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1 LANSANG VS.

GARCIA 2 SCRA 448, December 11, 1971 IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF TEODOSIO LANSANG RODOLFO DEL ROSARIO, and BAYANI ALCALA, petitioners, vs. BRIGADIER-GENERAL EDUARDO M. GARCIA, Chief, Philippine Constabulary, respondent.

FACTS: August 21, 1971, at about 9 p. m. while the Liberal Party was holding a public meeting at Plaza Miranda, Manila, for the presentation of its candidates in the general elections scheduled for November 8, 1971, two hand grenades were thrown at the platform where said candidates and other persons were. As a consequence, eight persons were killed and many more were injured. August 23, 1971 Pres. Marcos announced the issuance of Proclamation No. 889, suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus for the persons presently detained, as well as others who may be hereafter similarly detained for the crimes of insurrection or rebellion, and all other crimes in connection therewith. Petitioners were arrested and detained as suspected participants and/or perpetrators of the incident. In turn, petitions for writs of habeas corpus were filed with the Supreme Court by the petitioners who were arrested and detained without a warrant. Lansang together with the other petitioners questioned the validity of the suspension of the writ averring that the suspension does not meet the constitutional requisites. In said petition, the petitioners assailed the validity of Proclamation No. 889 made by the President and challenged its constitutionality on the ground that it does not comply with the Constitutional requisites, more specifically in Sec. 1 (par. 14.) of Art. III, which reads:

the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended except in cases of invasion, insurrection, or rebellion, when public safety requires it, in any way of which events the same may be suspended wherever during such period the necessity for such suspension shall exist. and that of Sec. 10 (par. 1) of Art. VII, which reads: The President shall be commander-in-chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and, whenever it becomes necessary, may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, insurrection, or rebellion. In case of invasion, insurrection, or rebellion or imminent danger thereof, when the public safety requires it, he may suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, of place the Philippines or any part thereof under Martial Law. The respondents, on the other hand, alleged that petitioners were apprehended and detained on reasonable belief that they had participated in the crime of insurrection or rebellion and that their continued detention is justified pursuant to the Proclamation No. 889.

2 August 30, 1971 - Proclamation No. 889-A amending the Proclamation No. 889, was issued by the President which reads:

x x x insurrection or rebellion [,] and [all] other [crimes and offenses] overt acts committed by them in furtherance [or on the occasion] thereof[,]. [or incident thereto, or in connection therewith.] November 15, 1971 - the Solicitor General filed a manifestation that nine (9) petitioners including Lansang had already been released as of November 13, 1971 while five (5) petitioners were still in their custody who were charged of violating the Anti-Subversion Act (R. A. No. 1700) respectively in the City Fiscals Office of Quezon City and in the Court of First Instance of Rizal. November 23, 1971 - Those who were still detained filed their comment to respondents manifestations, urging the court to already rule on the merits of the petitions, particularly on the constitutionality of Proc. No. 889 because its concern is public interest and civil liberties of the people. They also maintained the issue is not moot, not even to those who have been released due to the fact that as long as the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus remains suspended, those petitioners are still in danger of being arrested and detained again without valid reason. However, the Solicitor General insisted in his reply that the petitions were already moot and academic for the reason that the petitioners had already been released.

ISSUE/S: Whether the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus made by the president is valid. Whether the presidents decision was final and conclusive upon the courts and all other persons. Whether the petitions are already moot and academic.

RULING: PETITIONS DENIED. Judgment rendered declaring that the President did not act arbitrarily in issuing Proclamation No. 889, as amended, and that the same is not unconstitutional; petitions in L-33964, L-34004, L-34039, and L34265 dismissed; Court of First Instance of Rizal directed to act with utmost dispatch in conducting preliminary examination and/or investigation of the charges for violation of the Anti-Subversion Act filed against other petitioners, and to issue warrants of arrest if probable cause is found to exist against them, or otherwise, to order their release; and parties may, by motion, seek proper relief in these proceedings if there should be undue delay in the completion of the preliminary examination and/or investigation, or the issuance of proper orders or resolutions in connection therewith.

RATIO DECIDENDI:

3 The courts find that the Proclamation No. 889 of the President as valid because the requisites for the suspension of writ of habeas corpus are present. That there must be invasion, insurrection or rebellion, imminent danger thereof [Sec. 10 (par. 2) of Art. VIII of the 1935 Constitution] and public safety must require said aforementioned suspension. That the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus by the President is justifiable due to the acts of subversion and violence committed on the August 21, 1971, by lawless elements. Nevertheless, pursuant to the principle of the separation of power underlying our system of government, the Executive is only supreme in his own sphere. And the judiciary department has the authority to determine whether or not the legislature or the executive had gone beyond their constitutional limits. Therefore, the Supreme Court had the authority to inquire into the existence of the factual bases in the light of the requirements of the constitution. The determination of the President of the existence of such bases was neither absolute nor binding upon the courts. As for the issue of the petitions being moot and academic, the court ruled that there was no need in settling the questions being brought up as far as the released detainees were concerned because they were already released. Nevertheless, for those still detained, the issue on their right to bail was, however, in the jurisdiction of the courts of where they were charged.

EDU VS. ERICTA G.R. No. L-32096 October 24, 1970 ROMEO F. EDU, in his capacity as Land Transportation Commissioner, petitioner, vs. HON. VICENTE G. ERICTA in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Br. XVIII, Quezon City, and TEDDY C. GALO respondents. FACTS: Respondents Judge Ericta and Galo filed a suit for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction assailing the validity of the challenged Act (Administrative Order No. 2) as an invalid exercise of the police power, for being violative of the due process clause. They assailed the validity of the Reflector Law as an invalid exercise of the police power. The Reflector Law reads in full: Lights and reflector when parked or disabled. Appropriate parking lights or flares visible one hundred meters away shall be displayed at a corner of the vehicle whenever such vehicle is parked on highways or in places that are not well-lighted or is placed in such manner as to endanger passing traffic. Furthermore, every motor vehicle shall be provided at all times with built-in reflectors or other similar warning devices either pasted, painted or attached to its front and back which shall likewise be visible at light at least one hundred meters away. No vehicle not provided with any of the requirements mentioned in this subsection shall be registered." It is thus obvious that the challenged statute is a legislation enacted under the police power to promote public safety. ISSUE: Whether or not Administrative Order No. 2 is invalid for being contrary to the principle of non-delegation of legislative power. RULING: The writs of certiorari and prohibition prayed for are granted, the orders of the writ of preliminary injunction denying reconsideration are annulled and set aside. Respondent Judge is likewise directed to dismiss the petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by respondent Teddy C. Galo, there being no cause of action as

5 the Reflector Law and Administrative Order No. 2 of petitioner have not been shown to be tainted by invalidity.

RATIO DECIDENDI: Administrative Order No. 2 is not contrary to the principle of non-delegation of legislative power. It bears repeating that the Reflector Law construed together with the Land Transportation Code. Republic Act No. 4136, of which it is an amendment, leaves no doubt as to the stress and emphasis on public safety which is the prime consideration in statutes of this character. It is a fundamental principle flowing from the doctrine of separation of powers that Congress may not delegate its legislative power to the two other branches of the government, subject to the exception that local governments may over local affairs participate in its exercise. To determine whether or not there is an undue delegation of legislative power the inquiry must be directed to the scope and definiteness of the measure enacted. To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there must be a standard, which implies at the very least that the legislature itself determines matters of principle and lay down fundamental policy. There is likewise a categorical affirmation of the power of petitioner as Land Transportation Commissioner to promulgate rules and regulations to give life to and translate into actuality such fundamental purpose. His power is clear. There has been no abuse. His Administrative Order No. 2 can easily survive the attack, farfrom-formidable, launched against it by respondent Galo. Thereafter, the executive or administrative office designated may in pursuance of the above guidelines promulgate supplemental rules and regulations. In the Reflector Law, clearly the legislative objective is public safety.

6 GARCIA PADILLA VS. ENRILE G.R. No. L-61388 July 19, 1985 IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS FOR DR. AURORA PARONG, NORBERTO PORTUGUESE, SABINO PADILLA, FRANCIS DIVINA GRACIA, IMELDA DE LOS SANTOS, BENJAMIN PINEDA, ZENAIDA MALLARI, MARIANO SORIANO, TITO TANGUILIG, LETTY BALLOGAN, BIENVENIDA GARCIA, EUFRONIO ORTIZ, JR., JUANITO GRANADA and TOM VASQUEZ, JOSEFINA GARCIA PADILLA, petitioner, vs. MINISTER JUAN PONCE ENRILE, GENERAL FABIAN C. VER GENERAL FIDEL V. RAMOS, and LT. COL. MIGUEL CORONEL, respondents.

FACTS: The petitioners in Padilla were initially placed under surveillance as "identified" members of the Communist Party of the Philippines, allegedly engaged in subversive activities and using the residence and clinic of Dr. Aurora Parong in Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, as their headquarters. A judicial search warrant, authoring the seizure of "subversive documents, firearms of assorted calibers, medicine and other subversive paraphernalia" was secured by the Philippine Constabulary (PC) and served on 6 July 1982 at 1:45 p.m. The petitioners were allegedly caught in flagrante delicto holding a conference and the possession of firearms, cash, medicines, and some documents described as subversive. Nine of the fourteen detainees were arrested when three teams of the PC/INP of Bayombong, Nueva after securing a Search Warrant conducted a raid at the residence The herein fourteen (14) detainees were all detained at the PC/INP Command Headquarters, Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya from July 6, 1982 until their transfer on the morning of August 10, 1982 to an undisclosed place. They were placed under arrest and kept under detention for forty.-two days, without the filing of formal charges or the benefit of any of their rights as accused. On the forty-third day, a petition for habeas corpus was filed on their behalf. Hence, this petition for the writ of habeas corpus and mandamus filed by Josefina Garcia-Padilla, mother of detained petitioner Sabino G. Padilla, Jr. on August 13, 1982.

ISSUE: Whether or not the arrests done against the detainees are valid.

RULING: Pursuant to Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 1877 and Section 8 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing Presidential Decree No. 1877-A, the motion for reconsideration should have been granted, and the writ of habeas corpus ordering the release of the detainees covered by such Section 8 issued, but

7 in the light of the foregoing manifestation as to Norberto Portuguese, Sabino Padilla, Francis Divina gracia, Imelda de los Santos, Benjamin Pineda, Zenaida Mallari, Mariano Soriano, Tito Tanguilig, Letty Ballogan, Bienvenida Garcia, Eufronio Ortiz, Jr., Juanito Granada, and Tom Vasquez, having been released, the petition as to them has been declared moot and academic. As to Dr. Aurora Parong, since a warrant of arrest against her was issued by the municipal court of Bayombong on August 4, 1982, for illegal possession of firearm and ammunitions, the petition is likewise declared moot and academic. RATIO DECIDENDI: The Supreme Court decision in the Lansang Case was reversed and the ruling in the Barcelon Case & the Montenegro Case was again reinstated. The questioned power of the president to suspend the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus was once again held as discretionary in the president. The Supreme Court again reiterated that the suspension of the writ was a political question to be resolved solely by the president. It was also noted that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus must, indeed, carry with it the suspension of the right to bail, if the governments campaign to suppress the rebellion is to be enhanced and rendered effective. If the right to bail may be demanded during the continuance of the rebellion, and those arrested, captured and detained in the course thereof will be released, they would, without the least doubt, rejoin their comrades in the field thereby jeopardizing the success of government efforts to bring to an end the invasion, rebellion or insurrection.

NOTE: This ruling was aboilished by Sec 18, Art 7 of the 1987 Constitution which expressly constitutionalized the Lansang Doctrine. Note as well that under Art 3 (Sec 13) of the Constitution it is stated that the right to bail shall not be impaired even if the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended.

8 PEOPLE VS. DACUYCUY G.R. No. L-45127 May 5, 1989 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the Provincial Fiscal of Leyte, petitioner, vs. HON. JUDGE AUXENCIO C. DACUYCUY, CELESTINO S. MATONDO, SEGUNDINO A, CAVAL and CIRILO M. ZANORIA, respondents.

FACTS: On April 4, 1975, Celestino S. Matondo, Segundino A. Caval and Cirilo M. Zanoria, public school officials of Leyte, were charged before the Municipal Court of Hindang, Leyte for violation of Republic Act No. 4670, otherwise known as the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers, and the constitutionality of Section 32 thereof. Republic Act No. 4670 provides: Sec. 32. Penal Provision. A person who shall willfully interfere with, restrain or coerce any teacher in the exercise of his rights guaranteed by this Act or who shall in any other manner commit any act to defeat any of the provisions of this Act shall, upon conviction, be punished by a fine of not less than one hundred pesos nor more than one thousand pesos, or by imprisonment, in the discretion of the court. (Emphasis supplied). On September 8, 1976, respondent judge rendered a decision holding that Republic Act No. 4670 is valid and constitutional but cases for its violation fall outside of the jurisdiction of municipal and city courts. The petitioners alleged that Section 32 of Republic Act No. 4670 is unconstitutional for the following reasons: (1) It imposes a cruel and unusual punishment, the term of imprisonment being unfixed and may run to reclusion perpetua; and (2) It also constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power, the duration of the penalty of imprisonment being solely left to the discretion of the court as if the latter were the legislative department of the Government. Hence, this is an instant petition is a review to the decision of respondent judge.

ISSUES: Whether the municipal and city courts have jurisdiction over violations of Republic Act No. 4670 Whether Section 32 of said Republic Act No. 4670 is constitutional.

RULING: The decision and resolution of respondent judge are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Criminal Case No. 555 filed against private respondents herein is hereby ordered to be remanded to the Municipal Trial Court of Hindang, Leyte for trial on the merits.

RATIO DECIDENDI: The respondent judge erroneously assumed that since the penalty of imprisonment has been provided for by the legislature, the court is endowed with the discretion to ascertain the term or period of imprisonment. This assumption could not be agreed upon. It is not for the courts to fix the term of imprisonment where no points of reference have been provided by the legislature. What valid delegation presupposes and sanctions is an exercise of discretion to fix the length of service of a term of imprisonment which must be encompassed within specific or designated limits provided by law, the absence of which designated limits well constitute such exercise as an undue delegation, if not-an outright intrusion into or assumption, of legislative power. Section 32 of Republic Act No. 4670 provides for an indeterminable period of imprisonment, with neither a minimum nor a maximum duration having been set by the legislative authority. The courts are thus given a wide latitude of discretion to fix the term of imprisonment, without even the benefit of any sufficient standard, such that the duration thereof may range, in the words of respondent judge, from one minute to the life span of the accused. Irremissibly, this cannot be allowed. It vests in the courts a power and a duty essentially legislative in nature and which, as applied to this case, does violence to the rules on separation of powers as well as the nondelegability of legislative powers. This time, the presumption of constitutionality has to yield.