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Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. 152154 July 15, 2003
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (SPECIAL FIRST DIVISION), FERDINAND E. MARCOS (REPRESENTED BY HIS ESTATE/HEIRS: IMELDA R. MARCOS, MARIA IMELDA [IMEE] MARCOS-MANOTOC, FERDINAND R. MARCOS, JR. AND IRENE MARCOS-ARANETA) AND IMELDA ROMUALDEZ MARCOS, respondents. CORONA, J.: This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking to (1) set aside the Resolution dated January 31, 2002 issued by the Special First Division of the Sandiganbayan in Civil Case No. 0141 entitledRepublic of the Philippines vs. Ferdinand E. Marcos, et. al., and (2) reinstate its earlier decision dated September 19, 2000 which forfeited in favor of petitioner Republic of the Philippines (Republic) the amount held in escrow in the Philippine National Bank (PNB) in the aggregate amount of US$658,175,373.60 as of January 31, 2002. BACKGROUND OF THE CASE On December 17, 1991, petitioner Republic, through the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a petition for forfeiture before the Sandiganbayan, docketed as Civil Case No. 0141 entitled Republic of the Philippines vs. Ferdinand E. Marcos, represented by his Estate/Heirs and Imelda R. Marcos, pursuant to RA 13791 in relation to Executive Order Nos. 1,2 2,3 144 and 14-A.5 In said case, petitioner sought the declaration of the aggregate amount of US$356 million (now estimated to be more than US$658 million inclusive of interest) deposited in escrow in the PNB, as ill-gotten wealth. The funds were previously held by the following five account groups, using various foreign foundations in certain Swiss banks: (1) Azio-Verso-Vibur Foundation accounts; (2) Xandy-Wintrop: Charis-Scolari-Valamo-Spinus- Avertina Foundation accounts; (3) Trinidad-Rayby-Palmy Foundation accounts; (4) Rosalys-Aguamina Foundation accounts and (5) Maler Foundation accounts. In addition, the petition sought the forfeiture of US$25 million and US$5 million in treasury notes which exceeded the Marcos couple's salaries, other lawful income as well as income from legitimately acquired property. The treasury notes are frozen at the Central Bank of the Philippines, now Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, by virtue of the freeze order issued by the PCGG.
11. At the outset, however, it must be pointed out that based on the Official Report of the Minister of Budget, the total salaries of former President Marcos as President form 1966 to 1976 was P60,000 a year and from 1977 to 1985, P100,000 a year; while that of the former
P16,408,442.00 - 100.00%
15. FM's official salary pertains to his compensation as Senate President in 1965 in the amount of P15,935.00 and P1,420,000.00 as President of the Philippines during the period 1966 until 1984. On the other hand, Imelda reported salaries and allowances only for the years 1979 to 1984 in the amount of P1,191,646.00. The records indicate that the reported income came from her salary from the Ministry of Human Settlements and allowances from Food Terminal, Inc., National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation, National Food Authority Council, Light Rail Transit Authority and Home Development Mutual Fund.
4. Respondents ADMIT paragraphs 3 and 4 of the Petition. 5. Respondents specifically deny paragraph 5 of the Petition in so far as it states that summons and other court processes may be served on Respondent Imelda R. Marcos at the stated address the truth of the matter being that Respondent Imelda R. Marcos may be served with summons and other processes at No. 10-B Bel Air Condominium 5022 P. Burgos Street, Makati, Metro Manila, and ADMIT the rest. xxx xxx xxx
10. Respondents ADMIT paragraph 11 of the Petition. 11. Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 12 of the Petition for lack of knowledge sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegation since Respondents were not privy to the transactions and that they cannot remember exactly the truth as to the matters alleged. 12. Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 13 of the Petition for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegation since Respondents cannot remember with exactitude the contents of the alleged ITRs and Balance Sheet. 13. Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 14 of the Petition for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegation since Respondents cannot remember with exactitude the contents of the alleged ITRs. 14. Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 15 of the Petition for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegation since Respondents cannot remember with exactitude the contents of the alleged ITRs. 15. Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 16 of the Petition for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegation since Respondents cannot remember with exactitude the contents of the alleged ITRs. 16. Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 17 of the Petition insofar as it attributes willful duplicity on the part of the late President Marcos, for being false, the same being pure conclusions based on pure assumption and not allegations of fact; and specifically DENY the rest for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegation since Respondents cannot remember with exactitude the contents of the alleged ITRs or the attachments thereto. 17. Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 18 of the Petition for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegation since Respondents cannot remember with exactitude the contents of the alleged ITRs. 18. Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 19 of the Petition for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegation since Respondents
In their answer, respondents failed to specifically deny each and every allegation contained in the petition for forfeiture in the manner required by the rules. All they gave were stock answers like "they have no sufficient knowledge" or "they could not recall because it happened a long time ago," and, as to Mrs. Marcos, "the funds were lawfully acquired," without stating the basis of such assertions. Section 10, Rule 8 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, provides: A defendant must specify each material allegation of fact the truth of which he does not admit and, whenever practicable, shall set forth the substance of the matters upon which he relies to support his denial. Where a defendant desires to deny only a part of an averment, he shall specify so much of it as is true and material and shall deny the remainder. Where a defendant is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of a material averment made in the complaint, he shall so state, and this shall have the effect of a denial.28
The pre-trial brief of Mrs. Marcos was adopted by the three Marcos children. In said brief, Mrs. Marcos stressed that the funds involved were lawfully acquired. But, as in their answer, they failed to state and substantiate how these funds were acquired lawfully. They failed to present and attach even a single document that would show and prove the truth of their allegations. Section 6, Rule 18 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides: The parties shall file with the court and serve on the adverse party, x x x their respective pre-trial briefs which shall contain, among others:
The opposition filed by Mrs. Marcos to the motion for summary judgment dated March 21, 2000 of petitioner Republic was merely adopted by the Marcos children as their own opposition to the said motion. However, it was again not accompanied by affidavits, depositions or admissions as required by Section 3, Rule 35 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure:
All these pleadings again contained no allegations of facts showing their lawful acquisition of the funds. Once more, respondents merely made general denials without alleging facts which would have been admissible in evidence at the hearing, thereby failing to raise genuine issues of fact. Mrs. Marcos insists in her memorandum dated October 21, 2002 that, during the pre-trial, her counsel stated that his client was just a beneficiary of the funds, contrary to petitioner Republic's allegation that Mrs. Marcos disclaimed ownership of or interest in the funds. This is yet another indication that respondents presented a fictitious defense because, during the pre-trial, Mrs. Marcos and the Marcos children denied ownership of or interest in the Swiss funds: PJ Garchitorena: Make of record that as far as Imelda Marcos is concerned through the statement of Atty. Armando M. Marcelo that the US$360 million more or less subject matter of the instant lawsuit as allegedly obtained from the various Swiss Foundations do not belong to the estate of Marcos or to Imelda Marcos herself. That's your statement of facts? Atty. MARCELO: Yes, Your Honor. PJ Garchitorena: That's it. Okay. Counsel for Manotoc and Manotoc, Jr. What is your point here? Does the estate of Marcos own anything of the $360 million subject of this case. Atty. TECSON: We joined the Manifestation of Counsel. PJ Garchitorena: You do not own anything? Atty. TECSON:
These pleadings of respondent Marcoses presented nothing but feigned defenses. In their earlier pleadings, respondents alleged either that they had no knowledge of the existence of the Swiss deposits or that they could no longer remember anything as it happened a long time ago. As to Mrs. Marcos, she remembered that it was lawfully acquired. In her Manifestation dated May 26, 1998, Mrs. Marcos stated that: COMES NOW undersigned counsel for respondent Imelda R. Marcos, and before this Honorable Court, most respectfully manifests: That respondent Imelda R, Marcos owns 90% of the subject matter of the above-entitled case, being the sole beneficiary of the dollar deposits in the name of the various foundations alleged in the case; That in fact only 10% of the subject matter in the above-entitled case belongs to the estate of the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos. In the Compromise/Supplemental Agreements, respondent Marcoses sought to implement the agreed distribution of the Marcos assets, including the Swiss deposits. This was, to us, an unequivocal admission of ownership by the Marcoses of the said deposits. But, as already pointed out, during the pre-trial conference, respondent Marcoses denied knowledge as well as ownership of the Swiss funds.
Section 2. Filing of petition. Whenever any public officer or employee has acquired during his incumbency an amount or property which is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public officer or employee and to his other lawful income and the income from legitimately acquired property, said property shall be presumed prima facie to have been unlawfully acquired. xxx xxx
Sec. 6. Judgment If the respondent is unable to show to the satisfaction of the court that he has lawfully acquired the property in question, then the court shall declare such property in question, forfeited in favor of the State, and by virtue of such judgment the property aforesaid shall become the property of the State.Provided, That no judgment shall be rendered within six months before any general election or within three months before any special election. The Court may, in addition, refer this case to the corresponding Executive Department for administrative or criminal action, or both. From the above-quoted provisions of the law, the following facts must be established in order that forfeiture or seizure of the Swiss deposits may be effected: (1) ownership by the public officer of money or property acquired during his incumbency, whether it be in his name or otherwise, and (2) the extent to which the amount of that money or property exceeds, i. e., is grossly disproportionate to, the legitimate income of the public officer. That spouses Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos were public officials during the time material to the instant case was never in dispute. Paragraph 4 of respondent Marcoses' answer categorically admitted the allegations in paragraph 4 of the petition for forfeiture as to the personal circumstances of Ferdinand E. Marcos as a public official who served without interruption as Congressman, Senator, Senate President and President of the Republic of the Philippines from December 1, 1965
In addition to their accumulated salaries from 1966 to 1985 are the Marcos couple's combined salaries from January to February 1986 in the amount of P30,833.33. Hence, their total accumulated salaries amounted to P2,319,583.33. Converted to U.S. dollars on the basis of the corresponding peso-dollar exchange rates prevailing during the applicable period when said salaries were received, the total amount had an equivalent value of $304,372.43. The dollar equivalent was arrived at by using the official annual rates of exchange of the Philippine peso and the US dollar from 1965 to 1985 as well as the official monthly rates of exchange in January and February 1986 issued by the Center for Statistical Information of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas. Prescinding from the aforesaid admissions, Section 4, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court provides that: Section 4. Judicial admissions An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same case does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made.81 It is settled that judicial admissions may be made: (a) in the pleadings filed by the parties; (b) in the course of the trial either by verbal or written manifestations or stipulations; or (c) in other stages of judicial proceedings, as in the pre-trial of the case.82 Thus, facts pleaded in the petition and answer, as in the case at bar, are deemed admissions of petitioner and respondents, respectively, who are not permitted to contradict them or subsequently take a position contrary to or inconsistent with such admissions.83
Respondents' ownership of the Swiss bank accounts as borne out by Mrs. Marcos' manifestation is as bright as sunlight. And her claim that she is merely a beneficiary of the Swiss deposits is belied by her own signatures on the appended copies of the documents substantiating her ownership of the funds in the name of the foundations. As already mentioned, she failed to specifically deny under oath the authenticity of such documents, especially those involving "William Saunders" and "Jane Ryan" which actually referred to Ferdinand Marcos and Imelda Marcos, respectively. That failure of Imelda Marcos to specifically deny the existence, much less the genuineness and due execution, of the instruments bearing her signature, was tantamount to a judicial admission of the genuineness and due execution of said instruments, in accordance with Section 8, Rule 8100 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Likewise, in her Constancia101 dated May 6, 1999, Imelda Marcos prayed for the approval of the Compromise Agreement and the subsequent release and transfer of the $150 million to the rightful owner. She further made the following manifestations: xxx xxx xxx
3. Consistent with the foregoing, and the Marcoses having committed themselves to helping the less fortunate, in the interest of peace, reconciliation and unity, defendant MADAM IMELDA ROMUALDEZ MARCOS, in firm abidance thereby, hereby affirms her agreement with the Republic for the release and transfer of the US Dollar 150 million for proper disposition, without prejudice to the final outcome of the litigation respecting the ownership of the remainder. Again, the above statements were indicative of Imelda's admission of the Marcoses' ownership of the Swiss deposits as in fact "the Marcoses defend that it (Swiss deposits) is a legitimate (Marcos) asset." On the other hand, respondents Maria Imelda Marcos-Manotoc, Ferdinand Marcos, Jr. and Maria Irene Marcos-Araneta filed a motion102 on May 4, 1998 asking the Sandiganbayan to place the res (Swiss deposits) in custodia legis: 7. Indeed, the prevailing situation is fraught with danger! Unless the aforesaid Swiss deposits are placed in custodia legis or within the Court's protective mantle, its dissipation or misappropriation by the petitioner looms as a distinct possibility. Such display of deep, personal interest can only come from someone who believes that he has a marked and intimate right over the considerable dollar deposits. Truly, by filing said motion, the Marcos children revealed their ownership of the said deposits. Lastly, the Undertaking103 entered into by the PCGG, the PNB and the Marcos foundations on February 10, 1999, confirmed the Marcoses' ownership of the Swiss bank deposits. The subject Undertaking brought to light their readiness to pay the human rights victims out of the funds held in escrow in the PNB. It stated: WHEREAS, the Republic of the Philippines sympathizes with the plight of the human rights victims-plaintiffs in the aforementioned litigation through the Second Party, desires to assist in the satisfaction of the judgment awards of said human rights victims-plaintiffs, by releasing, assigning and or waiving US$150 million of the funds held in escrow under the Escrow Agreements dated August 14, 1995, although the Republic is not obligated to do so under final judgments of the Swiss courts dated December 10 and 19, 1997, and January 8, 1998; WHEREAS, the Third Party is likewise willing to release, assign and/or waive all its rights and interests over said US$150 million to the aforementioned human rights victims-plaintiffs. All told, the foregoing disquisition negates the claim of respondents that "petitioner failed to prove that they acquired or own the Swiss funds" and that "it was only by arbitrarily isolating and taking certain statements made by private respondents out of context that petitioner was able to treat these as judicial admissions." The Court is fully aware of the relevance, materiality and implications of every pleading and document submitted in this case. This Court carefully scrutinized the proofs
Magallona vs Ermita
EN BANC
PROF. MERLIN M. MAGALLONA, AKBAYAN PARTY-LIST REP. RISA HONTIVEROS, PROF. HARRY C. ROQUE, JR., AND UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW STUDENTS, ALITHEA BARBARA ACAS, VOLTAIRE ALFERES, CZARINA MAY CASTRO, ALTEZ, FRANCIS ALVIN ASILO, SHERYL BALOT, RUBY AMOR BARRACA, JOSE JAVIER BAUTISTA, ROMINA BERNARDO, VALERIE PAGASA BUENAVENTURA, EDAN MARRI CAETE, VANN ALLEN DELA CRUZ, RENE DELORINO, PAULYN MAY DUMAN, SHARON ESCOTO, RODRIGO FAJARDO III, GIRLIE FERRER, RAOULLE OSEN
Present:
CORONA, C.J., CARPIO, VELASCO, JR., LEONARDO-DE BRION, PERALTA, BERSAMIN, DEL CASTILLO, ABAD, VILLARAMA, JR., PEREZ, MENDOZA, and SERENO, JJ.
Magallona vs Ermita
FERRER, CARLA REGINA GREPO, ANNA MARIE CECILIA GO, IRISH KAY KALAW, MARY ANN JOY LEE, MARIA LUISA MANALAYSAY, MIGUEL RAFAEL MUSNGI, MICHAEL OCAMPO, JAKLYN HANNA PINEDA, WILLIAM RAGAMAT, MARICAR RAMOS, ENRIK FORT REVILLAS, JAMES MARK TERRY RIDON, JOHANN FRANTZ RIVERA IV, CHRISTIAN RIVERO, DIANNE MARIE ROA, NICHOLAS SANTIZO, MELISSA CHRISTINA SANTOS, CRISTINE MAE TABING, VANESSA ANNE TORNO, MARIA ESTER VANGUARDIA, and MARCELINO VELOSO III, Petitioners,
- versus HON. EDUARDO ERMITA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, HON. ALBERTO
Magallona vs Ermita
ROMULO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, HON. ROLANDO ANDAYA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, HON. DIONY VENTURA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS ADMINISTRATOR OF THE NATIONAL MAPPING & RESOURCE INFORMATION AUTHORITY, and HON. HILARIO DAVIDE, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES TO THE UNITED NATIONS, Respondents. July 16, 2011 Promulgated:
x -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
Magallona vs Ermita
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This original action for the writs of certiorari and prohibition assails the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9522 (RA 9522) adjusting the countrys archipelagic baselines and classifying the baseline regime of nearby territories.
1
The Antecedents
In 1961, Congress passed Republic Act No. 3046 (RA 3046) demarcating the maritime baselines of the Philippines as an archipelagic State. This law followed the framing of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone in 1958 (UNCLOS I), codifying, among others, the sovereign right of States parties over their territorial sea, the breadth of which, however, was left undetermined. Attempts to fill this void during the second round of negotiations in Geneva in 1960 (UNCLOS II) proved futile. Thus, domestically, RA 3046 remained unchanged for nearly five decades, save for legislation passed in 1968 (Republic Act No. 5446 [RA 5446]) correcting typographical errors and reserving the drawing of baselines around Sabah in North Borneo.
2 3 4
In March 2009, Congress amended RA 3046 by enacting RA 9522, the statute now under scrutiny. The change was prompted by the need to make RA 3046 compliant
Magallona vs Ermita
with the terms of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), which the Philippines ratified on 27 February 1984. Among others, UNCLOS III prescribes the water-land ratio, length, and contour of baselines of archipelagic States like the Philippines and sets the deadline for the filing of application for the extended continental shelf. Complying with these requirements, RA 9522 shortened one baseline, optimized the location of some basepoints around the Philippine archipelago and classified adjacent territories, namely, the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG) and the Scarborough Shoal, as regimes of islands whose islands generate their own applicable maritime zones.
5 6 7 8
Petitioners, professors of law, law students and a legislator, in their respective capacities as citizens, taxpayers or x x x legislators, as the case may be, assail the constitutionality of RA 9522 on two principal grounds, namely: (1) RA 9522 reduces Philippine maritime territory, and logically, the reach of the Philippine states sovereign power, in violation of Article 1 of the 1987 Constitution, embodying the terms of the Treaty of Paris and ancillary treaties, and (2) RA 9522 opens the countrys waters landward of the baselines to maritime passage by all vessels and aircrafts, undermining Philippine sovereignty and national security, contravening the countrys nuclear-free policy, and damaging marine resources, in violation of relevant constitutional provisions.
9 10 11 12 13
In addition, petitioners contend that RA 9522s treatment of the KIG as regime of islands not only results in the loss of a large maritime area but also prejudices the livelihood of subsistence fishermen. To buttress their argument of territorial diminution, petitioners facially attack RA 9522 for what it excluded and included its failure to reference either the Treaty of Paris or Sabah and its use of UNCLOS IIIs framework of regime of islands to determine the maritime zones of the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal.
14
Commenting on the petition, respondent officials raised threshold issues questioning (1) the petitions compliance with the case or controversy requirement for judicial
Magallona vs Ermita
review grounded on petitioners alleged lack of locus standi and (2) the propriety of the writs of certiorari and prohibition to assail the constitutionality of RA 9522. On the merits, respondents defended RA 9522 as the countrys compliance with the terms of UNCLOS III, preserving Philippine territory over the KIG or Scarborough Shoal. Respondents add that RA 9522 does not undermine the countrys security, environment and economic interests or relinquish the Philippines claim over Sabah.
Respondents also question the normative force, under international law, of petitioners assertion that what Spain ceded to the United States under the Treaty of Paris were the islands and all the waters found within the boundaries of the rectangular area drawn under the Treaty of Paris.
The Issues
1. Preliminarily
1. Whether petitioners possess locus standi to bring this suit; and 2. Whether the writs of certiorari and prohibition are the proper remedies to assail the constitutionality of RA 9522.
Magallona vs Ermita
The Ruling of the Court On the threshold issues, we hold that (1) petitioners possess locus standi to bring this suit as citizens and (2) the writs of certiorari and prohibition are proper remedies to test the constitutionality of RA 9522. On the merits, we find no basis to declare RA 9522 unconstitutional.
Petitioners themselves undermine their assertion of locus standi as legislators and taxpayers because the petition alleges neither infringement of legislative prerogative nor misuse of public funds, occasioned by the passage and implementation of RA 9522. Nonetheless, we recognize petitioners locus standi as citizens with constitutionally sufficient interest in the resolution of the merits of the case which undoubtedly raises issues of national significance necessitating urgent resolution. Indeed, owing to the peculiar nature of RA 9522, it is understandably difficult to find other litigants possessing a more direct and specific interest to bring the suit, thus satisfying one of the requirements for granting citizenship standing.
15 16 17
Magallona vs Ermita
In praying for the dismissal of the petition on preliminary grounds, respondents seek a strict observance of the offices of the writs of certiorari and prohibition, noting that the writs cannot issue absent any showing of grave abuse of discretion in the exercise of judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial powers on the part of respondents and resulting prejudice on the part of petitioners.
18
Respondents submission holds true in ordinary civil proceedings. When this Court exercises its constitutional power of judicial review, however, we have, by tradition, viewed the writs of certiorari and prohibition as proper remedial vehicles to test the constitutionality of statutes, and indeed, of acts of other branches of government. Issues of constitutional import are sometimes crafted out of statutes which, while having no bearing on the personal interests of the petitioners, carry such relevance in the life of this nation that the Court inevitably finds itself constrained to take cognizance of the case and pass upon the issues raised, non-compliance with the letter of procedural rules notwithstanding. The statute sought to be reviewed here is one such law.
19 20
RA 9522 is a Statutory Tool to Demarcate the Countrys Maritime Zones and Continental Shelf Under UNCLOS III, not to
Magallona vs Ermita
Petitioners submit that RA 9522 dismembers a large portion of the national territory because it discards the pre-UNCLOS III demarcation of Philippine territory under the Treaty of Paris and related treaties, successively encoded in the definition of national territory under the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. Petitioners theorize that this constitutional definition trumps any treaty or statutory provision denying the Philippines sovereign control over waters, beyond the territorial sea recognized at the time of the Treaty of Paris, that Spain supposedly ceded to the United States. Petitioners argue that from the Treaty of Paris technical description, Philippine sovereignty over territorial waters extends hundreds of nautical miles around the Philippine archipelago, embracing the rectangular area delineated in the Treaty of Paris.
21 22
UNCLOS III has nothing to do with the acquisition (or loss) of territory. It is a multilateral treaty regulating, among others, sea-use rights over maritime zones (i.e., the territorial waters [12 nautical miles from the baselines], contiguous zone [24 nautical miles from the baselines], exclusive economic zone [200 nautical miles from the baselines]), and continental shelves that UNCLOS III delimits. UNCLOS III was the culmination of decades-long negotiations among United Nations members to codify norms regulating the conduct of States in the worlds oceans and submarine areas, recognizing coastal and archipelagic States graduated authority over a limited span of waters and submarine lands along their coasts.
23
On the other hand, baselines laws such as RA 9522 are enacted by UNCLOS III States parties to mark-out specific basepoints along their coasts from which
Magallona vs Ermita
baselines are drawn, either straight or contoured, to serve as geographic starting points to measure the breadth of the maritime zones and continental shelf. Article 48 of UNCLOS III on archipelagic States like ours could not be any clearer:
Article 48. Measurement of the breadth of the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf. The breadth of the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf shall be measured from archipelagic baselines drawn in accordance with article 47. (Emphasis supplied) Thus, baselines laws are nothing but statutory mechanisms for UNCLOS III States parties to delimit with precision the extent of their maritime zones and continental shelves. In turn, this gives notice to the rest of the international community of the scope of the maritime space and submarine areas within which States parties exercise treaty-based rights, namely, the exercise of sovereignty over territorial waters (Article 2), the jurisdiction to enforce customs, fiscal, immigration, and sanitation laws in the contiguous zone (Article 33), and the right to exploit the living and non-living resources in the exclusive economic zone (Article 56) and continental shelf (Article 77).
Even under petitioners theory that the Philippine territory embraces the islands and all the waters within the rectangular area delimited in the Treaty of Paris, the baselines of the Philippines would still have to be drawn in accordance with RA 9522 because this is the only way to draw the baselines in conformity with UNCLOS III. The baselines cannot be drawn from the boundaries or other portions of the rectangular area delineated in the Treaty of Paris, but from the outermost islands and drying reefs of the archipelago.
24
UNCLOS III and its ancillary baselines laws play no role in the acquisition, enlargement or, as petitioners claim, diminution of territory. Under traditional international law typology, States acquire (or conversely, lose) territory through
Magallona vs Ermita
occupation, accretion, cession and prescription, not by executing multilateral treaties on the regulations of sea-use rights or enacting statutes to comply with the treatys terms to delimit maritime zones and continental shelves. Territorial claims to land features are outside UNCLOS III, and are instead governed by the rules on general international law.
25 26
RA 9522s Use of the Framework of Regime of Islands to Determine the Maritime Zones of the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal, not Inconsistent with the Philippines Claim of Sovereignty Over these Areas
Petitioners next submit that RA 9522s use of UNCLOS IIIs regime of islands framework to draw the baselines, and to measure the breadth of the applicable maritime zones of the KIG, weakens our territorial claim over that area. Petitioners add that the KIGs (and Scarborough Shoals) exclusion from the Philippine archipelagic baselines results in the loss of about 15,000 square nautical miles of territorial waters, prejudicing the livelihood of subsistence fishermen. A comparison of the configuration of the baselines drawn under RA 3046 and RA 9522 and the extent of maritime space encompassed by each law, coupled with a reading of the text of RA 9522 and its congressional deliberations, vis--vis the Philippines obligations under UNCLOS III, belie this view.
27 28
The configuration of the baselines drawn under RA 3046 and RA 9522 shows that RA 9522 merely followed the basepoints mapped by RA 3046, save for at least nine
Magallona vs Ermita
basepoints that RA 9522 skipped to optimize the location of basepoints and adjust the length of one baseline (and thus comply with UNCLOS IIIs limitation on the maximum length of baselines). Under RA 3046, as under RA 9522, the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal lie outside of the baselines drawn around the Philippine archipelago. This undeniable cartographic fact takes the wind out of petitioners argument branding RA 9522 as a statutory renunciation of the Philippines claim over the KIG, assuming that baselines are relevant for this purpose.
Petitioners assertion of loss of about 15,000 square nautical miles of territorial waters under RA 9522 is similarly unfounded both in fact and law. On the contrary, RA 9522, by optimizing the location of basepoints, increased the Philippines total maritime space (covering its internal waters, territorial sea and exclusive economic zone) by 145,216 square nautical miles, as shown in the table below:
29
Extent of maritime area using RA 3046, as amended, taking into account the Treaty of Paris delimitation (in square nautical miles) Internal or archipelagic waters 166,858
Extent of maritime area using RA 9522, taking into account UNCLOS III (in square nautical miles)
171,435
Territorial Sea
274,136
32,106
Magallona vs Ermita
586,210
Thus, as the map below shows, the reach of the exclusive economic zone drawn under RA 9522 even extends way beyond the waters covered by the rectangular demarcation under the Treaty of Paris. Of course, where there are overlapping exclusive economic zones of opposite or adjacent States, there will have to be a delineation of maritime boundaries in accordance with UNCLOS III.
30
Magallona vs Ermita
Further, petitioners argument that the KIG now lies outside Philippine territory because the baselines that RA 9522 draws do not enclose the KIG is negated by RA 9522 itself. Section 2 of the law commits to text the Philippines continued claim of sovereignty and jurisdiction over the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal:
SEC. 2. The baselines in the following areas over which the Philippines likewise exercises sovereignty and jurisdiction shall be
Magallona vs Ermita
determined as Regime of Islands under the Republic of the Philippines consistent with Article 121 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS): a) The Kalayaan Island Group as constituted under Presidential Decree No. 1596 and b) Bajo de Masinloc, also known as Scarborough Shoal. (Emphasis supplied)
Had Congress in RA 9522 enclosed the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal as part of the Philippine archipelago, adverse legal effects would have ensued. The Philippines would have committed a breach of two provisions of UNCLOS III. First, Article 47 (3) of UNCLOS III requires that [t]he drawing of such baselines shall not depart to any appreciable extent from the general configuration of the archipelago. Second, Article 47 (2) of UNCLOS III requires that the length of the baselines shall not exceed 100 nautical miles, save for three per cent (3%) of the total number of baselines which can reach up to 125 nautical miles.
31
Although the Philippines has consistently claimed sovereignty over the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal for several decades, these outlying areas are located at an appreciable distance from the nearest shoreline of the Philippine archipelago, such that any straight baseline loped around them from the nearest basepoint will inevitably depart to an appreciable extent from the general configuration of the archipelago.
32 33
The principal sponsor of RA 9522 in the Senate, Senator Miriam DefensorSantiago, took pains to emphasize the foregoing during the Senate deliberations:
Magallona vs Ermita
What we call the Kalayaan Island Group or what the rest of the world call[] the Spratlys and the Scarborough Shoal are outside our archipelagic baseline because if we put them inside our baselines we might be accused of violating the provision of international law which states: The drawing of such baseline shall not depart to any appreciable extent from the general configuration of the archipelago. So sa loob ng ating baseline, dapat magkalapit ang mga islands. Dahil malayo ang Scarborough Shoal, hindi natin masasabing malapit sila sa atin although we are still allowed by international law to claim them as our own. This is called contested islands outside our configuration. We see that our archipelago is defined by the orange line which [we] call[] archipelagic baseline. Ngayon, tingnan ninyo ang maliit na circle doon sa itaas, that is Scarborough Shoal, itong malaking circle sa ibaba, that is Kalayaan Group or the Spratlys. Malayo na sila sa ating archipelago kaya kung ilihis pa natin ang dating archipelagic baselines para lamang masama itong dalawang circles, hindi na sila magkalapit at baka hindi na tatanggapin ng United Nations because of the rule that it should follow the natural configuration of the archipelago. (Emphasis supplied)
34
Similarly, the length of one baseline that RA 3046 drew exceeded UNCLOS IIIs limits. The need to shorten this baseline, and in addition, to optimize the location of basepoints using current maps, became imperative as discussed by respondents:
[T]he amendment of the baselines law was necessary to enable the Philippines to draw the outer limits of its maritime zones including the extended continental shelf in the manner provided by Article 47 of [UNCLOS III]. As defined by R.A. 3046, as amended by R.A. 5446, the baselines suffer from some technical deficiencies, to wit: 1. The length of the baseline across Moro Gulf (from Middle of 3 Rock Awash to Tongquil Point) is 140.06 nautical miles x x x. This exceeds
Magallona vs Ermita
the maximum length allowed under Article 47(2) of the [UNCLOS III], which states that The length of such baselines shall not exceed 100 nautical miles, except that up to 3 per cent of the total number of baselines enclosing any archipelago may exceed that length, up to a maximum length of 125 nautical miles. 2. The selection of basepoints is not optimal. At least 9 basepoints can be skipped or deleted from the baselines system. This will enclose an additional 2,195 nautical miles of water. 3. Finally, the basepoints were drawn from maps existing in 1968, and not established by geodetic survey methods. Accordingly, some of the points, particularly along the west coasts of Luzon down to Palawan were later found to be located either inland or on water, not on low-water line and drying reefs as prescribed by Article 47.
35
Hence, far from surrendering the Philippines claim over the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal, Congress decision to classify the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal as Regime[s] of Islands under the Republic of the Philippines consistent with Article 121 of UNCLOS III manifests the Philippine States responsible observance of its pacta sunt servanda obligation under UNCLOS III. Under Article 121 of UNCLOS III, any naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is above water at high tide, such as portions of the KIG, qualifies under the category of regime of islands, whose islands generate their own applicable maritime zones.
36 37
Magallona vs Ermita
Petitioners argument for the invalidity of RA 9522 for its failure to textualize the Philippines claim over Sabah in North Borneo is also untenable. Section 2 of RA 5446, which RA 9522 did not repeal, keeps open the door for drawing the baselines of Sabah:
Section 2. The definition of the baselines of the territorial sea of the Philippine Archipelago as provided in this Act is without prejudice to the delineation of the baselines of the territorial sea around the territory of Sabah, situated in North Borneo, over which the Republic of the Philippines has acquired dominion and sovereignty. (Emphasis supplied)
UNCLOS III and RA 9522 not Incompatible with the Constitutions Delineation of Internal Waters
As their final argument against the validity of RA 9522, petitioners contend that the law unconstitutionally converts internal waters into archipelagic waters, hence subjecting these waters to the right of innocent and sea lanes passage under UNCLOS III, including overflight. Petitioners extrapolate that these passage rights indubitably expose Philippine internal waters to nuclear and maritime pollution hazards, in violation of the Constitution.
38
Magallona vs Ermita
Whether referred to as Philippine internal waters under Article I of the Constitution or as archipelagic waters under UNCLOS III (Article 49 [1]), the Philippines exercises sovereignty over the body of water lying landward of the baselines, including the air space over it and the submarine areas underneath. UNCLOS III affirms this:
39
Article 49. Legal status of archipelagic waters, of the air space over archipelagic waters and of their bed and subsoil. 1. The sovereignty of an archipelagic State extends to the waters enclosed by the archipelagic baselines drawn in accordance with article 47, described as archipelagic waters, regardless of their depth or distance from the coast. 2. This sovereignty extends to the air space over the archipelagic waters, as well as to their bed and subsoil, and the resources contained therein. xxxx 4. The regime of archipelagic sea lanes passage established in this Part shall not in other respects affect the status of the archipelagic waters, including the sea lanes, or the exercise by the archipelagic State of its sovereignty over such waters and their air space, bed and subsoil, and the resources contained therein. (Emphasis supplied)
The fact of sovereignty, however, does not preclude the operation of municipal and international law norms subjecting the territorial sea or archipelagic waters to necessary, if not marginal, burdens in the interest of maintaining unimpeded, expeditious international navigation, consistent with the international law principle of freedom of navigation. Thus, domestically, the political branches of the Philippine government, in the competent discharge of their constitutional powers, may pass legislation designating routes within the archipelagic waters to regulate innocent and sea lanes passage. Indeed, bills drawing nautical highways for sea lanes passage are now pending in Congress.
40 41
Magallona vs Ermita
In the absence of municipal legislation, international law norms, now codified in UNCLOS III, operate to grant innocent passage rights over the territorial sea or archipelagic waters, subject to the treatys limitations and conditions for their exercise. Significantly, the right of innocent passage is a customary international law, thus automatically incorporated in the corpus of Philippine law. No modern State can validly invoke its sovereignty to absolutely forbid innocent passage that is exercised in accordance with customary international law without risking retaliatory measures from the international community.
42 43 44
The fact that for archipelagic States, their archipelagic waters are subject to both the right of innocent passage and sea lanes passage does not place them in lesser footing vis--vis continental coastal States which are subject, in their territorial sea, to the right of innocent passage and the right of transit passage through international straits. The imposition of these passage rights through archipelagic waters under UNCLOS III was a concession by archipelagic States, in exchange for their right to claim all the waters landward of their baselines, regardless of their depth or distance from the coast, as archipelagic waters subject to their territorial sovereignty. More importantly, the recognition of archipelagic States archipelago and the waters enclosed by their baselines as one cohesive entity prevents the treatment of their islands as separate islands under UNCLOS III. Separate islands generate their own maritime zones, placing the waters between islands separated by more than 24 nautical miles beyond the States territorial sovereignty, subjecting these waters to the rights of other States under UNCLOS III.
45 46 47
Petitioners invocation of non-executory constitutional provisions in Article II (Declaration of Principles and State Policies) must also fail. Our present state of jurisprudence considers the provisions in Article II as mere legislative guides, which, absent enabling legislation, do not embody judicially enforceable constitutional rights x x x. Article II provisions serve as guides in formulating and interpreting implementing legislation, as well as in interpreting executory provisions of the Constitution. Although Oposa v. Factoran treated the right to a healthful and
48 49 50
Magallona vs Ermita
balanced ecology under Section 16 of Article II as an exception, the present petition lacks factual basis to substantiate the claimed constitutional violation. The other provisions petitioners cite, relating to the protection of marine wealth (Article XII, Section 2, paragraph 2 ) and subsistence fishermen (Article XIII, Section 7 ), are not violated by RA 9522.
51 52
In fact, the demarcation of the baselines enables the Philippines to delimit its exclusive economic zone, reserving solely to the Philippines the exploitation of all living and non-living resources within such zone. Such a maritime delineation binds the international community since the delineation is in strict observance of UNCLOS III. If the maritime delineation is contrary to UNCLOS III, the international community will of course reject it and will refuse to be bound by it.
UNCLOS III favors States with a long coastline like the Philippines. UNCLOS III creates a sui generis maritime space the exclusive economic zone in waters previously part of the high seas. UNCLOS III grants new rights to coastal States to exclusively exploit the resources found within this zone up to 200 nautical miles. UNCLOS III, however, preserves the traditional freedom of navigation of other States that attached to this zone beyond the territorial sea before UNCLOS III.
53
Petitioners hold the view that, based on the permissive text of UNCLOS III, Congress was not bound to pass RA 9522. We have looked at the relevant provision of UNCLOS III and we find petitioners reading plausible. Nevertheless, the prerogative of choosing this option belongs to Congress, not to this Court. Moreover, the luxury of choosing this option comes at a very steep price. Absent an UNCLOS III compliant baselines law, an archipelagic State like the Philippines will find itself
54 55
Magallona vs Ermita
devoid of internationally acceptable baselines from where the breadth of its maritime zones and continental shelf is measured. This is recipe for a two-fronted disaster: first, it sends an open invitation to the seafaring powers to freely enter and exploit the resources in the waters and submarine areas around our archipelago; and second, it weakens the countrys case in any international dispute over Philippine maritime space. These are consequences Congress wisely avoided.
The enactment of UNCLOS III compliant baselines law for the Philippine archipelago and adjacent areas, as embodied in RA 9522, allows an internationallyrecognized delimitation of the breadth of the Philippines maritime zones and continental shelf. RA 9522 is therefore a most vital step on the part of the Philippines in safeguarding its maritime zones, consistent with the Constitution and our national interest.
SO ORDERED.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES represented by the PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG), Petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (SECOND DIVISION) and ROBERTO S. BENEDICTO, Respondents. DECISION GARCIA, J.: Before the Court is this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to nullify and set aside the March 28, 19951 and March 13, 19972 Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan, Second Division, in Civil Case No. 0034, insofar as said resolutions ordered the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) to pay private respondent Roberto S. Benedicto or his corporations the value of 227 shares of stock of the Negros Occidental Golf and Country Club, Inc. (NOGCCI) at P150,000.00 per share, registered in the name of said private respondent or his corporations. The facts: Civil Case No. 0034 entitled Republic of the Philippines, plaintiff, v. Roberto S. Benedicto, et al., defendants, is a complaint for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, reconstitution and damages. The case is one of several suits involving ill-gotten or unexplained wealth that petitioner Republic, through the PCGG, filed with the Sandiganbayan against private respondent Roberto S. Benedicto and others pursuant to Executive Order (EO) No. 14,3 series of 1986. Pursuant to its mandate under EO No. 1,4 series of 1986, the PCGG issued writs placing under sequestration all business enterprises, entities and other properties, real and personal, owned or registered in the name of private respondent Benedicto, or of corporations in which he appeared to have controlling or majority interest. Among the properties thus sequestered and taken over by PCGG fiscal agents were the 227 shares in NOGCCI owned by private respondent Benedicto and registered in his name or under the names of corporations he owned or controlled. Following the sequestration process, PCGG representatives sat as members of the Board of Directors of NOGCCI, which passed, sometime in October 1986, a resolution effecting a corporate policy change. The change consisted of assessing a monthly membership due of P150.00 for each NOGCCI share. Prior to this resolution, an investor purchasing more than one NOGCCI share was exempt from paying monthly membership due for the second and subsequent shares that he/she owned. Subsequently, on March 29, 1987, the NOGCCI Board passed another resolution, this time increasing the monthly membership due from P150.00 to P250.00 for each share.
Republic vs Hidalgo
SECOND DIVISION DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, DIVISION OF ALBAY represented by its SCHOOLS DIVISION SUPERINTENDENT, Petitioner, G.R. No. 161758 Present: QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson, CARPIO, CARPIO MORALES, TINGA, and VELASCO, JR., JJ. Promulgated: CELSO OATE, Respondent. June 8, 2007 x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x DECISION VELASCO, JR., J.: A little neglect may lead to great prejudice.
- versus -
The Case This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] under Rule 45 seeking to reverse and set aside the January 14, 2004 Decision[2]of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 60659, which affirmed the November 3, 1997 Decision[3] of the Legaspi City Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch I, declaring as null and void the December 21, 1998 Deed of Donation[4] executed by the Municipality of Daraga, Albay in favor of petitioner, and directing the latter to return to
Republic vs Hidalgo
respondent Celso Oate the possession of the portion of land occupied by the school site of the Daraga North Central Elementary School. The Facts Spouses Claro Oate and Gregoria Los Baos owned Lot No. 6849 (disputed lot) with an area of around 27,907 square meters registered under the Torrens System of land registration under Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 2563. Claro Oate had three children, namely: Antonio, Rafael, and Francisco, all surnamed Oate. Respondent Celso Oate is the grandson of Claro Oate, being the son of Francisco Oate. In 1940, Bagumbayan Elementary School of Daraga was constructed on a portion of the disputed lot. The school was eventually renamed Daraga North Central Elementary School. The Municipality of Daraga leveled the area while petitioner Department of Education Culture and Sports (DECS; now Department of Education [DepEd]) developed and built various school buildings and facilities on the disputed lot. Sometime in 1991, respondent filed a reconstitution proceeding of OCT No. 2563 which was granted by the Legaspi City RTC, Branch V after due notice, publication, and hearing. Consequently, OCT No. RO-18971[5] was issued in the name of spouses Claro Oate and Gregoria Los Baos. On August 26, 1991, a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate and Cession was executed by respondent and his three (3) sisters, namely: Melba O. Napil, Cielo O. Lardizabal, and Maria Visia O. Maldo, who waived their successional rights in favor of respondent Celso Oate. Asserting that the disputed lot was inherited by his father, Francisco Oate, from the latters father, Claro Oate, by virtue of a prior partition among the three (3) sons of Claro Oate and Gregoria Los Baos, respondent in turn claimed ownership of said lot through the deed of extrajudicial settlement. Meanwhile, the issue of whether respondents father, Francisco Oate, truly acquired the disputed lot through a prior partition among Claro Oates three (3) children had been passed upon in another case, Civil Case No. 8724 for Partition,
Republic vs Hidalgo
Reconveyance and Damages filed by the heirs of Rafael Oate before the Legaspi City RTC, Branch IX.[6] In said case, respondent Celso Oate, the defendant, prevailed and the case was dismissed by the trial court. Thereafter, respondent caused Lot No. 6849 to be subdivided into five (5) lots, all under his name, except Lot No. 6849-B which is under the name of Mariano M. Lim. On October 26, 1992, the subdivided lots were issued Transfer Certificate of Titles (TCTs): (1) Lot No. 6849-A (13,072 square meters) under TCT No. T-83946;[7] (2) Lot No. 6849-B (3,100 square meters) under TCT No. T84049;[8] (3) Lot No. 6849-C (10,000 square meters) under TCT No. T83948;[9] (4) Lot No. 6849-D (1,127 square meters) under TCT No. T83949;[10] and (5) Lot No. 6849-E (608 square meters) under TCT No. T-83950.[11] On December 15, 1992, through his counsel, respondent sent a letter to petitioner apprising it about the facts and circumstances affecting the elementary school and its occupancy of Lot No. 6849-A with an area of 13,072 square meters. Respondent proposed to petitioner DECS that it purchase Lot No. 6849-A at the Fair Market Value (FMV) of PhP 400 per square meter and also requested for reasonable rentals from 1960.[12] The records show that then DECS Director IV Jovencio Revil subsequently referred the matter to the DECS Division Superintendent Rizalina D. Saquido for investigation.[13] On February 24, 1993, through his counsel, respondent likewise wrote to Engr. Orlando Roces, District Engineer, Albay Engineering District about the ongoing construction projects in the school.[14] Engr. Roces then informed respondents counsel that petitioner DECS is the owner of the school site having acquired the disputed lot by virtue of a Deed of Donation executed by theMunicipality of Daraga, Albay in favor of petitioner.[15] Consequently, on March 18, 1993, respondent instituted a Complaint[16] for Annulment of Donation and/or Quieting of Title with Recovery of Possession of Lot No. 6849 located at Barrio Bagumbayan, Daraga, Albay before the Legaspi City RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. 8715, against petitioner DECS, Division of Albay, represented by the Division Superintendent of Schools, Mrs. Rizalina D. Saquido; and the Municipality of Daraga, Albay, represented by the Municipal Mayor, Honorable Cicero Triunfante.
Republic vs Hidalgo
In its April 28, 1993 Answer,[17] the Municipality of Daraga, Albay, through Mayor Cicero Triunfante, denied respondents ownership of the disputed lot as it alleged that sometime in 1940, the Municipality bought said lot from Claro Oate, respondents grandfather, and since then it had continually occupied said lot openly and publicly in the concept of an owner until 1988 when the Municipality donated the school site to petitioner DECS; thus asserting that it could also claim ownership also through adverse possession. Moreover, it claimed that the disputed lot had been declared in the name of defendant municipality in the Municipal Assessors Office under Tax Declaration No. 31954 from 1940 until 1988 for purposes of exemption from real estate taxes. Further,defendant Municipality contended that respondent was guilty of laches and was estopped from assailing ownership over the disputed lot. Similarly, petitioners April 29, 1993 Answer[18] reiterated in essence the defenses raised by the Municipality of Daraga, Albay and further contended that respondent had no cause of action because it acquired ownership over the disputed lot by virtue of a Deed of Donation executed on December 21, 1988 in its favor; and that respondents claim was vague as it was derived from a void Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate and Cession disposing of the disputed lot which was already sold to the Municipality of Daraga, Albay in 1940. Petitioner likewise assailed the issuance of a reconstituted OCT over Lot 6849 when the lower court granted respondents petition for reconstitution without notifying petitioner. During the ensuing trial where both parties presented documentary and testimonial evidence, respondent testified that he came to know of the disputed lot in 1973 when he was 23 years old; that he took possession of the said lot in the same year; that he came to know that the elementary school occupied a portion of the said lot only in 1991; and that it was only in 1992 that he came to know of the Deed of Donation executed by the Municipality of Daraga, Albay.[19] Also, Felicito Armenta, a tenant cultivating a portion of disputed Lot 6849, testified that respondent indeed owned said lot and the share of the crops cultivated were paid to respondent.[20] However, after respondent testified, defendants in said case filed a Joint Motion to Dismiss[21] on the ground that respondents suit was against the State
Republic vs Hidalgo
which was prohibited without the latters consent. Respondent countered with his Opposition to Joint Motion to Dismiss.[22] Subsequently, the trial court denied the Joint Motion to Dismiss, ruling that the State had given implied consent by entering into a contract.[23] Aside from the reconstituted OCT No. RO-18971, respondent presented the TCTs covering the five (5) portions of the partitioned Lot 6849, Tax Declaration No. 04-006-00681[24] issued for said lot, and the April 20, 1992 Certification[25] from the Office of the Treasurer of the Municipality of Daraga, Albay attesting to respondents payment of realty taxes for Lot 6849 from 1980 to 1990. After respondent rested his case, the defense presented and marked their documentary exhibits of Tax Declaration No. 30235 issued in the name of the late Claro Oate, which was cancelled in 1938; Tax Declaration 31954,[26] which cancelled Tax Declaration No. 30235, in the name of Municipality of Daraga with the annotation of Ex-Officio Deputy Assessor Natalio Grageda attesting to the purchase by the Municipality under Municipal Voucher No. 69, August 1940 accounts and the issuance of TCT No. 4812 in favor of the Municipality; Tax Declaration No. 8926[27] in the name of the Municipality which cancelled Tax Declaration No. 31954; and the subsequent Tax Declaration Nos. 22184,[28] 332,[29] and 04-006-00068.[30] The defense presented the testimony of Mr. Jose Adra,[31] the Principal of Daraga North Central Elementary School, who testified on the Municipalitys donation of disputed Lot 6849 to petitioner and the improvements on said lot amounting to more than PhP 11 million; and Mrs. Toribia Milleza,[32] a retired government employee and resident of Bagumbayan, Daraga, Albay since 1955, who testified on the Municipalitys continuous and adverse possession of the disputed lot since 1940. As mentioned earlier, Civil Case No. 8724 for Partition, Reconveyance and Damages was instituted by the heirs of Rafael Oate in Legaspi City RTC, Branch IX against Spouses Celso Oate and Allem Vellez, involving the same disputed lot. Petitioner and co-defendant Municipality of Daraga, Albay were about to file a
Republic vs Hidalgo
complaint for intervention in said case, but it was overtaken by the resolution of the case on August 14, 1995 with the trial court dismissing the complaint. The Ruling of the RTC On November 3, 1997, the trial court rendered a Decision in favor of respondent Celso Oate. The dispositive portion declared, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants: 1. Declaring the Deed of Donation executed by the Municipality of Daraga, Albay in favor of the defendant Department of Education Culture and Sports through the Albay Schools Division as null and void; 2. Declaring the plaintiff as the owner in fee simple of Lots Nos. 6849-A, 6849-C, 6849-D and 6849-E which are registered in his name;
3. Commanding the defendants to return the possession of the portion of the land occupied by the school site to the herein plaintiff Celso Oate; 4. Ordering the plaintiff for reason of equity, to pay the defendant Municipality of Daraga, Albay the amount of Fifty Thousand (50,000.00) Pesos pursuant to Article 479 of the New Civil Code of the Philippines; 5. The defendant Department of Education Culture and Sports being a builder in good faith, the provisions of Article 448 of the New Civil Code of the Philippines shall be observed by the parties; and 6. Ordering the defendants to pay the costs of the suit. No attorneys fees is hereby adjudged in favor of plaintiffs counsel. SO ORDERED.[33]
Republic vs Hidalgo
The trial court ratiocinated that it was clear that subject Lot 6849 was originally registered under the Torrens System in the name of Spouses Claro Oate and Gregoria Los Baos as evidenced by OCT No. RO-18971. The right of respondent Celso Oate over the disputed lot had not been proven otherwise or overturned in Civil Case No. 8724, and this was bolstered by the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate and Cession, where respondents sister waived their successional rights in his favor. Thus, the trial court ruled in favor of respondents title. Besides, it further ruled that defendants could not assail the registered title of respondent in a collateral proceeding. While the Municipality of Daraga, Albay anchored its prior ownership over the disputed lot by virtue of a sale in 1940 and mentioned TCT No. 4812 supposedly issued in its name, it however failed to submit any deed of conveyance in its favor, as well as a copy of the alleged TCT No. 4812. Hence, the trial court held that its claim over disputed Lot 6849 was based solely on adverse prescription which could not prevail over respondents registered title. The trial court concluded that given these factual and evidentiary proofs, petitioner had no right to occupy Lot 6849-A, and the Deed of Donation executed by the Municipality of Daraga, Albay in favor of petitioner must be nullified. Finally, the trial court awarded PhP 50,000 to the Municipality of Daraga, Albay for the cost of landfill and ordered that Article 448[34] of the New Civil Code be followed by the parties as petitioner was a builder in good faith. The Ruling of the Court of Appeals Aggrieved, petitioner DECS and Municipality of Daraga, Albay filed their respective Notices of Appeal[35] assailing the trial courts Decision before the CA. However, on June 17, 1998, the appellate court declared the appeals of both petitioners abandoned and dismissed for their failure to pay the required docket fees within the reglementary period.[36] Petitioner then filed a Motion for Reconsideration[37] of the said June 17, 1998 Resolution and its appeal was subsequently reinstated.[38] The Municipality ofDaraga, Albay, however, totally
Republic vs Hidalgo
lost its appeal due to inaction, and the appellate court correspondingly issued a Partial Entry of Judgment on July 9, 1998.[39] Moreover, the appellate court held that there was no jurisdictional defect in the reconstitution proceeding being one in rem, and in the issuance of OCT No. RO-18971 based on the destroyed or lost OCT No. 2563, even if no notice was sent to petitioner. Thus, the CA ruled that respondents claim of ownership over Lot 6849-A occupied by the school is conclusive for being soundly predicated on TCT No. T-83946 which cancelled the reconstituted OCT No. RO18971. Furthermore, it reiterated the trial courts holding that petitioner is precluded from attacking collaterally respondents title over the disputed lot in this proceeding. The CA emphasized that petitioners failure to present TCT No. 4812 allegedly issued in the name of the Municipality of Daraga, Albay in 1940 in lieu of OCT No. 2563 and the Deed of Conveyance executed by the original owner, Claro Oate, in favor of the Municipalitywas fatal to the defense. It reasoned that all the more had their claim of ownership become doubtful when defendantsappellants [sic] failed to explain from their pleadings and the evidence submitted before Us their failure to present the two documents.[40] The appellate court concluded that given these facts, no title in the name of the Municipality ever existed and thus it could not have validly donated the subject property to petitioner. Anent the issue of the applicability of Amigable v. Cuenca,[41] the CA affirmed the doctrine enunciated in said case that to uphold the States immunity from suit would subvert the ends of justice. In fine, the appellate court pointed out the inconvenience and impossibility of restoring possession of Lot 6849-A to respondent considering the substantial improvements built on said lot by the government which amounted to almost PhP 12 million; and that the only relief available was for the government to pay just compensation in favor of respondent computed on the basis of the value of the property at the time of the governments taking of the land. Through its assailed Decision,[42] the CA dismissed petitioners appeal for lack of merit and affirmed the trial courts decisionin toto. It reasoned that laches
Republic vs Hidalgo
does not apply, its application rests on the sound discretion of the court, and where the court believes that its application would result in manifest wrong or injustice, it is constrained not to be guided strictly by said doctrine. Besides, it opined that laches could not defeat the rights of a registered owner. The Issues Hence, we have the instant petition where petitioner raises the following assignment of errors:
I THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURTS FINDING THAT RESPONDENTS CAUSE OF ACTION TO RECOVER POSSESSION OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY IS NOT YET BARRED BY LACHES. II THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ACCORDING GREAT WEIGHT ON RESPONDENTS RECONSTITUTED ORIGINAL CERTIFICATE OF TITLE (OCT) NO. 2563 COVERING SUBJECT PROPERTY. III THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT PETITIONER MAY BE SUED IN VIOLATION OF THE STATES IMMUNITY FROM SUIT. IV THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT PETITIONER MAY BE SUED INDEPENDENTLY OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES.[43]
Petitioner basically raises two issuesthe application of laches and the nonsuability of the State.
Republic vs Hidalgo
The threshold issue is whether petitioner DECS can be sued in Civil Case No. 8715 without its consent. A supplementary issue is whether petitioner DECS can be sued independently of the Republic of the Philippines. We rule that petitioner DECS can be sued without its permission as a result of its being privy to the Deed of Donation executed by the Municipality of Daraga, Albay over the disputed property. When it voluntarily gave its consent to the donation, any dispute that may arise from it would necessarily bring petitioner DECS down to the level of an ordinary citizen of the State vulnerable to a suit by an interested or affected party. It has shed off its mantle of immunity and relinquished and forfeited its armor of non-suability of the State.[44] The auxiliary issue of non-joinder of the Republic of the Philippines is likewise resolved in the negative. While it is true that petitioner is an unincorporated government agency, and as such technically requires the Republic of the Philippines to be impleaded in any suit against the former, nonetheless, considering our resolution of the main issue below, this issue is deemed mooted. Besides, at this point, we deem it best to lift such procedural technicality in order to finally resolve the long litigation this case has undergone. Moreover, even if we give due course to said issue, we will arrive at the same ruling. The Republic of the Philippines need not be impleaded as a party-defendant in Civil Case No. 8715 considering that it impliedly gave its approval to the involvement of petitioner DECS in the Deed of Donation. In a situation involving a contract between a government department and a third party, the Republic of the Philippines need not be impleaded as a party to a suit resulting from said contract as it is assumed that the authority granted to such department to enter into such contract carries with it the full responsibility and authority to sue and be sued in its name.
Main Issue: Equitable Remedy of Laches Petitioner strongly asserts that the Municipality of Daraga, Albay had continuous, open, and adverse possession in the concept of an owner over the
Republic vs Hidalgo
disputed lot since 1940 until December 21, 1988 or for about 48 years. Significantly, it maintains that Tax Declaration No. 31954 covering the disputed lot in the name of the Municipality of Daraga, Albay contains an annotation certifying that said lot was under voucher No. 69, August, 1940 accounts. The corresponding Transfer Title No. 4812 has been issued by the Register of Deeds Office of Albay on August 3, 1940.[45] When petitioner received the lot as donation from the Municipality on December 21, 1988, it possessed the subject lot also in the concept of an owner and continued to introduce improvements on the lot. Consequently, when respondent instituted the instant case in 1993, petitioner and its predecessor-ininterest Municipality of Daraga, Albay had possessed the subject lot for a combined period of about fifty two (52) years. Petitioner strongly avers that Claro Oate, the original owner of subject lot, sold it to the Municipality. At the very least it asserts that said Claro Oate allowed the Municipality to enter, possess, and enjoy the lot without protest. In fact, Claro Oate neither protested nor questioned the cancellation of his Tax Declaration No. 30235 covering the disputed lot and its substitution by Tax Declaration No. 31954 in the name of the Municipality on account of his sale of the lot to the latter. In the same vein, when Claro Oate and his spouse died, their children Antonio, Rafael, and Francisco who succeeded them also did not take any steps to question the ownership and possession by the Municipality of the disputed lot until they died on June 8, 1990, June 12, 1991, andOctober 22, 1957, respectively. Petitioner maintains that significantly, respondent and his siblings succeeding their father Francisco as the alleged owners, from his death on October 22, 1957also did not take any action to recover the questioned lot from 1957 until 1993 when the instant suit was commenced. Petitioner avers that if they were really the owners of said lot, they would not have waited 52 long years to institute the suit assuming they have a cause of action against the Municipality or petitioner. Thus, petitioner submits that the equitable principle of laches has indubitably set in to bar respondents action to recover possession of, and title to, the disputed lot.
Republic vs Hidalgo
Laches and its elements Indeed, it is settled that rights and actions can be lost by delay and by the effect of delay as the equitable defense of laches does not concern itself with the character of the defendants title, but only with plaintiffs long inaction or inexcusable neglect to bar the latters action as it would be inequitable and unjust to the defendant. Laches is defined as the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that whichby the exercise of due diligence could or should have been done earlier.[46] Verily, laches serves to deprive a party guilty of it to any judicial remedies. Its elements are: (1) conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one under whom the defendant claims, giving rise to the situation which the complaint seeks a remedy; (2) delay in asserting the complainant's rights, the complainant having had knowledge or notice of the defendant's conduct as having been afforded an opportunity to institute a suit; (3) lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the complainant would assert the right in which the defendant bases the suit; and (4) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to the complainant, or the suit is not held barred.[47] In Felix Gochan and Sons Realty Corporation, we held that [t]hough laches applies even to imprescriptible actions, its elements must be proved positively. Laches is evidentiary in nature which could not be established by mere allegations in the pleadings and can not be resolved in a motion to dismiss (emphases supplied).[48] In the same vein, we explained in Santiago v. Court of Appeals that there is no absolute rule as to what constitutes laches or staleness of demand; each case is to be determined according to its particular circumstances.[49] Issue of laches not barred by adverse judgment against Daraga, Albay
It is unfortunate that defendant Municipality of Daraga, Albay lost its appeal in CA-G.R. CV No. 60659 before the CA for its failure to pay the required docket fees within the reglementary period. As a result, a Partial Entry of Judgment was
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made on July 9, 1998 and consequently, the dispositions in the November 3, 1997 Decision, rendered by the Legaspi City RTC, Branch I in favor of respondent Celso Oate, became final and executory as against defendant Municipality of Daraga, Albay. As an off-shoot, with respect to the Municipality of Daraga, the Deed of Donation in favor of petitioner DECS was annulledrespondent Oate was declared owner in fee simple of the disputed lots and entitled to possession but was required to pay PhP 50,000 to the Daraga Municipal Government and the costs of suit. By reason of the finality of the Decision against the Municipality of Daraga, Tax Declaration Nos. 04-006-00068, 332, 22184, 31954, and 8926 are all cancelled and annulled (if not yet cancelled). What are the effects of the final judgment against Municipality of Daraga on its co-defendant, petitioner DECS? Generally, it has no impact on the appeal of DECS unless the decision affects its defenses. In this petition, DECS no longer questions the declaration of nullity of the Deed of Donation over the disputed lot and hence can be considered as a final resolution of the issue. Likewise, it does not challenge the ownership of Oate of the disputed lots, but merely relied on the defense of laches. The final directive for Municipality of Daraga to return possession of the land has no significance on DECS appeal since precisely, it is DECS position that it should retain possession of the land. From these considerations, the final RTC November 3, 1997 Decision against the Municipality of Daraga has no substantial and material effect upon the DECS appeal. The only remaining issue left is whether laches can inure to the benefit of petitioner DECS considering the fact that Lot No. 6849-A was devoted to public education when the elementary school was built in 1940 under the supervision and control of DECS up to 1993 when Civil Case No. 8715 was filed by respondent Oate. We rule in the affirmative. Laches has set in
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A brief scrutiny of the records does show tell-tale signs of laches. The first element is undisputed: the then Bagumbayan Elementary School of Daraga was constructed in 1940 on a portion of disputed Lot 6849, specifically Lot No. 6849-A containing13,072 square meters under TCT No. T-83946. Moreover, Mrs. Toribia Milleza,[50] a retired government employee and resident of Bagumbayan, Daraga since 1955 pertinently testified, thus:
Q: How long have you been residing in this Bagumbayan, Daraga, Albay? A: Maybe I stayed there in 1955 until the present.[51] xxxx Q: Now, can you further recall the kind of building that was constructed in this property? A: Seva type, building. Q: At present how many buildings were constructed in this property? A: Plenty of school buildings. Q: Now, how many buildings were first constructed in [sic] this property? A: In 1955 only one, the Seva type, then there was constructed five (5) Marcos Type buildings during the Marcos time.[52] place,
The devotion of Lot No. 6849-A to education started in 1940 and continued up to December 21, 1988 when said lot was donated to the DECS. From then on, DECS built various buildings and introduced improvements on said lot. Lot No. 6849-A was continuously used for public education until March 18, 1993 when respondent Oate filed Civil Case No. 8715 and thereafter up to the present. Thus, for a total period of more than fifty-two (52) years, Lot No. 6849-A was exclusively and completely utilized by DECS for public education. This fact was not successfully challenged nor refuted by respondent.
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The second element of laches was likewise proven. No evidence was presented to show that respondent or his predecessors-in-interest ever took any action, administrative or judicial, nor either party questioned or protested the Municipalitys adverse occupation of a portion of Lot 6849. As petitioner had demonstrated laches by persuasive and credible evidence, it is incumbent upon respondent to show that his predecessors-in-interest indeed protected their rights of ownership over the lot. Thus, as early as 1940, when the first Seva type school building was constructed over a portion of the disputed lot, now Lot 6849-A, respondent must prove that his predecessors-in-interest indeed undertook activities to contest the occupation of the portion of the lot by the Municipality and subsequently by petitioner DECS. Unfortunately, respondent failed to substantiate such defense of ownership and possession of the lot and even skirted this issue. Respondent testified that he came to know of Lot 6849 only in 1973 when he was 23 years old.[53] He asserted that he took possession of said lot in the same year when his two (2) uncles, the brothers of his late father, passed on to him the disputed lot as his fathers share of the inheritance from the late Claro Oate and Gregoria Los Baos (his grandparents). However, it is interesting to note that he testified that he only came to know in 1991 that the elementary school was built on a portion of Lot 6849, now Lot 6849-A. These assertions are irreconcilable. Common experience tells us that one who owns a property and takes possession of it cannot fail to discover and know that an existing elementary school was built and standing on the lot from the time that the owner starts possessing a property. Nonetheless, even granting that respondent indeed only came to know of such encroachment or occupation in 1991, his rights cannot be better than that of his predecessors-in-interest, that is, Claro Oate and his uncles, Antonio and Rafael, who died in 1990 and 1991, respectively. Since respondents right over the lot originated from his predecessors-in-interest, then he cannot have better rights over Lot No. 6849-A than the latter. The spring cannot rise higher than its source. Besides, respondent has not proffered any explanation why his predecessors-in-interest did not protest and challenge the Municipalitys occupancy over a portion of their lot. Verily, with the span of around 52 years afforded respondent and his predecessors-in-interest, their inaction and delay in protecting their rights were certainly excessive and unjustified.
Republic vs Hidalgo
In the third element, the records clearly bear out the fact that petitioner DECS did not know nor anticipate that their possession and occupancy of a portion of Lot 6849 would later be questioned. In fact, petitioner built additional school buildings and facilities on the school site amounting to more than PhP 11 million. Mr. Jose Adra, School Principal of the Daraga North Central Elementary School, testified on the donation of the disputed lot to petitioner and the cost of the improvements on it.[54] After more than forty-eight (48) years of unquestioned, peaceful, and uninterrupted possession by petitioner DECS, it had no knowledge nor reason to believe that respondent would assert any right over the lot after the lapse of such long occupation coupled with a tax declaration in the name of the Daraga Municipality. Finally, the last element is likewise proven by the antecedent facts that clearly show grave prejudice to the government, in general, and to petitioner, in particular, if the instant action is not barred without even considering the cost of the construction of the school buildings and facilities and the deleterious effect on the school children and affected school teachers and personnel if Lot No. 6849A would be returned to respondent. Verily, the application of laches is addressed to the sound discretion of the court as its application is controlled by equitable considerations. In the instant case, with the foregoing considerations, we are constrained from giving approbation to the trial and appellate courts ruling that the application of the principle of laches would subvert the ends of justice. Indeed, it is unjust for the State and the affected citizenry to suffer after respondent and his predecessors-ininterest had slept on their rights for 52 years. Also, the inaction of respondent Oate and his predecessors-in-interest for over 50 years has reduced their right to regain possession of Lot 6849-A to a stale demand. Laches holds over the actual area possessed and occupied by petitioner
Republic vs Hidalgo
We, however, make the clear distinction that laches applies in favor of petitioner only as regards Lot 6849-A which is actually possessed and occupied by it. Laches does not apply to Lot Nos. 6849-B, 6849-C, 6849-D, and 6849E. These portions were never occupied by the Municipality and petitioner. Agricultural tenant Felicito Armenta testified that his father, Antonio Armenta, started cultivating portions of Lot 6849 way back in the 1940s and that he took over the tenancy in 1960 when his father stopped tilling the land. Besides, if the Municipality indeed owned Lot 6849 by virtue of a purchase, it is likewise guilty of laches in not protecting or contesting the cultivation by Oates agricultural tenants of said portions of Lot 6849. Transfer Certificates of Title on portions of Lot 6849 valid Petitioner contends that the reconstitution of OCT No. 2563covering subject lot in 1991 or 52 years after the Municipality owned said lotdoes not in any way affect the latters preferential and superior right over the disputed lot. In the same vein, it maintains that it is inconsequential that petitioner and the Municipality failed to present as evidence the deed of conveyance in favor of the Municipality, as well as TCT No. 4812 as a registered land owner may lose the right to recover possession of a registered property by reason of laches. Petitioner concludes that the long delayed reconstitution of OCT No. 2563 by respondent was a mere afterthought and intended to camouflage his and his predecessors unreasonably long inaction which indicates an awareness that they have no valid claim whatsoever over disputed Lot 6849. We disagree. It must be noted that a reconstitution proceeding is one in rem and is thus binding to the whole world. While it is true that laches has set in so far as it pertains to the portion of Lot 6849, specifically Lot 6849-A where the Municipality and petitioner DECS had constructed the existing school, such does not hold true for the totality of Lot 6849 as explained above. Indeed, the reconstitution proceeding being one in rem, the consequent issuance of OCT No. RO-18971 in lieu of the lost or destroyed OCT No. 2563 is valid.
Republic vs Hidalgo
Anent the issue of non-notification, we agree with the observation of the courts a quo that even granting arguendo that petitioner was not notified about the reconstitution proceeding, such deficiency is not jurisdictional as to nullify and prevail over the final disposition of the trial court in a proceeding in rem. More so, while petitioner strongly asserts that the certification in Tax Declaration No. 31954 attesting to the payment of the disputed lot under Municipal Voucher No. 69 and the issuance of TCT No. 4812, which was never disputed nor controverted by respondent, should have been given evidentiary weight by the trial and appellate courts as the presumptions of regularity and validity of such official act have not been overcome, such documents cannot defeat the registered title of respondent. Between a clear showing of ownership evidenced by a registered title and a certification in a tax declaration, albeit done in an official capacity, the former holds as the latter is only persuasive evidence. Indeed, tax declarations in land cases per se do not constitute ownership without other substantial pieces of evidence. The records do not show and petitioner has not given any cogent explanation why the Deed of Conveyance in favor of theMunicipality of Daraga, Albay and TCT No. 4812 were not presented. With clear and affirmative defenses set up by petitioner andMunicipality of Daraga, Albay, it is incumbent for them to present these documents. Therefore, the unmistakable inference is that there was indeed no sale and conveyance by Claro Oate of Lot 6849 in favor of the Municipality. Consequently, the TCTs cancelling OCT No. RO-18971 covering Lot Nos. 6849-A, 6849-B, 6849-C, 6849-D, and 6849-E were likewise validly issued. Thus, notwithstanding valid titles over the portions of Lot 6849, respondent Oate cannot now take possession over Lot No. 6849-A for reason of laches. In the recent case of De Vera-Cruz v. Miguel, we reiterated the principle we have consistently applied in laches:
The law[55] provides that no title to registered land in derogation of that of the registered owner can be acquired by prescription or adverse
Republic vs Hidalgo
possession. Nonetheless, while it is true that a Torrens Title is indefeasible and imprescriptible, the registered landowner may lose his right to recover the possession of his registered property by reason of laches.[56] Thus, with our resolution of the principal issue of applicability of the equitable remedy of laches, the issue of suability of the State has been mooted.
A final word. Considering our foregoing disquisition and upon grounds of equity, a modification of the final decision prevailing between respondent Oate and the Municipality of Daraga, Albay is in order. It would be grossly iniquitous for respondent Oate to pay PhP 50,000 to the Municipality of Daraga, Albay considering that he is not entitled to recover the possession and usufruct of Lot No. 6849-A. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED and the January 14, 2004 Decision of the CA in CA-G.R. CV No. 60659 affirming the November 3, 1997 Decision of the Legaspi City RTC is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS: 1) Declaring the DepEd (formerly DECS), Division of Albay to have the rights of possession and usufruct over Lot 6849-A with an area of 13,072 square meters under TCT No. T-83946 of the Registry of Deeds of Albay, as a result of laches on the part of respondent Celso Oate and his predecessors-ininterest. Respondent Celso Oate, his heirs, assigns, and successors-in-interest are prohibited from selling, mortgaging, or encumbering Lot 6849-A while the said lot is still being used and occupied by petitioner DECS. However, the rights of possession and usufruct will be restored to respondent the moment petitioner DECS no longer needs the said lot. The Registry of Deeds of Albay is ordered to annotate the aforementioned restrictions and conditions at the back of TCT No. T83946-A in the name of respondent Celso Oate. Item No. 2 of the November 3, 1997 Decision of the Legaspi City RTC is modified accordingly; 2) Declaring Celso Oate as the true and legal owner in fee simple of the following lots:
Republic vs Hidalgo
a. Lot 6849-C with an area of 10,000 square meters under TCT No. T-83948 of the Registry of Deeds of Albay; b. Lot 6849-D with an area of 1,127 square meters under TCT No. T-83949 of the Registry of Deeds of Albay; and c. Lot 6849-E with an area of 608 square meters under TCT No. T-83950 of the Registry of Deeds of Albay. 3) Declaring Mariano M. Lim as true and legal owner of Lot 6849-B with an area of 3,100 square meters under TCT No.T-84049 of the Registry of Deeds of Albay; 4) Ordering petitioner DECS and all other persons claiming under said department to return the possession of Lots 6849-C, 6849-D, and 6849-E to respondent Celso Oate and Lot 6849-B to Mariano M. Lim; and 5) Deleting Item No. 4 of the November 3, 1997 Decision of the Legaspi City RTC, which ordered respondent Celso Oate to pay Fifty Thousand Pesos (PhP 50,000) to defendant Municipality of Daraga, Albay. The November 3, 1997 Decision of the Legaspi City RTC is AFFIRMED in all other respects. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Republic vs Hidalgo
FIRST DIVISION
THE G.R. No. 161657 Present: PUNO, C.J.,Chairperson, SANDOVALA. GUTIERREZ, CORONA, AZCUNA, and GARCIA, JJ. Promulgated: October 4, 2007
HON. VICENTE HIDALGO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 37, CARMELO V. CACHERO, in his capacity as Sheriff IV, Regional Trial Court of Manila, and TARCILA LAPERAL MENDOZA, Respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x DECISION GARCIA, J.: Via this verified petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic, for short), thru the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), comes to this Court to nullify and set aside the decision dated August 27, 2003 and other related issuances of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 37, in its Civil Case No. 9994075. In directly invoking the Courts original jurisdiction to issue the extraordinary writs of certiorari and prohibition, without challenge from any of the respondents, the Republic gave as justification therefor the fact that
Republic vs Hidalgo
the case involves an overTWO BILLION PESO judgment against the State, allegedly rendered in blatant violation of the Constitution, law and jurisprudence. By any standard, the case indeed involves a colossal sum of money which, on the face of the assailed decision, shall be the liability of the national government or, in fine, the taxpayers. This consideration, juxtaposed with the constitutional and legal questions surrounding the controversy, presents special and compelling reasons of public interests why direct recourse to the Court should be allowed, as an exception to the policy on hierarchy of courts. At the core of the litigation is a 4,924.60-square meter lot once covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 118527 of the Registry of Deeds of Manila in the name of the herein private respondent Tarcila Laperal Mendoza (Mendoza), married to Perfecto Mendoza. The lot is situated at No. 1440 Arlegui St., San Miguel, Manila, near the Malacaang Palace complex. On this lot, hereinafter referred to as the Arlegui property, now stands the Presidential Guest House which was home to two (2) former Presidents of the Republic and now appears to be used as office building of the Office of the President.[1] The facts: Sometime in June 1999, Mendoza filed a suit with the RTC of Manila for reconveyance and the corresponding declaration of nullity of a deed of sale and title against the Republic, the Register of Deeds of Manila and one Atty. Fidel Vivar. In her complaint, as later amended, docketed as Civil Case No. 99-94075and eventually raffled to Branch 35 of the court, Mendoza essentially alleged being the owner of the disputed Arlegui property which the Republic forcibly dispossessed her of and over which the Register of Deeds of Manila issued TCT No. 118911 in the name of the Republic. Answering, the Republic set up, among other affirmative defenses, the States immunity from suit. The intervening legal tussles are not essential to this narration. What is material is that in an Order of March 17, 2000, the RTC of Manila, Branch 35, dismissed Mendozas complaint. The court would also deny, in another order dated May 12, 2000, Mendozas omnibus motion for reconsideration. On a petition for certiorari, however, the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. SP No. 60749,reversed the trial courts assailed orders and remanded the case to the court a quo for further proceedings.[2] On appeal, this Court, in G.R. No. 155231, sustained the CAs reversal action.[3]
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From Branch 35 of the trial court whose then presiding judge inhibited himself from hearing the remanded Civil Case No. 99-94075, the case was re-raffled to Branch 37 thereof, presided by the respondent judge. On May 5, 2003, Mendoza filed a Motion for Leave of Court to file a Third Amended Complaint with a copy of the intended third amended complaint thereto attached. In the May 16, 2003 setting to hear the motion, the RTC, in open court and in the presence of the Republics counsel, admitted the third amended complaint, ordered the Republic to file its answer thereto within five (5) days from May 16, 2003 and set a date for pre-trial. In her adverted third amended complaint for recovery and reconveyance of the Arlegui property, Mendoza sought the declaration of nullity of a supposed deed of sale dated July 15, 1975 which provided the instrumentation toward the issuance of TCT No. 118911 in the name of the Republic. And aside from the cancellation of TCT No. 118911, Mendoza also asked for the reinstatement of her TCT No. 118527.[4]until the first week of July 1975 when a group of armed men representing themselves to be members of the Presidential Security Group [PSG] of the then President Ferdinand E. Marcos, had forcibly entered [her] residence and ordered [her] to turn over to them her Copy of TCT No. 118525 and compelled her and the members of her household to vacate the same ; thus, out of fear for their lives, [she] handed her Owners Duplicate Certificate Copy of TCT No. 118527 and had left and/or vacated the subject property.Mendoza further alleged the following: In the same third amended complaint, Mendoza averred that,
since time immemorial, she and her predecessors-in-interest had been in peaceful and adverse possession of the property as well as of the owners duplicate copy of TCT No. 118527. Such possession, she added, continued
1. Per verification, TCT No. 118527 had already been cancelled by virtue of a deed of sale in favor of the Republic allegedly executed by her and her deceased husband on July 15, 1975 and acknowledged before Fidel Vivar which deed was annotated at the back of TCT No. 118527 under PE: 2035/T118911 dated July 28, 1975; and 2. That the aforementioned deed of sale is fictitious as she (Mendoza) and her husband have not executed any deed of conveyance covering the disputed property in favor of the Republic, let alone appearing before Fidel Vivar. Inter alia, she prayed for the following: 4. Ordering the Republic to pay plaintiff [Mendoza] a reasonable compensation or rental for the use or occupancy of the subject property in
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the sum of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND (P500,000.00) PESOS a month with a five (5%) per cent yearly increase, plus interest thereon at the legal rate, beginning July 1975 until it finally vacates the same; 5. Ordering the Republic to pay plaintiffs counsel a sum equivalent to TWENTY FIVE (25%) PER CENT of the current value of the subject property and/or whatever amount is recovered under the premises; Further, plaintiff prays for such other relief, just and equitable under the premises. On May 21, 2003, the Republic, represented by the OSG, filed aMotion for Extension (With Motion for Cancellation of scheduled pre-trial). In it, the Republic manifested its inability to simply adopt its previous answer and, accordingly, asked that it be given a period of thirty (30) days from May 21, 2003 or until June 20, 2003 within which to submit an Answer.[5] June 20, 2003 came and went, but no answer was filed. On July 18, 2003 and again on August 19, 2003, the OSG moved for a 30-day extension at each instance. The filing of the last two motions for extension proved to be an idle gesture, however, since the trial court had meanwhile issued an order[6] dated July 7, 2003 declaring the petitioner Republic as in default and allowing the private respondent to present her evidence ex-parte. The evidence for the private respondent, as plaintiff a quo, consisted of her testimony denying having executed the alleged deed of sale dated July 15, 1975 which paved the way for the issuance of TCT No. 118911. According to her, said deed is fictitious or inexistent, as evidenced by separate certifications, the first (Exh. E), issued by the Register of Deeds for Manila and the second (Exh. F), by the Office of Clerk of Court, RTC Manila. Exhibit E[7] states that a copy of the supposed conveying deed cannot, despite diligent efforts of records personnel, be located, while Exhibit F[8] states that Fidel Vivar was not a commissioned notary public for and in the City of Manila for the year 1975. Three other witnesses[9]Arlegui property.testified, albeit their testimonies revolved around the
appraisal and rental values of the
Eventually, the trial court rendered a judgment by default[10] for Mendoza and against the Republic. To the trial court, the Republic had veritably confiscated Mendozas property, and deprived her not only of the use thereof but also denied her of the income she could have had otherwise realized during all the years she was illegally dispossessed of the same. Dated August 27, 2003, the trial courts decision dispositively reads as follows: WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
Republic vs Hidalgo
1. Declaring the deed of sale dated July 15, 1975, annotated at the back of [TCT] No. 118527 as PE:2035/T-118911, as non-existent and/or fictitious, and, therefore, null and void from the beginning; 2. Declaring that [TCT] No. 118911 of the defendant Republic of the Philippines has no basis, thereby making it null and void from the beginning; 3. Ordering the defendant Register of Deeds for the City of Manila to reinstate plaintiff [Mendozas TCT] No. 118527; 4. Ordering the defendant Republic to pay just compensation in the sum of ONE HUNDRED FORTY THREE MILLION SIX HUNDRED THOUSAND (P143,600,000.00) PESOS, plus interest at the legal rate, until the whole amount is paid in full for the acquisition of the subject property; 5. Ordering the plaintiff, upon payment of the just compensation for the acquisition of her property, to execute the necessary deed of conveyance in favor of the defendant Republic ; and, on the other hand, directing the defendant Register of Deeds, upon presentation of the said deed of conveyance, to cancel plaintiffs TCT No. 118527 and to issue, in lieu thereof, a new Transfer Certificate of Title in favor of the defendant Republic; 6. Ordering the defendant Republic to pay the plaintiff the sum of ONE BILLION FOUR HUNDRED EIGHTY MILLION SIX HUNDRED TWENTY SEVEN THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED EIGHTY EIGHT (P1,480,627,688.00) PESOS, representing the reasonable rental for the use of the subject property, the interest thereon at the legal rate, and the opportunity cost at the rate of three (3%) per cent per annum, commencing July 1975 continuously up to July 30, 2003, plus an additional interest at the legal rate, commencing from this date until the whole amount is paid in full; 7. Ordering the defendant Republic to pay the plaintiff attorneys fee, in an amount equivalent to FIFTEEN (15%) PER CENT of the amount due to the plaintiff. With pronouncement as to the costs of suit. SO ORDERED. (Words in bracket and emphasis added.) Subsequently, the Republic moved for, but was denied, a new trial per order of the trial court of October 7, 2003.[11] Denied also was its subsequent
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plea for reconsideration.[12] These twin denial orders were followed by several orders and processes issued by the trial court on separate dates as hereunder indicated: 1. November 27, 2003 - - Certificate of Finality declaring the August 27, 2003 decision final and executory.[13] 2. December 17, 2003 - - Order denying the Notice of Appeal filed on November 27, 2003, the same having been filed beyond the reglementary period.[14] 3. December 19, 2003 - - Order[15] granting the private respondents motion for execution. 4. December 22, 2003 - - Writ of Execution.[16]
Hence, this petition for certiorari. By Resolution[17] of November 20, 2006, the case was set for oral arguments. On January 22, 2007, when this case was called for the purpose, both parties manifested their willingness to settle the case amicably, for which reason the Court gave them up to February 28, 2007 to submit the compromise agreement for approval. Following several approved extensions of the February 28, 2007 deadline, the OSG, on August 6, 2007, manifested that it is submitting the case for resolution on the merits owing to the inability of the parties to agree on an acceptable compromise. In this recourse, the petitioner urges the Court to strike down as a nullity the trial courts order declaring it in default and the judgment by default that followed. Sought to be nullified, too, also on the ground that they were issued in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction, are the orders and processes enumerated immediately above issued after the rendition of the default judgment. Petitioner lists five (5) overlapping grounds for allowing its petition. It starts off by impugning the order of default and the judgment by default. To the petitioner, the respondent judge committed serious jurisdictional error when he proceeded to hear the case and eventually awarded the private respondent a staggering amount without so much as giving the petitioner the opportunity to present its defense. Petitioners posture is simply without merit.
Republic vs Hidalgo
Deprivation of procedural due process is obviously the petitioners threshold theme. Due process, in its procedural aspect, guarantees in the minimum the opportunity to be heard.[18] Grave abuse of discretion, however, cannot plausibly be laid at the doorstep of the respondent judge on account of his having issued the default order against the petitioner, then proceeding with the hearing and eventually rendering a default judgment. For, what the respondent judge did hew with what Section 3, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court prescribes and allows in the event the defending party fails to seasonably file a responsive pleading. The provision reads: SEC. 3. Default; declaration of.- If the defending party fails to answer within the time allowed therefor, the court shall, upon motion of the claiming party with notice to the defending party, and proof of such failure, declare the defending party in default. Thereupon, the court shall proceed to render judgment granting the claimant such relief as his pleading may warrant, unless the court in its discretion requires the claimant to submit evidence .[19] While the ideal lies in avoiding orders of default,[20] the policy of the law being to have every litigated case tried on its full merits,[21] the act of the respondent judge in rendering the default judgment after an order of default was properly issued cannot be struck down as a case of grave abuse of discretion. The term grave abuse of discretion, in its juridical sense, connotes capricious, despotic, oppressive or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.[22] The abuse must be of such degree as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, as where the power is exercised in a capricious manner. The word capricious, usually used in tandem with arbitrary, conveys the notion of willful and unreasoning action.[23] Under the premises, the mere issuance by the trial court of the order of default followed by a judgment by default can easily be sustained as correct and doubtless within its jurisdiction. Surely, a disposition directing the Republic to pay an enormous sum without the trial court hearing its side does not, without more, vitiate, on due procedural ground, the validity of the default judgment. The petitioner may have indeed been deprived of such hearing, but this does not mean that its right to due process had been violated. For, consequent to being declared in default, the defaulting defendant is deemed to have waived his right to be heard or to take part in the trial. The handling solicitors simply squandered the Republics opportunity to be heard. But more importantly, the law itself imposes such deprivation of the right to participate as a form of penalty against one
Republic vs Hidalgo
unwilling without justification to join issue upon the allegations tendered by the plaintiff. And going to another point, the petitioner would ascribe jurisdictional error on the respondent judge for denying its motion for new trial based on any or a mix of the following factors, viz., (1) the failure to file an answer is attributable to the negligence of the former handling solicitor; (2) the meritorious nature of the petitioners defense; and (3) the value of the property involved. The Court is not convinced. Even as the Court particularly notes what the trial court had said on the matter of negligence: that all of the petitioners pleadings below bear at least three signatures, that of the handling solicitor, the assistant solicitor and the Solicitor General himself, and hence accountability should go up all the way to the top of the totem pole of authority, the cited reasons advanced by the petitioner for a new trial are not recognized under Section 1, Rule 37 of the Rules of Court for such recourse.[24] Withal, there is no cogent reason to disturb the denial by the trial court of the motion for new trial and the denial of the reiterative motion for reconsideration. Then, too, the issuance by the trial court of the Order dated December 17, 2003[25] denying the petitioners notice of appeal after the court caused the issuance on November 27, 2003 of a certificate of finality of its August 27, 2003 decision can hardly be described as arbitrary, as the petitioner would have this Court believe. In this regard, the Court takes stock of the following key events and material dates set forth in the assailed December 17, 2003 order, supra: (a) The petitioner, thru the OSG, received onAugust 29, 2003 a copy of the RTC decision in this case, hence had up to September 13, 2003, a Saturday, within which to perfect an appeal; (b) On September 15, 2003, a Monday, the OSG filed its motion for new trial, which the RTC denied, the OSG receiving a copy of the order of denial on October 9, 2003; and (c) On October 24, 2003, the OSG sought reconsideration of the order denying the motion for new trial. The motion for reconsideration was denied per Order dated November 25, 2003, a copy of which the OSG received on the same date. Given the foregoing time perspective, what the trial court wrote in its aforementioned impugned order of December 17, 2003 merits approval: In the case at bar, it is clear that the motion for new trial filed on the fifteenth (15th) day after the decision was received on August 29, 2003 was denied and the moving party has only the remaining period from notice of notice of denial within which to file a notice of appeal. xxx
Republic vs Hidalgo
Accordingly, when defendants [Republic et al.] filed their motion for new trial on the last day of the fifteen day (15) prescribed for taking an appeal, which motion was subsequently denied, they had one (1) day from receipt of a copy of the order denying new trial within which to perfect [an] appeal . Since defendants had received a copy of the order denying their motion for new trial on 09 October 2003, reckoned from that date, they only have one (1) day left within which to file the notice of appeal. But instead of doing so, the defendants filed a motion for reconsideration which was later declared by the Court as pro forma motion in the Order dated 25 November 2003. The running of the prescriptive period, therefore, can not be interrupted by apro forma motion. Hence the filing of the notice of appeal on 27 November 2007 came much too late for by then the judgment had already become final and executory.[26] (Words in bracket added; Emphasis in the original.) It cannot be over-emphasized at this stage that the special civil action of certiorari is limited to resolving only errors of jurisdiction; it is not a remedy to correct errors of judgment. Hence, the petitioners lament, partly covered by and discussed under the first ground for allowing its petition, about the trial court taking cognizance of the case notwithstanding private respondents claim or action being barred by prescription and/or laches cannot be considered favorably. For, let alone the fact that an action for the declaration of the inexistence of a contract, as here, does not prescribe;[27] that a void transfer of property can be recovered by accion reivindicatoria;[28] and that the legal fiction of indefeasibility of a Torrens title cannot be used as a shield to perpetuate fraud,[29] the trial courts disinclination not to appreciate in favor of the Republic the general principles of prescription or laches constitutes, at best, errors of judgment not correctable by certiorari. The evidence adduced below indeed adequately supports a conclusion that the Office of the President, during the administration of then President Marcos, wrested possession of the property in question and somehow secured a certificate of title over it without a conveying deed having been executed to legally justify the cancellation of the old title (TCT No. 118527) in the name of the private respondent and the issuance of a new one (TCT No. 118911) in the name of petitioner Republic. Accordingly, granting private respondents basic plea for recovery of the Arlegui property, which was legally hers all along, and the reinstatement of her cancelled certificate of title are legally correct as they are morally right. While not exactly convenient because the Office of the President presently uses it for mix residence and office purposes, restoring private respondent to her possession of the Arlegui property is still legally and physically feasible. For what is before us, after all, is a registered owner of a piece of land who, during the early days of the martial law regime, lost possession thereof
Republic vs Hidalgo
to the Government which appropriated the same for some public use, but without going through the legal process of expropriation, let alone paying such owner just compensation. The Court cannot, however, stop with just restoring the private respondent to her possession and ownership of her property. The restoration ought to be complemented by some form of monetary compensation for having been unjustly deprived of the beneficial use thereof, but not, however, in the varying amounts and level fixed in the assailed decision of the trial court and set to be executed by the equally assailed writ of execution. The Court finds the monetary award set forth therein to be erroneous. And the error relates to basic fundamentals of law as to constitute grave abuse of discretion. As may be noted, private respondent fixed the assessed value of her Arlegui property at P2,388,990.00. And in the prayer portion of her third amended complaint for recovery, she asked to be restored to the possession of her property and that the petitioner be ordered to pay her, as reasonable compensation or rental use or occupancy thereof, the sum of P500,000.00 a month, or P6 Million a year, with a five percent (5%) yearly increase plus interest at the legal rate beginning July 1975. From July 1975 when the PSG allegedly took over the subject property to July 2003, a month before the trial court rendered judgment, or a period of 28 years, private respondents total rental claim would, per the OSGs computation, only amount to P371,440,426.00. In its assailed decision, however, the trial court ordered the petitioner to pay private respondent the total amount of overP1.48 Billion or the mind-boggling amount of P1,480,627,688.00,to be exact, representing the reasonable rental for the property, the interest rate thereon at the legal rate and the opportunity cost. This figure is on top of the P143,600,000.00 which represents the acquisition cost of the disputed property. All told, the trial court would have the Republic pay the total amount of about P1.624 Billion, exclusive of interest, for the taking of a property with a declared assessed value of P2,388,900.00. This is not to mention the award of attorneys fees in an amount equivalent to 15% of the amount due the private respondent. In doing so, the respondent judge brazenly went around the explicit command of Rule 9, Section 3(d) of the Rules of Court[30] which defines the extent of the relief that may be awarded in a judgment by default, i.e., only so much as has been alleged andproved. The court acts in excess of jurisdiction if it awards an amount beyond the claim made in the complaint or beyond that proved by the evidence.[31][32] In the abstract, this means that the judgment must not be characterized by outrageous one-sidedness, but by what is fair, just and equitable that always underlie the enactment of
Republic vs Hidalgo
a law. While
a defaulted defendant may be said to be at the mercy of the trial court, the Rules of
Court and certainly the imperatives of fair play see to it that any decision against him must be in accordance with law.
Given the above perspective, the obvious question that comes to mind is the level of compensation which for the use and occupancy of the Arlegui property - would be fair to both the petitioner and the private respondent and, at the same time, be within acceptable legal bounds. The process of balancing the interests of both parties is not an easy one. But surely, theArlegui property cannot possibly be assigned, even perhaps at the present real estate business standards, a monthly rental value of at least P500,000.00 or P6,000,000.00 a year, the amount private respondent particularly sought and attempted to prove. This asking figure is clearly unconscionable, if not downright ridiculous, attendant circumstances considered. To the Court, an award of P20,000.00 a month for the use and occupancy of the Arlegui property, while perhaps a little bit arbitrary, is reasonable and may be granted pro hac viceconsidering the following hard realities which the Court takes stock of: 1. The property is relatively small in terms of actual area and had an assessed value of only P2,388,900.00; 2. What the martial law regime took over was not exactly an area with a new and imposing structure, if there was any; and 3. The Arlegui property had minimal rental value during the relatively long martial law years, given the very restrictive entry and egress conditions prevailing at the vicinity at that time and even after. To be sure, the grant of monetary award is not without parallel. In Alfonso v. Pasay City,[33] a case where a registered owner also lost possession of a piece of lot to a municipality which took it for a public purposes without instituting expropriation proceedings or paying any compensation for the lot, the Court, citing Herrera v. Auditor General,[34] ordered payment of just compensation but in the form of interest when a return of the property was no longer feasible. The award of attorneys fees equivalent to 15% of the amount due the private respondent, as reduced herein, is affirmed. The assessment of costs of suit against the petitioner is, however, nullified, costs not being allowed against the Republic, unless otherwise provided by law.[35]
Republic vs Hidalgo
The assailed trial courts issuance of the writ of execution[36] against government funds to satisfy its money judgment is also nullified. It is basic that government funds and properties may not be seized under writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy such judgments.[37] Republic v. Palacio[38] teaches that a judgment against the State generally operates merely to liquidate and establish the plaintiffs claim in the absence of express provision; otherwise, they can not be enforced by processes of law. Albeit title to the Arlegui property remains in the name of the petitioner Republic, it is actually the Office of the Presidentwhich has beneficial possession of and use over it since the 1975 takeover. Accordingly, and in accord with the elementary sense of justice, it behooves that office to make the appropriate budgetary arrangements towards paying private respondent what is due her under the premises. This, to us, is the right thing to do. The imperatives of fair dealing demand no less. And the Court would be remiss in the discharge of its duties as dispenser of justice if it does not exhort the Office of the President to comply with what, in law and equity, is its obligation. If the same office will undertake to pay its obligation with reasonable dispatch or in a manner acceptable to the private respondent, then simple justice, while perhaps delayed, will have its day. Private respondent is in the twilight of her life, being now over 90 years of age.[39] Any delay in the implementation of this disposition would be a bitter cut. WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila dated August 27, 2003 insofar as it nullified TCT No. 118911 of petitioner Republic of the Philippines and ordered the Register of Deeds of Manila to reinstate private respondent Tarcila L. Mendozas TCT No. 118527, or to issue her a new certificate of title is AFFIRMED. Should it be necessary, the Register of Deeds of Manila shall execute the necessary conveying deed to effect the reinstatement of title or the issuance of a new title to her. It is MODIFIED in the sense that for the use and occupancy of the Arlegui property, petitioner Republic is ordered to pay private respondent the reasonable amount of P20,000.00 a month beginning July 1975 until it vacates the same and the possession thereof restored to the private respondent, plus an additional interest of 6% per annum on the total amount due upon the finality of this Decision until the same is fully paid. Petitioner is further ordered to pay private respondent attorney's fees equivalent to 15% of the amount due her under the premises. Accordingly, a writ of certiorari is hereby ISSUED in the sense that: 1. The respondent courts assailed decision of August 27, 2003 insofar as it ordered the petitioner Republic of the Philippines to pay private respondent
Republic vs Hidalgo
Tarcila L. Mendoza the sum of One Billion Four Hundred Eighty Million Six Hundred Twenty Seven Thousand Six Hundred Eighty Eight Pesos (P1,480,627,688.00) representing the purported rental use of the property in question, the interest thereon and the opportunity cost at the rate of 3% per annum plus the interest at the legal rate added thereon isnullified. The portion assessing the petitioner Republic for costs of suit is also declared null and void. 2. The Order of the respondent court dated December 19, 2003 for the issuance of a writ of execution and the Writ of Execution dated December 22, 2003 against government funds are hereby declared null and void. Accordingly, the presiding judge of the respondent court, the private respondent, their agents and persons acting for and in their behalves are permanently enjoined from enforcing said writ of execution. However, consistent with the basic tenets of justice, fairness and equity, petitioner Republic, thru the Office of the President, is hereby strongly enjoined to take the necessary steps, and, with reasonable dispatch, make the appropriate budgetary arrangements to pay private respondent Tarcila L. Mendoza or her assigns the amount adjudged due her under this disposition. SO ORDERED.
Yujuico vs Atienza
SECOND DIVISION
TERESITA M. YUJUICO, Petitioner, G.R. No. 164282 Present: - versus PUNO, J., Chairman, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CALLEJO, SR., TINGA, and CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.
HON. JOSE L. ATIENZA, JR., Chairman, City School Board of Manila, DR. MA. LUISA S. QUIONES, Co-Chairman, City School Board, and Schools Division Superintendent, ROGER Promulgated: GERNALE, Member, City School Board of Manila, HON. MANUEL M. ZARCAL, October 12, 2005 (in substitution of ARLENE ORTIZ), Member, City School Board of Manila, BENJAMIN VALBUENA (In substitution of MILES ROCES), Member, City School Board of Manila, LIBERTY TOLEDO, Member, City School Board of Manila, HON. FRANCESCA GERNALE (In substitution of PERCIVAL FLORIENDO), Member, City School Board of Manila, ISABELITA SANTOS, Secretary, City School Board of Manila, VICENTE MACARUBBO (In substitution of ISABELITA CHING), Assistant Secretary, City School Board of Manila, CITY SCHOOL BOARD OF MANILA and JUDGE MERCEDES POSADA-LACAP, in her capacity as
Yujuico vs Atienza
PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA, BRANCH 15, Respondents. x-------------------------------------------------------------------x
Yujuico vs Atienza
On 30 June 2000, the RTC rendered a Decision[6] in the expropriation case in favor of the City. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
The judgment became final and executory, no appeal having been interposed by either party.[8] On 6 April 2001, petitioner filed a Motion for Execution of Judgment[9] which the trial court granted. Pursuant to a Writ of Execution[10] dated 28 June 2001, the branch sheriff served a Notice ofGarnishment on the funds of the City deposited with the Land Bank of the Philippines, YMCA Branch, Manila (Land Bank) to satisfy the judgment amount of P67,894,226.00, with interest at 6% per annum.[11]
Yujuico vs Atienza
Invoking jurisprudence holding that public funds cannot be made subject to garnishment, the City filed a motion to quash the Notice of Garnishment.[12] Acting on the motion, the trial court issued anOrder dated 2 August 2001. In the Order, the lower court recalled that during the hearing on the motion, the counsel for the City manifested that the amount of P36,403,170.00 had been appropriated by the City School Board (CSB) under CSB Resolutions Nos. 613 and 623, of which P31,039,881.00 was available for release. The amount of P5,363,269.00, representing fifteen percent (15%) of the assessed value of the property, had been deposited in court at the start of the expropriation proceedings and subsequently received by petitioner. In line with the manifestation made by the counsel for the City, the trial court ordered the release to petitioner of the amount of P31,039,881.00 deposited with the Land Bank, in partial payment of the just compensation adjudged in favor of petitioner.[13] The trial court further stated in the Order:
Considering that this case is on all fours with the case of the Municipality of Makati vs. Court of Appeals (190 SCRA 206), wherein it was ruled that x x x Public funds are not subject to levy and execution, the Court therefore grants plaintiffs Motion to Quash the Notice of Garnishment and the Notice of Garnishment to the Landbank of the Philippines issued by the Branch Sheriff of this Court is hereby ordered lifted. There being no opposition for the release of the Thirty One Million Thirty Nine Thousand Eight Hundred Eighty One Pesos (P31,039,881.00) deposited with the Land Bank, YMCA Branch as Special Education Fund, the Manager of the Landbank of the Philippines, YMCA, Manila is hereby directed to release the said amount to defendant Teresita M. Yujuico in partial payment of the just compensation adjudged by this Court in its Decision dated June 30, 2000.
Yujuico vs Atienza
Upon manifestation of the counsel for the plaintiff that it is the City School Board which has the authority to pass a resolution allocating funds for the full satisfaction of the just compensation fixed, the said body is hereby given thirty (30) days from receipt of this Order to pass the necessary resolution for the payments of the remaining balance due to defendant Teresita M. Yujuico.[14]
A copy of the Order dated 2 August 2001 was served on the CSB on 3 August 2001.[15] On 30 August 2001, petitioner submitted a manifestation before the trial court requesting that she be informed by both the City and the CSB if a resolution had already been passed by the latter in compliance with the Order.[16] Earlier, petitioner sent a letter to the Superintendent of City Schools of Manila to verify the CSBs compliance with the Order.[17] Not having been favored with a reply to her queries even after the lapse of the thirty (30)-day compliance period, petitioner sent a letter to the CSB dated 10 September 2001, demanding compliance with the Order.[18] As there was no action from the CSB, on 1 February 2002, petitioner filed a petition for contempt of court against respondents Hon. Jose L. Atienza, Jr., Dr. Ma. Luisa S. Quioes, Roger Gernale, Arlene Ortiz, Miles Roces, Percival Floriendo, Liberty Toledo, Isabelita Santos and Isabelita Ching in their capacities as officers and members of the CSB.[19] The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 02-102837 of the Manila RTC.[20] Countering the petition for contempt, respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss,[21] wherein they alleged inter alia that they never disregarded the Order as the matter had in fact been calendared and deliberated upon during the meetings of the CSB.[22] In their subsequent Omnibus Reply,[23]respondents argued
Yujuico vs Atienza
that petitioners failure to avail of the proper recourse to enforce the final and executory judgment[24] should not be a ground to hold them in contempt of court. Citing the case ofMunicipality of Makati v. Court of Appeals,[25] respondents asserted that petitioner should have filed a petition for mandamus to force the CSB to pass the necessary resolution for immediate payment of the balance of the just compensation awarded in her favor.[26] According to respondents, petitioner took the Order as a writ of mandamus when in fact it was a mere order in furtherance of the Writ of Execution.[27] This interpretation, respondents insisted, should never be allowed since petitioner merely wanted to escape the payment of docket fees in the filing of the petition for mandamus.[28] In an Order[29] dated 17 May 2002, the trial court denied the petition for contempt of court.
On 6 June 2002, petitioner filed a Petition for Mandamus[30] against the members of the CSB, the same respondents in the petition for contempt of court, seeking to compel them to pass a resolution appropriating the amount necessary to pay the balance of the just compensation awarded to petitioner in the expropriation case, Civil Case No. 96-79699. The petition was docketed as Spl. Civil Action No. 02-103748 and raffled to Branch 51 of the RTC of Manila. [31] Upon petitioners motion,[32] Branch 51 of the Manila RTC before which the mandamus case was pending, in an Order[33] dated
Yujuico vs Atienza
23 August 2002, directed its consolidation with the expropriation case before Branch 15.[34] In a Decision[35] dated 9 October 2002, the lower court (Branch 15) granted the petition for mandamus. Specifically, it ordered respondents to immediately pass a resolution appropriating the necessary amount and the corresponding disbursement thereof for the full and complete payment of the balance of the court-adjudged compensation still due petitioner, ratiocinating as follows:[36]
This case is on all fours with the case of Municipality of Makati v. Court of Appeals (190 SCRA 206). .... The States power of eminent domain should be exercised within the bounds of fair play and justice. In the case at bar, considering that valuable property has been taken, the compensation to be paid fixed and the municipality is in full possession and utilizing the property for the public purpose, for three (3) years, the Court finds that the municipality has had more than reasonable time to pay full compensation. The arguments of the herein respondents that passing the ordinance or the act of appropriating special educational fund is a discretionary act that could not be compelled by mandamus should be thrown overboard. It must be stressed that what we have here is a final and executory judgment, establishing a legal right for the petitioner to demand fulfillment which on the other hand became an imperative duty on the part of the respondent to perform the act required. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED, and the respondents are hereby ordered to immediately pass a resolution appropriating the necessary amount; and the corresponding disbursement thereof, for the full and complete payment of the remaining balance of the court-adjudged compensation due and owing to petitioner Teresita M. Yujuico. SO ORDERED.[37]
Yujuico vs Atienza
Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration, which the trial court denied in an Order[38] dated 13 December 2002. With respondents not interposing an appeal, the Decision became final and executory on 2 January 2003[39] and eventually, the corresponding Entry of Judgment was issued on 15 January 2003.[40] The court granted petitioners Motion for Execution[41] in an Order[42] dated 12 March 2003. However, on 14 March 2003, respondents filed a Petition for Relief from Judgment,[43] wherein they also prayed for a temporary restraining order (TRO) and a writ of preliminary injunction. Respondents invoked excusable negligence as a ground for their failure to seasonably file an appeal.[44] While it denied the application for TRO in view of its prior order granting petitioners Motion for Execution, the court granted the Petition for Relief from Judgment in an Order[45] dated 25 June 2004. This had the effect of giving due course to respondents appeal despite the fact that the decision of the trial court had already attained finality. Finding the Order unacceptable, petitioner elevated it to this Court by way of a petition for certiorari under Rule 45. In her petition, petitioner asks that the order of the lower court giving due course to respondents appeal be reversed and set aside on a pure question of law.[46] Before resolving the substantive issues raised by the parties, the Court will first address the procedural infirmities ascribed by respondents to the petition at bar. Respondents assail the correctness and propriety of the mode of appeal resorted to by petitioner.[47]According to them, the order granting the petition for relief from judgment is an interlocutory order which cannot be made the subject of an appeal.[48] Respondents likewise argue that petitioner failed to
Yujuico vs Atienza
respect the rule on hierarchy of courts. This Court, they aver, had consistently held that its original jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is not exclusive but is concurrent with that of the RTC and the Court of Appeals in certain cases.[49] Respondents have correctly pointed out that an interlocutory order cannot be made subject to an appeal. However, when viewed in context, the recitals of the petition clearly disclose and the Court is convinced that the lower court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it granted respondents petition for relief from judgment. While this case should have been elevated to this Court not by way of a petition for review under Rule 45 but through a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65, in the exercise of our sound discretion and in order to write finis to this case which has needlessly dragged on for so long, we shall treat the petition as a special civil action for certiorari. After all, it was filed within the reglementary period for the filing of a Rule 65 petition. As we held in Salinas v. NLRC,[50] in the interest of justice, this Court has often judiciously treated petitions erroneously captioned as petitions for review on certiorari as special civil actions for certiorari. This is in line with the principle that the strict application of procedural technicalities should not hinder the speedy disposition of the case on the merits.[51] Accordingly, facial allegations of reversible error in the petition will be treated, as they should be, as contextual averments of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the court a quo. Appropriately, petitioner impleaded the RTC Presiding Judge as party-respondent in the instant petition. Anent the alleged breach of the rule on hierarchy of courts, the doctrine is not an iron-clad dictum.[52] The rule may be relaxed when exceptional and compelling circumstances warrant the
Yujuico vs Atienza
exercise of this Courts primary jurisdiction.[53] In this case, the judgment sought to be satisfied has long attained finality and the expropriated property has been utilized as a school site for five (5) years now; yet, the awarded just compensation has not been fully paid. These circumstances, in the Courts estimation, merit the relaxation of the technical rules of procedure to ensure that substantial justice will be served. Concerning petitioners alleged failure to implead the CSB or its new members before the trial court,[54] respondents argue that since there are five (5) new members in the CSB any decision in the case requiring the CSB to act as a body would prove to be legally impossible. The former members of the CSB could no longer be compelled to act according to the orders of the Court since they no longer have the capacity to do so. On the other hand, respondents continue, the new members cannot be directed to comply with the Courts judgment either; they have never been impleaded in the case; thus, the Court never acquired jurisdiction over their persons.[55] The arguments were effectively neutered our Resolution dated 8 August 2005. There, we declared:
Considering the arguments posited by both parties, this Court is of the view that a substitution of the original respondents by the members of the CSB who replaced them is warranted. The phrase or such time as may be granted by the Court in Sec. 17, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure denotes that the Court before whom the motion for substitution is filed may grant a period longer than thirty (30) days for the purpose. In any event, technical rules on substitution of a party should not be so narrowly construed as to prevent this Court from taking cognizance of a case and deciding it on the merits. Moreover, petitioner did make an attempt to implead the new members of the CSB by making the CSB itself a respondent before this Court. There is also no showing that the new members of the CSB have deviated from the stand of their predecessors-in-interest; hence,
in
Yujuico vs Atienza
there is a substantial need for continuing or maintaining petitioners action against them.[56]
In the same Resolution, the Court ordered the impleading of the new CSB members Roger Gernale,Manuel M. Zarcal, Benjamin Valbuena and Francesca Gernale as party respondentsthe last three in substitution of Arlene Ortiz, Percival Floriendo, Miles Rocesand the new CSB Assistant Secretary Vicente Macarubbo in substitution of Isabelita Ching.[57] Only Manuel Zarcal filed a Comment[58] dated 30 August 2005 through a new counsel, adopting in toto the comment of his co-respondents. Hence, the other four newly impleaded party respondents are deemed to have retained the Office of the City Legal Officer (OCLO) as their counsel and to have adopted the Comment already filed by the OCLO in behalf of their co-respondents. Thus, the proper substitutions of some party respondents have already taken place in this case. The last procedural hurdle thrown petitioners way by respondents refers to the supposed failure of the petition to comply with the requirements of Section 4, Rule 7 and Section 4, Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure[59] as amended by Supreme Court Circular A.M. No. 00-2-10-SC.[60]Respondents claim that there was failure to include a verified statement indicating the material dates relative to the receipt of the judgments and the filing of the pleadings. The verification, moreover, allegedly failed to state that petitioner has read the petition[61] and that the copies attached thereto are based on authentic records.[62] The defects of the verification allegedly render the petition without legal effect and constitute grounds for its dismissal. The purpose of requiring a verification is to secure an assurance that the allegations of the petition have been made in
Yujuico vs Atienza
good faith; or are true and correct, not merely speculative.[63] This requirement is simply a condition affecting the form of pleadings and non-compliance therewith does not necessarily render it fatally defective.[64] Perusal of the verification in question shows that there was sufficient compliance with the requirements of the Rules and the alleged defects are not so material as to justify the dismissal of the petition. Now, the substantial issues. Up for determination is the tenability of the RTCs favorable action on respondents petition for relief from judgment. This engenders a look at the grounds and defenses relied upon by respondents in support of their petition. Sections 2 and 3, Rule 38 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provide that a petition for relief may be granted upon a showing that (1) through fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence, a party has been prevented from taking an appeal, and (2) the party has a good and substantial cause of action or defense. The above requisites notwithstanding, it bears stressing that relief from judgment is premised on equity. It is an act of grace which is allowed only in exceptional cases.[65] In this case, according to respondents they were unable to seasonably file a notice of appeal due to excusable negligence.[66] One Ronald Silva (Silva), an employee of the OCLO, allegedly failed to forward the Order denying respondents motion for reconsideration in Civil Case No. 02-103748 to the handling lawyers. When the order was delivered to the OCLO on 17 December 2002,[67] Silva was the one who received it because the employee designated to do so was out on official business.[68] Since the employees were busy preparing for the office Christmas party that day,[69] Silva forgot all about the order. He only remembered it when the order for entry of judgment in the case was received on 29
Yujuico vs Atienza
January 2003. By that time, however, the order dated 17 December 2002 had already been misplaced.[70] Clearly, the situation does not present a case of excusable negligence which would warrant relief under Rule 38. Time and again, this Court has ruled that the inability to perfect an appeal in due time by reason of failure of a counsels clerk to notify the handling lawyer is not a pardonable oversight.[71] As held in one case:
. . . The excuse offered by respondent . . . as reason for his failure to perfect in due time his appeal from the judgment of the Municipal Court, that counsels clerk forgot to hand him the court notice, is the most hackneyed and habitual subterfuge employed by litigants who fail to observe the procedural requirements prescribed by the Rules of Court. The uncritical acceptance of this kind of common-place excuses, in the face of the Supreme Courts repeated rulings that they are neither credible nor constitutive of excusable negligence (Gaerlan v. Bernal, L-4039, 29 January 1952; Mercado v. Judge Domingo, L-19457, 17 December 1966) is certainly such whimsical exercise of judgment as to be a grave abuse of discretion. .... In the face of all these facts and circumstances, . . . the respondent judge revealed a simple-minded willingness to swallow a story patently concocted to delay as much as possible the satisfaction of a judgment against respondent . . . .This indiscriminating credulity does not conform to what is to be expected of a judicial mind.[72]
Reiterated in numerous cases is the rule that the clerks faults are attributable to the handling lawyers.[73] Thus, excuses offered based on the formers negligence are not deemed excusable. That the admonitions issued out by this Court were mostly directed against lawyers in law firms does not exempt respondents herein from the same treatment. For all intents and purposes, the set-up at the OCLO is akin to that of a law firm, the only difference being
Yujuico vs Atienza
that the former serves a public entity while the latter caters to private clients. The following pronouncement in Negros Stevedoring Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals[74] is apropos:
The negligence committed in the case at bar cannot be considered excusable, nor is it unavoidable. Time and again, the Court has admonished law firms to adopt a system of distributing pleadings and notices, whereby lawyers working therein receive promptly notices and pleadings intended for them, so that they will always be informed of the status of their cases. The Court has also often repeated that the negligence of clerks which adversely affect the cases handled by lawyers is binding upon the latter.[75]
Without doubt, it was grave abuse of discretion for the lower court to have given due course to respondents appeal through the grant of their petition for relief from judgment based on the flimsy ground they proferred. Even assuming that the negligence invoked by respondents could be considered excusable, still the petition should not have been granted. It must be borne in mind that two requisites must be satisfied before a petition under Rule 38 may be granted, the other being the existence of a good and substantial cause of action or defense. Respondents defense consisted of their claim that the CSB has a personality separate and distinct from the City such that it should not be made to pay for the Citys obligations.[76] However, the argument is undercut by the particular circumstances of this case. It is worthy of note that the records of this case clearly show that the same counsel, the OCLO, represented the City in the expropriation case and now, all except one of the individual respondents in the case at bar. Worthy of note are the following manifestations relied upon by the lower court in issuing the order
Yujuico vs Atienza
on the motion to quash the Notice of Garnishment over the funds of the City, to wit:
The Motion to Quash Notice of Garnishment was heard by this court this morning and Atty. Joseph Aquino appeared for the plaintiff (City of Manila) and Atty. Federico Alday, for the defendant. Atty. Aquino manifested that the amount of Thirty Six Million Four Hundred Three Thousand One Hundred Seventy Pesos (P36,403,170.00) had been appropriated by the City School Board (CSB) under CSB Resolution Nos. 613 and 623 for this purpose. .... Upon manifestation of the counsel for the plaintiff that it is the City School Board which has the authority to pass a resolution allocating funds for the full satisfaction of the just compensation fixed, the said body is hereby given thirty (30) days from receipt of this Order to pass the necessary resolution for the payments of the remaining balance due to defendant Teresita M. Yujuico. (Emphasis supplied.)[77]
The manifestation was made by the same counsel now claiming that it is actually the City which should be made liable for the payment of its own obligations. This, after it trotted out the CSB as the entity with authority to pass a resolution that would satisfy the obligation it had vigorously pursued. The above circumstances, coupled with the rule that an act performed by counsel within the scope of a general or implied authority is regarded as an act of the client,[78] render the City and, through it, respondents in estoppel. By estoppel is meant that an admission or representation is rendered conclusive upon the person making it and cannot be denied or disproved as against the person relying thereon.[79] Petitioner and the courts acted in accordance with the Citys own manifestations by running after the CSB. At this point, respondents and the OCLO can no longer turn around and toss the obligation back to the City. After all, it was the legal
Yujuico vs Atienza
counsel of both the City and respondents who made a big production out of showing that the liability incurred by the City will be borne by the CSB. Contrary to respondents claim, the law does not make the CSB an entity independent from the City of Manila. This is evident from the provisions of the Local Government Code of 1991, the law providing for the creation of school boards. It states:
TITLE IV.- LOCAL SCHOOL BOARDS Section 98. Creation, Composition and Compensation.(a) There shall be established in every province, city or municipality a provincial, city, or municipal school board, respectively. (b) as follows: The composition of local school boards shall be
... (2) The city school board shall be composed of the city mayor and the city superintendent of schools as co-chairmen; the chairman of the education committee of the sangguniang panlungsod, the city treasurer, the representative of the pederasyon ng mga sangguniang kabataan in the sangguniang panlungsod, the duly elected president of the city federation of parents-teachers associations, the duly elected representative of the non-academic personnel of public schools in the city, as members; ... Section 101. Compensation and Remuneration.The co-chairmen and members of the provincial, city or municipal school board shall perform their duties as such without compensation or remuneration. Members thereof who are not government officials or employees shall be entitled to traveling expenses and allowances chargeable against the funds of the local school board concerned, subject to existing accounting and auditing rules and regulations.[80]
Yujuico vs Atienza
The fact that the highest ranking official of a local government unit (LGU) is designated as co-chairman of the school board negates the claim in this case that the CSB has a personality separate and distinct from the City. The other fact that government officials in the school board do not receive any compensation or remuneration while NGO representatives merely receive allowances underscores the absurdity of respondents argument all the more. Indeed, such would not be the situation if the school board has a personality separate and distinct from the LGU.
Respondents also argue that the members of the CSB cannot be directed to decide a discretionary function in the specific manner the court desires.[81] The question of whether the enactment of an ordinance to satisfy the appropriation of a final money judgment rendered against an LGU may be compelled by mandamus has already been settled in Municipality of Makati v. Court of Appeals.[82]
Nevertheless, this is not to say that private respondent and PSB are left with no legal recourse. Where a municipality fails or refuses, without justifiable reason, to effect payment of a final money judgment rendered against it, the claimant may avail of the remedy of mandamus in order to compel the enactment and approval of the necessary appropriation ordinance, and the corresponding disbursement of municipal funds therefore [SeeViuda De Tan Toco v. The Municipal Council of Iloilo, supra, Baldivia v. Lota, 107 Phil 1099 (1960); Yuviengco v. Gonzales, 108 Phil 247 (1960)].[83]
Clearly, mandamus is a remedy available to a property owner when a money judgment is rendered in its favor and against a municipality or city, as in this case.
Yujuico vs Atienza
Moreover, the very ordinance authorizing the expropriation of petitioners property categorically states that the payment of the expropriated property will be defrayed from the SEF. To quote:
An amount not to exceed the current fair market value, prevailing in the area appraised in accordance with the requirements of existing laws, rules and regulations, of the property to be acquired or so much thereof as may be necessary for the purpose shall be allocated out of the Special Education Fund of the City to defray the cost of acquisition of the above-mentioned parcels of land.[84]
The legality of the above-quoted provision is presumed. The source of the amount necessary to acquire petitioners property having in fact been specified by the City Council of Manila, the passage of the resolution for the allocation and disbursement thereof is indeed a ministerial duty of the CSB. Furthermore, respondents had argued in the petition for contempt filed against them by petitioner that the latters failure to invoke the proper remedy of mandamus should not be a ground to penalize them with contempt. In their haste to have the contempt petition dismissed, respondents consistently contended that what petitioner should have filed was a case for mandamus to compel passage of the corresponding resolution of the CSB if she wanted immediate payment.[85] Having relied on these representations of respondents and having filed the action they adverted to, petitioner cannot now be sent by respondents on another wild goose chase to obtain ultimate recovery of what she is legally entitled to. While this Court recognizes the power of LGU to expropriate private property for public use, it will not stand idly by while the
Yujuico vs Atienza
expropriating authority maneuvers to evade the payment of just compensation of property already in its possession. The notion of expropriation is hard enough to take for a private owner. He is compelled to give up his property for the common weal. But to give it up and wait in vain for the just compensation decreed by the courts is too much to bear. In cases like these, courts will not hesitate to step in to ensure that justice and fair play are served. As we have already ruled:
. . . This Court will not condone petitioners blatant refusal to settle its legal obligation arising from expropriation proceedings it had in fact initiated. It cannot be over-emphasized that within the context of the States inherent power of eminent domain, . . . (j)ust compensation means not only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to the owner of the land but also the payment of the land within a reasonable time from its taking. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered just for the property owner is made to suffer the consequence of being immediately deprived of his land while being made to wait for a decade or more before actually receiving the amount necessary to cope with his loss (Consculluela v. The Honorable Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 77765, August 15, 1988, 164 SCRA 393, 400. See also Provincial Government of Sorsogon v. Vda. De Villaroya, G.R. No. 64037, August 27, 1987, 153 SCRA 291).[86]
The decision rendering just compensation in petitioners favor was promulgated way back in the year 2000.[87] Five years have passed, yet the award still has not been fully satisfied. Recently, inRepublic v. Lim,[88] this Court made the following pronouncement:
. . . while the prevailing doctrine is that the non-payment of just compensation does not entitle the private landowner to recover possession of the expropriated lots, however, in cases where the government failed to pay just compensation within five (5) years from the finality of judgment in the expropriation proceedings, the owners concerned shall have the right to recover
Yujuico vs Atienza
possession of their property. This is in consonance with the principle that the government cannot keep the property and dishonor the judgment. To be sure, the five-year period limitation will encourage the government to pay just compensation punctually. This is in keeping with justice and equity. After all, it is the duty of the government, whenever it takes property from private persons against their will, to facilitate the payment of just compensation.[89] (Citations omitted)
Given the above ruling, the reversion of the expropriated property to the petitioner would prove not to be a remote prospect should respondents and the City they represent insist on trudging on their intransigent course. One final note. Respondents appeal from the Decision dated 9 October 2002 of the lower court, made possible by its grant of their petition for relief, is before the Court of Appeals where it is docketed as CA-G.R. No. 86692.[90] The courts Decision in this case would have obvious consequences on said appeal; hence, referral of this Decision to the Court of Appeals is in order. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Order of the trial court dated 25 June 2004, granting respondents Petition for Relief from Judgment is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and its Decision dated 9 October 2002, ordering respondents to immediately pass a resolution for the payment of the balance of the court-adjudged compensation due petitioner, is REINSTATED.
Yujuico vs Atienza
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Court of Appeals for its information and guidance in relation to CA-G.R. No. 86692 entitled Teresita M. Yujuico v. Hon. Jose L. Atienza, Jr., et al. SO ORDERED.
O.
ATTESTATION
Yujuico vs Atienza
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairmans Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
SECOND DIVISION DEUTSCHE GESELLSCHAFT FR G.R. No. 152318 TECHNISCHE ZUSAMMENARBEIT, also known as GERMAN AGENCY Present: FOR TECHNICAL COOPERATION, (GTZ) HANS PETER PAULENZ and QUISUMBING, J., ANNE NICOLAY, Chairperson, Petitioners, CARPIO MORALES, TINGA, VELASCO, and - versus BRION, JJ.
Promulgated: HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ARIEL CADIENTE SANTOS, Labor Arbiter of the Arbitration Branch, National Labor Relations Commission, and BERNADETTE CARMELLA MAGTAAS, CAROLINA DIONCO, CHRISTOPHER RAMOS, MELVIN DELA PAZ, RANDY TAMAYO and EDGARDO RAMILLO, Respondents. April 16, 2009
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DECISION
TINGA, J.:
On 7 September 1971, the governments of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Republic of the Philippines ratified an Agreement concerning Technical
Co-operation (Agreement) in Bonn, capital of what was then West Germany. The Agreement affirmed the countries common interest in promoting the technical and economic development of their States, and recogni[zed] the benefits to be derived by both States from closer technical co-operation, and allowed for the conclusion of arrangements concerning individual projects of technical cooperation.[1] While the Agreement provided for a limited term of effectivity of five (5) years, it nonetheless was stated that [t]he Agreement shall be tacitly extended for successive periods of one year unless either of the two Contracting Parties denounces it in writing three months prior to its expiry, and that even upon the Agreements expiry, its provisions would continue to apply to any projects agreed upon x x x until their completion.[2] On 10 December 1999, the Philippine government, through then Foreign Affairs Secretary Domingo Siazon, and the German government, agreed to an Arrangement in furtherance of the 1971 Agreement. This Arrangement affirmed the common commitment of both governments to promote jointly a project called, Social Health InsuranceNetworking and Empowerment (SHINE), which was designed to enable Philippine familiesespecially poor onesto maintain their health and secure health care of sustainable quality.[3] It appears that SHINE had already been in existence even prior to the effectivity of the Arrangement, though the record does not indicate when exactly SHINE was constituted. Nonetheless, the Arrangement stated the various obligations of the Filipino and German governments. The relevant provisions of the Arrangement are reproduced as follows:
3. The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany shall make the following contributions to the project. It shall (a) second
one expert in health economy, insurance and health systems for up to 48 expert/months, one expert in system development for up to 10 expert/months short-term experts to deal with special tasks for a total of up to 18 expert/months, project assistants/guest students as required, who shall work on the project as part of their basic and further training and assume specific project tasks under the separately financed junior staff promotion programme of the Deutsche Gesellschaft fr Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ); (b) provide in situ
short-term experts to deal with diverse special tasks for a total of up to 27 expert/months, five local experts in health economy, health insurance, community health systems, information technology, information systems, training and community mobilization for a total of up to 240 expert/months, local and auxiliary personnel for a total of up to 120 months;
(c) supply inputs, in particular two cross-country vehicles, ten computers with accessories, office furnishings and equipment
up to a total value of DM 310,000 (three hundred and ten thousand Deutsche Mark); (c) meet
the cost of accommodation for the seconded experts and their families in so far as this cost is not met by the seconded experts themselves, the cost of official travel by the experts referred to in sub-paragraph (a) above within and outside the Republic of the Philippines, the cost of seminars and courses,
the cost of transport and insurance to the project site of inputs to be supplied pursuant to sub-paragraph (c) above, excluding the charges and storage fees referred to in paragraph 4(d) below, a proportion of the operating and administrative costs;
xxx 4. The Government of the Republic of the Philippines shall make the following contributions to the project: It shall (a) provide the necessary Philippine experts for the project, in particular one project coordinator in the Philippine Health Insurance Corporation (Philhealth), at least three further experts and a sufficient number of administrative and auxiliary personnel, as well as health personnel in the pilot provinces and in the other project partners, in particular one responsible expert for each pilot province and for each association representing the various target groups, release suitably qualified experts from their duties for attendance at the envisaged basic and further training activities; it shall only nominate such candidates as have given an undertaking to work on the project for at least five years after completing their training and shall ensure that these Philippine experts receive appropriate remuneration, ensure that the project field offices have sufficient expendables, make available the land and buildings required for the project; (b) assume an increasing proportion of the running and operating costs of the project; (c) afford the seconded experts any assistance they may require in carrying out the tasks assigned to them and place at their disposal all necessary records and documents; (d) guarantee that the project is provided with an itemized budget of its own in order to ensure smooth continuation of the project. the necessary legal and administrative framework is created for the project,
the project is coordinated in close cooperation with other national and international agencies relevant to implementation, the inputs supplied for the project on behalf of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany are exempted from the cost of licenses, harbour dues, import and export duties and other public charges and fees, as well as storage
fees, or that any costs thereof are met, and that they are cleared by customs without delay. The aforementioned exemptions shall, at the request of the implementing agencies also apply to inputs procured in the Republic of the Philippines, the tasks of the seconded experts are taken over as soon as possible by Philippine experts, examinations passed by Philippine nationals pursuant to this Arrangement are recognized in accordance with their respective standards and that the persons concerned are afforded such opportunities with regard to careers, appointments and advancement as are commensurate with their training.[4]
In the arraignment, both governments likewise named their respective implementing organizations for SHINE. The Philippinesdesignated the Department of Health (DOH) and the Philippine Health Insurance Corporation (Philhealth) with the implementation of SHINE. For their part, the German government charge[d] the Deustche Gesellschaft fr Technische Zusammenarbeit[[5]] (GTZ[[6]]) GmbH, Eschborn, with the implementation of its contributions.[7] Private respondents were engaged as contract employees hired by GTZ to work for SHINE on various dates between December of 1998 to September of 1999. Bernadette Carmela Magtaas was hired as an information systems manager and project officer of SHINE;[8] Carolina Dionco as a Project Assistant of SHINE;[9] Christopher Ramos as a project assistant and liason personnel of NHI related SHINE activities by GTZ;[10] Melvin Dela Paz and Randy Tamayo as programmers;[11] and Edgardo Ramilo as driver, messenger and multipurpose service man.[12] The employment contracts of all six private respondents all specified Dr. Rainer Tollkotter, identified as an adviser of GTZ, as the employer. At the same time, all the contracts commonly provided that [i]t is mutually agreed and understood that [Dr. Tollkotter, as employer] is a seconded GTZ expert who is hiring the Employee on behalf of GTZ and for a Philippine-German bilateral project named Social Health InsuranceNetworking and Empowerment (SHINE) which will end at a given time.[13]
In September of 1999, Anne Nicolay (Nicolay), a Belgian national, assumed the post of SHINE Project Manager. Disagreements eventually arose between Nicolay and private respondents in matters such as proposed salary adjustments, and the course Nicolay was taking in the implementation of SHINE different from her predecessors. The dispute culminated in a letter[14]dated 8 June 2000, signed by the private respondents, addressed to Nicolay, and copies furnished officials of the DOH, Philheath, and the director of the Manila office of GTZ. The letter raised several issues which private respondents claim had been brought up several times in the past, but have not been given appropriate response. It was claimed that SHINE under Nicolay had veered away from its original purpose to facilitate the development of social health insurance by shoring up the national health insurance program and strengthening local initiatives, as Nicolay had refused to support local partners and new initiatives on the premise that community and local government unit schemes were not sustainablea philosophy that supposedly betrayed Nicolays lack of understanding of the purpose of the project. Private respondents further alleged that as a result of Nicolays new thrust, resources have been used inappropriately; that the new management style was not congruent with the original goals of the project; that Nicolay herself suffered from cultural insensitivity that consequently failed to sustain healthy relations with SHINEs partners and staff. The letter ended with these ominous words:
The issues that we [the private respondents] have stated here are very crucial to us in working for the project. We could no longer find any reason to stay with the project unless ALL of these issues be addressed immediately and appropriately.[15]
In response, Nicolay wrote each of the private respondents a letter dated 21 June 2000, all similarly worded except for their respective addressees. She
informed private respondents that the projects orientations and evolution were decided in consensus with partner institutions, Philhealth and the DOH, and thus no longer subject to modifications. More pertinently, she stated:
You have firmly and unequivocally stated in the last paragraph of your 8 June 2000 letter that you and the five other staff could no longer find any reason to stay with the project unless ALL of these issues be addressed immediately and appropriately. Under the foregoing premises and circumstances, it is now imperative that I am to accept your resignation, which I expect to receive as soon as possible.[16]
th
Taken aback, private respondents replied with a common letter, clarifying that their earlier letter was not intended as a resignation letter, but one that merely intended to raise attention to what they perceived as vital issues.[17] Negotiations ensued between private respondents and Nicolay, but for naught. Each of the private respondents received a letter from Nicolay dated 11 July 2000, informing them of the pre-termination of their contracts of employment on the grounds of serious and gross insubordination, among others, resulting to loss of confidence and trust.[18] On 21 August 2000, the private respondents filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with the NLRC. Named as respondents therein where GTZ, the Director of its Manila office Hans Peter Paulenz, its Assistant Project Manager Christian Jahn, and Nicolay. On 25 October 2005, GTZ, through counsel, filed a Motion to Dismiss, on the ground that the Labor Arbiter had no jurisdiction over the case, as its acts were undertaken in the discharge of the governmental functions and sovereign acts of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany. This was opposed by private respondents with the arguments that GTZ had failed to secure a certification that it was immune from suit from the Department of Foreign Affairs, and that it
was GTZ and not the German government which had implemented the SHINE Project and entered into the contracts of employment. On 27 November 2000, the Labor Arbiter issued an Order[19] denying the Motion to Dismiss. The Order cited, among others, that GTZ was a private corporation which entered into an employment contract; and that GTZ had failed to secure from the DFA a certification as to its diplomatic status.
On 7 February 2001, GTZ filed with the Labor Arbiter a Reiterating Motion to Dismiss, again praying that the Motion to Dismiss be granted on the jurisdictional ground, and reprising the arguments for dismissal it had earlier raised.[20] No action was taken by the Labor Arbiter on this new motion. Instead, on 15 October 2001, the Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision[21] granting the complaint for illegal dismissal. The Decision concluded that respondents were dismissed without lawful cause, there being a total lack of due process both substantive and procedural [sic].[22] GTZ was faulted for failing to observe the notice requirements in the labor law. The Decision likewise proceeded from the premise that GTZ had treated the letter dated 8 June 2000 as a resignation letter, and devoted some focus in debunking this theory. The Decision initially offered that it need not discuss the jurisdictional aspect considering that the same had already been lengthily discussed in the Order de[n]ying respondents Motion to Dismiss.[23] Nonetheless, it proceeded to discuss the jurisdictional aspect, in this wise:
Under pain of being repetitious, the undersigned Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction to entertain the complaint on the following grounds: Firstly, under the employment contract entered into between complainants and respondents, specifically Section 10 thereof, it provides that contract partners agree that his contract shall be subject to the LAWS of the jurisdiction of the locality in which the service is performed. Secondly, respondent having entered into contract, they can no longer invoke the sovereignty of the Federal Republic of Germany. Lastly, it is imperative to be immune from suit, respondents should have secured from the Department of Foreign Affairs a certification of respondents diplomatic status and entitlement to diplomatic privileges including immunity from suits. Having failed in this regard, respondents cannot escape liability from the shelter of sovereign immunity.[sic][24]
Notably, GTZ did not file a motion for reconsideration to the Labor Arbiters Decision or elevate said decision for appeal to the NLRC. Instead, GTZ opted to assail the decision by way of a special civil action for certiorari filed with the Court of Appeals.[25] On 10 December 2001, the Court of Appeals promulgated a Resolution[26] dismissing GTZs petition, finding that judicial recourse at this stage of the case is uncalled for[,] [t]he appropriate remedy of the petitioners [being] an appeal to the NLRC x x x.[27] A motion for reconsideration to this Resolution proved fruitless for GTZ.[28] Thus, the present petition for review under Rule 45, assailing the decision and resolutions of the Court of Appeals and of the Labor Arbiter. GTZs arguments center on whether the Court of Appeals could have entertained its petition for certiorari despite its not having undertaken an appeal before the NLRC; and whether the complaint for illegal dismissal should have been dismissed for lack of jurisdiction on account of GTZs insistence that it enjoys immunity from suit. No special arguments are directed with respect to petitioners Hans Peter Paulenz and Anne Nicolay, respectively the then Director and the then Project Manager of GTZ
in the Philippines; so we have to presume that the arguments raised in behalf of GTZs alleged immunity from suit extend to them as well. The Court required the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to file a Comment on the petition. In its Comment dated 7 November 2005, the OSG took the side of GTZ, with the prayer that the petition be granted on the ground that GTZ was immune from suit, citing in particular its assigned functions in implementing the SHINE programa joint undertaking of the Philippine and German governments which was neither proprietary nor commercial in nature. The Court of Appeals had premised the dismissal of GTZs petition on its procedural misstep in bypassing an appeal to NLRC and challenging the Labor Arbiters Decision directly with the appellate court by way of a Rule 65 petition. In dismissing the petition, the
Court of Appeals relied on our ruling in Air Service Cooperative v. Court of Appeals.[29] The central issue in that case was whether a decision of a Labor Arbiter rendered without jurisdiction over the subject matter may be annulled in a petition before a Regional Trial Court. That case may be differentiated from the present case, since the Regional Trial Court does not have original or appellate jurisdiction to review a decision rendered by a Labor Arbiter. In contrast, there is no doubt, as affirmed by jurisprudence, that the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review, by way of its original certiorari jurisdiction, decisions ruling on complaints for illegal dismissal. Nonetheless, the Court of Appeals is correct in pronouncing the general rule that the proper recourse from the decision of the Labor Arbiter is to first appeal the same to the NLRC. Air Services is in fact clearly detrimental to petitioners position in one regard. The Court therein noted that on account of the failure to correctly appeal the decision of the Labor Arbiter to the NLRC, such judgment consequently became final and executory.[30] GTZ goes as far as to request that the Court re-examine Air Services, a suggestion that is needlessly improvident under the circumstances. Air Services affirms doctrines grounded in sound procedural rules that have allowed for the considered and orderly disposition of labor cases.
The OSG points out, citing Heirs of Mayor Nemencio Galvez v. Court of Appeals,[31] that even when appeal is available, the Court has nonetheless allowed a writ of certiorari when the orders of the lower court were issued either in excess of or without jurisdiction. Indeed, the Court has ruled before that the failure to employ
available intermediate recourses, such as a motion for reconsideration, is not a fatal infirmity if the ruling assailed is a patent nullity. This approach suggested by the OSG allows the Court to inquire directly into what is the main issuewhether GTZ enjoys immunity from suit. The arguments raised by GTZ and the OSG are rooted in several indisputable facts. The SHINE project was implemented pursuant to the bilateral agreements between the Philippine and German governments. GTZ was tasked, under the 1991 agreement, with the implementation of the contributions of the German government. The activities performed by GTZ pertaining to the SHINE project are governmental in nature, related as they are to the promotion of health insurance in the Philippines. The fact that GTZ entered into employment contracts with the private respondents did not disqualify it from invoking immunity from suit, as held in cases such as Holy See v. Rosario, Jr.,[32] which set forth what remains valid doctrine:
Certainly, the mere entering into a contract by a foreign state with a private party cannot be the ultimate test. Such an act can only be the start of the inquiry. The logical question is whether the foreign state is engaged in the activity in the regular course of business. If the foreign state is not engaged regularly in a business or trade, the particular act or transaction must then be tested by its nature. If the act is in pursuit of a sovereign activity, or an incident thereof, then it is an act jure imperii, especially when it is not undertaken for gain or profit.[33]
Beyond dispute is the tenability of the comment points raised by GTZ and the OSG that GTZ was not performing proprietary functions notwithstanding its entry into the particular employment contracts. Yet there is an equally fundamental
premise which GTZ and the OSG fail to address, namely: Is GTZ, by conception, able to enjoy the Federal Republics immunity from suit? The principle of state immunity from suit, whether a local state or a foreign state, is reflected in Section 9, Article XVI of the Constitution, which states that the State may not be sued without its consent. Who or what consists of the State? For one, the doctrine is available to foreign States insofar as they are sought to be sued in the courts of the local State,[34] necessary as it is to avoid unduly vexing the peace of nations.
If the instant suit had been brought directly against the Federal Republic of Germany, there would be no doubt that it is a suit brought against a State, and the only necessary inquiry is whether said State had consented to be sued. However, the present suit was brought against GTZ. It is necessary for us to understand what precisely are the parameters of the legal personality of GTZ. Counsel for GTZ characterizes GTZ as the implementing agency of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, a depiction similarly adopted by the OSG. Assuming that characterization is correct, it does not automatically invest GTZ with the ability to invoke State immunity from suit. The distinction lies in whether the agency is incorporated or unincorporated. The following lucid discussion from Justice Isagani Cruz is pertinent:
Where suit is filed not against the government itself or its officials but against one of its entities, it must be ascertained whether or not the State, as the principal that may ultimately be held liable, has given its consent to be sued. This ascertainment will depend in the first instance on whether the government agency impleaded is incorporated or unincorporated. An incorporated agency has a charter of its own that invests it with a separate juridical personality, like the Social Security System, the University of the Philippines, and the City of Manila. By contrast, the unincorporated agency is so called because it has no separate juridical personality but is merged in the general machinery of the government, like the Department of Justice, the Bureau of Mines and the Government Printing Office. If the agency is incorporated, the test of its suability is found in its charter. The simple rule is that it is suable if its charter says so, and this is true regardless of the functions it is performing. Municipal corporations, for example, like provinces and cities, are agencies of the State when they are engaged in governmental functions and therefore should enjoy the sovereign immunity from suit. Nevertheless, they are subject to suit even in the performance of such functions because their charter provides that they can sue and be sued.[35]
State immunity from suit may be waived by general or special law. [36] The special law can take the form of the original charter of the incorporated government agency. Jurisprudence is replete with examples of incorporated government agencies which were ruled not entitled to invoke immunity from suit, owing to provisions in their charters manifesting their consent to be sued. These include the National Irrigation Administration,[37] the former Central Bank,[38]and the National Power Corporation.[39] In SSS v. Court of Appeals,[40] the Court through Justice MelencioHerrera explained that by virtue of an express provision in its charter allowing it to sue and be sued, the Social Security System did not enjoy immunity from suit:
We come now to the amendability of the SSS to judicial action and legal responsibility for its acts. To our minds, there should be no question on this score considering that the SSS is a juridical entity with a personality of its own. It has corporate powers separate and distinct from the Government. SSS' own organic act specifically provides that it can sue and be sued in Court. These words "sue and be sued" embrace all civil process incident to a legal action. So that, even assuming that the SSS, as it claims, enjoys immunity from suit as an entity performing governmental functions, by virtue of the explicit provision of the aforecited enabling law, the Government must be deemed to have waived immunity in respect of the SSS, although it does not thereby concede its liability. That statutory law has given to the private citizen a remedy for the enforcement and protection of his rights. The SSS thereby has been required to submit to the jurisdiction of the Courts, subject to its right to interpose any lawful defense. Whether the SSS performs governmental or proprietary functions thus becomes unnecessary to belabor. For by that waiver, a private citizen may bring a suit against it for varied objectives, such as, in this case, to obtain compensation in damages arising from contract, and even for tort. A recent case squarely in point anent the principle, involving the National Power Corporation, is that of Rayo v. Court of First Instance of Bulacan, 110 SCRA 457 (1981), wherein this Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Vicente Abad Santos, ruled: "It is not necessary to write an extended dissertation on whether or not the NPC performs a governmental function with respect to the management and operation of the Angat Dam. It is sufficient to say that the government has organized a private corporation, put money in it and has allowed it to sue and be sued in any court under its charter. (R.A. No. 6395, Sec. 3[d]). As a government, owned and controlled corporation, it has a personality
of its own, distinct and separate from that of the Government. Moreover, the charter provision that the NPC can 'sue and be sued in any court' is without qualification on the cause of action and accordingly it can include a tort claim such as the one instituted by the petitioners."[41]
It is useful to note that on the part of the Philippine government, it had designated two entities, the Department of Health and the Philippine Health Insurance Corporation (PHIC), as the implementing agencies in behalf of the Philippines. The PHIC was established under Republic Act No. 7875, Section 16(g) of which grants the corporation the power to sue and be sued in court. Applying the previously cited jurisprudence, PHIC would not enjoy immunity from suit even in the performance of its functions connected with SHINE, however, governmental in nature as they may be. Is GTZ an incorporated agency of the German government? There is some mystery surrounding that question. Neither GTZ nor the OSG go beyond the claim that petitioner is the implementing agency of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany. On the other hand, private respondents asserted before the Labor Arbiter that GTZ was a private corporation engaged in the implementation of development projects.[42] The Labor Arbiter accepted that claim in his Order denying the Motion to Dismiss,[43] though he was silent on that point in his Decision. Nevertheless, private respondents argue in their Comment that the finding that GTZ was a private corporation was never controverted, and is therefore deemed admitted.[44] In its Reply, GTZ controverts that finding, saying that it is a matter of public knowledge that the status of petitioner GTZ is that of the implementing agency, and not that of a private corporation.[45] In truth, private respondents were unable to adduce any evidence to substantiate their claim that GTZ was a private corporation, and the Labor Arbiter acted rashly in accepting such claim without explanation. But neither has GTZ supplied any evidence defining its legal nature beyond that of the bare
descriptive implementing agency. There is no doubt that the 1991 Agreement designated GTZ as the implementing agency in behalf of the German government. Yet the catch is that such term has no precise definition that is responsive to our concerns. Inherently, an agent acts in behalf of a principal, and the GTZ can be said to act in behalf of the German state. But that is as far as implementing agency could take us. The term by itself does not supply whether GTZ is incorporated or unincorporated, whether it is owned by the German state or by private interests, whether it has juridical personality independent of the German government or none at all. GTZ itself provides a more helpful clue, inadvertently, through its own official Internet website.[46] In the Corporate Profile section of the English language version of its site, GTZ describes itself as follows:
As an international cooperation enterprise for sustainable development with worldwide operations, the federally owned Deutsche Gesellschaft fr Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) GmbH supports the German Government in achieving its development-policy objectives. It provides viable, forward-looking solutions for political, economic, ecological and social development in a globalised world. Working under difficult conditions, GTZ promotes complex reforms and change processes. Its corporate objective is to improve peoples living conditions on a sustainable basis. GTZ is a federal enterprise based in Eschborn near Frankfurt am Main. It was founded in 1975 as a company under private law. The German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) is its major client. The company also operates on behalf of other German ministries, the governments of other countries and international clients, such as the European Commission, the United Nations and the World Bank, as well as on behalf of private enterprises. GTZ works on a public-benefit basis. All surpluses generated are channeled [sic] back into its own international cooperation projects for sustainable development.[47]
GTZs own website elicits that petitioner is federally owned, a federal enterprise, and founded in 1975 as a company under private law. GTZ clearly has a very meaningful relationship with the Federal Republic of Germany, which
apparently owns it. At the same time, it appears that GTZ was actually organized not through a legislative public charter, but under private law, in the same way that Philippine corporations can be organized under the Corporation Code even if fully owned by the Philippine government. This self-description of GTZ in its own official website gives further cause for pause in adopting petitioners argument that GTZ is entitled to immunity from suit because it is an implementing agency. The above-quoted statement does not dispute the characterization of GTZ as an implementing agency of the Federal Republic of Germany, yet it bolsters the notion that as a company organized under private law, it has a legal personality independent of that of the Federal Republic of Germany. The Federal Republic of Germany, in its own official website,[48] also makes reference to GTZ and describes it in this manner:
x x x Going by the principle of sustainable development, the German Technical Cooperation (Deutsche Gesellschaft fr Technische Zusammenarbeit GmbH, GTZ) takes on non-profit projects in international technical cooperation. The GTZ is a private company owned by the Federal Republic of Germany.[49]
Again, we are uncertain of the corresponding legal implications under German law surrounding a private company owned by the Federal Republic of Germany. Yet taking the description on face value, the apparent equivalent under Philippine law is that of a corporation organized under the Corporation Code but owned by the Philippine government, or a government-owned or controlled corporation without original charter. And it bears notice that Section 36 of the
Corporate Code states that [e]very corporation incorporated under this Code has the power and capacity x x x to sue and be sued in its corporate name.[50] It is entirely possible that under German law, an entity such as GTZ or particularly GTZ itself has not been vested or has been specifically deprived the power and capacity to sue and/or be sued. Yet in the proceedings below and before this Court, GTZ has failed to establish that under German law, it has not consented to be sued despite it being owned by the Federal Republic of Germany. We adhere to the rule that in the absence of evidence to the contrary, foreign laws on a particular subject are presumed to be the same as those of the Philippines,[51] and following the most intelligent assumption we can gather, GTZ is akin to a governmental owned or controlled corporation without original charter which, by virtue of the Corporation Code, has expressly consented to be sued. At the very least, like the Labor Arbiter and the Court of Appeals, this Court has no basis in fact to conclude or presume that GTZ enjoys immunity from suit. This absence of basis in fact leads to another important point, alluded to by the Labor Arbiter in his rulings. Our ruling in Holy See v. Del Rosario[52] provided a template on how a foreign entity desiring to invoke State immunity from suit could duly prove such immunity before our local courts. The principles enunciated in that case were derived from public international law. We stated then:
In Public International Law, when a state or international agency wishes to plead sovereign or diplomatic immunity in a foreign court, it requests the Foreign Office of the state where it is sued to convey to the court that said defendant is entitled to immunity. In the United States, the procedure followed is the process of "suggestion," where the foreign state or the international organization sued in an American court requests the Secretary of State to make a determination as to whether it is entitled to immunity. If the Secretary of State finds that the defendant is immune from suit, he, in turn, asks the Attorney General to submit to the court a "suggestion" that the defendant is entitled to immunity. InEngland, a similar procedure is followed, only the Foreign Office issues a certification to that effect instead of submitting a "suggestion" (O'Connell, I International Law 130 [1965]; Note: Immunity from
Suit of Foreign Sovereign Instrumentalities and Obligations, 50 Yale Law Journal 1088 [1941]). In the Philippines, the practice is for the foreign government or the international organization to first secure an executive endorsement of its claim of sovereign or diplomatic immunity. But how the Philippine Foreign Office conveys its endorsement to the courts varies. In International Catholic Migration Commission v. Calleja, 190 SCRA 130 (1990), the Secretary of Foreign Affairs just sent a letter directly to the Secretary of Labor and Employment, informing the latter that the respondent-employer could not be sued because it enjoyed diplomatic immunity. In World Health Organization v. Aquino, 48 SCRA 242 (1972), the Secretary of Foreign Affairs sent the trial court a telegram to that effect. In Baer v. Tizon, 57 SCRA 1 (1974), the U.S. Embassy asked the Secretary of Foreign Affairs to request the Solicitor General to make, in behalf of the Commander of the United States Naval Base at Olongapo City, Zambales, a "suggestion" to respondent Judge. The Solicitor General embodied the "suggestion" in a Manifestation and Memorandum as amicus curiae.[53]
It is to be recalled that the Labor Arbiter, in both of his rulings, noted that it was imperative for petitioners to secure from the Department of Foreign Affairs a certification of respondents diplomatic status and entitlement to diplomatic privileges including immunity from suits.[54] The requirement might not necessarily be imperative. However, had GTZ obtained such certification from the DFA, it would have provided factual basis for its claim of immunity that would, at the very least, establish a disputable evidentiary presumption that the foreign party is indeed immune which the opposing party will have to overcome with its own factual evidence. We do not see why GTZ could not have secured such certification or endorsement from the DFA for purposes of this case. Certainly, it would have been highly prudential for GTZ to obtain the same after the Labor Arbiter had denied the motion to dismiss. Still, even at this juncture, we do not see any evidence that the DFA, the office of the executive branch in charge of our diplomatic relations, has indeed endorsed GTZs claim of immunity. It may be possible that GTZ tried, but failed to secure such certification, due to the same concerns that we have discussed herein.
Would the fact that the Solicitor General has endorsed GTZs claim of States immunity from suit before this Court sufficiently substitute for the DFA certification? Note that the rule in public international law quoted in Holy See referred to endorsement by the Foreign Office of the State where the suit is filed, such foreign office in the Philippines being the Department of Foreign Affairs. Nowhere in the Comment of the OSG is it manifested that the DFA has endorsed GTZs claim, or that the OSG had solicited the DFAs views on the issue. The arguments raised by the OSG are virtually the same as the arguments raised by GTZ without any indication of any special and distinct perspective maintained by the Philippine government on the issue. The Comment filed by the OSG does not inspire the same degree of confidence as a certification from the DFA would have elicited. Holy See made reference to Baer v. Tizon,[55] and that in the said case, the United States Embassy asked the Secretary of Foreign Affairs to request the Solicitor General to make a suggestion to the trial court, accomplished by way of a Manifestation and Memorandum, that the petitioner therein enjoyed immunity as the Commander of the Subic Bay Naval Base. Such circumstance is actually not narrated in the text of Baer itself and was likely supplied in Holy See because its author, Justice Camilio Quiason, had appeared as the Solicitor in behalf of the OSG in Baer. Nonetheless, as narrated in Holy See, it was the Secretary of Foreign Affairs which directed the OSG to intervene in behalf of the United States government in the Baer case, and such fact is manifest enough of the endorsement by the Foreign Office. We do not find a similar circumstance that bears here. The Court is thus holds and so rules that GTZ consistently has been unable to establish with satisfaction that it enjoys the immunity from suit generally enjoyed by its parent country, the Federal Republic of Germany. Consequently, both the Labor Arbiter and the Court of Appeals acted within proper bounds when they
refused to acknowledge that GTZ is so immune by dismissing the complaint against it. Our finding has additional ramifications on the failure of GTZ to properly appeal the Labor Arbiters decision to the NLRC. As pointed out by the OSG, the direct recourse to the Court of Appeals while bypassing the NLRC could have been sanctioned had the Labor Arbiters decision been a patent nullity. Since the Labor Arbiter acted properly in deciding the complaint, notwithstanding GTZs claim of immunity, we cannot see how the decision could have translated into a patent nullity. As a result, there was no basis for petitioners in foregoing the appeal to the NLRC by filing directly with the Court of Appeals the petition for certiorari. It then follows that the Court of Appeals acted correctly in dismissing the petition on that ground. As a further consequence, since petitioners failed to perfect an appeal from the Labor Arbiters Decision, the same has long become final and executory. All other questions related to this case, such as whether or not private respondents were illegally dismissed, are no longer susceptible to review, respecting as we do the finality of the Labor Arbiters Decision. A final note. This decision should not be seen as deviation from the more common methodology employed in ascertaining whether a party enjoys State immunity from suit, one which focuses on the particular functions exercised by the party and determines whether these are proprietary or sovereign in nature. The nature of the acts performed by the entity invoking immunity remains the most important barometer for testing whether the privilege of State immunity from suit should apply. At the same time, our Constitution stipulates that a State immunity from suit is conditional on its withholding of consent; hence, the laws and circumstances pertaining to the creation and legal personality of an instrumentality or agency invoking immunity remain relevant. Consent to be sued, as exhibited in this decision, is often conferred by the very same statute or general law creating the instrumentality or agency.
SO ORDERED.
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by FRANKLIN M. DRILON, in his capacity as Senate President, JUAN M. FLAVIER, in his capacity as Senate President Pro Tempore, FRANCIS N. PANGILINAN, in his capacity as Majority Leader, AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., in his capacity as Minority Leader, SENATORS RODOLFO G. BIAZON, "COMPANERA" PIA S. CAYETANO, JINGGOY EJERCITO ESTRADA, LUISA "LOI" EJERCITO ESTRADA, JUAN PONCE ENRILE, RICHARD J. GORDON, PANFILO M. LACSON, ALFREDO S.LIM, M. A. MADRIGAL, SERGIO OSMENA III, RALPH G. RECTO, and MAR ROXAS,Petitioners, vs. EDUARDO R. ERMITA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary and alter-ego of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, and anyone acting in his stead and in behalf of the President of the Philippines,Respondents. x-------------------------x G.R. No. 169659 April 20, 2006
BAYAN MUNA represented by DR. REYNALDO LESACA, JR., Rep. SATUR OCAMPO, Rep. CRISPIN BELTRAN, Rep. RAFAEL MARIANO, Rep. LIZA MAZA, Rep. TEODORO CASINO, Rep. JOEL VIRADOR, COURAGE represented by FERDINAND GAITE, and COUNSELS FOR THE DEFENSE OF LIBERTIES (CODAL) represented by ATTY. REMEDIOS BALBIN, Petitioners, vs. EDUARDO ERMITA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary and alter-ego of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, Respondent. x-------------------------x G.R. No. 169660 April 20, 2006
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, Petitioner, vs. EDUARDO R. ERMITA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary, AVELINO J. CRUZ, JR., in his capacity as Secretary of Defense, and GENEROSO S. SENGA, in his capacity as AFP Chief of Staff, Respondents. x-------------------------x G.R. No. 169667 April 20, 2006
ALTERNATIVE LAW GROUPS, INC. (ALG), Petitioner, vs. HON. EDUARDO R. ERMITA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary, Respondent. x-------------------------x
PDP- LABAN, Petitioner, vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO R. ERMITA, Respondent. x-------------------------x G.R. No. 171246 April 20, 2006
JOSE ANSELMO I. CADIZ, FELICIANO M. BAUTISTA, ROMULO R. RIVERA, JOSE AMOR AMORANDO, ALICIA A. RISOS-VIDAL, FILEMON C. ABELITA III, MANUEL P. LEGASPI, J. B. JOVY C. BERNABE, BERNARD L. DAGCUTA, ROGELIO V. GARCIA, and the INTEGRATED BAR FOR THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioners, vs. HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO R. ERMITA, Respondent. DECISION CARPIO MORALES, J.: A transparent government is one of the hallmarks of a truly republican state. Even in the early history of republican thought, however, it has been recognized that the head of government may keep certain information confidential in pursuit of the public interest. Explaining the reason for vesting executive power in only one magistrate, a distinguished delegate to the U.S. Constitutional Convention said: "Decision, activity, secrecy, and dispatch will generally characterize the proceedings of one man, in a much more eminent degree than the proceedings of any greater number; and in proportion as the number is increased, these qualities will be diminished."1 History has been witness, however, to the fact that the power to withhold information lends itself to abuse, hence, the necessity to guard it zealously. The present consolidated petitions for certiorari and prohibition proffer that the President has abused such power by issuing Executive Order No. 464 (E.O. 464) last September 28, 2005. They thus pray for its declaration as null and void for being unconstitutional. In resolving the controversy, this Court shall proceed with the recognition that the issuance under review has come from a co-equal branch of government, which thus entitles it to a strong presumption of constitutionality. Once the challenged order is found to be indeed violative of the Constitution, it is duty-bound to declare it so. For the Constitution, being the highest expression of the sovereign will of the Filipino people, must prevail over any issuance of the government that contravenes its mandates. In the exercise of its legislative power, the Senate of the Philippines, through its various Senate Committees, conducts inquiries or investigations in aid of legislation which call for, inter alia, the attendance of officials and employees of the executive department, bureaus, and offices including those employed in Government Owned and Controlled Corporations, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), and the Philippine National Police (PNP). On September 21 to 23, 2005, the Committee of the Senate as a whole issued invitations to various officials of the Executive Department for them to appear on September 29, 2005 as resource
MR. DAVIDE. Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer. I have only one reaction to the Question Hour. I propose that instead of putting it as Section 31, it should follow Legislative Inquiries. THE PRESIDING OFFICER. What does the committee say? MR. GUINGONA. I ask Commissioner Maambong to reply, Mr. Presiding Officer. MR. MAAMBONG. Actually, we considered that previously when we sequenced this but we reasoned that in Section 21, which is Legislative Inquiry, it is actually a power of Congress in terms of its own lawmaking; whereas, a Question Hour is not actually a power in terms of its own lawmaking power because in Legislative Inquiry, it is in aid of legislation. And so we put Question Hour as Section 31. I hope Commissioner Davide will consider this. MR. DAVIDE. The Question Hour is closely related with the legislative power, and it is precisely as a complement to or a supplement of the Legislative Inquiry. The appearance of the members of Cabinet would be very, very essential not only in the application of check and balance but also, in effect, in aid of legislation.
KILUSANG MAYO UNO, NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR UNIONS-KILUSANG MAYO UNO (NAFLU-KMU), JOSELITO V. USTAREZ, EMILIA P. DAPULANG, SALVADOR T. CARRANZA, MARTIN T. CUSTODIO, JR. and ROQUE M. TAN, Petitioners, vs. THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL, NATIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, and THE SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET and MANAGEMENT, Respondents. x-----------------------------------x G.R. No. 167930 April 19, 2006
BAYAN MUNA Representatives SATUR C. OCAMPO, TEODORO A. CASIO, and JOEL G. VIRADOR, GABRIELA WOMENS PARTY Representative LIZA L. MAZA, ANAKPAWIS Representatives RAFAEL V. MARIANO and CRISPIN B. BELTRAN, Rep. FRANCIS G. ESCUDERO, Rep. EDUARDO C. ZIALCITA, Rep. LORENZO R. TAADA III, DR. CAROL PAGADUAN-ARAULLO and RENATO M. REYES, JR. of BAYAN, MARIE HILAO-ENRIQUEZ of KARAPATAN, ANTONIO L. TINIO of ACT, FERDINAND GAITE of COURAGE, GIOVANNI A. TAPANG of AGHAM, WILFREDO MARBELLA GARCIA, of KMP, LANA LINABAN of GABRIELA, AMADO GAT INCIONG, RENATO CONSTANTINO, JR., DEAN PACIFICO H. AGABIN, SHARON R. DUREMDES of the NATIONAL COUNCIL OF CHURCHES IN THE PHILIPPINES, and BRO. EDMUNDO L. FERNANDEZ (FSC) of the ASSOCIATION OF MAJOR RELIGIOUS SUPERIORS OF THE PHILIPPINES (AMRSP), Petitioners, vs. EDUARDO ERMITA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary, ROMULO NERI, in his capacity as Director-General of the NATIONAL ECONOMIC and DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY (NEDA) and the Administrator of the NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE (NSO), Respondents. DECISION CARPIO, J.: This case involves two consolidated petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking the nullification of Executive Order No. 420 (EO 420) on the ground that it is unconstitutional. EO 420, issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on 13 April 2005, reads: REQUIRING ALL GOVERNMENT AGENCIES AND GOVERNMENT-OWNED AND CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS TO STREAMLINE AND HARMONIZE THEIR IDENTIFICATION (ID) SYSTEMS, AND AUTHORIZING FOR SUCH PURPOSE THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL, NATIONAL ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY TO IMPLEMENT THE SAME, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES WHEREAS, good governance is a major thrust of this Administration;
a. To reduce costs and thereby lessen the financial burden on both the government and the public brought about by the use of multiple ID cards and the maintenance of redundant database containing the same or related information; b. To ensure greater convenience for those transacting business with the government and those availing of government services; c. To facilitate private businesses and promote the wider use of the unified ID card as provided under this executive order; d. To enhance the integrity and reliability of government-issued ID cards; and e. To facilitate access to and delivery of quality and effective government service. Section 2. Coverage All government agencies and government-owned and controlled corporations issuing ID cards to their members or constituents shall be covered by this executive order. Section 3. Data requirement for the unified ID system The data to be collected and recorded by the participating agencies shall be limited to the following: Name Home Address Sex Picture Signature
Republic vs Gingoyon
EN BANC
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 166429 Represented by Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita, the DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND Present: COMMUNICATIONS (DOTC), and the MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT DAVIDE, JR., C.J., AUTHORITY (MIAA), PUNO, Petitioners, PANGANIBAN, ' QUISUMBING, YNARES-SANTIAGO, SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, CARPIO, ' -versus- AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CORONA, CARPIO-MORALES, CALLEJO, SR., AZCUNA, HON. HENRICK F. GINGOYON, TINGA, In his capacity as Presiding CHICO-NAZARIO, and Judge of the Regional Trial Court, GARCIA, JJ. Branch 117, Pasay City and PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL AIR TERMINALS CO., INC., Respondents. Promulgated:
Republic vs Gingoyon
x---------------------------------------------------------------------- x
In the first case that reached this Court, Agan v. PIATCO, [1] the contracts' which the Government had with the contractor were voided for being contrary to law and public policy. The second case now before the Court involves the matter of just compensation due the contractor for the terminal complex it built. We decide the case on the basis of fairness, the same norm that pervades both the Court's 2004 Resolution in the first case and the latest expropriation law.
The present controversy has its roots with the promulgation of the Court's decision in Agan v. PIATCO, [2]promulgated in 2003 (2003 Decision). This decision nullified the 'Concession Agreement for the Build-Operate-and-Transfer Arrangement of the Ninoy Aquino International Airport Passenger Terminal III entered into between the Philippine Government (Government) and the Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc. (PIATCO), as well as the amendments and supplements thereto. The agreement had authorized PIATCO to build a new international airport terminal (NAIA 3), as well as a franchise to operate and maintain the said terminal during the concession period of 25 years. The contracts were nullified, among others, that Paircargo Consortium, predecessor of PIATCO, did not possess the requisite financial capacity when it was awarded the NAIA 3 contract and that the agreement was' contrary to public policy. [3]
At the time of the promulgation of the 2003 Decision, the NAIA 3 facilities had already been built by PIATCO and were nearing completion. [4] However, the ponencia was silent as to the legal status of the NAIA 3 facilities following the nullification of the contracts, as well as whatever rights of PIATCO for reimbursement for its expenses in the construction of the facilities. Still, in his Separate Opinion, Justice Panganiban, joined by Justice Callejo, declared as follows:
Republic vs Gingoyon
Should government pay at all for reasonable expenses incurred in the construction of the Terminal? Indeed it should, otherwise it will be unjustly enriching itself at the expense of Piatco and, in particular, its funders, contractors and investors ' both local and foreign . After all, there is no question that the State needs and will make use of Terminal III, it being part and parcel of the critical infrastructure and transportation-related programs of government. [5]
PIATCO and several respondents-intervenors filed their respective motions for the reconsideration of the 2003 Decision. These motions were denied by the Court in its Resolution dated 21 January 2004 (2004 Resolution). [6]However, the Court this time squarely addressed the issue of the rights of PIATCO to refund, compensation or reimbursement for its expenses in the construction of the NAIA 3 facilities. The holding of the Court on this crucial point follows:
This Court, however, is not unmindful of the reality that the structures comprising the NAIA IPT III facility are almost complete and that funds have been spent by PIATCO in their construction.For the government to take over the said facility, it has to compensate respondent PIATCO as builder of the said structures. The compensation must be just and in accordance with law and equity for the government can not unjustly enrich itself at the expense of PIATCO and its investors.[7]
After the promulgation of the rulings' in Agan, the NAIA 3 facilities have remained in the possession of PIATCO, despite the avowed intent of the Government to put the airport terminal into immediate operation. The Government and PIATCO conducted several rounds of negotiation regarding the NAIA 3 facilities. [8] It also appears that arbitral proceedings were commenced before the International Chamber of Commerce International Court of Arbitration and the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes, [9] although the Government has raised jurisdictional questions before those two bodies. [10]
Then, on 21 December 2004, the Government [11] filed a Complaint for expropriation with the Pasay City Regional Trial Court (RTC), together with an Application for Special Raffle seeking the immediate holding of a special raffle. The Government sought upon the filing of the complaint the issuance of a writ of possession authorizing it to take immediate possession and control over the NAIA 3 facilities.
Republic vs Gingoyon
The Government also declared that it had deposited the amount of P 3,002,125,000.00 [12] (3 Billion) [13] in Cash with the Land Bank of the Philippines, representing the NAIA 3 terminal's assessed value for taxation purposes. [14]
The case [15] was raffled to Branch 117 of the Pasay City RTC, presided by respondent judge Hon. Henrick F. Gingoyon (Hon. Gingoyon). On the same day that the Complaint was filed, the RTC issued an Order [16] directing the issuance of a writ of possession to the Government, authorizing it to 'take or enter upon the possession of the NAIA 3 facilities. Citing the case of City of v. Serrano, [17] the RTC noted that it had the ministerial duty to issue the writ of possession upon the filing of a complaint for expropriation sufficient in form and substance, and upon deposit made by the government of the amount equivalent to the assessed value of the property subject to expropriation. The RTC found these requisites present, particularly noting that '[t]he case record shows that [the Government has] deposited the assessed value of the [NAIA 3 facilities] in the Land Bank of the Philippines, an authorized depositary, as shown by the certification attached to their complaint. Also on the same day, the RTC issued a Writ of Possession. According to PIATCO, the Government was able to take possession over the NAIA 3 facilities immediately after the Writ of Possession was issued. [18]
However, on 4 January 2005, the RTC issued another Order designed to supplement its 21 December 2004 Order and the Writ of Possession. In the 4 January 2005 Order, now assailed in the present petition, the RTC noted that its earlier issuance of its writ of possession was pursuant to Section 2, Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. However, it was observed that Republic Act No. 8974 (Rep. Act No. 8974), otherwise known as 'An Act to Facilitate the Acquisition of Right-of-Way, Site or Location for National Government Infrastructure Projects and For Other Purposes' and its Implementing Rules and Regulations (Implementing Rules) had amended Rule 67 in many respects.
There are at least two crucial differences between the respective procedures under Rep. Act No. 8974 and Rule 67. Under the statute, the Government is required to make immediate payment to the property owner upon the filing of the complaint to be entitled to a writ of possession, whereas' in Rule 67, the Government is required only to make an initial deposit with an authorized government depositary. Moreover, Rule 67 prescribes that the initial deposit be
Republic vs Gingoyon
equivalent to the assessed value of the property for purposes of taxation, unlike Rep. Act No. 8974 which provides, as the relevant standard for initial compensation, the market value of the property as stated in the tax declaration or the current relevant zonal valuation of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), whichever is higher, and the value of the improvements and/or structures using the replacement cost method.
Accordingly, on the basis of Sections 4 and 7 of Rep. Act No. 8974 and Section 10 of the Implementing Rules, the RTC made key qualifications to its earlier issuances. First, it directed the Land Bank of the Philippines, Baclaran Branch (LBP-Baclaran), to immediately release the amount of US$62,343,175.77 to PIATCO, an amount which the RTC characterized as that which the Government 'specifically made available for the purpose of this expropriation; and such amount to be deducted from the amount of just compensation due PIATCO as eventually determined by the RTC. Second, the Government was directed to submit to the RTC a Certificate of Availability of Funds signed by authorized officials to cover the payment of just compensation. Third, the Government was directed 'to maintain, preserve and safeguard the NAIA 3 facilities or 'perform such as acts or activities in preparation for their direct operation of the airport terminal, pending expropriation proceedings and full payment of just compensation. However, the Government was prohibited 'from performing acts of ownership like awarding concessions or leasing any part of [NAIA 3] to other parties. [19]
The very next day after the issuance of the assailed 4 January 2005 Order, the Government filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, which was set for hearing on 10 January 2005. On 7 January 2005, the RTC issued another Order, the second now assailed before this Court, which appointed three (3) Commissioners to ascertain the amount of just compensation for the NAIA 3 Complex. That same day, the Government filed a Motion for Inhibition of Hon. Gingoyon.
The RTC heard the Urgent Motion for Reconsideration and Motion for Inhibition on 10 January 2005. On the same day, it denied these motions in an Omnibus Order dated 10 January 2005. This is the third Order now assailed before this Court. Nonetheless, while the Omnibus Orderaffirmed the earlier dispositions in the 4 January 2005 Order, it excepted from affirmance 'the superfluous part of the Order prohibiting the plaintiffs from awarding concessions or leasing any part of [NAIA 3] to other parties. [20]
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Thus, the present Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 was filed on 13 January 2005. The petition prayed for the nullification of the RTC orders dated 4 January 2005, 7 January 2005, and 10 January 2005, and for the inhibition of Hon. Gingoyon from taking further action on the expropriation case. A concurrent prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction was granted by this Court in a Resolution dated 14 January 2005. [21]
The Government, in imputing grave abuse of discretion to the acts of Hon. Gingoyon, raises five general arguments, to wit:
(i) that Rule 67, not Rep. Act No. 8974, governs the present expropriation proceedings;
(ii) that Hon. Gingoyon erred when he ordered the immediate release of the amount of US$62.3 Million to PIATCO considering that the assessed value as alleged in the complaint was only P 3 Billion;
(iii) that the RTC could not have prohibited the Government from enjoining the performance of acts of ownership;
(iv) that the appointment of the three commissioners was erroneous; and
(v) that Hon. Gingoyon should be compelled to inhibit himself from the expropriation case. [22]
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Before we delve into the merits of the issues raised by the Government, it is essential to consider the crucial holding of the Court in its 2004 Resolution in Agan, which we repeat below:
This Court, however, is not unmindful of the reality that the structures comprising the NAIA IPT III facility are almost complete and that funds have been spent by PIATCO in their construction. For the government to take over the said facility, it has to compensate respondent PIATCO as builder of the said structures. The compensation must be just and in accordance with law and equity for the government can not unjustly enrich itself at the expense of PIATCO and its investors. [23]
This pronouncement contains the fundamental premises which permeate this decision of the Court. Indeed, Agan , final and executory as it is, stands as governing law in this case, and any disposition of the present petition must conform to the conditions laid down by the Court in its 2004Resolution .
The 2004 Resolution Which Is Law of This Case Generally Permits Expropriation
The pronouncement in the 2004 Resolution is especially significant to this case in two aspects, namely: (i) that PIATCO must receive payment of just compensation determined in accordance with law and equity; and (ii) that the government is barred from taking over NAIA 3 until such just compensation is paid . The parties cannot be allowed to evade the directives laid down by this Court through any mode of judicial action, such as the complaint for eminent domain.
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It cannot be denied though that the Court in the 2004 Resolution prescribed mandatory guidelines which the Government must observe before it could acquire the NAIA 3 facilities. Thus, the actions of respondent judge under review, as well as the arguments of the parties must, to merit affirmation, pass the threshold test of whether such propositions are in accord with the 2004 Resolution.
The Government does not contest 2004 Resolution , [24]thus its application
the
efficacy
of
this
pronouncement
in
the
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to the case at bar is not a matter of controversy. Of course, questions such as what is the standard of 'just compensation and which particular laws and equitable principles are applicable, remain in dispute and shall be resolved forthwith.
The Government has chosen to resort to expropriation, a remedy available under the law, which has the added benefit of an integrated process for the determination of just compensation and the payment thereof to PIATCO. We appreciate that the case at bar is a highly unusual case, whereby the Government seeks to expropriate a building complex constructed on land which the State already owns. [25] There is an inherent illogic in the resort to eminent domain on property already owned by the State. At first blush, since the State already owns the property on which NAIA 3 stands, the proper remedy should be akin to an action for ejectment.
However, the reason for the resort by the Government to expropriation proceedings is understandable in this case. The 2004 Resolution, in requiring the payment of just compensation prior to the takeover by the Government of
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NAIA 3, effectively precluded it from acquiring possession or ownership of the NAIA 3 through the unilateral exercise of its rights as the owner of the ground on which the facilities stood. Thus, as things stood after the 2004 Resolution, the right of the Government to take over the NAIA 3 terminal was preconditioned by lawful order on the payment of just compensation to PIATCO as builder of the structures.
The determination of just compensation could very well be agreed upon by the parties without judicial intervention, and it appears that steps towards that direction had been engaged in. Still, ultimately, the Government resorted to its inherent power of eminent domain through expropriation proceedings. Is eminent domain appropriate in the first place, with due regard not only to the law on expropriation but also to the Court's 2004 Resolution in Agan ?
The right of eminent domain extends to personal and real property, and the NAIA 3 structures, adhered as they are to the soil, are considered as real property. [26] The public purpose for the expropriation is also beyond dispute. It should also be noted that Section 1 of Rule 67 (on Expropriation) recognizes the possibility that the property sought to be expropriated may be titled in the name of the
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Republic of the Philippines, although occupied by private individuals, and in such case an averment to that effect should be made in the complaint. The instant expropriation complaint did aver that the NAIA 3 complex 'stands on a parcel of land owned by the Bases Conversion Development Authority, another agency of [the Republic of the Philippines]. [27]
Admittedly, eminent domain is not the sole judicial recourse by which the Government may have acquired the NAIA 3 facilities while satisfying the requisites in the 2004 Resolution. Eminent domain though may be the most effective, as well as the speediest means by which such goals may be accomplished. Not only does it enable immediate possession after satisfaction of the requisites under the law, it also has a built-in procedure through which just compensation may be ascertained. Thus, there should be no question as to the propriety of eminent domain proceedings in this case.
Still, in applying the laws and rules on expropriation in the case at bar, we are impelled to apply or construe these rules in accordance with the Court's prescriptions in the 2004 Resolution to achieve the end effect that the Government may validly take over the NAIA 3 facilities. Insofar as this case is concerned, the 2004 Resolution is effective not only as a legal precedent, but as the source of rights and prescriptions that must be guaranteed, if not enforced, in the resolution of this petition. Otherwise, the integrity and efficacy of the rulings of this Court will be severely diminished.
It is from these premises that we resolve the first question, whether Rule 67 of the Rules of Court or Rep. Act No. 8974 governs the expropriation proceedings in this case.
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The Government insists that Rule 67 of the Rules of Court governs the expropriation proceedings in this case to the exclusion of all other laws. On the other hand, PIATCO claims that it is Rep. Act No. 8974 which does apply. Earlier, we had adverted to the basic differences between the statute and the procedural rule. Further elaboration is in order.
Rule 67 outlines the procedure under which eminent domain may be exercised by the Government. Yet by no means does it serve at present as the solitary guideline through which the State may expropriate private property. For example, Section 19 of the Local Government Code governs as to the exercise by local government units of the power of eminent domain through an enabling ordinance. And then there is Rep. Act No. 8974, which covers expropriation proceedings intended for national government infrastructure projects.
Rep. Act No. 8974, which provides for a procedure eminently more favorable to the property owner than Rule 67, inescapably applies in instances when the national government expropriates property 'for national government infrastructure projects. [28] Thus, if expropriation is engaged in by the national government for purposes other than national infrastructure projects, the assessed value standard and the deposit mode prescribed in Rule 67 continues to apply.
Under both Rule 67 and Rep. Act No. 8974, the Government commences expropriation proceedings through the filing of a complaint. Unlike in the case of local governments which necessitate an authorizing ordinance before expropriation may be accomplished, there is no need under Rule 67 or Rep. Act No. 8974 for legislative authorization before the Government may proceed with a particular exercise of eminent domain. The most crucial difference between Rule 67 and Rep. Act No. 8974 concerns the particular essential step the Government has to undertake to be entitled to a writ of possession.
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'SEC. 2. Entry of plaintiff upon depositing value with authorized government depository. ' Upon the filing of the complaint or at any time thereafter and after due notice to the defendant, the plaintiff shall have the right to take or enter upon the possession of the real property involved if he deposits with the authorized government depositary an amount equivalent to the assessed value of the property for purposes of taxation to be held by such bank subject to the orders of the court. Such deposit shall be in money, unless in lieu thereof the court authorizes the deposit of a certificate of deposit of a government bank of the Republic of the Philippines payable on demand to the authorized government depositary.
SEC. 4. Guidelines for Expropriation Proceedings . Whenever it is necessary to acquire real property for the right-of-way, site or location for any national government infrastructure project through expropriation, the appropriate proceedings before the proper court under the following guidelines: a) Upon the filing of the complaint, and after due notice to the defendant, the implementing agency shall immediately pay the owner of the property the amount equivalent to the sum of (1) one hundred percent (100%) of the value of the property based on the current relevant zonal valuation of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR); and (2) the value of the improvements and/or structures as determined under Section 7 hereof; ... c) In case the completion of a government infrastructure project is of utmost urgency and importance, and there is no existing valuation of the area concerned, the implementing agency shall immediately pay the owner of the
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property its proffered value taking into consideration the standards prescribed in Section 5 hereof.
Upon completion with the guidelines abovementioned, the court shall immediately issue to the implementing agency an order to take possession of the property and start the implementation of the project. Before the court can issue a Writ of Possession, the implementing agency shall present to the court a certificate of availability of funds from the proper official concerned. ...
As can be gleaned from the above-quoted texts, Rule 67 merely requires the Government to deposit with an authorized government depositary the assessed value of the property for expropriation for it to be entitled to a writ of possession. On the other hand, Rep. Act No. 8974 requires that the Government make a direct payment to the property owner before the writ may issue. Moreover, such payment is based on the zonal valuation of the BIR in the case of land, the value of the improvements or structures under the replacement cost method, [29] or if no such valuation is available and in cases of utmost urgency, the proffered value of the property to be seized.
It is quite apparent why the Government would prefer to apply Rule 67 in lieu of Rep. Act No. 8974. Under Rule 67, it would not be obliged to immediately pay any amount to PIATCO before it can obtain the writ of possession since all it need do is deposit the amount equivalent to the assessed value with an authorized government depositary. Hence, it devotes considerable effort to point out that Rep. Act No. 8974 does not apply in this case, notwithstanding the undeniable reality that NAIA 3 is a national government project. Yet, these efforts fail, especially considering the controlling effect of the 2004 Resolution in Agan on the adjudication of this case.
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It is the finding of this Court that the staging of expropriation proceedings in this case with the exclusive use of Rule 67 would allow for the Government to take over the NAIA 3 facilities in a fashion that directly rebukes our 2004 Resolution in Agan . This Court cannot sanction deviation from its own final and executory orders.
Section 2 of Rule 67 provides that the State 'shall have the right to take or enter upon the possession of the real property involved if [the plaintiff] deposits with the authorized government depositary an amount equivalent to the assessed value of the property for purposes of taxation to be held by such bank subject to the orders of the court. [30] It is thus apparent that under the provision, all the Government need do to obtain a writ of possession is to deposit the amount equivalent to the assessed value with an authorized government depositary.
Would the deposit under Section 2 of Rule 67 satisfy the requirement laid down in the 2004 Resolution that '[f]or the government to take over the said facility, it has to compensate respondent PIATCO as builder of the said structures' ? Evidently not.
If Section 2 of Rule 67 were to apply, PIATCO would be enjoined from receiving a single centavo as just compensation before the Government takes over the NAIA 3 facility by virtue of a writ of possession. Such an injunction squarely contradicts the letter and intent of the 2004 Resolution. Hence, the position of the Government sanctions its own disregard or violation the prescription laid down by this Court that there must first be just compensation paid to PIATCO before the Government may take over the NAIA 3 facilities.
Thus, at the very least, Rule 67 cannot apply in this case without violating the 2004 Resolution. Even assuming that Rep. Act No. 8974 does not govern in this case, it does not necessarily follow that Rule 67 should then apply. After all, adherence to the letter of Section 2, Rule 67 would in turn violate the Court's requirement in the 2004 Resolution that there must first be payment of just compensation to PIATCO before the Government may take over the property.
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It is the plain intent of Rep. Act No. 8974 to supersede the system of deposit under Rule 67 with the scheme of 'immediate payment in cases involving national government infrastructure projects. The following portion of the Senate deliberations, cited by PIATCO in its Memorandum, is worth quoting to cogitate on the purpose behind the plain meaning of the law:
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. CAYETANO). 'x x x Because the Senate believes that, you know, we have to pay the landowners immediately not by treasury bills but by cash. Since we are depriving them, you know, upon payment, 'no, of possession, we might as well pay them as much, 'no, hindi lang 50 percent . xxx THE CHAIRMAN (REP. VERGARA). Accepted. xxx THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. CAYETANO). Oo. Because this is really in favor of the landowners, e. THE CHAIRMAN (REP. VERGARA). That's why we need to really secure the availability of funds. xxx THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. CAYETANO). No, no. It's the same. It says here: iyong first paragraph, diba? Iyong zonal ' talagang magbabayad muna. In other words, you know, there must be a payment kaagad. (TSN, Bicameral Conference on the Disagreeing Provisions of House Bill 1422 and Senate Bill 2117, August 29, 2000, pp. 14-20) xxx THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. CAYETANO). Okay, okay, 'no. Unang-una, it is not deposit, 'no. It's payment.
Republic vs Gingoyon
It likewise bears noting that the appropriate standard of just compensation is a substantive matter. It is well within the province of the legislature to fix the standard, which it did through the enactment of Rep. Act No. 8974. Specifically, this prescribes the new standards in determining the amount of just compensation in expropriation cases relating to national government infrastructure projects, as well as the manner of payment thereof. At the same time, Section 14 of the Implementing Rules recognizes the continued applicability of Rule 67 on procedural aspects when it provides 'all matters regarding defenses and objections to the complaint, issues on uncertain ownership and conflicting claims, effects of appeal on the rights of the parties, and such other incidents affecting the complaint shall be resolved under the provisions on expropriation of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court. [32]
'Given that the 2004 Resolution militates against the continued use of the norm under Section 2, Rule 67, is it then possible to apply Rep. Act No. 8974? We find that it is, and moreover, its application in this case complements rather than contravenes the prescriptions laid down in the 2004 Resolution.
Rep. Act No. 8974 Fits to the Situation at Bar and Complements the
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Rep. Act No. 8974 is entitled 'An Act To Facilitate The Acquisition Of Right-Of-Way, Site Or Location For National Government Infrastructure Projects And For Other Purposes. Obviously, the law is intended to cover expropriation proceedings intended for national government infrastructure projects. Section 2 of Rep. Act No. 8974 explains what are considered as 'national government projects.
Sec. 2. National Government Projects . ' The term 'national government projects' shall refer to all national government infrastructure, engineering works and service contracts, including projects undertaken by government-owned and controlled corporations, all projects covered by Republic Act No. 6957, as amended by Republic Act No. 7718, otherwise known as the Build-Operate-and-Transfer Law, and other related and necessary activities, such as site acquisition, supply and/or installation of equipment and materials, implementation, construction, completion, operation, maintenance, improvement, repair and rehabilitation, regardless of the source of funding.
As acknowledged in the 2003 Decision, the development of NAIA 3 was made pursuant to a build-operate-and-transfer arrangement pursuant to Republic Act No. 6957, as amended, [33] which pertains to infrastructure or development projects normally financed by the public sector but which are now wholly or partly implemented by the private sector. [34] Under the build-operate-and-transfer scheme, it is the project proponent which undertakes the construction, including the financing, of a given infrastructure facility. [35] In Tatad v. Garcia, [36] the Court acknowledged that the operator of the EDSA Light Rail Transit project under a BOT scheme was the owner of the facilities such as 'the rail tracks, rolling stocks like the coaches, rail stations, terminals and the power plant. [37]
There can be no doubt that PIATCO has ownership rights over the facilities which it had financed and constructed. The 2004 Resolution squarely recognized that right when it mandated the payment of just compensation to PIATCO prior to the takeover by the Government of NAIA 3.
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The fact that the Government resorted to eminent domain proceedings in the first place is a concession on its part of PIATCO's ownership. Indeed, if no such right is recognized, then there should be no impediment for the Government to seize control of NAIA 3 through ordinary ejectment proceedings.
Since the rights of PIATCO over the NAIA 3 facilities are established, the nature of these facilities should now be determined. Under Section 415(1) of the Civil Code, these facilities are ineluctably immovable or real property, as they constitute buildings, roads and constructions of all kinds adhered to the soil. [38] Certainly, the NAIA 3 facilities are of such nature that they cannot just be packed up and transported by PIATCO like a traveling circus caravan.
Thus, the property subject of expropriation, the NAIA 3 facilities, are real property owned by PIATCO. This point is critical, considering the Government's insistence that the NAIA 3 facilities cannot be deemed as the 'right-of-way', 'site or 'location of a national government infrastructure project, within the coverage of Rep. Act No. 8974.
There is no doubt that the NAIA 3 is not, under any sensible contemplation, a 'right-of-way. Yet we cannot agree with the Government's insistence that neither could NAIA 3 be a 'site or 'location. The petition quotes the definitions provided in Black's Law Dictionary of 'location as the specific place or position of a person or thing and 'site as pertaining to a place or location or a piece of property set aside for specific use. [39] Yet even Black's Law Dictionary provides that '[t]he term [site] does not of itself necessarily mean a place or tract of land fixed by definite boundaries. [40] One would assume that the Government, to back up its contention, would be able to point to a clear-cut rule that a 'site or 'location exclusively refers to soil, grass, pebbles and weeds. There is none.
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Indeed, we cannot accept the Government's proposition that the only properties that may be expropriated under Rep. Act No. 8974 are parcels of land. Rep. Act No. 8974 contemplates within its coverage such real property constituting land, buildings, roads and constructions of all kinds adhered to the soil. Section 1 of Rep. Act No. 8974, which sets the declaration of the law's policy, refers to 'real property acquired for national government infrastructure projects are promptly paid just compensation. [41] Section 4 is quite explicit in stating that the scope of the law relates to the acquisition of 'real property, which under civil law includes buildings, roads and constructions adhered to the soil.
It is moreover apparent that the law and its implementing rules commonly provide for a rule for the valuation of improvements and/or structures thereupon separate from that of the land on which such are constructed. Section 2 of Rep. Act No. 8974 itself recognizes that the improvements or structures on the land may very well be the subject of expropriation proceedings. Section 4(a), in relation to Section 7 of the law provides for the guidelines for the valuation of the improvements or structures to be expropriated. Indeed, nothing in the law would prohibit the application of Section 7, which provides for the valuation method of the improvements and or structures in the instances wherein it is necessary for the Government to expropriate only the improvements or structures, as in this case.
The law classifies the NAIA 3 facilities as real properties just like the soil to which they are adhered. Any sub-classifications of real property and divergent treatment based thereupon for purposes of expropriation must be based on substantial distinctions, otherwise the equal protection clause of the Constitution is violated. There may be perhaps a molecular distinction between soil and the inorganic improvements adhered thereto, yet there are no purposive distinctions that would justify a variant treatment for purposes of expropriation. Both the land itself and the improvements thereupon are susceptible to private ownership independent of each other, capable of pecuniary estimation, and if taken from the owner, considered as a deprivation of property. The owner of improvements seized through expropriation suffers the same degree of loss as the owner of land seized through similar means. Equal protection demands that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. For purposes of expropriation, parcels of land are similarly situated as the buildings or improvements constructed thereon, and a disparate treatment between those two classes of real property infringes the equal protection clause.
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Even as the provisions of Rep. Act No. 8974 call for that law's application in this case, the threshold test must still be met whether its implementation would conform to the dictates of the Court in the 2004 Resolution. Unlike in the case of Rule 67, the application of Rep. Act No. 8974 will not contravene the 2004 Resolution, which requires the payment of just compensation before any takeover of the NAIA 3 facilities by the Government. The 2004 Resolution does not particularize the extent such payment must be effected before the takeover, but it unquestionably requires at least some degree of payment to the private property owner before a writ of possession may issue. The utilization of Rep. Act No. 8974 guarantees compliance with this bare minimum requirement, as it assures the private property owner the payment of, at the very least, the proffered value of the property to be seized. Such payment of the proffered value to the owner, followed by the issuance of the writ of possession in favor of the Government, is precisely the schematic under Rep. Act No. 8974, one which facially complies with the prescription laid down in the 2004 Resolution.
Clearly then, we see no error on the part of the RTC when it ruled that Rep. Act No. 8974 governs the instant expropriation proceedings. The Proper Amount to be Paid under Rep. Act No. 8974
Then, there is the matter of the proper amount which should be paid to PIATCO by the Government before the writ of possession may issue, consonant to Rep. Act No. 8974.
At this juncture, we must address the observation made by the Office of the Solicitor General in behalf of the Government that there could be no 'BIR zonal valuations' on the NAIA 3 facility, as provided in Rep. Act No. 8974, since zonal valuations are only for parcels of land, not for airport terminals. The Court agrees with this point, yet does not see it as an impediment for the application of Rep. Act No. 8974.
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It must be clarified that PIATCO cannot be reimbursed or justly compensated for the value of the parcel of land on which NAIA 3 stands. PIATCO is not the owner of the land on which the NAIA 3 facility is constructed, and it should not be entitled to just compensation that is inclusive of the value of the land itself. It would be highly disingenuous to compensate PIATCO for the value of land it does not own. Its entitlement to just compensation should be limited to the value of the improvements and/or structures themselves. Thus, the determination of just compensation cannot include the BIR zonal valuation under Section 4 of Rep. Act No. 8974.
Under Rep. Act No. 8974, the Government is required to 'immediately pay the owner of the property the amount equivalent to the sum of (1) one hundred percent (100%) of the value of the property based on the current relevant zonal valuation of the [BIR]; and (2) the value of the improvements and/or structures as determined under Section 7. As stated above, the BIR zonal valuation cannot apply in this case, thus the amount subject to immediate payment should be limited to 'the value of the improvements and/or structures as determined under Section 7, with Section 7 referring to the 'implementing rules and regulations for the equitable valuation of the improvements and/or structures on the land. Under the present implementing rules in place, the valuation of the improvements/structures are to be based using 'the replacement cost method.[42] However, the replacement cost is only one of the factors to be considered in determining the just compensation.
In addition to Rep. Act No. 8974, the 2004 Resolution in Agan also mandated that the payment of just compensation should be in accordance with equity as well. Thus, in ascertaining the ultimate amount of just compensation, the duty of the trial court is to ensure that such amount conforms not only to the law, such as Rep. Act No. 8974, but to principles of equity as well.
Admittedly, there is no way, at least for the present, to immediately ascertain the value of the improvements and structures since such valuation is a matter for factual determination. [43] Yet Rep. Act No. 8974 permits an expedited means by which the Government can immediately take possession of the property without having to await precise determination of the valuation. Section 4(c) of Rep. Act No. 8974 states that 'in case the completion of a government infrastructure
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project is of utmost urgency and importance, and there is no existing valuation of the area concerned, the implementing agency shall immediately pay the owner of the property itsproferred value, taking into consideration the standards prescribed in Section 5 [of the law]. [44]The 'proffered value may strike as a highly subjective standard based solely on the intuition of the government, but Rep. Act No. 8974 does provide relevant standards by which 'proffered value should be based, [45] as well as the certainty
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In filing the complaint for expropriation, the Government alleged to have deposited the amount ofP3 Billion earmarked for expropriation, representing the assessed value of the property. The making of the deposit, including the determination of the amount of the deposit, was undertaken under the erroneous notion that Rule 67, and not Rep. Act No. 8974, is the applicable law. Still, as regards the amount, the Court sees no impediment to recognize this sum of P3 Billion as the proffered value under Section 4(b) of Rep. Act No. 8974. After all, in the initial determination of the proffered value, the Government is not strictly required to adhere to any predetermined standards, although its proffered value may later be subjected to judicial review using the standards enumerated under Section 5 of Rep. Act No. 8974.
How should we appreciate the questioned order of Hon. Gingoyon, which pegged the amount to be immediately paid to PIATCO at around $62.3 Million? The Order dated 4 January 2005, which mandated such amount, proves problematic in that regard. While the initial sum of P3 Billion may have been based on the assessed value, a standard which should not however apply in this case, the RTC cites without qualification Section 4(a) of Rep. Act No. 8974 as the basis for the amount of $62.3 Million, thus leaving the impression that the BIR zonal valuation may form part of the basis for just compensation, which should not be the case. Moreover, respondent judge made no attempt to apply the enumerated guidelines for determination of just compensation under Section 5 of Rep. Act No. 8974, as required for judicial review of the proffered value.
The Court notes that in the 10 January 2005 Omnibus Order , the RTC noted that the concessions agreement entered into between the Government and PIATCO stated that the actual cost of building NAIA 3 was 'not less than US$350 Million. [47] The RTC then proceeded to observe that while Rep. Act No. 8974 required the immediate payment to PIATCO the amount equivalent to 100% of the value of NAIA 3, the amount deposited by the Government constituted only 18% of this value. At this point, no binding import should be given to this observation that the actual cost of building NAIA 3 was 'not less than US$350 Million, as the final conclusions on the amount of just compensation can come only after due ascertainment in accordance with the standards set under Rep. Act No. 8974, not the declarations of the parties. At the same time, the
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expressed linkage between the BIR zonal valuation and the amount of just compensation in this case, is revelatory of erroneous thought on the part of the RTC.
We have already pointed out the irrelevance of the BIR zonal valuation as an appropriate basis for valuation in this case, PIATCO not being the owner of the land on which the NAIA 3 facilities stand. The subject order is flawed insofar as it fails to qualify that such standard is inappropriate.
It does appear that the amount of US$62.3 Million was based on the certification issued by the LBP-Baclaran that the Republic of the Philippines maintained a total balance in that branch amounting to such amount. Yet the actual representation of the $62.3 Million is not clear. The Land Bank Certification expressing such amount does state that it was issued upon request of the International Airport Authority 'purportedly as guaranty deposit for the expropriation complaint. [48]The Government claims in its Memorandum that the entire amount was made available as a guaranty fund for the final and executory judgment of the trial court, and not merely for the issuance of the writ of possession. [49] One could readily conclude that the entire amount of US$62.3 Million was intended by the Government to answer for whatever guaranties may be required for the purpose of the expropriation complaint.
Still, such intention the Government may have had as to the entire US$62.3 Million is only inferentially established. In ascertaining the proffered value adduced by the Government, the amount of P3 Billion as the amount deposited characterized in the complaint as 'to be held by [Land Bank] subject to the [RTC's ] orders, [50] should be deemed as controlling. There is no clear evidence that the Government intended to offer US$62.3 Million as the initial payment of just compensation, the wording of the Land Bank Certification notwithstanding, and credence should be given to the consistent position of the Government on that aspect.
In any event, for the RTC to be able to justify the payment of US$62.3 Million to PIATCO and notP3 Billion Pesos, he would have to establish that the higher amount represents the valuation of the structures/improvements, and not the BIR zonal valuation on the land wherein NAIA 3 is built. TheOrder dated 5 January 2005 fails to establish such integral fact, and in the absence of
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contravening proof, the proffered value of P3 Billion, as presented by the Government, should prevail.
Strikingly, the Government submits that assuming that Rep. Act No. 8974 is applicable, the deposited amount of P3 Billion should be considered as the proffered value, since the amount was based on comparative values made by the City Assessor. [51] Accordingly, it should be deemed as having faithfully complied with the requirements of the statute. [52] While the Court agrees that P3 Billion should be considered as the correct proffered value, still we cannot deem the Government as having faithfully complied with Rep. Act No. 8974. For the law plainly requires direct payment to the property owner, and not a mere deposit with the authorized government depositary. Without such direct payment, no writ of possession may be obtained.
Writ of Possession May Not Be Implemented Until Actual Receipt by PIATCO of Proferred Value
The Court thus finds another error on the part of the RTC. The RTC authorized the issuance of the writ of possession to the Government notwithstanding the fact that no payment of any amount had yet been made to PIATCO, despite the clear command of Rep. Act No. 8974 that there must first be payment before the writ of possession can issue. While the RTC did direct the LBPBaclaran to immediately release the amount of US$62 Million to PIATCO, it should have likewise suspended the writ of possession, nay, withdrawn it altogether, until the Government shall have actually paid PIATCO. This is the inevitable consequence of the clear command of Rep. Act No. 8974 that requires immediate payment of the initially determined amount of just compensation should be effected. Otherwise, the overpowering intention of Rep. Act No. 8974 of ensuring payment first before transfer of repossession would be eviscerated.
Republic vs Gingoyon
Rep. Act No. 8974 represents a significant change from previous expropriation laws such as Rule 67, or even Section 19 of the Local Government Code. Rule 67 and the Local Government Code merely provided that the Government deposit the initial amounts [53] antecedent to acquiring possession of the property with, respectively, an authorized Government depositary [54] or the proper court. [55] In both cases, the private owner does not receive compensation prior to the deprivation of property. On the other hand, Rep. Act No. 8974 mandates immediate payment of the initial just compensation prior to the issuance of the writ of possession in favor of the Government.
Rep. Act No. 8974 is plainly clear in imposing the requirement of immediate prepayment, and no amount of statutory deconstruction can evade such requisite. It enshrines a new approach towards eminent domain that reconciles the inherent unease attending expropriation proceedings with a position of fundamental equity. While expropriation proceedings have always demanded just compensation in exchange for private property, the previous deposit requirement impeded immediate compensation to the private owner, especially in cases wherein the determination of the final amount of compensation would prove highly disputed. Under the new modality prescribed by Rep. Act No. 8974, the private owner sees immediate monetary recompense with the same degree of speed as the taking of his/her property.
While eminent domain lies as one of the inherent powers of the State, there is no requirement that it undertake a prolonged procedure, or that the payment of the private owner be protracted as far as practicable. In fact, the expedited procedure of payment, as highlighted under Rep. Act No. 8974, is inherently more fair, especially to the layperson who would be hard-pressed to fully comprehend the social value of expropriation in the first place. Immediate payment placates to some degree whatever ill-will that arises from expropriation, as well as satisfies the demand of basic fairness.
The Court has the duty to implement Rep. Act No. 8974 and to direct compliance with the requirement of immediate payment in this case. Accordingly, the Writ of Possession dated 21
Republic vs Gingoyon
December 2004 should be held in abeyance, pending proof of actual payment by the Government to PIATCO of the proffered value of the NAIA 3 facilities, which totals P3,002,125,000.00.
Once the Government pays PIATCO the amount of the proffered value of P3 Billion, it will be entitled to the Writ of Possession. However, the Government questions the qualification imposed by the RTC in its 4 January 2005 Order consisting of the prohibition on the Government from performing acts of ownership such as awarding concessions or leasing any part of NAIA 3 to other parties. To be certain, the RTC, in its 10 January 2005 Omnibus Order , expressly stated that it was not affirming 'the superfluous part of the Order [of 4 January 2005] prohibiting the plaintiffs from awarding concessions or leasing any part of NAIA [3] to other parties. [56] Still, such statement was predicated on the notion that since the Government was not yet the owner of NAIA 3 until final payment of just compensation, it was obviously incapacitated to perform such acts of ownership.
In deciding this question, the 2004 Resolution in Agan cannot be ignored, particularly the declaration that '[f]or the government to take over the said facility, it has to compensate respondent PIATCO as builder of the said structures. The obvious import of this holding is that unless PIATCO is paid just compensation, the Government is barred from 'taking over, a phrase which in the strictest sense could encompass even a bar of physical possession of NAIA 3, much less operation of the facilities.
There are critical reasons for the Court to view the 2004 Resolution less stringently, and thus allow the operation by the Government of NAIA 3 upon the effectivity of the Writ of Possession.
Republic vs Gingoyon
For one, the national prestige is diminished every day that passes with the NAIA 3 remaining mothballed. For another, the continued non-use of the facilities contributes to its physical deterioration, if it has not already. And still for another, the economic benefits to the Government and the country at large are beyond dispute once the NAIA 3 is put in operation.
Rep. Act No. 8974 provides the appropriate answer for the standard that governs the extent of the acts the Government may be authorized to perform upon the issuance of the writ of possession. Section 4 states that 'the court shall immediately issue to the implementing agency an order to take possession of the property and start the implementation of the project. We hold that accordingly, once the Writ of Possession is effective, the Government itself is authorized to perform the acts that are essential to the operation of the NAIA 3 as an international airport terminal upon the effectivity of the Writ of Possession. These would include the repair, reconditioning and improvement of the complex, maintenance of the existing facilities and equipment, installation of new facilities and equipment, provision of services and facilities pertaining to the facilitation of air traffic and transport, and other services that are integral to a modern-day international airport. The Government's position is more expansive than that adopted by the Court. It argues that with the writ of possession, it is enabled to perform acts de jure on the expropriated property. It citesRepublic v. Tagle , [57] as well as the statement therein that 'the expropriation of real property does not include mere physical entry or occupation of land, and from them concludes that 'its mere physical entry and occupation of the property fall short of the taking of title, which includes all the rights that may be exercised by an owner over the subject property.
This conclusion is indeed lifted directly from statements in Tagle , [58] but not from the ratio decidendi of that case. Tagle concerned whether a writ of possession in favor of the Government was still necessary in light of the fact that it was already in actual possession of the property. In ruling that the Government was entitled to the writ of possession, the Court in Tagle explains that such writ vested not only physical possession, but also the legal right to possess the property. Continues the Court, such legal right to possess was particularly important in the case, as there was a pending suit against the Republic for unlawful detainer, and the writ of possession would serve to safeguard the Government from eviction. [59]
Republic vs Gingoyon
At the same time, Tagle conforms to the obvious, that there is no transfer of ownership as of yet by virtue of the writ of possession. Tagle may concede that the Government is entitled to exercise more than just the right of possession by virtue of the writ of possession, yet it cannot be construed to grant the Government the entire panoply of rights that are available to the owner. Certainly, neither Tagle nor any other case or law, lends support to the Government's proposition that it acquires beneficial or equitable ownership of the expropriated property merely through the writ of possession.
Indeed, this Court has been vigilant in defense of the rights of the property owner who has been validly deprived of possession, yet retains legal title over the expropriated property pending payment of just compensation. We reiterated the various doctrines of such import in our recent holding in Republic v. Lim: [60]
The recognized rule is that title to the property expropriated shall pass from the owner to the expropriator only upon full payment of the just compensation. Jurisprudence on this settled principle is consistent both here and in other democratic jurisdictions. In Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. et al., vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform [ [61] ] , thus:
Title to property which is the subject of condemnation proceedings does not vest the condemnor until the judgment fixing just compensation is entered and paid, but the condemnor's title relates back
to the date on which the petition under the Eminent Domain Act, or the commissioner's report under the Local Improvement Act, is filed.
x x x Although the right to appropriate and use land taken for a canal is complete at the time of entry, title to the property taken remains in the owner until payment is actually made. (Emphasis supplied.) In Kennedy v. Indianapolis , the US Supreme Court cited several cases holding that title to property does not pass to the condemnor until just compensation had actually been made. In fact, the decisions appear to be uniform to this effect. As early as 1838, in Rubottom v. McLure , it was held that 'actual payment to the owner of the condemned property was a condition precedent to the investment of the title to the property in the State albeit 'not to the appropriation of it to public use. In Rexford v.
Republic vs Gingoyon Knight , the Court of Appeals of New Yorksaid that the construction upon the statutes was that the fee did not vest in the State until the payment of the compensation although the authority to enter upon and appropriate the land was complete prior to the payment. Kennedy further said that 'both on principle and authority the rule is . . . that the right to enter on and use the property is complete, as soon as the property is actually appropriated under the authority of law for a public use, but that the title does not pass from the owner without his consent, until just compensation has been made to him. Our own Supreme Court has held in Visayan Refining Co. v. Camus and Paredes , that:
If the laws which we have exhibited or cited in the preceding discussion are attentively examined it will be apparent that the method of expropriation adopted in this jurisdiction is such as to afford absolute reassurance that no piece of land can be finally and irrevocably taken from an unwilling owner until compensation is paid.... (Emphasis
supplied.)
Clearly, without full payment of just compensation, there can be no transfer of title from the landowner to the expropriator. Otherwise stated, the Republic's acquisition of ownership is conditioned upon the full payment of just compensation within a reasonable time. Significantly, in Municipality of Bian v. Garcia [ [62]] this Court ruled that the expropriation of lands consists of two stages, to wit: x x x The first is concerned with the determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit. It ends with an order, if not of dismissal of the action, 'of condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to be condemned, for the public use or purpose described in the complaint, upon the payment of just compensation to be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint x x x. The second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned with the determination by the court of 'the just compensation for the property sought to
Republic vs Gingoyon be taken. This is done by the court with the assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners. x x x.
It is only upon the completion of these two stages that expropriation is said to have been completed. In Republic v. Salem Investment Corporation [ [63]] , we ruled that, 'the process is not completed until payment of just compensation. Thus, here, the failure of the Republic to pay respondent and his predecessors-in-interest for a period of 57 years rendered the expropriation process incomplete.
Lim serves fair warning to the Government and its agencies who consistently refuse to pay just compensation due to the private property owner whose property had been expropriated. At the same time, Lim emphasizes the fragility of the rights of the Government as possessor pending the final payment of just compensation, without diminishing the potency of such rights. Indeed, the public policy, enshrined foremost in the Constitution, mandates that the Government must pay for the private property it expropriates. Consequently, the proper judicial attitude is to guarantee compliance with this primordial right to just compensation. Final Determination of Just Compensation Within 60 Days
The issuance of the writ of possession does not write finis to the expropriation proceedings. As earlier pointed out, expropriation is not completed until payment to the property owner of just compensation. The proffered value stands as' merely a provisional determination of the amount of just compensation, the payment of which is sufficient to transfer possession of the property to the Government. However, to effectuate the transfer of ownership, it is necessary for the Government to pay the property owner the final just compensation.
Republic vs Gingoyon
In Lim, the Court went as far as to countenance, given the exceptional circumstances of that case, the reversion of the validly expropriated property to private ownership due to the failure of the Government to pay just compensation in that case. [64] It was noted in that case that the Government deliberately refused to pay just compensation. The Court went on to rule that 'in cases where the government failed to pay just compensation within five (5) years from the finality of the judgment in the expropriation proceedings, the owners concerned shall have the right to recover possession of their property. [65]
Rep. Act No. 8974 mandates a speedy method by which the final determination of just compensation may be had. Section 4 provides:
In the event that the owner of the property contests the implementing agency's proffered value, the court shall determine the just compensation to be paid the owner within sixty (60) days from the date of filing of the expropriation case. When the decision of the court becomes final and executory, the implementing agency shall pay the owner the difference between the amount already paid and the just compensation as determined by the court.
We hold that this provision should apply in this case. The sixty (60)-day period prescribed in Rep. Act No. 8974 gives teeth to the law's avowed policy 'to ensure that owners of real property acquired for national government infrastructure projects are promptly paid just compensation.[66] In this case, there already has been irreversible delay in the prompt payment of PIATCO of just compensation, and it is no longer possible for the RTC to determine the just compensation due PIATCO within sixty (60) days from the filing of the complaint last 21 December 2004, as contemplated by the law. Still, it is feasible to effectuate the spirit of the law by requiring the trial court to make such determination within sixty (60) days from finality of this decision, in accordance with the guidelines laid down in Rep. Act No. 8974 and its Implementing Rules.
Republic vs Gingoyon
Of course, once the amount of just compensation has been finally determined, the Government is obliged to pay PIATCO the said amount. As shown in Lim and other like-minded cases, the Government's refusal to make such payment is indubitably actionable in court.
Appointment of Commissioners
The next argument for consideration is the claim of the Government that the RTC erred in appointing the three commissioners in its 7 January 2005 Order without prior consultation with either the Government or PIATCO, or without affording the Government the opportunity to object to the appointment of these commissioners. We can dispose of this argument without complication.
It must be noted that Rep. Act No. 8974 is silent on the appointment of commissioners tasked with the ascertainment of just compensation. [67] This protocol though is sanctioned under Rule 67. We rule that the appointment of commissioners under Rule 67 may be resorted to, even in expropriation proceedings under Rep. Act No. 8974, since the application of the provisions of Rule 67 in that regard do not conflict with the statute. As earlier stated, Section 14 of the Implementing Rules does allow such other incidents affecting the complaint to be resolved under the provisions on expropriation of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court. Even without Rule 67, reference during trial to a commissioner of the examination of an issue of fact is sanctioned under Rule 32 of the Rules of Court.
But while the appointment of commissioners under the aegis of Rule 67 may be sanctioned in expropriation proceedings under Rep. Act No. 8974, the standards to be observed for the determination of just compensation are provided not in Rule 67 but in the statute. In particular,
Republic vs Gingoyon
the governing standards for the determination of just compensation for the NAIA 3 facilities are found in Section 10 of the Implementing Rules for Rep. Act No. 8974, which provides for the replacement cost method in the valuation of improvements and structures. [68]
Nothing in Rule 67 or Rep. Act No. 8974 requires that the RTC consult with the parties in the expropriation case on who should be appointed as commissioners. Neither does the Court feel that such a requirement should be imposed in this case. We did rule in Municipality of Talisay v. Ramirez[69] that 'there is nothing to prevent [the trial court] from seeking the recommendations of the parties on [the] matter [of appointment of commissioners], the better to ensure their fair representation. [70] At the same time, such solicitation of recommendations is not obligatory on the part of the court, hence we cannot impute error on the part of the RTC in its exercise of solitary discretion in the appointment of the commissioners.
What Rule 67 does allow though is for the parties to protest the appointment of any of these commissioners, as provided under Section 5 of the Rule. These objections though must be made filed within ten (10) days from service of the order of appointment of the commissioners. [71] In this case, the proper recourse of the Government to challenge the choice of the commissioners is to file an objection with the trial court, conformably with Section 5, Rule 67, and not as it has done, assail the same through a special civil action for certiorari. Considering that the expropriation proceedings in this case were effectively halted seven (7) days after the Order appointing the commissioners, [72] it is permissible to allow the parties to file their objections with the RTC within five (5) days from finality of this decision.
Republic vs Gingoyon
The final argument for disposition is the claim of the Government is that Hon. Gingoyon has prejudged the expropriation case against the Government's cause and, thus, should be required to inhibit himself. This grave charge is predicated on facts which the Government characterizes as 'undeniable. In particular, the Government notes that the 4 January 2005 Order was issued motu proprio , without any preceding motion, notice or hearing. Further, such order, which directed the payment of US$62 Million to PIATCO, was attended with error in the computation of just compensation. The Government also notes that the said Order was issued even before summons had been served on PIATCO.
The disqualification of a judge is a deprivation of his/her judicial power [73] and should not be allowed on the basis of mere speculations and surmises. It certainly cannot be predicated on the adverse nature of the judge's rulings towards the movant for inhibition, especially if these rulings are in accord with law. Neither could inhibition be justified merely on the erroneous nature of the rulings of the judge. We emphasized in Webb v. People : [74]
To prove bias and prejudice on the part of respondent judge, petitioners harp on the alleged adverse and erroneous rulings of respondent judge on their various motions. By themselves, however, they do not sufficiently prove bias and prejudice to disqualify respondent judge. To be disqualifying, the bias and prejudice must be shown to have stemmed from an extrajudicial source and result in an opinion on the merits on some basis other than what the judge learned from his participation in the case. Opinions formed in the course of judicial proceedings, although erroneous, as long as they are based on the evidence presented and conduct observed by the judge, do not prove personal bias or prejudice on the part of the judge. As a general rule, repeated rulings against a litigant, no matter how erroneous and vigorously and consistently expressed, are not a basis for disqualification of a judge on grounds of bias and prejudice. Extrinsic evidence is required to establish bias, bad faith, malice or corrupt purpose, in addition to the palpable error which may be inferred from the decision or order itself. Although the decision may seem so erroneous as to raise doubts concerning a judge's integrity, absent extrinsic evidence, the decision itself would be insufficient to establish a case against the judge. The only exception to the rule is when the error is so gross and patent as to produce an ineluctable inference of bad faith or malice. [75]
Republic vs Gingoyon
The Government's contentions against Hon. Gingoyon are severely undercut by the fact that the 21 December 2004 Order , which the 4 January 2005 Order sought to rectify, was indeed severely flawed as it erroneously applied the provisions of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, instead of Rep. Act No. 8974, in ascertaining compliance with the requisites for the issuance of the writ of possession. The 4 January
Republic vs Gingoyon
2005 Order , which according to the Government establishes Hon. Gingoyon's bias, was promulgated precisely to correct the previous error by applying the correct provisions of law. It would not speak well of the Court if it sanctions a judge for wanting or even attempting to correct a previous erroneous' order which precisely is the right move to take.
Neither are we convinced that the motu proprio issuance of the 4 January 2005 Order , without the benefit of notice or hearing, sufficiently evinces bias on the part of Hon. Gingoyon. The motu proprio amendment by a court of an erroneous order previously issued may be sanctioned depending on the circumstances, in line with the long-recognized principle that every court has inherent power to do all things reasonably necessary for the administration of justice within the scope of its jurisdiction. [76] Section 5(g), Rule 135 of the Rules of Court further recognizes the inherent power of courts 'to amend and control its process and orders so as to make them conformable to law and justice, [77] a power which Hon. Gingoyon noted in his 10 January 2005Omnibus Order. [78] This inherent power includes the right of the court to reverse itself, especially when in its honest opinion it has committed an error or mistake in judgment, and that to adhere to its decision will cause injustice to a party litigant. [79]
Certainly, the 4 January 2005 Order was designed to make the RTC's previous order conformable to law and justice, particularly to apply the correct law of the case. Of course, as earlier established, this effort proved incomplete, as the 4 January 2005 Order did not correctly apply Rep. Act No. 8974 in several respects. Still, at least, the 4 January 2005 Order correctly reformed the most basic premise of the case that Rep. Act No. 8974 governs the expropriation proceedings. Nonetheless, the Government belittles Hon. Gingoyon's invocation of Section 5(g), Rule 135 as 'patently without merit. Certainly merit can be seen by the fact that the 4 January 2005 Orderreoriented the expropriation proceedings towards the correct governing law. Still, the Government claims that the unilateral act of the RTC did not conform to law or justice, as it was not afforded the right to be heard.
The Court would be more charitably disposed towards this argument if not for the fact that the earlier order with the 4 January 2005 Order sought to correct was itself issued without the benefit of any hearing. In fact, nothing either in Rule 67 or Rep. Act No. 8975 requires the conduct of a
Republic vs Gingoyon
hearing prior to the issuance of the writ of possession, which by design is available immediately upon the filing of the complaint provided that the requisites attaching thereto are present. Indeed, this expedited process for the obtention of a writ of possession in expropriation cases comes at the expense of the rights of the property owner to be heard or to be deprived of possession. Considering these predicates, it would be highly awry to demand that an order modifying the earlier issuance of a writ of possession in an expropriation case be barred until the staging of a hearing, when the issuance of the writ of possession itself is not subject to hearing. Perhaps the conduct of a hearing under these circumstances would be prudent. However, hearing is not mandatory, and the failure to conduct one does not establish the manifest bias required for the inhibition of the judge.
The Government likewise faults Hon. Gingoyon for using the amount of US$350 Million as the basis for the 100% deposit under Rep. Act No. 8974. The Court has noted that this statement was predicated on the erroneous belief that the BIR zonal valuation applies as a standard for determination of just compensation in this case. Yet this is manifest not of bias, but merely of error on the part of the judge. Indeed, the Government was not the only victim of the errors of the RTC in the assailed orders. PIATCO itself was injured by the issuance by the RTC of the writ of possession, even though the former had yet to be paid any amount of just compensation. At the same time, the Government was also prejudiced by the erroneous ruling of the RTC that the amount of US$62.3 Million, and not P3 Billion, should be released to PIATCO.
The Court has not been remiss in pointing out the multiple errors committed by the RTC in its assailed orders, to the prejudice of both parties. This attitude of error towards all does not ipso facto negate the charge of bias. Still, great care should be had in requiring the inhibition of judges simply because the magistrate did err. Incompetence may be a ground for administrative sanction, but not for inhibition, which requires lack of objectivity or impartiality to sit on a case.
The Court should necessarily guard against adopting a standard that a judge should be inhibited from hearing the case if one litigant loses trust in the judge. Such loss of trust on the part of the Government may be palpable, yet inhibition cannot be grounded merely on the feelings of the party-litigants. Indeed, every losing litigant in any case can resort to claiming that the judge was biased, and he/she will gain a sympathetic ear from friends, family, and people who do not understand the judicial process. The test in believing such a proposition should not be the vehemence of the litigant's claim of bias, but the Court's judicious estimation, as people who
Republic vs Gingoyon
know better than to believe any old cry of 'wolf!', whether such bias has been irrefutably exhibited.
The Court acknowledges that it had been previously held that 'at the very first sign of lack of faith and trust in his actions, whether well-grounded or not, the judge has no other alternative but to inhibit himself from the case. [80] But this doctrine is qualified by the entrenched rule that 'a judge may not be legally prohibited from sitting in a litigation, but when circumstances appear that will induce doubt to his honest actuations and probity in favor of either party, or incite such state of mind, he should conduct a careful selfexamination. He should exercise his discretion in a way that the people's faith in the Courts of Justice is not impaired. [81] And a self-assessment by the judge that he/she is not impaired to hear the case will be respected by the Court absent any evidence to the contrary. As held in Chin v. Court of Appeals :
An allegation of prejudgment, without more, constitutes mere conjecture and is not one of the "just and valid reasons" contemplated in the second paragraph of Rule 137 of the Rules of Court for which a judge may inhibit himself from hearing the case. We have repeatedly held that mere suspicion that a judge is partial to a party is not enough. Bare allegations of partiality and prejudgment will not suffice in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to overcome the presumption that the judge will undertake his noble role to dispense justice according to law and evidence and without fear or favor. There should be adequate evidence to prove the allegations, and there must be showing that the judge had an interest, personal or otherwise, in the prosecution of the case. To be a disqualifying circumstance, the bias and prejudice must be shown to have stemmed from an extrajudicial source and result in an opinion on the merits on some basis other than what the judge learned from his participation in the case. [82]
Republic vs Gingoyon
The mere vehemence of the Government's claim of bias does not translate to clear and convincing evidence of impairing bias. There is no sufficient ground to direct the inhibition of Hon. Gingoyon from hearing the expropriation case.
(1) The 2004 Resolution in Agan sets the base requirement that has to be observed before the Government may take over the NAIA 3, that there must be payment to PIATCO of just compensation in accordance with law and equity. Any ruling in the present expropriation case must be conformable to the dictates of the Court as pronounced in the Agan cases.
(2) Rep. Act No. 8974 applies in this case, particularly insofar as it requires the immediate payment by the Government of at least the proffered value of the NAIA 3 facilities to PIATCO and provides certain valuation standards or methods for the determination of just compensation.
(3) Applying Rep. Act No. 8974, the implementation of Writ of Possession in favor of the Government over NAIA 3 is held in abeyance until PIATCO is directly paid the amount of P3 Billion, representing the proffered value of NAIA 3 under Section 4(c) of the law.
(4) Applying Rep. Act No. 8974, the Government is authorized to start the implementation of the NAIA 3 Airport terminal project by performing the acts that are essential to the operation of the NAIA 3 as an international airport terminal upon the effectivity of the Writ of Possession, subject to the conditions above-stated. As prescribed by the Court, such authority encompasses 'the repair, reconditioning and improvement of the complex, maintenance of the existing facilities and equipment, installation of new facilities and equipment, provision of services and facilities pertaining to the facilitation of air traffic and transport, and other services that are integral to a modern-day international airport. [83]
Republic vs Gingoyon
(5) The RTC is mandated to complete its determination of the just compensation within sixty (60) days from finality of this Decision. In doing so, the RTC is obliged to comply with 'law and equity as ordained in Again and the standard set under Implementing Rules of Rep. Act No. 8974 which is the 'replacement cost method as the standard of valuation of structures and improvements.
(6) There was no grave abuse of discretion attending the RTC Order appointing the commissioners for the purpose of determining just compensation. The provisions on commissioners under Rule 67 shall apply insofar as they are not inconsistent with Rep. Act No. 8974, its Implementing Rules, or the rulings of the Court in Agan .
(7) The Government shall pay the just compensation fixed in the decision of the trial court to PIATCO immediately upon the finality of the said decision.
(8) There is no basis for the Court to direct the inhibition of Hon. Gingoyon.
All told, the Court finds no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC to warrant the nullification of the questioned orders. Nonetheless, portions of these orders should be modified to conform with law and the pronouncements made by the Court herein.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED in PART with respect to the orders dated 4 January 2005and 10 January 2005 of the lower court. Said orders are AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:
1)
The implementation of the Writ of Possession dated 21 December 2005 is HELD IN ABEYANCE, pending payment by petitioners to PIATCO of the amount of Three Billion Two Million One Hundred Twenty Five Thousand Pesos (P3,002,125,000.00), representing the proffered value of the NAIA 3 facilities;
Republic vs Gingoyon
2)
Petitioners, upon the effectivity of the Writ of Possession, are authorized start the implementation of the Ninoy Aquino International Airport Pasenger Terminal III project by performing the acts that are essential to the operation of the said International Airport Passenger Terminal project;
3)
RTC Branch 117 is hereby directed, within sixty (60) days from finality of this Decision, to determine the just compensation to be paid to PIATCO by the Government.
The Order dated 7 January 2005 is AFFIRMED in all respects subject to the qualification that the parties are given ten (10) days from finality of this Decision to file, if they so choose, objections to the appointment of the commissioners decreed therein.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Silverio vs Republic
Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila FIRST DIVISION G.R. No. 174689 October 22, 2007
ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO, petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent. DECISION CORONA, J.: When God created man, He made him in the likeness of God; He created them male and female. (Genesis 5:1-2) Amihan gazed upon the bamboo reed planted by Bathala and she heard voices coming from inside the bamboo. "Oh North Wind! North Wind! Please let us out!," the voices said. She pecked the reed once, then twice. All of a sudden, the bamboo cracked and slit open. Out came two human beings; one was a male and the other was a female. Amihan named the man "Malakas" (Strong) and the woman "Maganda" (Beautiful). (The Legend of Malakas and Maganda) When is a man a man and when is a woman a woman? In particular, does the law recognize the changes made by a physician using scalpel, drugs and counseling with regard to a persons sex? May a person successfully petition for a change of name and sex appearing in the birth certificate to reflect the result of a sex reassignment surgery? On November 26, 2002, petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition for the change of his first name and sex in his birth certificate in the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 8. The petition, docketed as SP Case No. 02-105207, impleaded the civil registrar of Manila as respondent. Petitioner alleged in his petition that he was born in the City of Manila to the spouses Melecio Petines Silverio and Anita Aquino Dantes on April 4, 1962. His name was registered as "Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio" in his certificate of live birth (birth certificate). His sex was registered as "male." He further alleged that he is a male transsexual, that is, "anatomically male but feels, thinks and acts as a female" and that he had always identified himself with girls since childhood.1 Feeling trapped in a mans body, he consulted several doctors in the United States. He underwent psychological examination, hormone treatment and breast augmentation. His attempts to transform himself to a "woman" culminated on January 27, 2001 when he underwent sex reassignment surgery2 in Bangkok, Thailand. He was thereafter examined by Dr. Marcelino Reysio-Cruz, Jr., a plastic and reconstruction surgeon in the Philippines, who issued a medical certificate attesting that he (petitioner) had in fact undergone the procedure.
Silverio vs Republic
From then on, petitioner lived as a female and was in fact engaged to be married. He then sought to have his name in his birth certificate changed from "Rommel Jacinto" to "Mely," and his sex from "male" to "female." An order setting the case for initial hearing was published in the Peoples Journal Tonight, a newspaper of general circulation in Metro Manila, for three consecutive weeks.3 Copies of the order were sent to the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and the civil registrar of Manila. On the scheduled initial hearing, jurisdictional requirements were established. No opposition to the petition was made. During trial, petitioner testified for himself. He also presented Dr. Reysio-Cruz, Jr. and his American fianc, Richard P. Edel, as witnesses. On June 4, 2003, the trial court rendered a decision4 in favor of petitioner. Its relevant portions read: Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or judgment or any infraction thereof or for any unlawful motive but solely for the purpose of making his birth records compatible with his present sex. The sole issue here is whether or not petitioner is entitled to the relief asked for. The [c]ourt rules in the affirmative. Firstly, the [c]ourt is of the opinion that granting the petition would be more in consonance with the principles of justice and equity. With his sexual [re-assignment], petitioner, who has always felt, thought and acted like a woman, now possesses the physique of a female. Petitioners misfortune to be trapped in a mans body is not his own doing and should not be in any way taken against him. Likewise, the [c]ourt believes that no harm, injury [or] prejudice will be caused to anybody or the community in granting the petition. On the contrary, granting the petition would bring the much-awaited happiness on the part of the petitioner and her [fianc] and the realization of their dreams. Finally, no evidence was presented to show any cause or ground to deny the present petition despite due notice and publication thereof. Even the State, through the [OSG] has not seen fit to interpose any [o]pposition. WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered GRANTING the petition and ordering the Civil Registrar of Manila to change the entries appearing in the Certificate of Birth of [p]etitioner, specifically for petitioners first name from "Rommel Jacinto" to MELY and petitioners gender from "Male" to FEMALE. 5 On August 18, 2003, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru the OSG, filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals.6 It alleged that there is no law allowing the change of entries in the birth certificate by reason of sex alteration. On February 23, 2006, the Court of Appeals7 rendered a decision8 in favor of the Republic. It ruled that the trial courts decision lacked legal basis. There is no law allowing the change of either name or sex in the certificate of birth on the ground of sex reassignment through surgery. Thus, the Court
Silverio vs Republic
of Appeals granted the Republics petition, set aside the decision of the trial court and ordered the dismissal of SP Case No. 02-105207. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but it was denied.9 Hence, this petition. Petitioner essentially claims that the change of his name and sex in his birth certificate is allowed under Articles 407 to 413 of the Civil Code, Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court and RA 9048.10 The petition lacks merit. A Persons First Name Cannot Be Changed On the Ground of Sex Reassignment Petitioner invoked his sex reassignment as the ground for his petition for change of name and sex. As found by the trial court: Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or judgment or any infraction thereof or for any unlawful motive but solely for the purpose of making his birth records compatible with his present sex. (emphasis supplied) Petitioner believes that after having acquired the physical features of a female, he became entitled to the civil registry changes sought. We disagree. The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of identification.11 A change of name is a privilege, not a right.12 Petitions for change of name are controlled by statutes.13 In this connection, Article 376 of the Civil Code provides: ART. 376. No person can change his name or surname without judicial authority. This Civil Code provision was amended by RA 9048 (Clerical Error Law). In particular, Section 1 of RA 9048 provides: SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of First Name or Nickname. No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order, except for clerical or typographical errors and change of first name or nickname which can be corrected or changed by the concerned city or municipal civil registrar or consul general in accordance with the provisions of this Act and its implementing rules and regulations. RA 9048 now governs the change of first name.14 It vests the power and authority to entertain petitions for change of first name to the city or municipal civil registrar or consul general concerned. Under the law, therefore, jurisdiction over applications for change of first name is now primarily lodged with the aforementioned administrative officers. The intent and effect of the law is to exclude the change of first name from the coverage of Rules 103 (Change of Name) and 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court, until and unless an administrative petition for change of name is first filed and subsequently denied.15 It likewise lays down the corresponding venue,16 form17 and procedure. In sum, the remedy and the proceedings regulating change of first name are primarily administrative in nature, not judicial. RA 9048 likewise provides the grounds for which change of first name may be allowed: SECTION 4. Grounds for Change of First Name or Nickname. The petition for change of first name or nickname may be allowed in any of the following cases:
Silverio vs Republic
(1) The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous, tainted with dishonor or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (2) The new first name or nickname has been habitually and continuously used by the petitioner and he has been publicly known by that first name or nickname in the community; or (3) The change will avoid confusion. Petitioners basis in praying for the change of his first name was his sex reassignment. He intended to make his first name compatible with the sex he thought he transformed himself into through surgery. However, a change of name does not alter ones legal capacity or civil status.18 RA 9048 does not sanction a change of first name on the ground of sex reassignment. Rather than avoiding confusion, changing petitioners first name for his declared purpose may only create grave complications in the civil registry and the public interest. Before a person can legally change his given name, he must present proper or reasonable cause or any compelling reason justifying such change.19 In addition, he must show that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name.20 In this case, he failed to show, or even allege, any prejudice that he might suffer as a result of using his true and official name. In sum, the petition in the trial court in so far as it prayed for the change of petitioners first name was not within that courts primary jurisdiction as the petition should have been filed with the local civil registrar concerned, assuming it could be legally done. It was an improper remedy because the proper remedy was administrative, that is, that provided under RA 9048. It was also filed in the wrong venue as the proper venue was in the Office of the Civil Registrar of Manila where his birth certificate is kept. More importantly, it had no merit since the use of his true and official name does not prejudice him at all. For all these reasons, the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed petitioners petition in so far as the change of his first name was concerned. No Law Allows The Change of Entry In The Birth Certificate As To Sex On the Ground of Sex Reassignment The determination of a persons sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal issue and the court must look to the statutes.21 In this connection, Article 412 of the Civil Code provides: ART. 412. No entry in the civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order. Together with Article 376 of the Civil Code, this provision was amended by RA 9048 in so far as clerical or typographical errors are involved. The correction or change of such matters can now be made through administrative proceedings and without the need for a judicial order. In effect, RA 9048 removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the correction of such errors.22 Rule 108 now applies only to substantial changes and corrections in entries in the civil register.23 Section 2(c) of RA 9048 defines what a "clerical or typographical error" is: SECTION 2. Definition of Terms. As used in this Act, the following terms shall mean: xxx xxx xxx
Silverio vs Republic
(3) "Clerical or typographical error" refers to a mistake committed in the performance of clerical work in writing, copying, transcribing or typing an entry in the civil register that is harmless and innocuous, such as misspelled name or misspelled place of birth or the like, which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding, and can be corrected or changed only by reference to other existing record or records: Provided, however, That no correction must involve the change of nationality, age, status or sex of the petitioner. (emphasis supplied) Under RA 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a mere clerical or typographical error. It is a substantial change for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court are those provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil Code:24 ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be recorded in the civil register. ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register: (1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments of marriage; (6) judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9) acknowledgments of natural children; (10) naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14) judicial determination of filiation; (15) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (16) changes of name. The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil Code include even those that occur after birth.25 However, no reasonable interpretation of the provision can justify the conclusion that it covers the correction on the ground of sex reassignment. To correct simply means "to make or set aright; to remove the faults or error from" while to change means "to replace something with something else of the same kind or with something that serves as a substitute."26 The birth certificate of petitioner contained no error. All entries therein, including those corresponding to his first name and sex, were all correct. No correction is necessary. Article 407 of the Civil Code authorizes the entry in the civil registry of certain acts (such as legitimations, acknowledgments of illegitimate children and naturalization), events (such as births, marriages, naturalization and deaths) and judicial decrees (such as legal separations, annulments of marriage, declarations of nullity of marriages, adoptions, naturalization, loss or recovery of citizenship, civil interdiction, judicial determination of filiation and changes of name). These acts, events and judicial decrees produce legal consequences that touch upon the legal capacity, status and nationality of a person. Their effects are expressly sanctioned by the laws. In contrast, sex reassignment is not among those acts or events mentioned in Article 407. Neither is it recognized nor even mentioned by any law, expressly or impliedly. "Status" refers to the circumstances affecting the legal situation (that is, the sum total of capacities and incapacities) of a person in view of his age, nationality and his family membership.27 The status of a person in law includes all his personal qualities and relations, more or less permanent in nature, not ordinarily terminable at his own will, such as his being legitimate or illegitimate, or his being married or not. The comprehensive term status include such matters as the beginning and end of legal personality, capacity to have rights in
Silverio vs Republic
general, family relations, and its various aspects, such as birth, legitimation, adoption, emancipation, marriage, divorce, and sometimes even succession.28 (emphasis supplied) A persons sex is an essential factor in marriage and family relations. It is a part of a persons legal capacity and civil status. In this connection, Article 413 of the Civil Code provides: ART. 413. All other matters pertaining to the registration of civil status shall be governed by special laws. But there is no such special law in the Philippines governing sex reassignment and its effects. This is fatal to petitioners cause. Moreover, Section 5 of Act 3753 (the Civil Register Law) provides: SEC. 5. Registration and certification of births. The declaration of the physician or midwife in attendance at the birth or, in default thereof, the declaration of either parent of the newborn child, shall be sufficient for the registration of a birth in the civil register. Such declaration shall be exempt from documentary stamp tax and shall be sent to the local civil registrar not later than thirty days after the birth, by the physician or midwife in attendance at the birth or by either parent of the newborn child. In such declaration, the person above mentioned shall certify to the following facts: (a) date and hour of birth; (b) sex and nationality of infant; (c) names, citizenship and religion of parents or, in case the father is not known, of the mother alone; (d) civil status of parents; (e) place where the infant was born; and (f) such other data as may be required in the regulations to be issued. xxx xxx xxx (emphasis supplied)
Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of the facts as they existed at the time of birth.29 Thus, the sex of a person is determined at birth, visually done by the birth attendant (the physician or midwife) by examining the genitals of the infant. Considering that there is no law legally recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of a persons sex made at the time of his or her birth, if not attended by error,30 is immutable.31 When words are not defined in a statute they are to be given their common and ordinary meaning in the absence of a contrary legislative intent. The words "sex," "male" and "female" as used in the Civil Register Law and laws concerning the civil registry (and even all other laws) should therefore be understood in their common and ordinary usage, there being no legislative intent to the contrary. In this connection, sex is defined as "the sum of peculiarities of structure and function that distinguish a male from a female"32 or "the distinction between male and female."33 Female is "the sex that produces ova or bears young"34 and male is "the sex that has organs to produce spermatozoa for fertilizing ova."35 Thus, the words "male" and "female" in everyday understanding do not include persons who have undergone sex reassignment. Furthermore, "words that are employed in a statute which had at the time a well-known meaning are presumed to have been used in that sense unless the context compels to the contrary."36 Since the statutory language of the Civil Register Law was enacted in the early 1900s and remains unchanged, it cannot be argued that the term "sex" as used then is something alterable through surgery or something that allows a post-operative male-tofemale transsexual to be included in the category "female." For these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body and appearance through the intervention of modern surgery, no law authorizes the change of entry as to sex in the
Silverio vs Republic
civil registry for that reason. Thus, there is no legal basis for his petition for the correction or change of the entries in his birth certificate. Neither May Entries in the Birth Certificate As to First Name or Sex Be Changed on the Ground of Equity The trial court opined that its grant of the petition was in consonance with the principles of justice and equity. It believed that allowing the petition would cause no harm, injury or prejudice to anyone. This is wrong. The changes sought by petitioner will have serious and wide-ranging legal and public policy consequences. First, even the trial court itself found that the petition was but petitioners first step towards his eventual marriage to his male fianc. However, marriage, one of the most sacred social institutions, is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman.37 One of its essential requisites is the legal capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male and a female.38 To grant the changes sought by petitioner will substantially reconfigure and greatly alter the laws on marriage and family relations. It will allow the union of a man with another man who has undergone sex reassignment (a male-to-female post-operative transsexual). Second, there are various laws which apply particularly to women such as the provisions of the Labor Code on employment of women,39 certain felonies under the Revised Penal Code40 and the presumption of survivorship in case of calamities under Rule 131 of the Rules of Court,41 among others. These laws underscore the public policy in relation to women which could be substantially affected if petitioners petition were to be granted. It is true that Article 9 of the Civil Code mandates that "[n]o judge or court shall decline to render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the law." However, it is not a license for courts to engage in judicial legislation. The duty of the courts is to apply or interpret the law, not to make or amend it. In our system of government, it is for the legislature, should it choose to do so, to determine what guidelines should govern the recognition of the effects of sex reassignment. The need for legislative guidelines becomes particularly important in this case where the claims asserted are statute-based. To reiterate, the statutes define who may file petitions for change of first name and for correction or change of entries in the civil registry, where they may be filed, what grounds may be invoked, what proof must be presented and what procedures shall be observed. If the legislature intends to confer on a person who has undergone sex reassignment the privilege to change his name and sex to conform with his reassigned sex, it has to enact legislation laying down the guidelines in turn governing the conferment of that privilege. It might be theoretically possible for this Court to write a protocol on when a person may be recognized as having successfully changed his sex. However, this Court has no authority to fashion a law on that matter, or on anything else. The Court cannot enact a law where no law exists. It can only apply or interpret the written word of its co-equal branch of government, Congress. Petitioner pleads that "[t]he unfortunates are also entitled to a life of happiness, contentment and [the] realization of their dreams." No argument about that. The Court recognizes that there are people whose preferences and orientation do not fit neatly into the commonly recognized parameters of social convention and that, at least for them, life is indeed an ordeal. However, the remedies petitioner seeks involve questions of public policy to be addressed solely by the legislature, not by the courts.
Silverio vs Republic
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED.
SULTAN OSOP B. CAMID, petitioner, vs. THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, AUTONOMOUS REGION IN MUSLIM MINDANAO, DEPARTMENT of FINANCE, DEPARTMENT of BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, COMMISSION ON AUDIT, and the CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES (HOUSE of REPRESENTATIVES AND SENATE), respondents. DECISION TINGA, J.: This Petition for Certiorari presents this Court with the prospect of our own Brigadoon1 the municipality of Andong, Lanao del Surwhich like its counterpart in filmdom, is a town that is not supposed to exist yet is anyway insisted by some as actually alive and thriving. Yet unlike in the movies, there is nothing mystical, ghostly or anything even remotely charming about the purported existence of Andong. The creation of the putative municipality was declared void ab initio by this Court four decades ago, but the present petition insists that in spite of this insurmountable obstacle Andong thrives on, and hence, its legal personality should be given judicial affirmation. We disagree. The factual antecedents derive from the promulgation of our ruling in Pelaez v. Auditor General2 in 1965. As discussed therein, then President Diosdado Macapagal issued several Executive Orders3 creating thirty-three (33) municipalities in Mindanao. Among them was Andong in Lanao del Sur which was created by virtue of Executive Order No. 107.4 These executive orders were issued after legislative bills for the creation of municipalities involved in that case had failed to pass Congress.5 President Diosdado Macapagal justified the creation of these municipalities citing his powers under Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code. Then VicePresident Emmanuel Pelaez filed a special civil action for a writ of prohibition, alleging in main that the Executive Orders were null and void, Section 68 having been repealed by Republic Act No. 2370,6 and said orders constituting an undue delegation of legislative power.7 After due deliberation, the Court unanimously held that the challenged Executive Orders were null and void. A majority of five justices, led by the ponente, Justice (later Chief Justice) Roberto Concepcion, ruled that Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code did not meet the well-settled requirements for a valid delegation of legislative power to the executive branch,8 while three justices opined that the nullity of the issuances was the consequence of the enactment of the 1935 Constitution, which reduced the power of the Chief Executive over local governments.9 Pelaez was disposed in this wise: WHEREFORE, the Executive Orders in question are declared null and void ab initio and the respondent permanently restrained from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of said Executive Orders or any disbursement by the municipalities above referred to. It is so ordered.10
In the cases where a de facto municipal corporation was recognized as such despite the fact that the statute creating it was later invalidated, the decisions could fairly be made to rest on the consideration that there was some other valid law giving corporate vitality to the organization. Hence, in the case at bar, the mere fact that Balabagan was organized at a time when the statute had not been invalidated cannot conceivably make it a de facto corporation, as, independently of the Administrative Code provision in question, there is no other valid statute to give color of authority to its creation.44 The Court did clarify in Malabang that the previous acts done by the municipality in the exercise of its corporate powers were not necessarily a nullity.45 Camid devotes several pages of his petition in citing this point,46 yet the relevance of the citation is unclear considering that Camid does not assert the validity of any corporate act of Andong prior to its judicial dissolution. Notwithstanding, the Court in Malabang retained an emphatic attitude as to the unconstitutionality of the power of the President to create municipal corporations by way of presidential promulgations, as authorized under Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code. This principle was most recently affirmed in 1988, in Municipality of Kapalong v. Moya.47 The municipality of Santo Tomas, created by President Carlos P. Garcia, filed a complaint against another municipality, who challenged Santo Tomass legal personality to institute suit. Again, Santo Tomas had not been expressly nullified by prior judicial action, yet the Court refused to recognize its legal existence. The blunt but simple ruling: "Now then, as ruled in the Pelaez case supra, the President has no power to create a municipality. Since [Santo Tomas] has no legal personality, it can not be a party to any civil action."48
From this survey of relevant jurisprudence, we can gather the applicable rules. Pelaez and its offspring cases ruled that the President has no power to create municipalities, yet limited its nullificatory effects to the particular municipalities challenged in actual cases before this Court. However, with the promulgation of the Local Government Code in 1991, the legal cloud was lifted over the municipalities similarly created by executive order but not judicially annulled. The de facto status of such municipalities as San Andres, Alicia and Sinacaban was recognized by this Court, and Section 442(b) of the Local Government Code deemed curative whatever legal defects to title these municipalities had labored under. Is Andong similarly entitled to recognition as a de facto municipal corporation? It is not. There are eminent differences between Andong and municipalities such as San Andres, Alicia and Sinacaban.
It bears noting that based on Camids own admissions, Andong does not meet the requisites set forth by Section 442(d) of the Local Government Code. Section 442(d) requires that in order that the municipality created by executive order may receive recognition, they must "have their respective set of elective municipal officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of [the Local Government] Code." Camid admits that Andong has never elected its municipal officers at all.60 This incapacity ties in with the fact that Andong was judicially annulled in 1965. Out of obeisance to our ruling in Pelaez, the national government ceased to recognize the existence of Andong, depriving it of its share of the public funds, and refusing to conduct municipal elections for the void municipality. The failure to appropriate funds for Andong and the absence of elections in the municipality in the last four decades are eloquent indicia of the non-recognition by the State of the existence of the town. The certifications relied upon by Camid, issued by the DENR-CENRO and the National Statistics Office, can hardly serve the purpose of attesting to Andongs legal efficacy. In fact, both these certifications qualify that they were issued upon the request of Camid, "to support the restoration or re-operation of the Municipality of Andong, Lanao del Sur,"61thus obviously conceding that the municipality is at present inoperative.
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We may likewise pay attention to the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution, which had also been relied upon in Jimenez and San Narciso. This Ordinance, which apportioned the seats of the House of Representatives to the different legislative districts in the Philippines, enumerates the various municipalities that are encompassed by the various legislative districts. Andong is not listed therein as among the municipalities of Lanao del Sur, or of any other province for that matter.62 On the other hand, the municipalities of San Andres, Alicia and Sinacaban are mentioned in the Ordinance as part of Quezon,63 Bohol,64 and Misamis Occidental65 respectively. How about the eighteen (18) municipalities similarly nullified in Pelaez but certified as existing in the DILGCertification presented by Camid? The petition fails to mention that subsequent to the ruling in Pelaez, legislation was enacted to reconstitute these municipalities.66 It is thus not surprising that the DILG certified the existence of these eighteen (18) municipalities, or that these towns are among the municipalities enumerated in the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. Andong has not been similarly reestablished through statute. Clearly then, the fact that there are valid organic statutes passed by legislation recreating these eighteen (18) municipalities is sufficient legal basis to accord a different legal treatment to Andong as against these eighteen (18) other municipalities. We thus assert the proper purview to Section 442(d) of the Local Government Codethat it does not serve to affirm or reconstitute the judicially dissolved municipalities such as Andong, which had been previously created by presidential issuances or executive orders. The provision affirms the legal personalities only of those municipalities such as San Narciso, Alicia, and Sinacaban, which may have been created using the same infirm legal basis, yet were fortunate enough not to have been judicially annulled. On the other hand, the municipalities judicially dissolved in cases such as Pelaez, San Joaquin, and Malabang, remain inexistent, unless recreated through specific legislative enactments, as done with the eighteen (18) municipalities certified by the DILG. Those municipalities derive their legal personality not from the presidential issuances or executive orders which originally created them or from Section 442(d), but from the respective legislative statutes which were enacted to revive them.
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Sema vs Comelec
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case These consolidated petitions[1] seek to annul Resolution No. 7902, dated 10 May 2007, of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) treating Cotabato City as part of the legislative district of the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan.[2] The Facts
The Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution apportioned two legislative districts for the Province of Maguindanao. The first legislative district consists of Cotabato City and eight municipalities.[3] Maguindanao forms part of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), created under its Organic Act, Republic Act No. 6734 (RA 6734), as amended by Republic Act No. 9054 (RA 9054).[4] Although under the Ordinance, Cotabato City forms part of Maguindanaos first legislative district, it is not part of the ARMM but of Region XII, having voted against its inclusion in the ARMM in the plebiscite held in November 1989. On 28 August 2006, the ARMMs legislature, the ARMM Regional Assembly, exercising its power to create provinces under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054,[5] enacted Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 (MMA Act 201) creating the Province ofShariff Kabunsuan composed of the eight municipalities in the first district of Maguindanao. MMA Act 201 provides:
Section 1. The Municipalities of Barira, Buldon, Datu Odin Sinsuat, Kabuntalan, Matanog, Parang, Sultan Kudarat, Sultan Mastura, and Upi are hereby separated from the Province of Maguindanao and
Sema vs Comelec
constituted into a distinct and independent province, which is hereby created, to be known as the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan.
xxxx Sec. 5. The corporate existence of this province shall commence upon the appointment by the Regional Governor or election of the governor and majority of the regular members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. The incumbent elective provincial officials of the Province of Maguindanao shall continue to serve their unexpired terms in the province that they will choose or where they are residents: Provided, that where an elective position in both provinces becomes vacant as a consequence of the creation of the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan, all incumbent elective provincial officials shall have preference for appointment to a higher elective vacant position and for the time being be appointed by the Regional Governor, and shall hold office until their successors shall have been elected and qualified in the next local elections; Provided, further, that they shall continue to receive the salaries they are receiving at the time of the approval of this Act until the new readjustment of salaries in accordance with law. Provided, furthermore, that there shall be no diminution in the number of the members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the mother province. Except as may be provided by national law, the existing legislative district, which includes Cotabato as a part thereof, shall remain.
Later, three new municipalities[6] were carved out of the original nine municipalities constituting Shariff Kabunsuan, bringing its total number of municipalities to 11. Thus, what was left of Maguindanao were the municipalities constituting its second legislative district.Cotabato City, although part of Maguindanaos first legislative district, is not part of the Province of Maguindanao. The voters of Maguindanao ratified Shariff Kabunsuans creation in a plebiscite held on 29 October 2006.
Sema vs Comelec
On 6 February 2007, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cotabato City passed Resolution No. 3999 requesting the COMELEC to clarify the status of Cotabato City in view of the conversion of the First District of Maguindanao into a regular province under MMA Act 201. In answer to Cotabato Citys query, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 07-0407 on 6 March 2007 "maintaining the status quo with Cotabato City as part of Shariff Kabunsuan in the First Legislative District of Maguindanao. Resolution No. 07-0407, which adopted the recommendation of the COMELECs Law Department under a Memorandum dated 27 February 2007,[7]provides in pertinent parts:
Considering the foregoing, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby resolves, to adopt the recommendation of the Law Department thatpending the enactment of the appropriate law by Congress, to maintain the status quo with Cotabato City as part of Shariff Kabunsuan in the First Legislative District of Maguindanao. (Emphasis supplied)
However, in preparation for the 14 May 2007 elections, the COMELEC promulgated on 29 March 2007 Resolution No. 7845 stating that Maguindanaos first legislative district is composed only of Cotabato City because of the enactment of MMA Act 201.[8] On 10 May 2007, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 7902, subject of these petitions, amending Resolution No. 07-0407 by renaming the legislative district in question as Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City (formerly First District of Maguindanao with Cotabato City).[9] In G.R. No. 177597, Sema, who was a candidate in the 14 May 2007 elections for Representative of Shariff Kabunsuan withCotabato City, prayed for the nullification of COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 and the exclusion from canvassing of the votes cast in Cotabato City for that office. Sema contended that Shariff Kabunsuan is entitled to one representative in Congress under Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution[10] and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution.[11] Thus, Sema asserted that the COMELEC acted without or in
Sema vs Comelec
excess of its jurisdiction in issuing Resolution No. 7902 which maintained the status quo in Maguindanaos first legislative district despite the COMELECs earlier directive in Resolution No. 7845 designating Cotabato City as the lone component of Maguindanaos reapportioned first legislative district.[12] Sema further claimed that in issuing Resolution No. 7902, the COMELEC usurped Congress power to create or reapportion legislative districts. In its Comment, the COMELEC, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), chose not to reach the merits of the case and merely contended that (1) Sema wrongly availed of the writ of certiorari to nullify COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 because the COMELEC issued the same in the exercise of its administrative, not quasi-judicial, power and (2) Semas prayer for the writ of prohibition in G.R. No. 177597 became moot with the proclamation of respondent Didagen P. Dilangalen (respondent Dilangalen) on 1 June 2007 as representative of the legislative district of Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City. In his Comment, respondent Dilangalen countered that Sema is estopped from questioning COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 because in her certificate of candidacy filed on 29 March 2007, Sema indicated that she was seeking election as representative of Shariff Kabunsuan including Cotabato City. Respondent Dilangalen added that COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 is constitutional because it did not apportion a legislative district for Shariff Kabunsuan or reapportion the legislative districts in Maguindanao but merely renamed Maguindanaos first legislative district. Respondent Dilangalen further claimed that the COMELEC could not reapportion Maguindanaos first legislative district to make Cotabato City its sole component unit as the power to reapportion legislative districts lies exclusively with Congress, not to mention that Cotabato City does not meet the minimum population requirement under Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution for the creation of a legislative district within a city.[13] Sema filed a Consolidated Reply controverting the matters raised in respondents Comments and reiterating her claim that the COMELEC acted ultra vires in issuing Resolution No. 7902. In the Resolution of 4 September 2007, the Court required the parties in G.R. No. 177597 to comment on the issue of whether a province created by the
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ARMM Regional Assembly under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is entitled to one representative in the House of Representatives without need of a national law creating a legislative district for such new province. The parties submitted their compliance as follows: (1) Sema answered the issue in the affirmative on the following grounds: (a) the Court in Felwa v. Salas[14] stated that when a province is created by statute, the corresponding representative district comes into existence neither by authority of that statute which cannot provide otherwise nor by apportionment, but by operation of the Constitution, without a reapportionment; (b) Section 462 of Republic Act No. 7160 (RA 7160) affirms the apportionment of a legislative district incident to the creation of a province; and (c) Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution mandate the apportionment of a legislative district in newly created provinces. (2) The COMELEC, again represented by the OSG, apparently abandoned its earlier stance on the propriety of issuing Resolution Nos. 07-0407 and 7902 and joined causes with Sema, contending that Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution is self-executing. Thus, every new province created by the ARMM Regional Assembly is ipso facto entitled to one representative in the House of Representatives even in the absence of a national law; and (3) Respondent Dilangalen answered the issue in the negative on the following grounds: (a) the province contemplated in Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution is one that is created by an act of Congress taking into account the provisions in RA 7160 on the creation of provinces; (b) Section 3, Article IV of RA 9054 withheld from the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to enact measures relating to national elections, which encompasses the apportionment of legislative districts for members of the House of Representatives; (c) recognizing a legislative district in every province the ARMM Regional Assembly creates will lead to the disproportionate representation of the ARMM in the House of Representatives as the Regional Assembly can create provinces without regard to the requirements in Section 461 of RA 7160; and (d) Cotabato City, which has a population of less than 250,000, is not entitled to a representative in the House of Representatives.
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On 27 November 2007, the Court heard the parties in G.R. No. 177597 in oral arguments on the following issues: (1) whether Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, delegating to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create provinces, is constitutional; and (2) if in the affirmative, whether a province created under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is entitled to one representative in the House of Representatives without need of a national law creating a legislative district for such new province.[15] In compliance with the Resolution dated 27 November 2007, the parties in G.R. No. 177597 filed their respective Memoranda on the issues raised in the oral arguments.[16] On the question of the constitutionality of Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, the parties in G.R. No. 177597 adopted the following positions: (1) Sema contended that Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is constitutional (a) as a valid delegation by Congress to the ARMM of the power to create provinces under Section 20 (9), Article X of the Constitution granting to the autonomous regions, through their organic acts, legislative powers over other matters as may be authorized by law for the promotion of the general welfare of the people of the region and (b) as an amendment to Section 6 of RA 7160.[17] However, Sema concedes that, if taken literally, the grant in Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 to the ARMM Regional Assembly of the power to prescribe standards lower than those mandated in RA 7160 in the creation of provinces contravenes Section 10, Article X of the Constitution.[18] Thus, Sema proposed that Section 19 should be construed as prohibiting the Regional Assembly from prescribing standards x x x that do not comply with the minimum criteria under RA 7160.[19] (2) Respondent Dilangalen contended that Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is unconstitutional on the following grounds: (a) the power to create provinces was not among those granted to the autonomous regions under Section 20, Article X of the Constitution and (b) the grant under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 to the ARMM Regional Assembly of the power to prescribe standards lower than those mandated in Section 461 of RA 7160 on the creation of provinces contravenes Section 10, Article X of the Constitution and the Equal Protection Clause; and
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(3) The COMELEC, through the OSG, joined causes with respondent Dilangalen (thus effectively abandoning the position the COMELEC adopted in its Compliance with the Resolution of 4 September 2007) and contended that Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is unconstitutional because (a) it contravenes Section 10 and Section 6,[20] Article X of the Constitution and (b) the power to create provinces was withheld from the autonomous regions under Section 20, Article X of the Constitution. On the question of whether a province created under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is entitled to one representative in the House of Representatives without need of a national law creating a legislative district for such new province, Sema and respondent Dilangalen reiterated in their Memoranda the positions they adopted in their Compliance with the Resolution of 4 September 2007. The COMELEC deemed it unnecessary to submit its position on this issue considering its stance that Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is unconstitutional. The pendency of the petition in G.R. No. 178628 was disclosed during the oral arguments on 27 November 2007. Thus, in the Resolution of 19 February 2008, the Court ordered G.R. No. 178628 consolidated with G.R. No. 177597. The petition in G.R. No.178628 echoed Sema's contention that the COMELEC acted ultra vires in issuing Resolution No. 7902 depriving the voters ofCotabato City of a representative in the House of Representatives. In its Comment to the petition in G.R. No. 178628, the COMELEC, through the OSG, maintained the validity of COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 as a temporary measure pending the enactment by Congress of the appropriate law.
The Issues
The petitions raise the following issues: I. In G.R. No. 177597: (A) Preliminarily (1) whether the writs of Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus are proper to test the constitutionality of COMELEC Resolution No. 7902; and
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(2) whether the proclamation of respondent Dilangalen as representative of Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato Citymooted the petition in G.R. No. 177597.
(B) On the merits (1) whether Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, delegating to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays, is constitutional; and (2) if in the affirmative, whether a province created by the ARMM Regional Assembly under MMA Act 201 pursuant to Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is entitled to one representative in the House of Representatives without need of a national law creating a legislative district for such province. II. In G.R No. 177597 and G.R No. 178628, whether COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 is valid for maintaining the status quo in the first legislative district of Maguindanao (as Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City [formerly First District of Maguindanao with Cotabato City]), despite the creation of the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan out of such district (excluding Cotabato City).
The Ruling of the Court The petitions have no merit. We rule that (1) Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create provinces and cities; (2) MMA Act 201 creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuanis void; and (3) COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 is valid.
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The Writ of Prohibition is Appropriate to Test the Constitutionality of Election Laws, Rules and Regulations
The purpose of the writ of Certiorari is to correct grave abuse of discretion by any tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions.[21] On the other hand, the writ of Mandamus will issue to compel a tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person to perform an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty.[22] True, the COMELEC did not issue Resolution No. 7902 in the exercise of its judicial or quasi-judicial functions.[23] Nor is there a law which specifically enjoins the COMELEC to exclude from canvassing the votes cast in Cotabato City for representative of Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City. These, however, do not justify the outright dismissal of the petition in G.R. No. 177597 because Sema also prayed for the issuance of the writ of Prohibition and we have long recognized this writ as proper for testing the constitutionality of election laws, rules, and regulations.[24]
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There is also no merit in the claim that respondent Dilangalens proclamation as winner in the 14 May 2007 elections for representative of Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City mooted this petition. This case does not concern respondent Dilangalens election. Rather, it involves an inquiry into the validity of COMELEC Resolution No. 7902, as well as the constitutionality of MMA Act 201 and Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054. Admittedly, the outcome of this petition, one way or another, determines whether the votes cast in Cotabato City for representative of the district of Shariff Kabunsuan Province withCotabato City will be included in the canvassing of ballots. However, this incidental consequence is no reason for us not to proceed with the resolution of the novel issues raised here. The Courts ruling in these petitions affects not only the recently concluded elections but also all the other succeeding elections for the office in question, as well as the power of the ARMM Regional Assembly to create in the future additional provinces.
Whether the ARMM Regional Assembly Can Create the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan
The creation of local government units is governed by Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, which provides:
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Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished or its boundary substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.
Thus, the creation of any of the four local government units province, city, municipality or barangay must comply with three conditions. First, the creation of a local government unit must follow the criteria fixed in the Local Government Code. Second, such creation must not conflict with any provision of the Constitution. Third, there must be a plebiscite in the political units affected.
There is neither an express prohibition nor an express grant of authority in the Constitution for Congress to delegate to regional or local legislative bodies the power to create local government units. However, under its plenary legislative powers, Congress can delegate to local legislative bodies the power to create local government units, subject to reasonable standards and provided no conflict arises with any provision of the Constitution. In fact, Congress has delegated to provincial boards, and city and municipal councils, the power to create barangays within their jurisdiction,[25] subject to compliance with the criteria established in the Local Government Code, and the plebiscite requirement in Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. However, under the Local Government Code, only x x x an Act of Congress can create provinces, cities or municipalities.[26]
Under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, Congress delegated to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays within the ARMM. Congress made the delegation under its plenary legislative powers because the power to create local government units is not one of the express legislative powers granted by the Constitution to regional legislative bodies.[27] In the present case, the question arises whether the
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delegation to the ARMM Regional Assembly of the power to create provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays conflicts with any provision of the Constitution.
There is no provision in the Constitution that conflicts with the delegation to regional legislative bodies of the power to create municipalities and barangays, provided Section 10, Article X of the Constitution is followed. However, the creation of provinces and cities is another matter. Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution provides, Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative in the House of Representatives. Similarly, Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution provides, Any province that may hereafter be created, or any city whose population may hereafter increase to more than two hundred fifty thousand shall be entitled in the immediately following election to at least one Member x x x.
Clearly, a province cannot be created without a legislative district because it will violate Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution as well as Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. For the same reason, a city with a population of 250,000 or more cannot also be created without a legislative district. Thus, the power to create a province, or a city with a population of 250,000 or more, requires also the power to create a legislative district. Even the creation of a city with a population of less than 250,000 involves the power to create a legislative district because once the citys population reaches 250,000, the city automatically becomes entitled to one representative under Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. Thus, the power to create a province or city inherently involves the power to create a legislative district.
For Congress to delegate validly the power to create a province or city, it must also validly delegate at the same time the power to create a legislative district. The threshold issue then is, can Congress validly delegate to the ARMM
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Regional Assembly the power to create legislative districts for the House of Representatives? The answer is in the negative.
Legislative Districts are Created or Reapportioned Only by an Act of Congress Under the present Constitution, as well as in past[28] Constitutions, the power to increase the allowable membership in the House of Representatives, and to reapportion legislative districts, is vested exclusively in Congress. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provides:
SECTION 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
xxxx
(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory. Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative.
(4) Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standards provided in this section. (Emphasis supplied)
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Section 5 (1), Article VI of the Constitution vests in Congress the power to increase, through a law, the allowable membership in the House of Representatives. Section 5 (4) empowers Congress to reapportion legislative districts. The power to reapportion legislative districts necessarily includes the power to create legislative districts out of existing ones. Congress exercises these powers through a law that Congress itself enacts, and not through a law that regional or local legislative bodies enact. The allowable membership of the House of Representatives can be increased, and new legislative districts of Congress can be created, only through a national law passed by Congress. In Montejo v. COMELEC,[29] we held that the power of redistricting x x x is traditionally regarded as part of the power (of Congress) to make laws, and thus is vested exclusively in Congress. This textual commitment to Congress of the exclusive power to create or reapportion legislative districts is logical. Congress is a national legislature and any increase in its allowable membership or in its incumbent membership through the creation of legislative districts must be embodied in a national law. Only Congress can enact such a law. It would be anomalous for regional or local legislative bodies to create or reapportion legislative districts for a national legislature like Congress. An inferior legislative body, created by a superior legislative body, cannot change the membership of the superior legislative body. The creation of the ARMM, and the grant of legislative powers to its Regional Assembly under its organic act, did not divest Congress of its exclusive authority to create legislative districts. This is clear from the Constitution and the ARMM Organic Act, as amended. Thus, Section 20, Article X of the Constitution provides:
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SECTION 20. Within its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the provisions of this Constitution and national laws, the organic act of autonomous regions shall provide for legislative powers over: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) Administrative organization; Creation of sources of revenues; Ancestral domain and natural resources; Personal, family, and property relations; Regional urban and rural planning development; Economic, social, and tourism development; Educational policies; Preservation and development of the cultural heritage; and Such other matters as may be authorized by law for the promotion
Nothing in Section 20, Article X of the Constitution authorizes autonomous regions, expressly or impliedly, to create or reapportion legislative districts for Congress. On the other hand, Section 3, Article IV of RA 9054 amending the ARMM Organic Act, provides, The Regional Assembly may exercise legislative power x x x except on the following matters: x x x (k) National elections. x x x. Since the ARMM Regional Assembly has no legislative power to enact laws relating to national elections, it cannot create a legislative district whose representative is elected in national elections. Whenever Congress enacts a law creating a legislative district, the first representative is always elected in the next national elections from the effectivity of the law.[30] Indeed, the office of a legislative district representative to Congress is a national office, and its occupant, a Member of the House of Representatives, is a national official.[31] It would be incongruous for a regional legislative body like the ARMM Regional Assembly to create a national office when its legislative
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powers extend only to its regional territory. The office of a district representative is maintained by national funds and the salary of its occupant is paid out of national funds. It is a self-evident inherent limitation on the legislative powers of every local or regional legislative body that it can only create local or regional offices, respectively, and it can never create a national office. To allow the ARMM Regional Assembly to create a national office is to allow its legislative powers to operate outside the ARMMs territorial jurisdiction. This violates Section 20, Article X of the Constitution which expressly limits the coverage of the Regional Assemblys legislative powers [w]ithin its territorial jurisdiction x x x. The ARMM Regional Assembly itself, in creating Shariff Kabunsuan, recognized the exclusive nature of Congress power to create or reapportion legislative districts by abstaining from creating a legislative district for Shariff Kabunsuan. Section 5 of MMA Act 201 provides that:
Except as may be provided by national law, the existing legislative district, which includes Cotabato City as a part thereof, shall remain. (Emphasis supplied)
However, a province cannot legally be created without a legislative district because the Constitution mandates that each province shall have at least one representative. Thus, the creation of the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan without a legislative district is unconstitutional. Sema, petitioner in G.R. No. 177597, contends that Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution, which provides:
Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory. Each city with a population of at least two
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hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative. (Emphasis supplied)
serve as bases for the conclusion that the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan, created on 29 October 2006, is automatically entitled to one member in the House of Representatives in the 14 May 2007 elections. As further support for her stance, petitioner invokes the statement in Felwa that when a province is created by statute, the corresponding representative district comes into existence neither by authority of that statute which cannot provide otherwise nor by apportionment, but by operation of the Constitution, without a reapportionment. The contention has no merit. First. The issue in Felwa, among others, was whether Republic Act No. 4695 (RA 4695), creating the provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao, and Kalinga-Apayao and providing for congressional representation in the old and
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new provinces, was unconstitutional for creati[ng] congressional districts without the apportionment provided in the Constitution. The Court answered in the negative, thus:
The Constitution ordains:
The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than one hundred and twenty Members who shall be apportioned among the several provinces as nearly as may be according to the number of their respective inhabitants, but each province shall have at least one Member. The Congress shall by law make an apportionment within three years after the return of every enumeration, and not otherwise. Until such apportionment shall have been made, the House of Representatives shall have the same number of Members as that fixed by law for the National Assembly, who shall be elected by the qualified electors from the present Assembly districts. Each representative district shall comprise as far as practicable, contiguous and compact territory. Pursuant to this Section, a representative district may come into existence: (a) indirectly, through the creation of a province for each province shall have at least one member in the House of Representatives; or (b) by direct creation of several representative districts within a province. The requirements concerning the apportionment of representative districts and the territory thereof refer only to the second method of creation of representative districts, and do not apply to those incidental to the creation of provinces, under the first method. This is deducible, not only from the general tenor of the provision above quoted, but, also, from the fact that the apportionment therein alluded to refers to that which is made by an Act of Congress. Indeed, when a province is created by statute, the corresponding representative district, comes into existence neither by authority of that statute which cannot provide otherwise nor by apportionment, but by operation of the Constitution, without a reapportionment.
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There is no constitutional limitation as to the time when, territory of, or other conditions under which a province may be created, except, perhaps, if the consequence thereof were to exceed the maximum of 120 representative districts prescribed in the Constitution, which is not the effect of the legislation under consideration. As a matter of fact, provinces have been created or subdivided into other provinces, with the consequent creation of additional representative districts, without complying with the aforementioned requirements.[32] (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, the Court sustained the constitutionality of RA 4695 because (1) it validly created legislative districts indirectlythrough a special law enacted by Congress creating a province and (2) the creation of the legislative districts will not result in breaching the maximum number of legislative districts provided under the 1935 Constitution. Felwa does not apply to the present case because in Felwa the new provinces were created by a national law enacted by Congress itself. Here, the new province was created merely by a regional law enacted by the ARMM Regional Assembly. What Felwa teaches is that the creation of a legislative district by Congress does not emanate alone from Congress power to reapportion legislative districts, but also from Congress power to create provinces which cannot be created without a legislative district. Thus, when a province is created, a legislative district is created by operation of the Constitution because the Constitution provides that each province shall have at least one representative in the House of Representatives. This does not detract from the constitutional principle that the power to create legislative districts belongs exclusively to Congress. It merely prevents any other legislative body, except Congress, from creating provinces because for a legislative body to create a province such legislative body must have the power to create legislative districts. In short, only an act of Congress can
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trigger the creation of a legislative district by operation of the Constitution. Thus, only Congress has the power to create, or trigger the creation of, a legislative district. Moreover, if as Sema claims MMA Act 201 apportioned a legislative district to Shariff Kabunsuan upon its creation, this will leave Cotabato City as the lone component of the first legislative district of Maguindanao. However, Cotabato City cannot constitute a legislative district by itself because as of the census taken in 2000, it had a population of only 163,849. To constitute Cotabato City alone as the surviving first legislative district of Maguindanao will violate Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution which requires that [E]ach city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand x x x, shall have at least one representative. Second. Semas theory also undermines the composition and independence of the House of Representatives. Under Section 19,[33] Article VI of RA 9054, the ARMM Regional Assembly can create provinces and cities within the ARMM with or withoutregard to the criteria fixed in Section 461 of RA 7160, namely: minimum annual income of P20,000,000, and minimum contiguous territory of 2,000 square kilometers or minimum population of 250,000. [34] The following scenarios thus become distinct possibilities: (1) An inferior legislative body like the ARMM Regional Assembly can create 100 or more provinces and thus increase the membership of a superior legislative body, the House of Representatives, beyond the maximum limit of 250 fixed in the Constitution (unless a national law provides otherwise); (2) The proportional representation in the House of Representatives based on one representative for at least every 250,000 residents will be negated because the ARMM Regional Assembly need not comply with the requirement in Section 461(a)(ii) of RA 7160 that every province created must have a population of at least 250,000; and
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(3) Representatives from the ARMM provinces can become the majority in the House of Representatives through the ARMM Regional Assemblys continuous creation of provinces or cities within the ARMM.
The following exchange during the oral arguments of the petition in G.R. No. 177597 highlights the absurdity of Semas position that the ARMM Regional Assembly can create provinces:
Justice Carpio: So, you mean to say [a] Local Government can create legislative district[s] and pack Congress with their own representatives [?] Atty. Vistan II:[35] Yes, Your Honor, because the Constitution allows that. Justice Carpio: So, [the] Regional Assembly of [the] ARMM can create and create x x x provinces x x x and, therefore, they can have thirty-five (35) new representatives in the House of Representatives without Congress agreeing to it, is that what you are saying? That can be done, under your theory[?]
Justice Carpio: Under your theory, the ARMM legislature can create thirty-five (35) new provinces, there may be x x x [only] one hundred thousand (100,000)
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[population], x x x, and they will each have one representative x x x to Congress without any national law, is that what you are saying?
Without law passed by Congress, yes, Your Honor, that is what we are saying.
xxxx Justice Carpio: So, they can also create one thousand (1000) new provinces, sen[d] one thousand (1000) representatives to the House of Representatives without a national law[,] that is legally possible, correct?
(Emphasis supplied)
Neither the framers of the 1987 Constitution in adopting the provisions in Article X on regional autonomy,[37] nor Congress in enacting RA 9054, envisioned or intended these disastrous consequences that certainly would wreck the tribranch system of government under our Constitution. Clearly, the power to create or reapportion legislative districts cannot be delegated by Congress but must be exercised by Congress itself. Even the ARMM Regional Assembly recognizes this. The Constitution empowered Congress to create or reapportion legislative districts, not the regional assemblies. Section 3 of the Ordinance to the Constitution which states, [A]ny province that may hereafter be created x x x
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shall be entitled in the immediately following election to at least one Member, refers to a province created by Congress itself through a national law. The reason is that the creation of a province increases the actual membership of the House of Representatives, an increase that only Congress can decide. Incidentally, in the present 14th Congress, there are 219[38] district representatives out of the maximum 250 seats in the House of Representatives. Since party-list members shall constitute 20 percent of total membership of the House, there should at least be 50 party-list seats available in every election in case 50 party-list candidates are proclaimed winners. This leaves only 200 seats for district representatives, much less than the 219 incumbent district representatives. Thus, there is a need now for Congress to increase by law the allowable membership of the House, even before Congress can create new provinces.
It is axiomatic that organic acts of autonomous regions cannot prevail over the Constitution. Section 20, Article X of the Constitution expressly provides that the legislative powers of regional assemblies are limited [w]ithin its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the provisions of the Constitution and national laws, x x x. The Preamble of the ARMM Organic Act (RA 9054) itself states that the ARMM Government is established within the framework of the Constitution. This follows Section 15, Article X of the Constitution which mandates that the ARMM shall be created x x x within the framework of this Constitutionand the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines. The present case involves the creation of a local government unit that necessarily involves also the creation of a legislative district. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of the creation of municipalities and barangays that does not comply with the criteria established in Section 461 of RA 7160, as
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mandated in Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, because the creation of such municipalities and barangays does not involve the creation of legislative districts. We leave the resolution of this issue to an appropriate case. In summary, we rule that Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, insofar as it grants to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create provinces and cities, is void for being contrary to Section 5 of Article VI and Section 20 of Article X of the Constitution, as well as Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. Only Congress can create provinces and cities because the creation of provinces and cities necessarily includes the creation of legislative districts, a power only Congress can exercise under Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. The ARMM Regional Assembly cannot create a province without a legislative district because the Constitution mandates that every province shall have a legislative district. Moreover, the ARMM Regional Assembly cannot enact a law creating a national office like the office of a district representative of Congress because the legislative powers of the ARMM Regional Assembly operate only within its territorial jurisdiction as provided in Section 20, Article X of the Constitution. Thus, we rule that MMA Act 201, enacted by the ARMM Regional Assembly and creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan, is void. Resolution No. 7902 Complies with the Constitution Consequently, we hold that COMELEC Resolution No. 7902, preserving the geographic and legislative district of the First District of Maguindanao with Cotabato City, is valid as it merely complies with Section 5 of Article VI and Section 20 of Article X of the Constitution, as well as Section 1 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution.
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WHEREFORE, we declare Section 19, Article VI of Republic Act No. 9054 UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it grants to the Regional Assembly of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao the power to create provinces and cities. Thus, we declare VOID Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan. Consequently, we rule that COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 is VALID.
Let a copy of this ruling be served on the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives. SO ORDERED.
NPC DRIVERS AND MECHANICS ASSOCIATION, (NPC DAMA), represented by Its President ROGER S. SAN JUAN, SR., NPC EMPLOYEES & WORKERS UNION (NEWU) NORTHERN LUZON REGIONAL CENTER, represented by its Regional President JIMMY D. SALMAN, in their own individual capacities and in behalf of the members of the associations and all affected officers and employees of National Power Corporation (NPC), ZOL D. MEDINA, NARCISO M. MAGANTE, VICENTE B. CIRIO, JR., NECITAS B. CAMAMA, in their individual capacities as employees of National Power Corporation, petitioners, vs. THE NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION (NPC), NATIONAL POWER BOARD OF DIRECTORS (NPB), JOSE ISIDRO N. CAMACHO as Chairman of the National Power Board of Directors (NPB), ROLANDO S. QUILALA, as President Officer-in-charge/CEO of National Power Corporation and Member of National Power Board, and VINCENT S. PEREZ, JR., EMILIA T. BONCODIN, MARIUS P. CORPUS, RUBEN S. REINOSO, JR., GREGORY L. DOMINGO and NIEVES L. OSORIO, respondents. DECISION CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: Before Us is a special civil action for Injunction to enjoin public respondents from implementing the National Power Board (NPB) Resolutions No. 2002-124 and No. 2002-125, both dated 18 November 2002, directing, among other things, the termination of all employees of the National Power Corporation (NPC) on 31 January 2003 in line with the restructuring of the NPC. On 8 June 2001, Republic Act No. 9136, otherwise known as the "Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001" (EPIRA Law), was approved and signed into law by President Gloria MacapagalArroyo, and took effect on 26 June 2001. Section 2(i) and Section 3 of the EPIRA Law states: Section 2. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared the policy of the State: xxxx (i) To provide for an orderly and transparent privatization of the assets and liabilities of the National Power Corporation (NPC); xxxx Section 3. Scope. This Act shall provide a framework for the restructuring of the electric power industry, including the privatization of the assets of NPC, the transition to the desired competitive structure, and the definition of the responsibilities of the various government agencies and private entities.1
Mago vs Penalosa-Fermo
Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION A.M. No. MTJ-08-1715 March 19, 2009 [Formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 08-2037-MTJ] RODOLFO R. MAGO, Complainant, vs. JUDGE AUREA G. PEALOSA-FERMO, MTC, LABO, CAMARINES NORTE, Respondent. DECISION CARPIO MORALES, J.: Rodolfo R. Mago (complainant) filed before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Labo, Camarines Norte a complaint for grave coercion against Sheriff Alex Rodolfo Angeles (of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board [DARAB]), et al. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 04-7800. Sheriff Angeles filed a counter-charge for grave threats against complainant and his sons, docketed as Criminal Case No. 04-7811. Alleging that Presiding Judge of the MTC Labo, Camarines Sur Judge Aurea G. Pealosa-Fermo (respondent) committed gross ignorance of the law and bias in the disposition of his complaint and of the counter-charge against him, complainant filed the present administrative complaint, the details of which were summarized by the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) as follows:1 Mr. Mago claims that on April 21, 2004 he filed a complaint for Grave Coercion against Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB for brevity) Sheriff Alex Roberto Angeles which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 04-7800. However, instead of summoning the accused for a "Preliminary Investigation", he received a complaint charging him and his two (2) sons with Grave Threats [which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 04-7811]. He stresses the complaint against him as purely fabricated. He states that the complainant in the said case was not DARAB Sheriff Angeles. He avers that the affidavits of the witnesses in the said case could not be found in the records of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC). Complainant further declares that on July 20, 2004, he received a subpoena to attend the preliminary investigation of Criminal Case No. 04-7811. In compliance, he and his witnesses attended, and even without the assistance of counsel, they were examined through a prepared set of questions handed to them by the stenographer. The respondent judge was not present then. The complainant also states that right after the preliminary investigation, he was immediately arrested and was imprisoned for three (3) days. Thereafter, he was released after he posted bail in the amount of Php12,000 pesos. Complainant also alleges that he filed a Petition for Certiorari, Mandamus, Prohibition with Application for Preliminary Injunction and Ex-Parte Motion for Temporary Restraining Order questioning the order of respondent judge in denying his omnibus motion to quash the information, suppress evidence and produce, inspect and copy documentary evidence. He adds that despite the filing of this petition, the respondent judge continued to direct him to appear at the pretrial/preliminary conference. He likewise avers that his arraignment was set beyond the period allowed by the Rules of Court. He also laments that he could not locate his lawyer, Atty. Lamberto
Mago vs Penalosa-Fermo
Bonifacio, Jr. Finally, he alleges that the respondent judge had been biased when hearing his case.2 (Italics in the original; emphasis an underscoring supplied) By 2nd Indorsement dated July 31, 2007,3 respondent gave her side of the case as follows: Contrary to complainants allegation, the complaint in Criminal Case No. 04-7811 (for grave threats), and the affidavits of the therein complainant-sheriffs witnesses were attached to the record.4 Admitting complainants allegation that the court stenographer examined complainant and his witnesses during the preliminary investigation of the grave threats complaint against him with the use of prepared written set of questions, respondent explains as follows: What [complainant] claimed in his Letter-Complaint that the Court Stenographer has a prepared sheet of questions during the preliminary examination is true because after a complaint is filed, the undersigned prepares her questions for preliminary examination based on the affidavits of the complaining witnesses and the counter affidavits of the accused. This is done to make it easy for the Stenographers to take/print the transcript of the proceedings. Some witnesses even ask to read/study the question and request that they write down their answers to the questions for the Stenographers to finalize. Also, this is convenient when more than one preliminary examination is scheduled for the day. This procedure makes it easier for the Stenographers and the witnesses, too, considering the cramped office space. After the witnesses are briefed, the [s]tenographers take over since the prepared sheets are given to them so they could propound the questions and the answers are typed directly. x x x5 (Emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied) Denying complainants allegation that he was arrested within the court premises on July 20, 2004 or right after the conduct of the preliminary examination conducted in the grave threats complaint against him, respondent alleges that the preliminary examination was conducted at 9:00 oclock in the morning of July 19, 2004; that she issued an Order6 the following day, July 20, 2004, finding probable cause and directing the issuance of a warrant of arrest7against complainant which the warrant officer received at 4:40 p.m. on even date; and that complainant was arrested on July 21, 2004 at the Poblacion, Labo, Camarines Norte, as shown by the Warrant Officers Return of Service.8 Admitting that there was delay in scheduling the arraignment of complainant after his arrest, respondent surmises that the Clerk of Court or the clerk-in-charge might have overlooked the Return of Service of the warrant officer. Respondent states, however, that when the arraignment was scheduled, complainants counsel opposed the same and filed an Omnibus Motion which resulted in the repeated resetting of the arraignment. Respondent adds that after complainant was arraigned on June 6, 2006, the preliminary conference/pre-trial was set but was not terminated due to the absence of complainant or his counsel.9 In fact, respondent goes on to allege that in complainants attempt to block his arraignment and to quash the Information against him, he filed a Petition for Certiorari, Mandamus, Prohibition with Application for Mandatory Injunction and Ex-Parte Motion for Temporary Restraining Order with the Regional Trial Court of Labo which was denied for lack of merit. 10 On the allegation of bias on her part, respondent claims that until the criminal complaints were filed, she did not know any of the parties. By June 18, 2008 Report,11 the OCA came up with the following Evaluation:
Mago vs Penalosa-Fermo
xxxx . . . [W]e hold [respondent] administratively liable for her unfamiliarity with the basic rules on preliminary investigation. There was irregularity during the preliminary investigation when the respondent judge allowed the stenographers to handle the latter part of the proceedings. xxxx . . . [R]espondent admitted that after the complaint was filed, she prepared a set of questions based on the affidavits of the complaining witnesses and counter affidavits of the accused. She further added that during the preliminary investigation and after briefing the accused and his witnesses, the stenographers took charge of the proceedings. Hence, the respondent judge violated the rules on preliminary investigation. Respondent should not have allowed her stenographer to handle the latter part of the proceedings even if she only wanted to expedite the proceedings and it was more convenient. Respondent judge should have personally taken charge of the entire proceedings since the power to conduct preliminary investigations vests only on her and not on the stenographer. x x x x12 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) Finding respondent guilty of gross ignorance of the law or procedure, the OCA recommended that respondent be FINED in the amount of P20,000 in this wise: [W]e deem it proper to recommend the imposition upon the respondent judge of a penalty of fine in the amount of P20,000[,] this being her first offense. As regards the issue of continuous hearing of the case by the respondent judge, we opine that the respondent judge only acted in good faith and in accordance with law when she continued to direct the herein complainant to attend the pre-trial. Based on the records, the Petition for Certiorari, Mandamus, Prohibition with Application for Mandatory Injunction and Ex-Parte Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and the Motion for Reconsideration thereto filed by complainant with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 64, Labo, Camarines Norte were already denied; thus the respondent judge had the authority to proceed with the case. The postponements in the pre-trial were not attributable to the respondent judge but to the accused and his counsel.
1avv phi1
Finally, on the issue of bias, complainant failed to submit any evidence showing the respondent biased or partial in hearing the case. Bias and partiality of a judge must be proved by clear and convincing evidence. Mere suspicion that a judge is bias or partial would not be enough.13 (Italics in the original; underscoring supplied) By Resolution of August 20, 2008,14 the Court, on the recommendation of the OCA, re-docketed the case and required the parties to manifest within ten days from notice whether they were willing to submit the matter for resolution on the basis of the pleadings filed and submitted. Both parties have manifested in the affirmative. The Court finds the evaluation well-taken. Prior to the amendment on October 3, 2005 of Rules 112 and 114 of the Rules of Court via A.M. No. 05-8-26-SC,Re: Amendment of Rules 112 and 114 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure by Removing the Conduct of Preliminary Investigation from Judges of the First Level Courts, judges of municipal trial courts were empowered to conduct preliminary investigations in which they
Mago vs Penalosa-Fermo
exercised discretion in determining whether there was probable cause to hale the respondent into court. Such being the case, they could not delegate the discretion to another. An officer to whom a discretion is entrusted cannot delegate it to another, the presumption being that he was chosen because he was deemed fit and competent to exercise that judgment and discretion, and unless the power to substitute another in his place has been given to him, he cannot delegate his duties to another. In those cases in which the proper execution of the office requires on the part of the officer, the exercise of judgment or discretion, the presumption is that he was chosen because he was deemed fit and competent to exercise that judgment and discretion, and, unless power to substitute another in his place has been given to him, he cannot delegate his duties to another.15 (Underscoring supplied) Then, as now, a personal examination of the complainant in a criminal case and his witness/es was required. Thus, under Section 4, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Court before its amendment, the "investigating fiscal" was required to "certify under oath that he, or as shown by the record, an authorized officer, has personally examined the complainant and his witnesses . . . " By respondents delegation of the examination of the sheriff-complainant in the grave threats case to the stenographer, and worse, by allowing the witnesses to "read/study the [written] question[s]" to be propounded to them and to "write their answers [thereto]" upon respondents justification that the scheme was for the convenience of the stenographers, respondent betrayed her lack of knowledge of procedure, thereby contributing to the erosion of public confidence in the judicial system. Respondent is thus guilty of gross ignorance of the law or procedure which, under Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, is a serious charge,16 for which Section 11 (A) of the same Rule prescribes the following penalty: SEC. 11. Sanctions. A. If the respondent is guilty of a serious charge, any of the following sanctions may be imposed: 1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned and controlled corporations. Provided, however, That the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued leave credits; 2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3) but not exceeding six (6) months; or 3. A fine of more than P20,000 but not exceeding P40,000.00. The Court thus finds in order the Recommendation of the OCA to impose a fine of P20,000 on respondent. The OCAs recommendation to warn respondent that a "repetition of the same act will be dealt with more severely" does not lie, however, A.M. No. 05-8-26-SC, which took effect on October 3, 2005, having removed the power of judges of the first level courts17 to conduct preliminary investigation. A warning that a commission of another infraction tantamount to gross ignorance of law or procedures shall be dealt with more severely lies, however. WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent, Judge Aurea G. Pealosa-Fermo of the Municipal Trial Court of Labo, Camarines Norte, guilty of Gross Ignorance of the Law or Procedure. She is FINED in
Mago vs Penalosa-Fermo
the amount of Twenty Thousand (P20,000) Pesos and warned that a commission of another infraction which is tantamount to the same charge shall be dealt with more severely. SO ORDERED.
EN BANC METROPOLITAN MANILA G.R. Nos. 171947-48 DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, Present: DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS,[1] PUNO, C.J., DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, QUISUMBING, DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, YNARES-SANTIAGO, DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC CARPIO, WORKS AND HIGHWAYS, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND CORONA, MANAGEMENT, PHILIPPINE CARPIO MORALES, COAST GUARD, PHILIPPINE AZCUNA, NATIONAL POLICE MARITIME TINGA, GROUP, and DEPARTMENT OF CHICO-NAZARIO, THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL VELASCO, JR., GOVERNMENT, NACHURA, Petitioners, REYES, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and - versus BRION, JJ.
CONCERNED RESIDENTS OF MANILA BAY, represented and joined by DIVINA V. ILAS, SABINIANO ALBARRACIN, MANUEL SANTOS, JR., DINAH DELA PEA, PAUL DENNIS QUINTERO, MA. VICTORIA LLENOS, DONNA CALOZA, FATIMA QUITAIN, VENICE SEGARRA, FRITZIE TANGKIA,
SARAH JOELLE LINTAG, HANNIBAL AUGUSTUS BOBIS, FELIMON SANTIAGUEL, and Promulgated: JAIME AGUSTIN R. OPOSA, Respondents. December 18, 2008 x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x DECISION VELASCO, JR., J.: The need to address environmental pollution, as a cause of climate change, has of late gained the attention of the international community. Media have finally trained their sights on the ill effects of pollution, the destruction of forests and other critical habitats, oil spills, and the unabated improper disposal of garbage. And rightly so, for the magnitude of environmental destruction is now on a scale few ever foresaw and the wound no longer simply heals by itself.[2] But amidst hard evidence and clear signs of a climate crisis that need bold action, the voice of cynicism, naysayers, and procrastinators can still be heard. This case turns on government agencies and their officers who, by the nature of their respective offices or by direct statutory command, are tasked to protect and preserve, at the first instance, our internal waters, rivers, shores, and seas polluted by human activities. To most of these agencies and their official complement, the pollution menace does not seem to carry the high national priority it deserves, if their track records are to be the norm. Their cavalier attitude towards solving, if not mitigating, the environmental pollution problem, is a sad commentary on bureaucratic efficiency and commitment. At the core of the case is the Manila Bay, a place with a proud historic past, once brimming with marine life and, for so many decades in the past, a spot for different contact recreation activities, but now a dirty and slowly dying expanse mainly because of the abject official indifference of people and institutions that could have otherwise made a difference.
This case started when, on January 29, 1999, respondents Concerned Residents of Manila Bay filed a complaint before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Imus, Cavite against several government agencies, among them the petitioners, for the cleanup, rehabilitation, and protection of the Manila Bay. Raffled to Branch 20 and docketed as Civil Case No. 1851-99 of the RTC, the complaint alleged that the water quality of the Manila Bay had fallen way below the allowable standards set by law, specifically Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1152 or the Philippine Environment Code. This environmental aberration, the complaint stated, stemmed from:
x x x [The] reckless, wholesale, accumulated and ongoing acts of omission or commission [of the defendants] resulting in the clear and present danger to public health and in the depletion and contamination of the marine life of Manila Bay, [for which reason] ALL defendants must be held jointly and/or solidarily liable and be collectively ordered to clean up Manila Bay and to restore its water quality to class B waters fit for swimming, skin-diving, and other forms of contact recreation.[3]
In their individual causes of action, respondents alleged that the continued neglect of petitioners in abating the pollution of theManila Bay constitutes a violation of, among others:
Respondents constitutional right to life, health, and a balanced ecology; (2) The Environment Code (PD 1152); (3) The Pollution Control Law (PD 984); (4) The Water Code (PD 1067); (5) The Sanitation Code (PD 856); (6) The Illegal Disposal of Wastes Decree (PD 825); (7) The Marine Pollution Law (PD 979); (8) Executive Order No. 192; (9) The Toxic and Hazardous Wastes Law (Republic Act No. 6969); (10) Civil Code provisions on nuisance and human relations; (11) The Trust Doctrine and the Principle of Guardianship; and (12) International Law (1)
Inter alia, respondents, as plaintiffs a quo, prayed that petitioners be ordered to clean the Manila Bay and submit to the RTC a concerted concrete plan of action for the purpose. The trial of the case started off with a hearing at the Manila Yacht Club followed by an ocular inspection of the Manila Bay. Renato T. Cruz, the Chief of the Water Quality Management Section, Environmental Management Bureau, Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), testifying for petitioners, stated that water samples collected from different beaches around the Manila Bay showed that the amount of fecal coliform content ranged from 50,000 to 80,000 most probable number (MPN)/ml when what DENR Administrative Order No. 34-90 prescribed as a safe level for bathing and other forms of contact recreational activities, or the SB level, is one not exceeding 200 MPN/100 ml.[4] Rebecca de Vera, for Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS) and in behalf of other petitioners, testified about the MWSS efforts to reduce pollution along the Manila Bay through the Manila Second Sewerage Project. For its part, the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) presented, as part of its evidence, its memorandum circulars on the study being conducted on shipgenerated waste treatment and disposal, and its Linis Dagat (Clean the Ocean) project for the cleaning of wastes accumulated or washed to shore. The RTC Ordered Petitioners to Clean Up and Rehabilitate Manila Bay On September 13, 2002, the RTC rendered a Decision[5] in favor of respondents. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, finding merit in the complaint, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the abovenamed defendant-government agencies, jointly and solidarily, to clean up and rehabilitate Manila Bay and restore its waters to SB classification to make it fit for swimming, skin-diving and other forms of contact recreation. To attain this, defendant-agencies, with defendant DENR as the lead agency, are directed, within six (6) months from receipt hereof, to act and perform their respective duties by devising a consolidated, coordinated and concerted scheme of action for the rehabilitation and restoration of the bay.
In particular: Defendant MWSS is directed to install, operate and maintain adequate [sewerage] treatment facilities in strategic places under its jurisdiction and increase their capacities. Defendant LWUA, to see to it that the water districts under its wings, provide, construct and operate sewage facilities for the proper disposal of waste. Defendant DENR, which is the lead agency in cleaning up Manila Bay, to install, operate and maintain waste facilities to rid the bay of toxic and hazardous substances. Defendant PPA, to prevent and also to treat the discharge not only of ship-generated wastes but also of other solid and liquid wastes from docking vessels that contribute to the pollution of the bay. Defendant MMDA, to establish, operate and maintain an adequate and appropriate sanitary landfill and/or adequate solid waste and liquid disposal as well as other alternative garbage disposal system such as re-use or recycling of wastes. Defendant DA, through the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources, to revitalize the marine life in Manila Bay and restock its waters with indigenous fish and other aquatic animals. Defendant DBM, to provide and set aside an adequate budget solely for the purpose of cleaning up and rehabilitation of Manila Bay. Defendant DPWH, to remove and demolish structures and other nuisances that obstruct the free flow of waters to the bay. These nuisances discharge solid and liquid wastes which eventually end up in Manila Bay. As the construction and engineering arm of the government, DPWH is ordered to actively participate in removing debris, such as carcass of sunken vessels, and other non-biodegradable garbage in the bay. Defendant DOH, to closely supervise and monitor the operations of septic and sludge companies and require them to have proper facilities
for the treatment and disposal of fecal sludge and sewage coming from septic tanks. Defendant DECS, to inculcate in the minds and hearts of the people through education the importance of preserving and protecting the environment. Defendant Philippine Coast Guard and the PNP Maritime Group, to protect at all costs the Manila Bay from all forms of illegal fishing. No pronouncement as to damages and costs. SO ORDERED. The MWSS, Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA), and PPA filed before the Court of Appeals (CA) individual Notices of Appeal which were eventually consolidated and docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 76528.
On the other hand, the DENR, Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH), Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA), Philippine Coast Guard (PCG), Philippine National Police (PNP) Maritime Group, and five other executive departments and agencies filed directly with this Court a petition for review under Rule 45. The Court, in a Resolution of December 9, 2002, sent the said petition to the CA for consolidation with the consolidated appeals of MWSS, LWUA, and PPA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 74944. Petitioners, before the CA, were one in arguing in the main that the pertinent provisions of the Environment Code (PD 1152) relate only to the cleaning of specific pollution incidents and do not cover cleaning in general. And apart from raising concerns about the lack of funds appropriated for cleaning purposes, petitioners also asserted that the cleaning of the Manila Bay is not a ministerial act which can be compelled by mandamus.
The CA Sustained the RTC By a Decision[6] of September 28, 2005, the CA denied petitioners appeal and affirmed the Decision of the RTC in toto,stressing that the trial courts
decision did not require petitioners to do tasks outside of their usual basic functions under existing laws.[7] Petitioners are now before this Court praying for the allowance of their Rule 45 petition on the following ground and supporting arguments: THE [CA] DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE NOT HERETOFORE PASSED UPON BY THE HONORABLE COURT, I.E., IT AFFIRMED THE TRIAL COURTS DECISION DECLARING THAT SECTION 20 OF [PD] 1152 REQUIRES CONCERNED GOVERNMENT AGENCIES TO REMOVE ALL POLLUTANTS SPILLED AND DISCHARGED IN THE WATER SUCH AS FECAL COLIFORMS.
ARGUMENTS I [SECTIONS] 17 AND 20 OF [PD] 1152 RELATE ONLY TO THE CLEANING OF SPECIFIC POLLUTION INCIDENTS AND [DO] NOT COVER CLEANING IN GENERAL II THE CLEANING OR REHABILITATION OF THE MANILA BAY IS NOT A MINISTERIAL ACT OF PETITIONERS THAT CAN BE COMPELLED BY MANDAMUS.
The issues before us are two-fold. First, do Sections 17 and 20 of PD 1152 under the headings, Upgrading of Water Qualityand Clean-up Operations, envisage a cleanup in general or are they limited only to the cleanup of specific pollution incidents? Andsecond, can petitioners be compelled by mandamus to clean up and rehabilitate the Manila Bay? On August 12, 2008, the Court conducted and heard the parties on oral arguments. Our Ruling
We shall first dwell on the propriety of the issuance of mandamus under the premises.
The Cleaning or Rehabilitation of Manila Bay Can be Compelled by Mandamus Generally, the writ of mandamus lies to require the execution of a ministerial duty. A ministerial duty is one that requires neither the exercise of official discretion nor judgment.[9] It connotes an act in which nothing is left to the discretion of the person executing it. It is a simple, definite duty arising under conditions admitted or proved to exist and imposed by law. [10] Mandamus is available to compel action, when refused, on matters involving discretion, but not to direct the exercise of judgment or discretion one way or the other.
[8]
Petitioners maintain that the MMDAs duty to take measures and maintain adequate solid waste and liquid disposal systems necessarily involves policy evaluation and the exercise of judgment on the part of the agency concerned. They argue that the MMDA, in carrying out its mandate, has to make decisions, including choosing where a landfill should be located by undertaking feasibility studies and cost estimates, all of which entail the exercise of discretion. Respondents, on the other hand, counter that the statutory command is clear and that petitioners duty to comply with and act according to the clear mandate of the law does not require the exercise of discretion. According to respondents, petitioners, the MMDA in particular, are without discretion, for example, to choose which bodies of water they are to clean up, or which discharge or spill they are to contain. By the same token, respondents maintain that petitioners are bereft of discretion on whether or not to alleviate the problem of solid and liquid waste disposal; in other words, it is the MMDAs ministerial duty to attend to such services. We agree with respondents. First off, we wish to state that petitioners obligation to perform their duties as defined by law, on one hand, and how they are to carry out such duties, on the
other, are two different concepts. While the implementation of the MMDAs mandated tasks may entail a decision-making process, the enforcement of the law or the very act of doing what the law exacts to be done is ministerial in nature and may be compelled by mandamus. We said so in Social Justice Society v. Atienza[11] in which the Court directed the City of Manila to enforce, as a matter of ministerial duty, its Ordinance No. 8027 directing the three big local oil players to cease and desist from operating their business in the so-called Pandacan Terminals within six months from the effectivity of the ordinance. But to illustrate with respect to the instant case, the MMDAs duty to put up an adequate and appropriate sanitary landfill and solid waste and liquid disposal as well as other alternative garbage disposal systems is ministerial, its duty being a statutory imposition. The MMDAs duty in this regard is spelled out in Sec. 3(c) of Republic Act No. (RA) 7924 creating the MMDA. This section defines and delineates the scope of the MMDAs waste disposal services to include:
Solid waste disposal and management which include formulation and implementation of policies, standards, programs and projects for proper and sanitary waste disposal. It shall likewise include the establishment and operation of sanitary land fill and related facilities and the implementation of other alternative programs intended to reduce, reuse and recycle solid waste. (Emphasis added.)
The MMDA is duty-bound to comply with Sec. 41 of the Ecological Solid Waste Management Act (RA 9003) which prescribes the minimum criteria for the establishment of sanitary landfills and Sec. 42 which provides the minimum operating requirements that each site operator shall maintain in the operation of a sanitary landfill. Complementing Sec. 41 are Secs. 36 and 37 of RA 9003,[12] enjoining the MMDA and local government units, among others, after the effectivity of the law on February 15, 2001, from using and operating open dumps for solid waste and disallowing, five years after such effectivity, the use of controlled dumps. The MMDAs duty in the area of solid waste disposal, as may be noted, is set forth not only in the Environment Code (PD 1152) and RA 9003, but in its charter as well. This duty of putting up a proper waste disposal system cannot be characterized as discretionary, for, as earlier stated, discretion presupposes the
power or right given by law to public functionaries to act officially according to their judgment or conscience.[13] A discretionary duty is one that allows a person to exercise judgment and choose to perform or not to perform. [14] Any suggestion that the MMDA has the option whether or not to perform its solid waste disposalrelated duties ought to be dismissed for want of legal basis. A perusal of other petitioners respective charters or like enabling statutes and pertinent laws would yield this conclusion: these government agencies are enjoined, as a matter of statutory obligation, to perform certain functions relating directly or indirectly to the cleanup, rehabilitation, protection, and preservation of the Manila Bay. They are precluded from choosing not to perform these duties. Consider: (1) The DENR, under Executive Order No. (EO) 192,[15] is the primary agency responsible for the conservation, management, development, and proper use of the countrys environment and natural resources. Sec. 19 of the Philippine Clean Water Act of 2004 (RA 9275), on the other hand, designates the DENR as the primary government agency responsible for its enforcement and implementation, more particularly over all aspects of water quality management. On water pollution, the DENR, under the Acts Sec. 19(k), exercises jurisdiction over all aspects of water pollution, determine[s] its location, magnitude, extent, severity, causes and effects and other pertinent information on pollution, and [takes] measures, using available methods and technologies, to prevent and abate such pollution. The DENR, under RA 9275, is also tasked to prepare a National Water Quality Status Report, an Integrated Water Quality Management Framework, and a 10-year Water Quality Management Area Action Plan which is nationwide in scope covering theManila Bay and adjoining areas. Sec. 19 of RA 9275 provides:
Sec. 19 Lead Agency.The [DENR] shall be the primary government agency responsible for the implementation and enforcement of this Act x x x unless otherwise provided herein. As such, it shall have the following functions, powers and responsibilities: a) Prepare a National Water Quality Status report within twenty-four (24) months from the effectivity of this Act: Provided, That the
Department shall thereafter review or revise and publish annually, or as the need arises, said report; b) Prepare an Integrated Water Quality Management Framework within twelve (12) months following the completion of the status report; c) Prepare a ten (10) year Water Quality Management Area Action Plan within 12 months following the completion of the framework for each designated water management area. Such action plan shall be reviewed by the water quality management area governing board every five (5) years or as need arises.
The DENR has prepared the status report for the period 2001 to 2005 and is in the process of completing the preparation of the Integrated Water Quality Management Framework.[16] Within twelve (12) months thereafter, it has to submit a final Water Quality Management Area Action Plan.[17] Again, like the MMDA, the DENR should be made to accomplish the tasks assigned to it under RA 9275. Parenthetically, during the oral arguments, the DENR Secretary manifested that the DENR, with the assistance of and in partnership with various government agencies and non-government organizations, has completed, as of December 2005, the final draft of a comprehensive action plan with estimated budget and time frame, denominated as Operation Plan for the Manila Bay Coastal Strategy, for the rehabilitation, restoration, and rehabilitation of the Manila Bay. The completion of the said action plan and even the implementation of some of its phases should more than ever prod the concerned agencies to fast track what are assigned them under existing laws. (2) The MWSS, under Sec. 3 of RA 6234,[18] is vested with jurisdiction, supervision, and control over all waterworks and sewerage systems in the territory comprising what is now the cities of Metro Manila and several towns of the provinces of Rizal andCavite, and charged with the duty: (g) To construct, maintain, and operate such sanitary sewerages as may be necessary for the proper sanitation and other uses of the cities and towns comprising the System; x x x
(3) The LWUA under PD 198 has the power of supervision and control over local water districts. It can prescribe the minimum standards and regulations for the operations of these districts and shall monitor and evaluate local water standards. The LWUA can direct these districts to construct, operate, and furnish facilities and services for the collection, treatment, and disposal of sewerage, waste, and storm water. Additionally, under RA 9275, the LWUA, as attached agency of the DPWH, is tasked with providing sewerage and sanitation facilities, inclusive of the setting up of efficient and safe collection, treatment, and sewage disposal system in the different parts of the country.[19] In relation to the instant petition, the LWUA is mandated to provide sewerage and sanitation facilities in Laguna, Cavite, Bulacan, Pampanga, and Bataan to prevent pollution in the Manila Bay. (4) The Department of Agriculture (DA), pursuant to the Administrative Code of 1987 (EO 292),[20] is designated as the agency tasked to promulgate and enforce all laws and issuances respecting the conservation and proper utilization of agricultural and fishery resources. Furthermore, the DA, under the Philippine Fisheries Code of 1998 (RA 8550), is, in coordination with local government units (LGUs) and other concerned sectors, in charge of establishing a monitoring, control, and surveillance system to ensure that fisheries and aquatic resources in Philippine waters are judiciously utilized and managed on a sustainable basis.[21] Likewise under RA 9275, the DA is charged with coordinating with the PCG and DENR for the enforcement of water quality standards in marine waters.[22] More specifically, its Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR) under Sec. 22(c) of RA 9275 shall primarily be responsible for the prevention and control of water pollution for the development, management, and conservation of the fisheries and aquatic resources. (5) The DPWH, as the engineering and construction arm of the national government, is tasked under EO 292[23] to provide integrated planning, design, and construction services for, among others, flood control and water resource development systems in accordance with national development objectives and approved government plans and specifications. In Metro Manila, however, the MMDA is authorized by Sec. 3(d), RA 7924 to perform metro-wide services relating to flood control and sewerage
management which include the formulation and implementation of policies, standards, programs and projects for an integrated flood control, drainage and sewerage system. On July 9, 2002, a Memorandum of Agreement was entered into between the DPWH and MMDA, whereby MMDA was made the agency primarily responsible for flood control in Metro Manila. For the rest of the country, DPWH shall remain as the implementing agency for flood control services. The mandate of the MMDA and DPWH on flood control and drainage services shall include the removal of structures, constructions, and encroachments built along rivers, waterways, and esteros (drainages) in violation of RA 7279, PD 1067, and other pertinent laws. (6) The PCG, in accordance with Sec. 5(p) of PD 601, or the Revised Coast Guard Law of 1974, and Sec. 6 of PD 979,[24]or the Marine Pollution Decree of 1976, shall have the primary responsibility of enforcing laws, rules, and regulations governing marine pollution within the territorial waters of the Philippines. It shall promulgate its own rules and regulations in accordance with the national rules and policies set by the National Pollution Control Commission upon consultation with the latter for the effective implementation and enforcement of PD 979. It shall, under Sec. 4 of the law, apprehend violators who:
a. discharge, dump x x x harmful substances from or out of any ship, vessel, barge, or any other floating craft, or other man-made structures at sea, by any method, means or manner, into or upon the territorial and inland navigable waters of the Philippines; b. throw, discharge or deposit, dump, or cause, suffer or procure to be thrown, discharged, or deposited either from or out of any ship, barge, or other floating craft or vessel of any kind, or from the shore, wharf, manufacturing establishment, or mill of any kind, any refuse matter of any kind or description whatever other than that flowing from streets and sewers and passing therefrom in a liquid state into tributary of any navigable water from which the same shall float or be washed into such navigable water; and c. deposit x x x material of any kind in any place on the bank of any navigable water or on the bank of any tributary of any navigable water,
where the same shall be liable to be washed into such navigable water, either by ordinary or high tides, or by storms or floods, or otherwise, whereby navigation shall or may be impeded or obstructed or increase the level of pollution of such water.
(7) When RA 6975 or the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG) Act of 1990 was signed into law onDecember 13, 1990, the PNP Maritime Group was tasked to perform all police functions over the Philippine territorial waters and rivers. Under Sec. 86, RA 6975, the police functions of the PCG shall be taken over by the PNP when the latter acquires the capability to perform such functions. Since the PNP Maritime Group has not yet attained the capability to assume and perform the police functions of PCG over marine pollution, the PCG and PNP Maritime Group shall coordinate with regard to the enforcement of laws, rules, and regulations governing marine pollution within the territorial waters of the Philippines. This was made clear in Sec. 124, RA 8550 or the Philippine Fisheries Code of 1998, in which both the PCG and PNP Maritime Group were authorized to enforce said law and other fishery laws, rules, and regulations.[25] (8) In accordance with Sec. 2 of EO 513, the PPA is mandated to establish, develop, regulate, manage and operate a rationalized national port system in support of trade and national development.[26] Moreover, Sec. 6-c of EO 513 states that the PPA has police authority within the
ports administered by it as may be necessary to carry out its powers and functions and attain its purposes and objectives, without prejudice to the exercise of the functions of the Bureau of Customs and other law enforcement bodies within the area. Such police authority shall include the following: xxxx b) To regulate the entry to, exit from, and movement within the port, of persons and vehicles, as well as movement within the port of watercraft.[27]
Lastly, as a member of the International Marine Organization and a signatory to the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from
Ships, as amended by MARPOL 73/78,[28] the Philippines, through the PPA, must ensure the provision of adequate reception facilities at ports and terminals for the reception of sewage from the ships docking in Philippine ports. Thus, the PPA is tasked to adopt such measures as are necessary to prevent the discharge and dumping of solid and liquid wastes and other ship-generated wastes into the Manila Bay waters from vessels docked at ports and apprehend the violators. When the vessels are not docked at ports but within Philippine territorial waters, it is the PCG and PNP Maritime Group that have jurisdiction over said vessels. (9) The MMDA, as earlier indicated, is duty-bound to put up and maintain adequate sanitary landfill and solid waste and liquid disposal system as well as other alternative garbage disposal systems. It is primarily responsible for the implementation and enforcement of the provisions of RA 9003, which would necessary include its penal provisions, within its area of jurisdiction.[29] Among the prohibited acts under Sec. 48, Chapter VI of RA 9003 that are frequently violated are dumping of waste matters in public places, such as roads, canals or esteros, open burning of solid waste, squatting in open dumps and landfills, open dumping, burying of biodegradable or non- biodegradable materials in flood-prone areas, establishment or operation of open dumps as enjoined in RA 9003, and operation of waste management facilities without an environmental compliance certificate. Under Sec. 28 of the Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992 (RA 7279), eviction or demolition may be allowed when persons or entities occupy danger areas such as esteros, railroad tracks, garbage dumps, riverbanks, shorelines, waterways, and other public places such as sidewalks, roads, parks and playgrounds. The MMDA, as lead agency, in coordination with the DPWH, LGUs, and concerned agencies, can dismantle and remove all structures, constructions, and other encroachments built in breach of RA 7279 and other pertinent laws along the rivers, waterways, and esteros in Metro Manila. With respect to rivers, waterways, andesteros in Bulacan, Bataan, Pampanga, Cavite, and Laguna that discharge wastewater directly or eventually into the Manila Bay, the DILG shall direct the concerned LGUs to implement the demolition and removal of such structures, constructions, and other encroachments built in
violation of RA 7279 and other applicable laws in coordination with the DPWH and concerned agencies. (10) The Department of Health (DOH), under Article 76 of PD 1067 (the Water Code), is tasked to promulgate rules and regulations for the establishment of waste disposal areas that affect the source of a water supply or a reservoir for domestic or municipal use. And under Sec. 8 of RA 9275, the DOH, in coordination with the DENR, DPWH, and other concerned agencies, shall formulate guidelines and standards for the collection, treatment, and disposal of sewage and the establishment and operation of a centralized sewage treatment system. In areas not considered as highly urbanized cities, septage or a mix sewerage-septage management system shall be employed. In accordance with Sec. 72[30] of PD 856, the Code of Sanitation of the Philippines, and Sec. 5.1.1[31] of Chapter XVII of its implementing rules, the DOH is also ordered to ensure the regulation and monitoring of the proper disposal of wastes by private sludge companies through the strict enforcement of the requirement to obtain an environmental sanitation clearance of sludge collection treatment and disposal before these companies are issued their environmental sanitation permit. (11) The Department of Education (DepEd), under the Philippine Environment Code (PD 1152), is mandated to integrate subjects on environmental education in its school curricula at all levels.[32] Under Sec. 118 of RA 8550, the DepEd, in collaboration with the DA, Commission on Higher Education, and Philippine Information Agency, shall launch and pursue a nationwide educational campaign to promote the development, management, conservation, and proper use of the environment. Under the Ecological Solid Waste Management Act (RA 9003), on the other hand, it is directed to strengthen the integration of environmental concerns in school curricula at all levels, with an emphasis on waste management principles.[33] (12) The Department of Budget and Management (DBM) is tasked under Sec. 2, Title XVII of the Administrative Code of 1987 to ensure the efficient and sound utilization of government funds and revenues so as to effectively achieve the countrys development objectives.[34]
One of the countrys development objectives is enshrined in RA 9275 or the Philippine Clean Water Act of 2004. This law stresses that the State shall pursue a policy of economic growth in a manner consistent with the protection, preservation, and revival of the quality of our fresh, brackish, and marine waters. It also provides that it is the policy of the government, among others, to streamline processes and procedures in the prevention, control, and abatement of pollution mechanisms for the protection of water resources; to promote environmental strategies and use of appropriate economic instruments and of control mechanisms for the protection of water resources; to formulate a holistic national program of water quality management that recognizes that issues related to this management cannot be separated from concerns about water sources and ecological protection, water supply, public health, and quality of life; and to provide a comprehensive management program for water pollution focusing on pollution prevention. Thus, the DBM shall then endeavor to provide an adequate budget to attain the noble objectives of RA 9275 in line with the countrys development objectives. All told, the aforementioned enabling laws and issuances are in themselves clear, categorical, and complete as to what are the obligations and mandate of each agency/petitioner under the law. We need not belabor the issue that their tasks include the cleanup of the Manila Bay. Now, as to the crux of the petition. Do Secs. 17 and 20 of the Environment Code encompass the cleanup of water pollution in general, not just specific pollution incidents? Secs. 17 and 20 of the Environment Code Include Cleaning in General The disputed sections are quoted as follows:
Section 17. Upgrading of Water Quality.Where the quality of water has deteriorated to a degree where its state will adversely affect its best usage, the government agencies concerned shall take such measures as may be necessary to upgrade the quality of such water to meet the prescribed water quality standards.
When the Clean Water Act (RA 9275) took effect, its Sec. 16 on the subject, Cleanup Operations, amended the counterpart provision (Sec. 20) of the Environment Code (PD 1152). Sec. 17 of PD 1152 continues, however, to be operational.
As may be noted, the amendment to Sec. 20 of the Environment Code is more apparent than real since the amendment, insofar as it is relevant to this case, merely consists in the designation of the DENR as lead agency in the cleanup operations. Petitioners contend at every turn that Secs. 17 and 20 of the Environment Code concern themselves only with the matter of cleaning up in specific pollution incidents, as opposed to cleanup in general. They aver that the twin provisions
would have to be read alongside the succeeding Sec. 62(g) and (h), which defines the terms cleanup operations and accidental spills, as follows:
g. Clean-up Operations [refer] to activities conducted in removing the discharged or spilled in water to restore it to pre-spillcondition. h. pollutants
Accidental Spills [refer] to spills of oil or other hazardous substances in water that result from accidents such as collisions and groundings.
Petitioners proffer the argument that Secs. 17 and 20 of PD 1152 merely direct the government agencies concerned to undertake containment, removal, and cleaning operations of a specific polluted portion or portions of the body of water concerned. They maintain that the application of said Sec. 20 is limited only to water pollution incidents, which are situations that presuppose the occurrence of specific, isolated pollution events requiring the corresponding containment, removal, and cleaning operations. Pushing the point further, they argue that the aforequoted Sec. 62(g) requires cleanup operations to restore the body of water to pre-spill condition, which means that there must have been a specific incident of either intentional or accidental spillage of oil or other hazardous substances, as mentioned in Sec. 62(h). As a counterpoint, respondents argue that petitioners erroneously read Sec. 62(g) as delimiting the application of Sec. 20 to the containment, removal, and cleanup operations for accidental spills only. Contrary to petitioners posture, respondents assert that Sec. 62(g), in fact, even expanded the coverage of Sec. 20. Respondents explain that without its Sec. 62(g), PD 1152 may have indeed covered only pollution accumulating from the day-to-day operations of businesses around the Manila Bay and other sources of pollution that slowly accumulated in the bay. Respondents, however, emphasize that Sec. 62(g), far from being a delimiting provision, in fact even enlarged the operational scope of Sec. 20, by including accidental spills as among the water pollution incidents contemplated in Sec. 17 in relation to Sec. 20 of PD 1152. To respondents, petitioners parochial view on environmental issues, coupled with their narrow reading of their respective mandated roles, has contributed to the worsening water quality of the Manila Bay. Assuming, respondents assert, that petitioners are correct in saying that the cleanup coverage
of Sec. 20 of PD 1152 is constricted by the definition of the phrase cleanup operations embodied in Sec. 62(g), Sec. 17 is not hobbled by such limiting definition. As pointed out, the phrases cleanup operations and accidental spills do not appear in said Sec. 17, not even in the chapter where said section is found. Respondents are correct. For one thing, said Sec. 17 does not in any way state that the government agencies concerned ought to confine themselves to the containment, removal, and cleaning operations when a specific pollution incident occurs. On the contrary, Sec. 17 requires them to act even in the absence of a specific pollution incident, as long as water quality has deteriorated to a degree where its state will adversely affect its best usage. This section, to stress, commands concerned government agencies, when appropriate, to take such measures as may be necessary to meet the prescribed water quality standards. In fine, the underlying duty to upgrade the quality of water is not conditional on the occurrence of any pollution incident. For another, a perusal of Sec. 20 of the Environment Code, as couched, indicates that it is properly applicable to a specific situation in which the pollution is caused by polluters who fail to clean up the mess they left behind. In such instance, the concerned government agencies shall undertake the cleanup work for the polluters account. Petitioners assertion, that they have to perform cleanup operations in the Manila Bay only when there is a water pollution incident and the erring polluters do not undertake the containment, removal, and cleanup operations, is quite off mark. As earlier discussed, the complementary Sec. 17 of the Environment Code comes into play and the specific duties of the agencies to clean up come in even if there are no pollution incidents staring at them. Petitioners, thus, cannot plausibly invoke and hide behind Sec. 20 of PD 1152 or Sec. 16 of RA 9275 on the pretext that their cleanup mandate depends on the happening of a specific pollution incident. In this regard, what the CA said with respect to the impasse over Secs. 17 and 20 of PD 1152 is at once valid as it is practical. The appellate court wrote: PD 1152 aims to introduce a comprehensive program of environmental protection and management. This is better served by making Secs. 17 & 20 of general application rather than limiting them to specific pollution incidents.[35]
Granting arguendo that petitioners position thus described vis--vis the implementation of Sec. 20 is correct, they seem to have overlooked the fact that the pollution of the Manila Bay is of such magnitude and scope that it is well-nigh impossible to draw the line between a specific and a general pollution incident. And such impossibility extends to pinpointing with reasonable certainty who the polluters are. We note that Sec. 20 of PD 1152 mentions water pollution incidents which may be caused by polluters in the waters of the Manila Bay itself or by polluters in adjoining lands and in water bodies or waterways that empty into the bay. Sec. 16 of RA 9275, on the other hand, specifically adverts to any person who causes pollution in or pollutes water bodies, which may refer to an individual or an establishment that pollutes the land mass near the Manila Bay or the waterways, such that the contaminants eventually end up in the bay. In this situation, the water pollution incidents are so numerous and involve nameless and faceless polluters that they can validly be categorized as beyond the specific pollution incident level. Not to be ignored of course is the reality that the government agencies concerned are so undermanned that it would be almost impossible to apprehend the numerous polluters of the Manila Bay. It may perhaps not be amiss to say that the apprehension, if any, of the Manila Bay polluters has been few and far between. Hence, practically nobody has been required to contain, remove, or clean up a given water pollution incident. In this kind of setting, it behooves the Government to step in and undertake cleanup operations. Thus, Sec. 16 of RA 9275, previously Sec. 20 of PD 1152, covers for all intents and purposes a general cleanup situation. The cleanup and/or restoration of the Manila Bay is only an aspect and the initial stage of the long-term solution. The preservation of the water quality of the bay after the rehabilitation process is as important as the cleaning phase. It is imperative then that the wastes and contaminants found in the rivers, inland bays, and other bodies of water be stopped from reaching the ManilaBay. Otherwise, any cleanup effort would just be a futile, cosmetic exercise, for, in no time at all, the Manila Bay water quality would again deteriorate below the ideal minimum standards set by PD 1152, RA 9275, and other relevant laws. It thus behooves the Court to put the heads of the petitioner-department-agencies and the bureaus and offices under them on continuing notice about, and to enjoin them to perform, their mandates and duties towards cleaning up the Manila Bay and preserving the
quality of its water to the ideal level. Under what other judicial discipline describes as continuing mandamus,[36] the Court may, under extraordinary circumstances, issue directives with the end in view of ensuring that its decision would not be set to naught by administrative inaction or indifference. In India, the doctrine of continuing mandamus was used to enforce directives of the court to clean up the length of the Ganges River from industrial and municipal pollution.[37] The Court can take judicial notice of the presence of shanties and other unauthorized structures which do not have septic tanks along the Pasig-MarikinaSan Juan Rivers, the National Capital Region (NCR) (Paraaque-Zapote, Las Pias) Rivers, the Navotas-Malabon-Tullahan-Tenejeros Rivers, the MeycuayanMarilao-Obando (Bulacan) Rivers, the Talisay (Bataan) River, the Imus (Cavite) River, the Laguna De Bay, and other minor rivers and connecting waterways, river banks, and esteros which discharge their waters, with all the accompanying filth, dirt, and garbage, into the major rivers and eventually the Manila Bay. If there is one factor responsible for the pollution of the major river systems and the Manila Bay, these unauthorized structures would be on top of the list. And if the issue of illegal or unauthorized structures is not seriously addressed with sustained resolve, then practically all efforts to cleanse these important bodies of water would be for naught. The DENR Secretary said as much.[38] Giving urgent dimension to the necessity of removing these illegal structures is Art. 51 of PD 1067 or the Water Code,[39]which prohibits the building of structures within a given length along banks of rivers and other waterways. Art. 51 reads:
The banks of rivers and streams and the shores of the seas and lakes throughout their entire length and within a zone of three (3) meters in urban areas, twenty (20) meters in agricultural areas and forty (40) meters in forest areas, along their margins, are subject to the easement of public use in the interest of recreation, navigation, floatage, fishing and salvage. No person shall be allowed to stay in this zone longer than what is necessary for recreation, navigation, floatage, fishing or salvage or to build structures of any kind. (Emphasis added.)
Judicial notice may likewise be taken of factories and other industrial establishments standing along or near the banks of thePasig River, other major rivers, and connecting waterways. But while they may not be treated as unauthorized constructions, some of these establishments undoubtedly contribute to the pollution of the Pasig River and waterways. The DILG and the concerned LGUs, have, accordingly, the duty to see to it that non-complying industrial establishments set up, within a reasonable period, the necessary waste water treatment facilities and infrastructure to prevent their industrial discharge, including their sewage waters, from flowing into the Pasig River, other major rivers, and connecting waterways. After such period, non-complying establishments shall be shut down or asked to transfer their operations. At this juncture, and if only to dramatize the urgency of the need for petitioners-agencies to comply with their statutory tasks, we cite the Asian Development Bank-commissioned study on the garbage problem in Metro Manila, the results of which are embodied in the The Garbage Book. As there reported, the garbage crisis in the metropolitan area is as alarming as it is shocking. Some highlights of the report:
1. As early as 2003, three land-filled dumpsites in Metro Manila the Payatas, Catmon and Rodriquez dumpsites - generate an alarming quantity of lead and leachate or liquid run-off. Leachate are toxic liquids that flow along the surface and seep into the earth and poison the surface and groundwater that are used for drinking, aquatic life, and the environment. 2. The high level of fecal coliform confirms the presence of a large amount of human waste in the dump sites and surrounding areas, which is presumably generated by households that lack alternatives to sanitation. To say that Manila Bay needs rehabilitation is an understatement. 3. Most of the deadly leachate, lead and other dangerous contaminants and possibly strains of pathogens seeps untreated into ground water and runs into the Marikina and Pasig River systems and Manila Bay.[40]
Given the above perspective, sufficient sanitary landfills should now more than ever be established as prescribed by the Ecological Solid Waste Management Act (RA 9003). Particular note should be taken of the blatant violations by some LGUs and possibly the MMDA of Sec. 37, reproduced below: Sec. 37. Prohibition against the Use of Open Dumps for Solid Waste.No open dumps shall be established and operated, nor any practice or disposal of solid waste by any person, including LGUs which [constitute] the use of open dumps for solid waste, be allowed after the effectivity of this Act: Provided, further that no controlled dumps shall be allowed (5) years following the effectivity of this Act. (Emphasis added.)
RA 9003 took effect on February 15, 2001 and the adverted grace period of five (5) years which ended on February 21, 2006has come and gone, but no single sanitary landfill which strictly complies with the prescribed standards under RA 9003 has yet been set up. In addition, there are rampant and repeated violations of Sec. 48 of RA 9003, like littering, dumping of waste matters in roads, canals, esteros, and other public places, operation of open dumps, open burning of solid waste, and the like. Some sludge companies which do not have proper disposal facilities simply discharge sludge into the Metro Manila sewerage system that ends up in the Manila Bay. Equally unabated are violations of Sec. 27 of RA 9275, which enjoins the pollution of water bodies, groundwater pollution, disposal of infectious wastes from vessels, and unauthorized transport or dumping into sea waters of sewage or solid waste and of Secs. 4 and 102 of RA 8550 which proscribes the introduction by human or machine of substances to the aquatic environment including dumping/disposal of waste and other marine litters, discharge of petroleum or residual products of petroleum of carbonaceous materials/substances [and other] radioactive, noxious or harmful liquid, gaseous or solid substances, from any water, land or air transport or other human-made structure. In the light of the ongoing environmental degradation, the Court wishes to emphasize the extreme necessity for all concerned executive departments and agencies to immediately act and discharge their respective official duties and obligations. Indeed, time is of the essence; hence, there is a need to set timetables
for the performance and completion of the tasks, some of them as defined for them by law and the nature of their respective offices and mandates. The importance of the Manila Bay as a sea resource, playground, and as a historical landmark cannot be over-emphasized. It is not yet too late in the day to restore the Manila Bay to its former splendor and bring back the plants and sea life that once thrived in its blue waters. But the tasks ahead, daunting as they may be, could only be accomplished if those mandated, with the help and cooperation of all civic-minded individuals, would put their minds to these tasks and take responsibility. This means that the State, through petitioners, has to take the lead in the preservation and protection of the Manila Bay. The era of delays, procrastination, and ad hoc measures is over. Petitioners must transcend their limitations, real or imaginary, and buckle down to work before the problem at hand becomes unmanageable. Thus, we must reiterate that different government agencies and instrumentalities cannot shirk from their mandates; they must perform their basic functions in cleaning up and rehabilitating the Manila Bay. We are disturbed by petitioners hiding behind two untenable claims: (1) that there ought to be a specific pollution incident before they are required to act; and (2) that the cleanup of the bay is a discretionary duty. RA 9003 is a sweeping piece of legislation enacted to radically transform and improve waste management. It implements Sec. 16, Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, which explicitly provides that the State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature. So it was that in Oposa v. Factoran, Jr. the Court stated that the right to a balanced and healthful ecology need not even be written in the Constitution for it is assumed, like other civil and political rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, to exist from the inception of mankind and it is an issue of transcendental importance with intergenerational implications.[41] Even assuming the absence of a categorical legal provision specifically prodding petitioners to clean up the bay, they and the men and women representing them cannot escape their obligation to future generations of Filipinos to keep the waters of the Manila Bay clean and clear as
humanly as possible. Anything less would be a betrayal of the trust reposed in them. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The September 28, 2005 Decision of the CA in CA-G.R. CV No. 76528 and SP No. 74944 and the September 13, 2002 Decision of the RTC in Civil Case No. 1851-99 are AFFIRMED but withMODIFICATIONS in view of subsequent developments or supervening events in the case. The fallo of the RTC Decision shall now read:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the abovenamed defendant-government agencies to clean up, rehabilitate, and preserve Manila Bay, and restore and maintain its waters to SB level (Class B sea waters per Water Classification Tables under DENR Administrative Order No. 34 [1990]) to make them fit for swimming, skin-diving, and other forms of contact recreation.
In particular: (1) Pursuant to Sec. 4 of EO 192, assigning the DENR as the primary agency responsible for the conservation, management, development, and proper use of the countrys environment and natural resources, and Sec. 19 of RA 9275, designating the DENR as the primary government agency responsible for its enforcement and implementation, the DENR is directed to fully implement itsOperational Plan for the Manila Bay Coastal Strategy for the rehabilitation, restoration, and conservation of the Manila Bay at the earliest possible time. It is ordered to call regular coordination meetings with concerned government departments and agencies to ensure the successful implementation of the aforesaid plan of action in accordance with its indicated completion schedules. (2) Pursuant to Title XII (Local Government) of the Administrative Code of 1987 and Sec. 25 of the Local Government Code of 1991,[42] the DILG, in exercising the Presidents power of general supervision and its duty to promulgate guidelines in establishing waste management programs under Sec. 43 of the Philippine Environment Code (PD 1152), shall direct all LGUs in Metro Manila, Rizal, Laguna, Cavite, Bulacan, Pampanga, and Bataan to inspect all factories, commercial establishments, and private homes along the banks of the major river
systems in their respective areas of jurisdiction, such as but not limited to the Pasig-Marikina-San Juan Rivers, the NCR (Paraaque-Zapote, Las Pias) Rivers, the Navotas-Malabon-Tullahan-Tenejeros Rivers, the Meycauayan-MarilaoObando (Bulacan) Rivers, the Talisay (Bataan) River, the Imus (Cavite) River, the Laguna De Bay, and other minor rivers and waterways that eventually discharge water into the Manila Bay; and the lands abutting the bay, to determine whether they have wastewater treatment facilities or hygienic septic tanks as prescribed by existing laws, ordinances, and rules and regulations. If none be found, these LGUs shall be ordered to require non-complying establishments and homes to set up said facilities or septic tanks within a reasonable time to prevent industrial wastes, sewage water, and human wastes from flowing into these rivers, waterways, esteros, and the Manila Bay, under pain of closure or imposition of fines and other sanctions. (3) As mandated by Sec. 8 of RA 9275,[43] the MWSS is directed to provide, install, operate, and maintain the necessary adequate waste water treatment facilities in Metro Manila, Rizal, and Cavite where needed at the earliest possible time. (4) Pursuant to RA 9275,[44] the LWUA, through the local water districts and in coordination with the DENR, is ordered to provide, install, operate, and maintain sewerage and sanitation facilities and the efficient and safe collection, treatment, and disposal of sewage in the provinces of Laguna, Cavite, Bulacan, Pampanga, and Bataan where needed at the earliest possible time. (5) Pursuant to Sec. 65 of RA 8550,[45] the DA, through the BFAR, is ordered to improve and restore the marine life of theManila Bay. It is also directed to assist the LGUs in Metro Manila, Rizal, Cavite, Laguna, Bulacan, Pampanga, and Bataan in developing, using recognized methods, the fisheries and aquatic resources in the Manila Bay. (6) The PCG, pursuant to Secs. 4 and 6 of PD 979, and the PNP Maritime Group, in accordance with Sec. 124 of RA 8550, in coordination with each other, shall apprehend violators of PD 979, RA 8550, and other existing laws and regulations designed to prevent marine pollution in the Manila Bay.
(7) Pursuant to Secs. 2 and 6-c of EO 513[46] and the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, the PPA is ordered to immediately adopt such measures to prevent the discharge and dumping of solid and liquid wastes and other ship-generated wastes into the Manila Bay waters from vessels docked at ports and apprehend the violators. (8) The MMDA, as the lead agency and implementor of programs and projects for flood control projects and drainage services in Metro Manila, in coordination with the DPWH, DILG, affected LGUs, PNP Maritime Group, Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council (HUDCC), and other agencies, shall dismantle and remove all structures, constructions, and other encroachments established or built in violation of RA 7279, and other applicable laws along the Pasig-Marikina-San Juan Rivers, the NCR (Paraaque-Zapote, Las Pias) Rivers, the Navotas-Malabon-Tullahan-Tenejeros Rivers, and connecting waterways and esteros in Metro Manila. The DPWH, as the principal implementor of programs and projects for flood control services in the rest of the country more particularly in Bulacan, Bataan, Pampanga, Cavite, and Laguna, in coordination with the DILG, affected LGUs, PNP Maritime Group, HUDCC, and other concerned government agencies, shall remove and demolish all structures, constructions, and other encroachments built in breach of RA 7279 and other applicable laws along the Meycauayan-Marilao-Obando (Bulacan) Rivers, the Talisay (Bataan) River, the Imus (Cavite) River, the Laguna De Bay, and other rivers, connecting waterways, and esteros that discharge wastewater into the Manila Bay. In addition, the MMDA is ordered to establish, operate, and maintain a sanitary landfill, as prescribed by RA 9003, within a period of one (1) year from finality of this Decision. On matters within its territorial jurisdiction and in connection with the discharge of its duties on the maintenance of sanitary landfills and like undertakings, it is also ordered to cause the apprehension and filing of the appropriate criminal cases against violators of the respective penal provisions of RA 9003,[47] Sec. 27 of RA 9275 (the Clean Water Act), and other existing laws on pollution. (9) The DOH shall, as directed by Art. 76 of PD 1067 and Sec. 8 of RA 9275, within one (1) year from finality of this Decision, determine if all licensed
septic and sludge companies have the proper facilities for the treatment and disposal of fecal sludge and sewage coming from septic tanks. The DOH shall give the companies, if found to be non-complying, a reasonable time within which to set up the necessary facilities under pain of cancellation of its environmental sanitation clearance. (10) Pursuant to Sec. 53 of PD 1152,[48] Sec. 118 of RA 8550, and Sec. 56 of RA 9003,[49] the DepEd shall integrate lessons on pollution prevention, waste management, environmental protection, and like subjects in the school curricula of all levels to inculcate in the minds and hearts of students and, through them, their parents and friends, the importance of their duty toward achieving and maintaining a balanced and healthful ecosystem in the Manila Bay and the entire Philippine archipelago. (11) The DBM shall consider incorporating an adequate budget in the General Appropriations Act of 2010 and succeeding years to cover the expenses relating to the cleanup, restoration, and preservation of the water quality of the Manila Bay, in line with the countrys development objective to attain economic growth in a manner consistent with the protection, preservation, and revival of our marine waters. (12) The heads of petitioners-agencies MMDA, DENR, DepEd, DOH, DA, DPWH, DBM, PCG, PNP Maritime Group, DILG, and also of MWSS, LWUA, and PPA, in line with the principle of continuing mandamus, shall, from finality of this Decision, each submit to the Court a quarterly progressive report of the activities undertaken in accordance with this Decision. No costs. SO ORDERED.
EN BANC [G.R. Nos. 171947-48, February 15, 2011] METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS,[1] DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS, DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, PHILIPPINE COAST GUARD, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE MARITIME GROUP, AND
(4) Pursuant to RA 9275, the LWUA, through the local water districts and in coordination with the DENR, is ordered to provide, install, operate, and maintain sewerage and sanitation facilities and the efficient and safe collection, treatment, and disposal of sewage in the provinces of Laguna, Cavite, Bulacan, Pampanga, and Bataan where needed at the earliest possible time. (5) Pursuant to Sec. 65 of RA 8550, the DA, through the BFAR, is ordered to improve and restore the marine life of the Manila Bay. It is also directed to assist the LGUs in Metro Manila, Rizal, Cavite, Laguna, Bulacan, Pampanga, and Bataan in developing, using recognized methods, the fisheries and aquatic resources in the Manila Bay. (6) The PCG, pursuant to Secs. 4 and 6 of PD 979, and the PNP Maritime Group, in accordance with Sec. 124 of RA 8550, in coordination with each other, shall apprehend violators of PD 979, RA 8550, and other existing laws and regulations designed to prevent marine pollution in the Manila Bay. (7) Pursuant to Secs. 2 and 6-c of EO 513 and the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, the PPA is ordered to immediately adopt such measures to prevent the discharge and dumping of solid and liquid wastes and other ship-generated wastes into the Manila Bay waters from vessels docked at ports and apprehend the violators. (8) The MMDA, as the lead agency and implementor of programs and projects for flood control projects and drainage services in Metro Manila, in coordination with the DPWH, DILG, affected LGUs, PNP Maritime Group, Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council (HUDCC), and other agencies, shall dismantle and remove all structures, constructions, and other encroachments established or built in violation of RA 7279, and other applicable laws along the Pasig-Marikina-San Juan Rivers, the NCR (Paraaque-Zapote, Las Pias) Rivers, the Navotas-Malabon-Tullahan-Tenejeros Rivers, and connecting waterways and esteros in Metro Manila. The DPWH, as the principal implementor of programs and projects for flood control services in the rest of the country more particularly in Bulacan, Bataan, Pampanga, Cavite, and Laguna, in coordination with the DILG, affected LGUs, PNP Maritime Group, HUDCC, and other concerned government agencies, shall remove and demolish all structures, constructions, and other encroachments built in breach of RA 7279 and other applicable laws along the Meycauayan-Marilao-Obando (Bulacan) Rivers, the Talisay (Bataan) River, the Imus (Cavite) River, the Laguna De Bay, and other rivers, connecting waterways, and esteros that discharge wastewater into the Manila Bay. In addition, the MMDA is ordered to establish, operate, and maintain a sanitary landfill, as prescribed by RA 9003, within a period of one (1) year from finality of this Decision. On matters within its territorial jurisdiction and in connection with the discharge of its duties on the maintenance of sanitary landfills and like undertakings, it is also ordered to cause the apprehension and filing of the appropriate criminal cases against violators of the respective penal provisions of RA 9003, Sec. 27 of RA 9275 (the Clean Water Act), and other existing laws on pollution. (9) The DOH shall, as directed by Art. 76 of PD 1067 and Sec. 8 of RA 9275, within one (1) year from finality of this Decision, determine if all licensed septic and sludge companies have the proper facilities for the treatment and disposal of fecal sludge and sewage coming from septic tanks. The DOH shall give the companies, if found to be non-complying, a reasonable time within which to set up the necessary facilities under pain of cancellation of its environmental sanitation clearance. (10) Pursuant to Sec. 53 of PD 1152, Sec. 118 of RA 8550, and Sec. 56 of RA 9003, the DepEd shall integrate lessons on pollution prevention, waste management, environmental protection, and like subjects in the school curricula of all levels to inculcate in the minds and hearts of students and, through them, their parents and friends, the importance of their duty toward achieving and maintaining a balanced and healthful ecosystem in the Manila Bay and the entire Philippine archipelago. (11) The DBM shall consider incorporating an adequate budget in the General Appropriations Act of 2010
Region IV-A 8. Kalayaan (Longos), Laguna 9. Brgy. Sto. Nino, San Pablo City, Laguna 10. Brgy. San Antonio (Pilotage SLF), San Pedro, Laguna 11. Morong, Rizal