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SSPA Research Report No.
120
2002
System risk in dangerous goods transport

Risks in the transport chain and assessment of risk control measures
Joanne Ellis SSPA Sweden AB Gteborg
SSPA Research Report No. 120
2002

Risks in the transport chain and assessment of risk control measures
Joanne Ellis
SSPA Sweden AB Box 24001 SE-400 22 Gteborg, Sweden Telephone +46-31-7729000 Telefax +46-31-7729124 E-mail postmaster@sspa.se www.sspa.se

Risk in the transport chain and assessment of risk control measures by Joanne Ellis SSPA Research Report No. 120, 2002 ISBN 91-86532-33-2 ISSN 0282-5805
Published and distributed by: SSPA Sweden AB Box 24001 SE-400 22 Gteborg, Sweden Telephone Telefax E-mail www.sspa.se +46-31-7729000 +46-31-7729124 postmaster@sspa.se
FOREWORD
This report was produced as part of a project focussed on risks in the dangerous goods transportation system. This report is the third produced for the project, and it provides an analysis of risks along the dangerous goods transport chain, and discusses various risk reduction measures for the transport of dangerous goods. The advice and participation of the projects reference group was greatly appreciated. This group consisted of representatives from the Swedish National Railway Administration (Banverket), the Swedish National Road Administration (Vgverket), the Swedish Rescue Services Agency (Rddningsverket), the Swedish Maritime Administration (Sjfartsverket), the Swedish National Testing and Research Institute (SP), Vinnova, Schenker AG c/o BTL AB, and Chalmers University of Technology. Stockholm Port is also acknowledged for participating in the case study. The financial support of this phase of the project was provided by Rddningsverket, Banverket, and Vgverket. Their support is gratefully acknowledged. Gteborg, February 2002 Joanne Ellis
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SSPA Research Report No. 120 Author: Joanne Ellis
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
FOREWORD..................................................................................................................... 1 SAMMANFATTNING ..................................................................................................... 5 SUMMARY ....................................................................................................................... 7 1 2 3 3.1 3.1.1 3.1.2 3.2 3.2.1 3.2.2 3.2.3 3.3 4 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.4.1 4.4.2 4.5 4.6 5 5.1 5.1.1 5.1.2 5.1.3 5.2 5.2.1 5.2.2 5.3 5.4 6 6.1 6.2 6.3 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................. 9 METHODOLOGY .......................................................................................... 10 MODELLING RISK IN A DANGEROUS GOODS TRANSPORT CHAIN11 BACKGROUND .................................................................................................... 12 Transport system modelled as a chain with links and nodes ............................. 12 Accidents and incidents associated with various activities along the transport chain................................................................................................................... 13 MODEL OF RISK IN A MULTI-MODAL TRANSPORT CHAIN ................................... 15 Transport links risk components..................................................................... 17 Transport nodes risk components ................................................................... 18 Difficulties with developing a combined link and node quantitative risk model19 PHYSICAL FLOW OF INFORMATION AND ROLE IN GUIDANCE OF RISK REDUCTION ACTIONS ............................................................................................................. 20 CASE STUDY STOCKHOLM PORT ....................................................... 23 CASE STUDY DATA COLLECTION AND METHODOLOGY...................................... 23 DANGEROUS GOODS ACCIDENTS AND INCIDENTS.............................................. 24 DANGEROUS GOODS MOVEMENT AT STOCKHOLM PORT ................................... 25 STOCKHOLM PORT DANGEROUS GOODS DATABASE .......................................... 27 Dangerous goods flows at Stockholm Port........................................................ 28 Limitations and Quality Investigation of the Current Database System............ 30 HAZARDS AND RISKS ......................................................................................... 31 SUMMARY COMMENTS AND RELEVANCE TO OTHER TRANSPORT NODES .......... 33 RISK REDUCTION AND MANAGEMENT TECHNIQUES.................... 35 TYPES OF RISK REDUCTION MEASURES .............................................................. 35 Risk reduction for road transport ....................................................................... 39 Risk reduction for rail........................................................................................ 46 Emergency Response......................................................................................... 48 HUMAN ERROR .................................................................................................. 49 Education and Training...................................................................................... 49 Safety Culture .................................................................................................... 51 INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS ............................................................. 53 SUMMARY OF RISK REDUCTION TECHNIQUES .................................................... 53 THE REGULATORY SYSTEM AND PRINCIPLES FOR SETTING REGULATIONS.............................................................................................. 55 PRINCIPLES BEHIND REGULATIONS .................................................................... 57 HARMONISATION ............................................................................................... 58 RISK-BASED APPROACH TO SETTING REGULATIONS .......................................... 59
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6.4 6.5 6.5.1 6.5.2 6.5.3 7 8 8.1 8.1.1 8.1.2 8.1.3 8.2 8.3 9 10
TECHNICAL, ADMINISTRATIVE, AND OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH AND SAFETY ASPECTS OF REGULATIONS .................................................................................60 COMPLIANCE ......................................................................................................60 Road Transport...................................................................................................61 Railway ..............................................................................................................64 Marine Transport................................................................................................65 SECURITY MEASURES FOR DANGEROUS GOODS TRANSPORT ...67 ASSESSING RISK CONTROL MEASURES...............................................73 ASSESSING EFFECTIVENESS ................................................................................73 Subjective methods ............................................................................................73 Quantitative estimates of effectiveness ..............................................................75 Assessment of reduction measures - summary...................................................76 IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES ...................................................................................76 COSTS AND BENEFITS .........................................................................................77 CONCLUSIONS...............................................................................................83 REFERENCES .................................................................................................85
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SAMMANFATTNING
Alla lnkar i transportkedjan fr farligt gods r frenade med risker, nr godset r p vg mellan tv punkter likavl som nr det omlastas i en terminal eller hamn. Transport av farligt gods r viktigt i dagens industrialiserade samhlle men det r ocks viktigt att minska de potentiella skadeeffekterna fr allmnheten, miljn och infrastrukturen genom effektiva riskreducerande tgrder. Olycks- och incidentorsaker i transportnoder ssom terminaler eller hamnar skiljer sig frn olyckor nr godset r p vg d kollisioner och andra olyckstyper kan leda till stora utslpp av farliga mnen. Transportnoderna blir allt viktigare i takt med att transporterna i allt hgre grad blir intermodala. Riskfaktorerna i transportnoderna br vrderas som en del av transportkedjan men de krver annan metodik. De riskfaktorer som anvnds fr att uppskatta sannolikheter fr incidenter nr godset r p vg omfattar typ och kondition av lastbrare/fordon/fartyg, transportsystem, infrastruktur, volymflden och allmnna olycksfrekvenser (fr alla typer av fordon). Uppskattning av mjliga konsekvenser baseras p befolkningstthet, nrhet till bebyggelse och miljns knslighet. Lastnings- och lossningsaktiviteter, hantering och informationstillgng kan pverka sannolikheten fr olyckor i transportnoder. Flera andra, icke kvantifierbara, faktorer pverkar ocks riskerna under hela transportkedjan. Exempelvis trning, rddningsberedskap och skerhetskultur inom berrda organisationer och andra tgrder fr att undvika fel orsakade av mnskliga faktorn. En informationsbas om dessa faktorers betydelse mste utvecklas fr att man skall kunna beakta dem i kvantitativa riskmodeller. Informationsfldet r viktigt i transportnoderna fr att styra frflyttning och hantering av godset men ocks fr att vgleda rddningspersonal i hndelse av en olycka. En fallstudie illustrerade ngra av problemen med informationsfldet i transportnoder. Inspektionsresultat frn jrnvgs- och fartygstransport visade ocks p problem med farligt godsdokumentation. Automatiserade informationsrutiner och elektroniska rapporteringsformat erbjuder goda mjligheter att minska denna typ av brister. Riskreducerande tgrder kan antingen vara preventiva, fr att minska sannolikheten fr en olycka, eller konsekvensreducerande fr att mildra skadorna av en olycka. Den riskreducerande potentialen fr tgrder som direkt kan tillmpas p olika lnkar i transportkedjan, ssom infrastrukturfrbttringar fr att generellt minska olycksrisker, omlggning av rutter eller skyddsanordningar lngs rutten/banan fr att minska konsekvenserna av en olycka, kan kvantifieras med hjlp av riskanalytiska verktyg och metoder. Effektiviteten av mjuka riskreducerande tgrder med en bredare verkan lngs hela transportkedjan, ssom trning, strkt skerhetskultur och bttre 5
informationshanteringsrutiner kan i dagslget dock endast vrderas i subjektiva termer eftersom de inte ingr i de gngse riskkvantifierande verktygen. Risker fr sabotage och avsiktliga attacker mot farligt godstransporter hanteras genom ledningsrutiner, anvisningar/freskrifter, strikt kontroll vid anlggningar och under transport. Kemikaliers farlighetsklassificering och potentiell exponering av mnniskor kan nyttjas som underlag fr prioritering och val av lmpliga skerhetstgrder fr srskilt knsliga farligt godstransporter. Freskrifter om farligt godstransporter har utvecklats fr att frebygga skador p mnniskors hlsa, egendom och p miljn. Reglerna fr vg, jrnvg och flyg har nyligen reviderats utifrn FNs generella modeller och r numera mera harmoniserade. Inspektionsresultat visar dock att det fortfarande finns problem med regelefterlevnaden. Det kan vidare pvisas att trningsinsatser bidrar till frbttrad regelefterlevnad. Kostnad-nytta-analyser av alternativa riskreducerande tgrder kan ge vgledning om hur begrnsade resurser bst kan nyttjas fr mest effektiva tgrder. Det r dock fortfarande svrt att vrdera vissa lovande typer av riskreducerande tgrder. tgrder och metoder riktade mot mnskliga faktorn och baserade p bttre skerhetstrning i hela transportkedjan kan nnu bara vrderas subjektivt eftersom data och metoder fr kvantitativ bedmning fortfarande saknas.
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SUMMARY
Risks are present throughout the dangerous goods transport chain, whether the goods are moving between two points or are being transferred to another mode of transport at a terminal or port. The transport of dangerous goods is important for todays industrialised society, but it is also important to reduce the potential impacts on the public, the environment, and infrastructure, through the effective use of risk reduction measures. Accident/incident causes at transport nodes such as terminals or ports differ from the en-route portion of the transport chain where collisions and major accident events can initiate the release of dangerous goods. Transport nodes are becoming more important due to increased intermodal transport. The risk factors at nodes should be assessed as part of the transport chain, but require different techniques. Risk factors used to estimate probabilities for incidents while dangerous goods are enroute include vehicle/vessel type and condition, transport system infrastructure, flow volumes, and general accident rates (for all types of vehicles). For consequences, factors include population and environmental conditions. Loading and unloading activities, handling, and information availability can influence the probability of accidents at transport nodes. A number of other factors that cannot be quantified are considered to have an influence on risk throughout the transport chain. These include training, emergency response services, safety culture within organisations, and other measures to reduce human error. A base of information on the effects of these factors on risk needs to be developed before they can be included in a quantitative risk model. Information flow is important at transport nodes, as it can be used to guide activities related to the movement and handling of the goods, and is important for emergency response personnel in the event of an accident. A case study illustrated some of the problems with information flow at nodes. Information from compliance inspections for rail and ship transport also showed problems with errors in dangerous goods transport documents. The use of automated information procedures and electronic forms of information has potential for reducing these types of errors. Risk reduction measures can be either preventive, to reduce the probability of accidents, or mitigative, to reduce consequences in the event of an accident. The risk reduction potential of measures that can be physically applied to parts of the transport chain, such as 7
infrastructure improvements to reduce overall accident rates, changes to routes, and protective structures along transport routes to reduce consequences, can be quantified using existing risk analysis tools. The effectiveness of risk reduction measures that have broader effects throughout the transport chain, such as training, improvement of safety culture, and improved information handling procedures are currently assessed subjectively because they are not included in existing risk quantification tools. Types of security measures for reducing risk of sabotage and intentional attacks using dangerous goods during transport include management and personnel activities, improved security at facilities and en-route security. The chemical hazard and the potential population exposure of specific dangerous goods shipments can be used to prioritise security risk. Regulations for the transport of dangerous goods have been developed to prevent harm to people, property, and the environment. Regulations for road, rail, maritime transport, and air transport have recently been revised based on the UN model regulations, and greater harmony has been achieved. Inspection data shows that there are still problems with compliance with these regulations. There is some evidence that training can increase compliance rates. Cost-benefit analysis of risk reduction measures can provide useful information to help allocate limited resources to the most effective safety measures. It is still difficult, however, to evaluate some promising categories of risk reduction measures. Methods associated with reducing human error and improving safety training across the transport chain can only be assessed subjectively as data and methods to quantify them are lacking.
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INTRODUCTION
Dangerous goods are used extensively in industrialised societies, and as they are generally not produced where they are used, they must be transported by road, rail, ship, or air. In Sweden, about 14 million tonnes of dangerous goods are transported by road per year (SIKA/SCB, 2002, based on 1997-1999 data), and about 2 million tonnes are transported by rail (Banverket, 2000, based on 1996 data). Although there are no statistics available on national transport of dangerous goods by sea, it can be assumed from data from selected ports that the quantity is significant and is larger than that transported by road. Transport of dangerous goods is a concern due to the potential impacts of an accident or incident on public safety, the environment, and infrastructure. An understanding of the risks associated with various parts of the transport chain can help with assessment and prioritisation of risk control measures. A systems approach of looking at risks along the whole transport chain may be the most efficient, particularly for future decisions around allocating resources to improve safety. In transportation this systems approach could equate to looking at the whole transport chain. This report presents a conceptual model for portraying risk components along a dangerous goods transport chain, and discusses various risk reduction measures for the transport of dangerous goods. A case study of dangerous goods handling and information flows at a port is also discussed.
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METHODOLOGY
Relevant literature and studies of risks in dangerous goods transport were obtained and reviewed. Data and information on compliance with regulatory measures and risk control measures was also reviewed. A case study approach was used as part of the investigation into risks at the node portions of the transport chain. This helped to develop an understanding of the risks at transportation nodes and how they compare to the risks for the links of the transportation chain. A case study was considered appropriate because there are a large number of variables affecting risk at a transport node, and empirical data for dangerous goods accidents is limited. The circumstances that occur prior to an accident can be extremely varied. There are likely as many specific causes and circumstances leading up to an accident as there are individual accidents. A case study approach is suitable for focusing on a problem where variables cannot be manipulated (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 1998).
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MODELLING RISK IN A DANGEROUS GOODS TRANSPORT CHAIN

It is important to consider the transport chain as a whole when assessing risks with the transport of dangerous goods. Many risk methodologies for transport only look at the en-route portions of risk. But data on accidents and incidents in dangerous goods transport shows that a significant number of accidents occur at nodes. Transport nodes are becoming more critical due to increased inter-modal transport. There are a number of methodologies and computer programs for risk determination along transport links. For transport nodes, there is little in the way of specific methodologies, but methods for fixed facilities have been applied. There is a need to take a more in-depth look at this problem and develop models and methodologies for better understanding the risks at transport nodes. There have been some studies carried out that have included both transport corridors, such as road and rail, and transport nodes such as loading and unloading areas. These have been carried out as regional risk assessments, and have included production facilities in addition to transport facilities. An example is the Italian ARIPAR project described by Egidi et al. (1995), which assessed risks for the storage, process, and transportation of dangerous goods. The storage and process facilities included chemical and petrochemical plants. Other fixed facilities included transport nodes such as loading and unloading areas, railway marshalling yards, and shipping areas. Efforts were made to use the same analysis methods for assessing consequences for all risk sources. It was a goal to be able to compare the risk sources at the end of the project so that resources for risk reduction could be allocated appropriately. For the fixed installations such as chemical and industrial plants, the authors state that the methods used were rather well established. The transportation activities required more effort. For road and rail transport, empirical data on accident rates and traffic was used to estimate probabilities. For ship traffic, simulations were used. Another example of a study that looks at how risks from accidental releases of dangerous goods should be assessed from a regional point of view was carried out by Nicolet-Monnier (1996). He discusses assessing risk of accidental release from a fixed installation to determine potential human exposure and effects. Methods for chemical process plants are suggested. He also describes how the risk of dangerous goods transport by road and rail should be assessed and 11
incorporated in the overall regional risk assessment. Quantitative methods are suggested for specific road and rail sections. Current and Ratick (1995) developed a model to assess risk, equity and efficiency in a combined location-routing problem. The model was applied to an example of locating hazardous materials facilities, where it is important to consider both the risks presented by the facility itself, and the risks posed by transport of hazardous materials to and from the facility. This type of model could be considered with problems of locating a transfer facility, or a transportation node, but it would not suit the problem where the transport node was fixed due to the associated infrastructure such as with railway yards or ports. Low level events and incidents may be easier to control at fixed facilities since there should be better proximity to response personnel and clean-up and containment equipment (Current and Ratick, 1995). In contrast, even low-level incidents that occur during transport can pose a risk to the public. But when it comes to larger full-scale incidents, fixed facilities can have more serious incidents because there can be much larger quantities involved (more dangerous goods potentially assembled in one place).
3.1
Background
3.1.1
Transport system modelled as a chain with links and nodes The transportation chain can be thought of as a system consisting of links, where the cargo or goods are in motion, and nodes, where goods come to rest. A transportation node can be described as a location where goods are transferred to or from a warehouse, another mode of transport, or another carrier using the same mode of transport. An additional complexity at inter-modal transport nodes is that there are different regulations governing the transport of dangerous goods by road, rail, and sea, and it may be difficult to know which regulation to apply at a particular time. The causes of accidents and incidents at transportation nodes can differ significantly from the causes that occur along the links of the transport chain. Along transport links, accidents such as collisions and overturns for road vehicles; collisions and derailments for trains; and collisions, foundering, and groundings for ships can be the root cause for dangerous goods releases. At transport nodes, many dangerous goods releases are caused by less dramatic incidents such as loading and
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unloading errors for bulk cargoes or dropping and damaging packages for packaged dangerous goods. The increasing focus on the use of inter-modal transport to reduce transportation system congestion, improve the environment, and improve mobility (Schoener et al., 1994) places increased importance on the nodes where goods are transferred from one mode of transport to another. An understanding of the hazards and risks of handling dangerous goods both along transport links and at transport nodes is required when looking at ways of reducing risks in the transport system as a whole.
3.1.2
Accidents and incidents associated with various activities along the transport chain Figure 1 presents data from the Swedish Rescue Services Agency showing dangerous goods accidents and incidents associated with different phases of the transport chain in Sweden. A significant percentage of dangerous goods incidents occur during loading, unloading and temporary storage activities that take place at transport nodes.
During Transport Loading and Unloading
1000 800 600 400 200 0 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Intermediate Storage
Figure 1. Swedish Rescue Services calls for accidents and incidents in dangerous goods transportation. Data from Rddningsverket ( 1997, 1998, 1999, 2001, and 2002). Updated from Ellis and Torstensson, 2000a Figure 1 is a compilation of incidents for all modes of transport. Although the main percentage of incidents is associated with the transport of dangerous goods, some of the incidents are for spills from road vehicles themselves, rather than from dangerous goods cargo. The data source for the figure is a database of all calls to the rescue services agency where there has been a spill or threat of a spill of dangerous goods. Some of these incidents are associated with the spill of liquid 13
from the vehicle itself for example fuel (diesel or gasoline), battery acid, or engine oil. A maximum of 18% of the reported incidents were estimated to be from the vehicle rather than dangerous goods. This was estimated by analysing the number of incidents associated with various packaging types, as described below. Figure 2 shows the average number of dangerous goods accidents and incidents per year associated with a range of packaging types. The average was estimated for the five-year period from 1996 through 2000. The data was obtained from the Swedish Rescue Services Agency database of records of calls for dangerous goods accidents and incidents. Only those incidents that occurred during transport, intermediate storage, and loading and unloading are included in the averages for each packaging type. The packaging categories other and not specified could potentially represent spills of dangerous goods from vehicle equipment rather than cargo. Together these two categories represent 22% of all packaging types. The substance type was reviewed for each of the incidents with other and not specified as the packaging type. Substances that are not used in vehicle equipment, such as calcium hydroxide, heating oil, and sulphuric acid accounted for about 20% of the total. Therefore a maximum of 18% of the incidents may potentially be associated with spills from vehicle fuel tanks and equipment.
Other Solid Bulk Material IBC - Intermediate Bulk Container Portable Tank Tank vehicle Drum Jerrican Box Bag Not specified
117 3 5 28 514 37 38 4 6 62 0 100 200 300 400 500 600
Figure 2. Average number of dangerous goods incidents per year by packaging type for the 5-year period from 1996-2000.
(Estimated using data from Rddningsverket database of accidents and incidents. Only those accidents and incidents occurring during transport, loading and unloading, and intermediate storage were included.)
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The majority of dangerous goods transport accidents and incidents that the Swedish Rescue Services respond to are associated with tank vehicles, as shown in Figure 2.
3.2
Model of risk in a multi-modal transport chain

A conceptual model showing components of risk associated with links and nodes of the transport chain is presented in Figure 3. The multimodal transport of a shipment of dangerous goods is represented in the figure. The shipment is transported first by truck, then by ship, and then by rail to its final destination. The model is based on the link and node portrayal of a transport chain, as discussed previously. The transport links are considered to be those portions of the transport chain where the goods are in motion, or en-route between two points, and the nodes are those points where the goods are temporarily at rest. Risk is considered to consist of two components - both the likelihood (probability) of an event where there is a loss, and the magnitude of that loss. Scanlon and Cantilli (1985) suggest that for dangerous goods transportation, risk can be portrayed as the product of a dangerous goods accident and the consequences of that accident. The most commonly accepted and preferred method is the use of a curve showing probability and consequences of a number of accident scenarios. Probability and consequences are both key components in assessing the risk of a dangerous goods release accident scenario. The conceptual model draws upon this concept of risk to show factors affecting risk in the links and nodes of a transport chain. The flows along the links that are shown in the diagram are the physical flows of goods and information. The information that physically accompanies dangerous goods as they are transported includes documents, labels, and placards. This labelling and documenting is required by the dangerous goods transport regulations: the ADR regulation for road transport in Europe, the RID regulation for rail transport in Europe, and the internationally applied IMDG code for the marine transport of dangerous goods. Flow types that Lumsden (1995) describes for transport of goods between supplier and receiver include monetary flow, information flow, material flow, and resource flow. Information accompanying these flows can move vertically (between different functional groups in a company) or horizontally (in the same way as material flow). For the model of risk in a dangerous goods transport chain, the focus was only on the physical flow of the goods and their accompanying information, as these were considered to be the flows that had the most direct effect on risk.
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Factors influencing:
Probability: vessel type, age traffic, geographical area visibility, weather Probability: track quality crossings flow of dangerous goods, # of cars Consequences: population density land type environmental sensitivity emergency response Consequences: weather season, water temperature location specific factors such as shoreline, sediment, sensitivity of biota emergency response
Probability: road type traffic flow vehicle type and condition
Consequences: population density land type environmental sensitivity emergency response
Risk Port Ship Port Rail Destination
Risk
Risk
Origin
Road
Risk Risk Risk Risk Node Factors: For probability: packaging activities, handling, loading, unloading, storage conditions, information flow (see below). For Consequences, population, environmental conditions
DG and package
DG and package
DG and package
DG and package
Documents Labels, Placarding (ADR) Documents Labels, Placarding (IMDG)
Documents Labels, Placarding (RID)
Documents Labels, Placarding (RID)
Figure 3. Risk components associated with links and nodes of multi-modal transport chain
SSPA Research Report No. 120
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Author: Joanne Ellis
The risks associated with the transport chain are divided into those risks associated with the en-route or link portion of the chain, and those that are associated with the nodes. This differentiation would appear to be valid, as accidents/incidents occurring at nodes often have different underlying causes and the rates of accidents/incidents during loading/unloading is different from the en-route rate. For the link portion of the accident chain, the causes of serious accidents and incidents can include collisions, derailments, and other major primary causes. At transport nodes, errors during loading and unloading are often the primary cause of a dangerous goods release. Releases from non-accident causes, for example improperly closed and secured fittings, can be significant throughout the transport chain and activities at nodes can be important to controlling these.
3.2.1
Transport links risk components For each of the transport links, some of the major factors that influence probability and consequences and thus risk are shown in the model. These factors are based on current methodologies and were selected after reviewing a number of methodologies for estimating risk of dangerous goods transport, such as those described in Rhyne (1994) and Rddningsverket (1996) for road and rail transport. For sea transport, methodologies included Rmers (1996) model to predict frequency for ship transport dangerous goods accidents, and review of studies such as that by the Sealoc Consortium (1997), which used historical data to estimate accident probability. Further information on these methodologies can be found in Ellis and Torstensson (2000b). In addition to reviewing existing methodologies, practical experience using Rddningsverkets FARGO computer program (based on the methodology in Rddningsverket, 1996), for estimating risks with dangerous goods road and rail transport, was drawn upon. The vehicle/vessel type, transport system infrastructure, traffic flows, and general accident rate for the specific mode and the specific transport stretch under consideration are factors that should be considered when assessing the accident probability for each mode of transport. The human factor can have an influence on each of these types of variables. Categories of factors influencing consequences include environmental, population, and emergency response services. These would also be specific to the particular transport route being considered. For road and rail transport, the types of factors influencing consequences are identical. Computer programs for estimating the risk of dangerous goods transport such as Rddningsverkets FARGO use the same basic module for assessing the consequence of a dangerous goods spill.
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For transport by ship, it is more difficult to estimate consequences due to the many factors that can influence the extent of environmental damage. These can include type of shoreline, sediment, sensitivity of the marine biotic community, weather, season (life stage of certain organisms), etc.
3.2.2
Transport nodes risk components For the transport nodes, e.g. terminals and ports, the factors affecting risks can be considered to be quite similar for all transport modes. As shown in Figure 3, packaging activities, handling, loading, unloading, and storage conditions can have an influence on risks at nodes. Factors such as loading, unloading, and handling procedures can affect risk in either a positive or negative way. A very safe loading procedure and system, where activities take place in an area that is protected from where the majority of the staff work, can both reduce the probability of an accident through safe procedures, and reduce the consequence by keeping the hazardous activity away from where an accident may injure more people. In terms of the consequence component of risks at transport nodes, the population surrounding these is generally fixed, as are environmental conditions. Transient populations such as passengers and workers can vary over the short term, but averages would be relatively constant. The en-route portion of the transport chain differs with respect to being able to manage some of these consequence factors by changing routes or even switching transport modes. For transport nodes it is not usually a realistic option to re-locate the infrastructure and the facility, so this can be left out of the model as a variable that can be affected from a risk reduction point of view (though perhaps long-term it can be influenced). Good emergency planning and segregated areas for passengers can help to reduce the risk of damages in the event of a dangerous goods accident. Decisions made and actions taken at nodes about packaging, documents, labels, and placarding can have an influence on risk throughout the transport chain. There is very little in the literature about quantitatively assessing risks at transport nodes such as terminals and ports. Risk assessment methodologies that have been carried out for specific industrial areas sometimes include an assessment of transport nodes. The models by Egidi et al. (1995) and Nicolet-Monnier (1996), as discussed at the start of Section 3, consider transport nodes as fixed facilities. Although nodes such as rail terminals and ports are usually assessed in the fixed installation category, methods used for facilities such as chemical
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plants are not usually directly applicable. For chemical plants, risk assessments are usually process-oriented, and look at risks of system failures. The causes of accidents at ports and transfer facilities follow different chains of events. The consequence assessments would be quite similar.
3.2.3
Difficulties with developing a combined link and node quantitative risk model A quantitative risk model for a dangerous goods transport chain consisting of links and nodes can be partially assembled using existing risk methodology methods and techniques. There are gaps, however, where additional background and empirical data are required to incorporate factors that have been identified as important risk reduction measures (e.g. training, safety advisors) but that cannot be further quantified. The available methods and shortcomings for assessing risk factors across the transport chain can be shown as follows:
Risk along link = RL1 + RL2 + RL3 RL can be calculated using existing quantitative models Risk varies along link as section characteristics change: Probability varies (different road or rail types, or example) Consequence varies (changing landscape or population)
* Examples of factors than can affect risk that are not parameters in existing models: Emergency response service changes (affects consequences) Measures to reduce human error, improve safety culture
Node 1
Link (3 sections) RL1 RL2 RL3
Node 2
RN1 , RN2 : Risk at Nodes RN probability and consequence components: Probability: estimate using existing empirical data from facility if available (often is insufficient to estimate rates), then adjust based on number of dangerous goods shipments Consequence: Estimate based on population density and surrounding land use & conditions
Factors affecting risk such as handling procedures, training, communication are not parameters in the risk estimate procedure. Available data and methods are insufficient to include them
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The link portion of a transport chain often consists of a number of sections. There are no nodes between the sections of each link, as the goods remain in motion, but there are changes in risk as the goods move along different road or rail types en-route to the next node. Risk can be estimated using quantitative methods such as those described by Rhyne (1994) and Rddningsverket (1996). Input parameters for probability estimates include information related to road type, traffic flow and dangerous goods flows for road transport. For rail transport, track quality, number and type of crossings, and information on dangerous goods flows and number of wagons per train are required. For the consequence component, information on population density, land type, and ground cover is required. Other factors that are considered to have an influence on risk, such as requirements for safety advisors, training, and the provision of emergency services, are not part of the model. Accident rate data for the road types in the model are based on empirical data. The selection of accident rates and consequence estimates (injury and fatality factors, environmental damage) may have inherently included the effects of existing measures, but changes to these measures cannot be quantified. For transport nodes, possible methods for estimating risk can use empirical data for estimating accident rates and probabilities. This information is very limited at this time and not sufficient in many cases to estimate rates. Better data may become available in the future as more information is collected by safety advisors for facilities at transport nodes such as ports and terminals. Similar to the situation for transport links, factors such as training, emergency preparedness, handling procedures, and safety advisor programs cannot be built into methods of estimating risk due to lack of quantitative data on their effects on probability and consequences. To take this model further to a practical model that can be used in a multi-modal transport chain, additional data is required to incorporate non-physical factors that affect risk. Quantitative data showing how these factors affect risk is necessary, but there are no clear ways to get this information.
3.3
Physical flow of information and role in guidance of risk reduction actions

A review of the causes of 74 road traffic accidents which occurred during transport of dangerous goods by road in the US from 1993 through 1999 (data from DOT RSPA, 2000) showed that 14 out of 20 accidents that occurred during loading and unloading were due to
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human error (Ellis and Torstensson, 2000a). An assessment of information from the Swedish Maritime Authoritys SOS database shows that of 6 releases from ships carrying dangerous goods in Swedish waters over the time period 1995 through 1999, four occurred during loading as a result of problems with pumps and loading lines. The human factor was identified as the primary cause of accidents where dangerous goods were released for the majority of release cases listed in the SOS database. Because many of the activities at transport nodes such as loading, unloading, and handling can be influenced or guided by information that physically accompanies the dangerous good, a model of this flow was developed. Figure 4 shows the physical flow of information for the multi-modal dangerous goods transport chain used in Figure 3. Proper documentation, labelling and placarding is information that moves physically with the dangerous goods. This information can facilitate effective emergency response actions, which can potentially reduce the consequences of an accident. The actions that take place at transport modes that can be guided by this information are also shown. At the origin, information about the type and amount of dangerous goods being carried influences the loading, driver selection, and in some cases route selection. For road transport, the documents, labels, and vehicle placards must comply with the European ADR regulations. The RID regulations apply to rail transport, and have been harmonised with ADR regulations so are identical in many cases. At ports, dangerous goods need to be stowed according to International Maritime Dangerous Goods (IMDG) code requirements. Specific dangerous goods need to be stored and stowed away from other types of dangerous goods. Proper documentation ensures that the correct information is available to carry out these requirements. When dangerous goods are unloaded at the destination port, the information is again required to ensure appropriate temporary storage, parking, and railcar separation as required.
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Figure 4. Physical Flow of Information and Role in Guidance of Risk Reduction Actions
Transport Chain Port IMDG RID Port Destination ADR
Origin
Road Transport
Ship Transport
Rail Transport
Documents, Information Labels, Placarding Flow (ADR) Documents, Labels, Placarding (IMDG) Documents, Labels, Placarding (RID)
Documents, Labels, Placarding (RID)
Guides Actions (Potential Risk Reduction):
Emergency response actions in the case of an accident or incident at any point on the transport chain
Loading Driver selection (with d.g. training) Routing Parking separation at port loading/ separation on board
Unloading/
loading temporary parking / separation railcar separation
Unloading Appropriate handling
CASE STUDY STOCKHOLM PORT

A case study was undertaken on a node of a multi-modal dangerous goods transport chain to get a better understanding of risks associated with transport nodes. Stockholm Port was selected as the transport node and the information flow, hazards, and risks associated with handling of dangerous goods as roll-on roll-off (RoRo) cargo were investigated. A port can be considered a good example of a complex transport node because there are many groups (shipping companies, the port authority) working at one location, and dangerous goods are being transferred from one transport mode to another, such as from road or rail to sea transport.
4.1
Case study data collection and methodology

Data was collected primarily through visits to the port to observe activities related to loading and unloading of dangerous goods onto RoRo ships, and through meetings and discussions with personnel working at the port. Information was gathered on the path followed by a RoRo dangerous goods shipment from the time it entered port property until it was loaded onto a ship or transported off by truck. Information was collected through discussion with port staff and direct observation. Available reports and documentation on dangerous goods handling at Stockholm Port were also reviewed. The dangerous goods database implemented by Stockholm Port in August 2000, to collect better information on the amounts and types of dangerous goods handled by the port, was assessed. The flows of dangerous goods over a one-year period were estimated for each dangerous goods class. In addition, entries to the database over a fourmonth period in 2001 were checked to look for possible discrepancies related to information handling that may result in a hazardous situation. The database contained on average about 1000 entries per month for RoRo dangerous goods shipments, and each of these entries was checked with respect to UN number and class. After data was collected on handling of dangerous goods in the port, a preliminary identification of potential hazards was carried out.
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Regulations pertaining to dangerous goods transportation in a port environment were also reviewed to determine if complications exist, if there was overlap, or where different regulations may apply in specific cases (Baltic Sea agreement or specific limitations set by the Port Authority, for example). The regulations were also reviewed against the potential hazards and risks that have been identified in other parts of the study. Risk resulting from dangerous goods transport were assessed from a qualitative perspective using hazard information, dangerous goods flow volumes, and accident/incident information for general cargo, as there was no empirical information for dangerous goods incidents.
4.2
Dangerous goods accidents and incidents
No specific data exists for dangerous goods accidents and incidents that have occurred at Stockholm Port. There is some anecdotal information about a few past incidents involving dangerous goods on port property, but no written records. Prior to the year 2000, there were no requirements for formal reporting of dangerous goods accidents and incidents. Beginning in January 2000, there has been a requirement for a safety advisor to be in place at facilities and companies dealing with dangerous goods transport. The Swedish Rescue Services Agency administers this requirement, which stems from an EC directive on safety advisors for dangerous goods transport. The safety advisor is required to file a report on an annual basis, and dangerous goods accident and incident data should be included in this report. Stockholm Port has its own safety advisor, and the first safety report for the port was produced in 2001. The safety advisor reporting system will ensure that records of all dangerous goods accidents and incidents will be available in the future.
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4.3
Dangerous goods movement at Stockholm Port

The flow of dangerous goods cargo and associated information through Stockholm Port takes place as described in the following paragraph, and is summarized in Figure 5.
Arrivals by Land Dangerous Goods Flow
Port Boundary
Register Shipping Customer with DG Fax: Advance notification
Stevedores Loading List Shipping Company Office Fax Port Central Traffic Office
Manifest
Fax: Advance notification
Shipping Company in Origin Port Vessel en-route to Stockholm
database Stevedores Dangerous Goods Flow Information Flow by Fax (advance) Physical Information Flow Arrivals by Ship
Figure 5. Representation of flow of dangerous goods cargo and associated information at Stockholm Port Advance notification of all dangerous goods cargo is required to be sent to the Port of Stockholm at least 24 hours before the cargo arrives at the port. In practice, this notification may be less, as the port is allowed to give dispensation to the 24 hours. The advance notification applies to both cargo that is arriving at the port via a sea route, i.e. on board a vessel, and cargo arriving by land, either by road or by rail. This advance notification is required by EC Directive 93/75/EEC, and is also described in the IMOs Recommendations on the Safe Transport of Dangerous Cargoes and Related Activities in Port Areas (1995). For RoRo cargo at the Port of Stockholm, this notification comes from the shipping companies such as Silja Line, Viking Line, Tallink, and Sea Wind Line.
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The flow of goods and information for dangerous goods arriving by land is summarised in the following steps: dangerous goods arriving by truck check in at the gate and provide information to the shipping company office (original documentation and placards on the trucks are in compliance with ADR regulations) information is entered into the shipping companys system, for preparation of a loading list of all cargo, including dangerous goods the trucks or trailers are parked in a special location for dangerous goods to await loading on board the vessel (trucks or trailers arriving at night for the next mornings sailing may be parked in a separate location and moved in the morning) placards are changed to conform to IMDG regulations, as appropriate stevedores receive a list of all cargo to be loaded, with special notations for dangerous goods. This list is provided about one half hour before loading of the vessel dangerous goods are loaded onto the vessel by the stevedores, according to the stowage plan provided by the shipping company.
For dangerous goods arriving by sea, the flow of goods and information is as follows: a list of dangerous goods cargo loaded on the ship is received by the shipping company office, and provided to stevedores prior to unloading the vessel trailers containing dangerous goods are unloaded by stevedores and parked in a special location; trucks with drivers are driven directly off the ship and off the port property. trailers containing dangerous goods are picked up by drivers from the appropriate land transport company. The companies are responsible for having the appropriate documentation and placards according to ADR.
There is no notification provided to Stockholm Port when the dangerous goods leave the property.
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4.4
Stockholm Port dangerous goods database

Stockholm Port developed a database for recording information received from advance notification documents. The central traffic control office in Stockholm Ports main office maintains this database. Staff at the central traffic office enter data from faxed advance notification forms about once per day. The database is set up in Excel, and there are different spreadsheets for each shipping company, such as Silja Lines or Viking Lines, or for terminal areas. Each company has a dedicated loading area so that the different spreadsheets also give an indication of the physical location on the port property where the goods will be loaded or unloaded. Information entered into the database is as follows: Ship name Voyage number Date when vessel will be in Stockholm Port Registration number of trailer or vehicle carrying dangerous goods UN number Classification according to IMDG code Flash point Proper shipping name Quantity in kilograms.
The database system is quite new so there are still some problems, but there are ongoing efforts to make improvements. The previous system consisted of keeping paper records of the advance notification in a specific box. Records could be accessed if necessary to prepare a listing of the dangerous goods and their approximate location at any given time. The new system allows for statistics to be prepared and provides quicker access to past data. The IMO recommendations on safe transport of dangerous cargoes in port areas (IMO, 1995) state that the regulatory authority should require the preparation and maintenance of records of the dangerous cargoes which are present in the port area, for use in an emergency. The Stockholm Port database uses information from advance notification forms rather than actual data, so does not have information on exactly when dangerous goods shipments arrive on port property. Records at shipping company offices of dangerous goods cargoes that have arrived on port property are used to prepare the loading lists and these are the best source of information on the dangerous goods that are actually on the port property at a particular time. For preparing overall 27
statistics, however, the Port database is useful because it compiles data from all the different shipping companies.
4.4.1
Dangerous goods flows at Stockholm Port
Data from the Stockholm Port traffic central database for a one-year period beginning October 2000 was analysed to give an estimate of the flow of dangerous goods and the breakdown by dangerous goods class. The data is approximate since advance notification data is used, and for some cargos no weight was reported, or the cargo was classified as limited quantity. Figure 6 shows the percentage by weight of each dangerous goods class handled as RoRo cargo at Stockholm Port over a one-year period. The total amount of dangerous goods reported to be handled as RoRo cargo during this period was about 23 million tonnes.
Class 1 0,3% Class 9 16% Class 2 6%
Class 8 20% Class 3 49%
Class 7 0,3% Class 6 3% Class 5 2% Class 4 4%
Class 1 Class 2 Class 3 Class 4 Class 5 Class 6 Class 7 Class 8 Class 9
Figure 6. Classes of dangerous goods handled as RoRo cargo at Stockholm Port for a 12-month period beginning in October 2000. Breakdown shown as percentage of total quantity. Figure 7 shows the monthly totals in tonnes of dangerous goods handled as RoRo cargo at Stockholm Port over a six-month period, with a breakdown by class.
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3000
2500
2000
Weight (tonnes)
Class 9 Class 8 Class 7 Class 6 Class 5 Class 4 Class 3 Class 2 Class 1
1500
1000
500
Jan. 01
Feb. 01
Mar. 01
Apr. 01
May 01
Jun. 01
Figure 7. Total RoRo dangerous goods handled at Stockholm Port for the first half of 2001 Approximately 2000 tonnes of dangerous goods are handled as RoRo cargo each month at Stockholm Port. The largest class by weight is class 3, flammable liquids. Examples of flammable liquids transported include paint, adhesives, ethanol, printing ink, resin solution and gasoline. Paint was the class 3 liquid that was most often shipped, and represented the largest quantity. Class 8, corrosive liquids, represents the second largest class by weight. Approximately 1000 individual RoRo shipments (or packages) are registered in the database for each month. A single trailer or truck may have a number of dangerous goods present in small quantities. Looking at one week (7 days) in March 2001 as an example, there were 33 vessel arrivals or departures at the main RoRo terminals of Stockholm Port where dangerous goods cargoes are carried. A total of 88 trucks or trailers carrying dangerous goods were loaded or unloaded onto the vessels.
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4.4.2
Limitations and Quality Investigation of the Current Database System Since the database is quite new, there are still some limitations and problems that need to be worked out, as described below. Improvements are being made on a periodic basis. To check on potential problems with information in the database, the data included for RoRo shipments was checked for a four-month period. The UN number, classification, and weight entries for dangerous goods cargoes were checked. The UN numbers were compared to the IMDG classification to ensure that correct entries were made. It was also noted if the UN number or class was missing, or if the number and class entries had been reversed. The original faxed notification sheets were not retrieved or checked all checking was done from the database. The presence or absence of the weight entry was also noted. Overall, the total error percentage related to UN number and class ranged from 6 to 8% over the four-month period. The error percentage was significantly different for the two major shipping companies, however. One had error percentages from 6 to 11%, while for the other it was from 2 to 7%. It was similar for those shipments where there was no weight or amount entered available. For all data combined 25-35% of the entries had no weight entry. For one shipping company this rate was less than 1.5% for all four months. For the other company the rate was 35-50%. Table 1 gives a summary of the information on error checking for all data combined, by month.
Month Total number of D.G. cargo entries 1157 959 1012 730 % Errors related to UN number & class 8 6 6 6 % missing weight entry 35 29 29 24
January 2001 February 2001 March 2001 April 2001
Table 1. Summary of quality check on database from advance notifications.
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A slight improvement in the amount of data provided for weight is evident over time. One of the reasons for the differences between the two shipping company error rates could be the way data is handled and sent from the specific companies. For the one with the higher error rate, data was faxed from the shipping company office in the originating port. This information was handwritten. For the other company, the advance notification information was sent from the ship as it was enroute to Stockholm Port. The information was printed, so was possibly printed out of a database or selected from the manifest. There are currently changes being made at the company with the higher error rate, and it is thought that they will be using a new computer system where they can print out and fax the advance notification information in the future. Another limitation to the current system is related to the requirement for advance notification 24 hours prior to loading/unloading. The database consists of advance notification data rather than actual data on what is loaded onto the ships. This means that there may be changes made in the time period after the advance notification is given, and these are not recorded in the database. Thus if a specific dangerous goods cargo doesnt show up in time due to road traffic delays, for example, then there is no record of this in the database. This would only result in a small error in statistics when compiling the data, but could affect emergency service providers in the event of an accident. They may alter or delay their approach if they believe the quantity and type of dangerous goods differs from what is actually there.
4.5
Hazards and risks

A hazard can be considered a possible source or characteristic that can lead to an accident or incident. For dangerous goods, the properties of the goods themselves are a hazard, of course. With proper packaging and containment, these hazards are confined. However, faulty equipment and inappropriate loading and securing can cause damages and leaks before the dangerous goods even reach the port property. Potential hazards in the port environment that could result in damages to the packaging or containment are as follows: Traffic Accident during loading/unloading: There is an intense amount of activity occurring during a short time period when vessels are loaded and unloaded. The potential exists for traffic accidents that could damage trailers or trucks carrying dangerous goods. Although there are no incidents involving dangerous goods reported to date, there are a number of 31
incidents each month with damage to other types of cargo (nondangerous). Stockholm Port has a very good database for recording incidents where there is damage or loss of cargo. Sabotage, vandalism: A number of break-ins and thefts have occurred at the port property. To date, none of these have affected dangerous goods shipments. There is a possibility that dangerous goods shipments are on the property overnight (parked in a fenced area) awaiting loading on an early morning sailing. However, conditions of shipping for one of the large companies that carries RoRo cargo stipulates dangerous goods be dropped off no earlier than during the same shift as the sailing they are booked on, and picked up no later than the end of the same shift which the they arrive on.
Problems with information flow and accessibility could increase the risk of an accident or incident, or increase consequences in the event of an accident if it is not available or incorrect when emergency response personnel require it. Some of the issues related to information flow are as follows: The port authority traffic central office doesnt have current information on the dangerous goods that have arrived on port property. The advance notification describes what should be there, not what is actually there. The stevedore personnel may have better information at times, but the information should be available in a central location. The central traffic office does not have information on exactly where dangerous goods cargoes are parked on port property. There are specific areas for these cargos to be placed, but no data system for reporting the specific traffic lane location. As noted in the database section of this paper, there are a number of errors or missing information in the database. This could be a serious problem if there is an incident and emergency response personnel need to know the type and amount of dangerous goods cargoes located in the vicinity of the incident.
Although there are many regulations in place pertaining to documentation, labelling, and placarding that have the intent of reducing risk, there are still some problems in practice with ensuring that the right information is available when necessary. Education about the importance of sending correct and complete information could help to improve the situation. The regulations could also be clearer with respect to which transport mode regulations govern at transport nodes. As the regulations for the different transport modes are being harmonized this may be a minor point, but there may still be confusion around it.
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In terms of risk for the Stockholm Port case, the amount of dangerous goods transported and present on the site are quite small. Note from section 4.4.1 that during a sample week there were 88 trucks carrying dangerous goods on Port property. Although there is no record of accidents with dangerous goods trucks, there are recorded accidents for other types of goods. There is the possibility for an accident to occur, but there is no empirical data to estimate the probability. Since there have been no dangerous goods accidents in the last two years, the probability range is less than 0.0001 per vehicle possibly significantly lower then this. Regarding consequences, the majority of dangerous goods carried belong to class 3 and class 8 (see figure 4). Class 2 (gases) goods that are transported do not include any toxic gases. Many of the goods in class 2 are aerosols, or non-toxic non-flammable gases. There is, therefore, no potential for widespread consequences. Consequences would primarily be limited to the immediate area where the dangerous goods are located. Calculations for specific cases and amounts of dangerous goods moving through the port could be conducted to verify this, using computer models for a few of the types of typical goods carried.
4.6
Summary Comments and relevance to other transport nodes

The case study has identified some hazards at a sample transport node, and some issues with respect to information flow and availability. It also illustrates some of the differences and considerations for transport nodes as compared to links in a transport chain. Good traffic flow, control, and knowledge of locations and quantities of dangerous goods is important in a complex environment such as a multi-modal transport node, to ensure that dangerous goods movements are controlled and there is an awareness of the hazards present. In terms of documentation and information flow, omissions and errors may increase the risk of an accident or incident, or hamper emergency response personnel. This situation is likely common to other inter-modal transport nodes. The more automated information procedures used by some companies in the case study resulted in fewer errors in information at the central database. More steps, such as transferring information to a hand-written advance notification form, introduce more possibilities for human error. In terms of maintaining a central database for collecting information coming from different sources (shipping company customers), the use of pull down menus for data fields such as dangerous goods class would reduce entry of erroneous classes. Introducing a step where the UN number is checked against the class would also improve data 33
quality. Using on-line entry of data by shipping companies and customers would further reduce the chance for errors, as data is only being entered once. A system called Port@Net (Bckstrm et al., 2001) is being used in Finland for on-line entry of dangerous goods shipments. Stockholm Port is interested in testing this system.
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RISK REDUCTION AND MANAGEMENT TECHNIQUES
5.1
Types of risk reduction measures

Risk control measures can focus on reducing either component of the risk function - probability or consequence. A reduction in the probability that a dangerous goods release will occur, or a reduction in the consequences of a release, will reduce the total risk. Reducing Probability: Measures that reduce the probability of a dangerous goods release can also be referred to as preventative measures. These would include legislation designed to reduce accidental releases through measures such as improved equipment, higher training requirements for those handling dangerous goods, restriction of dangerous goods to safer routes, etc. Measures that reduce the accident rate for all traffic accidents also reduce the probability of a dangerous goods accident. Reducing Consequences: Measures designed to reduce the consequences, given that a dangerous goods release has occurred, could also be referred to as mitigative or release response/control measures. Examples of mitigative measures include closed drainage systems to prevent discharge of dangerous goods into a natural waterway; detection/alarm systems within tunnels to provide immediate notification that an accident has occurred; and special routing for dangerous goods to keep them away from highly populated areas where there would be higher consequences. A mitigative measure that applies to all transport modes is emergency response systems that reduce consequences by ensuring trained personnel are on the scene quickly with appropriate resources to deal with the situation. Some risk reduction measures may reduce both probability and consequence. Training of personnel, for example, usually provides training in both preventative actions and mitigative response actions. Risk reduction measures can also be looked at from the perspective of whether they can be physically applied to specific parts of the transport chain, or whether they have more far-reaching effects. Table 2 lists 35
some examples and types of risk reduction measures that can be physically applied, and that generally have a quantifiable effect on reducing probability or consequences. Quantitative risk analysis methods and tools, such as the methodology published by the Swedish Rescue Services Agency (1996), can be used to estimate risk reduction for specific transport routes or stretches. All of the measures listed in Table 2 affect input parameters to quantitative models, either on the probability or consequence portion of the model. For looking at the effects on a wider basis (not just for one route or route section), such as risk reduction quantification for a whole country or region, then extensive information collection and modelling must be carried out. Examples of types of physical risk reduction measures include: Reduction of accident rates: The base cause of many dangerous goods releases or incidents are traffic accidents for rail, road, or ship that occur irrespective of the goods being carried. Therefore reduction of probabilities and improved safety for reducing collisions, derailments, run off road accidents, groundings, etc. will reduce dangerous goods release risk. Infrastructure improvements such as widening roads, improving sight distance at intersections, and improving track quality are examples of measures that have the potential to reduce the accident rate for all traffic (see sub-sections 5.1.1 and 5.1.2 for more details). Reduction of release rate: These measures include those that would result in a reduced probability of a dangerous goods release, given that an accident has occurred. For example improvements to tank cars to allow them to withstand a greater accident severity would result in a lower probability of dangerous goods release and thus a lower risk. Physical route protection: This type of measure includes changing routes or modes used to transport dangerous goods, to reduce the risk either selecting a route with a lower accident rate and thus reducing probability of an accident, or selecting a route where consequences will be lower. Other physical route protection measures include controls to protect sensitive areas and resources and reduce consequences. Table 3 shows those risk reduction measures that are more difficult to quantify in terms of effect. These types of measures cant specifically be included in the quantitative risk analysis tools typically used for road and rail transport. Probabilistic risk assessments can account for mechanical failures but cant take into account factors such as improved training systems and reduction in human errors. The way humans respond to deviations can determine whether an incident caused by non-human actions turns into an accident or not. Training, interface improvements, and additional information are thought to improve the human response and reduce error, but they cant be easily quantified.
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Probability Transport (P) or Chain Consequence Component (C) Reduction Reduction of Accident Rate (improves overall traffic safety rate) Road: traffic control, improvement P En-route, of road surface, signing, widths, road sections separation of lanes, better geometry, improved intersections (infrastructure improvements) (see sub-section 5.1.1.1 for references) Rail: improvements to rails, ballast, P En-route, rail switching areas, crossings sections (improvements to reduce derailments and collisions), automatic controls, stopping devices Routing to reduce accident rates P En-route (applicable to both road and rail) Risk Reduction Measures
Level of Application (Regulatory, national, regional ) National or regional level, planning decisions planning by railway authorities
Comments
Reduces probability of all accidents
Reduces probability of all accidents
Planning, national or regional restrictions
Selection of route with lower general accident rate Reduces probability of a release, given an accident Reduces probability of a release given an accident Selection of route where consequences would be lower
Reduction of release rate (specifically focuses on dangerous goods) Equipment Improvements: P Both enRegulations / improvements to tank cars for both route and legislation road and rail nodes required to upgrade standards Packaging and container P Both enRegulations / improvements route and legislation nodes required to upgrade standards Physical route protection (specifically focuses on dangerous goods incidents) Optimisation of route and transport C En-route Planning, modes to limit exposure of sensitive national or environments, populations* regional restrictions
Construction of physical protection C En-route Planning by systems along routes fences, local ditches, berms authorities * Note that the legal basis for limiting or banning dangerous goods on parts of the railway network is unclear (Banverket and Rddningsverket, 2000)
Table 2. Risk reduction measures physical and quantifiable measures
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Risk Reduction Measures
Probability (P) or Consequence (C) Reduction C
Transport Chain Component
Level of Application (Regulatory, national, regional )
Comments
Emergency Response Provision of emergency response services; improvements in existing services; shorten distances and response times
National or regional level, planning decisions Individual Employee Level: Reduction of human error, improvement of response Training: for both prevention of P+C Both en-route International accidents and response to accidents and nodes regulations and incidents for minimum requirements Interface improvements P Both en-route Applied to and nodes new equipment, updates to existing Drug testing P Both en-route National and nodes regulations Work environment improvements: P+C Both en-route Regulations, appropriate working hours, well and nodes company defined procedures and initiative responsibilities in place Organisation Level: Safety culture Incident reporting system P Both en-route National and nodes regulations
Both en-route and nodes
Reduces consequences of all accidents
Human factors, reduction of human error
Safety advisor
National regulations
Ensuring safety is an important objective of the organisation
Organisation initiative
Increases awareness, lessons learned for future prevention, risk and hazard i.d. Increases safety awareness, responsibility training Goal of increasing safety at all levels of the organisation
Information handling and availability Labels, placards, documentation P+C Improved information on locations and amounts of dangerous goods P+C
Both en-route and nodes Both en-route and nodes
International regulations International regulations for minimum requirements
Table 3. Risk reduction measures with broad effects (difficult to quantify)
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Compliance Monitoring: Compliance can also be considered a risk control measure to some extent. It can improve adherence to regulations and increase knowledge of regulations, but if the regulations are ineffective, improved compliance will not reduce risk.
5.1.1
Risk reduction for road transport A number of studies list possible risk reduction measures for road transport of dangerous goods. A summary of selected studies is as follows: Erkut and Ingolfsson (2000) list some examples of risk reduction measures for highway transport as follows: proper driver training, enhanced vehicle maintenance, improved tank design, careful emergency-response planning, and strict schedules for drivers all contribute to the reduction of transport-related risks. They also identify route planning as being a promising risk reduction measure. Russell (1993) conducted a study where extreme-risk scenarios in highway transport of dangerous goods were developed. Protective systems to mitigate consequences of these scenarios were also developed. The systems were physical modifications to the highway system. The scenarios and protective systems were developed by a large panel of experts. Table 4 shows the categories and types of physical protective systems that were developed.
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Category Mitigative Detection and warning
Systems Built in PA systems; emergency call boxes; gas detectors/alarms; monitoring for quick response; communication/detection systems Crossovers; transversable medians; highway exit/entrance redesign for emergency response vehicles; emergency exits with heavy doors (tunnels); arrows pointing to nearest exit (tunnels) Foam blanketing systems; large sprinkler systems; effective vent systems; pea-style vents to trap gases; effective vent systems (closed areas) Robust drainage with holding reservoirs; avoid use of open rails on structures; large sumps; grease trap sedimentation basins; floating surface barriers; drainage gutters directed toward collection points; retention basins that automatically close; clay blankets or barrier membranes Fresh air vents at elevated levels (metro), coamings over street-level intake vents (metro); air intake away from roads (tunnels, metro); massive barriers with energy absorbing material (runaway trucks) Preventative High performance barrier systems Truck escape ramps; upgrade truck runoffs; wide shoulders
Systems to facilitate escape and response
System to mitigate fire/explosion consequences Systems to mitigate spill consequences
Specialized situations
Containment Control
Table 4. Categorization of proposed physical, protective systems for highways (from Russell, 1993). Envall (1998), in his report on dangerous goods on the road network, listed possible risk reduction measures for road transport as follows: Route selection (recommended routes and forbidden routes) Traffic safety improvement measures (general traffic safety) Alarm systems, warnings and plans for areas needing protection Use of landscaping, construction for consequence reduction (geological, topography, vegetation) Construction techniques for consequence reduction (building facing materials, wall construction, windows, ventilation)
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Protection of water resources through improvement of ditch and water collection systems to catch spilled and leaked dangerous goods Contingency plans for water supply reserves Preparation of emergency plans and resources.
Four major preventive measures are identified by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (1987, cited by Kuncty et al., 2002) for dangerous goods road transportation. These are as follows: Development of regulations and compliance with them Driver training Proper Maintenance of vehicles and equipment Maintenance of traffic engineering, including the network of roads designed from the transport of dangerous goods.
5.1.1.1
Road infrastructure and operations and maintenance measures Any measures that reduce overall accident rates (for all types of vehicles) should also reduce the probability of a dangerous goods accident. Specific factors such as road type and condition can affect accident rates. A description of the main factors and their effects on traffic safety are described below. Much of the information is summarised from recent reports by Vgverket (2001a and 2001b), which provide a review and analysis of research and knowledge within Sweden and relevant research from other countries. Operation and maintenance Effects related to the surface of paved roads: Vgverkets report (2001a) provides a summary of the effects related to the quality and maintenance of both paved and gravel roads. The report describes research showing that the friction characteristics of the surface of paved roads have an effect on accident rates. Unevenness of the road surface in the longitudinal direction was also reported to have a measurable effect, while the presence and depth of ruts in the paved road surface had a minor effect. The effect of ruts and wheel tracks on accident rate was most pronounced during wet weather. In some cases, it was found that poor road conditions resulted in improved safety it was speculated that this could be due to reduced speeds and more care taken on the part of drivers. Roadway improvements with respect to visual direction, visibility, signing, and lighting: these include improved visual guidance, such as long range and short range guidance. These measures make the lanes, road edges, and other important features more visible to the road users 41
in both day and night conditions. Other measures include signs providing route information, warnings, speed limits, restrictions, etc; lighting of the roadway area; road edge reflectors; and traffic signals. Vgverket (2001a) concluded from their review of research studies that these measures reduce the number of accidents, but the magnitude of the effects vary and has not been estimated for some measures. Lighting of the roadway had quite a substantial effect, while some improvements to roadway edge and centre lines had very small effects that were difficult to measure. Winter operations and maintenance: A Vgverket (2001a) study states that increased winter maintenance standards can reduce the number of accidents. Salting of roads throughout the winter season also reduces the number of accidents. Salting, sanding, and snow removal each reduce the number of accidents that occur 24 hours after they are carried out. The conclusions were based on the review of a number of investigations and studies within Sweden and Norway, which are described in more detail in Vgverket (2001a). New Road Construction and Upgrading of Existing Roads: The report by Vgverket on effects of new construction and upgrading (Vgverket 2001b) summarises the results of a number of studies. Summary comments for the measures investigated are as follows: Widening of roads: There is a definite tendency for a reduced number of accidents when roadways in rural environments are widened. In urban environments, there may be an increase in accidents involving other road users such as pedestrians (Vgverket, 2001b). There are no Swedish studies that make a direct comparison for safety on a road before and after widening, but a model was used to estimate the reduction in accident rate. In addition, a Norwegian report (Elvik et al., 1997) states that widening a narrow road to normal width reduces both accidents causing injuries and those resulting in other types of damages. Improved geometry/sight distances: Improving the geometry of roads by measures such as increasing the radius of horizontal curves and reducing the gradient of the roadway decreases accident rates. The decrease in rate varies depending on the extent of the changes and existing roadway conditions. The estimates were based on modelling studies (Vgverket, 2001b). Climbing lanes and passing lanes: Vgverket (2001b) provides accident rate reductions for climbing lanes, as obtained from a Norwegian handbook on traffic safety (Elvik et al., 1997). The rate varies depending on the grade of the roadway. Separation of lanes, improvements to medians and barriers: Vgverket (2001b) reports that head-on collisions between vehicles and accidents occurring during overtaking manoeuvres account for a large percentage of the serious accidents on two-lane roadways. Divided roadways and the use of medians and barriers can reduce the number of these types of 42
accidents. Vgverket is conducting studies into the optimal type and width of median and barrier systems. Improvements to roadside environments: Vgverket (2001) provide statistics for single vehicle accidents in Sweden and report that the highest risks are roads with 50 and 70 km/hr speed limits. The most common collision objects in the roadside environment are trees, poles, rock outcrops, and guardrails. Roadside environments can be improved through removal of collision objects; using guardrail to direct vehicles away from the object; and improvements in ditches, side slopes, and backslopes to minimise the probability of an overturn. Vgverket (2001b) estimates that total accident costs can be reduced by a maximum of 20 to 34% through improvement of the roadside environment. The estimate was based on accident analysis and previous accident statistics and costs. Improvements to the roadside environment can be particularly important to dangerous goods transport, as many dangerous goods releases are the result of single vehicle accidents. The German THESEUS study (Gnther et al., 1995) found 44% of the accidents with tank vehicles were single vehicle accidents. A review of data from the US Department of Transportations hazardous Materials Incident Reporting System (HMIRS) (as discussed in Ellis and Torstensson 2000a) showed that the majority of severe accidents occurring en-route were the result of single vehicle overturns. A Swedish investigation of dangerous goods accidents noted the high number of single vehicle accidents, and suggested that improvements to the roadside environment could be important in reducing dangerous goods accidents (Rddningsverket 1998b). Any measures that reduce the probability of vehicles leaving the roadway and overturning, such as improved guard rails and design of ditches and side slopes to reduce the probability of overturns, can help to reduce the probability of dangerous goods releases. Improved intersections: A wide range of measures are available for potentially reducing accidents at intersections. These include lighting, introduction of traffic signals, improving sight distances, adding left turn lanes and refuge areas, use of roundabouts instead of intersections, and using grade separation. Of course the cost of some of these measures can be substantial. The effectiveness of some of these measures varies by type of intersection. Detailed information on the potential effectiveness as determined by modelling and a review of existing studies is available in the report by Vgverket (2001b). Table 5 lists the road infrastructure and operations and maintenance measures previously discussed for reducing overall accident rates. Note that more detailed information on effects of operation and maintenance activities, and changes related to all aspects of roadway infrastructure can be found in the reports by Vgverket (2001a and 2001b).
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Measures Reducing Rates of Accidents for Road Vehicle

Surface improvements to paved roads: improved friction properties, reduced rutting, unevenness
Comments and Reference

Effects are significant for friction properties, but vary for rutting and unevenness Vgverket, 2001a
Winter maintenance: increased Improved, measurable effects snow removal, salting, sanding Vgverket, 2001a (review of Swedish and Norwegian studies) Improved visual guidance, lighting Lighting was found to have the most substantial effect, effects of other measures such as improved markings were difficult to estimate Vgverket, 2001a The effect is estimated to be larger for rural roads Vgverket, 2001b, based on models and review of Norwegian studies The effects on accident rate depends on the extent of the changes and the existing conditions Vgverket, 2001b, based on modelling studies The improvements in accident rates depend somewhat on the roadway grade. Vgverket, 2001b, based on models and review of Norwegian reports Reductions in head-on collisions and accidents occurring during passing attempts Vgverket, 2001b Reductions in consequences of accidents and run-off orad incidents Vgverket, 2001b A range of measures are available. Effectiveness was estimated using models and analysis of accident data and studies Vgverket, 2001b
Widened roads
Improved geometry / sight distances
Climbing lanes and passing lanes
Separation of lanes, improvements to medians and barriers
Improvements to roadside environments Improved intersections
Table 5. Road infrastructure measures to improve safety.
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Other studies have attempted to estimate accident rates for trucks on different roadway types. Harwood et al. (1993) estimated accident rates for trucks using data from three states. The weighted average for selected road classes is shown in Table 6.
Area Type Roadway type Truck Accident Rate (accidents per million vehicle kilometres) weighted average 1.36 2.79 1.34 0.40 5.38 8.65 7.75 1.35
Rural Rural Rural Rural Urban Urban Urban Urban
Two-lane Multilane undivided Multilane divided Freeway Two-lane Multilane undivided Multilane divided Freeway
Table 6. Average truck accident rates using data from three US states (data from Harwood et al., 1993). The table shows that accident rate varies with road class, with the higher standard freeways having lower accident rates. A study of accident rates for the State of Michigan by Lyles et al. (1991) had similar findings. They found roadway class to be the most significant factor associated with truck accident rate, with the lowest rates for limited-access highways and the highest rates for local road systems. The method developed in a report by VTI (Nilsson, 1994) for estimating the probability of a dangerous goods accident estimates the number of accidents for these types of vehicles by using the rate of accidents for all vehicle types. The total number of accidents is estimated using road speed, type of road, width of road, and average annual daily traffic. 5.1.1.2 Risk reduction for road tunnels The risk associated with the transport of dangerous goods through road tunnels has recently been studied in detail, as described in a comprehensive report by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and the World Road Association (OECD, 2001). Some of the risk reduction measures for road tunnels included: Probability reduction: Related to tunnel design and maintenance: tunnel cross section and visual design, alignment, lighting, maintenance, and road surface friction characteristics Related to traffic and vehicles: speed limit, prohibition on overtaking, escort, vehicle separation, and vehicle checks.
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Consequence reduction: Alarm, information, and communication with operator and rescue services: close-circuit television, automatic detection systems, radio communications, automatic vehicle identification, and emergency telephone Communication with users: loudspeakers, alarms, radio communication, emergency telephones Evacuation and user protection: emergency exits, smoke control, emergency lighting, fire-resistant equipment Reduction of accident severity: fire-fighting equipment, rescue teams, drainage, non-porous road surface, emergency action plan, escort Improved tunnel structures to minimise effects: fire resistant structures, explosion resistant structures. (from OECD, 2001)
5.1.2
Risk reduction for rail Some recent statistics for rail accident rates in Sweden are presented in Table 7 (Banverket, 2000). Train Accident Category Derailment 1997 1.7 1998 0.9 2.4 0.4 1999 1.4 3.9 1.5
Collisions at roadway crossings 3.5 (train and road vehicle collisions) Collisions at other locations 0.2 (train/train, train with other railway vehicle, train with other object such as snow, rocks, trees) Fires 1.8
0.7
2.2
Table 7. Number of occurrences per 10 million km. travelled (data from Banverket, 2000) Banverket has been implementing a program for improving railway crossings, and reduced the five year average for these types of accidents for the second half of the 1990s. They are continuing work with upgrading crossings, and eliminating crossings where possible (Banverket, 2000). A working group created by Banverket and Rddningsverket (Banverket and Rddningsverket, 2000) discussed 19 possible risk 46
reduction measures for reducing risks for a dangerous goods railway accident. These measures were evaluated in terms of effectiveness, cost, feasibility, and priority. The group noted that it is hard to judge the effectiveness of particular measures. From the 19 they evaluated, they selected ten that they considered to be the highest priority. These ten high priority measures were: Drug testing of train personnel Automatic (telematic) monitoring of wagon (bearings, etc.) and brake conditions Telematic monitoring of locations Expansion/development of automatic train control (ATC) into railway yards and station areas especially at stations where large volumes of dangerous goods pass through Improved incident reporting Clear channels of communications, information flow, responsible contact persons, especially for procedures in the event of an accident Information systems: common information system for wagon lists and loading information, including information from all traffic providers Better information base and decision support system for the rescue services, such as maps and on-line information Permanent work group on the issue of risk in the railway transport system Improved inspection of railway cargo wagons
The other measures that were discussed were not given priority for a variety of reasons, including prohibitive cost or that implementation was considered to be unrealistic for other reasons. The non-priority measures included:
Specialised dangerous goods training for train engineers (similar to requirements in ADR for truck drivers) System for preventing misuse of ATC warning system (as was done by the engineer for the Borlnge incident) Remove/control trackside objects that could potentially puncture a tank car in the event of an accident Protective embankments, etc. to minimise consequences General information to the public on risks and alarm responses Improved wagon construction Improved track construction and standard Track maintenance Route selection to minimise risk Speed reduction/restrictions for dangerous goods transport Complete coverage of telematic systems.
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Routing and speed reduction in special areas were considered to be appropriate only for sensitive areas. Another possible risk reduction measure that has been the subject of recent research is the practice of separating dangerous goods wagons with other wagons. The separation wagons are placed between, in front of, and behind the dangerous goods wagon. Fredn (1999) describes how the Swedish regulations concerning the use of these wagons are more extensive than the RID regulations. Fredn (1999) carried out a cost/benefit study of the use of separation wagons in Sweden. He found that for block trains, the cost of separation is much higher than the benefit received, even when the maximum theoretical benefit is considered. For mixed trains Fredn (1999) states that the cost is equal to the maximum possible benefit. It was found that separation wagons placed ahead of dangerous goods wagons increased the probability of a derailment of the dangerous goods wagon. Empty, two-axel wagons are normally used for separation wagons, and these were found to derail more often than fully-loaded dangerous goods wagons that have higher quality wheel and bogey systems. When the separation wagons derail, they can cause the wagons behind them to derail.
5.1.3
Emergency Response Some observations on emergency response for risk reductions were provided in a study carried out by Zografos et al. (2000). Risk management through consequence mitigation is discussed. They give a number of reasons why design and operation of a hazardous materials emergency response system is difficult, including: the probability of a hazardous materials accident is low, but the consequences can be catastrophic the responsibility of various stakeholders can be poorly defined (large number of stakeholder groups: emergency response (rescue services types, ambulances), police, hospitals, fire personnel, transport company, coast guard (if water transport), clean-up groups) emergency response decisions often have to be made under time pressure and with limited data available (for example, it may not be possible to know the exact condition of damaged rail cars if it is not safe enough to get close to assess them. Decisions about actions such as containment and evacuation then have to be made with limited information)
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factors influencing decisions evolve over time and information channels need to be very good.
Although good emergency response programs reduce risk through consequence reduction, there was no quantitative measure or indication of this reduction provided in the study.
5.2
Human Error
Human error is cited in many studies and incident reporting databases as being the root cause of many dangerous goods incidents. Kuncyt et al. (2002) report that an analysis of the European Communitys database on road transportation of dangerous goods-related accidents found human error to be the cause in almost half of all accidents where dangerous goods were released. Technical failure accounted for only 8% of accident causes, and third party causes accounted for 40% (OECD, 1987 quoted in Kuncyt et al. 2002). Kuncyt et al. (2002) report that a study on the transport of dangerous goods in the urban community of Montreal had a similar distribution of accident causes. The THESEUS project (Gnther et al., 1995) presented German data showing the driver to be responsible for 78% of the single vehicle accidents of dangerous goods tank vehicles. Human error can occur at any phase of the transport chain. It may be due to a range of factors such as poor training, carelessness, or indifference. Human factors, safety culture in organisations, training and other methods of reducing error are recognised as an area where further attention is warranted, as there is very good potential for reducing accident rates. A discussion of education and training, and ways of improving safety culture is included in the following subsections.
5.2.1
Education and Training Although all of the major transport regulations are based on the UN Recommendations on the transport of dangerous goods, they have different requirements for training for workers involved with handling dangerous goods. The UN recommendations provide some general recommendations for training for persons engaged in the transport of dangerous goods. Different countries have further taken the requirements in the regulations and adapted them to their particular systems and needs. As a result, the training legislation and regulations in countries varies. Kuncyt et al. (2002) compared the training requirements in four different countries for truck-drivers involved in the transportation of dangerous goods. Two of the countries Sweden 49
and the Netherlands follow the European agreement concerning the international carriage of dangerous goods by road (ADR). The other two countries were Canada and the United States, which both have national regulations based on the UN Recommendations on the transport of dangerous goods. The new revised versions of the European agreements for road and rail transport of dangerous goods specify that personnel shall have appropriate training and education. This training includes: general awareness training to ensure familiarity with the regulations and requirements; function-specific training regarding specific duties and responsibilities; and safety training for awareness of safe handling of dangerous goods and emergency response procedures.
There are fairly specific requirements for course content and structure, basic courses, and refresher training. Requirements for ADR and RID specifically mention training for radiation dangers and the precautionary measures that should be taken for radioactive materials. Even though ADR is quite specific with respect to training requirements, there is still room for individual ADR countries to suit the requirements to their own needs. Kuncyt et al. (2002) state that Sweden and the Netherlands apply the ADR regulations with respect to training in different ways. Sweden has very strict criteria for trainer accreditation, and the Swedish Rescue Services Agency inspects about 25% of accredited trainers per year (Kuncyt et al., 2002). In the Netherlands, there is more focus on the examination of drivers. Results of the examinations of truck drivers are analyzed by the national organization, rather than individual training agencies. In North America, the responsibility for training is placed on the employers. The employer decides upon the content of the training to assure that transport workers are adequately trained (Kuncyt et al., 2002). There is no national accreditation of trainers or training institutes, and no nationally administered exams. Kuncyt et al. (2002) report that it is not possible to determine the effect of the type of training on road transport safety and accident rates. Even comparisons between accident rates in different countries are difficult, because data is collected in a different way in each country. This was shown in an assessment of accident data for Sweden, US and Germany (Ellis and Torstensson, 2000a). For railway, there are no requirements for a special train engineers license for transporting dangerous goods in the International Regulations for transport of hazardous goods on railways (RID). There is some training required in dangerous goods as part of the education 50
for RID-S (the Swedish regulations for transport of dangerous goods by rail).
5.2.2
Safety Culture Building of safety culture and incorporating safety into all levels of dangerous goods transportation shows promise for increasing compliance and application of safety procedures. Policies such as incident reporting and employing safety advisors in companies involved in the transport of dangerous goods build awareness of the importance of safety. Policy documents need to stress that safety is a management objective that is equal to all other management objectives, and also it is a line responsibility, that should be carried down through the organisation.
5.2.2.1
Safety advisors A legal requirement for a safety advisor to be in place at facilities and companies dealing with dangerous goods transport came into effect 1 January 2000 in Sweden. This requirement is from the latest regulations for dangerous goods transport and the Swedish Rescue Services Agency administers it within Sweden. The main task of the safety advisor is to ensure that within the framework of the companys workplace there are appropriate procedures and instructions to facilitate a high level of safety and competence concerning handling and transport of dangerous goods. Safety advisors must prepare an annual report documenting ay accidents and incidents. There are currently about 875 qualified safety advisors in Sweden (Mannerstedt Berg, 2001).
5.2.2.2
Incident Reporting Incident reporting could help in part with building a safety culture, because it builds awareness of past accidents, and it helps to stress the importance of safety issues. The new versions of the dangerous goods regulations, introduced after the year 2000, have requirements for accident and incident reporting. Mandatory reporting of dangerous goods accidents has been in place in the US for a number of years. The reports are available from the US Hazardous Materials Incident Reporting System, which is maintained by the United States Department of Transportations Research and Special Programs Administration (RSPA). There is evidence that the process of investigating and reporting incidents and accidents increases awareness 51
of safety issues, as many of the reports include statements about how similar accidents will be prevented in the future, and what steps have been taken to increase awareness among employees. 5.2.2.3 Quality Systems The introduction of quality assurance systems in chemical companies, as well as in freight companies, may bring significant improvements in the safety achievements of dangerous goods transport operations. Safety and quality become closely related when the company considers the achievement of safe transportation to be one of the outcomes in terms of quality of service. An example of the application of this philosophy is the company Sandoz of Switzerland (Von Rohr, 1992) that reports that they strive for strict observation of all laws and regulations, state-of-the-art transportation and anticipation of technical and legal developments. Such measures include checklist for the loading of vehicles transport emergency cards equipment for the personal protection of the driver surveillance of vehicles handling of accidents and damages during out-of-office hours (a special emergency procedure is followed whenever an accident occurs during out-of-office hours) co-loading restrictions declaration of the goods in the transport orders demarcation of responsibilities and competencies within the company (reviewed every 6 months) use of thermo-insulated safety containers and swap-bodies (new, safer technologies being introduced as quickly as possible) responsibility declaration for forwarding agents or carriers dangerous goods surcharges (the chemical company pays the transport companies surcharges for their safety demands, for example in order to help pay for the safety clothing, etc.).
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5.3
Information and communications

The use of electronic data processing and on-line techniques should help to reduce human errors associated with the preparation and carriage of documents. The case study for Stockholm Port described in Section 4 of this report found that there was a number of errors present in the documentation submitted as part of advance notification requirements. Sub-section 6.5 of this report describes compliance monitoring and errors found with documentation within the road, rail, and sea transport modes. The UN/ECE Working Party on Facilitation of International Trade Procedures (1995) concluded that simplification of document procedures should increase accuracy and efficiency, and this could in turn lead to increased safety for those handling the goods, and less risk of damage to goods and equipment. Both ADR and RID permit the use of either electronic data processing (EDP) or electronic data interchange (EDI) as a supplement or replacement for paper versions of the required documentation on dangerous goods. The IMDG and ICAO regulations, for sea and air transport of dangerous goods respectively, also allow electronic documents. The procedures for the capturing, storing, and processing of data, however, must meet legal requirements pertaining to evidential value. The data must also be as easily accessible as paper documentation during the transport of the dangerous goods.
5.4
Summary of risk reduction techniques

Table 8 is a summary list of types of risk reduction measures for dangerous goods transport by road and rail, as discussed in section 5 of the report.
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Infrastructure
Road Infrastructure Improvements (probability reduction improves safety for all vehicles): Wider lanes and shoulders Improved visibility and lighting Improved intersections Improvement of roadside environment Surface improvements Reduced traffic intensity High performance barrier systems Runoffs and escape ramps on steep grades Improved geometry Lane Separation Rail Infrastructure Improvements (probability reduction improves overall safety): Improvement of rails, maintenance Better switching areas Upgrading/eliminating crossings Rail bed (ballast) improvements Removal of trackside hazards Infrastructure (road and rail) to reduce consequences measures specific to dangerous goods transport: Drainage and containment to protect water supplies Routing, speed reduced areas Escape and response systems in tunnels Protective barriers, embankments, walls for sensitive areas
Information
Monitoring and Control measures focussed on dangerous goods transport: - Monitoring of equipment - Detection and warning systems - Telematic monitoring of locations overall safety measures: - Expansion of use of automatic train control system Emergency Planning measures focussed on dangerous goods transport Improved information availability for emergency planning Information on alarms and responses to the public Information flow with goods
Worker/Workplace
Individual Level measures specific to dangerous goods transport: Clearer information and instructions Training improvements Improved interfaces overall safety measures: Length of work day/shift Stress management Drug/Alcohol testing
Equipment
Organisation measures specific to dangerous goods transport:
general safety measures: Improved vehicles wagons and trucks, maintenance, brakes, etc. measures specific to dangerous goods transport: Improved load securing Better tanks and equipment Improved packaging
Safety advisor Incident reporting Compliance monitoring
general safety measures: Safety culture: support throughout the organisation
Table 8. Summary of risk reduction measures for road and rail transport of dangerous goods (see report sub-sections 5.1 through 5.3 for more details and references) 54
THE REGULATORY SYSTEM AND PRINCIPLES FOR SETTING REGULATIONS

Many international bodies, multi-jurisdictional bodies, and national bodies base their regulations for dangerous goods transport on the UNCOE (United Nations Committee of Experts) Recommendations on the Transport of Dangerous Goods, Model Regulations. These UN regulations were first published in 1956, and are regularly updated to reflect new technology and information, and to respond to the changing needs of users. The UNCOE had been meeting in the second half of even years (1998, 2000) to consider changes to the Model Regulations proposed by the UN Transport of Dangerous Goods Sub-Committee (TDG Sub-Committee). The UNCOE has been reconfigured, with a new committee name of Committee of Experts on the Transport of Dangerous Goods and on the Globally Harmonized System of Classification and Labeling of Chemicals. Regulations based on the UN Recommendations on the Transport of Dangerous Goods, Model Regulations include the International Maritime Dangerous Goods Code (IMDG Code), the International Civil Aviation Organizations Technical Instructions for the Safe Transport of Dangerous Goods by Air, and the European regulations for transportation of dangerous goods by road (ADR) and rail (RID). Countries using the international or regional regulations use appropriate acts or legal instruments to apply the regulations within their own country. Within Sweden, the Swedish Rescue Services Agency (SRV) administers ADR and RID, and publishes the documents in Swedish, with an Annex S containing special requirements that apply nationally. The Swedish authority for the IMDG Code is the Swedish Maritime Administration (Maritime Safety Inspectorate), with the Swedish National Testing and Research Institute providing expertise on packaging and testing. Regulations are updated on a regular cycle to incorporate revisions made to the UN recommendations. These revisions occur every two years, and regulations such as the IMDG code are updated on a similar cycle, but lag behind the UN recommendation changes. This is because once changes are adopted at the UN, they must then be discussed and adopted formally by regulatory bodies such as the International Maritime Organization (IMO). These organizations themselves require time to revise their regulations, and usually allow a time period where the new regulations are provisional, rather than mandatory. All 55
countries that are members of the organizations that develop the regulations have input and can participate in setting the regulations. Meeting agendas and proposed changes must be submitted to members well in advance this allows time for consultation with relevant agencies and industries as required by some members within their countries. However, it means that there is lag time, and the regulations that are currently in force are not usually based on the latest available version of the UN Model regulations. As an example, the time line for the approval and introduction of the IMDG code is provided:
Date IMDG Code Amendments UN Recommendations and Model Regulations Amendments Amendment 11 of the UN Recommendations are approved by the UNCOE Amendment 31 of the IMDG code, based on Amdt. 11 of the UN Recommendations, is developed and agreed to by the Dangerous Goods, Solid Cargoes and Containers (DSC) sub-committee of the IMOs Maritime Safety Committee (MSC). Amendment 31 of the IMDG code is adopted by the MSC. The UN Committee adopts amendments to the Recommendations on the Transport of Dangerous Goods Amendment 31 of the IMDG code comes into effect on a voluntary basis (Amdt 30 is still in effect for the year 2003) Amdt 31 of the IMDG code (based on UN Amdt. 11) becomes mandatory
December 2000
July 2001
May 2002
December 2002
January 1, 2003
January 1, 2004
Note that in mid-2003, the Dangerous Goods, Solid Cargoes, and Containers sub-committee of the IMOs Maritime Safety Committee will agree to amendments of the IMDG, based on the newest amendment of the UNs Recommendations on the Transport of Dangerous Goods (as adopted in December 2002). So, in January 2003, 56
it is possible to use Amendment 30 of the IMDG (based on Amendment 10 of the UN recommendations), or to apply Amendment 31 (based on Amendment 11 of the UN recommendations). In addition, the UN will have adopted a newer amendment of their Recommendations on the Transport of Dangerous Goods, in December 2002. For the ADR, a new version of the regulation came into effect on July 1, 2001. There is an 18 month period where the old version of the regulation may still be used (with the exception of regulations for class 7, which become mandatory within six months). The changing of regulations every two years and the fact that the current regulations for different modes may be based on different amendments of the UN model regulations can introduce some confusion for transporters. It can be especially difficult for inter-modal transporters. Also, at any one time different countries may be applying either the new version of a code such as IMDG, or may still be using the old version because there is a time period (e.g. one year for the IMDG, 18 months for ADR) before the regulations that have been released become mandatory. During this time period countries may choose to use the older version of the regulation or to apply the new version before it becomes mandatory.
6.1
Principles behind regulations

The general principle behind the regulation of the transport of dangerous goods is to prevent harm to people, property, and the environment. In addition to attempting to ensure the safe transport of dangerous goods, international regulations aim to reduce barriers to the transport of goods by having consistent regulations across borders. Facilitating trade and the safe, efficient transport of hazardous materials are the underlying goals of the UN recommendations on the transport of dangerous goods. The IMDG Code (2000) states that in the past when there were differing regulations between countries, difficulties arose due to different terminology, frameworks, and requirements. The UN Recommendations on the Transport of Dangerous Goods strives to attain the goal of safe transport by providing recommendations in the following main areas: List of dangerous goods most commonly carried and their identification and classification; Consignment procedures: labelling, marking, and transport documents; Standards for packagings, test procedures, and certification;
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Standards for multimodal tank-containers, test procedures and certification (UN ECE, 2001).
Additional requirements necessary for specific transport modes and countries can be added to these base recommendations as required.
6.2
Harmonisation
There have been ongoing efforts to harmonize regulations for the different transport modes, and these are reflected in the latest editions of the regulations, which show the greatest harmonisation to date. The latest edition of the IMDG code is a significantly revised version - the primary reason for the revision was to have greater harmonisation with the other transport modes. The International Civil Aviation Organizations Technical Instructions for the Safe Transport of Dangerous Goods by Air is also consistent with the UN model regulations and this ensures better harmony with the other regulations. The ADR (road) and RID (rail) regulations for road and rail transport of dangerous goods in Europe have also been revised recently to achieve greater harmonisation. This work began in 1993 under the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, and was completed in the year 2000. The Swedish versions of these regulations came into effect in August 2001. The primary goal for harmonisation was to make the regulations more user-friendly and understandable. This should lead to improved safety. Since the regulations for each mode are based on the UN model regulations, there are many similarities. Each of the regulations has common sections or parts that are presented in the same order within the regulations. For example, part 1 contains general provisions and training, part 2 is classification, and part 3 is the dangerous goods list. Parts 1 through 7 are common to IMDG, ADR, and RID. Even though the sections have the same titles and cover the same general topics, there are differences specific to each mode. If regulations have extra sections specific to the transport node, they are placed after the sections that are common to all regulations. The latest version of ADR (European agreement of international transport of dangerous goods by road) has a section 8 and 9, whereas IMDG has only seven sections. The sections 8 and 9 of ADR pertain to vehicle crews and operations, and requirements for the construction and approval of vehicles. The dangerous goods list is similar for ADR, RID, and IMDG. The first four columns of the list provide information on the dangerous goods and their classification. The first column gives the UN number, the next is name and description in ADR, and proper shipping name in the IMDG. Other differences are the designations for limited quantities. In
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the IMDG code an amount is provided in the table, or the word none if limited quantity exceptions do not apply. For ADR, a code is provided in the table, such as LQ1. LQ is the abbreviation for limited quantity, and it is followed by a code that needs to be looked up in a table to determine the limited quantity amount. When the code is given as LQ0, then there are no exceptions for limited quantities for this particular dangerous good. The IMDG code has a special column for stowing and segregation information, while the ADR has a column to designate special provisions for loading, unloading and handling. Each mode has its own particular characteristics and concerns that result in some differences. For example the IMDG code for transport by sea has a special section on segregation and stowage of dangerous goods, with categories of segregation including whether different classes of dangerous goods need to be segregated by a hold or a deck. There are also limitations on the amount and type of dangerous goods that may be carried on vessels that carry more than a specified number of passengers. Designation of marine pollutants, preservation of the marine environment, and requirements for shipboard safety are also particular to the IMDG code. Examples of specific sections for ADR and RID include sections on vehicle approvals, loading, and unloading, among other areas. An example for air transport regulations is that there are special requirements for magnetized articles, due to possible interference with instruments. There are also very severe restrictions on the type and amount of dangerous goods that may be carried on board passenger aircraft. These are just a few examples of some of the differences between the dangerous goods transport regulations for the different transport modes.
6.3
Risk-based approach to setting regulations

Risk assessment procedures and principles are gaining more attention as a method of assessing proposed regulatory changes. The International Maritime Organization is looking at the trial application of Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) to objectively assess safety regulations both the need for regulations and the required content. The FSA method includes the evaluation of the costs and benefits of different options for reducing risks. So far, this is being investigated on a limited basis by a number of countries that are looking at the application to specific ship safety issues. The SEALOC project (Safer, more Efficient and Lower Operational Cost of the maritime transport of dangerous goods) is an example of an EU project that used the FSA approach. A report on the project (Plsson and Torstensson, 1998) stated that the FSA methodology should be a valuable tool both for developing safety routines and assessing regulations. A safety analysis 59
and assessment was carried out for three case studies a part of the SEALOC project. The FSA method has not yet been applied to regulations for dangerous goods transport. The risk assessment approach has been applied to regulations for rail transport of dangerous goods in the US. A paper by Raj and Pritchard (2000) describes and discusses the application of a risk based evaluation procedure for determining whether to implement changes to tank car regulations for transporting hazardous materials. This required a fairly detailed and extensive study, and generalizations had to be made to conduct the risk analysis for a large geographical area. Zhang et al. (2000) states that the US National Transportation Safety Board began promoting the benefits of a risk-based approach to developing regulations for transporting hazardous materials as early as 1971. The difficulties with estimating risk on a large scale as opposed to an individual case and the lack of empirical data on dangerous goods transport accidents and incidents are factors that complicate the use of risk-based assessment of regulations.
6.4
Technical, administrative, and occupational health and safety aspects of regulations

Although the regulations themselves can be considered an administrative method of controlling risk, they can target different aspects of the transport process. Regulations can apply to technical, administrative, or health and safety issues associated with the transport of dangerous goods. Standards for packaging, testing, loading, and classification sections of the codes are technically based. Requirements for consignment such as labelling, placarding, transport documents and advanced notification are administrative. Health and safety issues can be addressed through supplementary documents such as emergency procedures and the medical first aid guide for the IMDG code. In addition packaging, load securing, and segregation help protect the safety of transport workers. Indeed one of the goals of the regulations is to prevent harm to people.
6.5
Compliance
Although it is very important to have good regulations in place, they cannot improve safety unless they are complied with. Important factors in ensuring compliance with regulations is having clear, easily understood regulations, education to increase awareness of the regulations, and enforcement to ensure that companies and individuals
60
are aware that there is a cost or penalty for not complying. Regulations vary by transport mode and jurisdiction, as does compliance and enforcement of the regulations. The following subsections provide information on compliance with regulations by transport mode.
6.5.1
Road Transport Within Europe, there is an agreement between the participating countries for the regulations for transport of dangerous goods by road (ADR), but this agreement is not enforced by an overall authority. The national authorities in each country are responsible for checking compliance and taking action against offenders. Penalties for noncompliance are not prescribed by ADR. The latest version of ADR, brought into effect in 2000, has new provisions pertaining to measures to ensure compliance with requirements. The requirements for safety advisers are part of these new provisions. A report on checks on the transport of dangerous goods by road in the European Union stated that 20% of vehicles checked had infringements (European Communities, 2000). The checks were carried out according to EC Council directive 95/50/EC, which provides uniform procedures for performing checks on the transport of dangerous goods by road. Most of the EU states checked about one in 1000 vehicles. The four most active countries (Sweden, Spain, Germany and Netherlands) checked one vehicle in 500. The most commonly occurring infringements were: Lack of transport documents: 19.6% of total infringements Absence of orange panels (placards): 11.6% of total infringements
The absence of fire extinguishers was also noted to be a common infringement. The Commission stated that roadside checks were useful for identifying the problems related to the transport of dangerous goods, and that they indirectly could improve safety. They recommended that on average one in 1000 vehicle journeys should be checked. Envall (1998) reports that the Swedish National Road administration is responsible for about 20 full-scale traffic control checkpoints with weigh scales and inspections. At these points the drivers credentials and driving time are checked, along with the vehicles brakes and load securing. In addition to the 20 full checkpoints, there are approximately 80 minor control stations. Dangerous goods vehicles may be checked at any of these points. By checking one in 500 dangerous goods vehicles,
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Sweden is well within the EC recommendations for frequency of road checks. Table 9 shows the results of roadside checks in Sweden of vehicles transporting dangerous goods. The results are for 1999 and 2000, and about 90% of the vehicles checked for both years were registered in Sweden. Note that vehicles may have more than one infringement each. 1999 Total Number of Vehicles Checked Total Number of Vehicles with Infringements Percentage of Vehicles with Infringements Total Number of Infringements Noted 6669 1819 27% 3096 2000 7263 1857 26% 2929
Table 9. Results of roadside checks of vehicles transporting dangerous goods in Sweden (Rddningsverket, 2002). A total 22 different types of infringements were noted. The major types of infringements noted are shown in Table 10. All other types of infringements were each less than 4% of the total. Infringement % of total number of infringements Transport/accompanying document(s) 23 Written instructions 7 UN number/package labelling/UN packaging code 9 Vehicle and/or container marking 8 Fire extinguisher(s) 20 At least one wheel chock per vehicle 4 Two orange-coloured lights 5 Drivers personal protective equipment 5 All other infringement types (each accounting for less 19 than 4% of total) Table 10. Percentages of main types of infringements identified in roadside checks of vehicles transporting dangerous goods in Sweden in the year 2000 (Rddningsverket, 2002).
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US Study on Compliance The United States Federal Highway Administrations (FHWA) Office of Motor Carriers (OMC) carried out a national safety survey on trucking activities in 1996 (Star Mountain, Inc., 1997). This survey collected data from random truck inspections and analysed results for both the whole truck population plus the sub-population of trucks which carry hazardous material. Over 10,000 inspections were included in the sample, with more than 1,300 of these on trucks carrying hazardous materials. The survey results included estimates of overall out-of-service (OOS) rates plus rates specific to drivers and to vehicles. The study defined a vehicle as being out of service if it had at least one violation of the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations (FMCSRs) or Hazardous Materials Regulations (HMRs) which was serious enough for the vehicle to be placed out-of-service. The overall National OOS rate for trucks carrying hazardous materials was estimated at 27 percent. The vehicle specific OOS rate was estimated to be 25 percent, and the driver specific rate was 4 percent (note that these percentages do not sum to the overall rate, since the driver and vehicle violations are not mutually exclusive). The rates for hazardous materials trucks were lower than the rates for the whole truck populations, which has an overall OOS rate estimated at 32 percent. Brake violations were the most frequent cause of an OOS violation for both the general truck population and the hazardous materials vehicles. The brake violation rates were 49 and 51 percent respectively. For the sub-population of hazardous materials vehicles, 11 percent of OOS violations were related to HM-specific regulations. The results of the study show that non-compliance with regulations is significant. The violations could potentially play a role in accidents or incidents. Hazardous materials trucks were also checked to see if they were carrying the correct documentation. Seventy-eight percent of these trucks were found to have the correct documentation, and they had an overall OOS rate of 24 %, compared to a rate of 31% for trucks without proper documents. It is interesting to note that driver training had an effect on out of compliance rates for the group of drivers categorised as having little or no experience. Those that had received some form of training had an OOS rate of 35 percent, while those with no training had a rate of 51 percent.
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6.5.2
Railway
The Swedish Railway Inspectorate carries out inspections of dangerous goods railway wagons in Sweden. From 1995 through 1998 about 500 wagons were inspected each year. This number was reduced in recent years 242 wagons were inspected in 1999 and 143 in the year 2000. Special inspections were carried out in 1991 and 1998 (Jrnvgsinspektionen, 1998). The special inspection carried out in 1998 focussed on marking, labelling, carriage status, and consignment notes, and 184 shipments of dangerous goods were inspected throughout the country. Both international and domestic shipments were included in this inspection. The inspection found errors associated with 48% of the shipments. The breakdown of error types (as a percentage of the total number of errors) is shown in Table 11. Error associated with: Goods declaration ID placards, labels, markings Inspection, testing Other Percentage of total errors 64% 22% 11% 3%
Table 11. Error categories and percentages found during inspection of dangerous goods railway wagons in Sweden, 1998 (data from Jrnvgsinspektionen, 1998). The goods declaration errors category showed worse results than were found during the special inspection carried out in 1991. For the 1998 survey, 55% of the goods declaration errors were associated with emptied, not cleaned wagons. For loaded wagons, the percentage with goods declaration errors was 27%. The percentage of errors and deficiencies found during standard inspections in 1999 and 2000 was lower. In 1999, there were deficiencies for 25% of the 242 wagons inspected. The deficiencies were most often associated with goods declarations, ID placards, and labelling. The most serious deficiencies were the result of incorrect goods declarations. In 2000, there were deficiencies for 10% of the 143 wagons inspected, and the most common types of deficiencies were the same as those in 1999. Inspection of railway wagons was identified as an issue needing improvement in a report by Banverket and Rddningsverket (2000). A project by SJ (Swedish State Railways) and the Swedish Private Railcar
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owners association is underway to investigate improvements to wagon and tank car inspection.
6.5.3
Marine Transport
The Swedish Coast Guard carries out inspections of dangerous goods carried by ship. Table 12 shows the results of inspections carried out over an eight-month period in 2001. Inspection for: Documentation Marking and labelling Separation and handling Permit to take on board Cargo securing TOTAL INSPECTIONS Number of Inspections 1363 397 196 45 1531 3532 % Out of Compliance 20.5 18.6 3.1 11.1 18
Table 12. Results of inspections carried out at Swedish ports of dangerous goods carried by ship during the period January August 2001 (Data from Melander, 2001)
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SECURITY MEASURES FOR DANGEROUS GOODS TRANSPORT

Dangerous goods are a potential target for terrorist activities and acts of sabotage. The security of dangerous goods during transport is not a new issue, but has received more attention after the terrorist attacks that occurred in the United States in September 2001. Government organisations and transporters of dangerous goods have been assessing current transport security measures and investigating new measures to improve security. Risk Assessment of Transport Security It is not possible to accurately predict or estimate the probability of a terrorist action involving dangerous goods transport. There are no records within the US DOTs database of hazardous materials incidents of any incidents that were the result of deliberate actions. The range of possible scenarios of an intentional release is extremely wide. On the consequence side of the risk equation, it is possible to develop scenarios based on the type of goods being transported, and assume that release occurs in a highly populated area. Risk reduction measures could then be developed and assessed in a qualitative manner based on identified hazards and possible consequences. A risk-based approach to assessing transportation security is suggested by the American Chemistry Council (2001). They suggest a process with the following steps: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. Chemical listing Chemical hazard ranking Exposure ranking Prioritising risks Conducting risk review Developing and implementing risk reduction alternatives and preventative measures 7. Updating the process Compiling a list of the chemicals transported and ranking them according to hazards are the first two steps in the process. Hazard ranking can be done using basic categories such as high, medium, and low. A table of precedence of hazards as contained in dangerous goods transportation regulations such as ADR and RID can be used to rank hazards. The three UN packaging groups also represent a degree of danger (high, medium, and low) and could be used to rank the goods. The groupings of dangerous goods according to hazards that are recommended for the transport of dangerous goods through tunnels is 67
also a possibility (OECD, 2001). Some examples of dangerous goods that would be ranked as having a high hazard include explosives or substances with a toxic inhalation hazard. Once the dangerous goods have been ranked according to hazard, the potential exposure of the public and sensitive environmental areas can be estimated. Factors to consider include proximity to densely populated areas and city centres, the transport distance, the amount of chemical in each shipment, and the frequency of transport. The hazard and exposure rankings can be combined to prioritise security risk. Figure 8 is an example of how the rankings can be used to prioritise dangerous goods shipments.
High
Increasing Priority Chemical Hazard

Low
Movement Exposure
High
Figure 8. Combining chemical hazard and movement exposure to prioritise security risk (from American Chemistry Council, 2001). Security risk reviews of dangerous goods shipments can be conducted based on the relative priority. Those with a higher priority should be reviewed more often, and to a greater extent. A risk review should include an assessment of hazards, exposures, threats, and vulnerabilities. A threat assessment could take into consideration attacks on infrastructure, theft, and tampering with the product or container. Examples of factors influencing vulnerability include ease by which unauthorised persons can gain access to a shipment, equipment design, ability to change transport routes, and the security procedures used throughout the transport chain. After a review of the security risk has been carried out, appropriate measures can be implemented to improve security where necessary. Security Measures Security measures related to personnel and management activities can be implemented across the whole transport chain. There are also specific recommendations and measures to be considered for parts of 68
the transport chain such as while they are en-route or while they are at rest at a transport facility or node. Fritz Wybenga of the US Department of Transportations Research and Special Program Administration presented some recommendations on security of hazardous materials transport from an intermodal perspective (presentation during the panel discussion Security for Transportation of Hazardous Materials, Transportation Research Board Annual Meeting, January 2002). Recommendations by category included: Management and Personnel Issues: Security evaluation look at possible scenarios, threats Security plan Screening/background checks on employees Security training Routine security inspections Reporting suspicious activities to local authorities
Facilities security: Use guards, gates, fencing, lighting, control access, and secure dangerous goods within the facility Routine inspection Tighten custody transfer to carriers Establish good communication and cooperation with local law enforcement Limit information on shipments
En-route security: Select the transport route taking security into account Ensure the planned route is followed use GPS, telephone calls, etc. Measures to disable vehicles remotely, such as locks on cab and van doors. Limit en-route stops consider 2 drivers in some cases Locks on tank openings (possibly electronic) Escorts for selected materials
The US Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) contacted a large percentage of dangerous goods carriers in 2001 to increase awareness of potential terrorist threats. Approximately 32000 of the 35000 carriers in the US that were identified as transporting the type and quantity of hazardous materials considered to be a threat were contacted (B. Quaid, FMCSA, presentation during the panel discussion Security for Transportation of Hazardous Materials, Transportation Research Board Annual Meeting, January 2002). One of the main
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security points that was discussed was that carriers consider the development and implementation of a security plan that includes: Personnel security Hazardous materials and package control En route security Technical innovations Management prerogatives Communications Readjustment based upon current conditions (FMCSA, 2001)
More detailed information on some of these points is as follows: Personnel security: Employees can be a security risk in some cases, but in others they can be an asset for increasing security. Conducting background checks before hiring employees can help reduce the risk. Making sure all employees are aware of security can lead to improved security throughout the transport process. Hazardous materials and package control: Measures include ensuring there are secure dangerous goods storage areas at transport facilities; lighting and fencing; using locks and alarms; requiring records of removal of dangerous goods from secure facilities; and implementing standard procedures for controlling the movements of dangerous goods packages. Consideration could also be given to requiring employees to show identification cards prior to entering dangerous goods storage areas. En route security: Measures for increasing security en route include avoiding sensitive areas such as highly populated areas, tunnels, and bridges. Drivers should ensure that vehicles are locked and parked in appropriate areas. Technical innovations: New technology that could be considered includes tamper-proof seals, vehicle tracking, remote shut-off of vehicles, vehicles that require both a code and key to start the engine, and special locking features to prevent trailers from being removed from the power unit. Management prerogatives: Management may require additional special measures such as implementing security training for employees or conducting detailed background checks on employees that have access to high risk dangerous goods. Communications: Communicating with others involved in the transport of dangerous goods may help to identify security issues. Ensuring that there is good communication between the vehicles en-route and the fixed transport facilities is important. Communicating security messages to employees in a variety of ways increases awareness and compliance with organisation security procedures. The security plan should be reviewed and adjusted on a regular basis. 70
High Risk Dangerous Goods Military equipment and supplies such as ammunitions and weapons are often transported with a higher degree of security than commercial dangerous goods shipments. The US Department of Defense categorises the types of dangerous goods that are shipped, with different security measures applied to each of the four categories. Shipments in the higher risk categories have more restrictive conditions placed on them. For example, dangerous goods in the highest risk category are not permitted to be stopped for more than four hours at a commercial facility. Lower risk categories of goods may have stops up to 100 hours as a maximum. The use of point-to-point direct shipments is requested as much as possible. All terminals where dangerous goods shipments come to rest are inspected periodically, as they are considered a vulnerable part of the transport chain. Specific measures for increasing security at terminals included: discontinue the use of unacceptable terminals use double barrier fencing place guard facilities inside the first level of fencing use of armed guards and closed circuit video surveillance equipment
Other measures applied to the transport of dangerous goods include: real-time tracking of high risk dangerous goods shipments by satellite. This is carried out 24 hours a day and seven days a week. a threat analysis is conducted prior to sending out high risk shipments two drivers are required for long distances.
Additional security measures being considered for the future include: Technology to track both the power unit (tractor portion) and the conveyance unit (trailer) transponder technology on commercial rail cars used for military shipments exemptions to have placards removed from sensitive shipments.
Regarding the placards, there is a balance between the need to know of emergency response personnel and security regarding advertising what is in the rail car.
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ASSESSING RISK CONTROL MEASURES

Although there are many risk control measures available that can be effective to various degrees in the transport of dangerous goods, it is important to be able to assess the safety benefits from these measures. This is not always a straightforward task due to the many variables present in the dangerous goods transport chain that can influence safety. Risk control measures need to be assessed in terms of their effectiveness at increasing safety, ease of implementation, and costbenefit.
8.1
Assessing effectiveness
The effectiveness of risk reduction measures is often difficult to assess, since risk in the transport of dangerous goods is affected by a large number of variables. The effectiveness of physical risk reduction measures can be assessed using quantitative models, as discussed in sub-section 5.1. These physical measures affect parameters that are inputs to quantitative risk assessment models, and thus a quantitative assessment of their effectiveness can be made. For other broad-based measures that apply across a transport chain, for example those aimed at reducing human error, emergency response measures, or safety culture, it is not possible to quantify effectiveness using models. Although there are a number of sources and studies that cite the human factor as being the primary cause of accidents in a large number of cases, there is very little data on probability or consequence reduction that can be obtained from specific measures aimed at reducing human error. For example training is felt to reduce human error, but the study by Kuncyt et al. (2002) of different types of training systems could not make comparisons on which one was most effective. Similarly, safety advisors are in place to reduce accident rates, but there is no data available to show if risks have been reduced, and by what percentage.
8.1.1
Subjective methods Subjective rating by experts is an approach that can be used to rate risk reduction measures when it is not possible to make quantitative estimates (due to lack of information or other constraints). A study by Russell (1993) is an example of a method using subjective ratings. 73
Experts from a number of states were asked to generate and evaluate extremely risky incidents involving dangerous goods transport by road. They were then asked to do the same for potential measures to mitigate these catastrophic incidents. All incidents were within highway transport systems. He used what is referred to as the Delphi technique to have the panel of experts reach a consensus decision. He stated that this technique is applicable where there is a lack of concrete data and a wide range of initial ideas and values. Interestingly, although the author had stated many times that regulatory-type solutions were outside the project scope, many panel members presented these as protective systems. Since the panel members felt so strongly about these types of solutions, they were left in the evaluation process. Regulatory measures preferred over protective measures: The solutions preferred by the panel in Russells (1993) study were those of the regulatory preventative-measure type. They were rated higher and their effectiveness was considered to be higher than the physical systems (consequence reducing measures). The panel felt that physical protective systems were best limited to those areas where a specific high-risk situation had been identified. These areas should have a high enough risk to offset the cost. Although specific cost information was not provided in the study, the panel considered it when making suggestions and conducting ratings. Perhaps if costs to both users and governments were considered, focussing on high-risk areas may be a cheaper option. Calculating the costs of regulatory measures with farreaching effects is often controversial. Of the physical type of protective systems recommended by the panel used in Russell Sr.s study (1993), communication and detection-type protective systems were rated very high. It was stated that although these types of systems have been used in industrial situations, research and development would be needed to adapt these types of systems to general highway use. Other papers have stated that regulatory requirements surrounding dangerous goods are generally adequate, but enforcement is a problem. There could be underlying reasons why Russells panel rated the regulatory measures so high. The panel was made up entirely of state officials perhaps they were most comfortable with regulations as this was their area of expertise. Another reason could be that physical protection measures were a new concept. The measures that were proposed to mitigate the catastrophic events had not been used before, so were unfamiliar and this could have lead to some scepticism. Finally, all of the physical measures were related to reducing consequences whereas the regulatory measures included a mix of preventative and mitigative measures (although the author did not acknowledge this difference). The risk reduction measures developed to reduce risk of dangerous goods transport by rail in Sweden were rated by a study group (Banverket and Rddningsverket, 2000). Ten of the 19 measures 74
generated by the knowledgeable study group were rated as being more effective. The experience and knowledge among the group members were used to rate the measures. Potential cost and feasibility of implementing the measures were taken into account while rating the measures.
8.1.2
Quantitative estimates of effectiveness Quantitative estimates of the effectiveness of risk reduction measures can be carried out when the measures change input parameters to quantitative risk models or methodologies (such as that by Rddningsverket, 1996). The models can then be used if there is sufficient data available. They are applied to specific cases and require detailed information on the transport route and dangerous goods types and flows. For example road type, speed limit and traffic flow are among the input data required for road transport. Data for rail include track quality, number and type of crossings, and number of wagons carrying dangerous goods per train. For both road and rail, information on the transport route such as population density, land type and ground cover are required. The effectiveness of risk reduction measures can vary when they are applied to different cases. It is therefore difficult to generate a quantitative estimate for a general effect. For example, the detailed assessment of risk for dangerous goods transport in road tunnels by the OECD (2001) stated that the effectiveness of risk reduction measures is unique to each tunnel. A general effect of the measures that could be applied to all tunnels could not be estimated. The report stated that a complete assessment of risk reduction measures would require considering the effectiveness for all types of dangerous goods, weather conditions, all possible punctures and damage to the dangerous goods container, and many other conditions. As an alternative, thirteen different scenarios were used to assess effectiveness under a range of conditions. The use of different scenarios to give a range of potential effectiveness of risk reduction measures could be used for any measures that can be assessed with quantitative models. Typical transport links or nodes could be selected for the first modelling attempt. Alternatively parts of the transport network that have the highest flows of dangerous goods, or that are a worse case for some other reason such as environmental sensitivity, dense population, or higher accident probabilities could be used. If there is a favourable effect for the more extreme cases, other cases representing average or good conditions could be examined to determine if the measure should be applied to other parts of the transportation network.
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8.1.3
Assessment of reduction measures - summary In summary, the effectiveness of a risk reduction measure can be assessed quantitatively only if there is sufficient information and background data to include it in a risk analysis model. This is shown as follows:
Risk reduction measure affects input parameter in quantitative risk models?
No
Yes No
Is the risk reduction measure applied to a specific transport link or node?
No
Is there enough data and resources to generate representative scenarios?
Yes
Yes
Is sufficient information available as input to a model?
No
Yes
Use available quantitative model to assess risk reduction
Attempt to evaluate measure using subjective techniques or expert judgement
For measures applied across the transport chain to the human element, there is currently no statistical background data or common methodology for quantifying potential risk reduction.
8.2
Implementation issues
The complexity and issues related to the implementation of safety measures should be considered as part of the evaluation. Changing international regulations takes considerable time and requires lobbying and extensive studies to provide supporting documentation.
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When selecting which risk reduction measures to implement, decision makers may prefer those that present less of a risk for loss of public image. Erkut and Ingolfsson (2000) describe how decision makers can be adverse to low probability / high consequence events, and may prefer routing of hazardous materials that minimizes the maximum consequence, rather than minimizes overall societal risk. A single accident that affects a large number of people may attract proportionally more media and public attention than a series of smaller incidents that influence fewer people at a time. They also postulate that risk-aversion would be the case for private transport companies. Any company involved in a large scale incident may incur very significant costs in terms of public image. So a company may prefer routes that have a higher probability of having an impact on fewer people, than one with an equivalent overall risk but concentrated on a single low probability, high consequence incident. These thoughts about routing should also apply to decision-making about other risk reduction measures. Those measures that reduce risk of a catastrophic event may be preferable to decision-makers to similar measures that are focussed on the reduction of lower-consequence events.
8.3
Costs and benefits

Safety measures and risk reduction measures represent costs to the transport industry and to society as a whole for improvements to infrastructure that are carried out with public funds. It is therefore important to be able to assess the measures from a cost-benefit perspective to select those that provide the greatest improvement in safety for a given cost. Boardman et al. (2001) describe the main steps of a cost-benefit process. The first four steps are as follows: Specify the alternative projects Decide whose benefits and costs are important Catalogue the impacts and select the measurement units Predict the impacts quantitatively over the life of the project.
For assessing risk reduction measures, if a number of measures were being considered together, they could be specified and compared at the same time. For example a road transport route could be compared to rail transport. If evaluation of a single measure were to be considered, comparison could be to the existing situation. The second step requires a decision on whose costs and benefits are to be included. Will they include costs and benefits from a national perspective? Should costs to transport companies and transportation system users from other 77
countries be included? The third step is to catalogue the impacts by listing each impact as a cost or a benefit. Cost impacts would include categories such as construction costs and operation and maintenance costs. Benefits could include improved safety resulting in fewer deaths and injuries or reduced environmental damage. Depending on the measures being considered, there may be either costs or benefits to transport companies. A measure that involves requiring dangerous goods to be transported on a longer route to avoid populated areas would result in additional costs to transporters. Construction of a new, shorter route would result in benefits to transporters. The impacts of dangerous goods accidents have been categorised in a comparative risk study (Battelle, 2001) of hazardous materials road transport accidents as follows: Injuries and deaths Cleanup costs Property damage Evacuation Product loss Traffic incident delay Environmental damage.
The benefits associated with risk reduction measures will be a reduction in the total costs associated with each of these categories each year. The costs associated with implementation of risk reduction measures, such as improved equipment, packaging and routing will be distributed along the chain of custody of the goods in some manner. For other measures such as overall accident rate improvements and infrastructure development part of the costs will be distributed throughout society. Table 13 shows categories of costs and benefits associated with the types of risk reduction measures discussed in section 5 of this report.
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Type of Risk Reduction Measure Physical Infrastructure Measures to Reduce General Accident Probability
Benefits Dangerous Other Benefits Goods Incidents Benefits related to reduction of all other types of accidents Possible benefits to transporters due to reduced transport time.
Costs Construction, planning, implementation costs, also operation and maintenance costs
Physical Measures to Reduce Consequences Improvements to tanks and equipment
Benefits related to reduction in dangerous
Routing to Reduce Probabilities and Consequences
goods accidents and incidents
Emergency response Individual: Training
Individual: interface improvements, drug testing, work environment improvements Improvements at an organisational level: safety advisor, incident reporting, safety culture Improved information handling and availability
potential benefits due to reductions of other types of work-place accidents improved company profile, potential benefits due to reductions of other types of work-place accidents
Costs for constructing protection measures Costs to governments for research and testing to establish new standards Costs to transporters if equipment, etc. is more expensive Some costs to the government for implementing routing requirements Possible costs to transporters if the routes take more time or fuel Costs to the government/society ongoing costs, annual costs for salaries, equipment, etc. Costs to the transport companies Possible costs to the government to implement requirements and standards Costs to the transport companies, possible costs to regulatory agencies if standards and requirements are introduced Costs to the transport company, costs to the government to administer mandatory programs such as the safety advisor program Costs to the transport company, costs to the government to administer and manage (compliance checking, monitoring available information)
Table 13. Categories of costs and benefits associated with different types of risk control measures for dangerous goods transport 79
All measures shown on the table are considered to have the potential for benefits through improved safety of dangerous goods transport. Risk control measures that reduce the probability of all types of accidents, not just those that involve dangerous goods, have other societal benefits. There are benefits to reducing the number of deaths and injuries that occur with vehicles carrying passengers or nondangerous goods. Benefits to society from these types of accident reductions should also be included in the cost-benefit assessment. Examples of cost-benefit analysis for dangerous goods transport risk reduction measures: Torstensson (1999) reported on risk reduction measures for tanker trucks that were evaluated from a cost-benefit perspective. These measures were related to equipment improvements for the vehicles, primarily the design and construction of the tank and associated equipment. The data was from the German THESEUS project (Gnther et al., 1995). The measures that were assessed to have a cost-benefit less than one included: lower centre of gravity roll-over warning improved/strengthened connections between tank and vehicle frame or chassis improved manway covers warning system for proximity to obstacles protection for front tank edges improved lighting improved protection of tank and equipment during rollovers
Although these measures were estimated to be beneficial, the conclusion was that safety gains in the area of equipment improvement come at a high cost. It was considered that reducing errors through education and other technical means throughout the safety chain could be more efficient. An earlier Swedish study (Lindberg and Morn, 1994) assessed infrastructure changes, specifically protective areas around railways in an urban environment, and re-construction of roads used for liquefied petroleum gas. For the fictional case studies used, the cost-benefit ratios did not support the infrastructure changes. The costs were much higher than the estimated benefits from reducing the dangerous goods accidents. For physical, protective systems to reduce consequences along a transport route, the application is most effective in site-specific high80
risk areas, where the cost can be offset by the risk reduction that is achieved. It is not possible to do a general cost-benefit analysis for these types of systems, as their effectiveness and risk reduction potential is clearly tied to the specific areas where they are constructed. However, they can be very effective at reducing risk in these specific areas, and cost-benefit can be carried out on a case-by-case basis. Since training and human error reduction measures are more broad spectrum and are effective across the whole transport chain, the quantification of benefits would be extremely difficult and subjective. Even if an estimate of error reduction is possible, this still needs to be translated into a figure that represents a reduction in spills of dangerous goods. Errors of themselves do not always lead to release of dangerous goods. There are usually many opportunities along the chain of events to correct the situation before a release occurs. Without a quantitative estimate of risk reduction potential, it is not possible to conduct a costbenefit analysis. Development of a base of empirical information or methods for quantifying the effectiveness of risk control measures associated with human and management factors would facilitate the analysis.
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CONCLUSIONS
Risk factors at transport nodes such as terminals and ports differ from those along the en-route portion of the transport chain, so require different techniques for assessment. For dangerous goods in the enroute portion of the chain, risk factors for probabilities used in quantitative methods include vehicle/vessel type and condition, transport system infrastructure, flow volumes, and general accident rates (for all types of vehicles). Factors for consequences include population, environmental sensitivity, and emergency response. Loading and unloading activities, handling, and information availability can influence the probability of accidents at transport nodes. The effects on risk throughout the transport chain of factors such as improved information flow, training, and safety culture improvements have not been quantified, and thus cannot be part of a functional model of risk at this time. The information flow moving with the dangerous goods at transport nodes can be used to guide activities related to the movement and handling of the goods, and is important for emergency response personnel in the event of an accident. A case study illustrated some of the problems with information flow at nodes. Data from compliance inspections for all modes of transport shows there are problems with following the regulations. There is potential for errors to be reduced through the use of automated information procedures and electronic forms of information. Safety measures that can be quantified from a risk reduction perspective include those that can be physically applied to parts of the transport chain, such as infrastructure improvements to reduce overall accident rates, changes to routes, and protective structures along transport routes to reduce consequences. Existing risk analysis tools such as computer programs can help with this quantification. Other types of risk reduction measures such as those that have broader effects throughout the transport chain. Regulations for road, rail, maritime transport, and air transport have recently been revised to achieve greater harmony and to be more userfriendly. The overall goal of the regulations is to prevent harm to people, property, and the environment. Inspection data shows that there are still problems with compliance with these regulations. Training is considered to be one of the measures that can improve compliance. A number of studies have identified human error as a significant cause of dangerous goods accidents that can occur at any point along the transport chain. Methods to reduce human error include training, better 83
interfaces, and improved safety cultures in organisations appear promising. The process of investigating and reporting incidents increases awareness of safety issues. Cost-benefit analysis of risk reduction measures is recognised as an important way to allocate scarce resources to improve safety. There are still difficulties, however, with evaluating some promising categories of risk reduction measures such as those associated with reducing human error. Development of methods to evaluate the effectiveness of human error reduction techniques in reducing the risk of dangerous goods accidents would be valuable and facilitate improved cost-benefit analysis.
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SSPA Research Report No.

System risk in dangerous goods transport

Joanne Ellis SSPA Sweden AB Gteborg

SSPA Research Report No. 120

System risk in dangerous goods transport

System risk in dangerous goods transport

MODELLING RISK IN A DANGEROUS GOODS TRANSPORT CHAIN

117 3 5 28 514 37 38 4 6 62 0 100 200 300 400 500 600

Model of risk in a multi-modal transport chain

Probability: road type traffic flow vehicle type and condition

Consequences: population density land type environmental sensitivity emergency response

Risk Port Ship Port Rail Destination

Documents Labels, Placarding (ADR) Documents Labels, Placarding (IMDG)

Documents Labels, Placarding (RID)

Documents Labels, Placarding (RID)

Author: Joanne Ellis

Link (3 sections) RL1 RL2 RL3

Physical flow of information and role in guidance of risk reduction actions

Transport Chain Port IMDG RID Port Destination ADR

Documents, Labels, Placarding (RID)

Guides Actions (Potential Risk Reduction):

loading temporary parking / separation railcar separation

Unloading Appropriate handling

CASE STUDY STOCKHOLM PORT

Case study data collection and methodology

Dangerous goods accidents and incidents

Dangerous goods movement at Stockholm Port

Arrivals by Land Dangerous Goods Flow

Register Shipping Customer with DG Fax: Advance notification

Fax: Advance notification

Shipping Company in Origin Port Vessel en-route to Stockholm

Stockholm Port dangerous goods database

Dangerous goods flows at Stockholm Port

Class 1 0,3% Class 9 16% Class 2 6%

Class 8 20% Class 3 49%

Class 7 0,3% Class 6 3% Class 5 2% Class 4 4%

Class 1 Class 2 Class 3 Class 4 Class 5 Class 6 Class 7 Class 8 Class 9

Class 9 Class 8 Class 7 Class 6 Class 5 Class 4 Class 3 Class 2 Class 1

January 2001 February 2001 March 2001 April 2001

Table 1. Summary of quality check on database from advance notifications.

Hazards and risks

Summary Comments and relevance to other transport nodes

RISK REDUCTION AND MANAGEMENT TECHNIQUES

Types of risk reduction measures

Reduces probability of all accidents

Reduces probability of all accidents

Planning, national or regional restrictions

Table 2. Risk reduction measures physical and quantifiable measures

Risk Reduction Measures

Probability (P) or Consequence (C) Reduction C

Transport Chain Component

Level of Application (Regulatory, national, regional )

Both en-route and nodes

Reduces consequences of all accidents

Human factors, reduction of human error

Both en-route and nodes

Ensuring safety is an important objective of the organisation

Both en-route and nodes

Both en-route and nodes Both en-route and nodes

International regulations International regulations for minimum requirements

Table 3. Risk reduction measures with broad effects (difficult to quantify)

Category Mitigative Detection and warning