Doctoral Dissertation Proposal Essays on Tenure Security in Indian Slums Exploring the Interplay of Tenure Formalization, Tenure Security,

and Housing Investment in Indian Slums Politics of Formalizing Slums: A Case of Slum Notification in Pune, India Measuring Tenure Security and its Link to Housing Investment in Slum in Pune, In dia: A Structural Equation Modeling Approach

February 2013 Introduction In rapidly urbanizing developing countries, it is imperative to improve the living conditions of the urban poor in settlements with substandard housing and infrastructure, or slums.1 Recent discussions among academics and professionals emphasize the importance of enhancing the tenure security of slum dwellers in s timulating their investment in their houses and living facilities, which ultimat ely leads to poverty alleviation (Durand-Lasserve & Royston, 2002; Durand-Lasser ve & Selod, 2009; Payne, 2002; UN-Habitat, 2008). Integrating their informal ten ure status into formal systems which is often referred to as tenure formalization or regularization2 has been becoming a common practice to achieve the objective. Although a growing number of empirical studies attempt to assess the impact s of tenure formalization policies on the improvement of tenure security and phy sical environment in various parts of the developing world, they face a problem regarding the conceptualization of tenure security (Arnot, Luckert, & Boxall, 20 11; Durand-Lasserve & Selod, 2009; UN-Habitat, 2003a, 2011; van Gelder, 2010). I n the literature, tenure security is by and large associated with the degree of protection against the risk of forcible eviction faced by slum dwellers. Househo lds with weak tenure security have few reliable resorts to claim their possessio n of their housing or occupancy on the land against others and face the threat o f the demolition of their houses and involuntary displacement without due compen sation. However, due to the lack of solid theoretical background, researchers ha ve had difficulty of operationalizing the concept for empirical studies, as van Gelder (2010, p.452) states that [t]he indiscriminate use of the different elemen ts of tenure security and the confusion it generates easily leads to detrimental consequences of theory building and policy making. In India, some states have implemented slum notification, which is a type o f tenure formalization policy that provides certain level of property rights to slum dwellers in order to protect them (Banerjee, 2002; Risbud, 2009; Sharma & B arman, 2006). Slum settlements that are notified by local government agencies ar e called notified slums, while other slums are referred to as non-notified slums . The rules about how to select slum settlements to be notified vary from place

to place. Households in notified slums are supposed to be legally protected from eviction without due process for a certain period and entitled to infrastructur e and urban services provided by local municipalities. Available data sources in dicate that living conditions in notified slums are overall better than non-noti fied slums (Edelman & Mitra, 2006; NSSO, 2010a), though it is not clear to what extent and how slum notification has contributed to the difference. In fact, a body of literature questions the idea that tenure formalization enhances tenure security of slum households and thereby stimulates their investm ent in housing. Some argue that it is not land tenure status formal or informal but the perception about the risk of forcible eviction that influences housing inves tment by slum households (Gilbert, 2002; Payne, 2001; Varley, 1987). The urban p oor might actively invest in their housing in order to increase their security w hen they faced the risk of eviction (Razzaz, 1993). Others point out the cases i n which tenure formalization policies have brought negative impacts on the tenur e security of the urban poor (Banerjee, 2007; Davis, 2006; Gilbert, 2002; Payne, Durand-Lasserve, & Rakodi, 2009; Woodruff, 2001). In Indian context, it is repo rted that tenure formalization is arbitrary manipulated by local bureaucrats and politicians as a political tool (Risbud, 2009; Roy, 2009a; Zimmer, 2012). Against the backdrop presented above, the purpose of the proposed research will be to better understand what contributes to tenure security of slum househo lds and thereby support their housing investment. Specifically, my interest is i n to what extent and how slum notification has contributed to the improvement of the tenure security of slum households and their living conditions in India. Dr awing on theoretical and empirical literature on informal settlements in urban p lanning, development economics, and human geography, I will conceptualize and op erationalize tenure security by specifying its links to determinants and outcome s. Based on the theoretical framework, I will address the following research que stions: (1) How has slum notification been implemented in Indian cities?; (2) Wh at has contributed to tenure security of households in slums? In particular, to what extent and how has slum notification improved their tenure security?; and 3 ) To what extent is tenure security related to the frequency, timing, and amount of housing investment by slum households? In particular, to what extent and how has slum notification improved housing and access to infrastructure and service s in India? My project will address the overarching research questions via a series of three independent studies (1) a nation-wide cross-sectional study, (2) a city-wide qualitative study, and (3) a city-wide quantitative study , capitalizing on diffe rent data and methods. While the first phase study will attempt to capture natio n-wide trend, the second and third phase studies will focus on Pune, an Indian c ity, to take into account the local context. Phase I: Nation-wide cross-sectional study The first-phase study will aim to develop a theoretical framework of the in terplay of tenure security, housing investment, and tenure formalization, and ap ply it to the Indian context. I will explore how the determinants and outcomes o f tenure security such as slum notification, duration of residence, possession of document, housing investment, and access to infrastructure and services are interr elated across Indian slums, using large-size sample data that cover the entire n ation. Specifically, the study will statistically test the hypothesis that house holds in notified slums have invested in their houses more than other households in non-notified slums, with their characteristics controlled. Underlying idea i s that slum notification has enhanced tenure security of slum households and the reby encouraged their investment in housing. The data for this study will be Nat ional Sample Survey (NSS) 58th and 65th rounds housing condition survey unit dat a, which contain detailed information about 5,818 and 7,510 households living in slums as of 2002-03 and 2008-09 across India, respectively. The study will use OLS and logit models weighted with propensity scores to deal with selection bias . Phase II: Qualitative study in Pune

The second-phase study will be exploratory, rather than hypothesis testing, aiming to understand the local context of Pune. This qualitative study will be motivated by the following questions: how has the local government determined se ttlements to be notified in Pune? (or, what kinds of settlements have been notif ied? ); how have slum dwellers negotiated with local bureaucrats or politicians to secure their tenure?; and what, including slum notification, has possibly inf luenced the tenure security of slum dwellers? (in other words, what kinds of hou seholds have been forcibly evicted?). In this phase, data collection and analysi s (via interviews, document analysis, and site observations) will proceed simult aneously. During the planned fieldwork from June 2013 to August 2013, I will int erview at least 25 households in at least slum settlements in Pune, as well as l ocal bureaucrats, politicians, academic and professional experts. Based on the i nsight from this stage, I will determine the items to be included in the survey form for the subsequent statistical analysis. Phase III: City-wide quantitative study in Pune Finally, I will conduct a quantitative study to address the second and thir d sets of the research questions. During the planned fieldwork from October 2013 to December 2013, I will collect surveys from 1,000 households in 50 slums acro ss Pune. To measure the degree of tenure security, which embraces legal, de fact o, and perception elements, from its link with determinants and outcomes, I will employ a Multiple Indicators Multiple Causes (MIMIC) model, a type of structura l equation modeling (SEM). I will expand the measurement models introduced in Se ction 2.3 by incorporating multi-level aspects of tenure security. To deal with selection bias, I will use propensity score matching. To calculate the probabili ty of households living in notified slums, I will draw on insights from the seco nd-phase study. My project will bring about theoretical, methodological, and policy contrib utions. Theoretically, my project will present how to conceptualize and operatio nalize tenure security in informal settlements and its interplay with physical o utcomes and tenure formalization. This will provide a solid theoretical backgrou nd of tenure security, lack of which has been long recognized as problematic amo ng researchers in urban planning and development economics. In addition, my proj ect will widen the scope of theory by shed light on slum notification and Pune, which have been understudied in previous studies. Methodologically, the project will demonstrate the effectiveness of mixed-methods and SEM approaches in measur ing tenure security. Many of the previous qualitative works that explored tenure security of slum dwellers are confined to be descriptive, and systematically in vestigated evidence has been relatively rare. For quantitative studies, experime ntal design was touted as a powerful tool for causal inference, yet its practica lity is severely limited in studies about urban slums. It will be important to s how the advantage of mixed-methods approach that taps into both qualitative and quantitative analyses and SEM approach that has never been used in measuring ten ure security of slum households. The project will benefit policy makers in India who are involved in land and housing policies for the urban poor. In particular , given the current situation, in which the central government has been preparin g to offer property rights to slum dwellers (Government of India, 2010, 2011), a nalyzing the effect of slum notification will be critically important. Improved understanding how slum dwellers survive under the current informal settings and how tenure arrangement would impact their environment can help to ensure the mor e efficient and effective implementation of this and other tenure regularization initiatives. The remainder of this proposal is structured as follows. In Chapter 2, I de velop a theoretical framework that will overarch my entire project. Reviewing re levant literature, I conceptualize tenure security (Section 2.1), specify the li nk between tenure security, housing investment, and formalized tenure (Section 2 .2), and operationalize tenure security by proposing measurement models (Section 2.3). In Chapter 3, with the above theoretical framework in mind, I explore the Indian context. I review statistics to investigate the trend of slum formation

in India and compare living conditions in non-notified and notified slums (Secti on 3.1). I conduct a preliminary analysis to test if the theoretical model can b e applied to the Indian context (Section 3.2). I will elaborate on the analysis in my first-phase paper. Then, I review literature on two opposing forces prevai ling in Indian metropolises, which critically influences tenure security of slum dwellers (Section 3.3). Chapter 4 presents overarching research questions (Sect ion 4.1), explains the research design of three-phase project (Section 4.2), and introduces the regional settings of its research site (Section 4.3). In Chapter 5 clarify the contributions that my project will bring about. Finally, I will p rovide detailed descriptions of the three studies in my project in Chapter 6. Theoretical Framework In this chapter, I develop a theoretical framework that will overarch my en tire research project by reviewing relevant literature. In Section 2.1, I concep tualize tenure security by introducing the following three key issues: 1) tenure security embodies three elements legal, de facto, and perceived tenure securities ; 2) tenure security is a concept with a continuum, rather than the dichotomy of secure/insecure; and 3) tenure security embraces individual and collective aspe cts. In Section 2.2, I investigate the interplay of households tenure security, p hysical environment (i.e., housing and infrastructure/services), and formalized tenure in slums. In Section 2.3, I propose how to operationalize, or measure, th e degree of tenure security of households in slums in a Structural Equation Mode ling (SEM) framework. Conceptualization of Tenure Security In planning literature, tenure security is by and large associated with the degree of protection against forcible eviction without due process and compensa tion. For example, the United Nations defines tenure security as follows (UN-Hab itat, 2008, p. 5): the degree of confidence that land users will not be arbitrarily deprived of th e rights they enjoy over land and the economic benefits that flow from it; the certainty that an individual s rights to land will be recognized by others an d protected in cases of specific challenges; or, more specifically; the right of all individuals and groups to effective government protection agai nst forced evictions. The definitions above reflect important underpinning ideas about the nature of t enure security. First, tenure security is a multifaceted concept, embracing lega l, de facto, and perceived aspects. The definitions above conceptualize tenure s ecurity as the degree of confidence, the certainty, or the rights, which corresp ond to perceived, de facto, and legal tenure securities, respectively.3 Second, tenure security is not a dichotomous concept with secure or insecure, but a conc ept with a continuum, ranging from low to high security. Thus, it is a critical task to appropriately measure the varying degree of tenure security of slum hous eholds with different characteristics. Third, tenure security of individuals and their communities can be distinguished, though they may be complicatedly intert wined. I explain these three features of tenure security one by one in the remai nder of this section. Three Aspects of Tenure Security Some literature distinguishes de jure and de facto tenure securities, and i ncludes the aspect of perceived security in the latter (for example, Payne 2001) . However, as I will discuss later on, conceptualizing de facto and perceived te nure securities separately is useful for several reasons. Thus, I follow van Gel der's (2010) classification, which makes clear distinctions among legal, de fact o, and perceived tenure securities. Legal tenure security

Legal tenure security, or de jure tenure security, is established based on legal protection, including various types of property rights authorized by gover nments or any other public authorities. Households with legal tenure security ar e able to claim their possession of properties or occupancy against others in ca se of conflicts or litigations. The degree of legal tenure security depends on t he types of property/land rights conferred to households, such as the rights to occupy, develop, inherit, sublet, transfer, and mortgage. Various studies have i nvestigated the links between the level of tenure security and the types of land tenure with different bundles of property rights (Aristizabal & Gomez, 2004; Ku ndu, 2004; Porio & Crisol, 2004). De facto tenure security De facto tenure security represents the degree of households actual control o f property, regardless of the legal status in which it is held (van Gelder, 2010, p. 451). Households with de facto tenure security face less threat of eviction for whatever reasons other than legal protection. The factors enhancing de facto tenure security listed by key literature include the following: the size of set tlements (the larger the settlement, the more difficult demolition is), the cohe sion of communities (the more cohesive the community is, the more influential th eir collective action is), political support (leading to favorable arrangements of the household/settlement), and the access to infrastructure and services (inc reasing legitimacy of the household/settlement). (Durand-Lasserve, 2006; Gilbert , 2002; Payne, 2001; van Gelder, 2010). Since de facto tenure security depends t o a large degree on the local context, there could be a variety of other factors influencing it. Perceived tenure security Perceived tenure security indicates the risk of eviction estimated or felt by households. Households with perceived tenure security might estimate their r isk of eviction low or feel little fear against it.4 Various factors might influ ence households perceived tenure security, including the history of eviction expe rienced by their own or their neighbors or relatives, their trust in governments , and/or their personalities. In addition, households perception about their tenu re security may be influenced by their legal and de facto tenure security. Tenure Security as a Continuum Because tenure security is a continuum, each of its three elements range fr om low to high security, and the three elements constitute the overall level of tenure security of a household. The level of a household s legal tenure security v aries depending on what kinds of property rights he/she enjoys. It is not approp riate to simply regard that households with legal titles are secure and those wi thout titles insecure. Similarly, households enjoy varying degree of de facto an d perceived tenure securities. Although household s legal, de facto, and perceived tenure securities would b e positively correlated, the three types of tenure security enjoyed by slum dwel lers do not necessarily correspond, as argued by van Gelder (2010). In an ideal situation, three types of tenure security would converge; that is, households wh o are legally protected perceive no risk of eviction and actually have not faced any threat of eviction for a long period. In reality, however, there is often a discrepancy among the levels of the three types of tenure security in slums. Fo r example, if the enforcement of property rights is not reliable, de facto tenur e security must be low for the households with full property rights. Or, househo lds who do not trust in governments might not feel secure, no matter what kinds of legal protection they receive. A substantive imbalance among the degree of legal, de facto, and perceived tenure security might lower the overall level of tenure security. Payne (2001, p . 423) points out the possibility that poor households who are suddenly entitled full property rights might face high risk of eviction due to downward raiding, me aning the movement of affluent households or private capital into the area.

Individual and Collective Security One needs to distinguish individual-level tenure security and community-lev el tenure security. In terms of legal tenure security, a growing body of literat ure discusses the effectiveness of collective land rights in enhancing tenure se curity of the urban poor. For example, the Baan Mankong program in Bangkok provi des land titles to communities in order to strengthen personal, social, and econ omic ties among the community members and protect them from gentrification after upgradation (Archer, 2012; Boonyabancha, 2005, 2009). Measuring the legal tenur e security of households in such communities based on individual legal rights mi ght result in underestimation. Decomposing tenure security into household and community levels is also imp ortant when examining the influence of household-level and community-level facto rs. This is because the effect of household-level factors may significantly vary among communities. Previous quantitative studies have paid attention to tenure security of either households or communities, but not to their interaction. Let us consider the influence of belonging to socially disadvantage groups (e.g., sc heduled caste in India) on tenure security of households. Such an attribute migh t be, on average, associated with lower tenure security. However, comparing a se ttlement where only a few households are scheduled caste and another settlement where a majority of households are the scheduled caste, one may find that househ olds in the latter settlement might enjoy higher security than expected because they can collectively negotiate with local bureaucrats or politicians. Figure 1 graphically illustrates the case above. On the plots, the vertical axis represents the level of tenure security, the horizontal axis represents an y household-level factor that has a continuum, (let us say monthly income), and circles and triangles indicate households. Comparing communities A and B, one ca n observe the positive linear relationship between the level of tenure security and household income. In this case, the effect of the household-level attribute on tenure security in both communities is identical as indicated by the same slo pe of the trend lines. When all the other household-level characteristics are he ld equal, the gap in the level of tenure security between communities A and B (o r the gap in the intercepts) stems from community-level characteristics. By cont rast, the effects of the household-level attribute vary between community C and D, as indicated by the different slopes of the trend lines in the plot on the ri ght-hand side. In addition, the plots illustrate that estimating the effects of household-level factors for tenure security without taking account of communitie s would result in a wrong conclusion (for example, one would see no trend if mix ing up households in communities A and B). The third-phase study in my project w ill use a multilevel model to deal with these issues.

Figure 1. Household-level and community-level variances of tenure security. Interplay of Tenure Formalization, Tenure Security, and Physical Improvement Enhancing tenure security of vulnerable slum households itself is an importa nt policy goal from human rights perspectives. In planning, however, the primary interest in tenure security is often in its role in facilitating physical conso lidation in slums. In this section, I first review literature that theorizes how households determine whether to invest in their housing and other living facili ties. Then, drawing on a variety of literature in urban planning and development economics, I discuss the potential roles of tenure security in influencing thei r investment. Finally, I introduce tenure formalization as a policy to enhance t enure security of slum households and thereby encourage their investment in thei r houses. Figure 2 illustrates the theoretical framework introduced in this cha pter, which will overarch my research project.

Figure 2. Theoretical framework of the interplay of tenure formalization, tenure security, and housing investment. Housing Investment by Slum Households Since John Turner s influential argument (Turner & Fichter, 1972; Turner, 196 7, 1968, 1976), it has become popular to regard positive the efforts of the urba n poor into construction and improvement of their houses in slums. The underlyin g idea of his theory of self-help housing is that the urban poor are capable of accumulating and making adequate use of various assets to improve their living e nvironments (Mathey, 1992; Turner & Fichter, 1972; Ward, 1982). The theory proje cts self-construction by the urban poor as a solution to government s failure in e nsuring the availability of affordable housing in growing cities. The poor have made themselves well aware of their priorities in the course of their life cycle s and remain favorably disposed to invest at their own pace in physical assets w ith controllable resources. Turner s idea was espoused by the World Bank in the 19 70s and 80s, resulting in the implementation of a number of sites-and-services a nd slum upgrading projects in the developing world. Prescribing a policy to support self-help activities by the poor requires a well understanding of how they determine to invest in their housing. Turner s cla ssis model illuminates the changes in the priorities of the urban poor as they m ove up the economic ladder throughout their lifetime (Figure 3). Based on his ob servation of slum dwellers in Peru, Turner conceptualizes how households vital ne eds (identity, opportunity, and security) and housing needs (proximity to unskil led jobs, freehold ownership, and modern standard shelter) change depending on t heir income level. According to the model, the priority of tenure security is lo w for the poorest, who are desperate for making living. For them, living near th e workplace is more critical than secure tenure and housing quality. Low- or low er-middle income households who have escaped from such tough situations begin to aspire for secure tenure, with which they can gradually improve their living co nditions over a period of time. Ensuring tenure security of households in this s tate might boost their investment in their houses. Figure 3. Turner s classic model of slum households changing needs. Source: Turner, 1972, p. 167. Since the theory of self-help housing became an accepted norm, a number of studies have investigated the driving (or constraining) factors of housing inves tment by households in slums. Specifically, one needs to consider what motivates slum households to invest in their houses (i.e., motivation) and (2) what allow s them to do so (i.e., capacity). I hypothesize that the motivation of housing i nvestment might stem from either (a) dissatisfaction or (b) economic motivation. In the theories of residential satisfaction, the degree of a household s satisfac tion with his or her housing and neighborhood is measured by the difference betw een actual and desired (or aspired) situations (Galster & Hesser, 1981; Galster, 1987; Lu, 1999). Theory of housing adjustment posits that such dissatisfaction pushes households into adjustment activities, such as altering their houses or r elocation (Bruin & Cook, 1997; Morris & Jakubczak, 1988; Morris & Winter, 1975). As with Turner who points to the importance of slum households satisfaction in h ousing activities, this line of reasoning emphasizes role of psychological aspec ts in explaining housing activities. By contrast, economists view housing invest ment as economic activities, by presupposing that households invest in their hou ses as long as they expect that the returns from the investment exceed the curre nt costs (Arnot et al., 2011; Besley, 1995; Demsetz, 1967; Sjaastad & Bromley, 2 000). Slum households might capitalize on their houses by renting out to tenants (S. Kumar, 1996; Struyk & Lynn, 1983; UN-Habitat, 2003b), using as work place ( Benjamin, 2004; Strassmann, 1987; Tipple, 2005), or holding as economic assets u ntil bequeathing to their children. As argued by Turner, residential dissatisfac tion and economic motivation of slum households are closely tied and change thro ughout their lives.

Motivated households actually invest in their houses only if they are capa ble of doing so. The key factors that moderate the intensity of housing investme nt by slum households would be (i) available resources, (ii) access to infrastru cture and services, and (iii) tenure security. Because of the limitation of othe r options or their preference of minimizing bankrupt risk, slum households often invest in their houses with their own savings or borrowing from their relatives or friends (Gilbert, 2002). In India, for instance, most of the cost of housing construction in slums was paid for by households own financial resources (70%) o r their own labor (28%) (NSSO, 2010b). Thus, timing of investment by slum househ olds predicates on when they are ready to have adequate income and savings. Asid e from slum households financial capacity, access to infrastructure and services might influence the amount of their housing investment. This is because lack of access to services would reduce the expected return from the investment. Strassm ann (1984) stresses the importance of installing basic infrastructure in sites-a nd-services or slum upgrading projects in early stage to stimulate self-help con struction by the residents. The Link Between Tenure Security and Housing Investment In addition to available resources and access to infrastructure and service s, tenure security might play a critical role in facilitating housing investment in slum settlements. The nexus between tenure security and housing investment h as been one of the primary topics in the literature on informal settlements sinc e the link rationalizes the approach of enhancing tenure security of the urban p oor as a means of upgrading their living conditions in the long run. Theories in planning and economics have attempted to illuminate the mutuall y strengthening relationship between tenure security and housing: higher tenure security leads to better physical environments and vice versa. As I mentioned ea rlier, economic theory generally presupposes that people invest in their propert ies as long as the expected future benefits exceed the costs (Arnot et al., 2011 ; Besley, 1995; Demsetz, 1967; Sjaastad & Bromley, 2000). Higher tenure security would encourage their investment by reducing the uncertainty about whether they will be able to fully retrieve the expected benefits in the future. Economists often associate such tenure security with individual freehold property rights. B y contrast, an increasing number of researchers in other fields suggest that imp roving de facto and perceived tenure securities of the urban poor is more effect ive than providing full legal titles in stimulating their investment (Gilbert, 2 002; Kiddle, 2010; Payne et al., 2009; Reerink & van Gelder, 2010; Sjaastad & Br omley, 2000; van Gelder, 2009). According to their observations and reasoning, s lum households invest in their houses, regardless of their legal status, as long as they feel secure. Considering the risk of gentrification caused by the provi sion of full legal titles to slum households, enhancing perceived tenure securit y might be a better option (Payne, 2001). It should be noted that the degree of tenure security and the amount of hou sing investment is not in a simple linear relationship due to the existence of a reverse causation from the enhancement of physical conditions to tenure securit y (Besley, 1995; de Souza, 2001; Durand-Lasserve & Selod, 2009; Razzaz, 1993). B etter quality of housing, such as those built with cement walls, in slum settlem ents might reduce the risk of their being demolished by governments, which enhan ces de facto and perceived tenure security of the residents. Thus, while higher tenure security is expected to stimulate slum dwellers investments in their house s, extremely low tenure security might also motivate them to build up their hous ing in order to avoid an imminent threat. The Effects of Tenure Formalization I have so far discussed what motivates slum households to invest in their h ouses and what capable them to do so. By influencing households tenure security, financial capacity, access to infrastructure and services, and motivation for in vestment, tenure formalization potentially plays a critical role in facilitating physical consolidation in slums. The primary purpose of tenure formalization is often to enhance tenure secu

rity of slum dwellers. Tenure formalization, by integrating informal tenure into a system recognized by public authorities, is a common practice used to improve the tenure security of slum dwellers (Durand-Lasserve & Selod, 2009). In practi ce, a set of property rights are provided to slum households, ranging from the p rovision of occupancy rights to the freehold land tenure. Even granting a minimu m level of legal tenure, such as occupancy rights for a specified period, might greatly enhance perceived tenure security of slum residents (Payne, 2001). Slum notification in India is one such policy that provides occupancy rights to house holds for a specified period (Banerjee, 2002; Risbud, 2009; Sharma & Barman, 200 6). The critical question is: what kinds of land tenure arrangements could bette r enhance tenure security of the urban poor in slum settlements? On contrary to expectation, tenure legalization has resulted in the reducti on in tenure security in some cases. First, provision of legal title might encou rage further invasion of upper-middle class or private capital (Woodruff, 2001). In the review of empirical studies by Payne et al. (2009), tenure legalization reduced tenure security in cases in Afghanistan, India, Egypt, Cambodia, and Rw anda. In Indonesia, some residents in inner-city settlements improved by the Kam pong Improvement Program have been evicted as a result of their lack of legal te nure and the speculation caused by government policy (Tunas & Peresthu, 2010). D istorting existing social conditions based on the informal arrangements that slu m dwellers have developed over a period of time may jeopardize de facto tenure s ecurity. Second, a tenure formalization approach might not be followed by the in stallation of infrastructure and services by governments because titling program s are, as Gilbert (2002, p. 8) contends, being conducted for reasons other than h elping the poor and popular because they constitute housing policy on the cheap. Th ird, as Davis (2006) argues, titling approach could stratify slum dwellers, many of whom are renters.5 The benefits from the titling program sometimes end up ge tting confiscated by bureaucrats, who often own slum estates. Tenure formalization is also expected to facilitate slum households investme nt in their houses by (1) expanding their financial capacity, (2) improving thei r access to infrastructure and services, and/or (3) influencing their motivation for housing investment. According to economic theories, provision of individual property rights to slum households would expand their financial capacity by ena bling them to capitalize on their assets by accessing formal credit sources (Bes ley, 1995; de Soto, 2000; Deininger, 2003; Demsetz, 1967; World Bank, 1993). A b ody of literature, however, offers a counterargument and contracting evidence (F ield & Torero, 2006; Galiani & Schargrodsky, 2010; Gilbert, 2002; Payne et al., 2009). Gilbert (2002), for example, observes in Bogota that low-income household s with legal title still borrow from informal credit sources because legal title alone is not credible enough for lending agencies and the poor are not willing to risk their properties. Formalizing a slum settlement is often followed by the installation of infrastructure and services by government agencies, which would otherwise reluctant to do so to illegal squatters. In India, for instance, hous eholds in notified slums are entitled to infrastructure and services provided by local municipalities. Assurance of security and expectation of the provision of services in future might rush construction activities by slum households who as pire to rent out the spaces for the purpose of steady income. I have reviewed literature to develop a theoretical framework (Figure 2) th at explains what motivates and capable slum households to invest in their houses and how tenure formalization and tenure security influence the timing and inten sity of the investment. In the framework, the intensity of hosing investment is a function of tenure security, available resources, and access to infrastructure , all of which are influenced by tenure formalization. Legal, de facto, and perc eived tenure securities could respectively influence households decision to inves t in their houses, though literature pays growing attention to de facto and perc eived tenure security as a driver of housing investment. Next section discusses how to measure the degree of tenure security. Operationalization of Tenure Security In order to empirically examine the theoretical framework, it is necessary

to be able to measure the degree of tenure security of slum households. In this section, I operationalize tenure security by clarifying its outcomes and determi nants and proposing measurement models with those indicators. In SEM, two types of indicators are used in measuring unobservable (or latent) construct. Reflecti ve indicators (or effect indicators) are the manifests of the degree of tenure s ecurity, while formative indicators (or causal indicators) are what constitute o r influence tenure security (Bollen & Lennox, 1991). Outcomes and Determinants of Tenure Security In operationalizing the concept of tenure security, it is necessary to choo se appropriate reflective and formative indicators. Three types of tenure securi ty namely, legal, de facto, and perceived tenure securities have different sets of r eflective and formative indicators. Table 1 summarizes the list of their reflect ive and formative indicators discussed in literature. It is noted that some indi cators may represent more than two types of tenure securities, and some reflecti ve indicators of tenure securities may be formative indicators of other tenure s ecurities (for example, see duration of residence). Since I already discussed th e determinants of tenure security in Section 2.1, I focus on their reflective in dicators here.

Table 1. Examples of reflective and formative indicators of tenure security. Legal Formative indicators Reflectiveindicators tenure securitylitigations Chance to win Possession of document Premium in housing price Types of property rights Land tenure Renewability Duration of residence (adverse possession) Possession of documents de facto tenure security Duration of residence Size of settlements Probability of eviction Cohesion of communities Access to infrastructure and services Political affiliations Duration of residence Perceived tenureexperience ofof the risk of eviction Past security Perception/belief eviction Trust in governments Possession of documents Legal tenure security One of the reflective indicators of a household s legal tenure security is it s possession of document(s) issued by governments that support its legal status. Benjamin (2004), Kundu (2002), and Mahadevia (2010) have observed that slum hou seholds in Bangalore, Delhi, Ahmedabad attempt to claim their occupancy by showi ng a variety of such documents, such as ID card, voters card, and certificates i ssued by various government agencies. Estimating the premium of tenure security in housing price is a common approach in econometrics (Friedman, Jimenez, & Mayo , 1988; Kapoor & Leblanc, 2008; Kim, 2004; Lanjouw & Levy, 2002). In their hedon ic estimation approach, the price of formalized housing is decomposed into the b undle of amenities and locational characteristics, as well as the reduced risk o f being arbitrarily appropriated. It is widely observed that housing market exis ts in slum communities, yet it is unclear whether one can assume market equilibr ium on which hedonic estimation usually is based. De facto tenure security

A possible reflective indicator of de facto tenure security is the duration of households residence in the same places. Households who stay for a specific p eriod are regarded to have a certain level of de facto tenure security in a sens e that they have not been evicted (Durand-Lasserve & Selod, 2009; Mahadevia, 201 0; Struyk & Lynn, 1983). Relying on this single indicator could be, however, pro blematic because households with shorter duration of residence do not necessaril y have insecure tenure. For example, a household with shorter duration of reside nce might have high tenure security if they possess legal documents that prove t heir freehold tenure. Using multiple indicators is a way to avoid such miss-meas urement. Perceived tenure security One can measure the degree of perceived tenure security by investigating ho useholds about how they perceive the risk of eviction (Reerink & Van Gelder, 201 0; van Gelder, 2009). Van Gelder (2009) asked slum households in Buenos Aires fi ve-point scale questions, such as: The possibility that we will get evicted from this neighborhood is always present and The possibility of an eviction worries me sometimes . The former question asks about the perceived probability of eviction, while the latter asks about fear of eviction. His empirical test demonstrates th at the degree of households fear of eviction is a better predictor of their housi ng investment. Because duration of residence is an important indicator of tenure security but very complex, I discuss a little bit more about how to incorporate it in my theoretical framework (Figure 2). While duration of residence is a reflective in dicator of de facto tenure security, it is also formative indicators of legal, d e facto, and perceived tenure securities. Duration of residence influences legal tenure security because households with a specified period of residence are abl e to obtain a certain level of property rights in countries where adverse posses sion is in effect. Beneficiaries of government projects and services are often r equired to show a certain period of residence. Households have de facto tenure s ecurity if they stay without being evicted for a long period, but the fact that they remain for a certain period might also strengthen their tenure security. Pe rceived tenure security also depends on duration of residence since households b ecome confident about their security as they stay without facing the threat of e viction. For these reasons, duration of residence is conceptually closely relate d to tenure security. An empirical question is about the extent to which duration of residence is related to tenure security. If one relies on duration of residence as a reflect ive indicator of tenure security, tenure security needs to be able to explain a large portion of variation in duration of residence. However, a household s durati on of residence is influenced by many other factors, such as dissatisfaction of housing and/or neighborhood or economic/market factors. One needs to control for those residential mobility factors when using duration of residence as an outco me of tenure security. Similarly, relying on only duration of residence as the f ormative indicator of tenure security is problematic. Although one could expect duration of residence to explain a certain portion of variation in tenure securi ty as a formative indicator (or explanatory variable), households with longer (s horter) duration of residence do not necessarily have higher (lower) tenure secu rity. As I have discussed, the principal outcome of tenure security my project is interested in is the intensity of housing investment. Following the theoretical framework (Figure 2), I primarily measure the degree of tenure security from it s outcome (housing investment) and determinants (tenure formalization). In pract ice, including duration of residence as an additional indicator of tenure securi ty will be beneficial because it is also related to households financial capacity (income and savings) and motivation (timing of repairing/expanding houses). The refore, adding duration of residence as an explanatory variable might be useful for the estimation of the intensity of housing investment to check robustness.

Measurement Model I propose a measurement model of tenure security with its indicators based on a Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) framework (Figure 4). This measurement a pproach consists of within- and between- models to measure the variations of ten ure security at both household and community levels. In the within model, I will estimate the degree of households perceived tenure security in relation to its r eflective indicators, the intensity of their housing investment, the formative i ndicators of household-level legal and de facto tenure securities, and other fac tors that influence household-level perceived tenure security and/or housing inv estment (income and savings, access to infrastructure/services, age of household head, etc). The reflective indicators may include the risk of eviction and fear for it stated by slum households (see Table 1). Since perceived tenure security is influenced by legal and de facto tenure securities, the model contains their formative indicators, such as formalized tenure, possession of document, durati on of residence, personal relationship with politicians, etc. In the between-mod el, formative indicators of community-level legal tenure security (e.g., land ow nership, land use designated in plans, etc.) and de facto tenure security (e.g., size of settlement, cohesion of community, political affiliation, etc.) will ca pture the variation of perceived tenure security at community level. The type of the proposed measurement model is commonly referred to as multi level multiple indicators multiple causes (MIMIC) model (Joreskog & Goldberger, 1975; Joreskog, 1981). The third-phase study of my project will employ this appr oach in measuring tenure security of households in non-notified and notified slu ms in Pune.

Figure 4. Measurement models of tenure security. Notes: Tenure securities are placed in ellipses since it is an unobservable (lat ent) hypothetical construct. Formative indicators are placed in rectangles, indi cating that they are observable. While reflective indicators and housing investm ent are observable (in rectangles) at household level, their community-level var iations are not directly observable (in ellipses). Arrows indicate causal direct ions. Summary of This Chapter In this chapter, reviewing relevant literature, I discussed how to conceptu alize tenure security, specify its link with housing investment and formalized t enure, and measure its level. In Section 2.1, I conceptualized tenure security a s a concept that embraces three elements: legal, de facto, and perceived tenure securities. The levels of households legal, de facto, and perceived tenure securi ties vary and might correspond with each other or differ. In addition, tenure se curity can be decomposed into household and community levels. In Section 2.2, I explained that the amount and timing of housing investment by slum households ar e determined by their motivation for investment, available resources, and tenure security. Recent literature pays growing attention to perceived tenure security as a driver of housing investment. Tenure formalization is expected to facilita te physical consolidation in slums by enhancing tenure security of slum househol ds. In Section 2.3, I listed various reflective and formative indicators of lega l, de facto, and perceived tenure securities and proposed the multilevel MIMIC m odel that measures household-level and community-level tenure securities from th eir determinants and outcomes.

Indian Context The objective of this chapter is to investigate the Indian context regardin g slums and tenure security of residents there. In Section 3.1, I examine basic

statistics to see the current situations and trends of slum formation and living conditions there in India. For the analysis, I tap into the survey data collect ed by the National Sample Survey Organisation (NSSO). The NSSO has conducted sam ple surveys regarding the living conditions at household level and slum settleme nt level in the entire nation. I look into 58th round housing condition survey a nd slum survey (2002-03) and 65th round housing condition survey and slum survey (2008-09). In Section 3.2, I will apply the theoretical framework developed in previous chapter and test the hypothesis that slum notification stimulated their housing investment by enhancing their tenure security. This section will be a m ain component of the first-phase study of my project. In Section 3.3, I review r ecent literature on changing urban and political landscape since the economic li beralization, which has significantly influenced tenure security of slum dweller s in large Indian cities. Slums in India Definitions and Trends Although its definitions vary in India, NSSO defines a slum settlement as a compact area with a collection of poorly built tenements, mostly of temporary na ture, crowded together usually with inadequate sanitary and drinking water facil ities in unhygienic conditions (NSSO, 2004, p.11). Among the slums, Notified slums are those which have been notified by the respective municipalities, corporations , local bodies or development authorities (NSSO, 2004, p.11), while other slums, if at least 20 households live there, are counted as non-notified slums. The legal status of the settlement, such as land tenure, is not stipulated as defining cr iteria. NSS 58th round and 65th round surveys make it possible to extract the trend s of the number of slum households and settlements (Table 2 and Table 3).6, 7 As of 2008-09, the state with the largest number of slum households is Maharashtra (2,319,531), followed by Andhra Pradesh (924,898), Delhi (493,994), West Bengal (437,210), and Tamil Nadu (418,848). The proportion of the number of households in notified slums to the total number of slum households (or, notification rate ) is the highest in Andhra Pradesh (74.1%), followed by West Bengal (64.1%), Tam il Nadu (57.4%), Uttar Pradesh (55.0%), and Maharashtra (54.3%). The proportion of the number of households in slums to the number of households in urban areas (or, slum rate) is the highest in Maharashtra (23.6%), Delhi (19.6%), Andhra Pra desh (14.4%), Madhya Pradesh (9.8%), and West Bengal (9.3%). Across India, the n umber of households in slums increased from 5,810,532 in 2002-03 to 6,363,625 in 2008-09 by 553,093, or 9.3% increase. Despite the increase in the number of hou seholds in slums, the number of slum settlements declined from 51,688 in 2002-03 to 48,994 in 2008-09 by 2,694, or 5.2% decrease. This is because Andhra Pradesh and West Bengal report large scale of reduction in the number of slums. As Kuma r (2010) point out, the decrease in the number of slum settlements amid the incr ease in the number of slum households implies the densification of existing slum s. Table 2. Estimated number of households in slums in India, 2002-03 and 2008-09. Sources: NSSO, 2004, 2010b. Note: Rate1 refers to the rate (%) of the number of notified households/settleme nts to the total number of households/settlements; Rate2 refers to the rate (%) of households in slums to the total number of households in urban areas. Table 3. Estimated number of slum settlements in India, 2002-03 and 2008-09. Sources: NSSO, 2003, 2010a. Note: Rate refers to the rate (%) of the number of notified households/settlemen ts to the total numbers. On aggregate, slum settlements have been notified constantly since 1970s (T able 4). Because slum notification is a local policy, however, its rules and imp lementations vary from place to place (Banerjee, 2002; Risbud, 2009; Sharma & Ba

rman, 2006). The basic component of the policy is the provision of occupancy rig hts and the entitlement to infrastructure and services provided by municipal age ncies to residents in a slum settlement. In Mumbai, for instance, those in notif ied slums are legally protected from eviction and entitled to access to infrastr ucture and services provided by municipal government agencies. In addition, thos e who have lived in slum sites since 1995 (this is known as the cut-off date) ar e eligible for housing built by slum redevelopment efforts, free of cost. In And hra Pradesh, the government provides a patta, a certificate of occupancy, to tho se who have stayed on state land for more than five years. Provided in the name of the woman of the household, the patta is heritable but not alienable and can be mortgaged in order to obtain housing loans. Table 4. Estimated number of notified slums in major states. Source: NSSO, 2010a. NSS 65th round slum survey hints a clue as to what kinds of settlements have been notified across India (NSSO, 2010a). To see the statistical association wi th each attribute of slum settlement and notification status, I conduct a multip le correspondence analysis (MCA), which is a multivariate statistical method to compress the information of categorical variables into a reduced numbers of dime nsions by minimizing the loss of total information (Le Roux & Rouanet, 2010). Th e plot exhibits the relationships among five nominal variables: settlements notif ication status (notified or non-notified), land ownership (public or private), t he land use of surrounding areas (residential, commercial, industrial, slums, or others), location (fringe or non-fringe), and hazardous status of the location, such as prone to flood (hazard or non-hazard) (Figure 5). Each point on the plo t represents a category of the five variables. The distances between the points indicate whether the settlement attributes are similar (close) or dissimilar (di stant). As a result of computation, the first dimension (horizontal axis) and th e second dimension (vertical axis) explain 53% and 14% of the original informati on in the variables, respectively. I add circles around the points of notificati on status to make it clear what attributes are associated with them. The MCA plot of slums in all India demonstrates that notified slums tend to be surrounded by slums, spread over public land, and/or be located in non-fring e areas, while non-notified slums tend to be surrounded by residential or commer cial areas and/or located in fringe areas (panel (a) of Figure 5). Whether or no t a settlement is located in hazardous areas seems to be irrelevant to its notif ication status based on the data. Notified slums tend to be surrounded by slums probably because people often settle near notified slums by expecting their sett lements to be notified in future. The MCA analysis also suggests that government s are reluctant to notify slums on valuable land in commercial or industrial are as. Higher likelihood of settlement on public land being notified demonstrates t hat it is easier for governments to notify them because they do not have to comp ensate landowners.8 The MCA plot of slums in Maharashtra points to the different trend in slum notification (panel (b) of Figure 5). Similar to the all-India trend above, noti fied slums tend to be surrounded by slums, spread over public land, and/or be lo cated in non-fringe areas, while non-notified slums tend to be surrounded by res idential areas in Maharashtra. Unlike all-India trend, however, being located on land owned by public is strongly associated with notification status. In additi on, slums on hazardous location tend to be non-notified. This implies that poore r people who settle in hazardous locations, such as riverbank, are likely to rem ain denied to access to services. The difference in the trends of the implementa tion of slum notification in all-India and Maharashtra suggests that studying ab out the process of notification entails a close investigation of the local conte xt. (a) All India

(b) Maharashtra Figure 5. Multiple Corresponding Plot of slums in India. Source: NSSO, 2010. Living Conditions and Investment According to NSS survey data (NSSO, 2003, 2004, 2010a, 2010b), physical con ditions are overall better in notified slums than in non-notified slums, though both slums have experienced improvement over the last decade. In 2008-09, higher proportion of households live in houses built with permanent materials (pucca) in notified slums than in non-notified slums (Table 16 in Appendix D).9 The prop ortions of households with tap water and access to water for their exclusive use are higher in notified slums than in non-notified slums. Also, households in no tified slums on average have better latrine availability, drainage arrangements, and electricity connection. In addition, more households have access to garbage collection by municipalities in notified slums than in non-notified slums. Havi ng said that, the data demonstrates that the physical conditions in non-notified slums have improved since 2002-03 and the gap between notified and non-notified slums has become narrowed. As for settlement-level indicators, the proportion of settlements in which a majority of households live in pucca housing is higher in notified slums than in non-notified slums as of 2008-09 (Table 17 in Appendix D). The proportions of settlements that have recently experienced the improvement of services are also higher in notified slums. In both non-notified and notified slums, the improvem ents stemmed from governments, while the improvements primarily by residents wer e limited. These data suggest that government plays a significant role in the pr ovision and improvement of infrastructure and services, and thus slum notificati on that entitles slum households to the infrastructure and services is critical for their living conditions. The theoretical framework I developed in the previous chapter hypothesizes how tenure formalization could stimulate housing investment by slum households. In other words, households in notified slum would invest in their houses than ot hers in non-notified slums. On contrary to the expectation, households in non-no tified slums seem to engage in housing construction as actively as those in noti fied slums (NSS), 2004). As of 2002-03, about a quarter of households started ho using construction in both non-notified and notified slums during the last 5 yea rs (Table 5). More than 90 percent of the households are housing owners. Among t he constructions are new building (51%), extension of existing building that res ults in the increase of floor area (10%) and any type of remodeling, renovation, or major repair work (39%). As expected, the invested houses have better struct ure and large floor area in notified slums. On average, households in notified s lums spent Rs. 38,247 for the construction, 48 percent higher than the cost of c onstruction in non-notified slums (Rs. 25,804). The cost was mostly financed by their own sources, though households with varying expenditure levels engaged in construction. More than 90 percent of households who engaged in housing construc tion during the last 5 years in notified slums possess either voter ID cards, ra tion card, or passport, which reflect legal tenure security.10 It is worthwhile looking at how the patterns of housing investment differ a mong households with different levels of monthly per capita expenditure (MPCE). Table 6 shows the proportions of households who engaged in housing investment by slum households between 2004 and 2008 and the types of the investment by their expenditure levels (quintile). Interestingly, the proportions of households who engaged in housing investment are almost equivalent throughout the quintiles. Ap proximately three fourths of households in the bottom quintile who engaged in ho using investment built new houses, while the proportions are lower in other quin tiles. This is probably because a larger fraction of low-income households are n ew migrants and they less engage in addition or improvement of their houses. The proportions of addition to exiting houses become higher as expenditure levels b ecome high. This is reasonable considering that addition of rooms is possible on ly when households have enough resources. The proportions of improvement of exis

ting houses are almost same in the quintiles, except for the bottom quintile. Th ese patterns are by and large observed similarly in non-notified and notified sl ums. Figure 6 illustrates when households engage in housing investment in non-no tified and notified slums. The majority of construction of new houses was conduc ted by newly coming residents whose duration of stay is less than 5 years. House holds tend to add new rooms or expand floors when their duration of residence be tween 5 and 25 years. This is probably because the demand for space becomes stro ng as their children grow up and/or it takes a while for them to prepare enough savings. The improvement of existing houses seem to have two peaks at duration o f residence being 10 years and 30 years, though households engage in improving t heir houses throughout their lifetime. There is no stark difference observed in the patterns of housing investment above between non-notified and notified slums . Table 5. Recent and planned housing construction in slums in India, 2002-3. Source: NSSO, 2004. Note: Figures in percentages unless otherwise noted. MPCE refers to monthly per capita expenditure. Table 6. Recent residential construction by households in slums by expenditure l evel, 2002-03. Note: Figures in percentages. MPCE refers to monthly per capita expenditure.

(1) New building (3) Improvement

(2) Addition

Figure 6. Duration of residence by types of recent residential construction in s lums. Source: NSSO, 2004. Preliminary Analysis In this section, using the NSS sample survey data, I examine if the theore tical framework developed in the previous chapter (Figure 2) can be applied to t he Indian context. First, I take a closer look at duration of residence and poss ession of document to check if they can be used as indicators of tenure security . Then, I investigate what, including the indicators of tenure security and slum notification status, contributes to the propensity of housing investment in slu ms. Indicators of Tenure Security Duration of Residence As I discussed in Section 2.3, households duration of residence is a possibl e indicator of tenure security. The NSS housing condition survey contain the inf ormation about households duration of residence in slums as of 2002-03. The histo grams in Figure 7 show that the distributions of households in non-notified slum s, notified slums, and all slums are all skewed to the right. The average durati on of residence is 19.7 years (all slums), 19.2 years (non-notified slums), and 19.9 years (notified slums). The proportion of households who came to slums in t he last 2 years is higher in notified slums; approximately 10 percent of househo lds in notified slums moved into the slums in less than one year. The proportion of households with duration of residence between 2 and 20 years is slightly hig her in non-notified slums than in non-notified slums, yet there is no significan t difference in the distribution of the duration of residence between non-notifi

ed and notified slums. Households who recently moved to slums might have faced lower tenure secur ity in previous residence. The NSS data provides the list of the reasons for hou seholds movement in slums during the last 365 days as of 2002-03 (NSSO, 2004), al though there is no answer that clearly indicates the lack of tenure security as a reason for movement (Table 7). Approximately 57 percent of households moved be cause of job-related reasons and 22 percent of households list housing problems as the reasons for their movement. There is no difference in this trend between households in non-notified and notified slums. Breaking down the data by househo lds expenditure level, however, reveals different patterns among them. While lowe r-income households moved to the current location for job-related reasons, highe r-income households moved for housing-related reasons. This finding supports Tur ner s (1972) hypothesis that lower-income households prioritize the proximity to u nskilled jobs and, as their income rises (or duration of residence longer, see F igure 8), they begin to aspire for housing with higher standard.11 (A) All slums (B) By notification status

Figure 7. Duration of residence in slums. Source: NSSO, 2004. Table 7. Reasons for movement in slums during the last 365 days, as of 2002-03. Source: NSSO, 2004. Note: Figures in percentages. Figure 8. Monthly per capita expenditure of households in slums by duration of r esidence, 2002-03. Source: NSSO, 2004. To examine what contributes to households duration of residence, I estimate OLS and ordered logit models that calculate the odds of a household s stay in slum s for a specific period: ?log?(DURATION?_i)=?_1+?_11 ?NOTIFICATION?_i+?_12 X_i+?_1i (1) ologit?[P(?DURATION?_i )]=?_2+?_21 ?NOTIFICATION?_i+?_22 X_i+?_2i (1)

Where DURATION = Duration of residence in the slum (in years) NOTIFICATION = Notification status of the settlement (0 = non-notified slum, 1= notified slum) X = Household and location characteristics as follows: Monthly per capita expenditure (in Indian Rupees); Social groups (scheduled caste/tribe, or other backward caste); Hazardous location (whether the household experienced flood during the last 5 y ears); Size of the city (less than 100k, between 100k and 500k, between 500k and 1M, o r greater than 1M). P(DURATION) indicates the probability of ith household s duration of residence bei ng (1) less than 5 years, (2) between 5 and 10 years, (3) between 10 and 15 year s, or (4) longer than 15 years. While Model (1) estimates households duration of residence (in years) by their characteristics, Model (1) estimates the chance of staying in the slums for specific durations. The sample for Model (1) is the hou sing-owners with duration of residence (i) less than 40 years, (ii) between 15 a nd 40 years, and (iii) less than 15 years. For Model (1) , I choose owner househol ds with duration of residence (i) less than 40 years, (ii) 20 years, and (iii) 1 5 years. In addition, I apply the models to low-income households (bottom quarti

le (25%) among slum households) separately. Table 19 in Appendix D reports the e stimation results. Model (1) explains a small fraction of variation, particularly for househol ds with duration of residence between 15 and 40 years, as indicated by its low R -squared (0.029). Estimating households duration of residence obviously requires more information about what influence their residential mobility (i.e., motivati on in the theoretical framework in Figure 2). For households who came to the slu ms less than 15 years ago, their notification status is negatively associated wi th their duration of residence. This is because notified slums attract more migr ants (see Figure 7). The estimation results also confirm the positive associatio n between households expenditure level and their duration of residence, controlli ng for other variables.12 Households living in hazardous locations is found negat ively related to their duration of residence, which implies newly coming residen ts tend to settle in such locations and/or higher likelihood of their moving out either voluntarily or involuntarily. Estimation results of Model (1) show overal l similar patterns, though belonging to socially disadvantaged groups is found m ore strongly and negatively associated with duration of residence for low-income households. Possession of Document As discussed in Section 2.3, households possession of document issued by gov ernment might reflect or influence their legal tenure security and enhance their perceived tenure security. The NSS survey data contains the information about h ouseholds possession of voter ID cards, ration cards, or passports. These documen ts themselves do not legally prove their property rights. Since obtaining these documents usually requires proof of residence, however, possession of the docume nts reflect certain level of legal tenure security (Chandrasekhar & Mukhopadhyay , 2011; Subbaraman et al., 2012). If duration of residence contributes to tenure security and greater tenure security leads to higher likelihood of possession o f document, duration of residence and possession of document must be positively correlated. The data supports this hypothesis; the proportion of households who possess such document in both non-notified and notified slums rise as they stay longer and reaches the plateau at their duration of residence being 15 years (Fi gure 9). Figure 9. Possession of documents by duration of residence in slums, 2002-03. Source: NSSO, 2004. To check if households duration of residence and possession of document rema in positively associated when their expenditure level and other factors controll ed, I run a logit model that estimates the chance of households obtaining documen t issued by government from their characteristics. logit?[P(?DOCUMENT?_i )]=?+?_1 ?log?(DURATION?_i)+?_2 ?NOTIFICATION?_i+?_3 X_i+? _i (2) Where DOCUMENT = Possession of voter ID card, ration card, and/or passport (0=no, 1=ye s) DURATION = Duration of residence in the slum (in years) NOTIFICATION = Notification status of the settlement (0 = non-notified slum, 1= notified slum) X = Household and location characteristics as follows: Monthly per capita expenditure (in Indian Rupees); Social groups (scheduled caste/tribe, or other backward caste); Hazardous location (whether the household experienced flood during the last 5 y ears); Size of the city (less than 100k, between 100k and 500k, between 500k and 1M, o r greater than 1M).

The estimation results reported in Table 20 in Appendix D confirm that even if expenditure level is controlled, the probability of a household s possessing d ocument becomes higher as their duration of residence becomes longer until their duration of stay reaches 15 years. In addition, duration of residence strongly affects the probability of possession of document by low-income households with duration of residence 15-40 years. This implies that duration of residence might be a critical factor for the tenure security of lower-income households. By con trast, slum notification status does not help households to access to the docume nt. Housing Investment In my theoretical framework, the propensity or amount of housing investment by slum households is a function of tenure security which is (i) influenced by fo rmalized tenure and duration of residence and (ii) reflected by possession of do cument and duration of residence , available resources, motivation, and access to infrastructure (Figure 2). The hypothesis derived from the framework is that slu m notification influences tenure security of slum households and thereby stimula te their housing investment. To test the hypothesis, one can examine whether hou seholds in notified slums have invested in housing more than other households in non-notified slums, controlling for their characteristics. For the purpose, I r un the following logit and OLS models: ?logit[P(CONSTRUCTION?_i)]=?_1+?_11 ?DURATION?_i+?_12 ?DOCUMENT?_i+?_13 ?NOTIFIC ATION?_i+?_14 ?TAP?_i+?_15 X_i+?_1i (3) Where CONSTRUCTION = Whether the household engaged in residential construction (new bu ilding, addition, or improvement) during the last 5 years (0 = no, 1 = yes) COST = Cost of the latest residential construction by the household (in Rs.) DOCUMENT = Possession of voter ID card, ration card, and/or passport (0 = no, 1 = yes) DURATION = Duration of residence in the slum (in years) NOTIFICATION = Notification status of the settlement (0 = non-notified slum, 1= notified slum) TAP = Access to tap water (0 = no, 1 = yes) X = Household and location characteristics as follows: Monthly per capita expenditure (in Indian Rupees); Structure of the current dwelling (katcha, semi-pucca, or pucca); Social groups (scheduled caste/tribe, or other backward caste); Distance to work place (in km); Hazardous location (whether the household experienced flood during the last 5 y ears); Size of the city (less than 100k, between 100k and 500k, between 500k and 1M, o r greater than 1M). In the models above, notification status is a primary proxy of tenure security, while possession of document and duration of residence are additional for robust ness check. I proxy households resource availability by their monthly per capita expenditure. Households motivation is proxied by the structure of current dwellin g and distance to work place. I choose the availability of tap water as the indi cator of access to infrastructure and services. I apply the models to the following subpopulations: (1) housing owner house holds with duration of residence in slums for less than 40 years, (2) owners wit h duration of residence less than 20 years, (3) low-income (the bottom quartile) owners with duration of residence less than 40 years, (4) low-income owners wit h duration of residence less than 20 years. For models with new building constru ction as dependent variables, I exclude households whose duration of residence l ess than 5 years. Table 21, Table 22, Table 23, and Table 24 in Appendix D repor t the estimation results. Table below summarize the estimation results.

Table 8. Summary of estimation results. (+) Tap -+) Expenditure +ow Duration All Document <20 Notification <40 yrs 5-20income 5-40yrs+ Improvement Addition refers to statistically significant and positive; - refers to statistically New building N (ote: L-) significant and negative. Parentheses indicate statistically insignificance. Building new houses No difference was observed in the propensity to construct new buildings by households in non-notified slums and notified slums, except for households with duration of residence less than 20 years. This suggests that notification has st imulated housing construction by households in their early stage. Interestingly, households who constructed new housing tend not to possess document compared wi th other households, in particular in non-notified slums. A possible interpretat ion of this result is that households who recently constructed housing had lower tenure security; for example, they used to be tenants. Whereas households with higher expenditure levels tend to construct new houses in non-notified slums, ho useholds expenditure level and probability of new housing construction are found not associated in notified slums. This implies that lower-income households cons tructed new houses as much as other households in notified slums, indicating tha t their enhanced tenure security brought by slum notification. Addition to exiting houses As expected, households possession of document, duration of residence, and e xpenditure level are positively associated with the propensity of addition to th eir houses. Expenditure level is found a more critical factor for households in non-notified slums than those in notified slums. Slum notification has increased the probability of addition to existing houses only for low-income households. This implies that higher-income households are not constrained by insecure tenur e in making a decision to add new floors to their houses. Improvement of exiting houses According to the estimation results, households in non-notified slums and n otified slums would equally improve their houses, holding all else equal. Howeve r, slum notification has a positive influence on low-income households. In addit ion, households possession of document, duration of residence, and expenditure le vel increase their probability of improving their houses only when their duratio n of residence is less than 20 years. Thus, tenure security might have a critica l role for low-income households and/or younger households in encouraging them t o improve their houses. Construction cost In addition to the propensity of housing investment by slum households, I e xamine how slum notification has affected the amount of their investment by runn ing an OLS model: ?COST?_i=?_2+?_21 ?DURATION?_i+?_22 ?DOCUMENT?_i+?_23 ?NOTIFICATION?_i+?_23 ?TAP ?_i+?_24 X_i+?_2i (3) where the dependent variable is the cost of housing investment in Indian Rupees. The estimation result rejects the hypothesis that households in notified slums invest more resources into their housing than those in non-notified slums, contr olling for their characteristics (Table 25). In conclusion, I have offered evidence that suggests that tenure security h as played a critical role in facilitating housing investment by households in In dian slums, in particular in their early stage. Slum notification has particular ly enhanced tenure security of low-income households and thereby encouraged thei r investment in their houses.13

Evictions and Tenure Security This section explores the trends of eviction and relocation of slum dwelle rs in Indian cities and what critically influence their tenure security. First, I look into some available statistics that indicate recent massive eviction of s lum residents in large cities. Then, I review literature in planning and human g eography that have attempted to theorize changing urban and political landscape in post-liberalization India. The rich discussion in the literature helps to spe culate on the meaning of legal and de facto tenure security in Indian slums. Statistics In large Indian cities, an increasing number of incidences of massive evict ion of slum dwellers have been reported since the late 1990s. In Delhi, approxim ately 51,461 houses were demolished between 1990 and 2003, and 45,000 households were evicted between 2004 and 2007 (Bhan, 2009); in Kolkata, more than 77,000 h ouseholds were evicted in 2004 (Risbud, 2009); in Mumbai, 360,326 slum units wer e demolished between 1994 and 1998 (Risbud, 2009), and 90,000 households on 44 s ettlements were evicted between November 2004 and March 2005 (P. Kumar, 2010). It is, however, questionable to what extent these figures are reliable beca use of the difficulty of counting and tracking the evicted households. Figures r eported by non-profit organizations that are supportive for slum dwellers might have been overestimated; figured announced by government might have been underes timated. In addition, compared with the sensational massive evictions in major c ities above, small scale cases in other cities are hardly counted up. Thus, no s tatistics is available about the total number of evicted households across India and its trend. Lack of systematically collected data about evicted slum dweller s limits the availability of statistical analysis to estimate what would contrib ute to the chance of being evicted (or protected from it). Driving factors of eviction Human and critical geographers have been enthusiastically engaging in unrav eling growing hostility against slum dwellers in Indian megacities (Baviskar, 20 03; Bhan, 2009; Fernandes, 2004; Ghertner, 2008, 2011; Zerah, 2007). According t o the line of literature, the recent drive for slum demolition is rooted in incr easing demand for (1) beautification of the city environments and (2) modernizat ion of infrastructure, as well as (3) the criminalization of slum dwellers as a major hindrance to their realization. Non-slum residents have increasingly begun to deem slums that encroach reserved natural areas as environmental hazard and those remain unsanitary near their residence as eyesores. Slums that have encroa ched valuable land in preferable city areas have also been recognized as obstacl e to the installment of infrastructure or valorization of the land by residentia l, commercial, or industrial development. The literature points out four factors that strengthen demand for beautific ation and modernization and therefore fuels criminalization of slum dwellers: 1) soaring property values in liberalized real estate markets; 2) emergence of socalled new middle class; 3) aspiration for world-class cities; and 4) changes in c ourts interpretation of the proliferation of slums. Booming real estate values Since the economic liberalization in the early 1990s, India has been experi encing rapid urbanization and economic development. Governments use to tightly c ontrol land and restrict its possession and trading by private. Deregulation of such controls opened the real estate market for speculators, resulting in rising property values in central areas of metropolises (Nijman, 2000). As the values of urban land and real estate properties have been soaring, the demand for redev eloping slum sites into shopping malls, luxury condominiums, or office complex, has become increasingly high. New middle class A growing number of new middle class affluent urban citizens who grew up in (

or amid the image of) modern lifestyle has begun to call for beautification of the city environments by forming the residential welfare associations (RWAs) or env ironmental non-profit organizations (Baviskar, 2003; Chatterjee, 2004; Fernandes , 2004; Ghertner, 2008, 2011). Decentralization, promoted by the 74th amendment of the Constitution, has brought about opportunity for them to make their voices heard in policy-making process. Aspiration for world-class cities Aspiring for world-class cities, state and city governments are also motiva ted to modernize the built environment in order to attract foreign investment an d promote economically development (Kennedy & Zrah, 2008). Financially supported by the central government, this resulted in large-scale infrastructure developme nt and redevelopment projects, accompanied by the relocation of slum households. Changing rules of courts Court decisions play a critical role in prompting criminalization of slum r esidents. Bhan (2009), Ghertner (2008), and Zerah (2007) analyze how the courts changed their attitude against slum dwellers. According to the literature, cour ts used to show sympathy with slum dwellers who had no choice but to squat and c riticize incompetency and inactivity of bureaucrats and politicians who failed t o accommodate them. Since the late 1990s, however, courts have begun to attribut e the dismal failure of government s realizing development plans to slum dwellers by denouncing them as illegal encroachers. The courts have strong power to coerc e government agencies to follow their orders. Tenure security as a moderating factor While the factors above have been accelerating the driving force of slum de molition in Indian metropolises, there exit factors that protect slum dwellers f rom eviction. Tenure security of slum households hinges on the balance between t hese two opposing factors. In the Indian context, recent discussions on the tenu re security of slum dwellers are centered on the political realm in which those who are denied to access to service as citizens seek for protection through info rmal negotiation. Political negotiation by mobilizing slum dwellers, who often a ccount for more than half the population in major cities, is an important way to secure their tenure. SPARC is an example of the organization that exert signifi cant influence on directing policy-making toward pro-poor by mobilizing huge num ber of slum dwellers and homeless people and accumulating expertise and knowledg e (Appadurai, 2001).14 What makes such political negotiation possible is the blur about what is le gal/illegal (or formal/informal) in India. Given the improper enforcement of pro perty rights and the prevalence of non-conforming building activities, it is up to local governments how to classify buildings formal or informal. Zimmer (2012) , for example, describes how the Delhi Development Authority has arbitrarily reg ularized unauthorized colonies.15 Roy (2009) argues that governments have purpos ely left rules and implementation ambiguous so that they can tap into the politi cal support from people who ask for formalization of their tenure. While such go vernments informal practice keeps tenure security of the poor hinged on a precari ous status, it also allows them to take a strategy to first occupy land and then politically negotiate for securing their tenure (Benjamin, 2008). Discussions above presuppose two distinct arenas coexisting in globalizing Indian society. One is the formal domain dominated by small fraction of the elit e; the other is the political realm where the underprivileged populations seek f or case-by-case paralegal arrangements. Chatterjee (2004) named them as civil soc iety and political society , respectively. According to his reasoning, the latter em erged since the 1980s when ensuring welfare of the population became the respons ibility of government and political mobilization became widening. The disjunctio n of the civil society and political society, however, became intensified only a fter new middle class who used to be disengaged in urban politics return to refr ame the civil society as the society by/for culturally equipped propertied citiz

ens in the 1990s. There are three questions to be clarified. First, to what extent is slum no tification status important for the tenure security of slum dwellers? Notificati on of their settlements is supposed to enhance their legal tenure security by le gal protecting them from forced eviction without due legal process. However, giv en the government s arbitral actions and courts changing attitude discussed above, it is necessary to examine whether people in notified slums are actually protect ed. For example, households in notified slums are required to move out when gove rnment builds infrastructure there. If the relocation does not proceed without d ue process and compensation, slum notification does not necessarily contribute t o tenure security of slum dwellers. Related to this point, the second question i s: Is de facto tenure security is more important for slum dwellers survival than legal tenure security? Let us say that slum notification protects slum dwellers from forced relocation. What is important then is whether slum households can le t their settlements notified through political negotiation, or whether informal tenure arrangement is enough for the tenure security of slum dwellers even if th e notification of their settlement does not follow up. This requires a close inv estigation of the process of slum notification, taking fully account of the loca l political context. Third, the literature above tend to overly focus on selecte d metropolises, such as Delhi, Mumbai, Kolkata, Chennai, Hyderabad, and Bangalor e. Are other large cities following those cities? Expanding locational horizon i s crucial for widening the theoretical scope. Summary of This Chapter In this chapter, I reviewed statistics and relevant literature to explore t he Indian context regarding living conditions, housing investment, and tenure se curity in slums. In Section 3.1, I examined the NSS survey data, which points to the increase in the number of slum households and the decrease in the number of slum settlements across India. The data also demonstrates a set of characterist ics of slum settlements that have been notified/not notified. According to the s ample surveys, living conditions in notified slums have been overall better than in non-notified, though the gap between them has been narrowing. In Section 3.2 , I investigated how determinants and outcomes of tenure security i.e., slum notif ication, duration of residence, possession of document, expenditure level, and h ousing investment are related, using the NSS survey data. In particular, I statist ically tested the hypothesis that households in notified slums tend to invest in housing more than those in non-notified slums, holding their characteristics eq ual. My analysis supported the hypothesis for low-income and/or younger househol ds. In Section 3.3, I reviewed discussion in the literature on Indian post-liber alization urbanization. Their theorizing has focused on two opposing forces: one is driving demolition of slums and the other is de facto tenure security. Build ing on the discussion in this chapter, I will develop research questions overarc hing my research project.

Research Design In this Chapter, I state research questions that will overarch three indep endent but closely knitted studies in my research project. Then, I explain resea rch design of each study and how they are related. Finally, I introduce the rese arch site of my project, Pune. It is noted that detailed descriptions of the thr ee studies are provided in Chapter 6. 4.1 Research Questions The purpose of my research project will be to better understand what contr ibutes to tenure security of slum households and thereby support their housing i nvestment. Specifically, my interest is in to what extent and how slum notificat ion has enhanced tenure security of households in Indian slums and improved thei r living conditions. For the purpose, I will address the overarching research qu estions below:

How has slum notification been implemented in Indian cities? What contributes to tenure security of households in slums? In particular, to w hat extent and how has slum notification improved their tenure security? To what extent is tenure security related to the frequency, timing, and amount of housing investment by slum households? In particular, to what extent and how has slum notification improved housing and access to infrastructure and services in India? I will address the first question by investigating the following points: (1) wha t kinds of settlement characteristics would increase the probability of being no tified by local governments; (2) who has determined the settlements to be notifi ed and who influenced the decision; (3) how slum dwellers have engaged in politi cal actions to secure their tenure. In so doing, I will explore the complexity i n the political process of slum notification. The second sets of questions focus on tenure security of slum residents. Based on the conceptualization and operat ionalization of tenure security in Chapter 2, I will aim to measure the degree o f tenure security of slum households and the contribution of slum notification t o it. The third set of questions will test the hypothesis that tenure formalizat ion enhance tenure security of slum dwellers and thereby stimulate their housing investment and ultimately lead to the improvement of their living conditions. T he three studies of my project will address more specific questions, though I wi ll triangulate the findings to answer the overarching research questions above. 4.2 Research Plan To address the research questions in the Indian context, my project will em ploy a sequential mixed-methods approach. My project will consist of three phase s, each of which will address different questions by relying on different method s (Table 9). The three studies are basically independent in that they will addre ss different research questions with different research designs, yet they are cl osely related in that Phase-I study and Phase-II study will lay foundation for s ubsequent studies (Figure 10). Phase I: Nation-wide cross-sectional study The first-phase study will aim to test the applicability of the theoretical framework developed in Chapter 2, and it will explore how the determinants and outcomes of tenure security such as slum notification, duration of residence, poss ession of document, housing investment, and access to infrastructure and service s are related across Indian slums, using large-size sample data that cover the ent ire nation. Specifically, the study will statistically test the hypothesis that households in notified slums tend to invest in their houses more than others in non-notified slums, holding their characteristics equal, because of enhanced ten ure security by slum notification. The data for this study will be National Samp le Survey (NSS) 58th and 65th rounds housing condition unit data, which contain detailed information about 5,818 and 7,510 households living in slums as of 2002 -03 and 2008-09 across India, respectively. The study will use OLS and logit mod els with propensity score matching to deal with selection bias. Subsequent studies will focus on Pune, a city in India. The inherent charac teristics of land tenure, which are deeply embedded in local contexts, necessita te a case study, with which my dissertation will be able to take account of thos e factors (Yin, 2009). I chose Pune as the location for my research for several reasons. First, Pune is located in the state of Maharashtra, whose government ha s implemented a slum notification policy. This is a prerequisite for my project. Second, populations in non-notified slums have been rapidly increasing, and the proportion of non-notified slums, relative to the total number of slums, is hig h (239 out of 477). These numbers are important, because comparison of notified and non-notified slums could otherwise prove difficult. Third, fewer systematic studies have focused on tenure in Pune s slums, compared with other Indian megacit ies (Bapat, 2009; Kapoor & Leblanc, 2008; Lall, Lundberg, & Shalizi, 2008). Thus

, my study will significantly contribute to both academic theory and urban polic y in India by making available new evidence on under-studied tenure policy. Fina lly, valuable data on Pune s slums are available, such as the Pune Slum Atlas, whi ch was published by the non-governmental organization (NGO) MASHAL in 2011 and w hich contains socio-economic and geographic data for households in all of Pune s s lums. Phase II: Qualitative study in Pune The purpose of Phase II will be to understand local context of Pune, rather than hypothesis testing. This qualitative study will be motivated by the follow ing questions: how has the local government determined settlements to be notifie d in Pune? (or, what kinds of settlements have been notified? ); how have slum d wellers negotiated with local bureaucrats or politicians to secure their tenure? ; and what, including slum notification, has possibly influenced the tenure secu rity of slum dwellers? (in other words, what kinds of households have been forci bly evicted?). In this phase, data collection and analysis (via interviews, docu ment analysis, and site observations) will proceed simultaneously and be flexibl e. During the planned fieldwork from June 2013 to August 2013, I will interview at least 25 households in five to eight slum settlements in Pune, as well as loc al bureaucrats, politicians, academic and professional experts. Based on the ins ight from this stage, I will determine the items to be included in the survey fo rm for the subsequent statistical analysis. Phase III: City-wide quantitative study in Pune Finally, I will conduct a quantitative study to address the second and thir d sets of research questions. During the planned fieldwork from October 2013 to December 2013, I will collect surveys from 1,000 households in 50 slums across P une. To measure the degree of tenure security, which embraces legal, de facto, a nd perception elements, and its link with determinants and outcomes, I will empl oy a multilevel Multiple Indicators Multiple Causes (MIMIC) model, developed in Section 2.3 (Figure 4). The model pays specifically attention to the link betwee n households perceived tenure security and housing investment. In estimating the effect of slum notification on housing investment, it is necessary to account fo r the difference in the characteristics of households in non-notified and notifi ed slums. To deal with the selection bias, I will use a propensity score matchin g method. In calculating the probability of households living in notified slums, I will draw on insights from the phase-II study. Table 9. Summary of the project. Phase Sample Data I. National-wide cross-sectional study UA Research questions / Hypotheses Method Households in notified slums tend to invest in their houses more than others in non-notified slums, holding their characteristics equal, because of enhanced te nure security by slum notification. HH OLS and logit models, propensity score matching NSS 58 / 65th rounds housing condition survey 2002-03 / 2008-09 Phase II. Qualitative study in 5,818 / 7,150 HHs across India Pune Who/what determined settlements to be notified in Pune? Who/what influenced the decision? How have slum dwellers negotiated with local bureaucrats or politicians to secu re their tenure? What, including slum notification, has possibly influenced the tenure security of slum dwellers? HH Interview, document analysis, site observation Interview, government documents and newspapers, etc. Phase in City-wide quantitative Pune 25 HHsIII.5-8 slums in the city ofstudy in Pune What has contributed to tenure security of slum households in Pune? To what extent is tenure security related to the frequency, timing, and amount of housing investment by slum households in Pune during the last 20 years? In pa

rticular, to what extent and how has slum notification improved housing and acce ss to infrastructure and services in Pune? HH and settlement Multilevel MIMIC model, propensity score matching Survey Note: UA in 50 to unit the city of HH refers to household. 1,000 HHsrefers slums inof analysis; Pune Figure 10. Research schedule of my project. 4.3 Research site In this section, I briefly introduce the regional setting of my research si te, Pune, by overviewing basic statistics, slum projects implemented in Pune, an d some key literature on tenure security issues in the city. Basic statistics Located in Maharashtra state, Pune is the eighth largest city in India and second largest city in the state of Maharashtra (Figure 11). Pune is one of the Indian cities with rapidly growing population, soaring from 3 million in 2010 to 5.6 million in 2030 (Pune Municipal Corporation, 2006). While the city has thri ved as a regional hub of the information technology industry, the living conditi ons of the lower segment of Pune s society remain poor (Bapat, 2004, 2009; Pune Mu nicipal Corporation, 2006). Approximately 1 million people reside in 477 slum se ttlements across the city, of which 238 have been notified by government agencie s (MASHAL, 2011). As Figure 12 illustrates, slums spread over the entire city. Figure 11. Location of Pune, India. Figure 12. Slum locations in the City of Pune. Source: MASHAL, 2011. Note: Areas in yellow indicate slum settlements. The population in the city of Pune has been rapidly increasing from 606,777 in 1961 to 2,538,473 in 2001 (Table 10). The speed of urbanization has been acc elerating as indicated by the rise in the annual growth rate from 2.2% in the 19 50s to 4.1% in the 1990s. The number of slum population has been overwhelmingly increasing from 92,101 in 1961 to 1,025,000 in 2001. The growth of slum populati on has outpaced the population growth of the city. According to the Pune Slum Atlas, 204,601 households live in 477 slum settl ements in the city of Pune as of 2011 (Table 11). Among those slums, 239 settlem ents, or 50.1%, are notified. On average, 341 households live in a slum settleme nt with an area of 1.1 ha, or the density of 290 household/ha. The numbers of sl um households vary among 14 administrative wards, ranging from 1,052 in Ward 14 to 23,278 in Ward 8. The data also shows that approximately three fourths of slu ms located on private land (74.6%), followed by state government (15.3%), railwa y (6.9%), the Pune Municipal Corporation (PMC) (1.7%), central government (0.8%) , and MHADA (0.6%). More then half the slums located on land designated by the D evelopment Plan as residential areas (68.3%), followed by natural areas (9.4%), areas reserved for the Economic Weaker Sections (EWS) (8.2%), railway (3.6%), ag riculture (2.5%), areas reserved for public use (2.1%), industrial (1.7%), defen se (1.5%), commercial (1.0%), and others (1.7%). Among 238 notified slums, 31 sl ums (13.1%) were notified before 1980, 161 slums (67.9%) were notified between 1 981-1990, 43 slums (18.1%) were notified between 1991-2000, 2 slums (0.8%) were notified after 2001 (Figure 13). Interestingly, approximately 45% of notified sl ums were notified in 1983 or 1984 and few slums have been notified since the lat e 1990s. I will explore what shaped such trends in my planned fieldwork in Pune. Table 10. Total and slum populations in the city of Pune, 1961-2001. Source: Census of India and ESR 2004-05, cited in Pune Municipal Corporation, 20 06.

Table 11. Basic statistics of slums in the city of Pune as of 2011. Source: MASHAL, 2011. Figure 13. Notification year of slums in Pune. Source: MASHAL, 2011. Slum projects Several policies and projects for people in slums have been implemented in Pune. The PMC is currently conducting a detailed survey of the socio-economic st atus of each slum to prepare a city-wide plan for slum rehabilitation under the Rajiv Awas Yojana (RAY), the current central government initiative aiming for sl um-free India (Sep 5, 2012, Indian Express). In this section, I introduce the Ba sic Services to the Urban Poor (BSUP), Slum Rehabilitation Scheme (SRS), and a c ouple of other projects. Basic Services to the Urban Poor (BSUP): In-situ slum upgrading projects PMC has launched in-situ slum upgrading projects under the Basic Services t o the Urban Poor (BSUP) of the Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission ( JNNURM), which is a central government s initiative to upgrade infrastructure in t argeted cities across India. In Pune, three NGOs appointed by the PMC the SPARC, t he MASHAL, and the VRP Associates have been undertaking the projects since 2009, t argeting 4,000 slum households (MASHAL, 2011; Pawar, Mhaskar, Ambashta, & Nagpur e, 2011). These NGOs and appointed architects are supposed to cooperative with s lum residents for designing and constructing new multi-story housing in situ. Sl um dwellers who participate in this scheme are required to contribute 10% of the project costs. On completion of the project, tenure rights are provided to the co-operative of slum dwellers and their settlements are de-notified. Slum Rehabilitation Scheme (SRS) Another redevelopment scheme, the Slum Rehabilitation Scheme (SRS), has bee n implemented in Pune under the auspices of the Slum Rehabilitation Authority (S RA), the state agency in charge of SRS. SRS was first launched in Mumbai in the 1990s (Sundar Burra, 2005; Mukhija, 2003; Nijman, 2008), and now the central gov ernment attempts to promote the redevelopment scheme in other cities. Under the scheme, the SRA incentivizes private developers to redevelop slums by awarding t he Transfer of Development Rights (TDR). The developers engaged in the SRS proje cts can load TDR on other housing projects, which allows those buildings to be h igher than the limit set by the floor-area-ratio (FAR) of the site. Alternativel y, the developers can sell the TDR to other builders. By contributing 10% of the costs, eligible slum dwellers who have lived in the notified slums since 1995 a re entitled to new rooms on the redeveloped sites. According to the Pune Slum At las, 10 projects have been completed, rehabilitating 2,195 slum dwellers, and 35 projects are ongoing, targeting 11,270 slum dwellers (Table 12). Table 12. Projects implemented in the city of Pune, as of 2011. Source: MASHAL, 2011. Other projects Under the Paid Toilet Scheme, PMC has provided 773 sanitation blocks and co nstructed about 12,000 toilet seats in slum areas (S. Burra, Patel, & Kerr, 2003 ). The Valmiki-Ambedkar Awas Yojna provides Rs, 50,000 subsidy to households who have lived in slums since 1995 for a house of 225 sq.ft. Under the scheme, 2,00 0 houses are supposed to be built. PMC also aims to build another 2,000 houses f or the low-income groups under the Lok Awas Yojna. PMC has launched the Photo Pa ss Scheme, which issue photo passes to slum dwellers who have settled in slums s ince 1995 as identification proofs. PMC has so far identified 18,268 individuals eligible for this scheme. In addition, the Government Redevelopment Scheme has

been implemented in about 78 slums across Pune. I will include the beneficiaries of the projects above except for SRS. This is because people in redeveloped slums must have a quite different pattern for housing investment from other households. Since the number of participants in SR S projects is small, excluding them will not significantly affect my research de sign. Tenure security in slums Unlike Mumbai, large scale of eviction has been rare in Pune. Throughout th e 1980s, the PMC attempted to relocate a sizable number of families living in sl ums on the Parvati Hills (Bapat, 1983, 1985, 2004). In 1983, the PMC launched a rehabilitation project that aimed to clear 7 slum settlements on the landmark of the city by relocating more than 10,000 families to the then peripheral areas. Remedying water pollution was the stated objective of the project but actual mot ivation came from the middle-class dislike for squatters and the private capital watching for the valuable land. The reaction of slum dwellers against the projec t was not uniform; nearly 30 percent of families were willing to participate in the project. They have relatively well socio-economic background and many of the m are renters. The other residents who opposed to relocation formed a committee to protest against the project and filed a petition to the court. Although the p etition was rejected, intellectuals and social activists criticism against relocat ion without following legal procedure as an injustice act pushed the PMC to call off the project. A recent legal case regarding the relocation of a slum settlement illustrat es the critical role of slum notification in protecting tenure security. Padal V asti slum in Bopodi has been facing the threat of eviction since 1995. The encro achment started in 1973 and now more than 10,000 families live in the settlement . The PMC, which notified the settlement in 1984, provides water and electricity to them. PMC has proposed a rehabilitation scheme that aims to relocate slum dw ellers in the slum, though they refused the offer (June 13, 2011, DNA). The Loca l Military Authority claims that a part of the land belongs to the military and need to be cleared for defense use. After a series of litigation since 1995, the court recently ordered a temporal stay on the eviction order issued by the army by emphasizing the notification status of the slum (August 7, 2011, Indian Expr ess). On the other hand, the PMC has taken a series of stringent actions against unauthorized constructions and encroachment (not necessarily slums) since the co llapse of an under-construction building in Taljai. PMC demolished 900 illegal b uildings in total, spreading over 850,000 sq.ft, between July and Octorber, 2012 (Octorber 15, 2012, Times of India). Recently, PMC demolished unauthorized cons tructions spreading over 5,850 sq.ft in Kondhwa and Wanowrie on December 8 (Dece mber 9, 2012, Times of India); cleared around 12,000 sq.ft area in Amanora Park Town and Magarpatta City on December 11 (December 12, 2012, DNA India); razed un authorized constructions spreading over a 10,500 sq.ft area in Bibvewadi (Decemb er 17, 2012, Times of India).

Statement of Impact My project will bring about theoretical, methodological, and policy contrib utions. Theoretically, my project will present how to conceptualize and operatio nalize tenure security in informal settlements and its interplay with physical o utcomes and tenure formalization. This will provide a solid theoretical backgrou nd of tenure security, lack of which has been long recognized as problematic amo ng researchers in urban planning and development economics. In addition, my proj ect will widen the scope of theory by shed light on slum notification and Pune, which have been understudied in previous studies. Methodologically, the project will demonstrate the effectiveness of mixed-m ethods and SEM approaches in measuring tenure security. Many of the previous qua

litative works that explored tenure security of slum dwellers are confined to be descriptive, and systematically investigated evidence has been rare. For quanti tative studies, experimental design was touted as a powerful tool for causal inf erence, yet its practicality is severely limited in studies about slums. It will be important to show the advantage of mixed-methods approach that taps into bot h qualitative and quantitative analyses. The project will benefit policy makers in India who are involved in land an d housing policies for the urban poor. In particular, given the current situatio n, in which the central government has been preparing to offer property rights t o slum dwellers (Government of India, 2010, 2011), analyzing the effect of slum notification will be critically important. Improved understanding how slum dwell ers survive under the current informal settings and how tenure arrangement would impact their environment can help to ensure the more efficient and effective im plementation of this and other tenure regularization initiatives.

6. Descriptions of Three Studies Phase I: Exploring the Interplay of Tenure Formalization, Tenure Security, and H ousing Investment in Indian Slums. Drawing on the theoretical framework in Chapter 2, the first phase study wi ll aim to explore how slum notification has improved the tenure security of slum dwellers and thereby stimulated their housing investment across India. I will t est the following hypothesis: households in notified slums invest in their house s (either new housing construction, addition of floors, or improvement of existi ng houses) more than those in non-notified slums, controlling for their characte ristics. Methodand Data I will use the NSS 58th and 65th round housing condition survey unit data, which contain information about 5,818 and 7,150 households who lived in slums in India as of 2002-03 and 2008-09, respectively. I will run a logit model that es timates the probability of a household s investing in housing from its characteris tics: ?logit[P(CONSTRUCTION?_i)]=?+?_1 ?DURATION?_i+?_2 ?DOCUMENT?_i+?_3 ?NOTIFICATION ?_i+?_4 ?EXPENDITURE?_i+?_5 ?TAP?_i+?_6 X_i+?_i Where CONSTRUCTION = Whether the household engaged in residential construction (new bu ilding, addition, or improvement) during the last 5 years (0 = no, 1 = yes); DURATION = Duration of residence in the slum (in years); DOCUMENT = Possession of voter ID card, ration card, and/or passport (0 = no, 1 = yes); NOTIFICATION = Notification status of the settlement (0 = non-notified slum, 1= notified slum); EXPENDITURE = Monthly per capita expenditure (in Rs.); TAP = Access to tap water (0 = no, 1 = yes); X = Household and location characteristics as follows: Structure of the current dwelling (katcha, semi-pucca, or pucca); Social groups (scheduled caste/tribe, or other backward caste); Distance traveled to work (in km); Hazardous location (whether the household experienced flood during the last 5 y ears); Size of the city (less than 100k, between 100k and 500k, between 500k and 1M, o r greater than 1M). In estimating the probability, I will mitigate selection bias by multiplyin g the inverse of propensity scores as weights. When comparing the effect of slum

notification on the probability of housing investment, one needs to hold all th e other factors equal. In reality, however, there could be unobservable (i.e., u ncontrollable) factors that have systematically directed some households into no tified slums and others into non-notified slums. Without controlling for such co nfounding variables, estimation based on simple comparison of households in nonnotified and notified slums may be biased. To deal with this selection bias, pro pensity score matching is commonly used in observational studies (Austin, 2011; Gangl, 2010; Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983). The process is as follows: First, I will calculate the probability of a household living in notified slums, rather than n on-notified slums, by running a logit model. I will include in the model various predictors available in the NSS datasets. Then, I will take an inverse of the c alculated probability (or propensity of score) and apply it to the logit model a bove as weights. The estimated ?3 (or precisely its discrete change) will be the difference in the probability of housing investment stemming purely from slum n otification.

Phase II: Politics of Formalizing Slums: A Case of Slum Notification in Pune, In dia The purpose of the second-phase study will be to understand(1) the complexit y of the process of slum notification by focusing on its political aspects, (2) factors that influence tenure security of slum dwellers, and, in so doing, (3) d etermine variables to be included in the subsequent quantitative analysis. Research questions My inquiry in this phase will be motivated by three broad questions. First, who/what has determined settlements to be notified in Pune over the last 20 yea rs? I will address this question by investigating the formal rules of slum notif ication that are prescribed in written documents and informal rules that are con sciously or unconsciously shared among stakeholders. Second, how have slum dwell ers negotiate with local bureaucrats, politicians, or whomever to secure their o ccupancy in Pune? More specifically, who organized slum communities? Whom did sl um dwellers contact for negotiation and how did they reach those people? What ma de their negotiations successful or unsuccessful? Third, what has influenced ten ure security of slum dwellers in Pune? I will address this question by examining the cases in which notification status of a slum protected/ did not protect its residents from forcible eviction. I will also assess the effect of de facto ten ure security by investigating whether slum communities with political affiliatio n have not faced threat of eviction. Method and Data This qualitative case study will rely on interviews, document analysis, and site observations during the planned field research in Pune from June 2013 to A ugust 2013. In this exploratory inquiry, data collection and data analysis will proceed simultaneously. I will choose at least five slum settlements in Pune for case study. The se lection criteria is (1) notification status of the settlement (non-notified or n otified), (2) the level of tenure security that a majority of residents in the s ettlement (high, residents have not faced threat of eviction; low, residents rec ently faced threat of eviction), and (3) political affiliation (whether the comm unity has received political support). There could be 8 cases based on the crite ria, as shown on Table 13. Although I will ideally have all the eight cases, I w ill identify at least five cases (case 2, 3, 4, 6, and 7) so that I can compare how notification and political support affect tenure security of slum dwellers. Information about notification status of slum settlements is available in the Pu ne Slum Atlas. I will find out tenure security and political support of slum set tlements by collecting newspaper articles that report eviction in slums and by c onsulting local bureaucrats, politicians, and professional experts. Other site c

haracteristics are held as equal as possible to make the cases compatible. Withi n each settlement, I will interview 5-10 households, including community leaders . Table 13. Case selection for the phase II study. Low 6 High 5 Case 4 No 2 Yes 1 Political support Notification Tenure security 8 7 3 To address the first research question, I will conduct semi-structured inte rviews with local bureaucrats, politicians, and other stakeholders, if any (See Appendix A for the list of interviewees and questions). In the interviews, I wil l let them describe how they actually behaved in specific cases (i.e., notificat ion of some settlements) so that I will be able to infer formal and informal rul es in the implementation of slum notification policy. Formal rules may be stipul ated in official or unofficial government documents. Informal rules are those no t written but shared only among specific persons, consciously or unconsciously. To corroborate the statements of interviewees, I will interview other people such as residents in the slums, NGO workers, and architects who were involved in the no tification process of the settlements. In addition, I will examine newspaper art icles and government and legal documents. For the second research question, I will interview households in settlement s that I select as the cases for this study, local bureaucrats, politicians, and professionals who have worked for the communities. I will ask residents in the slums to describe how they organized themselves and how they approached local bu reaucrats, politicians, or any other stakeholders to secure their tenure. The on e-hour semi-structured interviews will be conducted in the residence of the info rmants or any other places where they feel comfortable and their privacy is secu red. I will record the interviews in digital audio format and transcribe them fo r analysis by coding. The interviewees will be kept anonymous to protect their p rivacy and reduce psychological barrier in telling personal stories. For the int erviews, I will hire a research assistant (local college student) who can commun icate with local residents in local languages (Hindi or Marathi). To explore what contributes to tenure security of households in slums, I wi ll compare the eight cases to examine how slum notification and political affili ation could influence tenure security. If the cases above involve legal litigati ons, I will carefully investigate legal documents. To explore perceived tenure s ecurity, I will interview residents in the slums. I will ask them to describe ho w they faced threat of eviction and how they felt and dealt with it. I will also ask the households about what they think protected (or would have protected) th em from the threat of eviction. In particular, I will ask them about how they ev aluate the following as such protection: slum notification, possession of docume nt, duration of residence, money, housing structure, connection to infrastructur e and services.

Phase III: Measuring Tenure Security and its Link to Housing Investment in Slum in Pune, India: A Structural Equation Modeling Approach The purpose of the study will be to identify what has contributed to househ olds tenure security and thereby expedited their housing investment in slums in P une. For the purpose, the study will explore the following research questions: What has contributed to tenure security (in particular perceived tenure securit y) of households in slums in Pune? In particular, to what extent and how has slu m notification improved their tenure security? Does notification status matter e ven if formative indicators of de facto tenure security are controlled? To what extent is tenure security related to the frequency, timing, and amount of housing investment by slum households in Pune? To what extent has slum notification improved housing and access to infrastruct

ure and services in slums in Pune? To explore the questions above, I will employ a multi-level MIMIC model to measu re what contributes to perceived tenure security of slum households and how the degree of perceived tenure security is associated with the intensity of housing investment or the quality of living conditions. I will collect survey from 1,000 households in 50 slum settlements in Pune for the analysis, during my planned f ieldwork from October 2013 to December 2013. Data collection Sampling frame and sample selection The sampling frame is all the households living in the 477 slums identified in the Pune Slum Atlas in the city of Pune as of the timing of the survey. The sample size is 1,000, which is a minimum size to gain variations enough to condu ct a multilevel model, according to simulation studies.16 I will choose 20 hous eholds from 50 slums, totaling to 1,000 households based on two-stage sampling. The procedure of sampling is as follows. First, I will select 25 non-notified sl ums and 25 notified slums so that the number of selected settlements can be as p roportional to the number of existing settlements in each ward as possible. In e ach selected slum, I will randomly choose 20 households. Table 14 shows the samp le distribution among 14 administrative wards (it is noted that at least one non -notified slum and one notified slum are selected in each ward). I will select 20 households from each selected slum settlement as follows. Let us think about how to choose samples in Ward 5. I will randomly select 3 non -notified slums and 3 notified slums from 37 non-notified and 25 notified slums in ward 5 by referencing to the map in the Pune Slum Atlas (Figure 14). I will d etermine intervals between households to be selected in each settlement by refer encing to the Pune Slum Atlas (Figure 15). A simplest way to calculate the inter vals is to divide the number of households in each settlement by the number of h ouseholds to be selected, or 20. Let s say the interval is calculated to be 15 in a settlement. After gaining permission of the survey from community leader, surv eyors will first walk around within the settlement to see if there is any signif icant change in its configuration. Then, each surveyor will start walking from d ifferent places and survey every 15 households along the routes. The surveyors w ill start from different points (e.g., from north/south) at different timing (e. g., morning/evening) so as not to collect biased sample. If the surveyors find a multiple number of households living in a structure, they will count all of the m in. Surveyors will primarily survey household heads or, in case of his/her abs ence, someone who can answer questions. If no one who can respond is present, su rveyors will move on to the next households. Surveyors record the location of ea ch household by using GPS and basic identity information. What if new slum settlements have formed in Pune since 2011 (after the Pune Slu m Atlas was published)? I assume that the number of slums in the city of Pune ha ve not significantly changed since the time of the Pune Slum Atlas compiled beca use new slums have been emerging outside the city boundary. Having said that, I will ask local planners if any large new slum recently emerged. I will include t hem in the sampling frame only if they are substantially large. This will not dr amatically damage my statistical estimation. What if the configurations of slum settlements have substantially changed from those depicted in the Pune Slum Atlas? This might be problematic if it makes it difficult for surveyors to find out respondents correctly. There are two possibl e typological transformations in slums: vertical densification and horizontal ex pansion. In the former case, surveyors will need to count how many households li ve in a multi-storied structure. In the latter case, I will include the extended area to the survey area rather than sticking to the atlas. In either case, I wi ll first ask community leaders if the number of households have recently signifi cantly increased. If so, I will recalculate intervals. What if surveyors do not choose households appropriately? I will accompany surv eyors as often as possible to check the procedure. In addition, I will check the

location information of surveyed households recorded by the surveyors with GPS appliances everyday in order to make sure that respondents spread over the settl ement. What if households refuse to be surveyed? In the case, surveyors record the loc ation of the households and move on to the next household. Surveyors will contin ue to collect surveys until they collect 20 surveys. If surveyors encounter a se ries of refusal, I will stop the survey for the time being and detect possible p roblems. Table 14. Sampling frame and sample of the third-phase study.

Figure 14. Slum locations in Ward 5. Source: MASHAL, 2011.

Figure 15. Structure map within slum settlement. Source: MASHAL, 2011. Survey design and procedure The survey for this study will be a written questionnaire, consisting of 50 to 60 items. The survey form is attached in Appendix B, though the questions wi ll change depending on the findings from the second-phase study. The questions a re about (1) living conditions; (2) tenure security; (3) household characteristi cs; (4) settlement characteristics; and (5) information about the identification of the sample. The survey form will be written on papers in English, Hindi, and Marathi (local language). I will conduct a preliminary test in a settlement to check if all the questions are clear and the survey process proceeds smoothly. The survey process is as follows. First, surveyors will explain the purpose of the survey to respondents how their privacy will be protected. Surveyors wil l ask them to sign the consent form (Appendix C). Then, surveyors will read each question out in front of respondents and fill in answers from respondents on be half of them. For some items about living conditions (e.g., floor area), surveyo rs will help respondents measure it. I expect that it will take 30 minutes to on e hour for a respondent to answer all questions. I will type the collected surve y forms into csv format on my laptop everyday. For this survey collection, I will hire 10 research assistants as surveyors . I will recruit students at the University of Pune with help from staff at the Center for Development Studies and Activities (CDSA), which is a research instit ute affiliated with the University of Pune and has offered help for my field res earch. I will reward them US$8 per day, which is a reasonable amount for motivat ed undergraduate student according to a local researcher in Pune. Thus, it will take $1,600 for the hiring of research assistants, which will be covered by the NSF funding. Each surveyor will collect five surveys a day, so it will take 20 d ays at fastest to collect 1,000 surveys (I expect 3 months). I will provide them explanation about the purpose and procedure of the survey before starting the s urvey collection. What if a respondent refuses to answer some questions? Although I will test a v ariety of wording in the preliminary test and choose the best one, surveyors wil l leave the question in case of refusal and move on to the next question. I will statistically check if any specific patterns exist in missing data. What if respondents overstate/understate in their answers? Households might be inclined to provide imprecise information in sensible questions about, for examp le, their income. If surveyors feel an answer unreasonable, they will ask the qu estion again to confirm the answer.

Data analysis The statistical model for this study will be a multilevel MIMIC model, an a dvanced type of structural equation modeling (SEM) approach. In general, the ess ence of SEM approach is to investigate the relationships among latent variables from their relationships with observed variables based on their covariance infor mation (Joreskog & Goldberger, 1975; Joreskog, 1981). Figure below graphically p resents the model. The model consists of within and between parts, which measure s household-level and settlement-level tenure securities, respectively. The with in model contains (1) a latent variable that indicates the degree of perceived t enure security of a slum household, (2) reflective indicators that reflect the d egree of perceived tenure security, (3) outcome of perceived tenure security (e. g., housing investment or quality of housing), (4) formative indicators of legal and de facto tenure securities, and (5) other factors that influence perceived tenure security and/or its outcome. The between model is structured similarly, y et variables are all about settlement-level variations. I will estimate within a nd between models simultaneously.

Figure 4. Measurement models of tenure security. Notes: Tenure securities are placed in ellipses since it is an unobservable (lat ent) hypothetical construct. Formative indicators are placed in rectangles, indi cating that they are observable. While reflective indicators and housing investm ent are observable (in rectangles) at household level, their community-level var iations are not directly observable (in ellipses). Arrows indicate causal direct ions. As with other SEM models, both within and between models consist of measure ment and structural parts. The measurement part estimates the relationship betwe en latent variable and its reflective indicators based on factor analysis. The m easurement part of the within model is expressed as follows: Y_ij=?_j+?_j ?SECURITY?_j+?_ij (1) where i and j indicate households and settlements, respectively; Yi is a vector of reflective indicators ; ? is a vector of variable intercepts; ?i is a vector of error terms; ? is a loading matrix, SECURITYi is a vector of random effects ( perceived tenure security). In SEM, structural part estimates the relationship b etween latent variable and its formative indicators and other covariates. The st ructural part of the within model is given as follows: ?SECURITY?_ij=?_1j+?_1j X_ij+?_1ij (2) ?HOUSING?_ij=?_2j+?_j ?SECURITY?_ij+?_2j X_ij+?_2ij (3)

where HOUSING indicates the amount/propensity of housing investment or the quali ty of housing, ? is a vector of intercept terms, ? is a matrix of structural reg ression parameters, ? is a matrix of slop parameters for exogenous covariates (f ormative indicators), and ?i is a vector of latent variable regression residuals . The between model is formulated as follows: SECURITY=?_1+?_1 X_j+?_1j (4) HOUSING=?_2+??SECURITY?_j+?_2 X_j+?_2j (5) where the vector ?i contains all the random effects; ?i is a vector of all settl ement-level covariates. The vector ? and matrices ? and ? contain estimated fixe d effects; ? contains means of the random effect distributions and intercepts of between structural equations, ? contains regression slopes of random effects re gressed on each other, and ? contains regression slopes of random effects regres

sed on exogenous settlement-level regressors. ?i is a settlement-level residuals . The variables to be included in the model is listed in Table 15 (for the full list, see Appendix B).

Table 15. Examples of variables in MIMIM model. Estimation results of the model above will provide clear answers to the res earch question of the third-phase study. The magnitude of influence of formative indicators (including slum notification) on perceived tenure security will be i ndicated by the estimated coefficients of the paths (?1 in equation 2 and ?1 in equation 4). The strength of the link between the degree of perceived tenure sec urity and the amount or propensity of housing investment (or quality of housing and infrastructure/services) will be indicated by the estimated coefficients ? i n equation 3 and ? in equation 5. The model above will handle problems stemming form hierarchical data and se lection bias. The primary data for the analysis is a hierarchical data in which households are nested in settlements. To separate household-level variation and settlement-level variation, I will use multilevel model, which simultaneously es timates within and between models. Selection bias becomes an issue when assessin g the impact of slum notification on tenure security and housing investment. If slum notification is not randomly assigned to slum settlements, simply comparing two groups (notified and non-notified slums) does not result in reliable estima tion of the pure effect of slum notification. Propensity score matching is a met hod widely used in observational studies to deal with such selection bias. The s trategy is to calculate the probability of being notified from available informa tion and use the inverse of the probability as weights in the MIMIC model. This estimation with inverse probability weight (IPW) is generally considered doubly robust; i.e., robust for both selection bias and misspecification of the model.

1 When I use slum without referring to any specific countries, the term, following UN-Habitat s (2003) operational definition, broadly refers to a settlement charac terized by inadequate access to safe water; inadequate access to sanitation and other infrastructure; poor structural quality of housing; overcrowding; and inse cure residential status. In addition, such settlements are often associated with varying level of informality. I will introduce the definitions of slums in the Indian context later. 2 I use tenure formalization and tenure regularization interchangeably in this p aper. 3 Precisely, the third definition is not confined to legal rights. UN-Habitat (2 008, p. 5) defines land rights as socially or legally recognized entitlements to access, use and control areas of land and related natural resources. 4 van Gelder (2009) empirically shows that households estimated risk of eviction and fear for eviction are distinguishable and the latter is a better predictor o f their investment in housing. 5 In India, more than a third of slum households are renters (NSSO, 2010b). 6 NSSO has collected surveys at household-level, including both slum- and non-sl um residents, about their housing characteristics and construction activities in 49th (1993), 58th (2002-03), 65th (2008-09) rounds. NSSO has also collected slu m settlement-level surveys in the same rounds. Although both surveys cover the e ntire nation, their samples are different. 7 In use of the NSS data hereafter, I apply the sampling weights provided in the datasets. 8 It is noted that slum notification policy does not apply to settlements on lan d owned by the central government. 9 In India, pucca refers to permanent materials, such as brick, stone, and cemen

t. Katcha refers to temporary materials, such as mud, bamboo, and wood. Pucca ho using is the housing with both roof and walls built with pucca materials, semi-p ucca housing is the housing with only either roof or walls built with pucca mate rials, and katcha housing is the housing with both roof and walls built with kat cha materials. 10 Interestingly, only 62 percent of households who plan to construct in the nex t 2 years in notified slums possess the document. 11 Figure 14 in Appendix C illustrates the types of housing structure by duratio n of residence in slums. Interestingly, while the proportion of pucca housing in creases as duration of residence longer in non-notified slums, it decreases in n otified slums. 12 Monthly per capita expenditure of households in notified slums is overall hig her than those in non-notified slums, regardless of their duration of residence (Figure 8). Expenditure level of households in non-notified and notified slums r ises until their duration of residence reaches 50 years. 13 This finding holds even if I reduce selection bias by using propensity score matching. 14 I do not discuss here but there has been a critical debate about the SPARC s st rategy (Buckley, 2011; Roy, 2009b). 15 Unauthorized colonies are the residential buildings that are built without co nforming to planning or building laws. They are not classified as slums because their living conditions do not meet the criteria I mentioned in Section 3.1. 16 A rule of thumb about minimum sample size for multilevel SEM analysis, sugges ted by several simulation studies, is 30 units from 30 groups (900 units) or, if primary interest is in group-level variables, 20 units from 50 groups (1,000 un its) (Preacher, Zhang, & Zyphur, 2011). ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------