different types of Weather Radar systems. VT-JCA, JCB and JCC are
installed with Honeywell Weather radar model WR-800 (P/N: MI585350-
5) which is a 1 kW radar. Airplanes VT-JCD, JCF, JCG, JCH are installed
with Honeywell Weather radar model WU-660 (P/N: 7021450-601)
which is 10 kW radar and does not have a waveguide.

Content : Model WR-800 does not display any fault codes during the test.
Transmitter and receiver integrity are monitored by the noise band in
the test pattern (Refer Figure 1). If the noise band is not continuous,
(i.e. broken up or appears periodically), the local oscillator or transmitter
is faulty. If the band is missing completely, the most likely cause is poor
receiver sensitivity. Other circuits also continuously monitor
performance, loading, and temperature of system power supplies. In
case of latched faults a system recycle will determine the actual cause of
the problem.

Model WU-660 has a feature where during the self test of the weather
radar, fault codes are displayed in the test pattern. (Ref: Figure 2). Upon
entering the TEST mode, if there are no currently active faults, a
"RADAR OK" message will be displayed for one sweep. After that the
most recent fault code is displayed, cycling to the oldest fault in the list
of faults. Upon reaching the last fault an "END OF LIST" message will be
displayed. Ensure that the POC (power on count) = 0 for faults
associated with the current power on cycle.

Excerpts from Honeywell TNL A23-2000-018 are attached as an
APPENDIX to this Technical Instruction which contains a detailed
description of the possible fault codes and the corresponding,
recommended maintenance action.

Of the various fault codes that can cause WEATHER RADAR RTA FAULT,
the following codes may be cleared by turning the radar OFF (on both
controllers) for 10 seconds and back on. Fault codes 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6,
10,24 or 36 are associated with RTA power-up initialization faults and if
there is no hardware failure, the radar usually will come up clean after a
power cycle (like re-booting your computer if it isnt working correctly).

Page 2 of 6

Action : 1. For model WR-800, perform operational test as per AMM and observe
the condition of noise band. Take suitable action accordingly. In case of
transient faults perform the following tests.
a. Verify aircraft power circuit breakers are ON (both DC and AC).
b. Rotate the indicator BRT/OFF knob fully counterclockwise (OFF), and
after a few seconds rotate Indicator BRT/OFF knob to ON.
c. Push the WX button.
d. If the fault was of transient nature, the system may operate
satisfactorily; if not, it will automatically cycle OFF.

2. For model WU-660, perform operational test as per AMM and record
the fault codes displayed on the test pattern. Take suitable action as per
the displayed fault codes using the fault code list attached to this
Technical Instruction. For Fault codes 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 10, 24 or
36,perform a power recycle and then perform operational test again to
ensure if the code is still present.

NOTE: In all cases, physically inspect the radome also for visible
damages and moisture ingression.

Page 3 of 6

FIGURE 1: TEST PATTERN DISPLAY FOR THE WR-800

FIGURE 2: TEST PATTERN DISPLAY FOR THE WU-660
Page 4 of 6

APPENDIX

Page 5 of 6

Page 6 of 6

Page 1 of 4

Jet Airways (I) Ltd

Date ATA Sub ATA
12-Dec-2007 00 --

Applicability :
VT-JCJ
Supersedes :

Subject :
VT-JCJ Salient features
Authority Ref :
Technical Services & ATR delivery documents.
Background
Information
:
Jet Airways is inducting a new ATR72 aircraft VT-JCJ (MSN 771) into its fleet.
This Technical Instruction is issued to highlight the salient features of VT-JCJ
and its differences with VT-JCH of the existing ATR72 fleet.
Content :
VT-JCJ has the following salient features
4 Engines PW127F Engine
4 Pax Configuration
o 62 @ 31 pitch.
VT-JCJ has the following differences with the rest of the ATR fleet
4 Max Take Off Weight 22,500kg
4 Max Zero Fuel Weight 20,300kg
4 Certification for 15 kt tailwind Take Off and Landing
4 VHF 8.33 KHz spacing
4 FDEP is removed. The FDEP page is now accessed through the MCDU
for updation of Time (Date & UTC time) and Flight Number selection.
4 Cockpit Door Surveillance System installed.
4 Dual Navigation Lights Installed. Navigation lights are controlled
through a 3 position switch. [OFF-NORMAL-ALT]
4 MLG Wheel tyre pressure is 121 psi instead of 119 psi. Nose Wheel tyre
pressure remains unchanged at 64 psi.
4 MPC (Multipurpose Computer)
The MPC is basically composed of Auxillary Flight Data Acquisition Unit
and the Data Management Unit part.

AFDAU has the following functions:-
o Flight Data Acquisition
o Aircraft Performance Monitoring
3 new lights are installed on 13 VU panel.
a) Cruise Speed Low Informs crew that an abnormal
drag increase induces a speed decrease of more than 10
kts compared with the expected speed.
b) Increase Speed It alerts the crew that minimum icing
speed is reached. This alert is ideally triggered after a
<<Degraded Performance Warning>>
c) Degraded Performance During Climb, Cruise and
Descent it alerts the crew that the performance is being
degraded and QRH procedures must be applied.
o Enhanced Surveillance
The AFDAU acquires, formats and sends the following
parameters to the Mode S ATC transponder
a) Magnetic Heading
b) True Air Speed
c) IAS
d) Ground Speed
e) Mach Number
f) Roll Angle
g) True Track Angle
h) Selected Altitude
i) Vertical Rate

Page 2 of 4

Content :
DMU Part has the following functions:-
o QAR/DAR/SAR
o Aircraft Condition Monitoring System
a) MPC creates engine reports in format directly
compatible with the ECTM software.
b) All parameters necessary for ECTM purpose are stored
on the PCMCIA card.

o Maintenance Built-in Test Equipment
BITE of the following systems can be performed from the
MCDU
a) AFCS
b) RADIOS
c) MFC
d) PEC/EEC
e) TCAS

o G-Meter
a) A/C flight and landing vertical accelerations can be read
and analysed through the G-Meter page on the MCDU
b) Max Vertical acceleration can be stored on the PCMCIA
card.

4 Cabin Lighting System - LED lighting with new brackets and associated
plugs are installed in place of current fluorescent lighting for central
and lateral lighting in cabin, in forward cargo zone, in entrance, galley
zone and lavatories. A centralized control box is installed for monitoring
the light power in cabin.

The following table gives a list of P/Ns installed on VT-JCJ and its
interchangeability with the P/Ns on the existing fleet.
Part
P/N on existing
fleet
P/N on VT-JCJ Interchangeability
Individual Air
Outlet
1747-2 1747-15 Not interchangeable
HF Antenna
Coupler
622-6668-002 622-8114-002 Not interchangeable
Cockpit
Loudspeaker
866-210-951 HP3520AA01 Not interchangeable
CVR S200-0012-00 2100-1020-02
2 Way
interchangeable
CVR Remote
Microphone
93A055-45 93A055-65
2 Way
interchangeable
HF/COMM Control
Panel
HF/COMM
Transceiver
Monitor
Video Surveillance
System
188-10699-990
188-11094-
990
Not interchangeable
VHF/COMM
Control Panel
622-6520-003 822-2175-003
Not
Interchangeable
VHF COMM
Transceiver
VHF Nav Control
Panel
622-6521-011 822-2179-011
1 Way
interchangeable

Page 3 of 4

Content :
Cockpit Door DC3001101 DC3001302 Not interchangeable
Co Pilot Seat 3A063-0036-03-5
3A063-0036-
05-5
Not interchangeable
Front Sunvisor 160-10668-990
160-11175-
990
Not interchangeable
Observer Seat 1250422-001 1250822-01 Not interchangeable
Pilot Seat 3A063-0035-03-5
3A063-0035-
05-5
Not interchangeable
Warming Oven 72067100
4311500-00-
55-0
Not interchangeable
Water Heater 4360004-81-00-1 72184003B
1 Way
interchangeable
Portable
Extinguisher
18012 863521-01
Not
Interchangeable
Aileron Gust Lock
Actuator
VL005030A VL005030B
1 Way
interchangeable
Fuel High Level
Sensor
722-404-2 722786-1-0
1 Way
interchangeable
MPC Not Installed
ED35E109-01-
04
Not Applicable
APIU Not Installed
201-156-000-
021
Not Applicable
DMU Software Not installed
252692803-
0101
Not Applicable
Clock
Q17-
94122051AA
Q17-94122051FA
GMT4150-1 Not interchangeable
D23189000-17 D23189100-00 Not interchangeable
D23189000-19 D23189100-00
2 Way
interchangeable
MLG TRUNION
LEG LH
D23190000-19 D23190100-00
2 Way
interchangeable
MLG TRUNION
LEG RH
346Q48-1
MLG TYRE
346Q48G3
M10001
2 Way
interchangeable
NLG ACTUATOR D22709000-4 D22709500
1 Way
interchangeable
NLG DRAG BRACE D22703072-1 D22703500-3
1 Way
interchangeable
NLG TYRE 459M08-2 026-545-0
2 Way
interchangeable
NOSE LANDING
LEG
SIDE BRACE MLG
LH
D23219000-3 D23219100-00
SIDE BRACE MLG
RH
D23220000-3 D23220100-00
1 way
Interchangeable
UNLOCKING
ACTUATOR
D22708000 D22708500
1 Way
interchangeable
Page 4 of 4

Content :
EMERGENCY
LIGHT POWER
SUPPLY
301-3000 301-3100
2 Way
interchangeable
TAXI AND T/O
LIGHT
4295747 8001006Y00
2 Way
interchangeable
ADF CONTROL
PANEL
622-6522-003 822-2180-003
1 Way
interchangeable
ATC Control Panel 622-6523-207 822-1807-004 Not interchangeable
ATC Transponder 622-9210-005 622-9210-108
1 Way
interchangeable
MCDU
82165-10-005
82165-18-005
82165-22
2 Way
interchangeable
TCAS CONTROL
PANEL
622-9614-103 822-2182-103
Not
Interchangeable
VOR/ILS/DME
CONTROL PANEL
622-6521-011 822-2179-011
1 Way
interchangeable
Duct Discharge
downstream valve
73E61-1 1-1-04-0677
2 Way
interchangeable
Action :
All documents (AMM, IPC, WDM etc) related to this aircraft will be uploaded in
Technical publication E-manuals. All concerned are advised to refer manuals
dedicated to those aircraft until next revision of ATR manuals.
Page 1 of 6
Jet Airways (I) Ltd

02-Feb-2007 27 20/21 0

Applicability
: B 737-700/800/900
Supersedes
: Technical Instruction TI 15/2003, 04/2004 Issue 3 and 12/2004 Issue 2.
Subject
: Rudder System Enhancement Program (RSEP)
Authority Ref
:
Airplane Configuration Bulletin B-S001-2002006350
Wiring Provision Installation (SB 737-27-1247 Rev 01)
P5-3 Panel Replacement (SB 737-27-1262)
Hardware Replacement (SB 737-27-1253 Rev 03)
Control Rod Replacement (737-27-1279)
Background
Information
:
Boeing has developed Rudder System Enhancement Program in order to
address the in-service rudder reversal exhibited on Boeing 737 aircrafts.
This Rudder System Enhancement Program consists of changes in wiring
provisions, modification & installation of P5-3 panel and full-up hardware
replacement including a new dual rudder Power Control Unit (PCU). This
modification is also mandated by FAA AD 2007-03-07 to be complied
before 12 Nov2008.
Content
:
The Rudder System Enhancement Program is fully complied on airplanes
beginning with line number 1948 and subsequent. For in-service airplane
the Rudder System Enhancement Program is divided in four parts:

- Wiring provision modification. (Production complied on airplane L/N
1100 and subsequent).

- P5-3 panel modification. (Production complied on airplane L/N 1221
and subsequent).
- Hardware replacement program excluding control rod replacement.
(Production complied on airplane L/N 596, 1268 and subsequent).

- Control rod replacement. (Applicable to L/N 596, 1268 thru 1947).

The salient features of this modification program are as follows:

1. Replacement of existing main PCU with new PCU having two
separate and independent control valves. Each valve is controlled
with separate and independent control input and feedback
linkages. Two pistons in a dual load path, tandem arrangement are
independently commanded by a dedicated control valve and each
receives power from separate hydraulic system.

2. The new PCU also contains a sensor for detecting malfunctions
within the PCU. New override devices connected to the main PCU
and standby PCU inputs allow pilots to instinctively retain control
using the rudder pedals following a malfunction. The standby PCU
is automatically pressurized when the main PCU sensor detects a
malfunction.

3. In addition, a new light in the P5-3 Panel provides annunciation
whenever the standby PCU is pressurized.
Page 3 of 6

Page 4 of 6

Page 5 of 6

737-27-1262 737-27-1247 R1 737-27-1253 R2 737-27-1253 R3 737-27A1279
VT-JNA 89 Complied Complied Complied Open N/A
VT-JNB 91 Complied Complied Complied Open N/A
VT-JNC 164 Complied Complied Complied Complied N/A
VT-JND 177 Complied Complied Complied Complied N/A
VT-JNE 138 Complied Complied Complied Open N/A
VT-JNF 152 Complied Complied Complied Open N/A
VT-JNG 169 Complied Complied Complied * Complied N/A
VT-JNH 181 Complied Complied Complied * Complied N/A
VT-JNJ 297 Complied Complied Complied * Complied N/A
VT-JNL 326 Open Open Superseded by R3 Open N/A
VT-JNM 465 Complied Open Superseded by R3 Open N/A
VT-JNN 489 Complied Open Superseded by R3 Open N/A
VT-JNP 664 Complied Open Superseded by R3 Open N/A
VT-JNQ 734 Complied Open Superseded by R3 Open N/A
VT-JNR 749 Open Open Superseded by R3 Open N/A
VT-JNS 775 Complied Open Superseded by R3 Open N/A
VT-JNT 417 Complied Open Superseded by R3 Open N/A
VT-JNU 835 Complied Open Superseded by R3 Open N/A
VT-JNV 927 Complied Open Superseded by R3 Open N/A
VT-JNW 1016 Open Open Superseded by R3 Open N/A
VT-JNX 1073 Open Open Superseded by R3 Open N/A
VT-JNY 1146 Complied N/A Superseded by R3 Open N/A
VT-JNZ 1185 Open N/A Superseded by R3 Open N/A
VT-JGA 1228 N/A N/A Superseded by R3 Open N/A
VT-JGB 1282 N/A N/A N/A N/A Complied
VT-JGC 1314 N/A N/A N/A N/A Open
VT-JGD 1350 N/A N/A N/A N/A Open
VT-JGE 1608 N/A N/A N/A N/A Open
VT-JGF 1643 N/A N/A N/A N/A Open
VT-JGG 1686 N/A N/A N/A N/A Open
VT-JGH 973 Complied Complied Complied Open N/A
VT-JGJ 998 Complied Complied Complied Complied N/A
VT-JGK 1002 Complied Complied Complied Complied N/A
VT-JGL 1392 N/A N/A N/A N/A Complied
VT-JGM 1201 Complied N/A Complied Open N/A
VT-JGN 1212 Complied N/A Open Open N/A
VT-JGP 1920 N/A N/A N/A N/A Open
* complied as per 737-27-1253 R3
Status of Service Bulletins
A/C
Line
No.
Page 6 of 6
Page 1 of 2
Jet Airways (I) Ltd

12-Feb-2007 00 -- 00

Applicability
:
VT-JGU
Supersedes
:
Not Applicable.
Subject
:
VT-JGU Differences.
Authority Ref
:
Technical Services & Production Revision Records (PRR).
Background
Information
:
Jet Airways is inducting a new B737-800 aircraft VT-JGU (Variable no.YC747, Line
no. 2170, MSN 34802) into its fleet.
This Technical Instruction is issued to highlight the salient features of aircraft VT-
JGU and differences with the existing B737-800 aircraft in Jet Airways fleet.
Content
:
Aircraft VT-JGU has the following salient features:
1) Maximum Take Off Weight 79,015 kgs.
2) Engine Thrust Rating 26K
Aircraft VT-JGU has the following common features with VT-JGQ & JGR & JGS &
JGT.
3) Winglets installed.
4) PAX Configuration - 24 Club Premier + 126 Economy
5) Seats:-
Club Premier SICMA.
Economy - Weber 5600 with IFE.
6) IFE System Panasonic eFX.
7) Flight Deck Video Surveillance Completely installed, integrated with Multi
Function Display.
8) Life vests in economy class if installed would be stowed in Passenger
Service Units (PSUs).
9) Dual FMC.
10) Rockwell Collins Multiscan weather radar system.
11) Boarding music is provided by the IFE system. There is no Tape
Reproducer/Digital PRAM at the forward attendant panel.
12) Fixed 3 frequency ELT system with Nav Interface Unit.
13) CDS Block Point 06 software.
14) Partial provision of Nitrogen Generation System.
15) The lower centre DU is used for Flight deck entry video surveillance
system.
Aircraft VT-JGU has the following common features with VT-JGR, VT-JGS & VT-
JGT
1) FCC OPS SOFTWARE version 4.0 (P/N: 2276-COL-AC1-05). This aircraft
cannot be fitted with an FCC with previous version software P/N: 2277-
COL-AC1-04. Both FCC must have the same software Part Number.
2) SMYD P/N: 285A1010-7. P/N: 285A1010-7 is not intermixable with previous
version P/N: 285A1010-2,-3,-4,-6 & -106. Only P/Ns: 285A1010-7 or -107
can be installed and intermixed on this aircraft.

Aircraft VT-JGU has the following common features with VT-JGT

1) PFD/ND display format instead of EFIS/MAP display format.
2) CDS DEU OPC S/W P/N: 3175-BCG-00V-W0.
3) Engine Oil quantity indication is in litres.
4) PSEU P/N: 285A1600-5.
5) FSEU P/N: 285A1200-2.

Page 1 of 6
Jet Airways (I) Ltd

Date ATA Sub ATA
22-Feb-2007 27 20/21

Applicability
: B 737-700/800/900
Supersedes
: Technical Instruction TI 04/2007.
Subject
: Rudder System Enhancement Program (RSEP)
Authority Ref
:
Control Rod Replacement (737-27A1279)
Background
Information
:
before 12 Nov2008.
Content
:


and subsequent).




malfunction.

Page 2 of 6

4. The old rudder control torque tube is with four cranks, one
authority limiter solenoid valve. The new rudder control torque
tube is with five cranks and two authority limiter solenoid valves.
Old configuration has two control rods one each for main and
standby rudder PCU while the new configuration has three control
rods, two for main rudder PCU and one for standby rudder PCU.
Action
:
With the introduction of enhanced rudder system on the airplane it is
possible to have a STBY RUD ON light on the P5-3. This is detected by
the Force Fight Monitor System and illumination of the STBY RUD ON
light on the P5-3 panel is Non-Dispatchable.

Repetitive operational testing of the standby hydraulic actuation system
as per SB 737-27A1280 has been introduced through work order to
detect an impending failure of the system.

The accomplishment of 737-27-1253 Rev 03 or 737-27A1279 for aircraft
that have complied previous revisions of 737-27-1253 in service or
production, terminates the repetitive operational testing of the standby
hydraulic actuation system as mandated by SB 737-27A1280.

As per the modification status VT-JNC/ JND/ JNG/ JNH/ JNJ/ JNT/ JGB/
JGC /JGD/ JGE/ JGF/ JGG/ JGJ/ JGK/ JGL/ JGQ and subsequent are fully
complied with Rudder System Enhancement Program and do not require
operational testing of the standby hydraulic actuation system as per SB
737-27A1280. A complete list of status of airplane complied through the
various SBs is attached here with (page 6).

All AMEs to take note that on airplanes complied with Rudder System
Enhancement Program, the hardware is not fully interchangeable with
airplanes without Rudder System Enhancement Program.

- The new P5-3 panel part number 233A3209-2 can be installed on
non-RSEP airplanes and requires an INOP placard to be placed over
the new STANDBY RUD ON annunciator.

- Post modification main rudder PCU part number is S251A308-1
(419300-1003).The pre and post modification PCUs are not
interchangeable.

- The old main & standby rudder PCU control rod assembly part number
251A3495-1 should not to be used as spare. Use only part number
251A3495-7 in case of replacement for main rudder PCU control rod.

Note: Some A/C may have installed standby rudder PCU control rod
part number 251A3495-1 in service as spare. It is only necessary to replace
the standby rudder PCU control rod if the part number is 251A3495-1
while carrying out SBs 737-27-1253 Rev 03 or 737-27A1279.

Attachments: Highlights of the changes from airplane configuration
bulletin (pages 3-5) & modification status of the SBs 737-27-1247 R1,
737-27-1262, 737-27-1253 R2 & R3, 737-27A1279 (page 6).
Page 3 of 6

Page 4 of 6

Page 5 of 6

Page 1 of 2
Jet Airways (I) Ltd

Date ATA Sub ATA
22-Mar-2007 00 --

Applicability
:
VT-JGV
Supersedes
:
TI 09/2007
Subject
:
VT-JGV Differences.
Authority Ref
:
Background
Information
:
Jet Airways is inducting a new B737-800 aircraft VT-JGV (Variable no.YC748,
Line no. 2209, MSN 34803) into its fleet.
This Technical Instruction is issued to highlight the salient features of aircraft
VT-JGV and differences with the existing B737-800 aircraft in Jet Airways fleet.
Content
:

Aircraft VT-JGV has the following salient features:

Aircraft VT-JGV has the following common features with VT-JGQ,JGR, JGS, JGT
& JGU.

5) Seats:-
Club Premier SICMA.
7) Flight Deck Video Surveillance Completely installed, integrated with
Multi Function Display.
9) Dual FMC.
14) Partial provision of Nitrogen Generation System.
15) The lower centre DU is used for Flight deck entry video surveillance
system.

Aircraft VT-JGV has the following common features with VT-JGR, VT-JGS, VT-
JGT & VT-JGU.

1) FCC OPS SOFTWARE version 4.0 (P/N: 2276-COL-AC1-05). This aircraft
cannot be fitted with an FCC with previous version software P/N: 2277-
COL-AC1-04. Both FCC must have the same software Part Number.

2) SMYD P/N: 285A1010-7. P/N: 285A1010-7 is not intermixable with
previous version P/N: 285A1010-2,-3,-4,-6 & -106. Only P/Ns:
285A1010-7 or -107 can be installed and intermixed on this aircraft.

Page 2 of 2

Content
:
Aircraft VT-JGV has the following common features with VT-JGT & VT-JGU

1) PFD/ND display format instead of EFIS/MAP display format.
2) CDS DEU OPC S/W P/N: 3175-BCG-00V-W0.
3) Engine Oil quantity indication is in litres.
4) PSEU P/N: 285A1600-5.
5) FSEU P/N: 285A1200-2.

Aircraft VT-JGV has the following common features with VT-JGU

1) New lens assembly with improved design. The new lens P/N:
417A5501-3B is fully interchangeable with the existing P/N: 417A5501-
2B.
2) Fluid barrier is added to the Inboard Slat Track Rib at SS 47.69.122.69,
163.95, 240.95, 282.91, 362.51, 409.09 to prevent fuel drainage onto
the engine exhaust nozzle. Fluid barrier installation consists of filling
cavities between Rib and panels with BMS5-45 and adding fay sealant
with parting agent. Penetration is added in the vapour barrier rib to
allow for flame arrestor tube to drain fuel in adjacent outboard LE area.
Long aluminium tube of .375 in ID X 6.375 is installed using small
bracket and BMS5-45 sealant is used to hold the tube in place. Both the
blow out door and access panel is sealed with a gasket to prevent fluid
from leaking onto engine nozzle.

Differences between VT-JGV and VT-JGU.

3) New Elevator Tab Rod Assembly P/N 65-45166-25 with solid
shank rod ends in place of P/N 65-45166-24 with hollow shank rod
ends.
4) New Hydraulic System Heat exchanger P/N 10951000.
5) New NLG Drag Strut Assembly P/N: 162A2101-6 with
strengthened flanges.

The following table provides the part numbers of the new components and
their interchangeability with existing part nos.

Component Old P/N New P/N Interchangeability
Elevator Tab
Rod Assy
65-45166-24 65-45166-25
One way
Interchangeable
Hydraulic
System Heat
Exchanger
11483-000 10951000 Fully Interchangeable
NLG Upper
Drag Strut
Assy
162A2101-4 162A2101-6
Interchangeable (New
P/N is preferred)

Jet Airways (I) Ltd
Technical Instruction No: 12 / 2007

Date ATA Sub ATA
10-April-2007 12 12

Applicability :
All 737 NG aircraft

Supersedes :
Nil

Subject :
Hydraulic reservoir servicing procedures

Authority Ref :
Boeing 737 MT 12-002, AMM 12-12-00

Background
information
:
In service aircraft have reported instances of Hydraulic fumes
in cabin. These fumes have been attributed to improper aircraft
configuration resulting in over servicing of the hydraulic
reservoirs.

Content :
The Hydraulic reservoir air pressurizations system pressurizes
the reservoir to prevent pump cavitations at reduced ambient
pressures. This system has check valves to prevent back flow
of the hydraulic fluid up the reservoir air pressurization lines.

In some instances it is observed that the check valves remain
open due contamination.

The 737 NG hydraulic reservoir indicator system indicates
maximum of 106% on the Cockpit Gauge. Similarly the
quantity indicator on the reservoir indicates slightly more than
FULL mark. It is possible to service the reservoirs above
these levels but without further indication.

If the reservoir is over filled it may result in the hydraulic fluid
entering the pneumatic system and eventually the air
conditioning system causing fumes in the cabin and engine
start system resulting in starter failures.

Action :
To get the correct results when you do a check of the hydraulic
fluid quantities or fill the reservoirs, the airplane should be in
this configuration:
Primary Flight controls - neutral
LE flaps and slats - up
TE flaps - up
Spoilers - down
Landing gear - down
Thrust reversers - closed
Hydraulic system A and system B - off
Brake accumulator pressure - 2800 psi or more.

If the ambient temperature on the ground is 20F (-6C) or lower
at an arrival location and a fluid level is below REFILL, service
the reservoir to just above REFILL to avoid the overflow of
fluid at the next warmer location.

It is recommended that the reservoirs are serviced between RF
(refill) and FULL which is approximately equal to 92 percent
indicated in the cockpit gages.

AMM 12-12-00 describes the procedure for hydraulic reservoir
servicing and should always be adhered to.

Page 1 of 1
Jet Airways (I) Ltd

Date ATA Sub ATA
16-Apr-2007 34 40

Applicability
:
Boeing 737 Airplanes installed with Multiscan Weather Radar system
Supersedes
:
Not Applicable
Subject
:
Possible occurrence of excessive ground returns in AUTO mode.
Authority
Ref
:
Rockwell Collins SIL WMA-701X/702X SIL 07-1

Background
Information
:
Rockwell Collins has advised that Multiscan Weather Radar Antenna
Drive unit P/N: 622-5135-802/803 may display excessive ground returns
in AUTO mode.

Content
:
The radar receiver/transmitter controls the antenna tilt and scan by
sending elevation and azimuth commands over a serial bus to the
antenna pedestal. In AUTO mode, the tilt is controlled automatically.
In the unlikely event that the antenna auto mode tilt is lower than
intended, excessive ground returns may be displayed.

Rockwell Collins has initiated the process of releasing a service bulletin
to correct the anomaly.

As an interim solution, Rockwell Collins recommends following actions to
be performed by Flight crew.
1. Deselect weather radar on both EFIS control panels for more than
one second.
2. Reselect weather radar, as needed. Excessive ground returns should
be removed within approximately 30 seconds.

Action

If the flight crew has observed excessive ground returns in AUTO mode
and the WXR system behaviour was normal after deselection of the of
the WXR from both EFIS control panels, then AME should perform the
WXR system self test.
- No further action is necessary if the self test is satisfactory.
- Perform the troubleshooting as per Fault Isolation Manual if the self
test fails.

1
Jet Airways (I) Ltd
Technical Instructions No: 14 / 2007

Date ATA Sub ATA
19-04-2007 11 00

Applicability :
All B737 aircrafts

Supersedes :
NIL

Subject :
Procedure for MEL placarding in cockpit.

Authority Ref :
Technical Services

Background
information
:
As per the requirements of the Preamble of MEL applicable for
the Boeing aircrafts, the cockpit is to be placarded as per
requirements of the DDPG.

Content :
In order to ensure that the information about existing MEL is
available to the operating crew and AMEs is available, an
arrangement similar to the CAT II and III holders is installed
on the aircrafts. This arrangement is made through EMO 737-
25-061 / 064.

This holder P/N JACHW0271 is located on the P1 instrument
panel and has a Removable MEL card P/N JAIPB0262.

This cards has two sides:

Front Side : Green
Back Side : Grey ( Panel colour)

Action :
Additional procedure for informing Flight crew and AMEs about
the MEL placarding is mentioned below. All personnel are
required to ensure compliance for the same.
All other requirements of the Preamble remain unchanged.

When an MEL is invoked:
Remove the MEL card from the holder.
Turn the card around and affix the MEL sticker (with the
MEL number) on the front side.
Insert the card in the MEL holder displaying the Front
Side (Green).
Note: Multiple MEL stickers can be affixed on a single MEL
card
2
When MEL is revoked:

Remove the MEL sticker/stickers from the front side of
the MEL card.
Insert the card in the MEL holder displaying the Back
Side (Grey / Panel Colour).

CARD FRONT SIDE CARD BACK SIDE

GREEN SIDE GREY SIDE

Card p/n JAIPB0262
M E L
MEL XX-X

Card p/n JAIPB0262

B737-CL Aircrafts B737-NG Aircrafts

COCKPIT INSTRUMENT PANEL WITH MEL HOLDER

Part no of
Holder:
JACHW0271
MEL HOLDER / CARD
Jet Airways (I) Ltd
Technical Instruction No. 'S' / 2007
Date
08-Ma -2007
ATA
34
Sub ATA
30
18737/
Applicability
:
B737NG Airplanes
Supersedes
:
Not Applicable
Subject
:
Flashing ILS deviation on primary flight display (PFD) or electronic
attitude direction indicator (EADI) during approach.
Authority Ref
:
737 MT 34-024 dated 15/003/2007
Background
:
Flashing of ILS deviation and Station Ident values on PFD or EADI can
Information occur during approach and can stay on until the MMR power is cycled.
The condition is believed to be caused by Neutron Single Event Upsets
(NSEU) that cause a processor reset, and result in ILS deviation
outputs toggling between "operational" and "no computed data". As a
result, the ILS deviation pointers on the PFDs or EADIs toggle in and
out of view at approximately a two-second rate during an ILS
approach.
Content
:
Investigation has revealed that when the ILS module warm starts
(i.e. MMR powered down for J ess than 10 seconds), the ILS deviation
values will not exhibit the toggling behavior. Cycling of the MMR
circuit breaker following a cold start will transition the MMR from the
cold start to a warm start condition.
Action
:
Cycle the MMR circuit breakers after landing to clear the above
mentioned condition. It is also recommended to cycle the MMR circuit
breakers any time power is restored to the airplane or power is restored
to the MMRs or after replacement of MMRs.
Ensure that each MMR circuit breaker is oDened and then
closed within five seconds while the remaininq MMR is DOwered.
NOTE:If power was removed from the MMR, allow the MMR to
complete its power-on self-test before cycling the circuit breaker.
Prepared By
Checked By
Approved By
Name
RAKESHR DIXIT
P.S.R.KRUPAKAR
C.S.TOMAR
Page 1 of 1
Date
08-May-2007
08-May-2007
08-May-2007
J et Airways (I) ltd
Date
08-Ma -2007
ATA
34
Sub ATA
60 IB7371
Applicability
: B737Airplanes installed with dual FMCHardware PIN:10-6222S-
003(SMITHS PIN:171497-0S-01)
Supersedes
:
Not Applicable
Subject
:
FMCNuisance"CROSSLOADFAIL" message
Authority Ref
: Boeing FTD737NG-FTD-34-07002dated 16/03/2007
Background
: Operators have reported that when updating the Navigation database
Information
(NDB), the FMCCDUdisplayed the "CROSSLOADFAIL" message.
Content
: Investigation has revealed that when a crossload of very large NDBs is
attempted and the receiving FMCis an H/W PIN 1O-6222S-003,the FMC
that initiated the crossload "times out" while waiting for the receiving
FMC to respond after the crossload is completed.
Lab tests have
indicated that, for this condition the crossload is actually completed
when the "CROSSLOADFAIL" message is displayed. However, the
messageis displayed due to the time out condition.
Action
: If the "CROSSLOADFAIL" message is displayed, confirmation that it is a
nuisance message is possible by selecting the "INDEX" prompt at 6L on
the FMC CDU, entering FMC BITE and selecting the "CROSSLOAD"
prompt at 6R on the FMCS Bm page. If no database names are
displayed, then both FMCshave the same databases and the database
crossloadedsuccessfully.
Alternatively, if the "CROSSLOAD FAIL" message is displayed,
confirmation that the NDB is loaded can be accomplished by accessing
the FMC "IDENT" page on the FMC CDU and moving the FMC Source
Select Switch from "Normal" to "Both on Left" and "Both on Right" and
verifying the correct new NDB part number is displayed on the IDENT
page for all source select switch positions.
This condition is expected to be corrected in the FMC software update
U10.8
Name Date
Prepared By
RAKESH R DIXIT 08-May-2007
Checked By
P.S.R.KRUPAKAR
08-May-2007
Approved By
C.S.TOMAR
08-May-2007
Page1of 1
Page 1 of 3
Jet Airways (I) Ltd

Date ATA Sub ATA
01-June-2007 34 20

Applicability : B737 NG Airplanes
Subject : Occurrence of ALIGN Light flashing.
Authority Ref : Boeing 737 AMM and Technical Services.
Background
Information
: Jet Airways has experienced in-service delays due to the occurrence of
both ADIRU ALIGN lights flashing. This Technical Instruction is used to
highlight the reasons for flashing of ALIGN light.

Content : The mode select unit (MSU) has a pair of ALIGN annunciators (One for
Left IRU and one for right IRU).They are white annunciators which come
on steady during ADIRU alignment. The annunciator will flash when the
ADIRU needs information. During alignment The ON DC light comes on
for 5 seconds. During this time, the ADIRU does a check of its DC power
source. After 5 seconds, the ON DC light goes off and the ALIGN light
comes on. The ADIRU is now in the alignment mode.

It is required to manually enter present position data for the ADIRU
during alignment. The IRU compares entered latitude and longitude with
the last known (stored) latitude and longitude during alignment. Once
the alignment period is over, the entered latitude is compared with the
IRU computed latitude during the current alignment.

Present position can be entered from the FMC CDU or the ISDU
When both ADIRUs are in alignment mode, it is advisable to enter the
present position data only one time and the same data goes to both
ADIRUs. If a wrong entry is made, it is possible to correct the position
entry. Alignment period ends when the alignment time shows zero.

NOTE: If the airplane is moved with the IRUs not aligned in NAV mode,
the change in present position may be sufficient to cause the ALIGN
annunciator to flash during initialization. Present position must be re-
entered to extinguish the ALIGN annunciator.

Do not use a space between the latitude and longitude. The format of
the latitude and longitude data is as follows:
Latitude and longitude: XDDMM.MYDDDMM.M
Where:
X is N or S for latitude, Y is E or W for longitude
D is the number of degrees ,M is the number of minutes

Page 2 of 3

: ALIGN light flashes in case the following anomalies occur

1. NO PRESENT POSITION ENTRY DURING ALIGNMENT PERIOD
If the alignment period ends and present position has not been entered,
these conditions show:
* ALIGN light flashes
* Status code 08 shows on ISDU
* ENTER IRS POSITION shows on FMS CDU scratchpad.

2. POSITION DIFFERENCE DURING ALIGNMENT PERIOD
When the position data entered during the alignment phase is more
than 1 degree different than the recorded (stored) latitude, these things
occur:

If the same incorrect position data is entered again these things occur:
* ALIGN light becomes steady (no flash).
* Status code 04 goes out of view
* ENTER IRS POSITION goes out of view.

NOTE: This does not imply that the ADIRU has accepted the incorrect
information. The incorrect data is now stored in the ADIRU memory
while the ADIRU continues to align.

Once the alignment time is over, the following things occur:
* Alignment time shows 0 on ISDU

NOTE: This is because the IRU has now finished calculating the current
latitude and it does not match with the previously entered present
position latitude.

Now if the same incorrect position data is entered once again these
things occur:
* FAULT light on
* SET IRS POSITION on FMS CDU scratchpad goes out of view
* Status code 02 shows on ISDU.

NOTE: This is because the IRU now assumes that entered position is
accurate and this implies that the IRU calculated latitude if erroneous.
Hence, the IRU declares itself as faulty.

Page 3 of 3

3. POSITION DIFFERENCE AFTER ALIGNMENT PERIOD
If the present position is entered after the alignment period is over and
if the ADIRU calculated latitude is different from the entered value,
these things occur
* SET IRS POSITION shows on FMS CDU scratchpad
* Status code 04 shows on the ISDU.

If the same incorrect position data is entered again these things occur
* FAULT light on
* SET IRS POSITION on FMS CDU scratchpad goes out of view
* Status code 02 shows on ISDU.

Action

: If Align light flashing defect is reported, check and record the
message displayed in the FMS CDU scratchpad and the status
code on ISDU with the Display selector switch in HDG/STS
position.

1. If the Enter IRS position message is displayed on FMS CDU
scratchpad and if the status code on the ISDU is 08, then enter the
correct latitude and longitude. The ALIGN light should extinguish and
the indications displayed on the Inboard and Outboard display should be
normal. No further maintenance action is necessary.

2. If the Enter IRS position message is displayed on FMS CDU
scratchpad and if the status code on the ISDU is 04 then enter the
correct latitude and longitude. The ALIGN light should extinguish and
the indications displayed on the Inboard and Outboard display should be
normal. No further maintenance action is necessary.

3. If during the alignment phase the IR FAULT light comes on and the
status code on the ISDU is 02, it means that the IRU has detected
repeated incorrect position entries. In such a scenario, switch the mode
select switch to OFF and wait for the ALIGN and FAULT lights to go off.
Enter the correct present position data and wait for the alignment
process to complete. If the fault light reappears replace the ADIRU.

NOTE: The CDU scratchpad must be reloaded with the correct present
position and the new position selected to the SET IRS POS field (by
pressing 4R LSK), even if the present position is already shown in the
SET IRS POS field.

Page 1 of 1
Jet Airways (I) Ltd

Date ATA Sub ATA
14-06-2007 34 10

Subject : Re-usage of Gasket during Pitot Probe Removal and Installation

Authority
Ref
: Boeing message #1-337080293-2

Background
Information
: AMM Task 34-11-01-000-801 for Pitot probe removal instructs to remove
gasket P/N: 232N9003-1 and discard it. This Technical Instruction is issued
to advise that the Pitot probe gasket can be reused provided the physical
condition of the gasket is satisfactory.

Content : As per AMM Task 34-11-01-000-801 (Pitot probe removal) gasket P/N:
232N9003-1 has to be removed and discarded.

We noticed a contradictory statement in Boeing SB 737-34-1811 (Pitot Static
Probe Bond Inspection and Grounding Plate Installation).The SB permits
reuse of the gasket provided the condition is satisfactory.

The matter was taken up with Boeing. Response Vide message number 1-
337080293-2 stated that Boeing has no objection to reuse the gasket
provided the gasket is not torn, cracked or otherwise damaged
while carrying out Removal and Installation of Pitot probe as per AMM task
34-11-01-000-801.

Boeing will include this information in a future revision of the AMM

Action : During Pitot probe replacement, the gasket may be reused if it is not
deteriorated.

Page 1 of 1
Jet Airways (I) Ltd

Date ATA Sub ATA
03 -Jul -2007
21 51

Applicability :
Boeing 737 airplanes.

Supersedes :
Not applicable.

Subject :
Pack trip on ground-Fan Bypass valve inoperative open/missing.

Authority Ref :
Boeing mail.

Background
information
:
Due reports of the fan bypass check valve inoperative open/missing on
airplane, MEL 21-44 is invoked. There is no mention of pack operating
restrictions with an inoperative open/missing valve in the MEL. Hence when
crew prepares the airplane, they operate the pack. This causes a pack trip.
This occurs just before departure and airplanes have to return to the bay
causing technical delays.

Content :
With the airplane is on the ground, there will be a reduction in airflow over
the pack heat exchanger, should the check valve be missing or stuck in the
open position. This will decrease the cooling effect of the pack heat
exchanger causing a Pack trip on ground.
The MEL 21-44 will be amended in its future revision.

Action :
For all maintenance personnel/Crew:

4 Raise a Notice To Crew (NTC), restricting use of the pack with an
inoperative open/missing fan by-pass valve on ground. This will avoid
pack trip before Take off.
4 Crew must not operate the specific pack on ground.

-
Date
10-J ul -2007
Technical Instruction No.2.2/ 2007
A ~ :A i L j _ S _ U _ ~ O _ A 1i_ 'A _
187371
A pplicability
:
B737airplanes.
S upersedes
:
Not A pplicable
S ubj ect
:
Cracks in the Pitot probe outer flexible hose.
A uthority Ref
:
Boeing message #1-337080301-2, 1-337080301-4 and 1-337080301-6.
Background
:
There have been occurrences of tears/separations in the outer flexible
Information rubber sheath of Pitot probe hose line PIN: 101143DBB0142D (Refer
attached figure). Consequentlythe hose assemblywas replaced.
This technical instruction is issued to highlight that separation in the
outer sheath of the Pitot flexible hose can be repaired provided the
associatedleak check, as per the A MMpassessuccessfully.
Content
:
A s the outside sheath of the flexible hose is not the pressure bearing
component of the hose, small splits in the sheath do not compromise
the performance of the hose.
Vide message number 1-337080301-4, Boeing has recommended that
the outer sheath of the flexible hose can be repaired using any of the
following sealants:
BAC5010 Tvoe 60 or Tvoe 62or Tvoe 68or Tvoe 74or Tvoe 77or Tvoe
79 or Tvoe 84or Tvoe 98or Tvoe 80.
This is considered as a permanent repair and the hose may remain on
the aircraft as long as there is no leak or damage to the inner pressure
bearing tubing.
NO TE:This procedure is to be usedonly after it is confirmed that the
separation is only in the outer rubber sheath and the associatedsystem
.
leak test Is successful as per A MM.
Page 1 of 2
Action
1. If a crack/separation (small split) is observed in the outer rubber
sheath of Pitot probe flexible hose at the j oint ,perform a leak test of
the systemas per A MM. If the leak test passes successfullythen the
flexible hose need not be replaced. The outer sheath of the hose can
be repaired by using anyone of the following sealants:
BA CS 010Type 60 or Type 62 or Type 68 or Type 74 or Type 77 or
Type 79 or Type 84 or Type 98 or Type 80.
2. If a crack/separation (small split) is observedand the flexible hose
fails leak tests then the Pitot probe flexible hose has to be replaced.
NOTE: This repair scheme is applicable to the Captain, First O fficer and
the A uxiliary Pitot flexible hoses.
Name Date
Prepared By
RAKESH R DIXIT 10-July-2007
Checked By UJAGAR LALL 10-July-2007
Approved By
S.KESKAR 10-July-2007
FLEXIBLE
HOSE
OUTER
SHEATH
CRACK!
SEPERA nON
A T THE
J OINT
FIG: ILLUSTRATION OF CRACK/SEPERATION AT THE J OINT OF THE FLEXIBLE HOSE

Page 2 of 2
,
A/C
Line Status of Service Bulletins
No. 737-27-1262 737-27-1247Rl 737-27-1253 R2 737-27-1253 R3 737-27A1279
VT-J NA 89 Complied Comolied Complied Open N/ A
VT-J NB 91 Complied Complied Complied aDen N/ A
VT-J NC 164 Complied Complied Comolied Complied N/ A
VT-J ND 177 Complied Complied Complied Complied N/ A
VT-J NE 138 Complied Complied Complied Open N/ A
VT-J NF 152 Complied Complied Comolied aDen N/ A
VT-J NG 169 Compiled Complied Complied * Complied N/ A
VT-J NH 181 Complied Complied Comnlied * Complied N/ A
VT-J NJ 297 Complied Complied Comolied * Complied N/ A
VT-J NL 326
Complied Complied Complied * Complied N/ A
VT-J NM 465 Comolied Comolied Comolied * Complied N/ A
VT-J NN 489
VT-J NP 664 Complied Open Suoerseded bYR3 aDen N/ A
VT-J NO 734 Complied aDen Superseded by R3 Open N/ A
VT-J NR 749 Open aDen Sunersededby R3 aDen N/ A
VT-J NS 775 Complied aDen Suoerseded pyR3 Open N/ A
VT - J NT 417
VT-J NU 835 Complied aDen Suoerseded by R3 Open N/ A
VT-J NV 927 Complied Open Superseded by R3 Open N/ A
VT-J NW 1016 Open Open Suoerseded by R3 aDen N/ A
VT-J NX 1073 ~ ~ ODen ~ ODen Superseded by R3 Open N/ A
VT-J NY 1146 Complied N/ A
.
Superseded by R3 Open N/ A
VT-J NZ 1185 Open N/ A Suoerseded by R3 Open N/ A
VT-J GA 1228 N/ A N/ A sUperseded by R3 Open N/ A
VT-J GB 1282 N/ A N/ A N/ A N/ A Complied
VT-JGC 1314 N/ A N/ A N/ A N/ A Complied
VT-J GD 1350 N/ A N/ A N/ A N/ A Complied
VT-J GE 1608 N/ A N/ A N/ A N/ A Complied
VT-J GF 1643 N/ A N/ A N/ A N/ A Complied
VT-JGG 1686 N/ A N/ A N/ A N/ A Complied
VT-J GH 973 Complied Complied Comolied Complied N/ A
VT-JGJ 998
Complied Complied Complied Complied N/ A
VT-J GK 1002 Complied Comolied Comolied Complied N/ A
VT-J GL 1392 N/ A N/ A N/ A N/ A Comolied
VT-J GM 1201 Complied N/ A Comnlied Complied N/ A
VT-J GN 1212 Complied N/ A Comolied * Complied N/ A
VT-J GP 1920 N/ A N/ A N/ A N/ A Complied
Page 6 of 6
Page 1 of 1
Jet Airways (I) Ltd

Date ATA Sub ATA
20-Aug-2007 00 --

Applicability :
VT-JGZ
Supersedes :

Subject :
VT-JGZ Salient Features.
Authority Ref :
Background
Information
:
Jet Airways has inducted a new B737-700 aircraft VT-JGZ (Variable no.YN121,
VT-JGZ and differences with the existing B737-700 aircraft in Jet Airways fleet.
Content :
Aircraft VT-JGZ has the following salient features:
3) Engine Model - CFM56-7B22/3
Seats:-
Club Premier SICMA.
7) Dual FMC.
11) PFD/ND Display format instead of EFIS/MAP format.
12) Cabin Altitude and Rate of Climb Module: P/N: 233A3213-2 is installed
for High Altitude Operations. A pressure altitude switch P/N: 214C50-2
is installed in the forward E&E bay.
13) 22 min Oxygen Generator P/N: E72220-10 is installed.
14) ACARS: Wiring provision only. Equipment not installed.
The following table gives a list of new P/Ns and its interchangeability with the
P/Ns in the existing fleet.
P/N
P/N on
existing fleet
P/N on
VT-JGZ
Interchangeability
Weather
Radar
822-1710-001 822-1710-002 Fully Interchangeable
SMYD 285A1010-107 285A1010-109
Interchangeable in
shipsets
FCC OPS S/W 2275-COL-AC1-05 2275-COL-AC1-06
Interchangeable in
shipsets
Cabin Alt &
Rate of climb
module
233A3213-1 233A3213-2
One way
interchangeable
Oxygen
Generator
E71740-00 E72220-10 Not interchangeable

Page 1 of 2
Jet Airways (I) Ltd

Date ATA Sub ATA
17-Sep-2007 00 --

Applicability :
VT-JGZ, VT-JGX.
Supersedes :
TI 25/2007
Subject :
VT-JGZ, VT-JGX Salient Features.

Authority Ref :

Background
Information
:
Jet Airways has inducted 2 new B737-700 aircrafts VT-JGZ (Variable no.YN121,
Line no. 2342, MSN 35218) & VT-JGX (Variable no.YN091, Line no. 2360, MSN
34805) into its fleet.
VT-JGZ and differences with the existing B737-700 aircraft in Jet Airways fleet.

Content :

Aircraft VT-JGZ and VT-JGX have the following salient features:
3) Engine Model - CFM56-7B22/3
4) Winglets Installed.
Seats:-
Club Premier SICMA.
8) Dual FMC.
12) PFD/ND Display format instead of EFIS/MAP format.
13) Cabin Altitude and Rate of Climb Module: P/N: 233A3213-2 is installed
for High Altitude Operations. A pressure altitude switch P/N: 214C50-2
is installed in the forward E&E bay.
14) 22 min Oxygen Generator P/N: E72220-10 is installed.
15) ACARS: Wiring provision only. Equipment not installed.
16) Take Off Warning Configuration Light: Illuminates on ground
simultaneously with Aural Warning intermittent horn for TAKE OFF
CONFIG Alert. (INOP)
17) Cabin Altitude Warning Light: Illuminates on ground simultaneously
with aural warning intermittent horn for CABIN ALTITUDE ALERT.
(INOP)

Page 2 of 2

Content :

The following table gives a list of new P/Ns and its interchangeability with the
P/Ns in the existing fleet.
P/N
P/N on
existing fleet
P/N on
VT-JGZ & VT-
JGX
Interchangeability
Weather
Radar
822-1710-001 822-1710-002 Fully Interchangeable
SMYD 285A1010-107 285A1010-109
Interchangeable in
shipsets
FCC OPS S/W 2275-COL-AC1-05 2275-COL-AC1-06
Interchangeable in
shipsets
Cabin Alt &
Rate of climb
module
233A3213-1 233A3213-2
One way
interchangeable
Oxygen
Generator
E71740-00 E72220-10 Not interchangeable

Page 1 of 1
Jet Airways (I) Ltd

Date ATA Sub ATA
18-Sep-2007 34 40

Applicability : B737NG Airplanes installed with Forward looking Weather Radar System.
Supersedes : Not Applicable.
Subject : Occurrence of intermittent PWS FAIL on take off or approach.

Authority Ref : Boeing Maintenance Tip 737 MT 34-028.

Background
Information
: There have been pilot reports of PWS FAIL displayed on ND during
takeoff or approach. Boeing and Rockwell Collins have also received
multiple reports of PWS FAIL during takeoff or approach below 2400
feet from other operators.

Content : On occurrence of PWS FAIL message the usual maintenance action is
to replace the weather radar receiver/transmitter (R/T). In most cases,
the R/T is returned with No Fault Found (NFF).After extensive
troubleshooting, Collins has been able to duplicate this condition in their
lab. Collins has found that the weather radar antenna drive is
susceptible to cross-talk interference between the motor drive circuit
signal and monitor circuit signal. This cross-talk can cause the weather
radar R/T to issue a PWS FAIL to the display units.

Action : For pilot reports of PWS FAIL, perform the weather radar operational
test in accordance with AMM section 34-43-00/501. If the weather radar
passes the operational test, then the PWS FAIL should be considered a
nuisance. If additional reports of PWS FAIL are reported on the same
airplane, then the weather radar antenna drive unit should be replaced

Page 1 of 4
Jet Airways (I) Ltd

Date ATA Sub ATA
12-Oct-2007 34 60

Applicability : B737 Airplanes
Subject : FLIGHT MANAGEMENT COMPUTER - UPDATE 10.7 Salient features
Authority Ref : Boeing SL: 737-SL-34-186, Smiths SIL: 3465 and Boeing SB: 737-34-
1918, Boeing message 1-5LUBME and Boeing FTD 737NG-FTD-34-
07004.
Background
Information
: B737 Airplane VT-JGW onwards have FMC software version 10.7
installed. It has also been decided to upgrade the FMC software version
on all other airplanes in our fleet to maintain fleet commonality.
the new software version 10.7.

Content : The reason for the Update 10.7 software is to add several
enhancements and improvements to the navigation control and
functionality of the existing software.

The features are as described below.

1. UNABLE REQD PERF RNP Message Display Logic Change
U10.7 software revises display logic for the UNABLE REQD PERF-RNP
message to have it be displayed on the map in addition to being
displayed in the FMC CDU scratchpad whenever an unable RNP condition
exists.

2. Loadable RNP Alert Times- U10.7 software modifies the UNABLE
REQD PERF RNP alerting times via FMC OPC (operational program
configuration). The default alert times have also been updated as
follows:
Environment U10.6 Default U10.7 Default
Oceanic 12.0 nm 80 sec 12.0 nm 60 sec
Enroute 2.0 nm 80 sec 2.0 nm 30 sec
Terminal 1.0 nm 60 sec 1.0 nm 10 sec
Approach 0.5 nm 10 sec 0.5 nm 10 sec

3. SW OPTIONS Page Loadable Alert Times display The U10.7
software will display the default lateral (RNP) , vertical (VRNP) and RNP
time to alarm values in the Software Options page for oceanic, enroute,
terminal and approach.

4. Revised Lateral ANP Calculation U10.7 software revises this
FMC navigation function to utilize an elliptical threshold to mitigate GPS
data latency on ANP (actual navigation performance) calculation, and to
use a common ANP value for both FMCs (for dual FMC configurations).

5. Revised Vertical ANP Calculation (VANP) U10.7 software
revises VANP to be based on Mach in order to better reflect actual
conditions.

Page 2 of 4

:
6. New Model Engine Database U10.7 software uses a new
MEDB, P/N BCG-014-A2 or BCG-014-V9 (both are completely
interchangeable), which incorporates changes to support updated
EEC software version 7.B.R3. This version EEC utilizes a higher idle
descent profile requiring the updated performance parameters included
in the new MEDB software.

7. Vertical Deviation Displayed in All Descent Phases U10.7
software revises the Vertical Deviation (VDEV) to always be displayed
while in a descent mode. Previous software versions did not display
VDEV during early descent.

8. Position Discrepancy Message Changes U10.7 software adds
message text to alert the condition that caused a position discrepancy as
follows:
On-Ground Trigger Message Text
Airport-IRS IRS POS/ORIGIN DISAGREE
Runway-FMC FMC POS/RW DISAGREE

In-Air Trigger Message Text
IRS-IRS VERIFY POS: IRS-IRS
IRS-FMC VERIFY POS: IRS-FMC
IRS-Radio VERIFY POS: IRS-RADIO
FMC-Radio VERIFY POS: FMC-RADIO
FMC-GPS VERIFY POS: FMC-GPS
FMC-FMC VERIFY POS: FMC-FMC

9.GPS Loss Alerting U10.7 software will provide an alert in the event
of loss of GPS data to the FMC. An FMC CDU scratchpad message will be
displayed indicating that GPS-L or GPS-R position data is not available
for use by the FMC. In-air, the message will be displayed if the left or
right GPS data is missing or invalid for 30 seconds. The message is
inhibited when the Approach Message Inhibit is set. The on-ground time
to alert is 10 minutes.

Page 3 of 4

:
10. VNAV/LNAV Armed Before Takeoff (737-6/7/8/900) U10.7
software allows the flight crew to arm VNAV and LNAV independently
prior to takeoff. This feature requires Common Display System (CDS)
Block Point 2006, P/N 311D-HNP-01A-09 and Enhanced Digital Flight
Control System P4.0, P/N 831-5854-140 (also P5.0 and Honeywell -710
Flight Control Computer when they certify). This feature is active
whenever the above combination of parts is installed. If armed prior to
F/D Takeoff selection, the VNAV Arm annunciation will appear on the
FMA and VNAV will engage at 400 feet with the speed target set to the
existing F/D Takeoff speed target, until reaching acceleration height.
The acceleration heights are specified on the TAKEOFF REF page 2. If
LNAV is armed prior to F/D Takeoff activation, the LNAV Arm
annunciation will appear on the FMA and LNAV will engage at 50 feet.

11. Trailing Edge Flap Placard and Leading Edge Device Speed
Target Limit U10.7 software limits FMC Target Speed to 5 kts below
the trailing edge flap placard speed. The flap placard speeds are hard
coded for the 737-3/4/500.The flap placard speeds are contained in the
MEDB for the 737NG. Also, for the 737NG, the FMC target speed is
limited to 230 kts until all leading edge devices are retracted. For the
737NG, this option requires CDS Block Point 2006 or later CDS software
installed.

12. LOC Update Inhibit U10.7 software has been revised to
automatically disable LOC updating when the FMC is GPS updating. A
prompt has also been added to the NAV OPTIONS page for flight crew
enable/disable of LOC updating. The default state of the LOC Update
prompt is ON.

13. VNAV INVALID - U10.7 will declare VNAV invalid if the aircraft has
been manually flown to an altitude that violates an altitude restriction in
descent

Page 4 of 4

Action : 1. Due to reported inconsistencies in the 10.7 software, flight operations
have been advised , not to arm VNAV on the ground prior to takeoff.

2. In the event the VNAV button is pressed inadvertently on the ground,
turn both flight director (F/D) switches OFF. Turn the F/D switch ON for
the pilot flying first and then turn the F/D switch ON for the pilot
monitoring. Verify the correct V2 speed is entered in the MCP IAS/MACH
display.

3. The FMC installed with 10.7, transitions to the "ENG OUT" mode
when the thrust lever positions differ by more than 52 degrees and the
airplane ground speed is greater then 30 knots. When in the "ENG OUT"
mode, the FMC will display "ALL ENG" on FMC CDU CLB page at Line
Select Key 4 Left (LSK 4L).
Once the FMC enters the "ENG OUT" mode, the FMC will not transition
back to "ALL ENG" until one of the following is performed:

a. The "ALL ENG" prompt on the CLB page is selected and executed

b. The FMC transitions from CLB to CRZ or,

c. A long term FMC power up occurs

Page 1 of 2
Jet Airways (I) Ltd
Date ATA Sub ATA
01-11-2007 36 11

Applicability
:
Boeing 737 airplanes(737-400 to -900 series)

Supersedes
:
Not Applicable.

Subject
:
Minimum Serviceable Pneumatic duct pressure.

Authority Ref
:
Boeing Service letter 737-SL-36-013-A. Technical Instruction no 43 / 2001

Background
information
:
Reference AMM 36-11-05 Figure 503 applicable for Boeing 737-400 and
AMM 36-11-00 figure 502 applicable to Boeing 737-700/800/900 aircrafts
indicate duct pressures for various engine power settings, but do not define
a minimum duct pressure limit. Technical Instruction no 43 / 2001 states
difference between the Left and Right duct pressure indicators that is
considered normal for the pressurization system to function normally.

This Technical Instruction defines minimum serviceable pneumatic duct
pressure value which will provide the pneumatic system users sufficient air
pressure to operate normally.

Content
:
The pneumatic system is a utility system that provides air pressure to the
system users.

AMM figures indicate the pneumatic duct pressure should be approximately
4 18 psig at ground idle,
4 32 psig when on regulated 9th stage supply and
4 42 psig when on regulated 5th stage supply.

The operating limit of the pneumatic system while on regulated 9th stage is
32 +/- 6 psig and 42 +/- 8 psig while on regulated 5th stage. Extraction of
bleed air from 9th or 5th stage engine compressors is dependent on engine
power setting, airplane altitude, and bleed system configuration.

In the pneumatic system only the pack flow control valve has a specified
normal inlet air pressures defined i.e. 10 to 50 psig. To maintain a cabin
pressure of approximately 8 psig a pneumatic duct pressure of 18 psig is
considered sufficient.

Action
:
If the pneumatic duct pressures are within the values as per AMM 36-
11-05 Figure 503 applicable for Boeing 737-400 and AMM 36-11-00
figure 502 applicable to Boeing 737-700/800/900, then the bleed
system is operating normally.

No maintenance action is required.

Page 2 of 2

If the pneumatic duct pressures are below the values shown on the
above mentioned figures & AMM figures but shows 18 psig or greater,
the bleed system is experiencing drifting performance but is still a
functioning system.
The airplane can be operated normally (without imposing the MEL), but
action should be taken to investigate and restore the bleed system
performance to normal operation at next maintenance opportunity.

If the pneumatic duct pressures are less than 18 psig, the bleed system
will not ensure normal operation of the user systems and the bleed
system should be considered inoperative. The bleed system should be
investigated and restored to normal operation before flight or declared
inoperative and impose the MEL restriction for continued operation.

Page 1 of 4
Jet Airways (I) Ltd

Date ATA Sub ATA
13-11-2007 73 21

Applicability : B737-NG Airplanes.
Subject : CFM56-7B Engine EEC Software Version 7.B.R3

Authority Ref : 1) Boeing service letter 737-SL-73-013-O dated 4
th
Oct2007.
2) Boeing FTD 737NG-FTD-34-06008 dated 30-3-2007.
3) CFM56-7B S/B 73-0135.

Background
Information
: New FADEC 3 (EEC) version 7.B.R3F3, software P/N: 2044M25P07, and
FADEC 2 version 7.B.R3F2, software P/N: 1853M78P27, increase the
Flight idle and Approach idle speeds of the Engine. This version EEC
utilizes a higher descent profile requiring a new MEDB with updated
performance parameters. The EEC software (P/N: 1853M78P27 or
P/N: 2044M25P07) is also a concurrent requirement for substitution or
intermix of a Technology Insertion Engine (CFM56-7BXX/3).

Boeing has developed Model Engine Data Base (MEDB) P/N BCG-014-A2
and BCG-014-V9 which incorporated changes to support EEC software
version 7.B.R3. These MEDB softwares can be used with FMC
Operational Program Software (OPS) Update 10.6 or higher. EEC
software version 7.B.R3 requires FMC MEDB software P/N: BCG-014-A2
or later MEDB software (Ex: P/N: BCG-014-V9).

Content : FADEC 2 and FADEC 3 EECs are functionally interchangeable on Engine.
However, FADEC 2 and FADEC 3 require hardware specific software that
is not interchangeable between the two hardware types. FADEC 3 is a
redesigned EEC with faster processing and more memory capability.

Following improvements are introduced in the new EEC software version
7.B.R3 to improve the reliability of the EEC and engine systems and to
add protection to engine hardware.

1) Variable Stator Vane (VSV) schedule changes: VSV system
will operate more closed during engine operation above idle.
Operating on a more closed VSV schedule results in improved
stall margin.

2) Approach Idle: is raised up to 2.4 percent. This change ensures
sufficient engine bleed air is maintained to clear cabin smoke if
required.

Page 2 of 4

3) Approach Idle Ice shedding accommodation logic: has
been added to keep the Variable Bleed Valve (VBV) doors open
on accelerations from approach idle when the total air
temperature (TAT) is below -6 degrees C and the throttle has
been at idle for 12 minutes. The VBV doors will remain open until
15 seconds after N1 reaches steady-state operation above max-
climb or TAT goes above -6 degrees C or the conditions for idle
are no longer approach.

4) Added PS3 schedules for Inert Gas requirement: Boeing
has provided a new requirement to pressurise the main fuel tank
with Inert Gas in flight. In order to meet the increased bleed-air
requirements to support the Inert gas system, the minimum PS3
schedules have been increased in flight. The minimum PS3
schedules remain unchanged during ground operation.

5) Altitude Bias to VBV speed speed schedule: In previous
software versions opening and closing of the VBV doors is based
on the deviation of the engine from a baseline speed-speed (N1
N2) relationship. For a given N1 speed, if the N2 speed is lower
than scheduled, the VBV doors are biased open. If the N2 speed
is higher, the VBV doors are biased closed. During engine
testing, it was observed that the VBV doors open slightly at high
power. This is due to N2 undershoot due to thermal soak effects.
VBV doors should not open at high power except when
commanded open by icing protection logic.
This software version keeps the VBV doors closed at high power.
This function is phased out between 15,000 and 15,500 feet.

6) T12 Fault Detection and Accommodation: Since entry-
Into-service three CFM56-7B engine model stall have been
related to the T12 sensing circuit. In previous versions of
software, the total air temperature (TAT) was calculated from
two engine T12 sensors and two aircraft sensors. If all of the
sensors were valid, TAT was calculated using a weighted average
of the four signals. If the signals were sufficiently close,
preference was given to the aircraft sensors. If both T12 engine
sensors were at least 5.5 degrees C from the aircraft sensors,
TAT was calculated from the average of the two T12 sensors.
In this software version if the valid T12 engine sensors disagree
by more than 12 degrees C and the aircraft TAT inputs are valid
and within 5.5 degrees C of each other, then the EEC uses the
engine sensor closest to the aircraft inputs instead of averaging
the two engine sensors in the computation of the TAT selected
value.

Page 3 of 4

7) PS3 sensor selection reference: EEC computes the PS3
selection reference difference with the selected value of PS3
instead of the local value. This computation method offers the
additional merit of synchronising the two EEC channels by
isolating a drifting sensor simultaneously on both channels.

8) Debris Monitoring System (DMS) requires inspection:
This software version updates the DMS selection logic so the
detection status and associated timer will not be reset every time
the core speed exceeds 10,000 rpm. This prevents the DMS
requires inspection from being set and reset multiple times
during taxi. This condition is held, but not latched. The condition
can still be reset below 10,000 rpm if the debris is no longer
detected.

9) Control Loop Position faults: Software testing revealed
that the TBV position fault is inhibited on the channel not in
menu mode, regardless of whether an actuator test is being
performed. Therefore, a position fault on this channel will not be
annunciated during the actuators test. By design, the fault
should not be inhibited on either channel during an actuator test.
This software version corrects this situation to allow a position
fault to be set on either channel during the actuators test. The
other control loops position fault logic has also been updated to
match the corrected TBV position fault logic.

10) Annunciating the T25 difference fault: This software
version modifies the maintenance logic to allow the T25 sensor
to sensor difference fault to be detected and annunciated during
the EEC test.

11) Transient N1 Redline Exceedance logic: This software
version implements a transient N1 redline exceedance algorithm.
This new algorithm, that applies to all CFM56-7B engine ratings,
will inhibit the reporting of a N1overspeed when the following
conditions are met:
The aircraft is on ground.
The sensed physical N1 speed is greater than the current
certified 104 percent redline, but is lower than 104.75
percent.
The condition listed above does not persist for more than
twenty (20) consecutive seconds.

If any of the conditions listed above are no longer met while the fan
speed is greater than 104 percent, then a N1 overspeed indication is
annunciated in the cockpit. Additionally, the 104 percent N1 redline
used in the power management logic will remain unchanged.

Page 4 of 4

12) Faster Engine deceleration during Rejected Takeoffs:
Software version 7.B.R3 contains logic to detect Rejected
Takeoff (RTO) conditions, and modification of the fuel
control logic to provide faster engine deceleration during RTO
events.

Action :
1) For EEC software 7.B.R3, can be installed on airplanes
with FMC OPS version 10.6 or above and FMC MEDB
P/N: BCG-014-A2 or BCG-014-V9.

2) EEC software 7.B.R3, P/N: 1853M78P27 (for FADEC 2
EEC) or P/N: 2044M25P07 (for FADEC 3 EEC) is not
intermixable with pervious software version
(Ex: P/N: 1853M78P25, 1853M78P26 or P/N:
2044M25P05, 2044M25P06) due to difference in the
deceleration rate.

Whenever EEC software is upgraded to 7.B.R3 version,
EEC on both the engines must have same software
version i.e., either P/N: 1853M78P27 or P/N:
2044M25P07.

3) FADEC 2 and FADEC 3 EEC are interchangeable and
intermixable i.e., One engine may be fitted with FADEC 2
EEC with software P/N: 1853M78P27 and other engine
may be fitted with FADEC 3 EEC with software
P/N: 2044M25P07.

Page 1 of 2

Jet Airways (I) Ltd

Date ATA Sub ATA
19-Nov-2007 00 --

Applicability :
VT-JBB
Supersedes :

Subject :
VT-JBB Salient Features.
Authority Ref :
Background
Information
:
Jet Airways has inducted a new B737-800 aircraft VT-JBB (Variable no.YL602,
VT-JBB and differences with the existing B737-800 aircraft in Jet Airways fleet.
Content :
Aircraft VT-JGW has the following salient features:
2) Engine Thrust Rating 24K .
3) Engine Model CFM56-7B24/3.

Aircraft VT-JBB has the following common features with VT-JGW.

6) Seats:-
Club Premier SICMA.
9) Dual FMC.

VT-JBB has the following differences with VT-JGW.

14) Flight Deck Video Surveillance Goodrich CDSS system. The O2 mask
on the Capt and F/Os side is moved to the waste bin site. The CDSS
LCD monitor is installed on the O2 mask location. The Control panel is
installed behind the LCD monitor. The CDSS system is not integrated
with the Multifunction Display (Lower DU).
15) Standby Altimeter, Airspeed and Standby attitude indicator instead of
ISFD.
16) The Alternate VMO/MMO select switch (S1127) is located in the main
E/E bay service panel (STA 358), adjacent to the E/E compartment
lighting switch and should be selected to alternate position for flights
that must be dispatched with the gear down and locked condition.

Page 2 of 2

Content :
Part P/N on JGW P/N on JBB Interchangeability
WXR
Transceiver
822-1710-001 822-1710-002 2 way interchangeable
Standby
Altimeter
WL102AMS3 Not Applicable
Standby
Attitude
Indicator
ISFD Installed
H341BWM Not Applicable
CDS DEU
OPC
317B-BCG-
018-06
3179-BCG-
018-51
Not interchangeable
Camera Select
Panel
2003-109-2 8431M1-23 Not interchangeable

Page 1 of 2

Jet Airways (I) Ltd

Date ATA Sub ATA
05-Dec-2007 00 --

Applicability :
VT-JBD
Supersedes :

Subject :
VT-JBD Salient Features.
Authority Ref :
Background
Information
:
Jet Airways has inducted a new B737-800 aircraft VT-JBD (Variable no.YC750,
VT-JBD and differences with the existing B737-800 aircraft in Jet Airways fleet.
Content :
Aircraft VT-JBD has the following salient features:
2) Engine Thrust Rating 24K.

Aircraft VT-JBD has the following common features with VT-JBB.
6) Seats:-
Club Premier SICMA.
9) Dual FMC.

VT-JBD has the following differences with VT-JBB.
14) The Lower DU is used for Flight Deck Entry Surveillance system. The
camera select panel is on the AFT electronics panel.
15) IFSD installed in place of Standby Altimeter, Airspeed and Standby
attitude indicator.

Part P/N on JBB P/N on JBD Interchangeability
WXR
Transceiver
Standby
Altimeter
WL102AMS3
Standby
Attitude
Indicator
H341BWM
C16221KA02
(IFSD)
Not Applicable
CDS DEU
OPC
3179-BCG-
018-51
317B-BCG-
018-06
Not interchangeable
CDS DEU
OPS
311D-HNP-
01A-09
HNP5E-AL02-
6001
Not interchangeable

Page 2 of 2

Page 1 of 2

Jet Airways (I) Ltd

Date ATA Sub ATA
05-Dec-2007 00 --

Applicability :
VT-JBC
Supersedes :

Subject :
VT-JBC Salient Features.
Authority Ref :
Background
Information
:
Jet Airways will be inducting a new B737-800 aircraft VT-JBC (Variable
no.YL603, Line no. 2388, MSN 36847) into its fleet.
VT-JBC and differences with the existing B737-800 aircraft in Jet Airways fleet.
Content :
Aircraft VT-JBC has the following salient features:
2) Engine Thrust Rating 24K.

Aircraft VT-JBC has the following common features with VT-JBD.
6) Seats:-
Club Premier SICMA.
9) Dual FMC.

VT-JBC has the following differences with VT-JBD.

14) Flight Deck Video Surveillance Goodrich CDSS system. The O2 mask
on the Capt and F/Os side is moved to the waste bin site. The CDSS
LCD monitor is installed on the O2 mask location. The Control panel is
installed behind the LCD monitor. The CDSS system is not integrated
with the Multifunction Display (Lower DU).
15) Standby Altimeter, Airspeed and Standby attitude indicator are installed
instead of ISFD.
16) The Alternate VMO/MMO select switch (S1127) is located in the main
E/E bay service panel (STA 358), adjacent to the E/E compartment
lighting switch and should be selected to alternate position for flights
that must be dispatched with the gear down and locked condition.

Page 2 of 2

Content :
The following table gives a list of new P/Ns installed on VT-JBC and its
interchangeability with the P/Ns installed on VT-JBD

Part P/N on JBD P/N on JBC Interchangeability
WXR
Transceiver
Standby
Altimeter
WL102AMS3 Not Applicable
Standby
Attitude
Indicator
ISFD Installed
H341BWM Not Applicable
CDS DEU
OPC
317B-BCG-
018-06
3179-BCG-
018-51
Not interchangeable
TCAS 822-1293-002 822-1293-003 1 Way interchangeable
Camera Select
Panel
2003-109-2 8431M1-23 Not interchangeable

Date
07-Dec-2007
r(~ ~ iAI
18737/
Applicability :B 737-700/800/900
Supersedes :Technical Instruction 11 23/2007.
Subject : Rudder SystemEnhancement Program(RSEP)
Authority Ref :
Airplane Configuration Bulletin B-SOOl-2002006350
Wiring ProvisionInstallation (SB737-27-1247 Rev 01)
P5-3Panel Replacement(SB 737-27-1262)
Hardware Replacement (SB737-27-1253 Rev03)
Control RodReplacement (737-27A1279)
QDerationtest &force fllJ ht monitor test f737-27A1280 RD
Background
:Boeing has developed Rudder SystemEnhancement Programin order to
Infonnation
This Rudder SystemEnhancement Programconsists of changes in wiring
provisions, modification &installation of P5-3 panel and full-up hardware
before 12Nov'2008.
Content
:
The Rudder SystemEnhancement Programis fully complied on airplanes
beginning with line number 1948and subsequent. For in-service airplane
the Rudder SystemEnhancement Programis divided in four parts:
- Wiring provision modification. (Production complied on airplane LJ N
1100and subsequent).
- P5-3 panel modification. (Production complied on airplane LJ N 1221
and subsequent).
(Production complied on airplane LJ N596, 1268and subsequent).
- Control rod replacement. (Applicable to LJ N596, 1268thru 1947).
The salient features of this modification programare as follows:
2.
The new PCUalso contains a sensor for detecting malfunctions
within the PCU. Newoverride devices connected to the main PCU
and standby PCUinputs allow pilots to instinctively retain control
is automatically pressurized when the main PCUsensor detects a
malfunction.
3.
In addition, a new light in the P5-3 Panel provides annunciation
whenever the standby PCUis pressurized.
Page 1 of 6
Action
tube is with fIVe cranks and two authority limiter solenoid valves.
standby rudder PCUwhile the new configuration has three control
rods two for main rudder PCUand one for standbY rudder PCU.
possible to have a STBY RUDON light on the P5-3. This is detected by
the Force Fight Monitor System and illumination of the STBY RUD ON
light on the P5-3pane! is Non-Dispatchable.
Repetitive operational testing of the standby hydraulic actuation system
as per 5B 737-27A1280 has been introduced through work order to
detect an impending failure of the system.
The accomplishment of 737-27-1253 Rev03 or 737-27A1279 for aircraft
hydraulic actuation systemas mandated by SB737-27A1280.
As per the modification status Vf-J NN J NB/ J NC/ J ND/ J NE/ J NF/ J NG/
J NH/ J NJ / J NL! J NM/ J NN/ J NT/ J NV/ J NW/ J GBand subsequent are fully
complied with Rudder SystemEnhancement Programand do not require
operational testing of the standby hydraulic actuation system as per SB
737-27A1280 R1. A complete list of status of airplane complied through
the various SBsis attached here with (page 6).
All AME's to take note that on airplanes complied with Rudder System
Enhancement Program, the hardware is "not fully interchangeable" with
airplanes without Rudder SystemEnhancement Program.
- The new P5-3 panel part number 233A3209-2 can be installed on
non-RSEPairplanes and requires an INOP placard to be placed over
the new"STANDBYRUDON" annunciator.
- Post modification main rudder PCU part number is S251A308-1
(419300-1003).The pre and post modification PCUs are not
interchangeable.
- The old main &standby rudclerPCUcontrol rodassemblypart number
251A3495-7 in caseof replacement for main rudder PCUcontrol rod.
Note: Some NC may have installed standby rudder PCUcontrol rod
partnumber251A3495-1inserviceasspare.It is onlynecessaryto replace
the standby rudder PCUcontrol rod if the part number is 251A3495-1
while carrying out SBs737-27-1253 Rev03 or 737-27A1279.
bulletin (pages 3-5) &modification status of the 5Bs 737-27-1247 R1,
737-27-1262,737-27-1253 R2&R3, 737-27A1279 (page 6).
siGnature Name Date
Prepared By
- - j C - t r
Sojln N J 07-12-2007
Checked By
/"
\U~ "'-'----
Majeed Walele 07-12-2007
Approved By
~ \~
s Keskar 07-12-2007
Page 2of 6
P5-3 Flight Control Module (Figure 2)
(9 light configuration shown with new light)
_ Location
of new
"STBY
RUD ON"
amber light.
STANDBY H'1D
lOW
QUANTI TY
LOW
PRESSlJRE
MACH TR1M
FAIL
AUTO SlAT
FAIL
FLI GHT
W6
~
A CO\I TROL
B
STBY
RUD
OFF OFF
AON BON
ALTERNA.TE FlN'S
PRi~ ;0RE PR~ ~ RE nOF
F
~ OFF
SPOILER ~ ~
= DD= ; ; ~ "
FAIL
OFF rJ i1;: .,
ON'&
Changes to P5-3 Panel
Add "STBY RUD ON"light (amber)
Replace KI relay
Add new relay
Replace mOlUltingplate
Replace light plate
Replace Master Caution Card (some Classics)
- Card type and minor model dependent
Prod.lncorD. At UN 1221 and on
P5-3 Panel
Ifon~ f;)ptQ.al
Page 4 of 6
Wire Provision - Next Gen. (Figure 1)
Wires: (Production and Retrofit)
7 wires for Rudder Enhancement
- 7 spare wires
Additional components:
(Production Only)
Circuit Breaker, Marker,
Inop. Sticker, Collar,
Two Relays, Diodes
Prod. Incorp. 2/02 at UN
1100
Page 3 of 6
EE eay
Coil
and
Slow
Aft Pressure
Bulkhead
I
Next Gen. Hardware (Figure 3)
Items affected
Main PCU, Torque Tube, Control Rods for Standby and Main
PCU Torque
Vertical Fin (trim structure) b~ '::olTu
Rudder Surface Seal Support Rods
Connect wires to components
Rig the system
Functionally test the system
Prod. Incorp. at
UN 1268and on
Page 5 of 6
Rudder Surface
Se.1 Support
A/C
Line
. Status of Service Bulletins
No.
737-27-1262 737-27-1247R1 737-27-1253 R2
737-27-1253R3 737-27A1279
VT-J NA 89
Comolied Comolied Comolied
Comolied N/ A
VT-J NB 91
Complied Complied Comolied
Complied N/ A
VT-J NC 164
Comolied Complied Complied
Complied N/ A
VT-J ND 177 Complied Complied Comolied
Complied N/ A
VT-J NE 138
Comolied Comolied Complied
Complied N/ A
VT-J NF 152
Complied Comolied Comolied
Complied N/ A
VT-J NG 169
Comolied Complied Complied *
Complied N/ A
VT-J NH 181
Complied Comolied Complied *
Complied N/ A
VT-J NJ 297 Comolied Complied Complied *
Complied N/ A
VT-J NL 326
Complied Comolied Complied *
Complied N/ A
VT-J NM 465
Comolied Complied Complied *
Complied N/ A
VT-J NN 489
Complied Complied Comolied *
C'; Plied
N/ A
VT-J NR 749 0 ODen SunerSeded bY R3 en N/ A
VT-J NS 775 Comolied 1'1' ODen IStJ Dersec!ed by R3 ODen N/ A
VT-J NT 417
VT-J NU 835 Comolied
;1;.
(1)im ersedec!; 1J yR3
-
aDen N/ A
VT-J NV 927 Complied Complied Complied * Complied N/ A
VT-J NW 1016 Comolied Comolied Comolied *
Complied N/ A
VT-J NX 1073 ODen I
Open ~ J Persededlfy R3 0en N/ A
VT-J NY 1146
Comolied N/ A Suoerseded by R3 CI en N/ A
VT-J NZ 1185
ODeri ..
N/ A Supe~ ed by R3 Open N/ A
VT-J GA 1228 N/ A N/ A ,!)uoerseded by R3 Open N/ A
VT-J GB 1282 N/ A N/ A N/ A N/ A Complied
VT-J GC 1314 N/ A N/ A N/ A N/ A Comolied
VT-J GD 1350 N/ A N/ A N/ A N/ A Complied
VT-J GE 1608 N/ A N/ A N/ A N/ A Complied
VT-J GF 1643 N/ A N/ A N/ A N/ A Complied
VT-J GG 1686 N/ A N/ A N/ A N/ A Complied
VT-J GH 973 Complied Complied Complied Complied N/ A
VT-J GJ 998 Comolied Complied Complied Complied N/ A
VT-J GK 1002 Complied Complied Comolied Complied N/ A
VT-J GL 1392 N/ A N/ A Nj A N/ A Complied
VT-J GM 1201 Complied N/ A Comolied Complied N/ A
VT-J GN 1212 Complied N/ A Comolied * Complied N/ A
VT-J GP 1920 N/ A N/ A Nj A N/ A Complied
Page 6 of 6
Page 1 of 1
Jet Airways (I) Ltd

Date ATA Sub ATA
18-Dec-2007 00 --

Applicability :
B737NG.
Supersedes :

Subject :
Interchangeability of Common Display System (CDS) Display Electronic Units.
Authority Ref :
Boeing Service Letter 737-SL-31-050, 737-SL-31-048-A.
Background
Information
:
This Technical Instruction is issued to provide the salient features of the new
CDS DEU & interchangeability with the existing DEU. The new DEU is referred
as DEU-II.
Content :
A new Display Electronic Unit known as DEU-II P/N: 4081600-940 has been
introduced in production from Line no 2385.
1) The DEU-II has the following salient features as compared to DEU-I:
4 Increased processor throughput and memory.
4 Increased graphics performance.
4 Improved data loading speed.
4 Reduced LRU weight.
4 Reduced LRU power use.

2) The CDS Blockpoint 06 software Part Number for DEU-II is HNP5E-
ALO2-6001 and DEU-I is 311D-HNP-01A-09.
3) The display of a Compatibility Class Number (CCN) below the OPS part
number on the Ident/Config CDU page, is used for the intermixability
of DEU-I and DEU-II. Since the OPS part numbers are different
between DEU-I and DEU-II, but may be functionally the same, a
method is needed to verify the compatibility between DEU-I and DEU-II
in an intermix configuration. If the first 4 digits of the CCN number
displayed for each DEU is the same, then the OPS load is functionally
equivalent. However if the CCN number is not displayed, or the first 4
digits are not the same, then a functionally equivalent OPS load is not
installed and a CDS FAULT message will be displayed.
Action
All Maintenance personnel to note :
4 DEU-I P/N: 4081600-930 can be installed with Blockpoint 06
software P/N: 311D-HNP-01A-09.
4 DEU-II P/N: 4081600-940 can be installed with Blockpoint 06
software P/N: HNP5E-AL02-6001 only.
4 DEU-I and DEU-II can be interchanged and intermixed provided
they are installed with associated Blockpoint 06 operational
software.

Jet Airways(I) Ltd
Technical Instruction No. 02 /2007
1 7 7 7
Date
30-Apr-2007
AT A
28
Sub AT A
22
Revision
00
Applicability
:
8777 airplanes.
Supersedes
:
Not Applicable.
Subject
:
Uncommanded fuel Transfers/Imbalances.
Authority Ref
:
777 MT28-008R4
Background
:
Uncommanded fuel transfers or imbalances occur during flight due to fuel
Information
feed or scavenge systemproblems. The imbalance condition then may result
in a FUEL IMBALANCE advisory message. This instruction is issued as a
guidance for troubleshooting.
Content
:
Atrue fuel imbalance canoccur for a number of reasons including the
following:
1. Scavenge systemoutlet float valve is stuck open or damaged, resulting in
premature center wing tank (CWT) to main tank transfer on one side.
Transfer will occur once the scavenge inlet valve opens.
2. Scavenge systemjet pump check valve is stuck open, resulting in transfer
from the one main tank to the center tank. Condition will occur when the
scavenge inlet float valves are open andoutlet float valves are still closed.
3. Asingle clogged scavenge systemjet pump will prevent proper scavenging
from the center tank into the associated wing tank. Imbalance will occur
when both the scavenge inlet andoutlet float valves are open.
4. A main boost pumpdischarge checkvalve leak, resulting in transfer to a
main tank only when the override/jettison pumps are supplying fuel pressure
to the engines fromthe center tank.
5. Suction feed bypass check valve leak, resulting in transfer to the main
tanks when the override/jettison pumps are supplying fuel pressure to the
engines fromthe center tank. Condition will occur throughout entire flight.
6. Fuel feed manifold leak, resulting in transfer to a main tank when the
override/jettison pumps are supplying fuel pressure to the engines from the
center tank.
7. Loose or separated center tank scavenge jet pump outlet line at b~ nut
connection, resulting in transfer to the center tank on the ground or in flight,
with the main boost pumps on or off.
8. Refuel manifold leak, resulting in transfer from one main tank to another
main tank. Noticeable on the ground during main tank pressure defueling.
Can also result in the overfilling of a main tank in to its expansion space
during refueling, then during flight that main tank would remain at the fuel
quantity indication system's "full" level, while the opposite main tank is
drawn down below"full" after the center pumps are shut off.
9. Centerfuel pumppressurebelowthe mainfuel boost pump's
pressure of 12 psi, but above the low-pressure switch set point of 8
psi. Canresult in premature fuel burn froma main tank due to that
tank's boost pumps overriding the affected center pump.
Page 1of 2
Action
Conditions 1, 2, and 3 can usually be isolated by accomplishing
AMM 28-22-00 Fuel Scavenge System- Functional Test. A useful initial
check for conditions 4, 5, and 6 is to perform the following steps:
Ensure main boost pumps are off.
Turn on the override/jettison pumps with fuel in the center wing
tank.
Observe fuel quantity indication system for transfer of fuel from
center tank to right or left main tank.
Isolation of a single main pump discharge check valve leak may be
accomplished by turning on one main tank boost pump at a time. If
the discharge valve is leaking on that particular pump, the transfer
rate should decrease. A more detailed leak check of the fuel feed manifold
is called out in AMM 28-21-00 and 28-22-15.
A check for condition 7 would require inspection of the center tank
scavenge jet pump outlet line by referring to AMM 28-22-12.
Condition 8 can be evaluated by performing a leak check of the refuel
manifold per AMM 28-21-00.Condition g can be evaluated by performing
the fOllowing steps:
Open the defuel valve and the affected side's center fuel tank refuel valve,
keeping the cross feed valves closed.
Turn on the affected override/jettison pump and that side's main
boost pumps and let run for 5 minutes.
If the main boost pumps are overriding the center pump the center
fuel quantity will increase.
Name Date
Prepared By Sandeep Shivdas 30.Apr.2007
Checked By Dave Madhavan 30.Apr.2007
Approved By S.A.Keskar 30.Apr.2007
Page 2 of 2
Page 1 of 2

Jet Airways (I) Ltd
Technical Instruction No. 05 /2007

02-May-2007
21 44
00

Action
: Action 1:
If EICAS status message CARGO HEAT VALVE AFT triggers due to an Aft Cargo
Heat under-floor overheat condition, perform the following procedure:

1. Select AFT Cargo Heat to LOW, when cargo carriage allows.

2. Load a pallet instead of an LD3 container, or not loading the LD3 container/or
a pallet near the sensor. This allows the aft cargo heat system to respond
correctly and keeps the temperatures under-floor well below the 125 degree
F under-floor overheat temperature.

Action 2:

If the EICAS status message CARGO HEAT VALVE BULK/AFT triggers then,
perform the following procedure:
1. Confirm that EICAS status message CARGO HEAT VALVE AFT is not due to an
Aft Cargo Heat overheat condition by performing the procedure in Action# 1
above.

Applicability
:
B777 airplanes.
Supersedes
:
Not Applicable.
Subject
:
Cargo Heat System Overheat And Erroneous Fault Indication.

Authority Ref
:
777-MT-21-024
Background
Information
:
Operators are experiencing a high number of occurrences of the EICAS status
message CARGO HEAT VLV BULK/AFT during airplane operation.

Content
:
Root Cause 1:
Aft Cargo Heat under-floor overheat occurs when the Aft Cargo Heat
System is selected to "HIGH"
Placing an LD3 container near the aft cargo compartment temperature sensor
inhibits airflow around the sensor and masks the actual rising temperature.
This results in a very slow system response and causes the aft cargo heat valves
to remain open for long periods of time which results in the high under-floor
temperatures. It was established that by loading a pallet instead of an LD3
container in the location near the sensor, or not loading the LD3 container near
the sensor, allows the aft cargo heat system to respond correctly and keeps the
temperatures under-floor well below 125 degrees F (the high temperature typically
does not exceed 90 degrees F). It was also recognized that an overheat condition
does not occur when the Aft Cargo Heat System is selected to "LOW.

The fix to this problem will involve relocating the temperature sensor forward 200
inches on the sidewall and reducing the bleed flow in the aft cargo ducting.

Root Cause 2:
Cargo Heat Valve fails to indicate CLOSED .The primary cause of the Cargo Heat
Valve faults is due to binding of the valve butterfly seal rings. Boeing is currently
working with Honeywell to resolve the valve binding issue and to establish a
schedule to incorporate the fix.

Page 2 of 2
2. At the Maintenance Access Terminal (MAT), check the Fault History and
Present Leg Faults to confirm that EICAS status messages CARGO HEAT VALVE
AFT and/or CARGO HEAT VLV BULK are not nuisance messages. Check by
verifying that there are multiple occurrences of Maintenance Message 21-12021
(Aft Cargo Heat Shutoff Valve) or maintenance message 21-12022 (Bulk Cargo
Heat Shutoff Valve) or Maintenance Message 21-12031 (Aft Cargo Heat Temp
Control Valve) or Maintenance Message 21-12032 (Bulk Cargo Heat Temp Control
Valve). Confirmed faulty valves should be returned to the supplier or repair facility
for repair.

Fault Isolation Manual, FIM 21-44 Tasks 802 and 804, to include steps
to check for a cargo heat valve nuisance fault.

Central Maintenance Computer Message:
21-12021 Cargo Heat Shutoff Valve (aft) is not in commanded
position.
21-12022 Cargo Heat Shutoff Valve (bulk) is not in commanded
position.
21-12031 Cargo Heat Temp Control Valve (aft) is not in commanded
position.
21-12032 Cargo Heat Temp Control Valve (bulk) is not in
commanded position.

Page 1 of 2
Jet Airways (I) Ltd

Date ATA Sub ATA
07-May-2007 00 --

Applicability
:
Boeing 777-300ER, VT-JEA
Supersedes
:
Not Applicable
Subject
:
VT-JEA Salient features
Authority Ref
:
Technical Services & Boeing delivery documents.
Background
Information
:
Jet Airways has inducted its first B777-300ER aircraft VT-JEA (MSN
35157, Variable number WD 761) into its fleet.
aircraft VT-JEA.
Content : Aircraft VT-JEA has the following salient features:-
1. Maximum Take-Off Weight 3, 37,926 kg.(7,45,000 lbs)
2. Engine Model GE90-115B
3. Max T/O Thrust 1, 15,000 lbs.
4. PAX Configuration 8 First Class + 30 Business Class + 274
Economy
5. Seats:-
First Class B/E Aerospace seats.
Business Class Contour seats.
Economy Keiper Recaro seats.
6. Fuselage length 205 Feet 10 Inches.
Wing Span 199 Feet 11 Inches
7. Maximum operating limit speeds (VMO) is 330 Knots Equivalent
Air Speed to 28, 400 feet. Maximum operating Mach is 0.89M
from an altitude of 28,400 feet to 43,000 feet.
8 IFE System- Panasonic eX2.Prerecorded announcements are also
through the IFE system.
ETOPS: Route-Brussels-Newark-Brussels, Diversion time-180
minutes, Speed 0.84M /320 kts in ISA conditions.
ILS Category III B.
RNP-10, RVSM, B-RNAV and NAT-MNPS operations.
(Ref:Permit number S-6A dated 04/05/2007)
10 Three Autopilot Flight Director systems.
11. Ozone Control - Ozone catalytic converters are installed in the
supply lines to the cooling packs (one converter for each pack) to
decrease the amount of ozone that goes into the air-conditioning
system.
12. SATCOM Rockwell Collins AERO-H+ three channel SATCOM
system is installed. It provides capability for two channels of
telephony and one datalink channel.

Page 2 of 2

13. Electrical Power - Two engine driven 120-kVA generators and one
APU driven 120-kVA generator provide 115V, 3 phase AC power.
Two 20-kVA engine driven backup generators and one converter to
supply 115V,3 phase AC power during flight when the primary
generators do not supply the power and also during autoland
operation. A Ram Air Turbine (RAT) drives a pump to supply
hydraulic power and 7.5-kVA generator to supply 115V, 3
phase electrical power.
14. Cabin Lighting - Programmable coloured accent mood lighting is
installed for all classes.
15. Information systems - Two Electronic Flight Bag Systems (EFB) are
installed consisting of two EFB Display Units (DU) and two EFB
Electronic units (EU).
16. A maintenance access terminal (MAT) gives maintenance persons
access to AIMS airplane condition monitoring and central computing
functions and the cabin management system.
17. APU Starting - The APU can start on the ground at ambient
conditions at altitudes from -2,000 feet to 14,000 feet. The APU can
start during flight up to an altitude of 43,100 feet.
18. Weather Radar System Rockwell Collins dual Multiscan weather
radar system
19. VHF 3 VHF systems with 8.33 khz spacing.
20. ATC System Two Mode S transponders are installed which includes
functions for Elementary Surveillance (ELS),Enhanced Surveillance
(EHS) and Extended Squitter (ES).
21. QAR A Thales Optical Quick Access Recorder is installed in the EE
bay.(Same as on Airbus A330)
22. Crew Oxygen - The Full face Crew Mask Assembly provides
emergency oxygen and eye protection during an emergency such as
decompression, or smoke, or toxic forms.
23. Engine oil Debris monitoring system A debris monitor is installed
on top of the oil tank on the engine. The monitor electronically
detects debris in the oil system.
24. ELT The fixed ELT (P/N:453-5004) manufactured by ARTEX is
installed at STA 1880, WL 337, LBL22.Access panel in the crew rest
area has to be removed to gain access to the ELT. Three water
activated , portable ELTs (P/N: 01N65920) manufactured by ELTA
are installed.

Page 1 of 1
Jet Airways (I) Ltd

Date ATA Sub ATA
08-May-2007 34 30

Applicability
:
B777 Airplanes installed with Rockwell Collins MMR GLU-925
Supersedes
:
Not Applicable
Subject
:
Flashing ILS deviation on primary flight display (PFD) or electronic
attitude direction indicator (EADI) during approach.

Authority Ref
:
777 MT 34-029 dated 15/03/2007

Background
Information
:
Flashing of ILS deviation and Station Ident values on PFD or EADI can
occur during approach and can stay on until the MMR power is cycled.
The condition is believed to be caused by Neutron Single Event Upsets
(NSEU) that cause a processor reset, and result in ILS deviation
outputs toggling between operational and no computed data. As a
result, the ILS deviation pointers on the PFDs or EADIs toggle in and
out of view at approximately a two-second rate during an ILS
approach.

Content
:
Investigation has revealed that when the ILS module warm starts
(i.e. MMR powered down for less than 10 seconds), the ILS deviation
values will not exhibit the toggling behavior. Cycling of the MMR
circuit breaker following a cold start will transition the MMR from the
cold start to a warm start condition.
The associated 777 CMC Maintenance Messages are:
34-53011, Multi-Mode Receiver (left) has an internal fault
34-53012, Multi-Mode Receiver (center) has an internal fault
34-53013, Multi-Mode Receiver (right) has an internal fault.

Action
:
Cycle the MMR circuit breakers after landing to clear the above
mentioned condition. It is also recommended to cycle the MMR circuit
breakers any time power is restored to the airplane or power is restored
to the MMRs or after replacement of MMRs.

Ensure that each MMR circuit breaker is opened and then
closed within five seconds while the remaining MMR is powered.

NOTE: If power was removed from the MMR, allow the MMR to
complete its power-on self-test before cycling the circuit breaker.

Page 1 of 1
Jet Airways (I) Ltd
Date ATA Sub ATA
15-05-2007 27 51

Applicability
:
B777 airplanes.

Supersedes
:
Not Applicable.

Subject
:
Flap Lever Fault Resulting in Primary Flight Display Anomalies.

Authority Ref
:
777-FTD-27-06002

Background
information
:
An operator recently reported an event in which a flap lever rotary variable
differential transducer (RVDT) fault led to the display of erroneous speed
and pitch limit information on the primary flight displays (PFDs).

Content
:
The aircraft was dispatched under MMEL 27-03-1 (one inoperative flap/slat
control lane) due to a faulty flap lever RVDT. Following takeoff and after
flaps and slats were retracted, Vmax on the Captain's PFD remained at Vfe
(255 kts) rather than transitioning to Vmax = Vmo, minimum maneuver
speeds which were not displayed on either PFD, "Overspeed VFE" status
message displayed during climb and pitch limits were in view on the
Captain's display throughout the flight.
It may be possible for a discrepant flap lever RVDT signal to result in the
associated Flap/Slat Electronics Unit (FSEU) incorrectly, declaring Slats
retracted to be false without setting an invalid data flag. While the FSEU
declares a fault and control switches to the other FSEU (if appropriate), the
erroneous data can still be used by the associated Warning Electronics Unit
(WEU), resulting in incorrect calculation and display of several Speed Tape
parameters and Pitch Limit Indication (PLI) on the associated PFD.
A discrepant flap lever RVDT signal will not impact air-driven pump (ADP)
operation or autoslat availability.

Action
:
The reason for release of the Technical Instruction is to alert
Crew/Maintenance personnel that the above displays may be triggered on
the primary flight displays (PFDs) in the event of a Flap Lever RVDT
malfunction.

Page 1 of 3
Jet Airways (I) Ltd
Date ATA Sub ATA
16-05-2007
32 45

Applicability
:
B777 airplanes.

Supersedes
:
Not Applicable.

Subject
:
Preventing P/N 83-200-01 SMARTSEM Tire Pressure Indication Errors Due
To Humidity-Induced Drift.

Authority Ref
:
777 MT 32-031

Background
information
:
The Crane SmartStem system installed on the Wheels is prone to indication
error due to Humidity induced drifts.A modified SmartStem will be available
later this year which will cater to this anomaly.

Content
:
When the SmartStem is installed in a built-up wheel/tire assembly, these
sensing and electronic elements are exposed to the relatively dry gas in the
tire. When a SmartStem is not installed in a wheel, these sensing and
electronic elements are exposed to ambient air, which can contain a much
higher humidity than the gas in the tire.

Testing has shown that exposure of the SmartStem to humidity-laden air for
8 hours can cause the indicated pressure to increase by approximately 4
psig.

Exposure to higher humidity, or exposure for longer periods of time, has
caused indicated pressure drifts of up to 10 psig.

Action
:
Any time a SmartStem is not installed in a built-up wheel/tire assembly
(wheel halves mated, tire installed and inflated), ensure the wheel-side
threaded end of the SmartStem is sealed to minimize exposure of the
internal sensing and electronic elements to humidity. One option to seal the
threaded end is to use a Crane developed sealing cap P/N 83-200016-01,
shown in the Attachment. This cap may also serve as a shipping cap.

Note: SmartStems should be removed from the wheel half prior to
wheel cleaning processes.

Determining if a SmartStem has been affected by exposure to humidity
can be accomplished in two ways :-

4 After installing the wheel with Smartstem, compare flight deck
indications against a manual gage. The allowable differential is shown
in AMM task 12-15-03-610.

Page 2 of 3
4 If the difference for any SmartStem comparison is greater than that
indicated in the AMM, then that Smartstem cannot be used for pressure
indication on the airplane (the SmartStem can still be installed if
necessary, however, MEL 32-49-01 must be applied).

Page 3 of 3

Page 1 of 2
Jet Airways (I) Ltd

Date ATA Sub ATA
04-06-2007 27 61

Applicability : B 777-300ER
Supersedes : Nil
Subject : Uncommanded Extension of Inboard Spoiler PCU
Authority
Ref
: Boeing 777-FTD-27-06009
Background
Information
: Operators reported three cases of uncommanded hardovers (i.e. full
extension or retraction) of inboard spoiler power control units (PCUs).
Among the three cases, two hardover-extensions were reported, in
which one case required 4-6 units of right wheel for level flight during
approach and the other resulted in an air-turnback. One event was a
hardover-retraction, which was identified as an inoperable spoiler PCU.
Content
:
The inboard PCU position is electrically controlled with its Electro
Hydraulic Servo Valve (EHSV). The position of the sleeve in the EHSV
controls the pressure differential across the PCU piston, thus controlling
the position of the PCU (see illustration).

In one case, a piece of a bushing O-ring migrated into the amplifier
segment. This blocked one flow path causing the sleeve to move to the
extend position. The blockage remained fixed in the amplifier segment
so that any time hydraulic pressure was available, the PCU would
extend.

In another case, the bushing O-ring material degraded to the point that
supply pressure was ported across it to the extend amplifier circuit.
Removing hydraulic pressure caused the O-ring to reseat and afterwards
the PCU behaved normally. The PCU was tested in a laboratory and the
fault could periodically be duplicated.

In all cases the Actuator Control Electronics (ACE) had shut down the
defective PCU and the opposite wing symmetric PCU. This was indicated
by an S next to the spoiler positions on the flight controls maintenance
page. However, because the fault was mechanical, the defective spoiler
stayed extended as long as hydraulic pressure was available.

The manufacturer of EHSV, Moog, is nearing completion of an extensive
study of the EHSV bushing O-ring degradation and intends to correct
this in near future.
Action
:
If an inboard spoiler PCUs experiences an uncommanded, full extension,
it must be replaced regardless if cycling of hydraulic pressure corrects
the fault.
Page 2 of 2

Spoiler PCU EHSV Seal Degradation

Page 1 of 1
Jet Airways (I) Ltd

Date ATA Sub ATA
08-06-2007 27 10

Applicability : B 777-300ER
Supersedes : Nil
Subject : FLIGHT CONTROLS Caution Message During Control Checks
Authority Ref : Boeing 777-FTD-27-06004
Background
Information
: One operator recently incurred three delays due to a FLIGHT CONTROLS
caution message set during flight crew control checks. The Flight Deck
Effect (FDE) was correlated to maintenance message (MM) 27-10222
(aileron power control units (PCUs) left do not follow command).

There have been five other similar reports over the last seven years
related to MMs 27-10222 and 27-10223 (right ailerons).
Content : MMs 27-10222 and 27-10223 are set by a Command Response Monitor
(CRM) in the primary flight computers (PFCs) that is active only on the
ground below 40 kts. The intent of the aileron CRM is to detect a
jammed aileron PCU prior to flight. The aileron position test is required
to clear the aileron CRM.

In most instances, running the related aileron position test clears the
aileron CRM or identifies a discrepant PCU. However, in recent case both
PCUs and several hydraulic components were replaced as no single
component could be identified as a suspect unit.

Slight component degradation (hydraulic system and aileron PCUs)
combined with rapid control wheel movement may cause the aileron
CRM to trip. All three instances for the most recent event, data showed
that the control wheel checks were accomplished in four seconds or less.

The Flight Crew Operations Manual (FCOM) advises against rapid control
checks in the Normal Procedures - Before Taxi Procedures.

Improvements to the PFC aileron CRM software are being considered to
preclude nuisance trips due to rapid control checks.
Action : In the event of aileron CRM Trip, verify with crew if flight control wheel
checks were performed with a smooth and slow motion. If crew
confirms flight control wheel checks were performed without rapid
movement of controls, follow normal troubleshooting procedures as per
FIM.
Page 1 of 2
Jet Airways (I) Ltd

Date ATA Sub ATA
13-June-07 25 28

Applicability : All B777 Airplanes
Supersedes : TI 03 of 2006
Subject : DEACTIVATION OF OVERHEAD CROSS AISLE STOWAGE (OCAS) UNITS
Authority Ref : 777-SL-25-040-A Dated 20 April 2007
Background
Information
: The new Overhead Cross Aisle Stowage (OCAS) provides additional
Information galley area stowage in the crown area of the airplane. The
system normally electrically powered to raise and lower the stowage
compartments.
Content : This Technical Instruction is issued to clarify that OCAS
installed on Jet Airways Aircraft is modified. However, this
Technical Instruction will remain active as Deactivation /
Activation procedures highlighted may be used when required.
Action : OCAS Electrical Deactivation Procedure:

1. Remove all items that would be in the path of each OCAS stowage
box as it is deployed and close all galley compartment doors. Attach
the galley safety straps to each side of the galley if they are
installed.
2. Move the OCAS stowage box all the way down using electrical
power or the manual hand crank as appropriate. Remove all items
that are in the OCAS stowage box. Move the OCAS stowage box to
the up and stowed position using electrical power or the manual
hand crank as appropriate. Remove the galley safety straps from
each side of the galley if they are installed. Repeat this procedure
for each OCAS stowage box location.
3. Open and collar circuit breaker C25348 OCAS POWER and install
safety tag. This circuit breaker is located on the P110 left power
management panel at Row F / Column 13.
4. Install a placard (locally manufactured) at each OCAS operator
panel to indicate that the OCAS is electrically deactivated.

OCAS Manual Operating Procedure:

Long-term use of the manual operating procedure is not
recommended.
1. To lower a stowed OCAS stowage box, clear the area below the
OCAS units of all items and galley compartment doors that are in
the path of the OCAS stowage box as it is lowered. Attach the
galley safety straps to each side of the galley if they are installed.
2. Stand away from the hand crank assembly and open the access
door for the hand crank assembly.
3. Raise the OCAS stowage box using the placarded hand crank
operating instructions.
4. Stow the manual hand crank and close the manual hand crank
compartment door.
5. Remove the galley safety straps from each side of the galley if they
are installed.
Page 2 of 2

Action : OCAS Electrical Power Re-Activation Procedure:

1. Ensure that the areas below the OCAS units are clear of items in
the path of the OCAS stowage boxes. Attach the galley installed,
to each side of the galleys with OCAS units.

2. Remove the collar and safety tag from circuit breaker C25348
close circuit breaker C25348. This circuit breaker is located
management panel at Row F / Column 13.

3. If necessary, verify proper operation of the OCAS systems by
stowing each OCAS stowage box.

4. Remove the galley safety straps from each side of each galley if
they are installed

Page 1 of 2
Jet Airways (I) Ltd
Date ATA Sub ATA
25-06-2007
28 22

Applicability :
B777-300ER airplanes.

Supersedes :
Not applicable.

Subject :
Fuel remaining in center tank after flight.

Authority Ref :
777-FTD-28-07002.

Background
information
:
Some operators have advised Boeing that as much as 2200 lbs (1000 kgs)
of fuel has remained in the center fuel tank after some flights. Review of
operator's flight data by Boeing shows this condition to occur primarily on
longer flights originating in cold climates. The flights reviewed that
experienced this problem were approximately 10 hours long with in-flight
temperatures below 5 degrees F (-15 degrees C) during at least the first
half of cruise.

Content :
The bottom of the center fuel tank is primarily flat, in flight with wing
flexure the low point of the tank becomes the center. The center tank fuel
scavenge inlets on the 777-300ER were relocated to the lower in-flight point
in the center of the tank to increase useable fuel by an additional 308 lbs
(140 kgs). However, the water scavenge inlets were not relocated with the
fuel scavenge inlets, and as a result water can be ingested in the fuel
scavenge inlets since they are now below the water scavenge inlets (water
is heavier than fuel and accumulates at the bottom of the tank.

Another change made in the center tank fuel scavenge system on the 777-
300ER was the discharge outlet float valve location in the main tank. The
discharge outlet float valve location was relocated further outboard in the
main tank to ensure all fuel is scavenged from the center tank by the end of
the flight. However, the scavenged center tank fuel now has more exposure
to the cold soaked main fuel tank prior to reaching the scavenge discharge.

Flight data and center tank fuel scavenge system changes made on the
777-300ER shows that water may be getting ingested in the scavenge
system and freezing prior to discharging in the main tank. Freezing water in
the scavenge system could result in a low rate of scavenge or no scavenge
of fuel from the center tank once the center pumps are shut off.

Action :
All maintenance personnel are hereby informed as follows:

1) For any flight completed with more than 500 lbs (227 kgs) of fuel
remaining in the center tank, sump the tank to determine if any water
exists and if so, provide the quantity of water removed.

Page 2 of 2

2) After draining all the water, if any fuel remains, operate all four main fuel
boost pumps to determine whether or not that fuel can be scavenged and
transferred to the main tanks. If the fuel can be transferred to the main
tanks, please provide the transfer time and the amount of fuel transferred.

Raise a work order to carry out the draining of the center fuel tank and
record the following:

4 Quantity of water removed: ________________________.

4 Time required for fuel transfer: ______________________.

4 Amount of fuel transferred to main tanks: ______________.

Technical Services would compile the data to be sent to Boeing for their
investigation.

All flight crew are hereby informed as follows:

4 On long distance flights as much as 2200 lbs (1000 kgs) of fuel may not
be accessible in the center fuel tank.

4 There will be no flight crew annunciation of this condition before,
during, or after the condition occurs.

Page 1 of 1
Jet Airways (I) Ltd

Date ATA Sub ATA
12-Oct-2007 46 11

Applicability : B777 Airplanes.
Supersedes : N.A
Subject : EFB Maintenance Practices.
Authority Ref : Boeing Message # 1-561211441-2 & Maintenance Tip 777 MT 46-002 &
777 MT 46-003.
Background
Information
: This Technical Instruction is issued to provide maintenance practices
recommended by Boeing, to minimize EFB failures and software corruption.
Content : In the event of an improper shutdown of the EFB, while power is being
removed from the aircraft, the EFB may not store all data and the software
may become corrupted. Hence Boeing recommends shutting down the EFB
before removing power from the aircraft. It is recommended to use the
SHUTDOWN function and then open the applicable circuit breaker.

Remove power from the display unit as follows:
(a) From the EFB MAIN MENU, make the SYSTEM PAGE selection.
(b) From the SYTEM PAGE, make the EFB MAINTENANCE page
selection.
(c) From the EFB MAINTENANCE page, make the SHUTDOWN selection.

CMCF fault messages, 23-71710, 23-71711, 23-71712 and 23-71713 can
become active when the EFB is powered or the EU Windows operating
system is restarted.
Boeing recommends using the correct FIM troubleshooting steps if, during
evaluation of the fault, the message shows ACTIVE for more than 5 minutes
while the EFB is operational.

OPS SOFTWARE FAILURE: - The REIMAGE LINUX feature has been proven
to reduce the number of failures to the EFB. If the REIMAGE LINUX feature
fails to recover the EFB, then Boeing recommends the REIMAGE WINDOWS
feature. The REIMAGE LINUX takes approximately 10 minutes and the
REIMAGE WINDOWS takes approximately 40 minutes.

After installation of the windows operating system (BFBxx-W2KT-zzzz) into
EU P/N: 198200-7, and after the REBOOT TO MAIN step, a RESTART
operation must also be done. If the EFB is not rebooted a second time,
certain Windows OS dialog boxes will not show on the DU and can prevent
correct EU operation.
Action : The above mentioned practices are for information and suitable action for
all concerned personnel.
Page 1 of 2
Jet Airways (I) Ltd

Date ATA Sub ATA
15-Oct-2007 00 --

Applicability : Boeing 777-300ER, VT-JEE and VT-JEF
Subject : VT-JEE and VT-JEF Salient Features.
Authority Ref : Technical Services & Boeing delivery documents.
Background
Information
: Jet Airways has inducted 2 new B777-300ER aircraft VT-JEE (MSN
35164, Variable number WD 765) and VT-JEF (MSN 35162, Variable
number WD 766) into its fleet.
aircraft VT-JEE and VT-JEF.
Content : Aircraft VT-JEE is delivered with the same configuration as VT-JED.

Aircraft VT-JEF the following salient features:-
4 Engine Model GE90-115B
4 Max T/O Thrust 115,000 lbs.
4 Max T/O Weight - 351,534 kg (775,000 lbs).

4 PAX Configuration 8 First Class + 30 Business Class + 274
Economy
4 Seats:-
o First Class B/E Aerospace seats.
o Business Class Contour seats.
o Economy Keiper Recaro seats.
4 IFE System- Panasonic eX2. Pre-recorded announcements are
also through the IFE system.

o ETOPS: Diversion time-180 minutes, Speed 0.84M /320
kts in ISA conditions.

4 EFB Blockpoint 3.1 Software.

Aircraft VT-JEF has the following differences with VT-JEE.
4 Fuel Pump Ground Fault Protection GFP/RELAYS Fuel pumps
located in the tanks that could go dry during flight require
GFI/Relays as an added extra layer of protection against
potential burn through in the pump housing and/or pump power
wiring in conduit, in case of pump power wires short to ground.
This change provides Ground Fault protection by adding GFI
relays to each existing Override and Jettison pumps control
system.
4 ELMS Panels Cooling air is provided to the P200 & P300 panels
by means of ECS ducts from the EE cooling system. A new
material melamine, having better thermal properties is
incorporated in the backplane for the P100, P200 and P300
panels. A new plain washer, spring washer and nut is installed to
each power feeder terminal of the ELM system panels.

Page 2 of 2

Content : 4 Cabin system management unit P/N changed from 285W0034-1
to 285W0034-2 for compliance with the Boeing EMI
specifications. Both P/Ns are completely interchangeable.

Page 1 of 1
Jet Airways (I) Ltd
Date ATA Sub ATA
01-12-2007 28 11

Applicability
:
Boeing 777 airplanes

Supersedes
:
Not Applicable.

Subject
:
Draining of accumulated water from the Main and Centre Tanks.

Authority Ref
:
Technical Services

Background
information
:
Numerous reports pertaining to the Blanking of Fuel Quantity Indicators
have been observed. The most probable cause for the blanking of the Fuel
Quantity Indicators is accumulated water in the tanks.

Content
:
Presently draining of accumulated water from the tanks as per AMM 12-11-
02-680-801 is performed during Extended Transit inspections provided
scheduled aircraft ground time is over 3.5 hrs.
The desired results are not achieved after performing the task at the
specified intervals.

Action
:
In order to achieve the desired results, it is decided to perform the above
mentioned task during Transit, Extended Transit and whenever opportunity
exists (Airplane on ground for more than 2 hours).

Drain accumulated water from the Centre and Main tanks prior refueling of
the airplane as per AMM 12-11-02-680-801.

If the Fuel temperature is below 5C (+41F), perform Cold weather
Maintenance as per AMM 12-33-01-660-040 time permitting.

Note: Fuel temperatures below 5C (+41F), may cause the accumulated
water to freeze and prevent the sump drain valve to open.

At any station if the above task is not performed raise Notice to Crew Entry
to perform the task at next suitable station.

Page 1 of 1
Jet Airways (I) Ltd

Date ATA Sub ATA
07-Dec-2007 00 --

Applicability : Boeing 777-300ER, VT-JEH
Subject : VT-JEH Salient features
Background
Information
: Jet Airways has inducted a new B777-300ER aircraft VT-JEH (MSN
35166, Variable number WD 768) into its fleet.
aircraft VT-JEH and its differences with the existing 777 airplanes in the
fleet.
Content : Aircraft VT-JEH has the following salient features:
4 Maximum Take-Off Weight 3, 51,534 kg.(7,75,000 lbs)
4 Engine Model GE90-115B.
4 Max T/O Thrust 1, 15,000 lbs.
Economy.
4 Seats:-

Aircraft VT-JEH has the following differences with VT-JEG

4 ELMS Panels:-
1. ECS ducts from the EE Cooling system are connected to the
P200 and P300 panels and provide cooling air.
2. The P200 and P300 ELMS panels are revised to incorporate
an air duct inlet (spud) and air outlet.
3. A new material, melamine, is incorporated in the backplane
for the P100, P200, and P300 panels. This material has better
thermal properties than FR-4 which was used in all earlier
ELMS2 panels.

DATE ISSUE
03/01/2007
QUALITY CIRCULAR 01 / 2007
1

ATTENTION

ALL AMEs / APPROVED PERSONS
APPLICABILITY

ALL AIRPLANES
SUBJECT INDEX OF T.I .& Q.C. of 2006
AUTHORITY REF QUALITY CONTROL MANAGER

BOEING TECHNICAL INSTRUCTIONS INDEX -2006

Tech.Inst.No SUBJECT DATE
ISSUE
NO.
01 of 2006 Cracks on Wing Leading edge Position Light Lenses 03/01/2006 1
02 of 2006
Emergency Light at First Left Hand Overhead Stowage
Compartment 06/01/2006 1
03 of 2006
Repair procedure for floor Proximity Lights - Photo
Luminescent Installation 09/01/2006 1
01 of 2006 Cracks on Wing Leading edge Position Light Lenses 09/01/2006 2
04 of 2006
Engine Fuel and control - ECU- New version 7.B.Q
software 03/02/2006 1
05 of 2006 MW0311 Electrical Harness 28/02/2006 1
06 of 2006
Nuisance SPD LIM message and / or AUTO SLAT FAIL
light illumination 29/03/2006 2
07 of 2006 VT -JGP Differences 21/04/2006 1
08 of 2006 Non Availabiilty of Automatic UTC Time Date 12/05/2006 1
09 of 2006 Smoke or Flame in the APU exhaust 17/05/2006 1
10 of 2006 MLG Retraction and Extension Actuator interchangebility 22/05/2006 1
11 of 2006 Mirror Effect in Integrated Standby Flt. Display ( IFSD) 08/06/2006 1
12 of 2006 Engine Bleed system health check 21/06/2006 0
13 of2006 Engine spar valve indication anomalies 16/06/2006 0
14 of 2006 Passenger Oxygen System 30/06/2006 2
15 of 2006 PRSOV Bleed Air flex Line Leakage 08/07/2006 0
16 of 2006
Maintenance Error in hand cranking Drive Cover
Installation 08/07/2006 0
17 of 2006 Weather radar System -- Troubleshooting 26/07/2006 0
18 of 2006 VT-JGQ Differences 05/9/2006 0
19 of 2006 Pitot Probe Flex Hose Installation Routing 13/09/2006 0
20 of 2006 VT-JGR Difference 20/09/2006 0

Page 1 of 3

BOEING TECHNICAL INSTRUCTIONS INDEX
cont...
21 of 2006
Installation of Pneumatic air cleaner system in the air
conditioning system 09/10/2006 0
22 of 2006 Wing Body Overheat Detection system 09/10/2006 0
23 of 2006 ADIRU interchangeability and intermixability 09/10/2006 0
24 of 2006
Windows - Flt. Compt. - Control cabin fixed windows -
Deletion of #4 & #5 windows 12/10/2006 0
25 of 2006 Life vests standardization 12/10/2006 0
26 of 2006 VT-JGS Differences 01/11/2006 0
27 of 2006 Weather radar System -- Troubleshooting 13/11/06 1
28 of 2006 ADIRU interchangeability and intermixability 16/11/06 1
29 of 2006 Fuel flow divider solenoid valve 15/11/06 0
30 of 2006 VT-JGS Differences 16/11/06 1
31 of 2006
Stall Management / Yaw damper Module assly.
Modification 06/12/2006 0
32 of 2006 Emergency Floatation Devices And Placarding 18/12/2006 1
33 of 2006 Installation procedure for the encoder rubber cap on ISFD 20/12/06 0
34 of 2006 VT-JGT Differences 22/12/06 0

QUALITY CIRCULAR INDEX- 2006

Quality
Circular No. SUBJECT DATE
ISSUE
NO
01 of 2006
INDEX OF TECHNICAL INSTRUCTIONS / QUALITY
CIRCULARS FOR 2005 15/01//2006 1
02 of 2006
Compliance with DDPG procedures before releasing a/c
under MEL 04/07/2006 1
03 of 2006
Elevator Servo control - Additional periodic test of servo
loops 05/07/2006 1
04 of 2006 Maintenance Program for A340-300 & A330-200 a/c 24/07/2006 1
05 of 2006 Salient Features 4/8/2006 1
06 of 2006 CAT II/IIA Maintenance Procedure Manual 31/08/06 1
07 of 2006 Fire Caused by Excessive grease 12/9/2006 1
08 of 2006 AMOS WORK ORDER 18/09/06 3
09 of 2006 Engine Hazard Areas & Servicing of Aircraft Wheels 3/10/2006 1
10 of 2006 Maintenance Error 3/10/2006 1
11 of 2006 Preservation of data after incident 12/10/06 1
12 of 2006 Dispatch Requirements for Portable Oxygen 30/11/06 1
13 of 2006 Invoking of MEL 2/12/2006 1

Page 2 of 3

ATR TECHNICAL INSTRUCTION INDEX- 2006

ISSUE
NO.
01 of 2006 ATR72-Leading Edges Interchangeability 14/03/2006 1
02 of 2006 Cargo Door Actuator Failures 26/04/2006 1
03 of 2006 ACWF Generation aids for wiring troubleshooting 21/06/2006 0
04 of 2006 DC Generation aids for wiring troubleshooting 21/06/2006 0
05 of 2006 Electrical Contact Enhancer 25/08/06 0
06 of 2006 Re-Engagement of tripped circuit breaker 24/11/06 0

A340 TECHNICAL INSTRUCTIONS INDEX- 2006

ISSUE
NO.
01 of 2006 APU Installed on A330/340 Airplane 24/01/2006 1
02 of 2006
Reporting of Spurious Slat or Flap CONFIG Warning /
Indication 06/02/2006 1
03 of 2006 Landing Gear Ext. Failure on Approach 30/05/2006 0
04 of 2006 Overheat Detection System Troubleshooting 12/06/2006 0
05 of 2006 No Localiser or glide slope capture in approach 13/06/2006 0
06 of 2006
MEL substantiation data for revenue flights with one exit
or one escape slide inop. 23/06/2006 0
07 of 2006 Extended storage quick access recorder ( EQAR) 04/07/2006 1
08 of 2006 Brass in Oil Filters -- Oil Pump Distress 08/07/2006 0
09 of 2006
Engine fire and overheat detection system-False fire
detector loop faults 11/07/2006 0
10 of 2006 ADIRU Interchangeability 13/07/2006 0
11 of 2006 Engine Stall in Climb / Cruise 3/8/2006 0
12 of 2006 Extended storage quick access recorder ( EQAR) 14/08/06 1
13 of 2006 Circuit breaker monitoring unit (CBMU) inoperative 28/08/06 0
14 of 2006 Inspection of Backup Control Module (BCM) 31/08/06 0
15 of 2006 CFM 56-5C Fan Blades Molydag coating missing limits 25/10/06 0
16 of 2006 NTC for high altitude APU start after troubleshooting 23/11/06 0
17 of 2006 Mel 24-53-01 - Circuit Breaker monitoring unit inop. 24/11/06 0
18 of 2006 Incorrect Airspeed/Altitude Event 0712/2006 0

Page 3 of 3
Page 1 of 2
ATTENTION All Engineering and Maintenance Personnel.
EFFECTIVITY All Engineering and Maintenance Activities.
SUBJECT ORGANIZATION APPROVAL - CAR 145
BACKGROUND

DGCA has approved Jet Airways as CAR 145 Approved Maintenance
Organization

This circular is issued to provide information relating to aircraft
maintenance under CAR-145 approval.

CONTENT
Policy Document: The aircraft maintenance functions of the
organization shall be governed by Maintenance Organization Exposition
(MOE) approved by DGCA as per CAR 145.

Organization Structure:
CEO is the Accountable Manager. Quality Manager, Line
Maintenance Manager, Base Maintenance Manager, Planning
and Logistics Manager and Workshop Manager are designated
Managers acceptable to DGCA.

The E & M organizational activities will be governed under the
scope and guidelines of M.O.E.

Working of each department shall be in accordance with
departmental manuals (Prepared by respective departments and
approved by Quality).

Certifying Staff :
All the certifying personnel have been issued with individual
approval issued by Quality Department. The certifying personnel
shall sign off this approval sheet; keep it current and handy for
review by Regulatory Authority/ Audit teams.

The scope of approval is indicated on the
Authorization/Approval sheets.

All the certifying personnel shall sign and affix the authorization
stamp on all certification documents (Maintenance schedules,
Work Orders, E.Os etc.).

DATE ISSUE- 1
05 Mar 2007

Page 2 of 2

It is the responsibility of the Certifying personnel to keep the
stamp in safe custody.

Applicability

Airbus A340 / Boeing 737

Subject

Invoking of MEL in Category C and D.

Background

The following are the salient changes with reference to CAR
Section 2, Series B, Part I, Rev 3 Dated 06 Sep 06 and MMEL.

Escalation of Category C MEL repair interval from 8 days to 10
days.

Inclusion of Category D MEL having repair interval of 120 Days.

Content

Method of invoking MEL shall be governed by the MEL Preamble.

The Validity of Category C MEL has been escalated from 8 to 10
consecutive calendar days.

MEL Category D having repair interval of 120 consecutive calendar
days has been included.

Action

This is to appraise all certifying personnel about new MEL
categorization and repair interval as mentioned above.

DATE ISSUE- 1
05 MAR 2007

DATE QUALITY CIRCULAR 11/ 2007 ISSUE-1
09J ul 2007
ATTENTION
All AMEs/APPROVALHOLDERS
EFFECTIVITY Jet Airways Fleet
Ref: Bureau of Civil Aviation Security Circular OS/2007
SUBJECT
Aircraft Release Certificate
A committee set up by the Ministry of Civil Aviation for fixing the
norms for deployment of airlines security staff to undertake
security functions related to airline's operations has recommended
that Aircraft ReleaseCertificate (format appended) must be signed
by concerneddepartments includingthe Commanderof the flight.
BACKGROUND
The Security Supervisor of the aircraft shall initiate the Aircraft
Release Certificate and ensure signature of all concerned
departments including the Commander of the flight. The signed
copywill be held bythe SecurityDepartment
This recommendationis to beimplemented with immediate effect.
On the part of engineering personnel, the Aircraft Release
Certificate needs to be certified after inspection of aircraft for
suspicious/foreign objects.
Necessaryinspection items are already a part of Transit inspection
CONTENT card and ExtendedTransit inspection schedule for ATR72, Boeing
737 CL, and Boeing737 NGaircraft.
Similar items of inspection shall be included in the Transit
inspection card and Extended Transit inspection schedule for
Boeing777 andAirbus 330aircraft during the upcoming revision.
Page 10f2
-~ ----
ACTION
Pending reVISion to Boeing 777 and Airbus 330 inspection
schedules, aircraft maintenance personnel are herby required to
carry out the following inspections before certifying the Aircraft
ReleaseCertificate.
1. CHECK THE FOLLOWING AREAS FOR SUSPICIOUS I
FOREIGN OBJECTS:
MLG& NLG,wheel well areas, E & E compartment (if opened),
control cabinvisible areasand cavities, engine inlet and
exhaust, ramair inlet andexhaust.
2. AFTER NIGHT HALT OF AI C OR MORE THAN ONE-HOUR
TRANSIT: Galleys, toilets, cabin including overhead lockers,
cargo and baggagecompartments
Certification of inspection on Technical Log shall also be deemed
to includethe above inspectionitems.
COMPILEDBY
~ ~
CHANDRA SHEKAR
MANAGER - UALITY
\
ASHOK G~
G.M.-En uali
Page 2of2
1
AINC!~ AI;, kfLEASE CER 1!fICA TE--FOR I 1St'AT INDfAN AIRP{'>RTS
ThisI' to ,"~ 'rtit1 fi",t "l)tl~ sabot4gem~ t.~ as pcr inspection~ dui" 1I~ "f!~ r;
artil:d Out ~ nd rm abj.,.",rj<:>l'!ablclsWI'''''l:t!d jt!m h,.,;beenfQund 0(1 boon:!.
SigootIJ re
Nal,rt<:
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Tim"
(n)
(c)
nus I' h>f:en:i!y <lh,t "Ii .. egi~ ter"dlm~ ", navo.:!ree"iOOlitiliedlrecQnd ed~ ,ot!i
with ",""'''ngenOTI oOZIrd '
The total I1l1mb",r of pdSst:ogers "'~per sr-tem h:ubeent!ll!iedand :tr!!0'
boon:!'
All c:,rgo, m .w , ~ _p"per, CNJ "", bag "rCo " , " - v e j;,"""f\ !oa<kd a.fb!), tkJ ey n:t\l
h""r. rj", ."curll:)' ,I""red
Sjgn",~ ,e
NBmE:
Dl!!lign<lt:ion
TIme
1h;" i. to r",r th~ t 'all ctl<lril1i Items .ifld :t'iu'prnenr, 11"'''''' />".,1\ (;h;:!<.,</ uy 11"
caU!>t~ 'IC~ !~ f !ng ,uIV".,,ujty staff Lefor" being pm oc, b""rd amI the .:',,\IV h.
f ecd,.tldthemvvil:hollt complam"" witbreg,lrri to the $e<2urity n1ea~ ur"'.s
Sig!k\tur@
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De::.ignarJ 'ta
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TJ ,:u~ 15t<~ tcr!)ftt~ r

>' iI.~ td ()J 11r s~ ded/,~ E;:,(unt;'
',dn:;r~ ft
equi~ 'meni. "t(;:1r:he<lto rfieair~ "~ ih' ""P'-Il d.e(:!(<:d'hol t,)u~,"
cl'fi"...are(~h a,g g .; ag e aoo itn~ ~ :u~ c:ted ConQ,int'zJ.n; ; lo;;,J ,(h?-(":hltn t ~ ~~ ~
$!glkttl!f'e
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De.!iiigclO,j,,"
. l1me
5ignaror"
Nal1'U:1
DeliigMtion
Time
S!gt!atllre
Name
Designa.tirm
Time

ATTENTION

All Certifying Staff

EFFECTIVITY Jet Airways Fleet
SUBJECT
Documentation of Maintenance

BACKGROUND

Maintenance action on aircraft/engine/system need to be
accomplished in systematic and orderly manner. The guidelines are
provided as procedure sheet/task card/AMM task etc. which is to
ensure no task has been erroneously missed out.
CONTENT

All maintenance personnel should use procedure sheet/task
card/JIC wherever provided, while performing schedule
maintenance and should sign off the same on completion of the
action.

Whenever a unscheduled maintenance action of complex nature
like replacement of Landing Gear, CDCCL on fuel system etc, is
accomplished, but no procedure sheet/task card is available, then a
copy of specific AMM task to be used for guidance, to ensure no
item of the task has been missed, and the same is to be signed off
as record.

Further the work order used for documenting, maintenance action
must contain the details of work carried out with a specific
reference AMM task, as per which the maintenance has been
carried out.

DATE ISSUE- 1
16/8/2007

Page 1 of 3

Jet Airways (I) Ltd

04/Jan/2008
71 00

Applicability
: All Airbus A330 A/C Powered by CF6-80E1A4/B ENGINES.

Supersedes
: None
Subject
: CF6-80E Tolerance Take-Up unit & Stage 14 Tubes Installation

Authority
Ref
: - PRESENTATION, CF6-80 TECHNICAL SYMPOSIUM OCT, 2007
- A330 AMM
- GE Training Letter CF6-80E TTU & Stage 14 Tubes Installation Sep 2005
(Attached).

Background
Information
: - An operator experienced TTU lock wire failure resulting in an ENGINE FIRE
WARNING and IN FLIGHT SHUT-DOWN (IFSD) with flight diversion.

- Lock wire failure allowed disengagement of the TTU duct adjustment sleeves,
resulting in loss of support of the engine bleed air system between the 14th
stage
manifold, HPV, TTU and Intersect Duct. Resulting failure to a 14th stage
manifold
clamp allowed manifold to engine port separation which activated the ENGINE
FIRE WARNING system.

- The thrust reverser structure and engine electrical harnesses suffered from
localized heat distress.

- Another operator discovered complete TTU separation and TTU inner bellows
duct failure following investigation for nacelle high temperature warnings. The
adjacent thrust reverser structure and engine harnesses suffered from extensive
secondary damage as a result. Investigation revealed missing lock wire on the
TTU.

Content
: - Installing lock wire in a diagonal cross pattern provides best security for the TTU
duct. Careful attention to published AMM procedures and performing final
adjustment checks of system, following component replacement, will prevent
unnecessary preloading and potential damage to bleed system components.

- Improper maintenance practices during installation of the TTU ducts may also
cause abnormal system preload and subsequent damage to system components
during High Pressure Bleed Valve (HPV) replacement.

- Root cause for HPV Failure are :

1. Bleed system vibration initiated during HPV modulation
2. Bleed system vibration independent of HPV modulation
3. Improper rigging of TTU duct
4. Subsequent damage following TTU duct lock wire failure
Note: initial test observations indicate no direct linkage to N1/N2 vibration

Page 2 of 3

Action
: 1) Make sure the following conditions are met during TTU unit & Stage tube
installation.
- Ensure there is no preload on the (3) Intersect Duct attachment links during
installation and follow-up inspections
- Ensure all duct clamps are loose and can be moved for positioning when
replacing
ducts or valves. Forcing alignment of Duct flanges using the clamps can lead to
failure of the clamps or ducts and cause air leaks.
- Verify the gap between the forward flange of the IP Check Valve and Intersect
duct is correct per Maintenance Manual.
- Tighten duct clamps once system alignment is achieved.
- Verify the thread gap between adjusting sleeves on the TTU are within manual
limits.
- Use a criss-crosspattern for safety-wire of the adjusting sleeves to prevent
rotation.
- Visually inspect safety wire, thread gap and S14 Manifold misalignment or cracks
whenever cowls are open.

Please refer the attachment for illustration & details Training Letter

2) After the installation of TTU & stage 14 Tubes per AMM, carry out the
inspection of TTU lock wire as per Taskcard JA330-36-CHK-001-00 for its proper
installation.
NOTE: This Taskcard is part of 2A check.
Page 3 of 3

Page 1 of 2
Jet Airways (I) Ltd

Date ATA Sub ATA
04-Jun-2008 00 --

Supersedes :
Subject : VT-JWM Salient features
Background
Information
: Jet Airways has inducted a new A330-202 aircraft VT-JWM (MSN 923) into its
fleet.
aircraft.
Content :
VT-JWM has the following salient features:-
4 Seats:

o ETOPS: Diversion time-180 min, Speed 0.86M /330 kts in ISA
conditions.

The following table gives a list of components installed on VT-JWL and its
interchangeability with the components installed on VT-JWM.
Component P/N on JWL P/N on JWM Interchangeability
VHF ANTENNA 2403-89 2438-89-00
2 Way
Interchangeable
ICE PROTECTION
CONTROL UNIT
300-040-628 300-060-750
1 Way
Interchangeable
EFCS-ACCELEROMETER J172AFM02 J172AFM03
2 Way
Interchangeable
MLG UPLOCK SPRING
STRUT
1402020-21 1404020-1
2 Way
Interchangeable
MLG UPLOCK SPRING
STRUT
1402001-1 1404001-1
2 Way
Interchangeable
BRAKE ASSY 2-1578-2 2-1578-3
2 Way
Interchangeable
SEL VALVE MANIFOLD
ASSY
D31AB4413 D31AB4414
2 Way
Interchangeable
TAT SENSOR 102LA2AG 0102LM2GE
2 Way
Interchangeable in
shipsets
LP OXY SUPPLY SOL
VALVE
DVE90-06 DVE90-07
2 Way
Interchangeable
Page 2 of 2

Page 1 of 4
Jet Airways (I) Ltd

Date ATA Sub ATA
24-06-2008 24/36/49 --

Subject : APU Generator Burst inspections and Dispatch requirements
Authority Ref : EASA AD No: 2008-0017R1 Dated: 17
th
June 2008
AOT ( All Operators Telex) A330-24A3044 Revision 03
Background
Information
: Uncontained APU Generator failures on ground have occurred on Airbus
A330 aircraft in service. Preliminary investigations confirmed
uncontained APU Generator failures with subsequent aircraft structural
damages to the APU compartment and, in one case, to the stabiliser
compartment. Loose APU generator parts can lead to damage to the
APU firewall which might reduce its fire extinguishing capability, possibly
leading to a temporary uncontrolled fire, which constitutes an unsafe
condition.

Further detailed investigations are ongoing to determine the root cause.
It has been evidenced that this unknown root cause initiates a collapse
of the Drive End Bearing (DEB) leading to an uncontained failure.
Evidence has shown also that the DEB failures are not instantaneous,
and therefore, the detection of small debris could indicate early stage of
a DEB failure.

Content : Airbus has received number of reports of wrong APU Generator
installation on the APU. More particularly, the seal plate between the
APU and the Generator installed incorrectly in the following ways: (refer
to attached presentation):
- Two seal plates instead of one.
- One seal plate plus rubber transportation seal
- Zero seal plate - this configuration would be identified through heavy
leaks during the subsequent oil leak check which is normally performed
at the end of the Generator installation procedure. However, it is
suspected that permanent damage is already made to the generator and
the generator should be considered as improper for operation.

Airbus AOT (All Operators Telex) A330-24A3044 Revision 02 and
EASA AD No. 2008-0017 specify inspections that are to be carried out
for determining the extent of deterioration of the Drive End Bearing
(DEB).

The EASA AD No. 2007-0188R1 has been superseded by another
EASA AD No: 2008-0017 dated: 22
nd
January 2008. Subsequently EASA
has revised the APU Generator inspection requirement vide
AD No: 2008-0017R1 to cancel the inspection requirement as per
EASA AD 2008-0017 and Airbus AOT A330-24A3044 Rev 2 for A330
aircraft while invoking and revoking MEL item 36-11-01.

Page 2 of 4
EASA AD No. 2008-0017 R1 mandates to perform following inspections
as per Airbus AOT A330-24A3044 Rev 3:
- Inspection of APU Generator scavenge oil filter element and
housing for detection of magnetic metallic debris.

- Inspection of APU Generator drain plug for detection of magnetic
metallic debris.

- Inspection of APU Generator seal plate fitting for correct installation
and application of associated corrective actions.

The above inspections are required to be performed:

1. Within 450 aircraft hours or 200 APU hours, whichever is later, after
the last inspection performed as per EASA AD 2008-0017R1 after the
original aircraft delivery date in accordance with instructions given in
Airbus AOT A330-24A3044 Revision 03.

2. Repeat inspections at interval not exceeding 450 aircraft hours or
200 APU hours, whichever is later.

3. At each time an APU Generator or an APU is installed on Aircraft,

a) Perform the inspection as per Airbus AOT A330-24A3044
Revision 03.
b) After the inspection performed during installation of APU
Generator or APU, the repetitive inspection to be performed at
an interval of 450 aircraft hours or 200 APU hours whichever is
later.

4. When the aircraft is dispatched under MEL item 24-22-01 'AC Main
Generation' with APU operating during the entire flight in accordance
with MEL requirements.

a) Before the first flight dispatch of aircraft under the MEL
rectification interval, and

b) Before the first flight following the MEL rectification.

Technical Services has developed a Task Card: JA330-49-DVI-001-04 to
perform the inspections mandated by EASA AD: 2008-0017R1 in
accordance with Airbus AOT A330-24A3044 Revision 03.

The inspection as per Task Card JA330-49-DVI-001-04 need not be
performed, when the aircraft is dispatched under MEL item 36-11-01
'Bleed Air Supply System failure with APU operating during the entire
flight.

The following Caution statement has been added in the subtask
24-23-51-210-050 (Installation of APU Generator) (Preparation for
installation, Step 4, A (9)) of A330 AMM: Make sure that one, and
only one, Seal Plate is in position and correctly installed.
Damage to the APU Generator can occur if the Seal Plate
installation is not correct.
Page 3 of 4

Action : 1. One and only one Seal Plate is to be installed between the
Generator and the APU. Task Card: JA330-49-DVI-001-04 illustrates
the procedure for correct installation the APU Generator Seal plate.

2. The repetitive inspection at an interval of 450 aircraft hours or
200 APU hours whichever is later is to be performed as per
Task Card: JA330-49-DVI-001-04.

3. The inspection as per Task Card: JA330-49-DVI-001-04 also to be
performed at each time an APU Generator or an APU is installed on
aircraft.

4. When the aircraft is dispatched under MEL item 24-22-01 'AC Main
Generation' with APU operating during the entire flight in
accordance with MEL requirements, the inspections as per TASK
CARD JA330-49-DVI-001-04 must be performed:

- Before the first flight dispatch of aircraft under the MEL
rectification interval, and

- Before the first flight following the MEL rectification.

5. The inspection as per Task Card JA330-49-DVI-001-04
need not be performed, when the aircraft is dispatched
under MEL item 36-11-01 'Bleed Air Supply System failure
with APU operating during the entire flight.

Page 4 of 4

Page 1 of 1
Jet Airways (I) Ltd
Technical Instruction No.12/ 2008

Date ATA Sub ATA
09-Jul-2008 00 --

Supersedes :
Subject : VT-JWN Salient features
Background
Information
: Jet Airways has inducted a new A330-202 aircraft VT-JWN (MSN 932) into its
fleet.
aircraft.
Content :
VT-JWN has the following salient features:-
4 Seats:

o ETOPS: Diversion time-180 min, Speed 0.86M /330 kts in ISA
conditions.

The following table gives a list of new components installed on VT-JWN and its
interchangeability with the components installed on VT-JWM.
Component P/N on JWN P/N on JWM Interchangeability
MARKER ANTENNA 6204-89-00 3107-89
2 Way
Interchangeable
ATC/DME ANTENNA 2439-89-03 2407-89-03
2 Way
Interchangeable
GLIDESLOPE ANTENNA 6202-89-62 3105-89
2 Way
Interchangeable
Page 1 of 3

Jet Airways (I) Ltd

Date
ATA Sub ATA

30-07-2008 34 & 23 --

Applicability : A330 aircrafts.
Supersedes : --
Subject : Painting of Navigation and Communication Antennas
Authority Ref : Airbus Service Information Letter 34-058 Rev 2 dated 29 May 2007
Background
Information
: This Technical Instruction is issued to provide Airbus recommendations for paint
rework of eroded antenna leading edge, instructions to apply fluorescent paint and
to limit the effects of erosion on the leading-edge of blade type antennas.
Content : A. Navigation Antennas
1. RA Antennas : P/N 9599-607-12352
Painting is prohibited in the active area (D+6mm) shown as shaded portion in the
picture below. Only surrounding passive area may be repainted with a small soft-
bristled brush in the following manner.
1 .Apply primary coat CELOMER P99, ref CELOMER 7641/3600(Thickness 5 to 10
microns).
2 .Apply protective coat CELOMER PAC33, ref CELOMER 4355/3600(Thickness 10
to 20 microns).
3 .Apply finishing coat polyurethane white paint CELOMER PU66(Thickness 60 to
80 microns).

Figure 1

2. ATC-DME Antennas: P/N 2439-89-03, P/N 2407-89-03, P/N 2407-89-13
- In case of paint erosion, the antennas may be repainted on their leading edges.
The paint must be of polyurethane type. The thickness of the applied paint layer
must not exceed 350 m and should be of the same color as the original.
P/N variants Paint finish Paint reference
2439-89-03 Gloss orange yellow Aeromap 1000 yellow
RAL 1028
2439-89-13 Gloss orange with red Aeromap 1000 red RAL
stripe 3020 and RAL 3028
Note: Aeromap 1000 meets specifications : Aerospatiale NT 10158, BMS 10-60H,
MIL C 83286
Limitation: Any antenna showing paint cracks or any other physical damage must
be removed and shall not be re-painted.

3. TCAS Antennas : P/N 7514081-912 .
- Painting not recommended.

4. ADF Antennas : P/N C12351AA .

Page 2 of 3

5. GPS Antennas : painting not recommended.

6. VOR-MKR Antennas
a) MARKER : P/N 3107-89-09 & P/N 6204-89-00 .
b) VOR : P/N 3110-89

B. Communication Antennas
1. HF Antennas: P/N A9239828000000, A9239828000600, A9239828000800.
If slight corrosion marks are observed on the HF antennas, a corrosion treatment
can be applied only on the contaminated surfaces :
- Primer coat (ICI) : Primary color - F580-2080 (CML 16-006B).
Hardener - F275-160.
Thinner - N39956.
- Coating lacquer : Primary color - N53.624 (ICI/WIEDERHOLD).
Hardener - N39/1327.
Thinner - N39/3259 or N39/3460.
If heavy corrosion is observed on the HF antenna, the replacement of the antenna
is necessary

2. VHF Antennas: -P/N 2403-89
-In case of paint erosion, the antennas may be repainted on their leading edges
as shown in fig 2.

Figure 2

The paint must be of polyurethane type(Refer AMM chapter 20-31-00, item no 16-
018A,16-018B,16-018C) .The thickness of the applied paint layer must not exceed
350 m and should be of the same color as the original.
Limitation: Any antenna showing paint cracks or any other physical damage must
be removed and shall not be re-painted.

Page 3 of 3

Action :

3. SATCOM Antennas : P/N 822-0953-002(HPA)

Prevention of erosion of blade antennas
The application of polyurethane adhesive tape (Scotch 8671) on VHF, and ATC/DME
blade type antennas is authorized provided the antenna area where the radiating
element is located is not covered.
Note: A)The Electro-Static discharges could result in noise. Therefore, if the flight
crew reports static noise on VHF after application of the adhesive tape, the tape
must be removed.
B) Airbus does not recommend application of polyurethane tape for Radio-Altimeter,
TCAS, GPS, SATCOM, ADF, etc.

1. Repainting should not be attempted on Antenna, not recommended by
Airbus .

2. Repainting should be performed only on the portion of antenna
recommended by Airbus using recommended primer/ paint.

3. If anti-corrosion tape has been applied on VHF antenna and crew reports
static noise on VHF ,then the anti-corrosion tape must be removed.

Page 1 of 2
Jet Airways (I) Ltd

Date ATA Sub ATA
10-10-2008 32 40

Applicability
:
Main Wheel & Nose Wheel Assemblies installed on A330-200 airplanes

Supersedes
:
TI 21/2007 Dated: 17/10/2007.

Subject
:
Introduction of In-house Main Wheel & Tire Assembly P/N : 3-1546-52 and
Nose Wheel & Tire Assembly P/N : 3-1596-54.

Authority Ref
:
Clarification from Airbus pertaining to Wheel Assembly Part Number
definition.

Background
information
:
Currently Jet Airways is using Goodrich - Messier Hub Assemblies P/N:
3-1546 for Main Landing Gear & P/N: 3-1596 for Nose Landing Gear. The
same P/Ns are also used for Wheel Assemblies comprising of Hub
Assembly & Tire. This is not a certified P/N for a complete Wheel
Assembly. This Technical Instruction is issued to introduce and define In-
house P/Ns for Wheel Assemblies to distinguish Hub Assembly P/Ns from
Wheel Assembly P/Ns.

Content
:
As Hub Assembly P/Ns 3-1546 and 3-1596 cannot represent a complete
Wheel Assembly, the matter was taken up with Airbus for further
clarification. Airbus has agreed that Operators can use Hub Assembly P/N
+ a two digit suffix (such as 52, 54 etc) to identify Wheel Assembly
(Comprising of Hub Assembly & Tire).
P/N of Wheel Assembly will be same for different makes of tires installed
on them, i.e, same P/N should be used for wheel Assemblies installed with
Bridgestone Tires & Michelin Tires. The following Main & Nose Wheel
Assemblies will be identified in AMOS with specific Part Numbers.
Main Wheel Assembly:
. Main Wheel Assembly P/N : 3-1546-52
.. Wheel Half Assy P/N (Outer) : 300-828
.. Wheel Half Assy P/N (Inner) : 300-829
.. Main Wheel Tyre P/N Bridgestone : APR06911 OR
Main Wheel Tyre P/N Michelin : M05102

Page 2 of 2
Nose Wheel Assembly:
. Nose Wheel Assembly P/N : 3-1596-54
.. Wheel Half Assy P/N (Outer) : 300-908
.. Wheel Half Assy P/N (Inner) : 300-907
.. Nose Wheel Tyre P/N Bridgestone : APR06500 OR
Nose Wheel Tyre P/N Michelin : M07601

Action
:
All concerned personnel should make note of this information and action
accordingly.

Jet Airways (I) Ltd

Date ATA Sub ATA Jet Airways JetLite

10-Oct-2008 27 90

Applicability :
All Airbus A330 Aircrafts
Supersedes :
Not Applicable
Subject :
Unexpected Flight Control System operation due Flight Control Primary
Computer (FCPC) configuration.
Authority Ref :
Airbus - Operators Information Telex (OIT) SE 999.0085/04/BB dt. 21 July 2004
Background
information
:
The aim of this TI is to inform of an in-service event where the elevators
responded abnormally to side stick orders in the flare phase due to an
unauthorized FCPC configuration.

During the flare phase, the elevators of an A330 aircraft remained at neutral
position for several seconds whereas the pilots had ordered a pitch up
movement through the side sticks. This resulted in a severe hard landing
and subsequent main landing gear replacement.
Content : While troubleshooting the event, the following FCPC configuration was
found:
- P/N LA2K1A100DA0000 (P8/M17 standard) at FCPC1 & FCPC3 positions.
- P/N LA2K2B100D80000 (P7/M16 standard) at FCPC2 position.

According to the Illustrated Parts Catalog (IPC) this mixed configuration is
not authorized. Investigations and testing have demonstrated that, with this
unauthorized FCPC configuration, FCPC2 sent erroneous orders to the
elevator servo controls, leading to force fighting between the actuators and
unwanted elevators movement.
Action :
All maintenance personnel are reminded about the importance of
adhering to the interchangeability and mix ability rules given in the IPC.
When deviating from these rules, aircraft is brought to an uncertified
configuration that may result in unexpected operation of the systems.
This is valid not only for interchangeability and mix ability of FCPCs, but
for all aircraft components.
To prevent unauthorized FCPC configuration, a new monitoring has
been implemented in the following FCPC standards:
A330-200/300 aircraft with electrical rudder: FCPC P9/M18
standard (PN LA2K2B100DB0000) available since July 2008.
With these new FCPC standards, an ECAM warning "F/CTL PRIM x
FAULT" associated with maintenance message "FCPCx (2CEx)" is
triggered in case of unauthorized FCPC configuration.

9
Page 1 of 1
Jet Airways (I) Ltd

Date ATA Sub ATA
17-10-2008 27 93

Applicability : A330-200 airplanes
Subject : Flight Control Primary Computer 1 (FCPC 1) Dispatch restriction and
Operational Test.
Authority Ref : EASA AD 2008-0010 R1 dated 07 Oct 2008 & AOT A330-27A3158
Background
Information
: This Technical Instruction is issued to inform about the Dispatch Restrictions and
Operational tests to be carried out prior to dispatch of the aircraft with FCPC 1
inoperative.

EASA AD 2008-0010 R1 revises and replaces the EASA EAD 2008-0010-E dated
14 Jan. 2008, which was initially released to address this problem.
Content : FCPC 2 and FCPC 3 are supplied with power from DC BUS 2 (2PP bus bar).
Electrical transients on the 2PP bus bar occur, in particular during engine 2
failure. Such electrical transients lead to a FCPC 2 reset. FCPC 3 reset does not
occur as there is a secondary electrical supply to FCPC 3 from DC BUS 1 (1 PP
bus bar).
In case of an engine failure during Take Off, with the FCPC 1 inoperative, if the
FCPC 2 and FCPC 3 computer reset occurs during rotation, transient loss of
elevator control associated with temporary incorrect flight control law
reconfiguration could occur. This could lead to a movement of the elevator to the
zero position, which induces a pitch down movement instead of a pitch up
movement needed to lift off. This leads to a limitation of the pilot authority in
pitch axis and limits the capacity to counter the pitch down movement during
this flight phase and could lead to a potentially unsafe condition.
Action : All maintenance personnel must ensure that prior to dispatch of the aircraft
under MEL 27-93-01-A FCPC PRIM 1 inoperative, a test of the FCPC 3 second
electrical power supply as per AMM 27-96-00-710-814 is successful. This test is
also reflected in the DDPG as part of the FCPC 1 deactivation procedure.

In case the test of the FCPC 3 second electrical power supply is unsuccessful
repair and rectification must be performed as per TSM 27-96-00-810-824 prior to
dispatch of aircraft with FCPC 1 inoperative.

Until the FCPC 3 second electrical power supply test is successful,
release of the aircraft under MEL 27-93-01-A FCPC PRIM 1
inoperative is prohibited.

The above dispatch restriction has already been included in MEL 27-93-01-A &
corresponding DDPG. A temporary revision of this MEL is being issued to reflect
the reference of AD 2008-0010 R1.

Page 1 of 2
Jet Airways (I) Ltd
Technical Instructions No: 18/2008

18-12-2008 32 45

Applicability
:
All Airbus A330-200 Aircraft.

Supersedes
:
Not Applicable

Subject
:
Tire Pressure Servicing For Cold Weather operations.

Authority Ref
:
AMM 12-14-32-614-801 Replenishment of Tires.
AMM 12-31-32-660-801 Cold weather maintenance practices for Landing
Gear

Background
information
:
As per MPD Task 324100-04 requirements, tire pressures are required to
be checked at regular intervals.
The tire pressures are required to be maintained in the limits specified in
AMM 32-41-00-220-802 Check of Tire Pressures.
Incorrect tire pressures have to be serviced as per AMM 12-14-32-614-
801.
In case of large temperature difference between departure and destination
airports, the tire pressures need to be adjusted. AMM 12-14-32-614-801
provides the reference guidelines.

Content
:
As per the current tire pressures maintained on the fleet, it is observed
and reported through Line Maintenance that at colder / sub zero
destinations the tire pressures drop below the limits specified and results
in tire charging / servicing at those destinations.
In order to avoid these activities at stations having sub-zero temperatures
this Technical Instruction revises Tire Pressures for Cold Weather
Operating conditions.

Action
:
The guidelines of this Technical Instruction are to be followed
between 15
th
December and 15
th
March period only.
A: Tire Pressure Servicing Limits, Aircraft Weight on Wheel condition:
Nose Wheel : 210 + 5 0 psi
Main Wheel : 235 + 1 0 psi

Page 2 of 2

B: Tire Pressure Operating Limits, Aircraft Weight on Wheel condition:
Nose Wheel : 175 210 psi
Main Wheel : 196 - 235 psi

If the temperature difference between the Departure station and
Destination is equal to or more than 15 deg C (59 Deg F), and the
Departure station has temperature higher than the destination, the tire
needs to be serviced to the Servicing Limits as per para A.

If the temperature difference between the Departure station and
Destination is equal to or more than 15 deg C (59 Deg F), and the
Departure station has temperature lower than the destination, it is
permissible to operate the aircraft with tire pressures within the Operating
Limits as per para B.

If the airplane is to be released from station with outside temperature less
than 0 deg C, and tire pressures are below the operating limits, servicing
must be carried out to the lower limits specified in the operating limits as
per para B.

At Transit stations, With TPIS system serviceable; Tire pressures can be
checked through the CDU.

Page 1 of 5
Jet Airways (I) Ltd

24-12-2008 73 21 X

Applicability
:
VT-JWD and VT-JWE (A330 aircraft powered by RR TRENT 700 Engines)

Supersedes
:
NONE

Subject
:
Intermediate Pressure Turbine Overspeed System (IPTOS) and EEC
Software Version A13.2.1.

Authority Ref
:
EASA AD 2008-0101; Airbus SIL 72-005, Airbus Service Bulletins: A330-73-
3047, A330-73-3049 and A330-73-3052; Rolls-Royce Service Bulletins:
RB.211-72-F655, RB.211-73-AF390, RB.211-72-AF392, RB.211-72-F394,
RB.211-72-F391 and RB.211-73-F852.

Background
information
:
An in-service incident involving an uncontained IP Turbine Blade release,
engine shut down and aircraft turn back, has highlighted the requirement
for a new method of protection to prevent IP turbine over speed incidents.
The problem is attributed to failure of the IP shaft as a result of an internal
oil fire.

Content
:
IPTOS: The IPTOS function has been designed to automatically reduce
engine thrust following the detection of overspeed in the IP turbine. The
IPTOS function will limit IP shaft speed, such that the terminal speed will
remain below the blade release threshold in the event of a subsequent IP
shaft failure.
Airbus SB 73-3049 introduces the IPTOS function on A330 aircraft powered
by ROLLS ROYCE Trent 700 engines. It covers the ROLLS ROYCE SB No.
RB.211-72-AF392. This modification consists in activating IPTOS function
(Intermediate Pressure Turbine Overspeed System) by Data Entry Plug
(DEP) reprogramming with Engine Standard Index Number 1. This
modification requires the EEC software A13.2.1 and the FWC K9 software
as a minimum. EASA AD 2008-0101 mandates activation of IPTOS
function, to be complied by 30
th
June 2009.

Extended flexible take off: In the framework of engine maintenance
cost reduction and A330 economic performance policy, an extended
flexible take-off function has been introduced.
The flexible temperature derated take-off capability is extended for the
T772B engines from around 25% to 33% of the maximum take-off thrust,
which corresponds to an increase of the maximum flexible temperature
from ISA +48 deg C to ISA +60 deg C.
For A330 fitted with Rolls-Royce (RR) Trent 772B engines, the activation of
the extended flexible de-rated take-off requests the re-programming of the
EEC Data Entry Plug (DEP) with Engine Standard Index Number 0 or 1.

Note: The Engine Standard Values and Functionality Table of RR SB 72-
F655 (Ref. Table 1) helps in DEP Programming by providing the different
Engine Standards to be selected based on the operators requirements and
the modification status of the aircraft / engines.

Page 2 of 5

* This value is for pre 73-E502 installations only. A13.2.1 (73-F390) implements
increased N3 idle and increased N3 redline (to 101.7 percent N3) for all engine
standard values currently certified.

Table 1: Engine Standard Values and Functionality Table

Engine
Standard
Increased
In-flight N3
Idle
Increased
Flex
Derate 72-
F391
IPT
Overspeed
72-F392
Enabling
(Concurrent)
Modifications
Applicable
Engine
Mark
Numbers
0 Selected Selected
Not
Selected

73-F390:
Introduction of
revised software
standard
A13.2.1
72-F394:
Introduction of
revised method
of Engine
Pressure Ratio
(EPR)
Trimming
Trent 772B
and Trent
772C Series
1 Selected Selected Selected
Airbus mod.
55191 (FWC T1-
O)
73-F390:
Introduction of
revised software
standard
A13.2.1
72-F394:
Introduction of
revised method
of Engine
Pressure Ratio
(EPR)
Trimming
Trent 772B
and Trent
772C Series
2 Selected
Not
Selected
Not
Selected
73-E324:
Introduction of
revised software
standard A12.4
All Trent
768, 772,
772B and
772C
Series.
3 Selected
Not
Selected
Selected
Airbus mod.
55191(FWC T1-
O).
73-F390:
Introduction of
revised software
standard
A13.2.1.
All Trent
768, 772,
772B and
772C
Series.
*4 Selected
Not
Selected
Not
Selected
73-E324:
Introduction of
revised software
standard A12.4
All Trent
768, 772,
772B and
772C
Series.
Page 3 of 5

Action
:
I. EEC Part Numbers: EEC2000-06BV, EEC2000-07BV, EEC2000-10BV,
EEC2010-01BV, EEC2010-02BV, EEC2000-06BW, EEC2000-07BW,
EEC2000-10BW, EEC2010-01BW and EEC2010-02BW can be installed on
the aircraft.
All the above parts are completely interchangeable and intermixable with
each other.

II. While programming the Data Entry Plug (DEP), ensure the following:

1. Engine Standard Index Number must be selected as 1 (IPTOS
activation mandated by EASA AD 2008-0101).
2. Engine EPR number is confirmed from the Engine data slip plate
(Ref. Fig. 1).
3. Nozzle EPR number is same as that given on the Common Nozzle
Assembly (CNA) Name plate (Ref. Fig. 2).

JAI fleet is currently fitted with FWC P/N: LA2E20202T10000 (Software
standard T1-0), which is of a higher standard than the required minimum
standard of K9.
Hence, IPTOS can be activated on VT-JWD and VT-JWE Engines.

The IPTOS function is a one-way modification. After activation of the
IPTOS function, intermixing of EEC software A13.2.1 is not permitted with
the previous EEC software standards (A12.4, A12.6, etc)

EEC PN 2000-06BS1, 2000-07BS1, 2000-10BS1, 2010-01BS1 and 2010-
02BS installed with software standard A12.6 can no longer be installed on
the aircraft.

Goodrich SBs EEC2000-73-7706 and EEC2010-73-7706 modifies EEC to
software standard A13.2.1 having part numbers EEC2000-06BV, EEC2000-
07BV, EEC2000-10BV, EEC2010-01BV and EEC2010-02BV.
Goodrich SBs EEC2000-73-7711 and EEC2010-73-7711 modifies EEC to
software standard A14 having part numbers EEC2000-06BW, EEC2000-
07BW, EEC2000-10BW, EEC2010-01BW and EEC2010-02BW.
Page 4 of 5
Fig. 1 Engine Data Slip Plate
Page 5 of 5

Fig. 2 Common Nozzle Assembly Name Plate
Page 1 of 1

Jet Airways (I) Ltd

Date ATA Sub ATA
02-Jan-2008 00 --

Applicability :
VT-JCK
Supersedes :

Subject :
VT-JCK Salient features.
Authority Ref :
Background
Information
:
Jet Airways has inducted a new ATR72 aircraft VT-JCK (MSN 775) into its fleet.
This Technical Instruction is issued to highlight the salient features of VT-JCK.
Content :
VT-JCK is delivered with the same configuration as VT-JCJ.

VT-JCK has the following salient features
4 Engines PW127F Engine.
4 Pax Configuration
o 62 @ 31 pitch.
4 Max Take Off Weight 22,500kg.
4 Max Zero Fuel Weight 20,300kg.
4 Certification for 15 kt tailwind Take Off and Landing.
4 VHF 8.33 KHz spacing.
4 MPC (Multipurpose Computer) installed.
4 MLG Wheel Tyre pressure is 121 psi instead of 119 psi. Nose wheel tyre

Page 1 of 2

Jet Airways (I) Ltd
Technical Instruction No.3 / 2008

Date ATA Sub ATA
04-Jun-2008 00 --

Applicability :
VT-JCL
Supersedes :

Subject :
VT-JCL Salient features
Authority Ref :
Background
Information
:
Jet Airways is inducting a new ATR72 aircraft VT-JCL (MSN 791) into its fleet.
This Technical Instruction is issued to highlight the salient features of VT-JCL
and its differences with VT-JCK (MSN 775) of the existing ATR72 fleet.
Content :
VT-JCL has the following salient features
4 Pax Configuration
o 62 @ 31 pitch.
4 Max Take Off Weight 22,500kg
4 Max Zero Fuel Weight 20,300kg
4 Certification for 15 kt tailwind Take Off and Landing
4 VHF 8.33 KHz spacing
4 Dual Navigation Lights Installed. Navigation lights are controlled
through a 3 position switch. [OFF-NORMAL-ALT]
4 MLG Wheel tyre pressure is 121 psi instead of 119 psi. Nose Wheel tyre
VT-JCL has the following difference with JCK :
PW127M Engines: The new engines have the following difference as compared
to PW127F Engines.
4 A DCU (Data Collection Unit) P/N: 3073308-01 is installed. This unit is
used to provide cycle count.
4 The torque probe with Bayonet type connector has been replaced with
a torque probe P/N: 307347-1 with Screw-In type connector.
4 A new EEC P/N: 1012974-2-001.
4 A Universal harness P/N: 3073315-03 is required for installation of
PW127M engine.

Component P/N on VT-JCK P/N on VT-JCL Interchangeability
Autopilot
Computer
FDAU ED34A340 ED34A350
One way
interchangeable
Reading light
equipment
module
2LA007417-02 2LA007417-40 Not Interchangeable
DMU Software
252692803-
0101
252692803-
0102
One way
interchangeable
MG Trunion leg
LH & RH
D23189100-00 D23189000-23
One way
interchangeable
Side Brace MLG
LH & RH
D23219100-00 D23219000-5
One way
interchangeable
EEC 820154-1-002 1012974-2-001 Not interchangeable
Data Collection
Unit (DCU)
Not installed 3073308-01 Not Applicable
Electrical wiring
harness
Turboprop
Engine
PW127F PW127M Not interchangeable

Page 2 of 2

Page 1 of 3
Jet Airways (I) Ltd
Technical Instruction No.5/2008

Date ATA Sub ATA
17-06-2008 72 00

Applicability : ATR 72
Supersedes : Nil
Subject : Introduction of PW127M Engine on ATR72212A
Authority Ref : P&W SIL No. PW100-116 dated 21.1.08 and ATR Operators Information
Message OIM 2008/001 Issue 2 dated 28.2.08
Background
Information

:

Pratt & Whitney Canada Corp. has introduced a new PW100 engine
model derivative designated as PW127M. This new model is installed on
the enhanced ATR 72-500 aircrafts. The PW127M is replacing the
PW127F engine models and become the main production model of the
PW127 engine series. ATR is installing the new Model Derivative
PW127M on production ATR72-212A (MSN 779) and onwards. Jet
Airways aircraft VT-JCL (MSN 791) and onwards is being delivered with
PW127M engines.
Content

:

The salient features of the PW127M Engine are given below:

Increased Take-off and maximum continuous thermal limits
compared to PW127F model
Common EEC hardware with existing PW127E / PW127F requiring
simple software revision
DCU (Data Collection Unit) added to the engine control system for
automatic cycle counting feature
Screw-in type torque probe No.1 and No.2 connectors
BOOST function: This option allows increased take-off (TO) and
maximum continuous (MCT) thermal limits. Boost function permits
the utilization of increased thermodynamic MTO (Take Off) and
MCT (Max Continuous) rating limits in order to benefit of higher A/C
performance in Hot & High conditions.
Reserve Take-Off (RTO) function: Use of RTO engine power
increases aircraft performances at take-off on short runways.

NOTE: Jet Airways has not opted for BOOST and RTO functions
on the new induction ATR72-212A aircrafts.

ATR72-212A PW127M Engine highlights:

1. Basic production configuration:

A new universal engine harness is introduced simultaneously with
PW127M. This harness is an evolution of main Quick Engine Change
(QEC) harness 4003VB and features modified torque sensor connector to
match PW127M screw-in type probe.

In order to ensure PW127M cycle counting function in any electrical
power shutdown scenario at aircraft level, an additional power supply to
both Electronic Engine Control (EEC) and Data Collection Unit (DCU) is
provided. Direct power supply from batteries is temporarily provided
once aircraft de-energized. This is included in PW127M modification
(5906) and is a prerequisite to automatic cycle counting.
Page 2 of 3

The PW127M control system performs automatic cycle count. The cyclic
data is stored in an engine mounted DCU and can be accessed via
maintenance pages on the aircraft cockpit. In addition to this method to
access cyclic data, P&WC has developed tool kit P/N 3073696 which
allows a laptop to be directly connected to the DCU via a harness. This
kit is also necessary in the event that the DCU software has to be
accessed or modified in the field by an operator. Tool kit P/N 3073696
contains the following items:

P/N 3073697 GBS software transfer module for laptop interface
PWC56832 DCU download harness assembly
1 Carry-case

Access to engine cycles information at aircraft level is done through
Multi-Purpose Computer (MPC) with new DMU step 4 software, using
Multifunction Control Display Unit (MCDU) interface. Engine cycles report
generated by MPC is an ACMS-type report (such as cruise or exceedance
reports), with same data management (automatic creation, manual
request, printing, storage on PCMCIA card). Modification introducing
DMU step 4 software is 5911.

Modified Flight Data Acquisition Unit (FDAU) ED34A350 is introduced as
production standard, with a provision for PW127M torque bug
computation. Associated modification is 5912.

2. PW127F/M INTERCHANGEABILITY

Introduction of PW127M engine will create a mixed fleet and several
engine/airframe combinations, which are listed hereafter going through
aircraft configurations.

2.1 New production 72-212A

Original engine is PW127M. PW127F can be installed, providing
installation of screw-in type torque probe to match universal engine
harness. Automatic cycle counting is no more available (MPC will not
trigger automatic reports, and only empty reports will be created in case
of manual request). JIC 72-00-00 RAI 10000 REMOVAL/INSTALLATION
ENGINE (VARIANT 006) will formally allow this configuration.

2.2 Basic 72-212A

Original engine is PW127F. PW127M can be installed, providing
installation of bayonet type torque probe to match non-universal engine
harness. Automatic cycle counting is inoperative as aircraft is pre-mod
5906 without additional power supply. Manual cycle counting applies.
JIC 72-00-00 RAI 10000 REMOVAL/INSTALLATION ENGINE (VARIANT
003) will formally allow this configuration.

2.3 72-212A post-SB ATR72-71-1011 (universal engine
harness)

Original engine is PW127F. PW127M can be installed with its basic
screw-in type torque probe. Automatic cycle counting is inoperative as
aircraft is pre-mod 5906 without additional power supply. Manual cycle
counting applies. JIC 72-00-00 RAI 10000 REMOVAL/INSTALLATION
ENGINE (VARIANT 004) will formally allow this configuration.
Page 3 of 3

TABLE SHOWING PW127F/M INTERCHANGEABILITY

PW127M PW127F
2.1 Production 72-212A
5909 Universal engine harness
5906 PW127M
5911 DMU step 4 software
5912 FDAU ED34A350
Original engine : PW127M
Original engine

JIC 72-00-00 RAI 10000
VAR 006
(embodiment of P&WC
SB 21763)
Cycle counting no more
available
2.2 Basic 72-212A
Original engine : PW127F

JIC 72-00-00 RAI 10000 VAR
003
(Embodiment of P&WC SB
21762 NOTE: It is necessary
to change the RGB left side
torque sensor from a
threaded type to a
bayonet type.)
Cycle counting inoperative
Original engine

2.3 72-212A post SB
71-1011 Universal engine
harness
Original engine : PW127F
No adaptation required
Cycle counting inoperative

post SB 21763 as
required in SB 71-1011

2.4 72-212A post SB
71-1011 Universal engine
harness
72-1006 PW127M
Original engine : PW127M
Original engine

JIC 72-00-00 RAI 10000
VAR 006
(embodiment of P&WC
SB 21763)
Cycle counting no more
available

2.4 72-212A post-SB ATR72-72-1006 (PW127M and universal
engine harness)

This configuration is equivalent to 5.1, with or without MPC.
JIC 72-00-00 RAI 10000 REMOVAL/INSTALLATION ENGINE (VARIANT
006) will formally allow this configuration.
Action : This Technical Instruction is released for information on the new
production Engine Model PW127M in our fleet.
Page 1 of 8
Jet Airways (I) Ltd
Technical Instruction No 07 / 2008

Date ATA Sub ATA
07-07-2008 21 51

Applicability :
All ATR 72 Aircraft
Supersedes :
ATR 72 TI 06/2008
Subject : Guide for Troubleshooting of Air-conditioning (Revised)
Authority Ref : Technical Services
Background
Information
:
Systematic degradation of air-conditioning system on ATR aircraft
is observed, due age & the environment.
The Aim is to improve component reliability, system performance
and reduce passenger complaints.
Content :
Frequent complaints like Poor Cooling, Cabin Hot, Temperature
control unserviceable etc have been reported on the Air
conditioning system.

A detailed study has been carried out on the system to assist in
troubleshooting and rectification.

ATR72 TI 06/2008 is revised to include procedure developed by
Technical Services to check the AUTO & MAN mode operation of
the Air-conditioning system.

Action :
All Maintenance Personnel can use the following recommendations
and guide lines in the attached Flowchart to Trouble Shoot and
restore the Air Conditioning System to the Optimum performance.

Refer Flowchart attached below.

Page 2 of 8
DOES THE
PROBLEM EXISTIS
ON GND OR IN FLT
IS THE GND
COOLING FAN IS
RUNNING ?
PRESS THE PACK VALVE PUSHBUTTON SWITCH
9HB (10HB)
- FAULT LIGHT ON (ENG1 (2) BLEED PUSHBUTTON
SWITCH PRESSED : OFF LIGHT OFF)
- GROUND COOLING FAN STARTS
IS THE
RAM AIR CHECK
VALVE FAILED
OPEN ?
GND YES
IS THE RAM AIR
CHECK VALVE
FAILED ?
REPLACE THE
VALVE AMM
(JIC) 21-51-59
RAI 10000
IS THE FAN
SUPPLIED ?
YES YES
9HB (10HB)
IS THE
FAILURE IN
AUTO MODE AND/
OR IN MAN
MODE ?
FIG. 101
FIG. 103
AUTO
AUTO & MAN
MAN
FIG. 102
REPLACE THE
FAN AMM (JIC)
21-51-59 RAI
10000
REPLACE THE
VALVE AMM
(JIC) 21-51-59
RAI 10000
CHECK THE WIRING
ASM 21-51-00-101
YES
NO
NO
IN FLT
AND ON
GND
IN FLT
IN FLT
START
FLT
NO
NO
ATR AIRCONDITIOING SYSTEM TROUBLE SHOOTING GUIDE
ON PANEL 22 VU
MANUAL MODE LEFT PACK MANUAL MODE RIGHT PACK
1. PACK V/V 2 P/B SW OFF.
- ENSURE OFF LIGHT ON.
2. TEMP SEL P/B SW PRESSED OUT
- MAN LEGEND ON.
- MAN LEGEND ON.
3. SELECT COMPT. SEL. TO FLIGHT COMPT. 3. SELECT COMPT. SEL. TO CABIN.
4. SELECT ROTARY S/W TO FULL COLD. 4. SELECT ROTARY S/W TO FULL COLD.
5. CHECK SUPPLY DUCT TEMP DROP. 5. CHECK SUPPLY DUCT TEMP DROP.
6. SELECT ROTARY S/W TO FULL HOT. 6. SELECT ROTARY S/W TO FULL HOT.
7. CHECK SUPPLY DUCT TEMP RISE. 7. CHECK SUPPLY DUCT TEMP RISE.
8. TEMP SEL P/B SW PRESSED IN
- MAN LEGEND OFF.
- MAN LEGEND OFF.
AUTO MODE LEFT PACK AUTO MODE RIGHT PACK
- MAN/ OVHT LEGEND OFF.
5. SPRAY CONTACT CLEANER TO FLIGHT
COMPARTMENT TEMP. SENSOR (36HR) CONTINUOUSLY.
- CHECK COMPT. TEMP. DROP.
- CHECK SUPPLY DUCT TEMP RISE.
5. SPRAY CONTACT CLEANER TO CABIN
TEMP. SENSOR (12HH) CONTINUOUSLY.
6. PACK V/V 2 P/B SW ON. 6. PACK V/V 1 P/B SW ON.

Page 3 of 8
(RH SIDE ONLY) I S THE
TEMP. SENSOR FAN 22HH
RUNNING ?
ENGINE RUNNING -
WITH RH ENG BLEED
AND PACK VALVE P/
BSWS PRESSED
VERIFY THAT THE
FAN IS RUNNING.
ENGINE RUNNING -
SEE IF THE PROBLEM IS CORRECTED BY
SWAPPING THE TWO TEMP.
CONTROLLERS.
THE FAILURE WOULD PASS TO THE
OTHER SIDE OF AIRCRAFT IF NECESSARY.
USE AN INTERCONNECTING JUMPER
HARNESS TO OPERATE THE ECU FROM
THE CONTROLLER OF THE OTHER SIDE OF
THE AIRCRAFT (THE GOOD SIDE).
IS THE TEMP.
CONTROLLER 9HH (10HH)
WORKING ?
I S THERE A SHORT OR OPEN
CIRCUIT OF ANY TEMPERATURE
SENSOR 11HH (12HH), 13HH
(14HH), 15HH (16HH)
ON TEMP CONTROLLER CONNECTOR, WIRING SIDE. CHECK THE VALUES OF
THE RESISTENCES OF THE SENSORS AS FOLLOWS:
PINS CONNECTS TO
NOMINAL
77
0
F
COMMENTS
R-S
THERMISTOR OF CABIN
TEMP. SENSOR
2 K
CAN BE AS LOW AS 0.84 K AT 120
0
F
CAN BE AS HIGH AS 13 K AT 0
0
F
W-X
THERMISTOR OF DUCT
TEMP. SENSOR AT ECU
OUTLET
10 K
0
F
0
F
X-Y
THERMISTOR OF DUCT
TEMP. SENSOR AT ECU
OUTLET
15 K
0
F
CAN BE AS LOW AS 6 K AT 120
0
F
b-c SKIN SENSOR 4 K
CAN BE AS HIGH AS 4.5 K ON A HOT DAY
CAN BE AS LOW AS 3 K ON A COLD DAY
A
IS THE TEMP. SENSOR
FAN SUPPLIED
IS THE TEMP.
CONTROLLER
SUPPLIED ?
REPLACE THE FAN
AMM (JIC) 21-61-28 RAI
10000
YES NO
NO
YES
CHECK THE WIRING
FOR CONTINUITY
REPLACE
CONTROLLER
NO
YES
CHECK WIRING
NO
CHANGE THE TEMP.
SENSOR INVOLVED
REF. APPLICABLE AMM
(JIC)
CHECK WIRING
BETWEEN TEMP.
SENSOR AND TEMP.
CONTROLLER FOR
CONTINUITY
A DISCRIEPANT READING IN A
SENSOR THERMISTOR RESISTANCE
VALUE, i.e. ( R-S, W-X-Y, b-c ),
WILL MOST LIKELY BE OPEN
CIRCUIT, INDICATING A FAILED
THERMISTOR. IF THIS IS INDICATED,
LOCATE THE OFFENDING SENSOR,
DISCONNECT ITS WIRES, AND
DOUBLE-CHECK THE RESISTANCE
VALUE AT THE SENSOR.
IS THE INVOLVED
SENSOR WORKING ?
ENGINE RUNNING -
WITH RH ENG BLEED AND PACK
VALVE P/BSWS PRESSED VERIFY
THAT THE FAN IS RUNNING,
VERIFY THAT THERE IS 115V/400
HZ BETWEEN RED AND BLUE
TERMINALS OF VENTILATION FAN
22HH.
DISCONNECT CONNECTOR FROM TEMP.
CONTROLLER, WIRING SIDE, WITH BATTERY
ON, CHECK THE FOLLOWING VOLTAGE
VALUES :
PINS POTENTIAL COMMENTS
T-D
28 VOLT
(PIN T +VE)
SELECTOR IN
EITHER AUTO OR
MANUAL
C-D
28 VOLT
(PIN C +VE)
SELECTOR IN
EITHER AUTO OR
MANUAL
YES
YES
NO
NO
YES
NO
( FIG 101 - SHEET 1 OF 2 )

Page 4 of 8

Page 5 of 8

Page 6 of 8
CHECK FOR
AIR CYCLE MACHINE
CORRECT OPERATION
REPLACE THE AIR
CYCLE MACHINE AMM
(JIC) 21-51-52 RAI 10000
FALED
OK
REMOVE THE ACM AS PER AMM (JIC) 21-51-52-RAI-10000
CHECK THE STATIC BREAKWAY TORQUE AS MARKED IN THE JIC
ABOVE MENTIONED AND/OR IN THE SL GARRETT GP-7.
NOTE:
- With engine running and BLEED and PACK selected ON, the ACM is not
correctly operating if the compressor side is not HOT and .or the turbine
side is not COLD.
- Following a failed ACM Replacement, The following is recommended :
1. Replace TIC Valve as a pair.
( In case of Operational constraints, the same should
be replaced within the next maintenance opportunity, raise open
work order for replacement.)
a) Removed TIC valve to be sent to stores with remark
BENCH CHECK REQUIRED.
2. Carry out operational check of Water Extraction system
(hose & spray nozzle) according to the AMM (JIC) 21-51-91 CHK
10000.
IS THE TRIM VALVE 17HH
(18HH) FAILED OPEN ?
REPLACE THE VALVE
10000
YES
IS THE HOT BY-PASS
VALVE FAILED OPEN ?
6321 HB (6232 HB)
REPLACE THE VALVE
10000
YES
IS THE
SERVICE PRESSURE
REGULATOR ?
6141HQ (6142HQ)
REPLACE THE SERVICE
PRESSURE
REGULATOR AMM (JIC)
21-11-52 RAI 10000
YES
MAKE AN OPERATIONAL
TEST OF THE ADDITIONAL DE-
ICING PRESSURE SWITCH AMM
(JIC) 21-51-96 OPT 10010
DISCONNECT INLET CONTROL PRESSURE
PORT OF TRIM AIR VALVE AND CONNECT A
PRESSURE GAGE TO THIS LINE. OPERATE
THE SYSTEM AND CHECK THAT THERE IS 15
+ 3 PSIG THIS LINE.
REPLACE THE
ADDITIONAL DE-ICING
PRESSURE SWITCH
10000
FAILED
ATR AIR-CONDITIOING SYSTEM TROUBLE SHOOTING GUIDE
( FIG 103 SHEET 1 OF 3 )
NO
NO
NO
B

Page 7 of 8

CHECK OPERATION OF ADDITIONAL
DE-ICING PRESSURE SWITCH RELAYS
84HB, 85HB IN 92VU
REPLACE THE RELAYS
FAULT
CHECK THE PACK VALVE AMM (JIC)
21-51-00 CHK 10010
REPLACE THE PACK VALVE AMM
(JIC) 21-11-51 RAI 10000
FAILED
IS THERE ANY OBSTRUCTION OF
THE HEAT EXCHANGERS ?
AMM (JIC) 21-51-51 CHK
CLEAN THE HEAT EXCHANGER OR
REPLACE IT
YES
CHECK OF THE HP DELIVERED PRESSURE
AMM (JIC) 36-11-00 CHK 10010
REPLACE THE HP VALVE AMM (JIC)
36-11-63 RAI 10000
FAILED
CHECK OF THE BLEED DUCT TIGHTNESS
AMM (JIC) 36-11-00 CHK 10000
PERFORM ALL THE ACTIONS TO
RESTORE THE DUCT TIGHTNESS
FAILED
PERFORM INSPECTION OF HEAT
EXCHANGER ACCORDING TO AMM (JIC) 21-
51-51 RAI 10000.
OK
OK
OK
OK
B
C

Page 8 of 8

Page 1 of 8
Jet Airways (I) Ltd

20-10-2008 21 51

Applicability
:
All ATR 72 Aircraft

Supersedes
:
Technical Instruction No: 07/2008

Subject
:
Guide for Troubleshooting of Air-conditioning (Revised)

Authority Ref
:
Technical Services

Background
information
:
Systematic degradation of air-conditioning system on ATR aircraft is
observed, due age & the environment.
The Aim is to improve component reliability, system performance and
reduce passenger complaints.

Content
:
Frequent complaints like Poor Cooling, Cabin Hot, Temperature
control unserviceable etc have been reported on the Air conditioning
system.

A detailed study has been carried out on the system to assist in
troubleshooting and rectification.

ATR72 TI 07/2008 is revised to include new procedure to check if
Ground Cooling Fan is supplied (Refer page 2 of 8).

Action
:
All Maintenance Personnel can use the following recommendations
and guide lines in the attached Flowchart to Trouble Shoot and
restore the Air Conditioning System to the Optimum performance.

Refer Flowchart attached below.

Page 2 of 8
DOES THE
PROBLEM EXISTIS
ON GND OR IN
FLT ?
IS THE GND
COOLING FAN IS
RUNNING ?
9HB (10HB)
IS THE
RAM AIR CHECK
VALVE FAILED
OPEN ?
GND YES
IS THE RAM AIR
CHECK VALVE
FAILED CLOSED
?
REPLACE THE
VALVE AMM
(JIC) 21-51-59
RAI 10000
IS THE FAN
SUPPLIED ?
YES YES
REMOVE ACCESS DOOR 191GL (192GR),
DISCONNECT CONNECTOR FROM GROUND
COOLING FAN. WIRING SIDE,WITH PACK VALVE
PUSHBUTTON PRESSED, VERIFY THAT BETWEEN
PIN 3 AND GROUND EXISTS 28VDC.
IS THE
FAILURE IN
AUTO MODE AND/
OR IN MAN
MODE ?
FIG. 101
FIG. 103
AUTO
AUTO & MAN
MAN
FIG. 102
REPLACE THE
FAN AMM (JIC)
21-51-58 RAI
10000
REPLACE THE
VALVE AMM
(JIC) 21-51-59
RAI 10000
CHECK THE WIRING
ASM 21-51-00-101
YES
NO
NO
IN FLT
AND ON
GND
IN FLT
IN FLT
START
FLT
NO
NO
ON PANEL 22 VU
MANUAL MODE LEFT PACK MANUAL MODE RIGHT PACK
- MAN LEGEND ON.
- MAN LEGEND ON.
4. SELECT ROTARY S/W TO FULL COLD. 4. SELECT ROTARY S/W TO FULL COLD.
5. CHECK SUPPLY DUCT TEMP DROP. 5. CHECK SUPPLY DUCT TEMP DROP.
7. CHECK SUPPLY DUCT TEMP RISE. 7. CHECK SUPPLY DUCT TEMP RISE.
- MAN LEGEND OFF.
- MAN LEGEND OFF.
AUTO MODE LEFT PACK AUTO MODE RIGHT PACK
5. SPRAY CONTACT CLEANER TO FLIGHT
COMPARTMENT TEMP. SENSOR (36HR) CONTINUOUSLY.
5. SPRAY CONTACT CLEANER TO CABIN
TEMP. SENSOR (12HH) CONTINUOUSLY.
6. PACK V/V 2 P/B SW ON. 6. PACK V/V 1 P/B SW ON.

Page 3 of 8
(RH SIDE ONLY) I S THE
TEMP. SENSOR FAN 22HH
RUNNING ?
ENGINE RUNNING -
WITH RH ENG BLEED
AND PACK VALVE P/
BSWS PRESSED
VERIFY THAT THE
FAN IS RUNNING.
ENGINE RUNNING -
SEE IF THE PROBLEM IS CORRECTED BY
SWAPPING THE TWO TEMP.
CONTROLLERS.
THE FAILURE WOULD PASS TO THE
OTHER SIDE OF AIRCRAFT IF NECESSARY.
USE AN INTERCONNECTING JUMPER
HARNESS TO OPERATE THE ECU FROM
THE CONTROLLER OF THE OTHER SIDE OF
THE AIRCRAFT (THE GOOD SIDE).
IS THE TEMP.
WORKING ?
I S THERE A SHORT OR OPEN
CIRCUIT OF ANY TEMPERATURE
SENSOR 11HH (12HH), 13HH
(14HH), 15HH (16HH)
ON TEMP CONTROLLER CONNECTOR, WIRING SIDE. CHECK THE VALUES OF
THE RESISTENCES OF THE SENSORS AS FOLLOWS:
PINS CONNECTS TO
NOMINAL
77
0
F
COMMENTS
R-S
THERMISTOR OF CABIN
TEMP. SENSOR
2 K
0
F
0
F
W-X
THERMISTOR OF DUCT
TEMP. SENSOR AT ECU
OUTLET
10 K
0
F
0
F
X-Y
THERMISTOR OF DUCT
TEMP. SENSOR AT ECU
OUTLET
15 K
0
F
CAN BE AS LOW AS 6 K AT 120
0
F
b-c SKIN SENSOR 4 K
CAN BE AS HIGH AS 4.5 K ON A HOT DAY
CAN BE AS LOW AS 3 K ON A COLD DAY
A
IS THE TEMP. SENSOR
FAN SUPPLIED
IS THE TEMP.
CONTROLLER
SUPPLIED ?
REPLACE THE
TEMPERATURE
SENSOR VENTILATION
FAN AMM (JIC) 21-61-28
RAI 10000
YES NO
NO
YES
CHECK THE WIRING
FOR CONTINUITY
REPLACE
CONTROLLER
NO
YES
CHECK WIRING
NO
CHANGE THE TEMP.
SENSOR INVOLVED
REF. APPLICABLE AMM
(JIC)
CHECK WIRING
BETWEEN TEMP.
SENSOR AND TEMP.
CONTROLLER FOR
CONTINUITY
A DISCRIEPANT READING IN A
SENSOR THERMISTOR RESISTANCE
VALUE, i.e. ( R-S, W-X-Y, b-c ),
WILL MOST LIKELY BE OPEN
CIRCUIT, INDICATING A FAILED
THERMISTOR. IF THIS IS INDICATED,
LOCATE THE OFFENDING SENSOR,
DISCONNECT ITS WIRES, AND
DOUBLE-CHECK THE RESISTANCE
VALUE AT THE SENSOR.
IS THE INVOLVED
SENSOR WORKING ?
ENGINE RUNNING -
WITH RH ENG BLEED AND PACK
VALVE P/BSWS PRESSED VERIFY
THAT THE FAN IS RUNNING,
VERIFY THAT THERE IS 115V/400
HZ BETWEEN RED AND BLUE
TERMINALS OF VENTILATION FAN
22HH.
DISCONNECT CONNECTOR FROM TEMP.
CONTROLLER, WIRING SIDE, WITH BATTERY
ON, CHECK THE FOLLOWING VOLTAGE
VALUES :
PINS POTENTIAL COMMENTS
T-D
28 VOLT
(PIN T +VE)
SELECTOR IN
EITHER AUTO OR
MANUAL
C-D
28 VOLT
(PIN C +VE)
SELECTOR IN
EITHER AUTO OR
MANUAL
YES
YES
NO
NO
YES
NO
( FIG 101 - SHEET 1 OF 2 )

Page 4 of 8

IS THE
TEMP. SELECTOR
5 HH (6 HH)
WORKING ?
IS THE
MFC
WORKING
PROPERLY ?
REPLACE THE TEMP.
SELECTOR AMM (JIC)
21-61-82 RAI 10000
NO
REPLACE THE MFC
NO
CHECK THE WIRING FOR CONTINUITY
YES
A
YES
SWAP THE TWO MFCs.
ON THE TEMPERATURE CONTROLLER CONNECTOR, WIRING SIDE,
CHECK FOR TEMPERATURE SELECTOR 5HH (6HH) POTENTIOMETER
RESISTANCE (AUTO MODE) VALUES, AS FOLLOWS :
PINS CONNECTS TO
NOMINAL
77
0
F
COMMENTS
H-K TEMP. SELECTOR 1 K
CONSTANT -
POTENTIOMETER FOR
AUTOMATIC OPERATION
H-J
J-K
TEMP. SELECTOR
1 K-0
0-1 K
RESISTANCE VARIES AS
SELECTOR KNOB
ROTATED
( FIG 101 - SHEET 2 OF 2 )

Page 5 of 8
IS THE
TEMP. SELECTOR
5 HH (6 HH)
WORKING ?
IS THE
MFC
WORKING
PROPERLY ?
REPLACE THE TEMP.
SELECTOR AMM (JIC)
21-61-82 RAI 10000
NO
REPLACE THE MFC
NO
REPLACE SEL PB/SW 7HH
(8HH) OR TEMPERATURE
YES
YES
SWAP THE TWO MFCs.
DISCONNECT CONNECTOR OF TEMPERATURE CONTROLLER ON THE
SIDE OF THE AIRCRAFT WHICH HAS THE ABNORMALITY WITH
BATTERY POWER OFF, CHECK TEMP. SELECTOR 5HH (6HH)
POTENTIOMETER RESISTANCE VALUES AS FOLLOWS:
PINS CONNECTS TO
NOMINAL
77
0
F
COMMENTS
D-C TEMP. SELECTOR 5 K
CONSTANT -
POTENTIOMETER FOR
MANUAL OPERATION
D-E
AND
C-E
TEMP. SELECTOR
0-5 K
5 K - 0
RESISTANCE VARIES AS
SELECTOR KNOB
ROTATED
( FIG 102 )

Page 6 of 8
CHECK FOR
AIR CYCLE MACHINE
CORRECT OPERATION
REPLACE THE AIR
CYCLE MACHINE AMM
(JIC) 21-51-52 RAI 10000
FAILED
OK
REMOVE THE ACM AS PER AMM (JIC) 21-51-52-RAI-10000
CHECK THE STATIC BREAKWAY TORQUE AS MARKED IN THE JIC
ABOVE MENTIONED AND/OR IN THE SL GARRETT GP-7.
NOTE:
- With engine running and BLEED and PACK selected ON, the ACM is not
correctly operating if the compressor side is not HOT and .or the turbine
side is not COLD.
- Following a failed ACM Replacement, The following is recommended :
1. Replace TIC Valve as a pair.
( In case of Operational constraints, the same should
be replaced within the next maintenance opportunity, raise open
work order for replacement.)
a) Removed TIC valve to be sent to stores with remark
BENCH CHECK REQUIRED.
2. Carry out operational check of Water Extraction system
(hose & spray nozzle) according to the AMM (JIC) 21-51-91 CHK
10000.
IS THE TRIM VALVE 17HH
(18HH) FAILED OPEN ?
REPLACE THE VALVE
10000
YES
IS THE HOT BY-PASS
VALVE FAILED OPEN ?
6321 HB (6232 HB)
REPLACE THE VALVE
10000
YES
IS THE
SERVICE PRESSURE
REGULATOR ?
6141HQ (6142HQ)
REPLACE THE SERVICE
PRESSURE
REGULATOR AMM (JIC)
21-11-52 RAI 10000
YES
MAKE AN OPERATIONAL
TEST OF THE ADDITIONAL DE-
ICING PRESSURE SWITCH AMM
(JIC) 21-51-96 OPT 10010
DISCONNECT INLET CONTROL PRESSURE
PORT OF TRIM AIR VALVE AND CONNECT A
PRESSURE GAGE TO THIS LINE. OPERATE
THE SYSTEM AND CHECK THAT THERE IS 15
+ 3 PSIG THIS LINE.
REPLACE THE
ADDITIONAL DE-ICING
PRESSURE SWITCH
10000
FAILED
NO
NO
NO
B

Page 7 of 8
CHECK OPERATION OF ADDITIONAL
DE-ICING PRESSURE SWITCH RELAYS
84HB, 85HB IN 92VU
REPLACE THE RELAYS
FAULT
CHECK THE PACK VALVE AMM (JIC)
21-51-00 CHK 10010
REPLACE THE PACK VALVE AMM
(JIC) 21-11-51 RAI 10000
FAILED
IS THERE ANY OBSTRUCTION OF
THE HEAT EXCHANGERS ?
AMM (JIC) 21-51-51 CHK
10000
CLEAN THE HEAT EXCHANGER OR
REPLACE IT
YES
CHECK OF THE HP DELIVERED PRESSURE
AMM (JIC) 36-11-00 CHK 10010
REPLACE THE HP VALVE AMM (JIC)
36-11-63 RAI 10000
FAILED
CHECK OF THE BLEED DUCT TIGHTNESS
AMM (JIC) 36-11-00 CHK 10000
RESTORE THE DUCT TIGHTNESS
FAILED
PERFORM INSPECTION OF HEAT
EXCHANGER ACCORDING TO AMM (JIC) 21-
51-51 RAI 10000.
OK
OK
OK
OK
B
C

Page 8 of 8
CHECK FOR PACK LEAKAGE
RESTORE THE PACK OPERATIONS
FAILED
CHECK THE DUCT TEMPERATURE LIMITER
6125HB (6126HB)
REPLACE THE DUCT TEMPERATURE
LIMITER AMM (JIC) 21-61-25 RAI 10000
FAILED
CHECK OF DUCT TEMPERATURE LIMITER
LINE AND OVHT SWITCH 19HH (20HH)
REPLACE THE OVHT SWITCH AMM
(JIC) 21-61-24 RAI 10000
FAILED
IS THERE CONTINUITY BETWEEN
THE TEMPERATURE SELECTOR AND THE
CONTROLLER, BETWEEN THE CONTROLLER AND
THE PB/SW 7HH (8HH) AND BETWEEN THE
PB/SW AND THE TRIM VALVE ?
REPAIR THE WIRING ASM 21-61-01
NO
IS THE MFC WORKING PROPERLY ? REPLACE THE MFC
NO
RH ENGINE H/M, PERFORM A LEAK TEST TO
DISCOVER THE ABNORMALITY ACCORDING
TO AMM (JIC) 21-51-00 CHK 10020.
OK
OK
OK
YES
SWAP THE TWO MFCs.
END
C

J et Airways(I) ltd
Technical Instruction No. 0I/2008
Date
06-Feb-2008
ATA
27
SubATA
20/21 18737/
Applicability
:
B 737-400
SUpersedes
:
Technical Instruction 37/2007, 01/2007 &19/2005 Issue 1
Subject
:
Rudder SystemEnhancement Program
Authority Ref :
SB737-27-1246 Rev. 01 (Wiring Provision Installation).
SB737-27-1264 Rev. 01 (P5-3 Panel Replacement).
SB737-27-1255 Rev. 03 (Hardware Replacement).
SB737-27A1281 (Standby operational test &force fiaht monitor test)
Background
:Boeing has developed Rudder SystemEnhancement Programin order to
Information
This Rudder SystemEnhancement Programconsists of changes of wiring
provision, modification &installation of P5-3 panel and full-up hardware
before 12Nov'2008.
Content
:For in-service airplane the Rudder SystemEnhancement Program(RSEP)
is divided inthree parts:
- Hardware replacement program including a newdual rudder PCU.
- Wiring provision modification.
- P5-3panel modification.
The salient features of this modification programare as follows:
1.
Replacement of existing main PCU with new PCU having two
separate and independent control valves. Eachvalve is controlled
with separate and independent control input and
feedback
receives power from separate hydraulic system. The standby PCU
is replacedby an improved standby PCU.
The new PCUalso contains a sensor for detecting malfunctions
within the PCU. Newoverride devices connected to the main PCU
and standby PCUinputs allow pilots to instinctively retain control
is automatically pressurized when the main PCUsensor detects a
malfunction.
The old rudder control torque tube is with four cranks .The new
rudder control torque tube is with five cranks. Old configuration
has two control rods one each for main and standby rudder PCU
while new configuration has three control rods, two for main
rudder PCUand one for standby rudder PCU.
2.
Wiring provision modification consists of wiring installation in the
fuselage on the left side of the airplane in the crown and
terminated aft of the pressure bulkhead in an electrical connector
at station 1080. A new circuit breaker, circuit breaker marker and
two relays are installed in the P6-2panel.
Page10f4
Action
3. A new light in the P5-3 Panel provides annunciation whenever the
standby PCUis pressurized.
possible to have a STBY RUDON light on the P5-3. This is detected by
the Foroe Fight Monitor 5ystem and illumination of the STBY RUD ON
light on the P5-3 panel is Non-Dispatchable until investigation and
corrective actions are carried out prior to further flight. MEL item 27-21
permits dispatch of the aircraft conditionally.. "Note" given in MEL 27-21
(page 27.6) TR10 (MMEL49) will be amended in the next MELrevision.
As per the modification status:
- J PL B737-400 fleet is fully complied with Rudder 5ystem
Enhancement Program.
- J PL B737-400 fleet is complied with 5B 737-27-1255 Rev. 03 and do
not require operational testing of the standby hydraulic actuation
systemas per 5B 737-27A1281.
- Wiring Provision Installation (5B 737-27-1246 Rev. 01) &P5-3 Panel
Replacement (5B 737-27-1264 Rev. 01) have been completed on
B737-400 fleet.
All AME'sto take note of the following:
- Post modification P5-3 panel part number is 69-37313-
400/401/402/404/405/407/408/409.
- Post modification main rudder PCU part number is 419200-1003
(Boeing PIN 5251A307-1) & standby rudder PCU part number is
1U1150-4 (Boeing PIN 10-60797-9). The pre modification and post
modification PCUsare not interchangeable.
- The old main rudder PCU control rod assembly part number
251A3495-1 should not be used as spare. Useonly main rudder PCU
control rod assembly PIN251A3495-7 in caseof replaoement.
Attachments: Highlights of the changes from Airplane Configuration
Bulletin (pages 3-4)
Prepared By
Checked By
Approved By
Si nature Name
Sojin N J
Majeed Walele
5 Keskar
Date
06-02-2008
06-02-2008
06-02-2008
Page20f4
_ _ _ _ P_ 5_ - _ 3_ F _ I _ i g_ h_ t_ C _ O _ n_ tr _ o _ I _ M _ O _ d_ u_ I e ~
(9li ght co nfi gur ati o n sho wn wi th new li ght)
F LI GHT
STBY u
A
CCNTROL
B
STBY
RUO RUD
OFF OFF
.ON BON
STANDBY H'tO
LOW
QUANTITY
LOW
PRESSt..R:
_ Lo cati o n
o f new
"STBY
RUDO N"
amber li ght.
P5-3 Panel
Page 3 of 4
FEEL OFF
PRESS
SPEED TRId
FAIL
MACHlRIM
FAil
AUTO SLAT
F AlL
Conceptual
Hardware
Torque
Three Tube
Control
Rods
Rudder Surface
Seal Support
C o nceptual
Page 4 of 4
Page 1 of 3
Jet Airways (I) Ltd

22-02-2008
23 75 00

Applicability : B737-700/-800/-900 (VT-JNC Thru VT-JGP)
Supersedes : --
Subject : COCKPIT DOOR SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM (CDSS)

Authority Ref : FAA STC ST02368CH Dated 16 January 2008.
Rosemount Aerospace AMM Supplement 23-75-00.

Background
Information
: This Technical Instruction is issued to provide information about Cockpit
Door Surveillance System, which will be progressively installed on Jet
Airways B737 NG (VT-JNC Thru VT-JGP) Airplanes. The installation will
be performed as per FAA STC documents provided by Goodrich.
In the Current fleet of B737NG Airplanes, VT-JGQ and onwards are
delivered with Boeing configured CDSS known as Flight Deck Video
Surveillance system (FDVSS). In FDVSS video display of the view of
three cameras is available on lower Display Unit.

: Content

Goodrich/ Rosemount Aerospace CDSS (Cockpit Door Surveillance
System) will be progressively installed on Jet Airways B737 NG (VT-JNC
Thru VT-JGP) airplanes as per FAA STC ST02368CH issued to
Rosemount Aerospace. Now Rosemount Aerospace Inc. is a subsidiary
of Goodrich Sensor & Systems.

Cockpit Door Surveillance system consists of three cameras, two Liquid
Crystal Displays (LCD) and two control panels.

1) Cameras (P/N: 8410B1-204-105)
Camera one is mounted in the ceiling panel in the galley area,
just aft of the cockpit door, at STA 297, BL 0. This camera
provides a view of the area aft of the cockpit door.

Camera two is mounted in the ceiling panel in the galley area, at
STA 341, LBL 30. This camera provides a view of the forward
passenger seating area and aisle way leading to the cockpit door.

Camera three is mounted in the ceiling panel in the galley area,
at STA 306, RBL 32. This camera provides a view of the forward
passenger seating area and aisle way leading to the cockpit door.

2) Liquid Crystal Displays (P/N: 8420M1-2 MOD A)
The primary LCD is mounted in the side panel just forward and
outboard of the First Officers seat, at STA 216.

The secondary LCD is mounted in the side panel just forward and
outboard of the Captains seat, at STA 216.

3) Control Panels (P/N: 8431M1-23)
Two control panels located in the cockpit located aft of the
LCDs. Each control panel contains the system power, camera
view selector, system standby and LCD dimmer control.
Page 2 of 3

Content

:

The operation of CDSS can be tested using the following procedure:

1) Energize aircraft electrical power system (AMM Ref. 24-22-00/201).

2) Make sure that the POWER switches on the Captains and First
Officers CDSS control panels are toggled to OFF.

3) Close the E17, VID CAM (P6-1 Panel, Main Power Distribution)
circuit breaker.

4) Position CAM SEL switch on Capt & F/O control panel to position 1.

5) Conduct a test of the CDSS control panel and LCD :

(a) Toggle the POWER switch on the Captains CDSS control panel
to ON. Wait 15 seconds then verify a camera image is
displayed on the Captains LCD.

(b) Rotate the CAM SEL switch on the Captains CDSS control panel
from position 1, to position 2, to position 3, back to position 1.
Verify that the camera image displayed on the Captains LCD
corresponds to the camera selected.

(c) Rotate the DIM switch on the Captains CDSS control panel to
the (-) position and to the (+) position, back to about the
midrange position. Verify that the camera images displayed on
the Captains LCD dims when the DIM switch is rotated to the (-)
position and brightens when rotated to the (+) position.

(d) Push the STDBY button on the Captains CDSS control panel.
Verify that the image from Camera 1 disappears and the screen
turns black on the Captains LCD.

(e) Push the STDBY button again on the Captains CDSS control
panel or rotate the CAM SEL switch to another camera position.
Verify that the camera image is restored on the Captains LCD.

(f) Repeat steps (a)-(e) above for the First Officers CDSS control
panel and LCD.

(g) Toggle the POWER switch on the Captains and First Officers
CDSS control panel to OFF.

6) De-energize the aircraft electrical power system (AMM Ref.
24-22-00/201).

As a part of the CDSS modification as per STC, the following changes
have been made in cockpit layout.

(a) Captain & F/Os oxygen masks are relocated. Now they are
located in place of Cup holder.

(b) LCD monitors and Control panels are installed in the previous
location of oxygen mask stowage box.

Page 3 of 3
(c) Captain & F/Os Cup holders have been removed.

(d) New map Pockets are installed along with oxygen masks.

(e) Captain & F/Os Hand microphone hooks moved 4 inches up.

(f) A clamp has been installed to keep hand microphone away
from oxygen masks.

(g) New Circuit breaker (VID CAM) is installed on P6-1 panel at
E17 location.

:

Action

1) Aircraft may be released with CDSS inoperative under MEL 23-
21 Cat C.
Any portion of the system which operates normally may be used.

2) First Officers control panel must be always installed as 28VDC
power for Captains control panel is routed through F/Os
control panel.

3) All three cameras are identical & may be interchanged for
operational requirements (if necessary).

4) Captain and F/Os LCD monitors are identical & have same part
number.

5) Captain and F/Os control panels are identical & have same part
number.

6) (a) A copy of all relevant documents ( Accomplishment
instructions, AMM supplement, IPC supplement, FIM
supplement, WDM supplement, AFM supplement etc. are
kept in supplementary file.
(b) These documents can also be viewed in e-manuals on
Technical Publication Website.

7) CDSS modification can be identified by
(a) Looking at the location of the Captain & F/O oxygen masks
& observing LCD monitors and Control panels installed in
the previous location of oxygen mask stowage box.
Captain & F/Os oxygen masks relocated aft on the side
panel ,where cup holder was installed.
(b) CB (VID CAM) on P6-1 panel at E17 location.

Page 1 of 3
Jet Airways (I) Ltd

Date ATA Sub ATA
23-06-2008 21 75

Applicability : VT-JNF / JNH / JNS
Supersedes : Technical Instruction No: 06/2008
Subject : Installation of Pneumatic Air Cleaner system in the Air Conditioning
system.
Authority Ref : Boeing SB 737-21-1154 R3
Background
Information
: It is observed that the air conditioning system performance pertaining to
the Boeing 737-700 is not satisfactory. Numerous reports of passenger
complain have been observed. Jet Airways has undertaken several
programs in order to reduce these complains along with Boeing and
Honeywell.

High rate of Heat Exchanger removals and premature Torous erosion on
the ACM is also observed.

It has been analyzed that the prime cause of Heat Exchanger clog and
Torous erosion is environment contamination which enters into the
system through the Bleed system.

Content : In order to reduce erosion a Centrifugal Air Cleaner System has been
installed on the airplane. The air cleaner system will separate the heavy
dust particles from the bleed air. It is expected that installation of a
centrifugal air cleaner system will decrease Heat exchanger
contamination and will reduce Torous erosion.

Refer the attached photographs for installation details.

For maintenance of the system additional Chapter 21-75 FIM and 21-75
AMM have been uploaded on e manuals.

IPC and WDM for the subject would be uploaded shortly.

Action : Future revisions in the Maintenance documents would include these
chapters.
Part numbers of LRUs are mentioned below:
Air Cleaner P/n : CD011461
Shut Off v/v P/n : 67-2906-002
Circuit breaker : BACC18AD2
BACR13CE2 : RELAY.
BACR13CF2AB : RELAY
Detailed installation procedures and all applicable part numbers of the
components are available in SB 737-21-1154 R3 also uploaded on
e manuals.
Page 2 of 3

Air Cleaner Installation

Additional Circuit breaker installation

Page 3 of 3

Exhaust Plenum Modification and Drain tube installation

Page 1 of 2
Jet Airways (I) Ltd
Date
ATA Sub ATA

25/06/2008 30 72

Applicability : B737-700/800/900 (VT- JNA thru VT-JNZ and VT-JGA thru VT-JGP)
Supersedes : NIL
Subject : Bonding jumper requirement during Gray water Composite drain mast
installation.
Authority Ref : 737NG-FTD-30-04001, FAA AD 2008-08-22,Boeing Message No:
1-857842711-2, Boeing SB 737-30-1056 R1.
Background
Information
: During an inspection of the forward cargo area, an operator noticed
both charred insulation blankets and burned wires around the forward
gray water composite drain mast. Additional charring of insulation
blankets was noticed several feet away along the ground wire of the
drain mast. Evidence indicates the drain mast had been struck by
lightning. The concern is that a large lightning induced transient could
propagate through the power system with an undetermined effect on
systems.

Design reviews of composite drain masts on 737NG, 757,767 and 777
airplanes by Boeing indicate that the drain tubes need additional
electrical bonding to provide adequate lightning protection.
Content : FAA AD 2008-08-22 mandates installation of Bonding Jumper during
Gray water composite drain mast installation as per
SB B737-30-1056 R1.

Boeing 737NG airplanes are fitted with two types of Drain Mast:
a) Composite Drain Mast
b) Aluminum Drain mast

Composite Drain Mast Part Numbers are:-
5E2675-6 (FWD), 5E2675-12 (FWD), 5E2675-3 (AFT),
5E2675-8 (AFT), 417A2093-1.

Composite Drain mast can be identified by :-
a) Visual Inspection: Composite Drain masts were supplied with a strip
of clear thick tape installed along the leading edge of the Mast.
Aluminium drain masts were not supplied with Tape installed along
leading edge of the Mast.

b) Tap Test method: Use a metal disc to tap on the surface of the drain
mast. If you hear a Metallic sound the mast is made from Aluminium, if
you hear non-metallic sound the Mast is made from Composite.

Refer SB B737-30-1056 R1:
(i) For Fwd composite drain mast:
Bonding jumper P/N: BACJ40D10-76 is installed using screw P/N
BACS12GU3K9 (Qty1), washer P/N: NAS1149D0316H (Qty4) & nut P/N:
BACN10YR3CD (Qty2).

(ii) For Aft composite drain mast:
Bonding jumper P/N: BACJ40D10-55 is installed using screw P/N
BACS12GU3K9 (Qty1), washer P/N: NAS1149D0316H (Qty3) & nut P/N:
BACN10YR3CD (Qty1).

Page 2 of 2

Action : Whenever a composite gray water drain mast is installed, ensure a
bonding jumper is also installed between the clamp on the tube &
structure as per SB 737-30-1056 R1 or AMM 38-31-01 page block 400
effectivity post SB 737-30-1056 R1.
Page 1 of 2
Jet Airways (I) Ltd

Date ATA Sub ATA
02-Jul-2008 56 11/12

Applicability : B737
Supersedes : Nil
Subject : Application of Vibration Damping Tape on Window Sealant
Authority Ref : Boeing AMM 56-11-11 & ATR72-212A JIC 56-12-00
Background
Information
: As part of the procedure, post replacement of the Fight deck
window / windshield, application of Aerodynamic sealant is
required. Due various constrains sufficient time is not available for
the sealant to cure. Relevant Aircraft Maintenance Manuals permit
the application of Damping tape on the sealant once it is tack free
to allow the airplane to be released to Service.
Content : It is observed that the current application procedure of the
Damping Tape tends to stick on the Aerodynamic Sealant. During
removal of the tape the Sealant is damaged / peeled thereby
defeating its purpose.

This Technical Instruction provides guidance in preparation of
Damping Tape so that it does not adhere on the Sealant and
simultaneously serves the intended purpose. The procedure will
ensure that when the tape is removed, the sealant will not be
damaged.
Action : If sufficient curing time for the sealant is not available, follow the
procedure mentioned below for preparation and application of the
Damping Tape over the sealant.

1. Cut a sufficient length of Aluminum tape (Damping Tape) to
cover the Sealant area. Ensure that the Aluminum Tape is
wide and long enough to permit a good adhesion of its edges
to the windshield (or side window) and the windshield (side
window) frame. Refer Figure 1

2. Stick a 3M Tape or equivalent Teflon tape to the Aluminum
Tape with the adhesion side (glue side) of both tapes sticking
to each other. The 3M tape or equivalent Teflon tape must be
wide enough so that only the non-adhesive side of the Teflon
is in contact with the sealant. Refer Figure 1

3. When the sealant is tack-free, apply the prepared tape
combination with non-adhesive side of teflon tape covering
the sealant.
Page 2 of 2

Figure 1

A
l
u
m
i
n
u
m

T
a
p
e

T
e
f
l
o
n

T
a
p
e

Aluminum Tape, adhesive
side on top.
Teflon Tape, non adhesive
side on top.
Ensure sufficient width to
cover the Aerodynamic
Sealant
Ensure sufficient width to stick
on adjacent structure
Page 1 of 2
Jet Airways (I) Ltd

Date ATA Sub ATA
03-Jul-2008 32 51

Applicability : B737
Supersedes : Nil
Subject : Nose Wheel Steering Tiller Not Centering
Authority Ref : Boeing Message 1-818733341-2 & 1-818733341-4
Background
Information
: Jet Airways experienced repeated reports of nose wheel tiller not
centering when displaced.

This technical instruction gives recommendations provided by Boeing
which may be utilized to avoid grounding of aircraft due to non
availability of spares.
Content : During the course of troubleshooting high friction was observed on tiller
assembly. Further inspection discovered deep groove on inside face of
tiller. Tiller was replaced to return aircraft to service.

Boeing had received similar reports of binding in the tiller mechanism. It
is observed that if the BACN10JC10CD nut that secures the tiller handle
onto the shaft is over tightened, it can crush a spacer into the back of
the soft magnesium tiller handle.

The spacer behind the tiller handle was changed from aluminum to
stainless steel. This helps prevent the spacer from being distorted as the
tiller handle nut is tightened.
Action : All maintenance personal to make a note of the following rectification
procedure:

1. Examine the P/N BACB28Y10C018 spacer behind the tiller handle for
distortion.

Note: If the back of the tiller handle is also damaged, installing a
new spacer may not fully correct the riding condition.

2. If a new tiller handle is not easily available, manufacture a thin
washer to. Fabricate a washer similar to AN960C1016L or
AN960C1016 except that the outer diameter must be 1.00 +/- 0.010
inch instead. Ensure that the washer is thin enough to result in
adequate engagement of the locking feature of the tiller nut and to
prevent the spacer from bedding into the worn tiller handle.

3. Depending upon the thickness of the washer installed, the existing
spacer must be reduced in length by the same amount as the
thickness of the washer to ensure that the tiller attach nut will have
proper thread engagement.
Page 2 of 2

Action : 4. As an option to fabricating a washer and modifying the existing
spacer, install an NAS77C10-012 flanged bushing in place of the
existing spacer. Ensure that the flanged end of the bushing contacts
the tiller and not the bearing in the tiller mechanism.

Note: A photo of a washer that another operator manufactured for this
purpose is shown.

5. Tighten the tiller handle nut to only 100-150 in-lbs above running
torque. This torque is reflected in AMM 32-51-41.

6. Ensure that the tiller is free to move in both directions and does not
interfere with the side panel or the tiller housing.

Page 1 of 2
Jet Airways (I) Ltd

Date ATA Sub ATA
17-07-2008 77 -

Applicability : Applicable to B737 Classic and NG airplanes

Supersedes : Technical Instruction No. 07/2008 Dated: 22
nd
April 2008
Technical Instruction No. 10/2004 Dated: 25
th
June 2004
Subject : Engine Vibration Monitoring Signal Conditioner
Interchangeability.

Authority Ref : Boeing SL: 737-SL-77-015-E Dated: 13
th
January 2004

Background
Information
: This Technical Instruction supersedes the previous Technical Instruction
No. 10/2004 to revise applicability of AVM Signal Conditioner post
Boeing SB: 737-77-1056 on B737-NG airplanes.

Content : 1. B737-400 airplanes: The following Airborne Vibration Monitoring
(AVM) signal conditioners are two way interchangeable.

Boeing Part
Number
Vendor Part
Number
Vendor
S332T304-23 6670M2223 ENDEVCO

S332T304-25 6670M2225 ENDEVCO

S332T304-26 6670M2227 ENDEVCO

S332T304-30 6670M2230 ENDEVCO

S360N021-200 6672M200 ENDEVCO

S360N021-201 6672M201 ENDEVCO

S360N021-203 6672M202 ENDEVCO

S360N021-213 6672M203 ENDEVCO

S360N021-100 241-250-000-031 VIBRO-METER

S360N021-102 241-250-000-121 VIBRO-METER

S360N021-113 241-258-032-109 /
241-258-032-107
VIBRO-METER

S360N021-114 241-258-032-110 VIBRO-METER

Page 2 of 2

2. B737-700/-800/-900 airplanes: The following Airborne Vibration
Monitoring (AVM) signal conditioners are two-way interchangeable
on current B737-NG fleet of Jet Airways because the modification as
per Boeing SB: 737-77-1056 Rev 0 has been complied on all the
applicable B737-NG airplanes.

Boeing Part
Number
Vendor Part
Number
Vendor
S360N021-113 241-258-032-109 /
241-258-032-107
VIBROMETER

S360N021-114 241-258-032-110 VIBROMETER

S360N021-203 6672M203 ENDEVO

S360N021-213 6672M213 ENDEVO

S362A001-1 241-280-051-012 VIBROMETER

S362A001-10 241-280-053-013 VIBROMETER

S362A001-12 241-280-056-014 VIBROMETER

Note: The AVM P/Ns: 241-258-032-109 or 241-258-032-107,
241-258-032-110, 241-280-051-012, 241-280-053-013, 241-280-056-
014 have trim balance feature. Refer Boeing SL: 737-SL-77-015-E for
details.

Action : Aircraft Maintenance Engineers may use the above for information and
guidance.

Page 1 of 6
Jet Airways (I) Ltd

Date ATA Sub ATA
23-Jul-2008 27 20/21

Applicability : B 737-700/800/900
Supersedes : Technical Instruction TI 02/2008, 36/2007, 23/2007, 07/2007, 04/2007,
12/2004 Issue 2, 04/2004 Issue 3 and 15/2003.
Subject : Rudder System Enhancement Program (RSEP)
Authority Ref : Airplane Configuration Bulletin B-S001-2002006350
Operation test & force fight monitor test (737-27A1280 R1)
Background
Information
:
address the in-service rudder reversal exhibited on Boeing 737 aircraft.
before 12 Nov2008.
Content
:

and subsequent).



malfunction.

Page 2 of 6

tube is with five cranks and two authority limiter solenoid valves.
standby rudder PCU while the new configuration has three control
rods, two for main rudder PCU and one for standby rudder PCU.
Action
:
possible to have a STBY RUD ON light on the P5-3. This is detected by the
Force Fight Monitor System and illumination of the STBY RUD ON light on
the P5-3 panel is Non-Dispatchable until investigation and corrective actions
are carried out prior to further flight. MEL item 27-21 permits dispatch of
the aircraft conditionally.

Repetitive operational testing of the standby hydraulic actuation system as
per SB 737-27A1280 has been introduced through work order to detect an
impending failure of the system.

The accomplishment of 737-27-1253 Rev 03 or 737-27A1279 for aircraft
hydraulic actuation system as mandated by SB 737-27A1280.

As per the modification status VT-JNA/ JNB/ JNC/ JND/ JNE/ JNF/ JNG/
JNH/ JNJ/ JNL/ JNM/ JNN/ JNR/ JNS/ JNT/ JNU/ JNV/ JNW/ JNX/ JNY/ JNZ/
JGB and subsequent are fully complied with Rudder System Enhancement
Program and do not require operational testing of the standby hydraulic
actuation system as per SB 737-27A1280 R1. A complete list of status of
airplane complied through the various SBs is attached here with (page 6).

All AMEs to take note that on airplanes complied with Rudder System
Enhancement Program, the hardware is not fully interchangeable with
airplanes without Rudder System Enhancement Program.

- The new P5-3 panel part number 233A3209-2 can be installed on non-
RSEP airplanes and requires an INOP placard to be placed over the new
STANDBY RUD ON annunciator.

- Post modification main rudder PCU part number is S251A308-1 (419300-
1003).The pre and post modification PCUs are not interchangeable.

- The old main & standby rudder PCU control rod assembly part number
251A3495-7 in case of replacement for main rudder PCU control rod.

Note: Some A/C may have installed standby rudder PCU control rod part
number 251A3495-1 in service as spare. It is only necessary to replace the
standby rudder PCU control rod if the part number is 251A3495-1 while
carrying out SBs 737-27-1253 Rev 03 or 737-27A1279.

bulletin (pages 3-5) & modification status of the SBs 737-27-1247 R1, 737-
27-1262, 737-27-1253 R2 & R3, 737-27A1279 (page 6).
Page 3 of 6

Page 4 of 6

Page 5 of 6

737-27-1262 737-27-1247 R1 737-27-1253 R2 737-27-1253 R3 737-27A1279
VT-JNA 89 Complied Complied Complied Complied N/A
VT-JNB 91 Complied Complied Complied Complied N/A
VT-JNC 164 Complied Complied Complied Complied N/A
VT-JND 177 Complied Complied Complied Complied N/A
VT-JNE 138 Complied Complied Complied Complied N/A
VT-JNF 152 Complied Complied Complied Complied N/A
VT-JNG 169 Complied Complied Complied * Complied N/A
VT-JNH 181 Complied Complied Complied * Complied N/A
VT-JNJ 297 Complied Complied Complied * Complied N/A
VT-JNL 326 Complied Complied Complied * Complied N/A
VT-JNM 465 Complied Complied Complied * Complied N/A
VT-JNN 489 Complied Complied Complied * Complied N/A
VT-JNR 749 Complied Complied Complied * Complied N/A
VT-JNS 775 Complied Complied Complied * Complied N/A
VT-JNT 417 Complied Complied Complied * Complied N/A
VT-JNU 835 Complied Complied Complied * Complied N/A
VT-JNV 927 Complied Complied Complied * Complied N/A
VT-JNW 1016 Complied Complied Complied * Complied N/A
VT-JNX 1073 Complied Complied Complied * Complied N/A
VT-JNY 1146 Complied N/A Complied * Complied N/A
VT-JNZ 1185 Complied N/A Complied * Complied N/A
VT-JGA 1228 N/A N/A Superseded by R3 Open N/A
VT-JGB 1282 N/A N/A N/A N/A Complied
VT-JGC 1314 N/A N/A N/A N/A Complied
VT-JGD 1350 N/A N/A N/A N/A Complied
VT-JGE 1608 N/A N/A N/A N/A Complied
VT-JGF 1643 N/A N/A N/A N/A Complied
VT-JGG 1686 N/A N/A N/A N/A Complied
VT-JGH 973 Complied Complied Complied Complied N/A
VT-JGJ 998 Complied Complied Complied Complied N/A
VT-JGK 1002 Complied Complied Complied Complied N/A
VT-JGL 1392 N/A N/A N/A N/A Complied
VT-JGM 1201 Complied N/A Complied Complied N/A
VT-JGN 1212 Complied N/A Complied * Complied N/A
VT-JGP 1920 N/A N/A N/A N/A Complied
Status of Service Bulletins
A/C
Line
No.
Page 6 of 6
Page 1 of 3
Jet Airways (I) Ltd

Date ATA Sub ATA
21-08-2008 21 75

Applicability : VT-JNF / JNG / JNH / JNS / JNU / JGL
Supersedes : Technical Instruction No: 09/2008
Subject : Installation of Pneumatic Air Cleaner system in the Air Conditioning
system.
Authority Ref : Boeing SB 737-21-1154 R3
Background
Information
: It is observed that the air conditioning system performance pertaining to
Honeywell.


Torous erosion is environment contamination which enters into the
system through the Bleed system.

Content : In order to reduce erosion a Centrifugal Air Cleaner System has been
centrifugal air cleaner system will decrease Heat exchanger
contamination and will reduce Torous erosion.


AMM have been uploaded on e manuals.

IPC and WDM for the subject would be uploaded shortly.

Action : Future revisions in the Maintenance documents would include these
chapters.
Shut Off v/v P/n : 67-2906-002
BACR13CE2 : RELAY
BACR13CF2AB : RELAY
e manuals.
Page 2 of 3



Page 3 of 3


Page 1 of 1
Jet Airways (I) Ltd

16-Oct-2008 27 20/21

Applicability : B737-700/800/900
Supersedes : Technical Instruction TI 15/2008, TI 02/2008, 36/2007, 23/2007,
07/2007, 04/2007, 12/2004 Issue 2, 04/2004 Issue 3 and 15/2003.
Subject : Rudder System Enhancement Program (RSEP)
Authority Ref :
Operation test & force fight monitor test (737-27A1280 R1)
Background
Information
: Boeing had developed Rudder System Enhancement Program in order to
address the in-service rudder reversal exhibited on Boeing 737 aircraft.
This program consists of changes in wiring provisions, modification &
installation of P5-3 panel and full-up hardware replacement including a
new dual rudder Power Control Unit (PCU). This modification was
mandated by FAA AD 2007-03-07 and to be complied before 12 Nov2008.
Content :
As per the modification status all JPL B737-700/800/900 airplanes are
fully complied with Rudder System Enhancement Program.
possible to have a STBY RUD ON light on the P5-3. This is detected by the
Force Fight Monitor System.
Action : All AMEs to take note that of the following:
- Applicable P5-3 panel part number is 233A3209-2.
- Applicable main rudder PCU part number is S251A308-1 (419300-
1003).
- Illumination of the STBY RUD ON light on the P5-3 panel is Non-
Dispatchable until investigation and corrective actions are carried out
prior to further flight. MEL item 27-21 permits dispatch of the aircraft
conditionally.

9
Page 1 of 4
Jet Airways (I) Ltd

20-10-2008 21 75

Applicability
:
VT-JNE / JNF / JNG / JNH / JNS / JNU / JGB / JGL

Supersedes
:

Subject
:
Installation of Pneumatic Air Cleaner system in the Air Conditioning
system.

Authority Ref
:
Boeing SB 737-21-1154 R3

Background
information
:
It is observed that the air conditioning system performance pertaining to
Honeywell.


Torous erosion is environment contamination which enters into the system
through the Bleed system.

Content
:
In order to reduce erosion a Centrifugal Air Cleaner System has been
centrifugal air cleaner system will decrease Heat exchanger contamination
and will reduce Torous erosion.


AMM and 21-75 WDM have been uploaded on e manuals.

IPC for the subject would be uploaded shortly.

Action
:
Future revisions in the Maintenance documents would include these
chapters.


Shut Off v/v P/n : 67-2906-002
BACR13CE2 : RELAY
Page 2 of 4
BACR13CF2AB : RELAY

e manuals.

Page 3 of 4


Page 4 of 4



Page 1 of 2

Figure 1 (Flap Track wear)

Figure 2 (Grease Dirt Contamination)
Page 1 of 4
Jet Airways (I) Ltd
22-12-2008 21 75

Applicability
:
VT-JNE / JNF / JNG / JNH / JNS / JNU / JNV / JNW / JGB / JGL

Supersedes
:

Subject
:
Installation of Pneumatic Air Cleaner system in the Air Conditioning
system.

Authority Ref
:
Boeing SB 737-21-1154 R3

Background
information
:
It is observed that the air conditioning system performance pertaining to
programs in order to reduce these complain along with Boeing and
Honeywell.


Torous erosion is environment contamination which enters into the system
through the Bleed system.

Content
:
In order to reduce erosion a Centrifugal Air Cleaner System has been
centrifugal air cleaner system will decrease Heat exchanger contamination
and will reduce Torous erosion.


AMM and 21-75 WDM have been uploaded on Boeing e-manuals with a
separate link.

IPC for the subject would be uploaded shortly.

Action
:
Future revisions in the Maintenance documents would include these
chapters.


Shut Off v/v P/n : 67-2906-002
BACR13CE2 : RELAY
BACR13CF2AB : RELAY
Page 2 of 4

e manuals.

Page 3 of 4


Page 4 of 4


Page 1 of 2
Jet Airways (I) Ltd

26-12-2008 52 51
9 9

Applicability: B737-CLASSIC & NG AIRPLANES

Supersedes : Technical instruction No. 60/2002

Subject: ENHANCED SECURITY FLIGHT DECK DOOR OPERATION

Authority Ref: Boeing AMM 52-51-00

Background information: Jet Airways and Jet Lite Boeing737 Classic and NG airplanes are equipped with
Enhanced Security Flight Deck Door System using different codes for access ,deny time delay ,time delay for
continuous buzzer. However, with effect from 01 Jan 2009 ,Flight deck door System on Jet Lite airplanes
will also use the access code and delay timings being used by Jet Airways.

Content: The enhanced cockpit door includes an Electronic Access System (EAS). The system gives flight
crew full control of the cockpit door during normal flight operations.
Components of Electronic Access System include:
(1) A Keypad with six key 1-5 and three light emitting diodes (LED). Red, Amber and Green indicator
lights located on the keypad. The keypad is mounted on the passenger compartment side of the
door post (R.H. Side of the door frame)
(2) Cockpit Control panel Switch/Light Module, Auto Unlock and Lock Fail Indicator Press-To-Test Lights
are located on the center pedestal. Cockpit Control panel Switch/Light Module includes a three
position (UNLKD-AUTO-DENY), push-to-rotate momentary switch for unlocking the cockpit door and
lock indicator lights.
(a) At the flight deck switch panel, the AUTO UNLK indicator light stays on when the correct
entry is received by the DCM.
(b) The LOCK FAIL indicator light comes on when the solenoid fails to engage while power is
being applied to it.
(3) A Door Control/Chime Module (DCM) mounted on the flight compartment side of the door post,
an Electronic Striker(Solenoid) in the door post and a circuit breaker on P6 Panel.
(4) System software which can be programmed to accept a combination of entries from the keypad
(3 to 8 digits).
(5) Kill Switch The DCM includes a two position (OFF-NORM) toggle (KILL) switch.
The KILL switch is located under a switch guard. The switch is used by the operator to disable
the chime and lock without any affect to the keypad operations.

Auto Mode: This mode is used to allow opening of the cockpit door after entry of valid access
code. The access mode operation can be checked as per the following procedure:
(a) On Cockpit Control panel Switch/Light Module, Select Door Lock Switch (UNLK/AUTO/DENY) to
AUTO position
(i) The Red LED on the keypad comes ON
(ii) The electric strike is in locked position.
(b) Enter the access code in the keypad and press the ENT key. Immediately after the correct
access code is entered
the amber LED on the keypad comes ON,
chime module sounds two one-half second tones and
AUTO UNLK lights on the Cockpit Control panel Switch/Light Module comes ON.
(c) After 15 seconds a 2-tone chime is heard from the Door Control Module(DCM).
(d) After another 20 seconds, a continuous buzzer sound is heard from the DCM (the length of
Page 2 of 2
buzzer is 10 seconds).
(e) Auto UNLK light flashes.
(f) After the buzzer has sounded, the electric strike goes to unlocked position.
(g) The Green LED on the keypad comes ON for 5 seconds and the Amber LED goes OFF. The
chime module does not sound.
(h) AUTO UNLK light goes OFF
(i) After 5 seconds the electric strike goes to locked position.
(j) Green LED goes OFF and the Red LED comes ON.

UNLK MODE : This mode is used to unlock the cockpit door without entry of access code in the
keypad. The access mode operation can be checked as per the following procedure:

1. Push and turn the FLT DK DOOR switch to the UNLK position:
(a) Green LED on the keypad comes ON and Amber LED goes OFF.
(b) Electric strike goes to unlocked position.
2. Hold the Flight Deck Door switch in the UNLK position for 45 seconds:
(a) Electric strike goes to unlocked position
(b) After 45 seconds electric strike automatically goes to locked position.
(3) Put FLT DK DOOR switch back to AUTO position.

DENY MODE : Using the Flight Deck Door Switch to DENY position pilots can deny the entrance
for 30 minutes, after the access code has been entered on the keypad and the chime sounds and
AUTO UNLK light comes ON. The deny mode operation can be checked as per the following
procedure:

1. When Red LED on the keypad is ON and electric strike in the locked position enter the access
code on the keypad and press ENT key
(a) The Amber LED on the keypad comes ON and Red LED goes OFF. Chime Module sounds
two one-half second tones, AUTO UNLK light on the control panel comes ON.
2. Put and momentarily hold the FLT DK DOOR switch in the DENY position.
(a) Electric strike remains in Locked position. Amber LED goes OFF and the Red LED comes
ON. AUTO UNLK light on the control panel goes OFF.
(b) Entering access code during Deny Time Delay will not have any effect.
(Deny Time Delay is 30 minutes).

Action: Aircraft Maintenance Personnel are advised to take note of the above information and be guided
accordingly.

Page 1 of 1
Jet Airways (I) Ltd

Date ATA Sub ATA
17-Mar-2008 00 --

Applicability : Boeing 777-300ER, VT-JEJ and VT-JEK
Subject : VT-JEJ and VT-JEK Salient Features.
Background
Information
: Jet Airways has inducted 2 new B777-300ER aircraft VT-JEJ (MSN
35161, Variable number WD 769) and VT-JEK (MSN 35165, Variable
number WD 770) into its fleet.
aircraft VT-JEJ and VT-JEK.
Content : Aircraft VT-JEJ and VT-JEK have the following salient features:-
4 Max Take-Off Weight - 337,926 kg (745,000 lbs)
4 Engine Model GE90-115B
4 Max T/O Thrust 115,000 lbs.
Economy
4 Seats:-
o RNP-10, RVSM, B-RNAV, NAT-MNPS & PRNAV(RNP-1)
operations.

VT-JEJ has the following difference with VT-JEH : -

4 New E/E Cooling Fan P/N: 4100943D. This Part is 2 way
interchangeable with P/N: 4100943C.

VT-JEK has the following difference with VT-JEJ : -

4 New Cargo Heat Valve P/N: 3290888-3. This Part is 1 way
forward interchangeable with P/N: 3290888-2

Page 1 of 1
Jet Airways (I) Ltd

Date ATA Sub ATA
17-Mar-2008 00 --

Applicability : Boeing 777-300ER.
Subject : ACMS Reports parameter setting.
Authority Ref : AMM 31-35-00
Background
Information
: ACMS Reports may not be automatically downlinked if the Modifiable
Constant is not enabled in the MAT or if customized ACMF AMI software
is not loaded in Left & right AIMS.
Content : The following reports are required to be set to enable at all times for
Aircraft Performance monitoring, Engine & APU condition monitoring.
4 Engine Stable. (DOWNLINK_STABLE)
4 Engine Takeoff. (DOWNLINK_TAKEOFF)
4 Engine Climb. (DOWNLINK_CLIMB)
4 Abnormal Engine Start. (DOWNLINK_ABNES)
4 Engine Oil Monitoring.(DOWNLINK_OILMON)
4 EGT Divergence. (DOWNLINK_EGTDIVRG)
4 Engine Exceedance. (DOWNLINK_ENGXCD)
4 Airplane Performance Monitoring. (DOWNLINK_APM)
4 APU. (DOWNLINK_APUASDN) (DOWNLINK_APUPERF)
Automatic downlinking of an ACMS report may not happen due to one of
the following reasons.
1) Automatic downlink of the desired report is not enabled through
MAT. Automatic Downlinking of ACMS reports can be enabled
through the MAT as follows
4 On the MAT main menu select Condition Monitoring.
4 Select ACMS.
4 Select Modifiable Constants.
4 To change the enable or disable state of a report, use the
MAT keyboard to enter 1 for enable and 0 to disable.
Select ACCEPT to return to the modifiable constants
page. The new state then shows on the modifiable
constants page.
2) Customized ACMF AMI software is not installed in AIMS :- Ensure
ACMS software P/N: 316F-BSM-740-02.
Action : Whenever one or more ACMS reports are not Automatically
Downlinked carry out the following:

1) Ensure the desired report is enabled by changing the value of
the modifiable constant in MAT.
2) Ensure correct ACMF AMI P/N is installed in both Left & Right
AIMS.

Jet Airways (I) Ltd

Date ATA Sub ATA
04-09-2008
28 022
B777
Applicability
:
B777-300ER Airplanes.
Supersedes
:
N/A
Subject
:
NUISANCE FUEL QUANTITY INDICATION SYSTEM (FQIS) TANK UNIT
MAINTENANCE MESSAGES.
Authority Ref
:
777 MT 28-022 R1
SB 777-28-0050
Background
Information
:
Fuel Quantity Processor unit with software P/N: 286E-SMI-000-03
may generate several nuisance maintenance messages.
This Technical Instruction is issued to provide list of nuisance
messages for which no maintenance action is necessary unless
corresponding tank fuel quantity indication blank.
Content
:
Fuel Quantity Processor unit with software P/N prior to 2869-SMI-000-
04 may generate following nuisance maintenance messages.

28-20010 tank unit (Center Left No. 1) signal is out of range
28-20025 tank unit (Center Right No. 1) signal is out of range
28-20059 tank unit (Left Main No. 1) signal is out of range

:
28-20107 tank unit (Right Main No. 1) signal is out of range


A new FQPU software P/N: 2869-SMI-000-04 has been developed by
GE Aviation to address the nuisance Out Of Range (OOR) messages.
Boeing has released SB 777-28-0050 for installation of new software
P/N: 2869-SMI-000-04. VT-JEJ & JEK airplanes have been delivered
with new FQPU software.

Action
:
1. For aircraft equipped with FQPU software P/N: 286E-SMI-000-03, no
maintenance action is required for out of range messages listed above
unless the corresponding tank indication is blank.
2. If the tank fuel quantity indication is reported blank then maintenance
action should be performed as per applicable FIM Task
3. For aircraft equipped with FQPU software P/N: 2869-SMI-000-04,
perform trouble shooting as per applicable FIM Task.

Page 1 of 5

DATE ISSUE
09 / 01 / 2008
1

ATTENTION
All AMEs / APPROVED PERSONS
APPLICABILITY
ALL AIRPLANES
SUBJECT
INDEX OF T.I. & Q.C. OF 2007

AUTHORITY REF.

QUALITY MANAGER

QUALITY CIRCULAR INDEX 2007
Q.C. No. SUBJECT Date
Issue
No. Applicability
01 of 2007
INDEX OF TECHNICAL INSTRUCTIONS / QUALITY
CIRCULARS FOR 2006 03/01/2007 1 All
02 of 2007 ORGANIZATION APPROVAL - CAR 145 05/03/2007 1 All
03 of 2007 Invoking of MEL in Category C and D. 05/03/2007 1 B737 & A340
04 of 2007 Invoking of MEL in Category C and D. 23/03/2007 1 ATR
05 of 2007 Superseded By Q.C. 05 of 2007 Issue -2 30/03/2007 1
B737,B777,
A330
05 of 2007 Autoland Status Change 15/10/2007 2
B737,B777,
A330
06 of 2007 Engine Exceedance Checks 22/05/2007 1 B737 CL
07 of 2007
Crew O2 Bottles Pressure Check Prior to Release
of A/c 25/05/2007 1 B777
08 of 2007
Safety Precautions to be Taken During Engine
Ground Run / Taxi 07/06/2007 1 ALL
09 of 2007 Superseded By Q.C. 09 of 2007 Issue -2 20/06/2007 1 ALL
09 of 2007 Monsoon Precautions 25/06/2007 2 ALL
10 of 2007 24-1 (2) MEL Limitation on VT-JGW 29/06/2007 1 JGW
11 of 2007 Aircraft Release Certificate 09/07/2007 1 ALL
12 of 2007
Critical Design Configuration Control Limitations
(CDCCL) 16/07/2007 1 ALL
13 of 2007 Anti - Sabotage Inspection Guidance 24/07/2007 1 B777 & A330
14 of 2007 Accounting of Personnel Tools 24/07/2007 1 All
15 of 2007 Cockpit Entry Restrictions 07/08/2007 1 All
16 of 2007 Documentation of Maintenance 16/08/2007 1 All
17 of 2007 Recording of Fault Codes 17/08/2007 1 All
18 of 2007
Avionics Extension Approval for CAT "A" Licensed
Personnel 01/10/2007 1 ALL
Page 2 of 5
QUALITY CIRCULAR INDEX 2007
Q.C. No. SUBJECT Date
Issue
No. Applicability
19 of 2007
Multiple Cockpit Effects Due DC Bus1
Loss - Incident Due Maintenance Error
18/10/2007 1 ALL
20 of 2007
Fan-Reverser- Inspection of the TRAS Lock Flexible
Shaft Assemblies after an Aborted Take-Off
03/12/2007 1 All
21 of 2007
Tyre Pressure Checks During Layover/ Extended
Transit Inspection 05/12/2007 1 All
22 of 2007 Refueling During Atmospheric Electrical Activity 13/12/2007 1 All

B737- TECHNICAL INSTRUCTIONS INDEX 2007
TI NO. SUBJECT DATE APPLICABILTY
01 of 2007 Superseded By T.I. 37 of 2007 31/01/2007 B737-400
02 of 2007 Common Display System (CDS) Block Point 06 Software 31/01/2007 B737-NG
03 of 2007 GTCP85-129 APU Combustor Coupling (Clamp) Inspection 01/02/2007 B737-400
04 of 2007 Rudder System Enhancement Program (RSEP) 02/02/2007 B737-NG
05 of 2007 Interchangeability of Weather Radar System Components 05/02/2007 B737-NG
06 of 2007 VT-JGU Differences 12/02/2007 VT-JGU
07 of 2007 Superseded By T.I. 23 of 2007 22/02/2007 B737-NG
08 of 2007 Requirements of Deflating Tire Prior to Wheel Removal 09/03/2007 B737-NG
09 of 2007 Superseded By T.I. 10 of 2007 20/03/2007 VT-JGV
10 of 2007 VT-JGV Differences 22/03/2007 VT-JGV
11 of 2007 Emergency Locator Transmitter (ELT) 22/03/2007 B737 NG & CL
12 of 2007 Hydraulic Reservoir Servicing Procedures 10/04/2007 B737-NG
13 of 2007
Possible Occurrence of Excessive Ground Returns in
"AUTO" Mode 16/04/2007 B737
14 of 2007 Procedure for MEL Placarding in Cockpit 19/04/2007 B737-ALL
15 of 2007
Flashing ILS Deviation on Primary Flight Display (PFD) or
Electronic Attitude Direction Indicator (EADI) During
Approach 08/05/2007 B737-NG
16 of 2007 FMC Nuisance "CROSSLOAD FAIL" Message 08/05/2007 B737
17 of 2007 Occurrence of ALIGN Light Flashing 01/06/2007 B737-NG
18 of 2007
Re-Usage of Gasket During Pitot Probe Removal and
Installation. 14/06/2007 B737-NG
19 of 2007 Introduction of New Fan Blade Platform. P/N 340-001-816-0 27/06/2007 B737-NG
20 of 2007
Pack Trip on Ground Fan Bypass Valve Inoperative Open /
Missing 03/07/2007 B737
21 of 2007 VT-JGW Salient Features 09/07/2007 VT-JGW
22 of 2007 Cracks in the Pitot Probe Outer Flexible Hose 10/07/2007 B737
23 of 2007 Superseded By T.I. 36 of 2007 02/08/2007 B737-NG
24 of 2007
New Part No for Thrust Reverser Manual Unlock Handle
Assembly 02/08/2007 B737-NG
25 of 2007 Superseded By T.I. 27 of 2007 20/08/2007 VT-JGZ
26 of 2007 Engine Bleed System Leak Check Using APU 20/08/2007 B737-NG
27 of 2007 VT-JGZ, VT-JGX Salient Features 17/09/2007 VT-JGX,JGZ
Page 3 of 5
28 of 2007
Occurrence of Intermittent "PWS FAIL" on Take Off or
Approach 18/09/2007 B737-NG
29 of 2007
Flight Management Computer - Update 10.7 - Salient
Features 12/10/2007 B737
30 of 2007 Loss of Reliable Air Data Due to Icing of Static Ports 24/10/2007 B737-NG
31 of 2007 Minimum Serviceable Pneumatic Duct Pressure 01/11/2007 B737-NG,CL
32 of 2007 CFM56-7B Engine EEC Software Version 7.B.R3 13/11/2007 B737-NG
33 of 2007 VT-JBB Salient Features 19/11/2007 VT-JBB
34 of 2007 VT-JBD Salient Features 05/12/2007 VT-JBD
35 of 2007 VT-JBC Salient Features 05/12/2007 VT-JBC
36 of 2007 Rudder System Enhancement Program(RSEP) 07/12/2007 B737-NG
37 of 2007 Rudder System Enhancement Program 11/12/2007 B737-400
38 of 2007
Interchangeability of Common Display System (CDS)
Display Electronic Units 18/12/2007 B737-NG

1 of 2007 ELMS Power Panel Damage Due to Arcing Power Contactor 05/01/2007 B777
2 of 2007 Uncommanded Fuel Transfer / Imbalances 30/04/2007 B777
3 of 2007
Deactivation of Overhead Cross AISLE Stowage (OCAS)
Units 30/04/2007 B777
4 of 2007
Improving Galley Refrigeration Performance and Reliability
Best Practices 30/04/2007 B777
5 of 2007 Cargo Heat System Overheat and Erroneous Fault Indication 02/05/2007 B777
6 of 2007 Flap/Slat Electronic Unit - Low Time Removals 02/05/2007 B777
7 of 2007 VT-JEA Salient Features 07/05/2007 VT-JEA
8 of 2007
Flashing ILS Deviation on Primary Flight Display (PFD) or
Electronic Attitude Direction Indicator (EADI) During
Approach 08/05/2007 B777
9 of 2007
Flap Lever Fault Resulting in Primary Flight Display
Anomalies 15/05/2007 B777
10 of 2007
Preventing P/N 83-200-01 SMARTSEM Tire Pressure
Indication Errors Due to Humidity - Induced Drift 16/05/2007 B777
11 of 2007 Uncommanded Extension of Inboard Spoiler PCU 04/06/2007 B777
12 of 2007 VT-JEB Salient Features 05/06/2007 VT-JEB
13 of 2007
FLIGHT CONTROLS Caution Message During Control
Checks 08/06/2007 B777
14 of 2007
Deactivation of Overhead Cross Aisle Stowage ( OCAS)
Units 13/06/2007 B777
15 of 2007 Fuel Remaining in Center Tank After Flight 25/06/2007 B777
16 of 2007
Autopilot - Backdrive Actuator Tachometer A/B Mismatch on
Airplanes Equipped with Rockwell Collins AFDC P/N 822-
0006-105 03/07/2007
VT-JEA,
VT-JEB,
VT-JEC,VT-JED
17 of 2007 VT-JEC and VT-JED Salient Features 02/08/2007 VT-JEC,VT-JED
Page 4 of 5
18 of 2007 EFB Maintenance Practices 12/10/2007 B777
19 of 2007 VT-JEE and VT-JEF Salient Features 15/10/2007 VT-JEE,VT-JEF
20 of 2007 B777 Weather Radar System Related Anomalies 16/10/2007 B777
21 of 2007 Loss of Reliable Air Data Due to Icing of Static Ports 24/10/2007 B777
22 of 2007 VT-JEG Salient Features 07/11/2007 VT-JEG
23 of 2007
Draining of Accumulated Water From the Main and Centre
Tanks 01/12/2007 B777
24 of 2007 VT-JEH Salient Features 07/12/2007 VT-JEH

ATR TECHNICAL INSTRUCTIONS INDEX 2007
01 of 2007 Towing Standard Practices 02/01/2007 ATR
02 of 2007 Superseded By T.I. 03 of 2007 10/01/2007 ATR
03 of 2007 Life Vest Standardisation 28/03/2007 ATR
04 of 2007
Installation of New Cockpit Loudspeaker
P/N: HP3520AA01 16/08/2007 ATR
05 of 2007 Weather Radar System Troubleshooting 18/09/2007 ATR
06 of 2007 VT-JCJ Salient Features 12/12/2007 VT-JCJ
07 of 2007
Revision of ATR72-212A Airplanes Main Wheel Tire
Pressures
26/12/2007 ATR

A330/340 -TECHNICAL INSTRUCTIONS INDEX 2007
01 of 2007 FMGEC Pegasus Standard Reliability Issue 03/01/2007 A340 & A330
02 of 2007 Trent 700 IFSD Due to Loss of Oil Pressure 04/01/2007 A330/RR Trent
03 of 2007 VT-JWE Differences 16/01/2007 VT-JWE
04 of 2007
Generator Control Unit and Ground and Auxiliary Power
Control Unit Failsafe Type 01/SRAM Failure 17/01/2007 A340 & A330
05 of 2007
MEL 34-22-030-- Attitude and Heading Standby Data /
Integrated Standby Instrument System ( ISIS) 23/01/2007 A340 & A330
06 of 2007 Installation Procedure for the Encoder Cap on ISIS 23/01/2007 A340
07 of 2007 Fuel Leak at the Drain Mast After Engine Shutdown 30/01/2007 A330/RR Trent
08 of 2007
Analysis of ACMS LOAD Report 15 for Confirmation of
Hard/Overnight Landing 05/02/2007 A340 & A330
09 of 2007 Thales/Smiths FMS2 ( REV 2+) Installation 16/02/2007 VT-JWD
10 of 2007 Superseded By T.I. 22 of 2007 & T.I. 23 of 2007 01/03/2007 A340 & A330
11 of 2007
Analysis of ACMS LOAD Report 15 for Confirmation of
Hard/Overnight Landing 01/03/2007 A340 & A330
12 of 2007
Unavailability of Mag Var Database Part Number in the
Printout 14/03/2007 A330
Page 5 of 5
A330/340 -TECHNICAL INSTRUCTIONS INDEX 2007
13 of 2007 Superseded By T.I. 15 of 2007 15/03/2007 A340 & A330
14 of 2007 Trent 700 Temporary Loss of Engine Control 23/02/2007
A330 / RR
TRENT
15 of 2007 Superseded By T.I. 18 of 2007 29/03/2007 A340 & A330
16 of 2007 VT-JWF Differences 10/05/2007 VT-JWF
17 of 2007
Dispatch Guide Lines After Activation of Secondary Gland
Seal Due Leak From MLG Shock Absorber 06/06/2007 A330
18 of 2007 APU GENERATOR BURST 03/08/2007 A330
19 of 2007 Pylon Engine Fuel Feed Pipe Connector Leak 21/08/2007 A330
20 of 2007 Breather Mast Emissions 11/10/2007 A330/RR Trent
21 of 2007
Introduction of In-House Part Numbers for Main Wheel &
Nose Assemblies 17/10/2007 A330
22 of 2007
Superseded By T.I. 23 of 2007
13/11/2007 A330
23 of 2007
Draining of Accumulated Water from Center, Inner, Trim
Tank and Trim Vent Surge, Outer and Wing Vent Surge
Tanks
13/11/2007 A330
24 of 2007 VT-JWH Salient Features 5/12/2007 VT-JWH
25 of 2007 Superseded By T.I. 26 of 2007 10/12/2007 VT-JWJ
26 of 2007 VT-JWJ Salient Features 12/12/2007 VT-JWJ
27 of 2007 CF6-80E1 Hydraulic Pump Adapter Loosening 12/12/2007 A330
28 of 2007 VT-JWK Salient Features 19/12/2007 VT-JWK

DAT E
21.01.08
QUA L ITY CIRCUL A R 0' 1/2008
A TTENTION Aircraft MaintenancePersonnel
A PPL ICA BIL ITY J et Airways Aircraft fleet
EFFECTIVE Immediate
SUBJECT Control of on boardFirstAid Kit and Physician'sKit
REF CAR,Section2. SeriesX, PartIII
CAR requires that all public transport aircraft, when engaged in
commercial flights, shall be equipped with valid First Aid Kit (FAK)
and Physician'sKit (PK).
BA CKGROUND
The number of First Aid Kit and Physician's Kit to be carried on
board depends upon seating capacity. Approved LOPA-Emergency
Equipment Chart onboard shows the number and location of such
kits.
Maintenance personnel are required to adhere to the following
procedure to maintain the validity of First Aid Kit (FAK) and
Physician'sKit (PK) on board:
Prior to eachflight, maintenancepersonnel shall ensure FAK

and PKare sealedandthe certificate is valid.
During transit inspection, if a FAK/ PKis found opened(for

use or for inspection due security reasons etc.), it shall be
A CTION replaced if spare is available. If spare is not available, an
entry in the Deferred Defect L og shall be made for
replacementof the sameat the first availableopportunity or
on arrival of aircraft at flight originating station/Base Station/
Night halt station, which ever is earlier.
Deferred Defect L og & Cabin Defect L og shall be

reviewed for FAK/ PK related entries during inspection at
flight originating station / BaseStation / Night halt station.
FAK / PK shall be replaced/re-certified, as necessary, and
action taken shall be recordedin the log.
Work order shall be raisedto record action taken.

COMPIL ED BY AP. ROVED BY
~~
\
ltl.A/
D MATHIYAZHAGAN ASHOK GOPINATH
Manager - Ouality Ouality Manager
DA TE
26/03/2008
QUA LITY CIRCULA R 06/ 2008 ISSUE
A PPLICA B ILITY All airplane
EFFECTIVE F orthwith
SUB J ECT P ortable Oxygen Bottle and emergency equipment.
A UTHORITY REF LOP A
OB J ECTIVE P ortable Oxygen bottles fonms part of the safety equipment on board the Aircraft. The
quantity and location of the bottles are as specified in the LOP A. These equipments
along with masks are life saving devices during emergent situations to a sick
passenger.
Recently, in one of our flight, one portable oxygen failed to supply Oxygen to a sick
passenger under most required situation.
E ach Oxygen bottle has two outlet nozzles for mask connection. One of the outlets,
where the oxygen mask is connected had a very minor deformity in the form of a burr
and the mask adapter could not be fixed fully. This led to no oxygen flow and the
bottle could not be used.
This damage might have been caused due poor handling during transportation.
Magnified photograph of the damage is attached.
Hence, such critical safety equipments demands utmost attention and vigilance on
the part of the AME S while nsoecnno them.
A CTION In view of the above mentioned finding:
-
.: .
A One time maintenance call out was issued for inspection of all bottles on
the 9W fleet for satisfactory condition. Inspection findings were satisfactory
except one bottle which had the similar defect and is being investigated.
Serviceable units in Stores are also checked.
.: .
Stores inspectors while accepting the bottle into the system are advised to
check for flow with the mask connected.
.: .
The bottles must always be stored, accepted and transported in its container
so as to prevent any handling damage.
.: .
Inspection of all safety equipment on board all aircraft are part of extended
transit inspection schedule.
.: .
This circular is issued to draw the attention of all certifying personnel on the
existence of such a possibility and to ensure the inspections are carried out
in a conscientious manner.
COMPILED B Y A WPROVEDB Y
~
.\~~
N. K RISHNA MOORTHY A SHOK GOPINA TH
MA NA GER - ENGINEERING QUA LITY G.M. - ENGINEERING QUA LITY
/
DATE
06 OCT 2008
ATTENTI ON
EFFECTI VI TY
SUBJ ECT
BACKGROUND
CONTENTS
II I ..uV\-, ... 6
QUALI TY CI RCULAR '10/ 2008
I SSUE
1
Al l Mai nt enance Per sonnel
Al l Mai nt enance act i vi t i es.
Pr i or i t y Code and Compl i ance Due Dat e i n Wor k Or der .
Thi s ci r cul ar super sedes Qual i t y Ci r cul ar 12 Of 2003 and must be
r ead i n conj unct i on wi t h Qual i t y Ci r cul ar DB of 2006.
As par t of ai r cr af t r ecor ds, Mai nt enance cal l out s ar e r ai sed /
generated as Work order by Maintenance Personnel or Support
Ser vi ces ( Qual i t y / Techni cal Ser vi ces / Pl anni ng) f or t he
mai nt enance bei ng per f or med on t he ai r cr af t .
Apar t f r om ot her det ai l s, ever y W. O. cont ai ns a Pr i or i t y Code,
whi ch i ndi cat es t he cr i t i cal i t y of t he j ob and a Due Dat e wi t hi n
whi ch t he j ob needs t o be accompl ~shed.
Schedul ed w. o ar e assi gned i n AMOS and i ssued t o Mai nt enance f or
accompl i shment by Engg. Pl anni ng af t er ensur i ng necessar y
manpower / spar es / t ool s / equi pment ar e avai l abl e.
Once t he w. o i s i ssued t o Mai nt enance, i t i s t he r esponsi bi l i t y
of r espect i ve Mai nt enance Manager t o ensur e accompl i shment of
t he t ask / j ob and cl ose t he W. O.
At t i mes, due t o devel opment of unf or eseen ci r cumst ances, i t
wi l l not be possi bl e t o accompl i sh t he t ask t ot al l y or
par t i al l y. I n such cases, t he w. o may be def er r ed f ol l o. wi ng t he
gui del i nes enumer at ed bel ow.
Pr i or i t i es ar e def i ned based on t he cr i t i cal i t y of t he t ask and
t he i mpact i t can have on t he Ai r cr af t i f not per f or med.
Fol l owi ng pr i or i t i zat i on i s i nt ended f or t he t i mel y execut i on of
t asks and def er ment due t o unf or eseen ci r cumst ances.
For r ecor ds and st at i st i cal pur poses, pr i or i t i es def i ned i n t he
AMOS cont i nue t o be i n vogue.
Priority 1
Wor k or der s per t ai ni ng t o Mandat or y t asks such as AD, SB, CMR,
AWL, Mandat or y Modi f i cat i on, Mai nt enance Schedul es.
Such W. O, wi t h i n t he compl i ance
Mai nt r ol / Mai nt enance manager
pl anni ng f or r eschedul i ng t he t ask
t i me, may be def er r ed by t he
i n consul t at i on wi t h l i ne
bef or e due dat e.
Wor k or der s l ef t wi t h l ess t han 5 days of compl i ance t i me ( D- 5)
must have concur r ence f r om Qual i t y manager f or def er ment .
Priority 2
Wor k or der s per t ai ni ng t o t asks of cr uci al nat ur e
Ai r wor t hi ness of t he Ai r cr af t such as N~O,
r ect i f i cat i on, Manuf act ur er messages, CDRs, et c.
and af f ect t he
Repeat def ect
Page1of2
/
/
DATE
06 OCT 2008
QUALITY CIRCULAR .<e/ 2008
I SSUE
1
Def er ment per i od i f not def i ned by mai nt enance document s, must
be established by manager deferring the work order in
consul t at i on wi t h t he Techni cal ser vi ces manager .
Pr i or i t y 3
Workorders pertaining to tasks such as revoking of MEL, AMM
per mi t t ed def er ment s, Rel i abi l i t y i ssues, ser vi ce l et t er s et c
Suchwork orders maybedeferred by the Maintrol / Maintenance
manager / Shift In Charge in consultation with planning for
r eschedul i ng t he t ask wi t h i n a r easonabl e t i me.
Def er ment per i od i f not def i ned bymai nt enance document s must be
est abl i shed by manager def er r i ng t he wor k or der i n consul t at i on
wi t h t he or i gi nat or of t he cal l out / Techni cal ser vi ces.
Pr i or i t y 4.
CONTENTS
Wor k or der s havi ng t asks not af f ect i ng t he
saf et y such as cabi n i t ems, gal l ey i t ems et c
t he shi f t i n char ge i n consul t at i on wi t h
def i ne a r easonabl e t i me f or compl et i on.
ai r wor t hi ness or
may be def er r ed by
l i ne pl anni ng and
Manager def er r i ng t he wor k or der must exer ci se t he di scr et i on
ver y j udi ci ousl y and must r evi ew t he i mpact of t he def er ment
on t he Ai r cr af t oper at i on, company pol i cy, r egul at i ons
bef or e such deci si on.
No w.o shoul d be def er r ed by t he AME execut i ng t he j ob on
hi s own.
Any mai nt enance t ask def er r ed must be wel l coor di nat ed and
f ol l owed up by t he concer ned mai nt enance manager wi t h Li ne
pl anni ng, Qual i t y, Techni cal ser vi ces f or r ei ssui ng and
t i mel y compl et i on.
Any def er ment must be j ust i f i ed by t he SI C / Concer ned
manager def er r i ng t he wor k or der wi t h r easons f or non-
accompl i shment and mai nt ai n r ecor d of such def er ment s f or
quar t er l y r evi ew bet ween pl anni ng and mai nt enance.
Al l concer ned per sonnel f r om Suppor t Ser vi ces and Mai nt enance
r ai si ng / gener at i ng W. O must ensur e t hat gui del i nes f or
Pr i or i t y Code and Due Dat e as gi ven i n t hi s Ci r cul ar ar e
st r i ct l y adher ed t o.
PREPARED BY ovsn BY
~6/'
N.KRISHNAMOORTHY
DY QUALITY MANAGER QUALITY MANAGER
Page2of2

Jet Airways {I) Ltd
Technical Instructions No: 01 J2009

24-03-2009 29 11

AppIicabiIity
:
ALL A330 with HSMU P/N 735-632-6

Supersedes
:
NL

Subject
:
Resetting of HSMU circuit breaker FIN 5JR

Authority Ref
:
TFU REF: 29.31.00.004.

Background
information
:
Recently VT-JWM had an Emergency Landing due to "Green system
hydraulic loss. Troubleshooting was carried out and the "B nut below
hydraulic accumulator was found loose .Same was re-torqued, Hydraulic
system restored and dispatched without resetting HSMU circuit breaker
FN 5JR.The aircraft had an air turn back due landing gear not retracting.

Content
:
HSMU logic automatically closes the "Green hydraulic system Fire Shutoff
Valves (FSOVs) for "HYD G RSVR LO LVL warning .This is done to
ensure sufficient fluid for RAT operation, avoiding cavitations & damage to
"Green EDPs.
f the "Blue & "Yellow reservoir level conditions are normal ("No RSVR LO
LVL) the HSMU will reopen the FSOVs with auto depress of the "Green
"EDPs, which is effective until aircraft is on ground. However the "Green
System Low Pressure remains latched in the HSMU memory.
Consequently the Auto depress Logic of EDPs will again trigger at the next
Take off & it would not be possible to retract the L/G due to system low
pressure.

Action
:
The HSMU Auto depress Logic can only be unlatched after Reservoir
Servicing (Reservoir low level condition is cancelled) AND by resetting the
circuit breaker FN - 5JR.
All maintenance personnel are hereby advised that in any event of "Green
Hydraulic System loss, it is imperative to reset circuit breaker FN - 5JR
without fail post servicing of the Reservoir.

Page 1 of 2
Jet Airways {I) Ltd
Technical !nstruction No. 02 f 2009
Date ATA Sub ATA Jet Airways Jet Lite

25-05-2009 2+f+9 -- V --


Supersedes : TI 11J200S
Subject : APU Generator Burst inspections and Modification
Authority Ref : EASA AD No: 200S-0173 Dated: 15
th
September 200S
AOT { All Operators Telex) A330-24A3044 Revision 03
AIRBUS SB A330-24-3045 Rev 00 Dated 13 June 200S
Background
Information
: Uncontained APU Generator failures on ground have occurred on Airbus
A330 aircraft in service. Preliminary investigations confirmed
uncontained APU Generator failures with subsequent aircraft structural
damages to the APU compartment and, in one case, to the stabiliser
compartment. Loose APU generator parts can lead to damage to the
APU firewall which might reduce its fire extinguishing capability, possibly
leading to a temporary uncontrolled fire, which constitutes an unsafe
condition.

Further detailed investigations are ongoing to determine the root cause.
!t has been evidenced that this unknown root cause initiates a collapse
of the Drive End Bearing (DEB) leading to an uncontained failure.
Evidence has shown also that the DEB failures are not instantaneous,
and therefore, the detection of small debris could indicate early stage of
a DEB failure.

Content : Airbus has received number of reports of wrong APU Generator
installation on the APU. Nore particularly, the seal plate between the
APU and the Generator installed incorrectly in the following ways: (refer
to attached presentation):
- Two seal plates instead of one.
- One seal plate plus rubber transportation seal
- Zero seal plate - this configuration would be identified through heavy
leaks during the subsequent oil leak check which is normally performed
at the end of the Generator installation procedure. However, it is
suspected that permanent damage is already made to the generator and
the generator should be considered as improper for operation.

Airbus AOT (All Operators Telex) A330-2+A30++ Revision 02 and
EASA AD No. 2008-0017 specified inspections that were to be carried
out for determining the extent of deterioration of the Drive End Bearing
(DEB).

The EASA AD No. 2007-0188R1 was superseded by another
EASA AD No: 2008-0017 dated: 22
nd
January 2008. Subsequently EASA
has revised the APU Generator inspection requirement vide
AD No: 200S-0017R1 to cancel the inspection requirement as
per EASA AD 200S-0017 and Airbus AOT A330-24A3044 Rev 2
for A330 aircraft while invoking and revoking MEL item 36-11-
01.

Page 2 of 2

Airbus has released a SB A330-2+-30+5 for installation of a secondary
housing for the APU generator. Goodrich has designed the secondary
housing to contain APU generator parts in the event of an APU
Generator burst.

EASA has released AD 200S-0173 dated 15 Sep 200S which
supersedes the EASA AD 200S-0017R1.

AD 2008-0173 retains the requirement of AD 2008-0017R1 and adds the
requirement to install a secondary housing on the APU generator.
Compliance of the SB A330-2+-30+5 is terminating action of the EASA
AD 2008-0173.

The repetitive inspections of the APU generator scavenge filter element
and filter housing and of the APU Generator drain plug as per task Card
JA330-+9-Dv!-001-0+ fAOT A330-2+A30++ R3 are no longer required
after installation of the secondary APU generator housing on an aircraft.

All A330 airplanes in current fleet of Jet Airways have been
modified for installation of secondary housing on APU
generator as per Airbus SB A330-24-3045 Rev 00 dated 13 June
200S.

The following Caution statement has also been added in the subtask
2+-23-51-210-050 (!nstallation of APU Generator) (Preparation for
installation, Step +, A (9)) of A330 ANN: "Make sure that one, and
only one, Seal Plate is in position and correctly installed.
Damage to the APU Generator can occur if the Seal Plate
installation is not correct".
Action : 1.Sinceall JA! A330 airplanes are modified as per Airbus SB A330-2+-
30+5 dated 13 June 2008, the repetitive inspections of the APU
generator scavenge filter element and filter housing and of the APU
Generator drain plug as per task Card JA330-+9-Dv!-001-0+ fAOT
A330-2+A30++ R3 are not required, when the aircraft is dispatched
under NEL item 2+-22-01 'AC Nain Generation' and 36-11-01 'Bleed
Air Supply System failure' with APU operating during the entire flight.

2. Whenever APU Generator or APU is replaced, ensure that secondary
housing is installed on the APU Generator.
Note: Secondary housing from removed APU Generator or APU may
be installed on new APU Generator as per ANN 2+-23-51.

Page 1 oI 2
Jet Airways {I) Ltd
Technical Instructions No: 04J2009

15-06-2009 57 56

Applicability
:
All Airbus A330-200 Aircraft.

Supersedes
:
Not Applicable

Subject
:
Application of PR-1+36 and High Speed Tape and on access hole covers of
fixed and moveable Flap Track Fairings.

Authority Ref
:
S!L 57-103 and Technical Services

Background
information
:
Flap track fairing covers are installed at fixed and movable flap track
fairing 2 to 5. The covers are used to cover the access holes at fixed and
movable flap track fairings, which provide access to underlying
mechanicalfstructural components that secure the fairing to the wings.
These fairing covers have undergone series of modifications to prevent
them from detaching.

Content
:
A one time exercise on application of PR-1+36 sealant was complied on the
fleet as per Airbus S!L 57-103.
JA! has observed that even after the modifications the loss of flap track
fairing cover continues.
CDL provisions are available to dispatch the aircraft with upto two covers
missing per moveable flap track fairing.
This T! is issued to prevent the loss of flap track fairing cover until a
permanent solution is available from Airbus !ndustry.

Action

:
!f the Flap track fairing cover are removed and for any reason carry out
the following task:
1) Comply with Airbus S!L 57-103 Wing (attached) - Noveable flap
track fairings - !nstallation of access holes cover to avoid loss of
the flap track cover.
2) Apply a strip of High Speed tape across the covers to avoid loss of
the cover.

Page 2 oI 2
Ensure that the strip of High speed tape extends at least one inch on
either side of the cover and Ensure that the High Speed Tape has
edges cut to ensure proper aesthetic looks.

CUSTOMER SERVICES DIRECTORATE AIRBUS
1 ROND POINT MAURICE BELLONTE
31707 BLAGNAC CEDEX FRANCE
TELEPHONE + 33 (0)5 61 93 33 33
TELEX AIRBU 530526F SERVICE INFORMATION LETTER

SIL NUMBER: 57-103
PAGE: 1 of 4

SUBJ ECT:
ATA CHAPTER:
AIRCRAFT TYPE:
APPLICABILITY:
REFERENCES:
The aim of this SIL is to inform operators on instructions regarding installation of caps at flap track
fairings 2 to 5, to avoid loss of caps. The covers are used to cover the access holes at fixed and
movable flap track fairings, which provide access to underlying mechanical/structural components
that secure the fairing to the wing.

1. PURPOSE:
57-56
IPC 57-56-11, fig 1 to 10A
A330/A340 CDL 6.01.57 P 07
All A330 and A340 a/c
A330-200, A330-300, A340-200, A340-300
WI NG MOVABLE FLAP TRACK FAI RI NGS I NSTALLATI ON OF
ACCESS HOLES COVERS

DATE: Mar 31/2008
REVISION:

AIRBUS

SERVICE INFORMATION LETTER

SIL NUMBER: 57-103
PAGE: 2 of 4

2. BACKGROUND:
Flap track fairings covers are installed at fixed and movable flap track fairings 2 to 5, and have been
submitted to development in the last years.
The first modification (Mod 45018) consists in replacing screwed covers with injected moulded
plastic snap-in-type covers (self secured) and retainers to simplify the assembly and to save weight.
Pre and post Mod 45018 covers are not interchangeable.
The second modification (Mod 50464) has been issued to introduce a new type of access covers
with reinforced design (stiffeners added), material improvement, and optimisation of the shape of
the tabs for a better locking within the fairing retainer. Pre and post Mod 50464 covers are fully
interchangeable.

3. DESCRIPTION:

The covers are installed at flap track fairing via a receptacle (retainer), which is bonded to the fairing
body.
Different P/N are installed at each flap track fairing, taking into account the specificity of each
fairing in terms of utilisation and geometry.

Cover FIN
Covers P/N for post
Mod 50464 fairing
Cover FIN
Covers P/N for post
Mod 50464 fairing

Fixed FTF n 2 : 531AR / 631AR F575-74160-200 Movable FTF n 2 : 531FL / 631FL F575-74160-202
531AL / 631AL F575-74160-200 531FR / 631FR F575-74160-202
531BR / 631BR F575-74160-200 531CL / 631CL F575-74162-204
531BL / 631BL F575-74160-200 531CR / 631CR F575-74162-204
531BB / 631BB F575-74162-200 531DR F575-74161-000
631DL F575-74161-000
531EL F575-74161-000
631ER F575-74161-000
531DB / 631DB F575-74163-000

Fixed FTF n 3 : 532AR / 632AR F575-74160-200 Movable FTF n 3 : 532FL / 632FL F575-74160-202
532AL / 632AL F575-74160-200 532FR / 632FR F575-74160-202
532BR / 632BR F575-74160-200 532CL / 632CL F575-74162-204
532BL / 632BR F575-74160-200 532CR / 632CR F575-74162-204
532BB / 632BB F575-74162-202 532DL F575-74161-000
632DR F575-74161-000
532EL F575-74161-000
632ER F575-74161-000
532DB / 632DB F575-74163-000

DATE: Mar 31/2008
REVISION:

AIRBUS


SIL NUMBER: 57-103
PAGE: 3 of 4

Cover FIN
Covers P/N for post
Mod 50464 fairing
Cover FIN
Covers P/N for post
Mod 50464 fairing

Fixed FTF n 4 LH : 533AR F575-74160-200 Movable FTF n 4 LH : 533FL F575-74160-202
533AL F575-74160-200 533FR F575-74160-202
533BR F575-74160-200 533CL F575-74160-204
533BL F575-74218-200 533CR F575-74160-204
533BB F575-74162-202 533DL F575-74161-000
533EL F575-74161-000
533DB F575-74163-000
533FB F575-74444-210

Fixed FTF n 4 RH : 633GR F575-74160-200 Movable FTF n 4 RH : 633FL F575-74160-202
633GL F575-74160-200 633FR F575-74160-202
633AR F575-74160-200 633CL F575-74160-204
633AL F575-74160-200 633CR F575-74160-204
633BL F575-74160-200 633DR F575-74161-000
633BR F575-74218-200 633ER F575-74161-000
633BB F575-74162-202 633DB F575-74163-000
633J R F575-74444-202 633FB F575-74444-208
633HB F575-74444-208
633SL F575-74160-204

Fixed FTF n 5 : 534AR/ 634AR F575-74160-200 Movable FTF n 5 : 534FL / 634FL F575-74160-202
534AL / 634AL F575-74160-200 534FR / 634FR F575-74160-202
534BR / 634BR F575-74160-200 534CL / 634CL F575-74162-204
534BL / 634BL F575-74218-200 534CR / 634CR F575-74162-204
534BB / 634BB F575-74162-202 534DL F575-74161-000
634DR F575-74161-000
534EL F575-74161-000
634ER F575-74161-000
534DB / 634DB F575-74163-000

4. AIRBUS ACTION:

Airbus has launched some quality investigations to check and improve the covers manufacturing and
installation processes. This has led to some improvement of Final Assembly Line control
procedures of the cover P/NF575-74161-000.

Additional investigations are currently performed to define if design, material or manufacturing
process may be improved to avoid loss of post Mod 50464 covers, taking into account the existing
retainer design.

DATE: Mar 31/2008
REVISION:

AIRBUS


SIL NUMBER: 57-103
PAGE: 4 of 4

In addition, Airbus has introduced in A330/A340 CDL the authorisation to release an a/c with
missing covers at flap track fairings 2 to 5, considering that the hole is covered with high-speed tape
(CDL 6.01.57 P 07 Oct 07).

5. MODIFICATION INFORMATION:

In order to avoid further loss of flap track fairing covers, Airbus allows the use of small amount of
PR-1436 (or equivalent material listed in A330/A340 CML) at the tangs only. This increases the
pull-out force and reduces possible tolerance concerns at the same time. If a cover has more than 4
tangs, application of PR every two tangs should be sufficient.
The covers installed with PR can be removed without damaging the covers themselves.
Standard tools can be used to remove the PR from the covers (SRM 51-76-11).

The follow-up of this subject will be handled through TFU 57.56.11.005.

6. MATERIAL:

Not applicable.

7. PROCUREMENT:

Not applicable.

DATE: Mar 31/2008
REVISION:
Page 1 of 2
Jet Airways {I) Ltd
Technical !nstruction No. 06f 2009

27-07-2009 27 90 V --

Applicability A330 Airplanes

Supersedes T! 13f2008
Subject Flight Controls - Flight Control Primary Computer (FCPC) - PR!N 3
Dispatch Restriction
Authority Ref EASA AD 2009-0153 dated 1+ July 2009
O!T SE 999.0058f09fLB dated 13 July 2009
O!T SE 999.0062f08fLB dated 10 July 08
Background
Information
During the introduction of new BCN PfN +18-00877-102 as per SB A330-
27-31+2, internal gyro meter attachment screws and casing attachment
screws were found loosened inside some Back up control modules
(BCN).
This technical instruction is issued to inform possible safety degradation
and the restriction to dispatch the aircraft with PR!N 3 (Flight Control
Primary Computer 3) inoperative, in view of the above findings.
Content
: The BCN is installed on all A330 enhanced aircraft fitted with electrical
rudder. This is the flight control electrical back up. !t provides yaw
control when the normal servoing of the rudder, computed by the flight
control computers is inoperative. The BCN transmits pilot orders from
the rudder pedals to the rudder and ensures Dutch roll damping.

Analysis carried out by SAGEN, (BCN) manufacturer, discovered screw
loosening on BCN PfN +18-00877-100, +18-00877-101 and +18-00877-
102 due to temperature variations combined with vibrations. This may
induce erroneous yaw data orders leading to a degradation of the
piloting laws when the aircraft is in back up control configuration.

EASA AD 2008-0131 was issued to prohibit aeroplane dispatch with
FCPC3 inoperative (from GO !F to NO GO) as an interim solution, limited
to A330 and A3+0-300 fitted with electrical rudder.

Further to EASA AD 2008-0131 issuance, several Pedal Feel Trim Units
(PFTU) PfN: 6259-1 and 6259-2 have been found with loose or broken
screws in the flexible coupling during troubleshooting of rudder electrical
back-up operational test failure on A330 fitted with electrical rudder and
A3+0-600.

Analysis and tests are ongoing to confirm the root cause of the screw
rupture and the possibility that the screw was weakened during heat or
surface treatment.

The PFTU ensures following roles :
- Rudder trim,
- Pedal artificial feel,
- Transmission of the pedal position to Flight Control Primary Computers
2 and 3 (FCPC 2 and 3) and to the BCN, using three dedicated position
transducers.

Page 2 of 2

: The screw failure or unscrewing could lead to the loss of the coupling
between the Rotary variable Differential Transducer (RvDT) shaft and
the PFTU shaft, and consequently to a potential rudder runaway when
the BCN is activated.

EASA AD 2009-0153 has been issued to supersede EASA AD
200S-0131. As per EASA AD 2009-0153 dispatch with the FCPC
"PRIM 3" inoperative [MEL item numbered 27-93-01-C] is
prohibited

Proposed Airbus SB A330-27-3161 (modification 58118) will introduce a
new BCN PfN +18-00877-103 which will correct the BCN screw
loosening issue. A PFTU modification is also under development with
SAGEN to improve the robustness of the PFTU screws.

These modifications will be mandated by EASA. The embodiment of
PFTU modification and Airbus SB A330-27-3161 will cancel the FCPC 3
dispatch restriction.

Action 1. All Naintenance Personnel to note that dispatch of the aircraft with
PR!N 3 inoperative as per NEL 27-93-01 C item is prohibited. Hence
FCPC 3 must be operative to dispatch the airplane.

2. The above dispatch restriction has already been included in NEL 27-
93-01-C. A temporary revision of this NEL is being issued to reflect
the reference of AD 2009-0153.

Page 1 of 1
Jet Airways {I) Ltd

0+-08-2009 26 12 V NA

Applicability : A330 Airplanes

Subject : Troubleshooting of "ENG Fire Loop Defects " on A330 Airplanes
Authority Ref : Airbus message : SEEE3-2009-340332 dated 23
rd
April , 2009
Background
Information
: Jet Airways experienced intermittent defects on "Engine Fire Detection
System" on their A330 Airplanes. The matter was referred to Airbus.
This Technical !nstruction provides Airbus suggestions for
troubleshooting intermittent Engine fire Loop Faults.

Content : Airbus vide message no. SEEE3-2009-3+0332 has provided the following
response.

The Engine fire loop faults are generally intermittent and difficult to
reproducefisolate when doing the trouble shooting as per TSN.

!f the detect is of intermittent nature and not rectified by
troubleshooting as per TSN, for further isolation, Airbus should be
contacted for allowing,
1. To swap Engine Fire Loop A and Engine Fire Loop B wires at
terminal block (3801vT1 or 3801vT2 as applicable) located in the pylon
area for troubleshooting.
2. To operate the aircraft without application of NEL.

A No technical Objection or a Technical Adaptation is required because
swapping of wires will induce a non certified aircraft definition. Only one
detector should be swapped at a time to isolate the faulty element.

Action : 1. Whenever an Engine Fire Loop defect is reported, perform visual
inspections and resistance checks as per TSN to find a faulty fire
detection element or wiring.

2. !f the detect is of intermittent nature and not rectified by
troubleshooting as per TSN, Airbus should be contacted for allowing,
a. To swap Fire Loop A and Fire Loop B wires at terminal block
(3801vT1 or 3801vT2 as applicable) located in the pylon area for
troubleshooting.
b. To operate the aircraft without application of NEL.

Page 1 of 2 Form No. JA/TS/03/09
Jet Airways {I) Ltd
Technical Instructions No: 0S J 2009
Date

ATA Sub ATA
Jet Airways
JetLite

14-0S-2009 71 00 V NA

Applicability : A330-200 Fitted with CF6-S0E1A4B Engines.

Supersedes : NONE

Subject : Recommended Vibration Guidelines for CF6-S0E1A4B Engine.

Authority Ref : AIRBUS A330 AMM, GE CF6-S0E1 SR Number:7-1-1S27733003
& CF6 Technical Symposium MARCH 2009.

Background
information
: Higher level N1 vibration can be felt in the cockpit due to

+ FOD
+ Loss of blade lubrication
+ Dirt accumulation around the dovetails
+ Ice accumulation
+ Fan Imbalance
+ Blade repair or replacement due to FOD

Content : As per A330 AMM, the N1 vibration limit is

- Less than 5 units, no maintenance action
required.
- 5.0 to 5.6 units, troubleshoot at operator
convenience.
- Greater than 5.7 units, troubleshoot prior to
next flight.
- Shift of 3 units, troubleshoot prior to next flight.

GE found through fleet experience that the Fan vibration levels
immediately following fan blade lubrication may be high but
usually decrease within 5 to 10 cycles.

Action :
1. After observing the vibration levels for 5-10 cycles post
fan blade lubrication and if the vibration is above 2.5 units,
carryout fan trim balance {EIVMU One Shot Method) as per
AMM.

2. GENERAL IN SERVICE GUIDELINES :

a. If the Fan vibration is between 2.5 and 3.00 units
{Smoothened) - carryout mid span lubrication as per
AMM.

Page 2 of 2 Form No. JA/TS/03/09
b. If the Fan vibration is above 3.0 units {Smooth) but
below 4.0, Carryout Trim balance {EIVMU One Shot
Method) as per AMM.

c. If the vibration is above 4 units, carryout
troubleshooting as per TSM for high N1 vibration
at the next available oppurtunity.

d. If vibration is above 5.7 or a shift of 3 units is
observed from the last data, carryout trouble
shooting before next flight as per TSM.

3. VIBRATION SURVEY GUIDELINES:

a. During vibration survey, if the vibration is above 2.5
units, find out the cause of high vibration, rectify and
carryout fan trim balance as per AMM.

Jet Airways {I) Ltd

02-11-09 35 22 V

Applicability : A330-200 Airplanes
Supersedes :
Subject : Inspection of cabin Oxygen containers installation.

Authority Ref : Airbus AOT A330-35A3026 Dated 26 Oct 2009.
EASA Emergency AD 2009-0237-E Dated 30 Oct 2009.
Background
Information
: !n-service experience has shown cases where several oxygen containers
could not fully open due to an insufficient clearance between the oxygen
container and the adjacent panels.
!ncorrect opening of the oxygen containers could lead to non-release of
oxygen masks. Therefore, in case of cabin depressurization event,
passengers would not be able to reach the oxygen masks while seated.
Content : Airbus released AOT A330-35A3026, Dated 26 Oct 2009 to carry out one
time inspection of the oxygen containers and adjacent panels installation to
ensure minimum gap of 2 mm between these components.
EASA has also issued Emergency AD 2009-0237-E on 30 Oct 2009. The
compliance requirements of Emergency AD are as follows:
1. Within 150 flight hours after the effective date of this AD (Effective
date: 02 Nov 2009), Check the clearance between oxygen
containers door lid and adjacent panels of each cabin oxygen
container loaded in the passenger service channel, in accordance
with the instructions of Airbus AOT A330-35A3026.
2. !f the clearance is less than 2.0 mm, then before next flight apply
the associated corrective actions in accordance with the instructions
of Airbus AOT A330-35A3026.
Jet Airways has already performed the above inspection on its fleet of A330
airplanes after receipt of AOT A330-35A3026, except on one aircraft vT-
JWE (NSN 807) undergoing `C' check. The inspection on vT-JWE will be
performed during `C' check.
Airbus has released ANN Temporary revision for tasks 35-21-+1-000-801,
35-21-+1-+00-801 covering 2 mm clearance requirement w.r.t. oxygen
containers installation.
Action : 1. Naintenance Engineers are advised that Whenever a Passenger
service Unit (PSU), spacers, Filler panels or oxygen containers are
subjected to Naintenance operation or removed for access to other
Equipment, the inspection as per Airbus AOT A330-35A3026 to
ensure that minimum 2.0 mm clearance Between the oxygen
container door lid and the adjacent Panel must be performed before
releasing the aircraft for next flight.
2. DAe Systems tool PfN: E60176 or Jet Airways tool PfN: 2NN-F!L-
GAGE-JA or an equivalent may be used to ensure minimum 2 mm
clearance between oxygen containers and adjacent panels
1 1 3 - ~ ; : ~ 9 I I A~ A I Sub ATA I I J et AJ rways I J etLite I ~
I
]
]
]
I Applicability
I Supersedes
~ ~
I Authority Ref
Background
information
Content
Action
Jet Airways (I) Ltd
Technical Instructions No: ql/2009
All ATR airplanes
Nj A
ATR72-EGPWS Altitude call outs.
SL ATR72-34-6012
Flight operation has requested for changing the EGPWS MODE 6 Altitude
callout menu.
The GPWC mode 6 supplies aural callouts when the airplane descends
through set radio altitude.
There are few options of altitude callout menus available for airline to
choose.
I n current configuration of ATR fleet in J et Airways ALTI TUDE CALLOUT
is set to sound at 500 I t only.
Flight operations department has decided to revise the option to enable
EGPWS MODE 6 altitude callout to be set at
"500,200,100,50,40,30,20,10" I t
The option is changed by procedure specified in AMM J I C 34-48-82 LDG
10000-001 using laptop with winviews software & RS232 cable connecting
to EGPWS computer.
All ATR airplanes will be progressively reconfigured to new setting of
altitude callout.
AME's are advised to note the new setting of altitude call out .During long
level 1 self test, the aural altitude call out will sound as MI NI MUMS
MI NI MUMS ,200,100,50,40,30,20,10,500.
Signature Name
I
Date
Prepared By
Mehul Hazare 1 3 - 03 - 09
Checked By
~
Ujagar Lall 1 3 - 03 - 09
Approved By
F
\.
S.A. Keskar 1 3 - 03 - 09
\
'; ; 1
Page 1 of 1
Page 1 oI 6
Jet Airways {I) Ltd

19-06-2009 52 40

Applicability
:
All ATR72-500 Aircrafts.

Supersedes
:
Not Applicable

Subject
:
ATR communication door closing procedure

Authority Ref
:
ATR Email

Background
information
:
Several instances of damage were observed on the ATR communication
door Latch (PfN: H333+-5). This failure has been attributed to the sudden
load on to the latch transferring from the latch pin due to improper
opening and closing of the door.

Content
:
The modes of latch failure are different in nature i.e. latch lever breakage,
missing spring. The main cause among the failure are latch lever
breakage, due to the incorrect alignment of the latch lever pin with the
holes in the fuselage frame (Refer Fig.1 and 2). This happens when
insufficient force is applied on the door to hold it in closed position, while
the latch handle is being moved to the closed (down) position as a result
the load is transferred to the latch which eventually breaks.
This T! is issued to inform all personnel that whenever the communication
door is closed, uniform force must be applied. This means that door
closing with one hand should be avoided.

Action

:
Carry out the following procedure to close the communication door:
1) With one hand close and hold the door to align latch handle (lever)
pin with fuselage frame hole - (Fig 3)
2) Continue to apply force on the door and begin to operate the Latch
handle (lever) with the other hand - (Fig +)
3) Continue step 2 until the latch handle reaches end of travel (latch
Locked) - (Fig 5 8 6)
Page 2 oI 6
+) Close the communication door trim panel - (Fig 7)

Note: All concerned should follow this procedure for closing the
communication door. This will prevent latch breakages and avoid delays.

Page 3 oI 6

Page 4 oI 6

FIG 2

FIG 3

Page 5 oI 6

FIG 4

FIG 5

Page 6 oI 6
FIG 6

FIG 7

Page 1 of 1

Jet Airways {I) Ltd

07-09-09 31 31 V

Applicability :
ATR Airplanes fitted with MPC {VT-JCJ & Onwards).
Supersedes :
--
Subject :
APM fault on ground.
Authority Ref :
ATR OPERATOR !NFORNAT!ON NESSAGE no. O!N2009f00+ !ssue 1.

Background
Information
:

Some operators including Jet Airways have reported APN fault on ground. The manufacturer of
NPC, SAGEN performed investigation and concluded that APN fault on ground is due to a
software anomaly in APN fault inhibit functioning.

Content
:
Upon ATR request SAGEN conducted investigation for abnormal APN faults coming only on
ground and concluded that APN fault on ground is due to a software anomaly in the APN fault
inhibition function.
ATR specification requests to inhibit APN fault on ground to avoid spurious fault
message on ground when APN function is not operative.
ATR and SAGEN are working to develop, test and certify a new software version
to correct this anomaly.
Availability of the new software and the associated SB is expected to be released
in first quarter of 2010.

As an interim solution, ATR has recommended to perform the following troubleshooting for APN
fault on ground.
1. After Taxi and both engine stopped (or left engine stopped and the right
in hotel mode), reset NPC circuit breakers 159TU (DFDRfFDAU NPC
AP!U GND SPLY) and +TU (DFDRfFDAU NPC AP!U FLT SPLY).
2. !f APN fault is still present after reset then troubleshooting needs to be
performed.
3. !f APN fault disappears no other action is necessary.
ATR has also recommended to forward the data recorded in PCNC!A card of NPC for analysis.
ATR also advised the flight crew to apply current AFN procedure for the APN fault occurring in
flight.

Action
:

Whenever APN fault light is illuminated on ground. Reset circuit breakers 159TU (DFDRfFDAU
NPC AP!U GND SPLY) and +TU (DFDRfFDAU NPC AP!U FLT SPLY) with either engines stopped
or LH engine stopped and RH engine in hotel mode.
1. !f the APN fault light extinguishes, then no further action is necessary.
2. !f the APN fault light does not extinguish then troubleshooting needs to be performed.
3. A. Remove the PCNC!A card from NPC.
B. Upload the data onto RATE server.
C. Either install a new formatted PCNC!A card or reinstall the removed PCNC!A card
after formatting it.

Page 1 of 1

Jet Airways {I) Ltd
Technical !nstruction No. 0+ f 2009

07-09-09 31 31 V

Applicability : All ATR Airplanes

Supersedes : --
Subject : FDAU PJNs ED34A340 and ED34A350 leading to intermittent erratic
clock data.
Authority Ref : SAGEN S!L ED3+A-31-1002.

Background
Information
:
Jet Airways had been experiencing intermittent erratic clock data recording in
DFDR on ATR airplanes. The matter had been taken up with ATR. !t has been
established that FDAU intermittently generates erratic clock data.

Content
:
To address the intermittent erratic clock data Sagem had released SB ED3+A-31-
009. Upon ATR request, Jet Airways modified the FDAU units PfN ED3+A3+0 Amdt
`A' and ED3+A350 Amdt `A' to ED3+A350 Amdt `B' as per SAGEN SB ED3+A-31-009.
Jet Airways experienced that modification has not yielded desired result.
!ntermittent erratic clock data recording in DFDR has been observed on
airplanes fitted with modified FDAU.
ATR and SAGEN have acknowledged the problem and working together to
resolve the issue.
As an interim solution, ATR has recommended to check and adjust the
clock through FDEP or NCDU at each power on.

Action
:
All maintenance engineers are advised to note the above information and
be guided accordingly.
!t is advisable to check clock date and time setting and correct it during
departure check.
Page 1 oI 2
Jet Airways {I) Ltd

30-01-2009 31 51

Applicability
:
ALL B737 NG Airplanes

Supersedes
:

Subject
:
TAKE OFF WARNING TEST SWITCH INSTALLATION.

Authority Ref
:
Aeroconseil SB no. 03S7-01-A-31 01-R03

Background
information
:
Jet Airways has been experiencing rejected take off due to take off
warning horn sound on B737NG airplanes. !n most of the cases, the speed
brake handle had slightly moved up from down detent, it was not possible
for crew to confirm that the aircraft was in TfO configuration prior to take
off with out Engine running at high power. A take off warning test switch is
installed to enable crew to confirm that aircraft is in Tfoff configuration
with Engine running at idle power.

Content
:
A modification for installation of Take off warning test will be progressively
performed as per modification documents 0387-01 provided by EASA
approved organization Aeroconseil.
The modification consists of:
1. !nstallation of test switch on P3-3 (First Officer panel) below the
clock
2. !nstallation of CB (C9101) on P+2 panel near rudder pedal crank
handle.
3. !nstallation of wiring between J+6 and P3 panel.
The test switch, when pressed provides input equivalent to thrust lever
moved forward beyond take off warning position setting.

The test switch allows the crew to perform take off warning test and
confirm that flight controls, speed brake handle 8 parking brake are in
take off configuration while the engines are running at idle power.

With the test switch pressed, warning horn will not sound if all flight
controls, speed brake handle 8 parking brake are in take off configuration.
Brake pedals can be kept pressed during the test if there is a need to
perform the test with aircraft not moving with engines running at idle
power.
Page 2 oI 2

!f the warning horn sound is heard, crew can verify speed brake handle
position, flapfslat position, stab trim, parking brake and perform corrective
action before take Off.

The circuit breaker is installed to deactivate the system and stop the horn
sound due to wiring fault.

vT-JGW aircraft has been modified and progressively other B737NG
airplanes will be modified.

Action
:
1. Nodification documents can be viewed in e manuals on Technical
Publication Website.

2. The above is for information and guidance for all maintenance
personnel.

Technical Instructions No:3/2009
I Applicability: VT-JBH
I Supersedes: NIL
[ Subject: VT-JBH Salient Features
I Authority Ref: Aircraft Maintenance Manual
_ _ 1 _ 0 _ - 0 _ D : _ : _ ~ O _ O _ 9_ _ 1 1
AT A
00
I SUb_~ TA I I J et A~ ayS 1 = = J e= tL = it= e = 1 1 B O E I N G I
I
I
I
I
Background information: J et Airways has inducted a new B737-800 aircraft VT-J BH (Variable nO.Yl374, Line
no.2811, MSN: 35289). This Technical I nstruction is issued to highlight the Salient Features of aircraft VT-J BH.
Content: Following are the Salient features of aircraft VT-J BH (Yl374)
Maximum Take O ff Weight - 79,015 KG
Engine Thrust Rating - 26K
Engine Model - CFM56-7B
Seating Capacity - Total 144 (24 Club Premier +120 Economy)
~ Club Premier - SI CMA; Economy - Weber 5600 with I FE
Winglets installed.
I FE System - Panasonic eFX
Life Vests in economy class if installed would be stowed in Passenger Service Units (PSUs).
Fixed 3 frequency ELT system with Nav I ntefface Unit.
Dual FMC.
Dual Rockwell Collins Multiscan weather radar system.
Boarding music is provided by the I FE system. There is no Tape Reproducer/Digital PRAM at the forward
attendant panel.
CDS Block Point 06 software.
Functional Nitrogen Generation System.
Rockwell Collins ACARS.
Mechanical timer: A 60 minute mechanical count down time is installed on the overhead panel in the flight
deck. The timer has no systems or power interface to the airplane. The timer generates a 2 seconds aural
audible "ding", 30 seconds before the timer counts down to zero mark on the dial.
A. 21-30 Pressurization Control
Two cabin altitude warning switches (S128 and S1153) provide an increased safety factor with their
redundancy
These switches installed in the area forward of the nose landing gear wheel well and just below the cabin
floor are functionally identical but either switch may close anywhere between 9,000 and 11,000 feet of
cabin altitude.
B. 22-11 DiGital FliGht Control System
DFCSthat supports all weather operations to Category I I I B weather minimums.
Digital flight control system/ Flight Control Computer Altitude Alert limits are 200 and 900 feet.
When in a single-channel approach mode, the system cannot be changed to control wheel steering.
Provides flight director roll commands during takeoff mode to maintain selected heading.
Page 1 of 4
C. 23-12 VHF Communication SYstem
Three VHF Transceivers.
D. 23-27 Aircraft Communications Addressina and Reoortina System CACARS)
Rockwell Collins ACARS system functionally similar to A330 wide body aircraft.
E. 23-71 Vaice Recorder
L3 Communications Voice Recorder control panel and two-hour solid state recorder with GMT capability.
F. 30-41 Contral Cabin Window Anti-I cina SYstem
#3 Windows of the flight compartment are electrically heated.
G. 31-31 Fliaht Data Recorder System
TELEDYNE CONTROLS Digital Flight Data Acquisition Unit (DFDAU) -
The FDAU also sends digital outputs to the printer. The printer sends digital signals to the FDAU to show
status.
The control display unit (CDU) controls the ACMS functions in the FDAU.
The Wireless Graund Link - quick access recorder (WGL-QAR ):
WGL-QAR is capable of automatically transmitting the recorded data over a commercial wireless data link.
While the aircraft is on the ground, the recorded data is compressed, encrypted and transmitted securely
over the wireless cellular data link.
I t also has a removable PCMCI A card for manual removal of the recorded data.
To remove the PCMCI A card: Push the - or +keys to show the CARTRI DGE EJ ECT menu. Push the SEL
key. The display shows: TO CONTI NUE PRESS +. Push the +key. The QAR display shows: WAI TI NG FOR
CLEANUP for several seconds and then shows: EJ ECTCARTRI DGE NOW. Open the door and then push the
mechanical eject button to eject the PCMCI A card. Check to see that the display shows: I NSERT NEW
CARTRI DGE NOW and that the FAI L indicator is on.
Caution: Removing a PC card from an un-powered or faulty QAR may result in data loss.
H. 31-33 Printer System
The FDRS uses the printer to print reports and FDRS status.
I . 31-62 Com man DisDlay SYstem
Either a medium or low level "ACARS" message is displayed on the Engine Display based on an input from
the ACARS MU. The medium level message is accompanied by a HI /LO chime output while the low level
message is indented one space to the right on the display.
Displays ground speed in the Mach number window at the base of the airspeed tape when the Mach
number is not displayed.
J . 34-24 StandbY Attitude Reference System
An I ntegrated Standby Flight Display (I SFD) is located in the center instrument panel and is CAT I I I B
compatible.
An I SFD Dedicated Battery/Charger (DBC) is installed in E4-1.
K. 34-43 Weather Radar System
Dual Rockwell Collins MultiScan WXR system
L. 34-61 FMCS: U10.S
Enable the engine-out standard instrument departures (SI D) feature in the FMC. For an engine failure
during a departure, this option provides a method to modify the FMC flight plan to include a runway-
specific engine-out SI D from the navigation data base (NDB).I f the flaps are not up and there is an engine-
out SI D in the NDB that is compatible with the departure runway in the active flight plan, then selection of
engine-out climb on the FMC will modify the existing route to include the appropriate engine-out SI D, which
the pilot can then EXECUTEor ERASE.
Page20 f4
AOC Datalink enabled: This option lets the FMC uplink and downlink data through ACARS.
Activate the flight management computer (FMC) operational feature to provide color control display
unit/multipurpose control display unit (CDU/MCDU) operation. Color is used on the CDU/MCDU to highlight
the data that the FMC is commanding to, data that the flight crew is changing and other key information.
The colors used match the data displayed on the common display system (CDS) navigation display (ND).
Black is the background color for the display and white is used as the default color for displayed data.
Magenta highlights the FMC commanded data, shaded white is used to differentiate pending modifications
to FMC data and green denotes the active state of toggles.
Display the missed approach in Cyan on the Navigation Display so that it can be differentiated from the
active flight plan. The missed approach color changes to magenta when the missed approach becomes
active.
Enable the I ntegrated Approach Navigation (I AN) feature, which provides a Common Approach Procedure
for flying I LS and Flight Management Computer (FMC) based approach procedures. This function allows
FMC RNAV approaches and other FMC non-precision approaches to be flown in an "I LS-look-alike" manner
using common flight crew procedures.
FLI GHT MANAGEMENT COMPUTER SYSTEM (FMCS) - COMMON VNAV - ENABLE: This option allows the
FMCS to use VNAV SPD as the active mode in the event of an airplane overspeed instead of disengaging
VNAV.
Plan fuel entry enabled: This option lets the flight crew input the final fuel load before refueling has been
completed. Thus, the FMC flight plan can be activated while the airplane is being refueled. At engine start,
in air, or entry of a new gross weight, any entered plan fuel will be invalid.
Geometric Path Descents enabled: This option lets the flight crew select a calculated gradient path between
altitude restrictions during descent.
M. 35- 1 0 Oronasal Mask
Full face oxygen mask with built-in smoke goggles for Captain, First Officer and Second Observer.
N. 47- 0 0 Nitroaen Generatina Svstem
The Nitrogen Generation System (NGS) reduces the oxygen content of the air mixture in the center fuel
tank to a level which will not support combustion.
The nitrogen enriched air distribution system (NEADS) has components in the left ram air duct
compartment, in the center tank, in the right surge tank, and in the left wheel well. The controller is
installed in the aft forward cargo area. The Bm display unit is in the right ECS compartment. The
operability indicator is in the right wheel well, adjacent to the APU shutoff switch.
The fallowina table Drovide5 the Dart numbers of the new comoonents and their interchanaeabilitv
with existina Dart numbers:
Nomenclature
Part Number on VT- Part Number on VT-
I nterchangeability
J BH J BG
CMU
822-1239-151
NfA NfA
DFDAU
2233000-BI 6-1 967-0212-002 Not interchangeable
Voice Recorder control panel
5152-0020-00 980-6116-001 Two way
Solidstate CockpitVoiceRecorder
2100-1020-00 980-6022-001 Two way
Wireless QuickAccessRecorder(WQAR)
2243800-73
NfA NfA
Antenna
DI 41AM-G5MfDC5
NfA NfA
Multi-port printer
8055515-4507
NfA NfA
Weather Radar control panel
622-5130-802 622-5129-802 Not I nterchangeable
Page 3of 4
Weather Radar waveguide Switch
410-0596-040 N/A N/A
I 5FD C16221MA01 C16221KA02 Two Way
822-1567-101 should not
AlP - FDModeControl Panel 822-1567-102 822-1567-102 be fitted on CAT 1118
aircraft.
FCC 822-1604-151 822-1604-101 Not Interchangeable
Rudder Rollout Guidance Actuator 822-1588-101 N/A N/A
Airplane Personality Module 822-1424-001 N/A N/A
Oven(G2"G4 Galley) 4323100-00-66-22 8202-03-0000 N/A
Oven(Smaller sizein G2galley) 8202-13-0000 8202-13-0000
-
Mechanical Timer D102037
N/A N/A
OxygenMask-Full Face 174595-02
N/A N/A
NG5Controller 1153154-4
NG5partially
-
Drovisioned . inactive
NG5 Altitude Sensor 1153158-2
NG5partially
-
Drovisioned .inactive
NG5Temperature Sensor(T3020) 1153174-2
NG5partially
-
provisioned" inactive
NG58I TE Display 1153206-1
NGSpartially
-
NG5PressureSensor(M2565) 1153222-2
NG5partially
-
provisioned" inactive
NG5Diff. PressureFilter Switch (M2561) 2040061-102
NGSpartially
-
I
NG5HeatExchanger 2341924-2
NGSpartially
-
NG5Filter 2040025-104
NG5partially
-
Drovisioneda. inactive
NG5Panel(P63) 5210AOO2
NG5partially
-
Drovisloned .inactive
SpecificPart numbers of A/P- F/D equipment requiredto befitted for the aircraft to be inCat1118Autoland configuration.
AI p- FDModecontrol Panel 822-1567-102
FCC 822-1604-151
Rudder Rollout Guidance Actuator 822-1588-101
Multi Mode Receiver 822-1821-001
Although the aircraft VT-J BH is Type certified for Cat I I I B operation, DGCA has currently granted
approval for Cat I liA operations. I n due course, the approval will be granted for Cat I I I B operations.
Avionics AMEs are advised to be extra cautious while replacing above mentioned AlP - F/D
components. The aircraft should be maintained in Cat I I I B configuration.
Name Date
Prepared By Arvind Singh 1 0 - 0 3- 20 0 9
Checked By Ujagar Lall 1 0 - 0 3- 20 0 9
Approved By Shirish A Keskar 1 0 - 0 3- 20 0 9
Page 4of 4
Dat e
10-03-2009
I Applicabilit y
I Supersedes
I Subject
Aut horit y Ref
Background
informat ion
Cont ent
Technical Instructions No:4 /2009
A~ A I SU~ ~ TA I I J et A~ ayS I J e~ ite [ I BO E I NG I
All Boeing NGairplanes.
J et Airways TI 87/99 &18/2002
APUECUSoftware PI N: 491A-TUS-A04-00 and Maintenance Message 49-41244.
1. Boeing 737-700/800/900 Fault I solation Manual.
2. Honeywell SB 1152466-49-13
3. Honeywell SB 2118966-49-4209
4. Boeing 737-SL-49-078
This Technical I nstruction has been raised to provide guidance for
troubleshooting of APUstart problems with associated Fault Message
49-41244: STARTCONVERTERSHOWSFAI LED GENERATORDI ODE and to
Drovide information about the new APUECUSoftware PI N: 491A-TUS-A04-00.
Honeywell has introduced the new ECU software with the following major
benefits:
Low oil auantity (LOO) indication: The software has been revised to correct
the nuisance LOQ indication.
Loss of bleed air due to icina conditions: The ice-removing logic incorporated
in this upgrade will greatly reduce the occurrence of bleed air loss due to ice
formation.
Prevention of Start ODnverter unit (SCU) damaae inadvertentlv due to faiied
shorted rotatina diode in aenerator: Starting the APUwill be inhibited
following the detection of a shorted rotating diode condition in the starter-
generator. "STARTOK" has to be entered into the CDUCurrent Status page
scratch pad to enable re-start of the APU.
Data memorv module (DMM) data loss of APUhours. cvcies and trendina
Parameters: The DMM data transfer iogic has been revised to prevent loss of
data.
For airDlanes eauiDDed wit h SCUPI N: 1152426-245:
A failure of the Starter Generator rotating Diode can cause a secondary failure to
the SCU. The "APU MAl NT" light on the P5 overhead Panel will illuminate for the
maintenance message 49-41244: START CONVERTER SHOWS FAI LED
GENERATORDI ODE.
A shorted rotating diode will most likely occur when the Starter Generator is
being used to provide electrical power to the aircraft (Generator Mode). When
this type of failure occurs, the generator mayor may not stay online depending
upon the load applied to the generator. The concern is that if APUstart is
attempted after this message / Fault has been flagged, secondary damage can
be caused to SCU. FI M 49-40, Task 806 ciearly specifies this and recommends
the replacement of the APUStarter Generator Unit before APUstart.
There is also a seoond concern with this happening. When a start is attempted
with a Starter Generator that has ashorted rotating diade (SRD) Fault, the SCU
becomes damaged and flags a Start Converter Failure. Becausethe SRD Fault is
not latched while a start is performed, Maintenance personnel may attempt to fix
the failed start problem by replacing the SCU. Hawever, if the APUStarter
Generator has not been replaced due to SRDfault and an APUStart is
attempted, it will cause damage to the second SCU.
For AirDlanes eauiDDed wit h SCUPI N: 1152466-250:
One or more APUstart tries with a failed starter-generator rotatina diode will not
Page I of2
Action
damage the start converter unit. However, the starter-generator can have
decreased performance. The resuit of this decreased performance is slower APU
start times or hung starts and lower generating capacity.
For AirDlanes eauiDDed with SCU PI N: 1152466-250. Series 2:
SCUPI N: 1152466-250, Series 2, may generate false annunciations of SRD
maintenance message 49-41244 erroneously. The blue APUMAI NT light is also
illuminated on the flight deck. I n this case, the Starter Generator is not faulty.
The false annunciation of BI TE Message49-41244 has no effect on APUstarting
or operation.
For AirDlanes eauiDaed with SCU PI N: 1152466-250. Series 3:
Honeywell SB 1152466-49-13 converts SCUPI N: 1152466-250 Series 2 to Series
3, which eliminates the false annunciations of maintenance message 49-41244.
For AirDlanes eauiDDed with SCU PI N: 1152466-250. Series 4:
Honeywell SB 1152466-49-15 converts SCUPI N: 1152466-250 Series 2 and
Series 3 to Series 4, which introduces hardware improvements to address failure
induced by voltage transients due to inductive load.
Whenever the blue "APU MAI NT" light is illuminated and fault message 49-41244
is observed, carry out the following:
1. Check SCUPart Number.
2. Check the APUECUSoftware Part Number.
3. a) I f SCUPjN: 1152426-245 is installed, do the following:
i. Replace the Starter Generator before starting the APU.
ii. I f defect persists then follow the Boeing FI M 49-40 Task 806 for further
troubleshooting.
b) I f SCUPI N: 1152466-250 is installed, do the following:
i. Make 3 APU start and normal shutdown cycles as per AMM 49-11-00.
Appiy electrical load to the APUgenerator during each operation.
ii. I f every time the APUMAI NT light stays on when the APUmaster switch
is set to the ON position and the APUis operating, replace the Starter
generator.
iii. I f the APU MAI NT light does not illuminate, or illuminates and goes out
during any of the APU run cycles, the fault is intermittent and may be false.
Replace the SCU.
NOTE 1: I f APU ECU Software Dart number is 491A-TUS-A04-00. 'STARTOK'
needs tD be entered in the scratch Dad. on the CURRENTSTATUS Daoe. before
starting the APU.
NOTE 2: The general Dractice being followed. to reDlace both the Start
Convert er Unit and t he St art er G enerat or t Qaet her on occurrence of APU
Maintenance light with fault message 49-41244. should be discontinued. The
above troubleshooting guidelines along with the Boeing FI M 49-40 Task 806
should be strictlv followed to avoid unnecessarv reDlacement of a serviceable
KU...
NOTE 3: To avoid handling damages to the Starter Generator. the Removal and
I nstallation Drocedures and cautions given in Boeing AMM 49-41-21 should be
atrlctlv adhered to. I
,
~ - . , . o_ _ . - " <>. . . . . . , : !
Prepared By
Checked By
Approved By
Si nature Name
Rumila Banerjee
Ujagar Lall
Shirish Keskar
Date
10- 03- 2009
10- 03- 2009
10- 03- 2009
Page2of2
Date
02-04-2009
Jet Airways (I) Ltd
Technical Instructions No: OS/2009
ATA
31
Sub ATA
31
J et Lite
./
J et Airwa 5
./
Applicabilitv i : ~ I B737 NG Airplanes I
I
,
Supersedes ! : I I NIA
I
I I
Subiect I : DFDAU SOFTWARE - STANDARDIZATION
Authority Ref BOEING MESSAGE NO. 1-959997421-2
Background
I :
J et Airways B737 NG air lanes are delivered with DFDAU loaded with
information
Content
I
2. 737-3C data frame:
DFDAU Mandatory software pI n: 998-2512-504
DFDAU Broadcast software pI n: 998-2513-504
Newer B737 NG airplanes delivered with certain navigation system
options such as GL5 approach are required to record the operating mode
of these optional navigation modes. These airplanes are delivered with
737- 3C data frame software.
Mandatory software decides the parameters transmitted from FDAU to
DFDR and the data frame. I
Broadcast software decides the parameters used for ACMS functions.
Differences between 737-3B and 737-3C data frames: I
1. 737-3C data frame provides recording of additional parameters.
2. Some parameters are recorded at a lower rate in 737- 3C data
frame in order to make room for the additional parameters I
associated with optional navigation modes.
3. The 737-3C data frame will record parameters from the
navigation options which will not be provided by 737- 3B data
frame.
All B737NG airplanes in J et Airways and J etlite fieet are being
progressively standardized with DFDAU Mandatory software pin 998-
2512-504 and Broadcast software pin 998-2513-504. The
standardization will allow interchange ability of DFDAUs across the fieet,
will ease in DFDR parameter read out using common read out software
for all aircraft and would also allow retrofit installation of Teledyne
wireless QAR.
Page I of2
Action
l.
On B737 NG airplanes, DFDAU Mandatory software pin 998-
2512-504 and Broadcast software pin 998-2513-504 should be
loaded.
2. While installing DFDAU removed from B737NG aircraft on B737
I
Classic airplanes, ensure that DFDAU Mandatory and Broadcast
softwares applicable to classic aircraft are installed.
Prepared By
Checked By
Name
Ms. Avantika Karkare
Date
02-04-2009 I
02-04-2009 Mr. Ujagar lall
Approved By
Mr. Shirish Keskar 02-04-2009
Page 2of2
Page 1 of 2
Jet Airways {I) Ltd
Technical !nstruction No. 09f2009

26-06-2009 27 32 V V

Supersedes : TI 31J2006
Subject : Stall ManagementJYaw Damper Module Assembly Modification
Authority Ref : Boeing Service Letter 737-SL-27-193 Rev A dated 27 July 2007
Background
Information
: SNYD PfN: 285A1010-9 has been delivered on aircraft vT-JBB onwards,
with product improvements over the previous versions of SNYD.
All airplanes in Jet Airways B737NG fleet are now equipped with SNYD
PfN: 285A1010-7 or -107 or -9 or -109. All airplanes in Jet Lite B737NG
fleet are equipped with SNYD PfN: 285A1010-6 or -7.
This Technical instruction is issued to provide product improvements in
SNYD PfN: 285A1010-7, -107, -9 8 -109 over the earlier versions of
SNYD and to provide the SNYD interchangeability and applicability
information.
Content : Product improvements in the 285A1010-7 8 -107 SNYD are as described
below:

1. The reliability of the Angle of Attack signal, which is the primary
signal that drives the Autoslat and Stall Warning functions, is
improved by using a median selection scheme in order to address
those in-service nuisance events attributable to AOA.

2. The new part number eliminates the nuisance stick shaker, or
indications of near stick shaker conditions, when flying in turbulence
in certain cruise situations and during flap transitions.

3. For 737s configured with blended winglets and provisions for the
speedbrake autostow system, the autostow logic is improved to
prevent nuisance Speedbrake Do Not Arm" light occurrences.

+. !n certain situations with the earlier SNYD part numbers and P5-3
overhead module tolerance characteristics, a cockpit stickshaker test
could cause yaw damper disconnects when on the ground, leading to
unwarranted maintenance troubleshooting or parts swapping. The
285A1010-7 SNYD eliminated the output driver check for the yaw
damper engage driver during the cockpit stickshaker preflight test,
but maintained it for the box power-up test.

5. The reliability of the PL! (pitch limit indication) signal is improved by
using offside AD!RU pitch angle data along with the present onside
AD!RU pitch angle data. Previously, a failed onside pitch angle signal
would blank the PL!.

6. The only difference between -7 8 -107 SNYD versions are that
285A1010-107 version SNYD has the needed hardware to drive the
wing load alleviation (speedbrake autostow) system required on
those models and has the same software as the 285A1010-7 SNYD.

The new part number 285A1010-9, -109 was developed for the 737-
900ER. The new 285A1010-9 and -109 SNYDs retain all Product
improvements introduced on the -6 and -7 SNYDs.
Page 2 of 2
Product improvements in the 285A1010-9 and -109 SNYD are described

below.

1. The lift curve has been modified for the 737-800SFP to address in
service complaints of the landing reference speed appearing within
the amber band. Additionally, Logic has been modified for all 737NG
models to cap the amber band at vref for both TA! on and off if the
calculations place it above vref. Prior to the -9f-109 SNYD, this cap
was only provided for TA! on.

2. he -9f-109 SNYD will revert to the -7f-107 amber band
configurations if it detects a -7f-107 SNYD as the offside part
number. This is done to avoid display splits in the flight deck.

3. Handling of invalid FNC data has been modified in the new SNYD in
order to avoid nuisance FNC DATA !NvAL!D" faults being logged
into the SNYD B!TE.

+. A autoslat high speed reduction bias has been added to the autoslat
calculation for all 737 NG models. This is done so that if autoslat is
needed during a high g maneuver, the leading edge slats can reach
full actuation in sufficient time.
Action : 1. SNYD PfN: 285A1010-7, -107, -9 8 -109 cannot be intermixed with
earlier versions SNYD PfN: 285A1010-2, -3, -+, -6 8 -106.

2. On Aircraft without winglet:
!n both SMYD #1 & #2 Position: PfN: 285A1010-7 or -107 or -9 or
-109 can be installed and intermixed.

3. On aircraft with winglet and without Speed Brake {SPBK)
Autostow feature:
!n both SMYD #1 & #2 Position: PfN: 285A1010-7 or -107 or -9 or
-109 can be installed and intermixed.

+. On aircraft with winglet and with SPBK Autostow feature:
The aircraft with SPBK Autostow feature will have a Circuit Breaker
C1611- SPDBRK AUTOSTOW located on P6-2 panel at location A10.
(Currently vT-JGX, vT-JGY, vT-JGL 8 vT-JGZ airplanes have this
feature)
SMYD #1 Position: PfN: 285A1010-7 or -107 or -9 or -109 can be
installed.
SMYD #2 Position: PfN: 285A1010-7 or -9 can not be
installed.
Only PJN: 2S5A1010-107 or -109 can be installed.

Page 1 oI 2
Jet Airways {I) Ltd

16.09.2009 00 --

Applicability :

Supersedes : Supersedes Technical Instruction N0. 13J2009

Subject :vT-JBL Salient Features

Authority Ref :Aircraft Naintenance Nanual, Airplane Readiness Log

Background information : Jet Airways has inducted a new B737-800 aircraft vT-JBL (variable
no.YL731, Line No. 3000, NSN: 35651). This Technical !nstruction is issued to highlight the Salient
Features of aircraft vT-JBL.

Content :Following are the Salient features of aircraft vT-JBL (YL731)

1. Naximum Take Off Weight - 70533 kilograms
2. Engine NodelfThrust Rating - CFN56-7Bf2+K
3. Seating Capacity - Total 186 (All Economy).
+. Type Certified for CAT !!!B operation.
5. Pax Seats are H!C(Head !njury Criteria) compliant. (Children below 12 years are not permitted to
occupy the first ROW seats). The front row seats are fitted with a new Y-Belt. The Seat Belt
Extension on this aircraft is of a new Part No. 1027-1-011-8158.
6. Dual Flight Nanagement System.
7. Functional Nitrogen Generation System for Fuel Tank.
8. Dual Rockwell Collins Nultiscan Weather Radar System.
9. Three vHF systems. vHF # 3 used for voice and data communication.
10. Rockwell Collins ACARS with printer.
11. Common Display System(CDS) - Display Unit (DU) Upgrade - DU Phase !!!.
12. CDS Block Point 06 Software.
13. Fixed 3 Frequency ELT system with Navigation !nterface UnitfProgramming and Position !nterface
Unit ( PP!U), 2+ bit protocol address.
1+. Three cabin crew attendant handsets. One at forward 8 two at aft attendant stations.
15. Full face oxygen mask for Captain, First Officer, First Observer 8 Second Observer.
Page 2 oI 2
16. Nechanical Timer: A 60 minute mechanical count down time is installed on the overhead panel in the
flight deck. The timer has no system or power interface to the airplane. The timer generates a 2
seconds aural audible ding", 30 seconds before the timer counts down to zero mark on the dial.
17. Winglets installed.
18. JANCO Galleys.

The differences between vT-JBJ and vT-JBL :

VT-JBJ VT-JBL

Engine Thrust Rating - 2+K
Seating Capacity - 1++(2+ Club
Premier + 120 Economy)

Seating Capacity - Total 186

Seat Belt Extension PfN:2010-2-011-900+ Seat Belt Extension PfN:1027-1-011-8158

Jet Airways {I) Ltd

Technical Instructions No: 15 J2009
34 33

Applicability: B737 NG airplanes.

Supersedes: Not Applicable

Subject: Naintenance tip on LOW RANGE RAD!O ALT!NETER (LRRA) of Antenna Coax Cable Connector
!nstallation.

Authority Ref: Boeing 737 NT-737-3+-038 dated 09-09-2009

Background information: Jet Airways have been experiencing defects on LRRA system resulting in
several pilot reports on B 737 NG airplanes.
!n most cases, the defects on discrepant LRRA operation were cleared after the swappingfreplacing the
LRRA transceivers and for LRRA antennas. Although there is no definite correlation is established yet,
Boeing is still investigating.
The Antenna Fail" message during LRRA B!TE interrogation has lead to removal of many LRRA antennas.

Content: Over tightening the antenna coax cable connector may force the center conductor pin in the
antenna stem into and through circuit board inside the antenna causing intermittent and permanent loss
of DC continuity. Because the antenna is relatively large and easy to hold when compared to the coupling
nut, too much torque can be generated if the antenna is rotated onto the coupling nut. On extreme cases
of over tightening, the center conductor pin is pushed so far that a bump may be seen on the antenna
face, near the center of the orientation arrow. However, the loss of DC continuity caused by a damaged
center conductor pin is possible without an apparent bump appearing on the antenna face.

Action: While performing LRRA B!TE, if Antenna Fail" message is observed, carry out the following-
1. Connect the antenna coax cable connector hand tight only. Do not over tighten the connection in an
attempt to ensure a water tight seal. Do not turn the antenna into the coax cable connector.
2. When installing a new antenna, maintain the proper antenna orientation per the arrow stenciled on
the face of the antenna. The antenna is held stationary and raised to the coupling nut on the coax
cable connector.
3. Screw the coupling nut on the coax cable connector onto the threaded antenna connector on the
antenna stem. Hand tighten only. Do not hold the coupling nut stationary and rotate the antenna into
the nut.
+. Follow all other antenna installation procedures per ANN 3+-33-11f+01.
Note: The above mentioned procedures will be incorporated in the next revision of ANN 3+-33-11f+01.
All ANE's are required to adhere to the above steps diligently while replacing antenna.
Page 1 of 4
Jet Airways {I) Ltd
Technical !nstruction No. 16f 2009

5
th
Oct 2009 73 21 V V

AppIicabiIity : Boeing 737 Airplanes

Supersedes : T 08/2009
Subject : CFM56-7B Engine EEC software version 7.B.U1
Authority Ref : 1) Boeing Service Letter 737-SL-73-013-S.
2) CFM56-7B SB 73-0157.
Background
Information
: CFM56-7B SB 73-0157 has introduced EEC software version 7.B.U1:
FADEC 2 version 7.B.U1F2, software P/N 1853M78P31 and FADEC 3
version 7.B.U1F3, software P/N 2044M25P12, for the EEC installed on
CFM56-7B Engines.
Content
: Jet Airways will be progressively loading software version 7.B.U1: FADEC
2 version 7.B.U1F2, software P/N 1853M78P31 and FADEC 3 version
7. B.U1F3, software P/N 2044M25P12, on all the EEC's installed on
CFM56-7B Engines on Boeing 737 Airplanes.

The software version 7.B.U1 is being introduced with foIIowing
saIient features:
. ntroduce lightning stall detection and accommodation logic
. ntroduce bodie stall margin improvement logic
. mprove variable stator vane (VSV) open beta margin logic
. ntroduce water wash menu mode function
. Add compressor health calculations
. ntroduce a new ECU/EEC fuel nozzle fault
. ntroduce variable bleed valves (VBVs) sand ingestion logic
. N1 Trim altitude increase and optimization
. DMS resistance history
. Modify 7B26/B2 rating for high altitude

Page 2 of 4
Content
(a) Incorporate Iightning induced staII detection and
accommodation
n this software version, logic has been added to detect the rotating stall,
which sometimes occurs after lightning strike, and make necessary
accommodations.

Once a sub-idle rotating stall is detected, the fuel is cycled off for one
second to clear the stall. gnitors are turned on. This software version
sets the ENG FAL alert if any of the following occur:
. Engine N2 speed decrease 5 percent below idle and a stall is not
detected in 10 seconds
. Stalled indication lasts for longer than 15 seconds after fuel has been
cycled
. N2 rate is less than 0 rpm/sec after fuel has been cycled
. N2 goes below 50 percent

(b) Incorporate engine bodie staII margin improvements
An additional 3 degrees of VSV closure are applied to the current bodie
VSV schedule, and applied in flight only, at altitudes above 15,300 feet
(4.663 m). Additional closure has been shown to improve bodie stall
margin. Engine acceleration rates are reduced when bodie logic is in
effect, and applied in flight only, at altitudes greater than 15,300 feet
(4.663 m).

Bodie stalls occur when the throttle is rapidly pulled back after a high
power setting, then quickly pushed to accel.

(c) Incorporate VSV open beta margin improvements
Several high time CFM56-7B engine models have experienced stalls
during throttle pull-back from take-off to climb power. The cause of the
stalls is reduction of open beta stall margin due to dirt or deterioration
in the compressor. Open beta margin logic closes the VSV up to 5
degrees to improve stall margin during throttle pull-back from take-off to
climb power.

(d) Introduce water wash menu mode function
A water wash function is made available on the control display unit
(CDU) to increase water wash efficiency. This function closes VBVs,
LPTC, and HPTC valves and opens VSVs during a water wash. This
functionality is accessed through the ground tests screen on the CDU.

(e) Add compressor heaIth caIcuIations
The compressor health logic outputs compressor flow, compressor
efficiency, and Delta EGT on ARNC to the aircraft computers, for
evaluation. nformation gained from this evaluation will be used for a
maintenance water wash indication in a future software version.

(f) Introduce a new EEC fueI nozzIe fauIt
Several airline customers have experienced fuel nozzle O-ring failures
near the 12:00 o'clock position of the engine. The O-ring failures led
to uneven hot-streaking of the fuel nozzles causing the nozzles to
deteriorate. These airline customers are using individual T49.5 probe
comparisons to aid in identifying nozzle issues.

Page 3 of 4
Content
To detect possible fuel nozzle O-ring failures, the T49.5 sensors will
detect hot spots that will indicate a possible failed fuel nozzle O-ring that
lets fuel leak past.

MSG number : 73-x137n " upper EGT sectors reading high will be
generated when either EGT sector 1 or sector 4 reads more than 100
degrees above the average of sectors 2 and 3.

(g) Incorporate VBV sand ingestion Iogic
n order to decrease the amount of high pressure compressor (HPC)
erosion from sand ingestion during reverse thrust operation, this version
of software changes the reverse VBV position bias from 6 to 15 degrees.
This will open the VBVs an additional 9 degrees during thrust reverse
operation.

(h) N1 Trim aItitude increase and optimization
The current N1 trim, designed to trim excess thrust, is faired to zero
above 15,000 feet (4.572 mm).To support the introduction of the
7B26/B2 high altitude rating, the N1 trim effects are increased to
19,000 feet (5.791 mm) This increase will be applied to all engine
ratings. To reduce FADEC2 programmable read only memory (PROM),
the N1 trim logic has been optimized in this software version.

(I) DMS resistance history
n software version 7.B.U1, a new menu mode page will be added
to display the minimum and maximum value for the DMS sensor for
previous flights.

(j) Modify 7B26/B2 rating for high aItitude
This change provides about 10 percent average thrust increase during
climb-out from airports above 14,000 feet (4.267 m) on an SA+61F hot
day with no impact to EGT and N2 limits.

Action
1) EEC software version 7.B.U1 is not intermixabIe with an earIier
software version.

EEC software part numbers 1853M78P31 (FADEC 2) and
2044M25P12 (FADEC 3) and Iater incIude staII margin
software improvements. Intermix of this software with an
earIier version of software wiII cause transient asymmetric
thrust differences due to different acceIeration / deceIeration
rates at aItitude.

2) When one engine has EEC with software version 7.B.U1, the
opposite engine must aIso have EEC software version 7.B.U1.

3) FADEC 2 software part number 1853M78P31 should only be loaded
on FADEC 2 ECU / EEC part numbers 1851M50PXX and 1853M33PXX
(where XX = 02,03,05 etc).

on FADEC 3 ECU / EEC part numbers 2044M16P02 and
2042M67P02/04.

Page 4 of 4
Action
on FADEC 3 ECU / EEC part numbers 2044M16P02 and
2042M67P02/04.

5) FADEC 2 and FADEC 3 EEC hardware are interchangeable and
intermixable with each other.

6) EEC FADEC2 software P/N: 1853M78P31 and FADEC3 software
P/N: 2044M25P12 are intermixable with each other.

7) EEC software P/N 2044M25P09 or later is required for use with
FADEC 3 hardware P/N 2042M67P04 and P/N 2042M16P04.

8) EEC software version 7.B.U1 can be installed on airplanes having
FMC MEDB software BCG-014-A2, BCG-014-V9,BCG-014-F9,
BCG-016-D0 or BCG-01J-05.

9) FMC OPS version 10.8 requires FMC MEDB software version 10.8
(P/N: BCG-016-F9). Do not downgrade MEDB software to lower
versions (i.e., to P/N: BCG-014-A2 or BCG-014-V9) on airplanes with
FMC OPS version 10.8.

Page 1 of 3
Jet Airways (I) Ltd

04-11-2009 00 -- --

Applicability :VT-JBM

Supersedes : NIL

Subject :VT-JBM Salient Features

Authority Ref : Aircraft Maintenance Manual, Airplane Readiness Log, Detail Specification

Background information : Jet Airways has inducted a new B737-800 aircraft VT-JBM (Variable
no.YQ001, Line No. 3055, MSN: 36817). This Technical Instruction is issued to highlight the Salient
Features of aircraft VT-JBM.

Content : Following are the Salient features of aircraft VT-JBM (YQ001)

1. Maximum Take Off Weight - 79,015 kilograms
2. Engine Model/Thrust Rating - CFM56-7B/26K
3. Passenger Seating Capacity - 175 (All Economy).
4. The front row seats are fitted with a new Y-Belt (Children below 2 years are not permitted to occupy
the first ROW seats). The Seat Belt Extension on this aircraft is of a new Part No. 1027-1-011-8158.
5. Type Certified for CAT IIIB operation.
6. Dual Flight Management System.
7. Passenger Oxygen Generator 12 minutes.
8. The cargo compartment comply with Class C regulations for fire protection.
10. ETOPS operation approved by DGCA for 120 minutes diversion time.
11. Takeoff and landing is permissible with tailwind up to 15 knots.
12. Two Portable ELTA Emergency Locator Transmitter.
14. Dual Rockwell Collins Multiscan Weather Radar System.
15. Three VHF systems. VHF # 3 used for voice and data communication.
16. Teledyne Wireless ground link quick access recorder (WGL-QAR).
17. No In flight entertainment (IFE) System.
18. PANASONIC Digital PRAM System for boarding music and announcement.
19. Common Display System(CDS) Display Unit (DU) Upgrade DU Phase III.
Page 2 oI 3
22. Three cabin crew attendant handsets. One at forward 8 two at aft attendant stations.
2+. Nechanical Timer: A 60 minute mechanical count down timer is installed on the overhead panel in the
25. Number 3 Window heated.
26. Pre select fuel quantity indicator - The quantity of the fuel for each tank can be pre-selected on the
fuel indicator for that tank during refueling.
28. JANCO Galleys
29. Short field performance enhancement feature included. !t provides higher certified payload when
operating into airports using runways with 5,000 feet or less available takeoff and landing distance
under certain conditions. This feature includes modification to the leading edge devices and spoilers.
*Flight Spoiler Control System
When the speed brake lever moves more, the flight spoilers on both wings move more. When the
speed brake lever is in the flight detent, flight spoilers 2, 3, 10, and 11 move to 19.5 degrees.
When the speed brake lever is at the UP position, these spoilers move to a maximum of -. degrees.
When the speed brake lever is in the flight detent, flight spoilers +, 5, 8, and 9 move to 2+.5 degrees.
When the speed brake lever is at the UP position, these spoilers move to a maximum of .- degrees.

*Speed brake Control System - Automatic Operation
The auto speedbrake module also sends commands through relays to the solenoid operated valves
(SOvs) on the flight spoiler actuators (also known as power control units). The SOvs allow the flight
spoilers to move to the full up position on landing or during a refused take-off.

*Ground Spoiler !nterlock valve

The ground spoiler interlock valve also has two proximity sensors and a pressure switch. For one of
the proximity sensors, the target is near when the airplane is in the air, and the target is far when the
airplane is on the ground. For the other proximity sensor, the target is near when the airplane is on
the ground, and the target is far when the airplane is in the air.

One of the proximity sensors (S1050) and the pressure switch send their data to the proximity switch
electronics unit (PSEU). This data is for the takeoff warning system and to operate the SPEEDBRAKES
EXTENDED light.

Data from the other proximity sensor (S01131) is used to operate the flight spoiler solenoid operated
valves (SOvs). !t also inputs to the SPEEDBRAKE DO NOT ARN light in case of a relay or signal
failure.

*Ground Spoilers

The ground spoilers move up when the speed brake lever moves more than 31 degrees. Ground
spoilers 1, 6, 7, and 12 move up . degrees.

*LE FLAP AND LE SLAT Control System - LE FLAPS AND LE SLATS
Page 3 oI 3

The LE slats are at the extend position when the flap lever is in the 1, 2, 5, 10, 15, and 25 detents.
The LE slats are at the full extend position when the flap lever is in the 30 and +0 detents.

Differences between vT-JBN 8 vT-JBL
1. Short Field Performance(SFP) Enhancement feature included in vT-JBN. SFP not included in vT-JBL.
2. Engine Rating: vT-JBN 26K; vT-JBL 2+K
3. Fuel quantity indicators (No.1, No.2 8 Centre Tanks): vT-JBN pre-select ; vT-JBL No pre-select.
3. vT-JBL is All EY 186 and vT-JBN is All EY 175
+. Parts differences between vT-JBN 8 vT-JBL:
Part Description Part Number on vT-JBN Part Number on vT-JBL
CDS DEU OPC 2+2A8001-1863 2+2A8001-1776
Battery-Acoustic Beacon
(with CvR 8 DFDR)
266E0305-00 DK 120
TE Nain Flap (!NBD) 113A2100-63 113A2100-61
TE Nain Flap (!NBD) 113A2100-6+ 113A2100-62
Actuator - Ground Spoiler +0810 30+90
Power Control Unit, Flight
Spoiler
P665A0001-01

N/A
Control Unit Assembly - Flap 256A3550-7 256A3550-6
Fuel Quantity !ndicator 10037-0770 10037-0750

Page 1 oI 2
Jet Airways {I) Ltd
Technical Instructions No: 1SJ2009

04-11-2009 00 --

Applicability :

Supersedes : Supersedes Technical Instruction N0. 14J2009

Subject :vT-JBL Salient Features

Authority Ref :Aircraft Naintenance Nanual, Airplane Readiness Log

Background information : Jet Airways has inducted a new B737-800 aircraft vT-JBL (variable
no.YL731, Line No. 3000, NSN: 35651). This Technical !nstruction is issued to highlight the Salient
Features of aircraft vT-JBL.

Content :Following are the Salient features of aircraft vT-JBL (YL731)

1. Naximum Take Off Weight - 70533 kilograms
2. Engine NodelfThrust Rating - CFN56-7Bf2+K
3. Passenger Seating Capacity - 186 (All Economy).
5. Pax Seats are H!C(Head !njury Criteria) compliant. (Children below 2 years are not permitted to
occupy the first ROW seats). The front row seats are fitted with a new Y-Belt. The Seat Belt
Extension on this aircraft is of a new Part No. 1027-1-011-8158.
7. Passenger Oxygen Generator - 12 minutes.
1+. Dual Rockwell Collins Nultiscan Weather Radar System.
15. Three vHF systems. vHF # 3 used for voice and data communication.
Page 2 oI 2
17. No !n - flight entertainment (!FE) System.
18. PANASON!C Digital PRAN System - for boarding music and announcement.
2+. Nechanical Timer: A 60 minute mechanical count down time is installed on the overhead panel in the
27. JANCO Galleys.

The differences between vT-JBJ and vT-JBL :

VT-JBJ VT-JBL

Engine Thrust Rating - 2+K
Seating Capacity - 1++(2+ Club
Premier + 120 Economy)

Seating Capacity - Total 186

Seat Belt Extension PfN:2010-2-011-900+ Seat Belt Extension PfN:1027-1-011-8158
Panasonic (eFX) !FE installed !FE not installed
Digital PRAN System - for boarding music
and announcement.

Page 1 oI 2
Jet Airways {I) Ltd

12.11.2009 00 --

Applicability :

Supersedes : N!L

Subject : vT-JBK Salient Features

Authority Ref : Aircraft Naintenance Nanual, Airplane Readiness Log, Detail Specification

Background information : Jet Airways has inducted a new B737-800 aircraft vT-JBK (variable
no.YF832, Line No.307+, NSN: 36553). This Technical !nstruction is issued to highlight the Salient
Features of aircraft vT-JBK.

Content : Following are the Salient features of aircraft vT-JBK (YF832)

1. Naximum Take Off Weight - 79,015 kilograms
2. Engine NodelfThrust Rating - CFN56-7Bf26K
3. Passenger Seating Capacity - 1++(2+ Club Premier + 120 Economy)
6. Passenger Oxygen Generator - 22 minutes.
13. Dual Rockwell Collins Nultiscan Weather Radar System.
1+. Three vHF systems. vHF # 3 used for voice and data communication.
16. Panasonic eFX !n-Flight Entertainment System.
Page 2 oI 2
22. Nechanical Timer: A 60 minute mechanical count down timer is installed on the overhead panel in the
2+. Winglets installed.
25. JANCO Galleys.
26. Battery-Acoustic Beacon (with CvR 8 DFDR) PfN: 266E0305-00

Differences between vT-JBK 8 vT-JBN
1. Short Field Performance (SFP) Enhancement feature included in vT-JBN. SFP not included in vT-JBK.
2. Fuel quantity indicators (No.1, No.2 8 Centre Tanks): vT-JBN pre-select ; vT-JBK No pre-select.
3. Pax. Seating Capacity vT-JBN is all economy 175 and vT-JBK is 2+ Club Premier + 120 Economy
+. Parts differences between vT-JBN 8 vT-JBK:
Part Description Part Number on vT-JBN Part Number on vT-JBK
CDS DEU OPC 2+2A8001-1863 2+2A8001-1776
Actuator - Ground Spoiler +0810 30+90
Power Control Unit, Flight
Spoiler
P665A0001-01

N/A
Control Unit Assembly - Flap 256A3550-7 256A3550-6
Fuel Quantity !ndicator 10037-0770 10037-0750
Pax. Oxygen Generator E71740-00
(12 minutes.)
E72220-10
(22 minutes.)
Power Panel - P91 1151932-1604 1151932-170+
Power Panel - P92 1151934-1304 115193+-210+
Seat Belt Extension 1027-1-011-8158 2010-2-011-900+

let Airways (I ) Ltd
Technical Instruction No. 1.. / 2009
D a t e
20-03-09
I I _ A ~_ A _ I S U ~~T A I I J e t A 7 a y s I J e t L i t e I 187 7 7 1
ADDlicabilitv All B777 AirDlanes
sueersedes
- -
Sub1ect Hvdraulic Interface Module (HYDIMl Card PIN: 285WOO17- 104
Authoritv Ref 777- FTD- 29- 09002 Dated 1O- Feb- 2009
Background Failures of HYDIM Card PIN: 285W0017- 104 shows intermittent status messages
Information "HYDIM CARDHCR or HCL or HR or HL". Some times these messages may be
cleared by swapping the faulty HYDIM card with other HYDIM card. This action
temporarily corrects the fault by clearing the status message, but does not
address the root cause.
Content BAE Systems (manufacturer of HYDIM cards) discovered that Cyclic Redundancy
Check (CRC) errors linked to the EEPROMs manufactured by Catalyst were
associated with early component failure of the HYDIMcard.
BAE Systems has changed production process to only allow installation of
EEPROMdevices from Xicor/Intersii (current manufacturer) in all new production
HYDIMcards from SIN: D03276 and on.
HYDIM card fitted with Catalyst (previous manufacturer) EEPROMare from SIN:
D01923 to D03275.
CRC faults associated with Catalyst EEPROMfailures can cause the following
status messages:
HYDIMCard HR (Fault code 291 056 42 &Maintenance message 29- 11070)
HYDIMCard HCR(Fault code 291 057 01 &Maintenance message 29- 11080)
HYDIMCard HL (Fault code 291 05641 &Maintenance message 29- 11060)
HYDIMCard HCL(Fault code 291 057 02 &Maintenance message 29- 11090)
Action If any of the above status message along with associated maintenance
message appears, then EEPROMin HYDIM card may be causing CRCerrors.
The HYDIMcard should be replaced.
Prepared By
Name
Niky Ghosh
Date
20- 03- 2009
Checked By
Approved By
Arvind Singh 20- 03- 2009
S. A. Keskar 20- 03- 2009
Page 1 of 1

B777-300 MINIMUM EQUIPMENT LIST
AUTOFLIGHT
ATA 22

MEL Page 22.8
NUMBER INSTALLED
REPAIR INTERVAL NUMBER REQD . FOR DISPATCH
ITEM REMARKS OR EXCEPTIONS

11-7

A/L

Automatic Landing
System
(Autoland)

C

1

0

May be inoperative provided
CAT II /CATIII operation is not
permitted

1) Triple Channel
Autoland
(LAND 3 )
C 1 0 May be inoperative provided
CAT III Landing is not performed

11-8

A/L
Control Wheel
Autopilot Disconnect
Switches
C

B
2

2
1

0
One may be inoperative provided :

a) Autopilot is not used below
1,500 feet AGL, and

b) CATIII B operation is not
permitted

May be inoperative provided :

a) Autopilot is not used
b) Approach minimums do not
require use of the autopilot,
c) Number of flight segments and
flight duration is acceptable to
flight crew, and
d) Enroute operations do not
require use of autopilot.
11-9
A/L
Takeoff/
Go- Around(TO/GA)
Switches
C 2 1 A) Except for CATIII operation one
may be inoperative

A/L

C 2 0 B) May be inoperative provided:

a) Both thrust levers are
operated manually for
takeoff and go-around,

b) Autopilot and flight director
are not used below 500 feet
AGL or MDA, whichever is
higher

NOTE: Flight director go-around and
windshear guidance are not
available with both TO/GA switches
inoperative

REV.04 APPROVED BY DAW MUMBAI VIDE LETTER NO. DATED -

COMMUNICATIONS
ATA 23

MEL Page 23.12
NUMBER INSTALLED

51-6
Microphone
(MIC)/Interphone
Switches (Cont'd)

3) Glareshield MIC/
Interphone Switches

C 2 0 (M)
the affected switch is deactivated
open.

70-1
Flight Deck Door Visual
Surveillance Systems

A 1 0 (O)
A) May be inoperative provided :

a) Alternate procedures are
established and used.
b) Repairs are made within three
flight days

C 1 0 (O)
B) May be inoperative provided :

a) A flight deck door viewing port is
installed and operates normally
b) Alternate procedures are
established and used.

NOTE: Any Visual Surveillance
System function that
operates normally may be
used.

D 1 0
C) May be inoperative provided
procedures do not require its use.

70-2
Direct View Camera
System
C 1 0 (O)
alternate procedures are
established and used

71-1
Cockpit Voice
Recorder(CVR) System
A 1 0
May be inoperative provided:

a) Flight Data Recorder
(FDR) operates normally,
and

b) Repairs are made
within three flight
days.


EQUIPMENT/FURISHINGS
ATA 25

MEL Page 25.16
NUMBER INSTALLED

64-3

Emergency Medical
Equipment

1)RESERVED

2) RESERVED

3) Automated External
Defibrillators (AED)
and / or Associated
Equipment

A

1

0

(O)

May be incomplete, missing or
inoperative provided :

a) AED is resealed in a manner that
will identify it as a unit that cannot
be mistaken for a fully serviceable
unit, and

b) Repairs or replacements are
made within three flight cycles.

64-4

Security Kits

Moved to MEL item 25-20-01
under NEF

64-5

Flight Deck Tool Kit
and Associated
Equipment

Moved to MEL item 25-20-01
under NEF

REV.04 APPROVED BY DAW MUMBAI VIDE LETTER NO. DATED-

NAVIGATION
ATA 34

MEL Page 34.16
NUMBER INSTALLED

51-1 VOR Navigation
Systems
D 2 1 No.2 VOR may be inoperative

Note : Two systems are desirable on
European & HKG-TYO sector
53-1
ATC Transponder/
Automatic Altitude
Reporting Systems
D 2 1

B 2 0 Except for RVSM operation may be
inoperative provided:

a) Operations do not require its use ,and

b) Prior to flight, approval is obtained
from ATC facilities having jurisdiction
over the planned route of flight.

1) Elementary and
Enhanced Downlink
Aircraft Reportable
Parameters not
required by FAR
A - 0 May be inoperative provided :

a) Operations do not require its use, and
b) Repairs are made prior to completion of
next heavy maintenance visit.

2) ADS-B squitter
transmissions
A - 0 May be inoperative provided :

a) Operations do not require its use, and
b) Repairs are made prior to completion of
next heavy maintenance visit.

1 55-1 Distance Measuring
Equipment (DME)
D 2 1 Except for B-RNAV / P-RNAV/ RNP 1 /
RNP 10/ RNP 0.3 operations,
one may be inoperative provided
approach minima do not require its use

57-1 ADF Systems C 2 1 May be inoperative provided ADF is not the
sole means of navigation and both VHF
Navigation systems operates normally.

58-1 Global Positioning
Systems
C

C

C

2

2

2

2

1

0

A) Enroute Navigation requires its use
(e.g.: RNP-10 / MNPS routes)

B) For P-RNAV / RNP 0.3 operations,
one must be operative.

C) May be inoperative provided :

a) Enroute operations do not require its
use, and
b) SAARU operates normally.

D

2

1

D) One may be inoperative provided
enroute operations do not require its use.


Jet Airways {I) Ltd
Date

ATA Sub ATA
Jet Airways
JetLite

06-0S-2009 30 71 V

Applicability : All B777 Airplanes.

Supersedes : --

Subject : Drain Nast !nterchangeability and Bonding Requirements

Authority Ref : 777-FTD-30-09001 Dated 27-July-2009

Background
information
: During an inspection of the forward cargo compartment on a 767-300F
airplane, an operator found charred insulation blankets and burned wires
around the forward gray water composite drain mast. Additional charring on
the insulation blankets was noticed several feet away along the routing of the
drain mast's ground wire. An analysis of the damaged parts concluded that a
lightning strike on the composite drain mast caused the damage to the wires
and insulation blankets. Boeing 777 !PC allows !nterchangeability of
composite drain mast and aluminum drain mast.

Content : Boeing Service Bulletin 777-30-001+ was created to prevent a fire near a
composite drain mast and possible disruption of the electrical power system
due to a lightning strike on a composite drain mast.

This SB identifies those airplanes that were delivered with composite drain
masts that were not equipped with large bonding jumpers. The service
bulletin did not identify those airplanes that were originally equipped with
aluminium drain masts at the time of delivery, but have interchangeability
with composite drain masts noted in the !PC.

This SB is mandated by FAA AD 2009-09-11 which calls for installation of
bonding jumper between the ground and the clamp on the tube of the FWD 8
AFT gray water composite drain masts as per the SB 777-30-001+.

SB 777-38-0026 Rev 01 advised for replacement of forward drain mast
assemblies PN: +78W1610-6, +78W1610-7 8 +78W1610-8 (Aluminum) and
drain mast PN: 5E2675-7 or 5E2675-11 (Composite) based on investigation
reports of separation of FWD drain Nast from fuselage.

Current fleet of B777 airplanes in Jet Airways are not identified in the
affectivity list of the SB 777-30-001+ 8 777-38-0026 Rev 01.

Boeing does not recommend for an operator to replace an aluminium drain
mast with a composite drain mast.

Part number 5E2675-7 8 -11 (FWD Drain mast) 8 5E2675-13 8 -1+ (AFT
Drain mast) shown in the !PC are of Composite Naterial.
Part number +78W1610-9 (FWD Drain mast) 8 +78W1600-6 (AFT Drain mast)
shown in the !PC are of Aluminium Naterial.

Action :

1) The above is for information and guidance to all Engineering and
Naintenance personnel's.

2) !t is advisable that FWD Drain Nast assembly PN: +78W1610-6 or -7 and
5E2675-7 or -11 is not used for replacement of PN: +78W1610-9.

3) !t is advisable that composite material FWD or AFT drain mast assembly is
not used for replacement of aluminium drain mast assembly because there is
a possibility of fire hazard if it is not bonded properly, also replacement of
aluminium drain mast by composite material will require installation of large
bonding jumper as per SB 777-30-001+.

FormNo.JAfTSf03f09
Page 1 of 1
Jet Airways {I) Ltd

30-10-2009 27 +8 V NA
B777

Applicability : B777 Airplanes
Subject : Stabilizer Position Indicator and Rudder Trim indicator - LCD
Display Reliability Improvement

Authority Ref : Boeing Nessage: JPL-09-0162-05F (dated 23-Aug-2009).
SSN 33-13-18.

Background
Information
: Jet airways experienced few failures of SP! on B777 airplanes. Natter
was taken up with manufacturer Nfs Parker and Boeing. This Technical
!nstruction is issued to highlight the recommendation provided by
Boeing to improve the reliability.

Content : Parker SL 372-079-6080 Rev.1 dated 25
th
July, 2009 and Boeing SL 777-
SL-27-057 dated 13
th
August, 2009 recommended to switch off the
power supply to SP! and RT!, when these are not used. Since the circuit
breakers C27633 and C2763+ are located at P110 (Left Power
Nanagement Panel) and P210 (Right Power Nanagement Panel)
respectively in EE Bay, pulling out circuit breakers is not a good solution.
Hence Boeing has suggested to put the outer knob of the A!SLE STAND
PNLfFLOOD light control on the P8 aft aisle stand brightness panel to
full dim position, when SP!s and RT! are not being used.

Action : Naintenance Engineers are advised to put the outer knob of the A!SLE
STAND PNLfFLOOD light control on the P8 aft aisle stand brightness
panel to full dim position, when SP!s and RT! are not being used during
extended transit or longer grounding of the aircraft.
J ETAIRWAYS"
I DATE
20 March. 2009
QUAUTY CI RCULAR
ENGINEERING &MAINTENANCE DIVISION
2/ 2009 I I~UE I
ATTENTI ON All E & M Staff

EFFECTI VI TY All Jet Airways and JetLite fleet
SUBJECT Carry forward sheet and CMR Requirement after Maintenance
REFERENCE MOE- Maintenance documentation
Instances of incomplete/ inadequate documentation after maintenance such as engine
installation have been noticed in the recent past.
BACKGROUND The procedure of certain post build up test/check being completed after engine
installation and the bulky build up file being carried with the engine till completion of
installation for want of certification such test/ check has attributed to the said oversight.
Whenever a complex maintenance task, requiring high skill and involving multiple
personnel, such as QEC/De-QEC of Engine/APU, Landing Gear build up etc. is
accomplished, certain tasks such as functional check, leak check etc., which can be
completed only after installation on to the aircraft, could be deferred and the same can
be documented in carry Forward sheet (CFS - Sample attached).
When the pending task is documented in the CFS, the build up file shall be closed with
reference to CFS against the task pending.
The Carry Forward Sheet shall have tracking number which should be cross referred in
the release tag and shail form part of maintenance release.
The CFS shall be raised in duplicate and the original will be part of release document
while the second copy shall be part of build up file.
Certification of such test/ check will be through certification of CFS itself and No
requirement of separate work order, provided no installation of LRU involved.
CONTENTS
In the event of subsequent cannibalization/robbery, the same should done through
raising a work order for removed unit at the removal location and updating the CFS of
the item. The Serial No. of pending tasks in the additional CFS shall be in continuation.
The certifying staff while installing the component/item/units shall ensure all the tasks
reflected in the CFS and open work orders are properly completed and certified.
Release to Service in the form of CMR needs to be issued after completion of any
Maintenance activity from Base Maintenance and on completion of any major activity i.e
Engine change, landing gear change/APU change/livery painting etc by appropriately
qualified certifying personnel, not below the rank of Asst. Manager, who is in charge of
the area/section after ensuring all the maintenance requirements have been adequately
complied with.
The above process shall
- Eliminate the bulky build up file being carried with the part till installed on to aircraft.
- All pending/deferred tasks are consolidated in one form called carry Forward Sheet,
minimizing the probability of erroneously non accomplishment of any task.
-
Facilitate the closing of work package/ schedule enabling while certain task /test yet
to be accomplished, label booking and AMOS updation of the task accomplished till
then as the same is now captured through work order and CFS.
PREPARED BY APP OVED BY
~vJ l
\~~
T.A~
ASHOK GOPI NATH
MGR- ENG . UALI TY
QUALI TY MANAGER
JET A1RWAYS"
ENGINEERING &MAINTENANCE DIVISION
CARRY FORWARD SHEET
CFS SrNo:
-----
Station:
-----~
Date:
-------
Nomenclature:
-------
Part Number: _ Serial No: _
The below mentioned tasks have to be completed and certified prior to finally releasing the above said part into service.
Sr Description of Tasks W/ONo. Details of action taken Technician AME
No pending if raised with reference, if any.
.
Certified that the tasks identified above have been accomplished in accordance with CAR 145and in respect to those
work the item is considered ready for release to service.
Signature I Stamp of authorized person
Note:
I. This Carry Forward Sheet along with the CRS shall be included in the Engine Installation work package.
2. This form finally shall be closed by the person who certifies the CRS for Engine installation.
3. Sr.No. &date of this CFS to be cross referred inthe new CFS being raised for continuation and tracking purpose.
For continuation and additional task if carried forward,
Ref. to CFS Sr. No. Dated. _

Signature: _
App. No. : _
Date:
------
Form No. :J AlEO/MAINT/002
J ET A1RWAYS I-
DATE
12
th
Oct. 2009
QUALITY CIRCULAR 10/2009 ISSUE
1
ATTENTION All Certifying staff
EFFECTIVITY J et Airways I J etLite fleet
SUBJ ECT Guidelines on instructions to fill Tech Log page
REFERENCE MOEsect L2.4
In the recent times, atmospheric pollution has gained wider attention.
Subsequently, emission of C02 due various industrial activities has become
under the scanner of emission control norms. The regulators across the world
are in the process of implementing stringent emission norms. European Union
has recently included Aviation activity under C02 emission monitoring norms.
Therefore, every aircraft being operated to and fromthe European airports need
to be in compliance with the said norms, which necessitates strict accounting
and monitoring of the fuel uplifted / consumed for the aircraft.
BACK-
GROUND
To achieve the above, accurate capture of aircraft operational and maintenance
data from the tech log is important, including accurate recording of fuel uplifted
at each occasion along with specific gravity.
This circular is issued to highlight to all concerned about the procedure of
completing the tech log with actual values, so that realistic analysis of aircraft
performance and operational characteristics are achieved.
A sample tech log page is attached as annexure. Various set of data are
identified as blocks and explanation to fill up each block is given here under.
TECHNICAL LOG /VOYAGE REPORT
Block
Instructions to fill Tech Log
No.
General
All entries in the tech log are to be made in English block
letters with ball pen and should be legible inall copies.
All date and time to be recorded in UTC.
Shaded / Crossed blocks are not to be filled.

CONTENTS
All information as called out are required to be filled in the
respective field
All blocks explained here may not be applicable to certain
tech log.
Block 1. Information to be filled by the Cockpit Crew
Information to be filled during layover / Ext. Transit or higher
inspection by AME /Authorized person.
Block 2.
Aircraft Hours/Cycles at the time of inspection and the Next
Layover / Ext. Transit check due to be recorded
Page1of5
JET A1RWAYS"
DATE
12
tn
Oct. 2009
Block 3.
Block 4.
Block 5.
CONTENTS
Block 6.
QUAL I TY CI RCUL AR 10/2009 ISSUE
1
Information to be filled by the Cockpit Crew on Airplane I Engine
performance at stabilized cruise.
Defects reporting by the Cockpit CrewI Observed by the
AME/Authorized person during transit.
There are two itemblock inevery page.
Maximumof one defect is to be recorded in each item block.
If additional space is required to record defect I rectification
details, use next page.
Defect rectificationl MEL release/CDUATP action by the
AME/Authorized person against reported defect in block 4
Information to be filled byAME/Authorized person as follows:
[Arr Fuel (Kgs~tD l - Pis read and record actual fuel quantity
from individual fuel tank gauges without rounding off, prior to
refuelling.
Refuel fuel tanks to demanded fuel figure using individual
aircraft fuel tank gauges. Maximum variation acceptable to
Pilot in Command fromthese gauges, at time of departure is:
+200 kgsl - 0 kgs for A330/B777;
+70 kgsl - 0 kgs for B737;
+60 kgsl - 0 kgs for ATRlCRJ .
IUplifted (Ltrs) I - Pis record the information as provided by
refueller on the Aviation Delivery Receipt or equivalent
document.
[Sp. Gravihl - Pis record the information as provided by
refueller on the Aviation Delivery Receipt or equivalent
document.
Exception: If the information is not received from the refueller,
marikthis block as "NOTAVAILABLE".
Note: All effort should be made to get Sp. Gravity, as non-
availability of this information would cost company approximately
USD 50 per flight.
Page 2of5
J ET A1RWAY S"
DATE
12
tn
Oct. 2009
1
llndividual Tank Dep. Fuel(kgs~- Read and record actual fuel
quantity from individual fuel tank gauges, after refuelling.
[otal Dep. Fuel (Kgs~= r D l [ArrFuel (Kgs~+EllIUplifted(Kgs~
Note: trotal Dep.Fuel(Kgs)I is NOTa sumof !IndividualTankQty.1
as observedonaircraftgauge. It is a figureto be calculated
as pertheabovegivenformula.Thisnoteis notapplicablefor
theexceptionas statedabove.
Name of the Fuel Company and the Receipt No. should be
recorded.
CONTENTS
Exam Iefor fuel block
FUEL DISTRIBunON
FLT9W DATE:
LEFT CENTRE
ARR FUEL(KGS)
TOTAL
44100 (1)=106500
UPLIFTED (KGS) (2)=15600
UPLIFTED (LTRS) 20000
SP GRAVITY
DEP. FUEL KGS
31200
0.78
59700 31200 (1)+(2) =122100
Information to befilled in by AME/Authorized person as follows:
Engine Oil status on arrival and departure to be recorded
Engine Oil uplift. if any, with consumption rate to be
Block 7. recorded.
(Engine Oil consumption to be ensured within the limit for the
operation). .
CSD/IDG I Backup Genl Hydraulic oil uplift to be recorded
Page3of5
JET A1RWAYS #
DATE
l in Oct. 2009
1
Block 8.
AME/Authorized person to inspect fuel quality for contamination
prior to refueling and certify for the same.
Information to be filled in byAME/Authorized Person as follows:
Circle the applicable maintenance check carried out
Circle the applicable status of AUTO LAND/ ETOPS/

Block 9. RVSM with reference to previous sector Tech Log ,
Maintenance carried out, NTC/ MEL.
Certify Release to Service with either " Authorization

stamp" or "signature and authorization number".
CONTENTS
Block 10.
The acceptance from the Pilot in Command has to be obtained
prior to flight
Block 11.
Special Report - To be filled up by Pilot in Command, for
information of Ops Dept ONLY.
Information:
The blue copy of Tech Log page to be retained at arrival/
Block 12. departure station and the rest shall be removed at night halt /
base stations and distributed as required.
(White - EQ. Green - OPS, Pink - Tech Log Book).
PREPARED BY VED BY
ASHOKG~
MGR-ENGG. QUALITY QUALITY MANAGER
Page 4ofS
J ET A1RWAY S #-
DATE
12
tn
Oct. 2009
1
ANNEXURE
SR NO .
.
~
a
II

-
Page5of5

Circulars 2007 To 2009: Airbus Atr B737 B777 Quality Airbus Atr B737 B777 Quality Airbus Atr B737 B777 Quality

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FIG: ILLUSTRATION OF CRACK/SEPERATION AT THE J OINT OF THE FLEXIBLE HOSE

TJ ,:u~ 15t<~ tcr!)ftt~ r

Prior to eachflight, maintenancepersonnel shall ensure FAK

During transit inspection, if a FAK/ PKis found opened(for

Deferred Defect L og & Cabin Defect L og shall be

Work order shall be raisedto record action taken.

Date ATA Sub ATA Jet Airways Jet Lite

Applicability : A330 airplanes

Date ATA Sub ATA Jet Airways Jet Lite

Applicability A330 Airplanes

Date ATA Sub ATA Jet Airways Jet Lite

Applicability : A330 Airplanes

Subject : Inspection of cabin Oxygen containers installation.

Date ATA Sub ATA Jet Airways Jet Lite

Date ATA Sub ATA Jet Airways Jet Lite

Applicability : All ATR Airplanes

Date ATA Sub ATA Jet Airways Jet Lite

Product improvements in the 285A1010-9 and -109 SNYD are described

Jet Airways {I) Ltd

Date ATA Sub ATA Jet Airways Jet Lite

AppIicabiIity : Boeing 737 Airplanes

Date ATA Sub ATA Jet Airways Jet Lite

ATTENTI ON All E & M Staff

Ref. to CFS Sr. No. Dated. _

Shaded / Crossed blocks are not to be filled.

Circle the applicable maintenance check carried out

Circle the applicable status of AUTO LAND/ ETOPS/

Certify Release to Service with either " Authorization

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