only the criminal liability (including the fine, which is pecuniary, but not civil) of the accused is extinguished

by his death, but the civil liability remains [G.R. No. 81337. August 16, 1991.] RICHARD V. PETRALBA, petitioner, vs. THE SANDIGANBAYAN and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. PARAS This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks the reversal of the Decision of the Sandiganbayan promulgated on October 5, 1987 in Criminal Case No. 9390 entitled "The People of the Philippines vs. Richard V. Petralba" convicting herein petitioner of the crime of Malversation of Public Funds penalized under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code and the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan dated December 15, 1987 denying the petitioner's motion for reconsideration. Facts: Petitioner Richard V. Petralba was designated OIC of the Municipal Treasury of Alcoy, Cebu on October 23, 1979. Fourteen months after designation, petitioner's cashbook balance was audited by Auditors Constantino Alagar and Rene Flores. He was found short of P28,107.00. Petitioner was charged with, and convicted of, 31 counts of "Malversation of Public Funds," "Illegal Use of Public Funds" and "Falsification of Public Documents." Petitioner was granted probation and continued his function as Municipal Treasurer of Alcoy, Cebu, from December 23, 1980 until he was succeeded by Mrs. Lilia Suico on March 15, 1981. Petitioner's cash and accounts from the period of December 23, 1980 to March 15, 1981 were audited by Leticia Trazo and Flora Pacana. Petitioner was found short in the amount of P50,447.06 On December 4, 1981, the Trazo Team sent a letter to the petitioner demanding the turnover of the latter's cash accountability. Vouchers amounting to P43,468.84, which were previously allowed by Auditors Constantino Alagar and Rene Flores, were presented by petitioner to Auditors Trazo and Pacana. Only the amount of P21,348.87 was allowed reducing the petitioner's accountability to only P29,098.19 while the remaining vouchers amounting to P22,119.97 were disallowed for want of administrative approval. On July 30, 1984 herein petitioner, Richard V. Petralba, was charged with Malversation of Public Funds, in violation of Article 217, Revised Penal Code, allegedly committed as follows: "That on the 5th day of November, 1981 and for some time prior thereto, in the Municipality of Alcoy, Province of Cebu, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, a Deputy Provincial and Municipal Treasurer then designated as the Officer in Charge of the Municipal Treasury of Alcoy, Cebu, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take and misappropriate the amount of P29,098.19 representing various receipts and collection and, therefore, public funds, which he had custody or control by reason of the duties of his office and for which he was accountable, and despite repeated demands for him to produce or restitute the amount, failed and still fails to do so, to the damage and prejudice of the government in the amount aforestated.

In violation of Article 217 of the Revised (Penal) Code." (Rollo, "Information," pp. 21-22) During the pre-trial inquest, the parties stipulated and agreed on the following facts: "(A)The accused admits that he had been appointed Deputy Provincial and Municipal Treasurer of Alcantara, Cebu as shown by Exh. A; "(2)That on October 23, 1979, he was designated Officer-in-Charge of the Municipal Treasury of Alcoy, Cebu and acted as such until March 15, 1981 as shown by Exh. B; "(3)Accused also admits that on March 15, 1981 the office of the accused as Officer-in-Charge of the Municipal Treasurer of Alcoy, Cebu was turned over to Mrs. Lilia Suico; "(4)That accused admits that after the turn-over of the office to Suico the statement of his cash accountability was prepared and signed by him as shown in Exh. C and C-1; "(5)Accused admits that on November 5, 1981 COA Examiners Leticia Trazo and Flora Pacana conducted an examination on the cash and accounts of his (sic) as shown by the Reports of Examination for General Funds marked Exh. D, Trust Funds marked Exh. E, Infrastructure Funds as Exh. F and Special Educational Funds marked as Exh. G and that certified the findings of the COA examiners as reflected in said report and his signatures a ready marked as Exhs. D1, F-1 and G-1; "(6)Likewise, accused admitted that on December 7, 1981, a letter of demand was served on and received by him as reflected in Exh, H, as shown by his signature acknowledging receipt thereof; "(7)Accused admits that COA Examiners Leticia Trazo and Flora Pacana were duly authorized to conduct an examination of the cash and accounts of the accused as shown by Exh. I; "(8)That accused admits that he was originally found short in the amount of P50,447.00 as shown by Exh. J, however, after he submitted vouchers which were allowed, his shortage was reduced to P29,098.19 as shown by Exhs. J-1 and K; "(9)That accused denies that up to the present he has not yet paid the amount of P29,098.19, and which he will explain on the witness stand. (Rollo, Annex "B", pp. 24-24) The respondent Court found that the vouchers disallowed by the Trazo team in the amount of P22,119.19 were either supported by invoices or receipts or duly signed by respective payees. Thus, the amount of P6,978.22 out of the P29,098.19 remained unaccounted for. The respondent Sandiganbayan rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads: "WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Richard V. Petralba guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Malversation of Public Funds described in and penalized under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code. Appreciating in favor of the accused the mitigating circumstance of Voluntary Surrender, there being no aggravating circumstance adduced and proven by the prosecution, the accused should be, as he is, hereby sentenced to the indeterminate penalty of, from Six (6) Years and One (1) Day of prision mayor, as minimum, to Ten (10) Years and One (1) Day of prision mayor, as

maximum, with the accessory penalties of the law; to pay a fine in the sum of P6,978.22, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency; to suffer the penalty of perpetual special disqualification; to indemnify the government in the aforesaid sum of P6,978.22; and to pay the costs. SO ORDERED." (pp. 68-69, Rollo) Sandiganbayan denied the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner dated December 15, 1987. Hence, this petition. On August 10, 1989, while this case was pending before Us, petitioner's counsel filed a manifestation that his client, Richard V. Petralba, had died, evidenced by a death certificate dated July 10, 1989. (Rollo, Annex "A" of Manifestation, p. 173). Under Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code, death of the convict extinguishes criminal liability. In view of the fact that one of the juridical conditions of penalty is that it is personal. A personal right of action dies with the person. A penal action is not given against an heir, unless, indeed, such heir is benefited by the wrong. Criminal liability does not only mean the obligation to serve the personal or imprisonment penalties but it also includes the liability to pay the fines or pecuniary penalties. Pecuniary liability is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment. In the case at bar, petitioner Richard V. Petralba died pending appeal and before any final judgment therein. Hence, the death of Richard V. Petralba extinguished his personal and pecuniary (such as the fine) liabilities. Though the death of an accused-appellant during the pendency of an appeal extinguished his criminal liability, his civil liability survives. Extinction of criminal liability does not necessarily mean that the civil liability is also extinguished. People vs. Navoa and in People vs. Sendaydiego: only the criminal liability (including the fine, which is pecuniary, but not civil) of the accused is extinguished by his death, but the civil liability remains. The claim of the government for the civil liability survives Petralba but only if the offense can be proved. The Supreme Court continues to exercise appellate jurisdiction over the petitioner's possible civil liability for the money claims of the government arising from the alleged criminal acts complained of Petitioner was able to explain the amount of P22,119.97 Out of the shortage of P29,098.19, but he failed to explain the remaining balance of P6,978.22, thereby giving rise to the conclusion that he had spent such amount for his personal use. estate of the deceased petitioner is hereby sentenced to indemnify the government in the amount of P6,978.22

Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore [G.R. No. 102007. September 2, 1994.] PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROGELIO BAYOTAS Y CORDOVA, accused-appellant. ROMERO Rogelio Bayotas y Cordova charged with Rape convicted thereof on June 19, 1991 in a decision penned by Judge Manuel E. Autajay. Pending appeal of his conviction, Bayotas died on February 4, 1992 at the National Bilibid Hospital due to cardio respiratory arrest secondary to hepatic encephalopathy secondary to hipato carcinoma gastric malingering Supreme Court in its Resolution of May 20, 1992 dismissed the criminal aspect of the appeal required the Solicitor General to file its comment with regard to Bayotas' civil liability arising from his commission of the offense charged. Solicitor General expressed his view that the death of accused-appellant did not extinguish his civil liability as a result of his commission of the offense charged; insists that the appeal should still be resolved for the purpose of reviewing his conviction by the lower court on which the civil liability is based. Counsel for the accused-appellant opposed the view of the Solicitor General arguing that the death of the accused while judgment of conviction is pending appeal extinguishes both his criminal and civil penalties People v. Castillo and Ocfemia: held that the civil obligation in a criminal case takes root in the criminal liability and, therefore, civil liability is extinguished if accused should die before final judgment is rendered. Issue: WON death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguish his civil liability? It resolved this issue thru the following disquisition: "Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code is the controlling statute. It reads, in part: 'ART. 89.How criminal liability is totally extinguished. Criminal liability is totally extinguished: 1.By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to the pecuniary penalties liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment; With reference to Castillo's criminal liability, there is no question. The law is plain. Statutory construction is unnecessary. Said liability is extinguished. The civil liability, however, poses a problem. Such liability is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment. Saddled upon us is the task of ascertaining the legal import of the term 'final judgment.' Is it final judgment as contradistinguished from an interlocutory order? Or, is it a judgment which is final and executory?

We go to the genesis of the law. The legal precept contained in Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code heretofore transcribed is lifted from Article 132 of the Spanish El Codigo Penal de 1870 The code of 1870 . . . it will be observed employs the term 'sentencia firme.' What is 'sentencia firme' under the old statute? 'Sentencia firme' really should be understood as one which is definite. as Judge Kapunan well explained, when a defendant dies before judgment becomes executory, 'there cannot be any determination by final judgment whether or not the felony upon which the civil action might arise exists,' for the simple reason that `there is no party defendant.' Section 7, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court which states that a judgment in a criminal case becomes final 'after the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal or when the sentence has been partially or totally satisfied or served, or the defendant has expressly waived in writing his right to appeal.' The term final judgment employed in the Revised Penal Code means judgment beyond recall. Really, as long as a judgment has not become executory, it cannot be truthfully said that defendant is definitely guilty of the felony charged against him. the right to institute a separate civil action is not reserved, the decision to be rendered must, of necessity, cover 'both the criminal and the civil aspects of the case. Judge Kapunan observed that as 'the civil action is based solely on the felony committed and of which the offender might be found guilty, the death of the offender extinguishes the civil liability.' Castillo's criminal liability is out. His civil liability is sought to be enforced by reason of that criminal liability. But then, if we dismiss, as we must, the criminal action and let the civil aspect remain, we will be faced with the anomalous situation whereby we will be called upon to clamp civil liability in a case where the source thereof criminal liability does not exist Bautista, et al. vs. Estrella: 'no party can be found and held criminally liable in a civil suit,' which solely would remain if we are to divorce it from the criminal proceeding." As held by then Supreme Court Justice Fernando in the Alison case: "The death of accused-appellant Bonifacio Alison having been established, and considering that there is as yet no final judgment in view of the pendency of the appeal, the criminal and civil liability of the said accusedappellant Alison was extinguished by his death; consequently, the case against him should be dismissed."

Buenaventura Belamala v. Marcelino Polinar and Lamberto Torrijos v. The Honorable Court of Appeals ruled differently We see no merit in the plea that the civil liability has been extinguished, in view of the provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines of 1950 (Rep. Act No. 386) that became operative eighteen years after the revised Penal Code. As pointed out by the Court below, Article 33 of the Civil Code establishes a civil action for damages on account of physical injuries, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action. 'ART. 33.In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.' Assuming that for lack of express reservation, Belamala's civil action for damages was to be considered instituted together with the criminal action still, since both proceedings were terminated without final adjudication, the civil action of the offended party under Article 33 may yet be enforced separately." In Torrijos, the Supreme Court held that: It should be stressed that the extinction of civil liability follows the extinction of the criminal liability under Article 89, only when the civil liability arises from the criminal act as its only basis. Stated differently, where the civil liability does not exist independently of the criminal responsibility, the extinction of the latter by death, ipso facto extinguishes the former, provided, of course, that death supervenes before final judgment. The said principle does not apply in instant case wherein the civil liability springs neither solely nor originally from the crime itself but from a civil contract of purchase and sale. In the above case, the court was convinced that the civil liability of the accused who was charged with estafa could likewise trace its genesis to Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code since said accused had swindled the first and second vendees of the property subject matter of the contract of sale. It therefore concluded: "Consequently, while the death of the accused herein extinguished his criminal liability including fine, his civil liability based on the laws of human relations remains." Since Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court 9 requires the dismissal of all money claims against the defendant whose death occurred prior to the final judgment of the Court of First Instance (CFI), then it can be inferred that actions for recovery of money may continue to be heard on appeal, when the death of the defendant supervenes after the CFI had rendered its judgment. In such case, explained this tribunal, "the name of the offended party shall be included in the title of the case as plaintiff-appellee and the legal representative or the heirs of the deceased-accused should be substituted as defendants-appellants." Stated differently, the claim for civil liability is also extinguished together with the criminal action if it were solely based thereon, i.e., civil liability ex delicto.

People v. Sendaydiego departed from this long-established principle of law accused Sendaydiego was charged with and convicted by the lower court of malversation thru falsification of public documents. Sendaydiego's death supervened during the pendency of the appeal of his conviction. This court in an unprecedented move resolved to dismiss Sendaydiego's appeal but only to the extent of his criminal liability. His civil liability was allowed to survive although it was clear that such claim thereon was exclusively dependent on the criminal action already extinguished. The legal import of such decision was for the court to continue exercising appellate jurisdiction over the entire appeal, passing upon the correctness of Sendaydiego's conviction despite dismissal of the criminal action, for the purpose of determining if he is civilly liable. "The claim of complainant Province of Pangasinan for the civil liability survived Sendaydiego because his death occurred after final judgment was rendered by the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, which convicted him of three complex crimes of malversation through falsification and ordered him to indemnify the Province in the total sum of P61,048.23. The civil action for the civil liability is deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal action in the absence of express waiver or its reservation in a separate action. The civil action for the civil liability is separate and distinct from the criminal action. When the action is for the recovery of money and the defendant dies before final judgment in the Court of First Instance, it shall be dismissed to be prosecuted in the manner especially provided in Rule 87 of the Rules of Court. The implication is that, if the defendant dies after a money judgment had been rendered against him by the Court of First Instance, the action survives him. It may be continued on appeal The accountable public officer may still be civilly liable for the funds improperly disbursed although he has no criminal liability In view of the foregoing, notwithstanding the dismissal of the appeal of the deceased Sendaydiego insofar as his criminal liability is concerned, the Court Resolved to continue exercising appellate jurisdiction over his possible civil liability for the money claims of the Province of Pangasinan arising from the alleged criminal acts complained of, as if no criminal case had been instituted against him, thus making applicable, in determining the civil liability, Article 30 of the Civil Code Succeeding cases raising the identical issue have maintained adherence to our ruling in Sendaydiego; in other words, they were a reaffirmance of our abandonment of the settled rule that a civil liability solely anchored on the criminal (civil liability ex delicto) is extinguished upon dismissal of the entire appeal due to the demise of the accused. Sendaydiego: The resolution of the civil action impliedly instituted in the criminal action can proceed irrespective of the latter's extinction due to death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction, pursuant to Article 30 of the Civil Code and Section 21, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court. Article 30 of the Civil Code provides:

"When a separate civil action is brought to demand civil liability arising from a criminal offense, and no criminal proceedings are instituted during the pendency of the civil case, a preponderance of evidence shall likewise be sufficient to prove the act complained of." Nowhere in its text is there a grant of authority to continue exercising appellate jurisdiction over the accused's civil liability ex delicto when his death supervenes during appeal. What Article 30 recognizes is an alternative and separate civil action which may be brought to demand civil liability arising from a criminal offense independently of any criminal action. In the event that no criminal proceedings are instituted during the pendency of said civil case, the quantum of evidence needed to prove the criminal act will have to be that which is compatible with civil liability and that is, preponderance of evidence and not proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Citing or invoking Article 30 to justify the survival of the civil action despite extinction of the criminal would in effect merely beg the question of whether civil liability ex delicto survives upon extinction of the criminal action due to death of the accused during appeal of his conviction. This is because whether asserted in the criminal action or in a separate civil action, civil liability ex delicto is extinguished by the death of the accused while his conviction is on appeal. Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code is clear on this matter: prcd "Art. 89.How criminal liability is totally extinguished. Criminal liability is totally extinguished: 1.By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment; xxx xxx xxx" However, the ruling in Sendaydiego deviated from the expressed intent of Article 89. It allowed claims for civil liability ex delicto to survive by ipso facto treating the civil action impliedly instituted with the criminal, as one filed under Article 30, as though no criminal proceedings had been filed but merely a separate civil action. This had the effect of converting such claims from one which is dependent on the outcome of the criminal action to an entirely new and separate one, the prosecution of which does not even necessitate the filing of criminal proceedings. One would be hard put to pinpoint the statutory authority for such a transformation. It is to be borne in mind that in recovering civil liability ex delicto, the same has perforce to be determined in the criminal action, rooted as it is in the court's pronouncement of the guilt or innocence of the accused. This is but to render fealty to the intendment of Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that "every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable." In such cases, extinction of the criminal action due to death of the accused pending appeal inevitably signifies the concomitant extinction of the civil liability. Mors Omnia Solvi. Death dissolves all things. In sum, in pursuing recovery of civil liability arising from crime, the final determination of the criminal liability is a condition precedent to the prosecution of the civil action, such that when the criminal action is extinguished by the demise of accused-appellant pending appeal thereof, said civil action cannot survive. The claim for civil liability springs out of and is dependent upon facts which, if true, would constitute a crime. Such civil liability is an inevitable consequence of the criminal liability and is to be declared and enforced in the criminal proceeding. This is to be distinguished from that which is contemplated under Article 30 of the Civil Code

which refers to the institution of a separate civil action that does not draw its life from a criminal proceeding. The Sendaydiego resolution of July 8, 1977, however, failed to take note of this fundamental distinction when it allowed the survival of the civil action for the recovery of civil liability ex delicto by treating the same as a separate civil action referred to under Article 30. Surely, it will take more than just a summary judicial pronouncement to authorize the conversion of said civil action to an independent one such as that contemplated under Article 30. Ironically however, the main decision in Sendaydiego did not apply Article 30, the resolution of July 8, 1977 notwithstanding. Thus, it was held in the main decision: "Sendaydiego's appeal will be resolved only for the purpose of showing his criminal liability which is the basis of the civil liability for which his estate would be liable." In other words, the Court, in resolving the issue of his civil liability, concomitantly made a determination on whether Sendaydiego, on the basis of evidenced adduced, was indeed guilty beyond reasonable doubt of committing the offense charged. Thus, it upheld Sendaydiego's conviction and pronounced the same as the source of his civil liability. Consequently, although Article 30 was not applied in the final determination of Sendaydiego's civil liability, there was a reopening of the criminal action already extinguished which served as basis for Sendaydiego's civil liability. We reiterate: Upon death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction, the criminal action is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused; the civil action instituted therein for recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal. Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court was also invoked to serve as another basis for the Sendaydiego resolution of July 8, 1977. In citing Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, the Court made in the inference that civil actions of the type involved in Sendaydiego consist of money claims, the recovery of which may be continued on appeal if defendant dies pending appeal of his conviction by holding his estate liable therefor. Hence, the Court's conclusion: prcd "'When the action is for the recovery of money' 'and the defendant dies before final judgment in the court of First Instance, it shall be dismissed to be prosecuted in the manner especially provided' in Rule 87 of the Rules of Court (Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court). The implication is that, if the defendant dies after a money judgment had been rendered against him by the Court of First Instance, the action survives him. It may be continued on appeal." Sadly, reliance on this provision of law is misplaced. From the standpoint of procedural law, this course taken in Sendaydiego cannot be sanctioned. As correctly observed by Justice Regalado: "xxx xxx xxx I do not, however, agree with the justification advanced in both Torrijos and Sendaydiego which, relying on the provisions of Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, drew the strained implication therefrom that where the civil liability instituted together with the criminal liabilities had already passed beyond the judgment of the then Court of First Instance (now the Regional Trial Court), the Court of Appeals can continue to exercise appellate jurisdiction thereover despite the extinguishment of the component criminal liability of the deceased. This pronouncement, which has been followed in the Court's judgments subsequent and consonant to Torrijos and Sendaydiego, should be set aside and abandoned as being clearly erroneous and unjustifiable.

Said Section 21 of Rule 3 is a rule of civil procedure in ordinary civil actions. There is neither authority nor justification for its application in criminal procedure to civil actions. Nor is there any authority in law for the summary conversion from the latter category of an ordinary civil action upon the death of the offender. . . ." Moreover, the civil action impliedly instituted in a criminal proceeding for recovery of civil liability ex delicto can hardly be categorized as an ordinary money claim such as that referred to in Sec. 21, Rule 3 enforceable before the estate of the deceased accused. Ordinary money claims referred to in Section 21, Rule 3 must be viewed in light of the provisions of Section 5, Rule 86 involving claims against the estate, which in Sendaydiego was held liable for Sendaydiego's civil liability. "What are contemplated in Section 21 of Rule 3, in relation to Section 5 of Rule 86, 14 are contractual money claims while the claims involved in civil liability ex delicto may include even the restitution of personal or real property." 15 Section 5, Rule 86 provides an exclusive enumeration of what claims may be filed against the estate. These are: funeral expenses, expenses for the last illness, judgments for money and claim arising from contracts, expressed or implied. It is clear that money claims arising from delict do not form part of this exclusive enumeration. Hence, there could be no legal basis in (1) treating a civil action ex delicto as an ordinary contractual money claim referred to in Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court and (2) allowing it to survive by filing a claim therefor before the estate of the deceased accused. Rather, it should be extinguished upon extinction of the criminal action engendered by the death of the accused pending finality of his conviction Accordingly, we rule: if the private offended party, upon extinction of the civil liability ex delicto desires to recover damages from the same act or omission complained of, he must subject to Section 1, Rule 111 16 (1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended) file a separate civil action, this time predicated not on the felony previously charged but on other sources of obligation. The source of obligation upon which the separate action is premised determines against whom the same shall be enforced. If the same act or omission complained of also arises from quasi-delict or may, by provision of law, result in an injury to person or property (real or personal), the separate civil action must be filed against the executor or administrator 17 of the estate of the accused pursuant to Sec. 1, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court: "SECTION 1.Actions which may and which may not be brought against executor or administrator. No action upon a claim for the recovery of money or debt or interest thereon shall be commenced against the executor or administrator; but actions to recover real or personal property, or an interest therein, from the estate, or to enforce a lien thereon, and actions to recover damages for an injury to person or property, real or personal, may be commenced against him." This is in consonance with our ruling in Belamala 18 where we held that, in recovering damages for injury to persons thru an independent civil action based on Article 33 of the Civil Code, the same must be filed against the executor or administrator of the estate of deceased accused and not against the estate under Sec. 5, Rule 86 because this rule explicitly limits the claim to those for funeral expenses, expenses for the last sickness of the decedent, judgment for money and claims arising from contract, express or implied. Contractual money claims, we stressed,

refers only to purely personal obligations other than those which have their source in delict or tort. Conversely, if the same act or omission complained of also arises from contract, the separate civil action must be filed against the estate of the accused, pursuant to Sec. 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court. From this lengthy disquisition, we summarize our ruling herein: 1.Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore." 2.Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. 19 Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a result of the same act or omission: a)Law 20 b)Contracts c)Quasi-contracts d). . . e)Quasi-delicts 3.Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for recovery therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate civil action may be enforced either against the executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on the source of obligation upon which the same is based as explained above. Cdpr 4.Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil action by prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private-offended party instituted together therewith the civil action. In such case, the statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case, conformably with provisions of Article 1155 21 of the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible privation of right by prescription. Applying this set of rules to the case at bench, we hold that the death of appellant Bayotas extinguished his criminal liability and the civil liability based solely on the act complained of, i.e., rape. Consequently, the appeal is hereby dismissed without qualification. WHEREFORE, the appeal of the late Rogelio Bayotas is DISMISSED with costs de oficio. Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concur. Cruz, J., is on leave.

While amnesty looks backward and abolishes and puts into oblivion the offense itself, it so overlooks and obliterates the offense with which he is charged that the person released by amnesty stands before the law precisely as though he had committed no offense. [G.R. No. L-1278. January 21, 1949.] LORETO BARRIOQUINTO and NORBERTO JIMENEZ, petitioners, vs. ENRIQUE A. FERNANDEZ, ANTONIO BELMONTE and FELICISIMO OCAMPO, as Commissioners of the Fourteenth Guerrilla Amnesty Commission, respondents. 1.AMNESTY; PARDON AND AMNESTY DISTINGUISHED. Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive and as such it is a private act which must be pleaded and proved by the person pardoned, because the courts take no notice thereof; while amnesty by Proclamation of the Chief Executive with the concurrence of Congress, and it is a public act of which the courts should take judicial notice. Pardon is granted to one after conviction; while amnesty is granted to classes of persons or communities who may be guilty of political offenses, generally before or after the institution of the criminal prosecution and sometimes after conviction. Pardon looks forward and relieves the offender from the consequences of an offense of which he has been convicted, that is, it abolishes or forgives the punishment, and for that reason it does "nor work the restoration of the rights to hold public office, or the right of suffrage, unless such rights be expressly restored by the terms of the pardon," and it "in no case exempt the culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence" (article 36, Revised Penal Code). While amnesty looks backward and abolishes and puts into oblivion the offense itself, it so overlooks and obliterates the offense with which he is charged that the person released by amnesty stands before the law precisely as though he had committed no offense. 2.ID.; REQUISITES TO ENTITLE ONE TO INVOKE BENEFITS OF AMNESTY; ADMISSION OF COMMISSION OF OFFENSE NOT REQUIRED. In order to entitle a person to the benefits of the Amnesty Proclamation of September 7, 1946, it is not necessary that he should, as a condition precedent or sine qua non, admit having committed the criminal act or offense with which he is charged, and allege the amnesty as a defense; it is sufficient that the evidence, either of the complainants, or the accused, shows that the offense committed comes within the terms of said Amnesty Proclamation. Although the accused does not confess the imputation against him, he may be declared by the courts or the Amnesty Commissions entitled to the benefits of the amnesty. For, whether or not he admits or confesses having committed the offense with which he is charged, the Commissions should, if necessary or requested by the interested party, conduct summary hearing of the witnesses both for the complainants and the accused, on whether he has committed the offense in furtherance of the resistance to the enemy, or against persons aiding in the war efforts of the enemy, and decide whether he is entitled to the benefits of amnesty and to be "regarded as a patriot or hero who have rendered invaluable services to the nation," or not, in accordance with the terms of the Amnesty Proclamation. 3.ID.; ID.; ID. There is no necessity for an accused to admit his responsibility for the commission of a criminal act before a court or Amnesty Commission may investigate and extend or not to him the benefits of amnesty. The fact that he pleads not guilty or that he has not committed the act with which he is charged, does not necessarily prove that he is not

guilty thereof. Notwithstanding his denial, the evidence for the prosecution or complainant may show the contrary, as it is generally the case in criminal proceedings, and what should in such a case be determined is whether or not the offense committed is of political character. The plea of not having committed the offense made by an accused simply means that he can not be convicted of the offense charged because he is not guilty thereof, and, even if the evidence would show that he is, because he has committed it in furtherance of the resistance to the enemy or against persons aiding in the war efforts of the enemy, and not for purely political motives. FERIA, J p: This is a special action of mandamus instituted by the petitioners against the respondents who composed the 14th Guerrilla Amnesty Commission, to compel the latter to act and decide whether or not the petitioners are entitled to the benefits of amnesty. Petitioners Norberto Jimenez and Loreto Barrioquinto were charged with the crime of murder. As the latter had not yet been arrested the case proceeded against the former, and after trial the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga sentenced Jimenez to life imprisonment. Before the period for perfecting an appeal had expired, the defendant Jimenez became aware of the Proclamation No. 8, dated September 7, 1946, which grants amnesty in favor of all persons who may be charged with an act penalized under the Revised Penal Code in furtherance of the resistance to the enemy or against persons aiding in the war efforts of the enemy, and committed during the period from December 8, 1941, to the date when each particular area of the Philippines where the offense was actually committed was liberated from enemy control and occupation, and said Jimenez decided to submit his case to the Guerrilla Amnesty Commission presided by the respondents herein, and the other petitioner Loreto Barrioquinto, who had then been already apprehended, did the same. After a preliminary hearing had started, the Amnesty Commission, presided by the respondents, issued on January 9, 1947, an order returning the cases of the petitioners to the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga, without deciding whether or not they are entitled to the benefits of the said Amnesty Proclamation, on the ground that inasmuch as neither Barrioquinto nor Jimenez have admitted having committed the offense, because Barrioquinto alleged that it was Hipolito Tolentino who shot and killed the victim, they cannot invoke the benefits of amnesty. The Amnesty Proclamation of September 7, 1946, issued by the President with the concurrence of Congress of the Philippines, reads in part as follows: "WHEREAS, since the inception of the war and until the liberation of the different areas comprising the territory of the Philippines, volunteer armed forces of Filipinos and of other nationalities operated as guerrillas and other patriotic individuals and groups pursued activities in opposition to the forces and agents of the Japanese Empire in the invasion and occupation of the Philippines; "WHEREAS, members of such forces, in their determined efforts to resist the enemy, and to bring about his ultimate defeat, committed acts penalized under the Revised Penal Code; "WHEREAS, charges have been presented in the courts against many members of these resistance forces, for such acts;

"WHEREAS, the fact that such acts were committed in furtherance of the resistance to the enemy is not a valid defense under the laws of the Philippines; "WHEREAS, the persons so accused should not be regarded as criminals but rather as patriots and heroes who have rendered invaluable services to the nation; and. "WHEREAS, it is desirable that without the least possible delay, these persons be freed from the indignity and the jeopardy to which they are now being subjected; "NOW, THEREFORE, I, Manuel Roxas, President of the Philippines, in accordance with the provisions of Article VII, section 10, paragraph 6 of the Constitution, do hereby declare and proclaim an amnesty in favor of all persons who committed any act penalized under the Revised Penal Code in furtherance of the resistance to the enemy or against persons aiding in the war effort of the enemy, and committed during the period from December 8, 1941 to the date when each particular area of the Philippines was actually liberated from the enemy control and occupation. This amnesty shall not apply to crimes against chastity or to acts committed from purely personal motives. "It is further proclaimed and declared that in order to determine who among those against whom charges have been filed before the courts of the Philippines or against whom charges may be filed in the future, come within the terms of this amnesty, Guerrilla Amnesty Commissions, simultaneously to be established, shall examine the facts and circumstances surrounding each case and, if necessary, conduct summary hearings of witnesses both for the complainant and the accused. These Commissions shall decide each case and, upon finding that it falls within the terms of this proclamation, the Commissions shall so declare and this amnesty shall immediately be effective as to the accused, who shall forthwith be released or discharged." The theory of the respondents, supported by the dissenting opinion, is predicated on a wrong conception of the nature or character of an amnesty. Amnesty must be distinguished from pardon. Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive and as such it is a private act which must be pleaded and proved by the person pardoned, because the courts take no notice thereof; while amnesty by Proclamation of the Chief Executive with the concurrence of Congress, and it is a public act of which the courts should take judicial notice. Pardon is granted to one after conviction; while amnesty is granted to classes of persons or communities who may be guilty of political offenses, generally before or after the institution of the criminal prosecution and sometimes after conviction. Pardon looks forward and relieves the offender from the consequences of an offense of which he has been convicted, that is, it abolishes or forgives the punishment, and for that reason it does "nor work the restoration of the rights to hold public office, or the right of suffrage, unless such rights be expressly restored by the terms of the pardon," and it "in no case exempts the culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence" (article 36, Revised Penal Code). While amnesty looks backward

and abolishes and puts into oblivion the offense itself, it so overlooks and obliterates the offense with which he is charged that the person released by amnesty stands before the law precisely as though he had committed no offense. In view of the foregoing, we are of the opinion and so hold that, in order to entitle a person to the benefits of the Amnesty Proclamation of September 7, 1946, it is not necessary that he should, as a condition precedent or sine qua non, admit having committed the criminal act or offense with which he is charged, and allege the amnesty as a defense; it is sufficient that the evidence, either of the complainant or the accused, shows that the offense committed comes within the terms of said Amnesty Proclamation. Hence, it is not correct to say that "invocation of the benefits of amnesty is in the nature of a plea of confession and avoidance." Although the accused does not confess the imputation against him, he may be declared by the courts or the Amnesty Commissions entitled to the benefits of the amnesty. For, whether or not he admits or confesses having committed the offense with which he is charged, the Commissions should, if necessary or requested by the interested party, conduct summary hearing of the witnesses both for the complainants and the accused, on whether he has committed the offense in furtherance of the resistance to the enemy, or against persons aiding in the war efforts of the enemy, and decide whether he is entitled to the benefits of amnesty and to be "regarded as a patriot or hero who have rendered invaluable services to the nation," or not, in accordance with the terms of the Amnesty Proclamation. Since the Amnesty Proclamation is a public act, the courts as well as the Amnesty Commissions created thereby should take notice of the terms of said Proclamation and apply the benefits granted therein to cases coming within their province or jurisdiction, whether pleaded or claimed by the person charged with such offenses or not, if the evidence presented shows that the accused is entitled to said benefits. The right to the benefits of amnesty, once established by the evidence presented, either by the complainant or prosecution, or by the defense, can not be waived, because it is of public interest that a person who is regarded by the Amnesty Proclamation, which has the force of a law, not only as innocent, for he stands in the eyes of the law as if he had never committed any punishable offense because of the amnesty, but as a patriot or hero, can not be punished as a criminal. Just as the courts of justice can not convict a person who, according to the evidence, has committed an act not punishable by law, although he confesses being guilty thereof, so also and a fortiori they can not convict a person considered by law not a criminal, but a patriot and hero, for having rendered invaluable services to the nation in committing such an act. While it is true that the evidence must show that the offense charged was not against chastity and was committed in furtherance of the resistance against the enemy, for otherwise, it is to be naturally presumed that it has been committed for purely personal motive, it is nonetheless true that though the motive as a mental impulse is a state of mind or subjective, it need not be testified to by the defendant himself at his arraignment or hearing of the case. Generally the motive for the commission of an offense is established by the testimony of witnesses on the acts or statements of the accused before or immediately after the commission of the offense, deeds or words that may express it or from which his motive or reason for committing it may be inferred. The statement or testimony of a defendant at the time of arraignment or the hearing of the case about said motive, can not generally be considered and relied on, specially if there is evidence

to the contrary, as the true expression of the reason or motive he had at the time of committing the offense. Because such statement or testimony may be an afterthought or colored by the interest he may have to suit his defense or the purpose for which he intends to achieve with such declaration. Hence it does not stand to reason and logic to say, as the dissenting opinion avers, that unless the defendant admits at the investigation or hearing having committed the offense with which he is charged, and states that he did it in furtherance of the resistance to the enemy, and not for purely personal motive, it is impossible for the court or Commission to verify the motive for the commission of the offense, because only the accused could explain his belief and intention or the motive of committing the offense. There is no necessity for an accused to admit his responsibility for the commission of a criminal act before a court or Amnesty Commission may investigate and extend or not to him the benefits of amnesty. The fact that he pleads not guilty or that he has not committed the act with which he is charged, does not necessarily prove that he is not guilty thereof. Notwithstanding his denial, the evidence for the prosecution or complainant may show the contrary, as it is generally the case in criminal proceedings, and what should in such a case be determined is whether or not the offense committed is of political character. The plea of not having committed the offense made by an accused simply means that he can not be convicted of the offense charged because he is not guilty thereof, and, even if the evidence would show that he is, because he has committed it in furtherance of the resistance to the enemy or against persons aiding in the war efforts of the enemy, and not for purely political motives. According to Administrative Order No. 11 of October 2, 1946, creating the Amnesty Commissions, issued by the President of the Philippines, cases pending in the Courts of First Instance of the province in which the accused claims the benefits of Amnesty Proclamation, and cases already decided by said courts but not yet elevated on appeal to the appellate courts, shall be passed upon and decided by the respective Amnesty Commission, and cases pending appeal shall be passed upon by the Seventh Amnesty Commission. Under the theory of the respondents and the writer of the dissenting opinion, the Commissions should refuse to comply with the directive of said Administrative Order, because in almost all cases pending in the Court of First Instance, and all those pending appeal from the sentence of said courts, the defendants must not have pleaded guilty or admitted having committed the offense charged, for, otherwise, they would not or could not have appealed from the judgment of the Courts of First Instance. To hold that an Amnesty Commission should not proceed to the investigation and act and decide whether the offense with which an accused was charged comes within the Amnesty Proclamation if he does not admit or confess having committed it, would be to defeat the purpose for which the Amnesty Proclamation was issued and the Amnesty Commissions were established. If the courts have to proceed to the trial or hearing of a case and decide whether the offense committed by the defendant comes within the terms of the Amnesty Proclamation although the defendant has pleaded not guilty, there is no reason why the Amnesty Commissions can not do so. Where a defendant to admit or confess having committed the offense or being responsible therefor before he can invoke the benefit of amnesty, as there is no law which makes such admission or confession not admissible as evidence against him in the courts of justice in case the Amnesty Commission finds that the offense does not come

within the terms of the Amnesty Proclamation, nobody or few would take the risk of submitting their case to said Commissions. Besides, in the present case, the allegation of Loreto Barrioquinto that the offended party or victim was shot and killed by Agapito Hipolito, does not necessarily bar the respondents from finding, after the summary hearing of the witnesses for the complainants and the accused, directed in the said Amnesty Proclamation and Administrative Order No. 11, that the petitioners are responsible for the killing of the victim, either as principals by coperation, inducement or conspiration, or as accessories before as well as after the fact, but that they are entitled to the benefits of amnesty, because they were members of the same group of guerrilleros who killed the victim in furtherance of the resistance to the enemy or against persons aiding in the war efforts of the enemy. Wherefore, the respondents are hereby ordered to immediately proceed to hear and decide the applications for amnesty of petitioners Barrioquinto and Jimenez, unless the courts have in the meantime already decided, expressly and finally, the question whether or not they are entitled to the benefits of the Amnesty Proclamation No. 8 of September 7, 1946. So ordered. TUASON, J., dissenting: I am unable to agree with the decision of the Court and shall briefly state my reasons. The decision proceeds on the assumption that the Guerrilla Amnesty Commission refused to hear and decide the application for amnesty of the present petitioners. I think this is a mistake. There were examinations of records, hearing and decisions. The pleadings and annexes show that hearing was held on the 9th of January, 1947 in which the two petitioners and their counsel were present, and one of them, Barrioquinto, testified, and that it was after that hearing, on the same date, that the Commission denied their petition in a written order and directed the clerk to return the "expedientes" to the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga for its final action. It is apparent from this order that the Commission acted in the manner contemplated by Proclamation No. 8 of the President. The return of the papers to the court merely follows the procedure provided in the proclamation, which stipulates "that any case now pending or which may be filed in the future which a Guerrilla Amnesty Commission decides as not within the terms of the amnesty shall proceed in accordance with the usual legal procedures in the courts without regard to this proclamation." The proclamation does not prescribe any specific mode of hearing. That the Commission shall examine the facts and circumstances surrounding each case is all that is provided for. In its discretion, the Commission may, if it deems necessary, hear the witnesses both for the complainant and the accused. This hearing does not have to be formal; it may be summary, according to the proclamation. This privilege, discretionary with the Commission, was afforded the accused as far as the nature of their defense permitted. I get the inference from an examination of the orders of the Commission that the latter went over the record of each defendant's criminal case. These records are, without doubt, the "expedientes" which the Commission ordered sent back to the court. The Commission, we are to presume, read the exhaustive and well-reasoned decision of the court against Jimenez and the evidence for and against him on which that decision is based. The

fact that Jimenez and his witnesses had already given his evidence at length, may well account for the failure or refusal of the Commission to hear him and his witnesses further. Only Barrioquinto, whose case had not yet been tried in the Court of First Instance because he had escaped, was heard by the Commission. The record of that hearing consists of 33 written pages. As to the determination of the pretended right of the defendants to the benefits of amnesty, the two orders of the Commission are decisions on the merits, definite and final as far as the Commission is concerned. The fact that the defendants denied having committed the crime imputed to them was cited by the Commission as ground for its decision to turn down their application. That circumstance was not given as ground for refusal to act. Moreover, in the second order, a lengthy order dictated on the motion for reconsideration by Jimenez, additional reasons are stated. The Commission has thus amply performed the duties required of it by the Amnesty Proclamation in both the matters of investigating and deciding. The Commission heard one accused and examined the evidence introduced and the decision rendered against the other. With the reasoning by which the Commission reached its decision, or with the result of its decision, it is not within the province of the court to concern itself. The Amnesty Commissions are executive instrumentalities acting for and in behalf of the President. They are not courts; they are not performing judicial functions, and this Court has no appellate jurisdiction over their actuations, orders or decisions. In the view I take of the case, it is unneccesary to discuss the court's premise that "there is nothing in the proclamation to even hint that the applicant for amnesty must first admit having executed the acts constituting the offense with which he is charged or may be charged." Nevertheless, I don't think the Commission was wrong in its theory. Amnesty presupposes the commission of a crime. When an accused says that he has not committed a crime he cannot have any use for amnesty. It is also self-evident that where the Amnesty Proclamation imposes certain conditions, as in this case, it is incumbent upon the accused to prove the existence of those conditions. A petition for amnesty is in the nature of a plea of confession and avoidance. The pleader has to confess the allegations against him before he is allowed to set out such facts as, if true, would defeat the action. It is a rank inconsistency for one to justify an act, or seek forgiveness for an act of which, according to him, he is not responsible. It is impossible for a court or commission to verify the presence of the essential conditions which should entitle the applicants to exemption from punishment, when the accused and his witnesses say that he did not commit a crime. In the nature of things, only the accused and his witnesses could prove that the victim collaborated with the enemy; that the killing was perpetrated in furtherance of the resistance movements; that no personal motive intervened in the commission of the murder, etc., etc. These, or some of these, are matters of belief and intention which only the accused and his witnesses could explain.

Where an accused has been found to have committed a lesser offense includible within the offense charged, he cannot be convicted of the lesser offense, if it has already prescribed [G.R. No. L-45674. May 30, 1983.] EMILIANO A. FRANCISCO and HARRY B. BERNARDINO, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. PRESCRIPTION; NO CONVICTION OF LESSER OFFENSE IF IT HAS ALREADY PRESCRIBED. Where an accused has been found to have committed a lesser offense includible within the offense charged he cannot be convicted of the lesser offense, if it has already prescribed. To hold otherwise would be to sanction the circumvention of the law on prescription by the simple expedient of accusing the defendant of the graver offense. DE CASTRO Petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals dated August 25, 1976 which modified the decision of the lower court by finding petitioners guilty of the crime of simple slander instead of grave oral defamation as the former Court of First Instance has held, and imposed on him a fine of P200.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and ordered them to pay complainant the amount of P1,000.00 as moral damages. On February 6, 1966 complainant Dr. Patrocinio Angeles, who was then the Director of the Morong Emergency Hospital, filed a case for intriguing against honor allegedly committed on December 26, 1965 against Dr. Emiliano Francisco and Atty. Harry Bernardino with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal. On May 3, 1966, the Provincial Fiscal filed an information in the former Court of First Instance of Rizal accusing Francisco and Bernardino of the crime of grave oral defamation. On October 8, 1966 the information upon order of the court, was amended by adding the particular statements uttered by each accused allegedly constituting the crime of slander to wit: "AMENDED INFORMATION "The undersigned Special Counsel accuses Harry Bernardino and Emiliano Francisco of the crime of Grave Oral Defamation, committed as follows: That on or about the 26th day of December, 1965, in the municipality of Tanay, province of Rizal, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court of the abovenamed accused conspiring and confederating together, with the deliberate intent of bringing one Dr. Patrocinio Angeles into public discredit, disrepute and contempt, after having knowledge that the wife of one Romulo Cruz who was a former patient of the Morong Emergency Hospital was operated thereat by Dr. Patrocinio Angeles, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and publicly speak and utter the following insulting and defamatory words and expressions, to wit: Dr. Francisco (To Romulo Cruz): 'Your wife should not have been operated. If I were the doctor, all that I should have done was to do a curretage (raspa) on her.' Atty. Bernardino: 'Those doctors are incompetent. They are not surgeons. They are just bold.' Dr. Francisco: 'The operation was unusual.'

Atty. Bernardino: 'The doctors who operated on your wife could be charged for murder thru reckless imprudence. The doctors there are no good. They are not surgeons.' thereby imputing upon the offended party, Dr. Patricinio Angeles, the attending physician of the wife of Romulo Cruz and one of the physicians at the Morong Emergency Hospital, professional contempt and ridicule upon the reputation of the said Dr. Patrocinio Angeles. On February 1, 1973 the trial court rendered its decision convicting the accused Harry Bernardino and Emiliano Francisco of the crime of grave oral defamation, sentenced each of them to suffer a penalty of four (4) months of arresto mayor as minimum to one (1) year and one (1) day of prision correccional as maximum and each of the accused was directed to pay complainant the amount of ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00) On appeal to the Court of Appeals the decision of the trial court as already stated was modified finding the accused guilty of simple slander. As found out by the Court of Appeals, the facts of the case are as follows: "The evidence of the prosecution is that Mrs. Lourdes Cruz, wife of Romulo Cruz, had been suffering from a vaginal bleeding since November 24, 1965; that she consulted a Dr. Custodio about her ailment and the latter was able to stop the bleeding for two days; that thereafter her bleeding recurred; that Mrs. Cruz then consulted a Dr. Floreza who advised her that if her bleeding continued she should go to a hospital; that her bleeding continued so on December 9, 1965 Lourdes Cruz entered the Morong Emergency Hospital; that she was attended by Dr. Patrocinio Angeles, the complainant; that her ailment was tentatively diagnosed by Dr. Angeles as "R-Mole, abortion and pregnancy"; that an x-ray examination conducted on Mrs. Cruz, however, revealed that she was negative for pregnancy; that Mrs. Cruz continued to lose blood and had to be given a transfusion of fresh blood on December 11, 1965; that as the bleeding did not stop Mrs. Cruz was operated on by the complainant Dr. Patrocinio Angeles; that her uterus which contained three (3) dead foetal triplets was removed; that the operation was successful and her bleeding was arrested, that on December 26, 1965 at about 9:20 o'clock in the evening the two accused Dr. Emiliano Francisco and Atty. Harry Bernardino, together with Dr. Crisologo Golla and Ernesto Ocampo went to the house of Mrs. Lourdes Cruz in Tanay, Rizal; that the two accused interviewed Mrs. Cruz and her husband Romulo Cruz about her operation; that the couple informed the two that they are satisfied with the operation; that in the course of this interview the accused Dr. Emiliano Francisco said that the operation was not correctly done and Mrs. Cruz should not have been operated on and that if he were the one he would not conduct an operation but only curretage (raspahin); that on the same occasion the accused Atty. Harry Bernardino said that the physicians in Morong Emergency Hospital were no good, are incompetent and they are not surgeons and said accused told Romulo Cruz that he could file charges for murder through reckless imprudence; that the accused Dr. Francisco was formerly a member of the Courtesy Medical Staff on the Morong

Emergency Hospital and as such he could bring in his private patients who needed the facility of the hospital for proper management; that, however, on December 15, 1965 his membership in the said staff was cancelled by the Credential Committee of said hospital at a meeting called for that purpose by the complainant Dr. Angeles who was then the Director of the Morong Emergency Hospital; that the accused Harry Bernardino, as counsel of a Dr. Lerma had earlier moved for the ouster of Dr. Angeles as Director of the Morong Emergency Hospital; that the case was bitterly contested that it even reached the Office of the President; that, furthermore, during the incumbency of the accused Atty. Bernardino as Mayor of Morong Rizal he caused the passage of a resolution wherein he was given authority to recommend all charity cases for admission to the Morong Emergency Hospital and that this resolution, however, was ignored by the complainant Dr. Angeles in accordance with the policy of the Director of the Bureau of Medical Services." "The evidence of the defense is that as Chairman of the Ethics Committee of the Eastern District of Rizal Medical Society, the accused Dr. Francisco sought to find out what could be done with the reported wrong operation of Mrs. Lourdes Cruz by complainant Dr. Angeles which resulted in the removal of triplets; that so the accused Dr. Francisco consulted the other accused Atty. Bernardino on the proper steps to take; that upon the advice of accused Atty. Bernardino, the accused Dr. Francisco accompanied by Dr. Crisologo Golla who was a Committee member, and the accused, Atty. Bernardino went on December 26, 1965 to Tanay, Rizal the hometown of Mrs. Lourdes Cruz; that they interviewed the spouses Romulo Cruz and Lourdes Cruz regarding the operation performed on Mrs. Cruz on December 13, 1965; that in that interview the two accused sought the facts regarding the case pursuant to the Ethics Committee decision to conduct the fact finding investigation; and that after the interview with the Cruz spouses Dr. Golla and the accused Dr. Francisco went to Dr. Floreza, in-coming president of the Rizal Medical Society on December 27, 1965, to take up the matter with him but they were advised to take it up with the Eastern District of Rizal Medical Society, which they did." On the basis of the foregoing, the Court of Appeals concluded that while it is true that the statements were made on the occasion of the so-called fact finding interview pursuant to the Ethics Committee decision, the accused went out of bounds by imputing to the complainant acts which are not only derogatory but constitute a crime that can be prosecuted de oficio. It went on to rule however that the defamation committed by the accused cannot be considered as grave under the circumstances, and the worst that was said of the complainant was that he should not have performed the operation, and that he could be prosecuted for murder through reckless imprudence. Not satisfied with the decision of the Court of Appeals, the present case was instituted. While the case was pending, Atty. Harry Bernardino one of the petitioners herein died, hence in the resolution of April 10, 1979 the case was dismissed insofar as he is concerned. Petitioners' brief, prepared by their counsel with notable zeal raises several questions. In synthesis, they are:

1.Whether or not the crime of simple slander found by the Court of Appeals to be the offense committed by the petitioners has prescribed; 2.Whether or not the alleged defamatory remarks of petitioners may be considered libelous; 3.Whether or not there was conspiracy; 4.Whether or not the failure to allege in the information that petitioners acted with "malice" is fatal; and 5.Whether or not the Court erred in giving credence to the testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution. Francisco argues that since the Court of Appeals had found that the offense committed was the lesser offense of simple slander, which prescribed in two months under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code, the said court should have dismissed the case, and sustained the acquittal of the accused on the ground that said crime had already prescribed. He pointed out the alleged defamatory remarks were committed on December 26, 1965, and the information charging the accused of the greater offense of grave oral defamation was filed with the court more than four (4) months later on May 3, 1966. Disputing the foregoing, the Solicitor General contends that for the purpose of determining the proper prescriptive period, what should be considered is the nature of the offense charged in the information which is grave oral defamation, not the crime committed by the accused, as said crime was found by the Court to constitute only simple slander. Hence, the period of prescription here should be six (6) months; complaint was filed by the offended party before the Fiscal's office on February 3, 1966 or only thirty-nine (39) days after the incident in question which is still within the prescriptive period People v. Olarte which overruled the case of People v. del Rosario: the filing of the complaint in the Municipal Court, even if it be merely for purposes of preliminary examination or investigation should, and does, interrupt the period of prescription of criminal responsibility, even if the court where the complaint or information is filed cannot try the case on the merits. It makes no difference whether the case was filed in the Fiscal's Office and not in the Municipal Court as in the Olarte case, since Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code does not require that the complaint be one filed in court in order to toll the running of the period. Where an accused has been found to have committed a lesser offense includible within the offense charged, he cannot be convicted of the lesser offense, if it has already prescribed. To hold otherwise would be to sanction the circumvention of the law on prescription by the simple expedient of accusing the defendant of the graver offense. general rule, one indicted for an offense not barred by limitation, but convicted of a lesser included offense which is so barred, is entitled to discharge' In this situation, the rule is that if the statute has not run against the felony, while the lesser offense is barred, the bar cannot be evaded by indicting the defendant for the felony and convicting him of the lesser offense.'" Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code provides that "the period of prescription shall commence to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents, and shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information, and shall commence to run again when such proceedings terminate without the accused being convicted or acquitted, or are unjustifiably stopped for any reason not imputable to him."

the period shall commence to run again when the proceedings initiated by the filing of the complaint or information terminate without the accused being convicted or acquitted, adding that the proceedings in the Office of the Fiscal cannot and there in the acquittal or conviction of the accused Several reasons buttress this conclusion: first, the text of Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, in declaring that the period of prescription "shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information" without distinguishing whether the complaint is filed in the court for preliminary examination or investigation merely, or for action on the merits. Second, even if the court where the complaint or information is filed may only proceed to investigate the case, its actuations already represent the initial step of the proceedings against the offender. Third, it is unjust to deprive the injured party of the right to obtain vindication on account of delays that are not under his control. All that the victim of the offense may do on his part to initiate the prosecution is to file the requisite complaint. "And it is no argument that Article 91 also expresses that the interrupted prescription "shall commence to run again when such proceedings terminate without the accused being convicted or acquitted", thereby indicating that the court in which the complaint or information is filed most have power to acquit or convict the accused. Precisely, the trial on the merits usually terminates in conviction or acquittal, not otherwise. But it is in the court conducting a preliminary investigation where the proceedings may terminate without conviction or acquittal, if the court should discharge the accused because no prima facie case has been shown." Clearly, therefore, the filing of the denuncia for complaint for intriguing against honor by the offended party, later changed by the Fiscal to grave oral defamation, even if it were in the Fiscal's Office, 39 days after the alleged defamatory remarks were committed (or discovered) by the accused interrupts the period of prescription. Nevertheless, petitioner Francisco cannot be held liable, for his statements 'Your wife would not have been operated. If I were the doctor, all that I should have done was to do a curretage (raspa) on her.' xxx xxx xxx 'The operation was unusual.' are clearly not libelous per se. Complainant Angeles had admitted that he committed a mistake in the management of the case of Mrs. Cruz. The remarks made by Francisco were but a harmless expression of his opinion on what should have been done in treating her, if he were the doctor managing her. His statements were nothing more than a comment that complainant committed a mistake in the diagnosis and management of the patient. An impartial observer would readily note that such remarks do not degrade the competency of a doctor, for the latter, because of human limitations, cannot be expected to be accurate at all times in the diagnosis of patients. As noted in the case of Blende vs. Hearst Publications, 93 P 2d. 733, a "physician is only required to possess the ordinary knowledge and skill of his profession, and is not liable for mistakes if he uses the methods recognized and approved by

those reasonably skilled in the profession. Clearly, a criticism in a physician's wrong management of the case, such as that of Francisco cannot be considered libelous. In the same American case, it was held: "It is clear that to charge a physician merely with the mismanagement of the making of a wrong diagnosis in a particular case is not of itself actionable. Such a charge implies nothing more, at most, than ignorance or unskillfulness in that case, and does not materially affect his reputation as respects his general competency to practice his profession. "To charge a professional man with negligence or unskillfulness in the management or treatment of an individual case is not more than to impute to him the mistakes and errors incident to fallible human nature. The most eminent and skilful physician or surgeon may make mistake on the symptoms of a particular case without detracting from his general professional skill or learning. To say of him, therefore, that he was mistaken in that case would not be calculated to impair the confidence of the community in his general professional competency." We cannot see our way clear on how Francisco's questioned statements could be branded as libelous. To stigmatize them as libelous would be a dangerous precedent whereby a mere criticism on the actuation of another will generate criminal liability for slander. His alleged defamatory remarks may be likened to a criticism of a lawyer's or Judge's erroneous handling of the case. It may be mentioned here that in the brief of the Solicitor General, the statements quoted and stigmatized as defamatory are those only of accused Bernardino. 6 That latter's statements are what the Solicitor General considered as "strong words that are evidently serious and damaging." Nothing has been said by the Solicitor General regarding the statements uttered by Francisco. Nonetheless, the Solicitor General would like to hold Francisco liable by the utterances of Bernardino on the ground of conspiracy. Assuming that Bernardino's statement is libelous, Francisco cannot be held liable for the same. Neither the lower court nor the Court of Appeals found that they conspired with each other to commit the alleged crime. This is so because no evidence was offered to show that there was prior consultation on what each would say. The fact alone that they were together when those words were uttered is not proof that there was conspiracy to utter those words. Clearly, each accused spoke spontaneously and individually. Conspiracy being of a very far-reaching effect, the degree of proof required for establishing it must be the same as that required to support a finding of guilt for the crime itself which must be upon proof beyond reasonable doubt. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, accused Emiliano Francisco is hereby acquitted, with cost de oficio.

Cabral v Puno G.R. No. L-41692 April 30, 1976 Ponente: Antonio Facts: - September 24, 1974, Cabral was charged with falsification of public document for allegedly falsifying the signature of private respondent in a deed of sale of a parcel of land on August 14, 1948 - the said document of sale was notarized on August 14, 1948, registered with the Register of Deeds of Bulacan on August 26, 1948 and as a consequence the original certificate of title was cancelled and a new transfer certificate of title issued RTC (Judge Echeverri): dismissed the information on the ground of prescription San Diego filed MR. Cabral opposed on the ground that San Diego cannot intervene in criminal case, having filed a civil action. Judge Puno granted. San Diego stated that he discovered the crime sometime in 1970 Judge Puno set aside previous decision and reinstated the information Cabral filed MR (a) the judgment of acquittal which became final immediately upon promulgation and could not, therefore, be recalled for correction or amendment (b) by instituting civil case, San Diego lost his right to intervene in the prosecution of the criminal case Motion was denied Hence, this petition for certiorari and prohibition

Held: - San Diego had actual if not constructive notice of the alleged forgery after the document was registered in the Register of Deeds on August 26, 1948. petition is hereby granted

[G.R. No. 49454. December 21, 1990.] PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellant, vs. SALVADOR MONTEIRO, appellee. Ponente: CRUZ January 1964 to May 31, 1974: at Liliw, Laguna Monteiro failed to register and/or report to the Social Security System, Elizabeth Collantes as member thereof who was employed in said firm or establishment from January 1964 to May 1974 in violation of the Social Security Laws; and despite demands failed to register aforesaid employee to the damage and prejudice of the offended party. The case was moved to quash on the ground of prescription. The trial court agreed with the appellee that the crime charged, which is punishable only with a fine from P500.00 to P5,000.00 or imprisonment of not less than six months to more than one year, or both, could no longer be prosecuted. The law applied was Section 1(b) of Act 3326, as amended, providing that offenses punishable with imprisonment for more than one month but less than two years prescribe after four years. The trial court reckoned the 4-year prescriptive period from January 1964, holding that the crime was deemed committed from the time the private respondent failed to register the employee. As the information against Monteiro was filed only on November 10, 1975, it was clear that it was already time-barred under the cited provision. According to the Solicitor General, the 4-year period should commence, not in January 1964, when the violation started, but in May 1974, when it was discovered. Monteiro insists that the prescriptive period should be counted from the date of the alleged violation as this was not concealed and did not have to be discovered. The statements of Collantes were not admissible evidence because they had not been formally offered; hence, no proof of discovery had been presented by the appellant. He also suggests that the subsequent registration of Collantes with the SSS had the effect of extinguishing the offense and that in any case the appeal would place him in double jeopardy. SC affirm the conclusion that the period of prescription for the offense of failure to register with the SSS shall begin from the day of the discovery of the violation if this was not shown at the time of its commission. A contrary view would be dangerous as the successful concealment of an offense during the period fixed for its prescription would be the very means by which the offender may escape punishment. The Solicitor General consistently opposed the contention that the offense had prescribed. SC cannot accept Monteiro argument that the appeal should be dismissed because the appellant had failed to show that it was only in 1974 that the offense was discovered. That was not his responsibility. On the contrary, the burden of proving that the crime had prescribed fell on Monteiro because it was he who was invoking that affirmative defense.The fact of prescription not being apparent on the face of the information, it was incumbent on Monteiro to establish the

basis of that defense. We note that in the case at bar, the trial court resolved the motion merely on the basis of the amended information, the motion to quash and the opposition thereto. These were insufficient bases for the findings of fact needed to justify the grant of the motion. The trial judge did not require submission of affidavits and counter-affidavits or hold a preliminary hearing to inform himself of the date when the prescriptive period was supposed to have commenced. This was because he assumed at the outset that the period of prescription began in 1964. There is no proof of this, nor is such knowledge deducible from a reading of the information that the appellant was already aware on that date of the commission of the crime. In the case at bar, it does not appear that Collantes knew at the outset, that is, from January 1964, that she had not been registered by the appellee with the SSS. In fact, she said she learned she was not a member only much later, when she wanted to avail herself of SSS benefits because of the hospitalization of her husband. The appellee's claim that his subsequent registration of Collantes with the SSS extinguished his current liability, if any, is not acceptable. If subsequent compliance with the law were sufficient to condone past violation, then the penal clause might as well be deleted from the statute. Such an interpretation would nullify the purpose of the law, which is precisely to protect the members of the working class. The invocation of the rule against double jeopardy must also be rejected. Double jeopardy will attach only if there is: (a) a valid complaint or information; (b) filed before a competent court; (c) to which the defendant had pleaded; and (d) of which he had been previously acquitted or convicted or which was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent. The herein appellee has not yet been arraigned and it was upon his express motion that the information was quashed and the case dismissed. WHEREFORE, the challenged Order dated May 17, 1976, is SET ASIDE. This case is remanded to the Regional Trial Court of Laguna for determination, after hearing, of the date when the alleged offense was discovered and the prescriptive period commenced to run. [G.R. No. L-22465. February 28, 1967.] PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ET AL., defendants-appellants, vs. ASCENCION P. OLARTE, defendant-appellee. Ponente: REYES, J.B.L Facts: Ascencion P. Olarte is charged with libel. It is alleged in the information that, on or about the 24th day of February, 1954 and subsequently thereafter, said defendant had willfully, unlawfully and feloniously written certain letters which were libelous,

contemptuous and derogatory to Miss Visitacion M. Meris, with evident and malicious purpose of insulting, dishonoring, humiliating and bringing into contempt the good name and reputation, of said complainant. On January 7, 1956: Miss Meris lodged the corresponding charge of libel with the provincial fiscal of Pangasinan On February 22, 1956: she filed with the Justice of the Peace Court of Pozorrubio, Pangasinan, a complaint for libel against Ascencion P. Olarte Olarte waived her right to a preliminary investigation, whereupon the justice of the peace court forwarded the case to the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, in which the corresponding information was filed on July 3, 1956; Olarte seasonably moved to quash the information upon the ground of prescription of the offense The court of first instance granted said motion and dismissed the case, with costs de oficio. Hence, this appeal by complainant Miss Meris, with the conformity of the special counsel of the office of the provincial fiscal of Pangasinan, who represented the prosecution in said court." cda the crime of libel . . . shall prescribe in two (2) years, which, pursuant to Article 91 of the same Code, 'shall commence to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities or their agents, and shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information . . . On February 27, 1964: Miss Meris stated that one defamatory letter was received by her and that there were other libelous letters, seemingly written after the first. On or about March 1 and 13, April 26 and May 9, 1954: subsequent letters were received ISSUE: whether the statute of limitations was suspended by the filing of the complaint with the justice of the peace court on February 22, 1956, as claimed by appellant, or continued to run until July 3, 1956, when the information was filed with the court of first instance, as contended by the defendant RTC held that the prescriptive period had expired before the filing of said information. SC: the filing of the complaint with the justice of the peace court of Pozorrubio, Pangasinan, interrupted the running of the statute of limitations, as regards the crime of libel with which defendant herein is charged, and that said crime has not been extinguished by prescription, for which reason the order appealed from is reversed, and the records of this case are hereby remanded to the lower court for further proceedings, conformably with law. This ruling became final and executory Pursuant thereto, the lower court set the case for hearing on the merits and the prosecution started presenting its evidence. However, on August 26, 1963, the defense presented another motion to quash the information, supplemented by another motion of September 5, 1963, on the ground of prescription of the offense charged in the information. In said motions, the defense invoked the subsequent ruling of this Court in the case of People vs. Coquia, G.R. No. L-15456, promulgated on June 29, 1963. On November 4, 1963, the prosecution opposed said motions. The defense submitted its reply on November 13, 1963.

After due hearing on this incident, the lower court issued the appealed order, dated January 16, 1964, sustaining the defense's new motion to quash upon the ground of prescription. In this order, the lower court, after comparing and finding that the set of facts obtaining in the case at bar is practically identical with those of the Coquia case, opined that inasmuch as the latter case is inconsistent with or contradicts the previous decision (L-13027) in the case at bar, promulgated on June 30, 1960, the 1963 ruling in the Coquia case indicates that this Supreme Court intended to abandon the one made in 1960 in the first appeal of this same case (L-13027). The complainant Miss Meris, through her private prosecutor, filed her brief. Subsequently, the Solicitor General, in representation of plaintiff-appellant, People of the Philippines, instead of filing a brief, filed, on August 18, 1964, a manifestation, stating to the effect that they are submitting the case without any brief, said complainant having filed a brief in her behalf; and that they are of the opinion that the order of the lower court dismissing the case was well taken. In view of this manifestation, Olarte presented, on September 7, 1964, a motion to dismiss the appeal. This Court, by resolution dated October 2, 1964, denied said motion to dismiss for the present. Olarte moved to reconsider said denial but this Court, in its resolution of October 21, 1964, overruled the defendant's motion. Thereafter, said Olarte filed her brief and the case was submitted for decision.

ISSUE: The only issue presented for determination in this appeal is the effect of this Court's ruling on the first appeal in this very same case (L-13027) and whether the decision in the later case of People vs. Coquia warrants the dismissal of the information in the case at bar on the ground of prescription. It is thus clear that posterior changes in the doctrine of this Court can not retroactively be applied to nullify a prior final ruling in the same proceeding where the prior adjudication was had, whether the case should be civil or criminal in nature. Analysis of the precedents on the issue of prescription discloses that there are two lines of decisions following differing criteria in determining whether prescription of crimes has been interrupted. One line of precedents holds that the filing of the complaint with the justice of the peace (or municipal judge) does interrupt the course of the prescriptive term: People vs. Olarte, L-13027, June 30 1960 and case cited therein; People vs. Uba, L-13106, October 16, 1959; People vs. Aquino, 68 Phil. 588, 590. Another series of decisions declares that to produce interruption the complaint or information must have been filed in the proper court that has jurisdiction to try the case on its merits: People vs. Del Rosario, L-15140, December 29, 1960; People vs. Coquia, L-15456, June 29, 1963. In view of this diversity of precedents, and in order to provide guidance for Bench and Bar, this Court has reexamined the question and, after mature consideration, has arrived at the conclusion that the doctrine is, and should be, the one established by the decisions holding that the filing of the complaint in the Municipal Court, even if it be merely for purposes of preliminary examination or investigation, should, and does, interrupt the period of prescription of the criminal responsibility, even if the court where the complaint or

information is filed cannot try the case on its merits. Several reasons buttress this conclusion: first, the text of article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, in declaring that the period of prescription "shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information" without distinguishing whether the complaint is filed in the court for preliminary examination or investigation merely, or for action on the merits. Second, even if the court where the complaint or information is filed may only proceed to investigate the case, its actuations already represent the initial step of the proceedings against the offender. Third, it is unjust to deprive the injured party of the right to obtain vindication on account of delays that are not under his control. All that the victim of the offense may do on his part to initiate the prosecution is to file the requisite complaint. And it is no argument that Article 91 also expresses that the interrupted prescription "shall commence to run again when such proceedings terminate without the accused being convicted or acquitted", thereby indicating that the court in which the complaint or information is filed must have power to acquit or convict the accused. Precisely, the trial on the merits usually terminates in conviction or acquittal, not otherwise. But it is in the court conducting a preliminary investigation where the proceedings may terminate without conviction or acquittal, if the court should discharge the accused because no prima facie case has been shown. cdasia Considering the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby overrules the doctrine of the cases of People vs. Del Rosario, L-15140, December 29, 1960; and People vs. Coquia, L-15456, promulgated June 29, 1963. And it having been finally decided in the previous appeal that the criminal action here was not barred, the issue of prescription is utterly foreclosed, and all that remains is to try and decide the case on the merits. It is expected that it will be done with the utmost dispatch, this case having been already pending for many years. Wherefore, the appealed order of dismissal is hereby set aside and reversed, and the records of this case ordered remanded to the lower court for further proceedings conformably with this decision. With costs against defendant-appellee.

[G.R. No. L-17616. May 30, 1962.] PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant, vs. FELIPE ABUY, defendantappellee. Ponente: Barrera 1.PRESCRIPTION OF OFFENSES; INTERRUPTION OF PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD; WHAT COMPLAINT OR INFORMATION INTERRUPTS UNDER ARTICLE 91 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE. The complaint or information mentioned in Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code must be the proper complaint or information corresponding to the offense committed, in

order that the proceedings thereunder may interrupt the prescriptive period. Thus, where there is nothing to show that the two offenses charged in two informations are related to each other, except that they were committed by the same accused on the same date and within the jurisdiction of the same court, the one is not a bar to the other and, consequently, the filing of one does not interrupt the prescriptive period as to the other. On or about February 21, 1959: Abuy entered the dwelling of Ruperto Carpio without his knowledge or consent On April 1, 1959: Felipe Abuy was charged in the Municipal Court of Zamboanga City with the crime of "trespass to dwelling" On November 5, 1959: the case was called for continuation on trial The prosecution moved for the dismissal of the case, on the ground that the evidence so far presented by it would not sustain the accused's conviction of said crime charged. The motion to dismiss was granted by the court. On February 21, 1959: the said accused caused vexation upon Nicolasa B. de Magadia On November 13, 1959, Abuy was charged before the same Municipal Court of Zamboanga City with the crime of "unjust vexation" with aggravating circumstance that it was committed in the dwelling of said Nicolasa B. de Magadia. On November 19, 1959, Abuy filed a motion to quash the above information for "unjust vexation", on the ground that said offense "has already prescribed". On May 14, 1960, the Municipal Court granted said motion to quash. Prosecution appealed to the CFI Zamboanga City On July 30, 1960, said court denied the appeal Hence, this appeal SC: no merit in the People's appeal no question that the crime of "unjust vexation" is a light offense and, therefore, prescribes in 2 months From February 21, 1959 (date of commission) to November 13, 1959 (date of filing of the information) is 6 months and 20 days, far beyond the 2-month prescriptive period of said offense. Abuy correctly moved to quash said information Municipal Court properly granted the same.

The Court of First Instance, on its part, committed no reversible error in dismissing the prosecution's appeal from said quashal by the Municipal Court, for being "unmeritorious and unfounded". The prosecution argues that the offense of "unjust vexation" had not yet prescribed when it filed the information against appellee Abuy, because the filing of the information for trespass to dwelling on April 1, 1959 interrupted the running of the two-month prescriptive period. "After the municipal court of the City of Zamboanga dismissed the case on November 5, 1959 on motion of the prosecution (p. 17, mun. court folder), it was only then that the prescriptive period commenced to run again. "The information for unjust vexation was received by the municipal court of the City of Zamboanga on November 13, 1959, 8 days after the dismissal of the information for trespass to dwelling was handed down by the court. "Adding the 39 days which had elapsed prior to the filing of the information for trespass to dwelling with the 8 days, prior to the filing of the information for unjust vexation, the aggregate total of 47 days would still be shy of the 2-month prescriptive period allowed by law for the latter crime." This contention of the prosecution is not in accordance with Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that, "The period of prescription . . . shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information, and shall commence to run again when such proceedings terminate without the accused being convicted or acquitted, or are unjustifiably stopped for any reason not imputable to him (accused)". The "complaint or information" or "such proceedings" mentioned in the law must be the proper information or complaint corresponding to the offense committed in order that "such proceedings" thereunder may interrupt the prescriptive period. Here, the first information was trespass to dwelling committed against Ruperto Carpio, the elements of which as described in the information are, the prosecution expressly admits, entirely different from the elements of the other offense of unjust vexation against Nicolasa B. de Magadia charged in the second information. There is nothing in the two informations to show that the two offenses are related to each other except that they were committed by the same accused on the same date and within the jurisdiction of the same court. The one, in fact, is not a bar to the other. Consequently, the filing of the one does not interrupt the prescriptive period as to the other. WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the order appealed from, the same is hereby affirmed, without costs. So ordered.

[G.R. No. L-42925. January 31, 1977.] PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. RICARDO D. GALANO, Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XIII, and GREGORIO SANTOS, respondents. TEEHANKEE The Court sets aside the respondent judge's orders dismissing the information for estafa against respondent accused, since the offense charged clearly has not prescribed. The complaint filed with the Batangas court which expressly alleged commission of the offense within the municipality and which pended for twelve years (the accused having jumped bail and evaded rearrest for nine years) and which was eventually dismissed by said court for lack of territorial jurisdiction as a result of the proof adduced before it properly interrupted and tolled the prescription period. Respondent judge failed, in ruling otherwise, to apply the settled rule that the jurisdiction of a court is determined in criminal cases by the allegations of the complaint or information and not by the result of proof. The case is ordered remanded for determination with the utmost dispatch, since this case has already been pending for fifteen years owing to respondent accused's deplorable tactics. Facts: "1.On October 2, 1962, a criminal complaint for estafa was filed in the municipal court of Batangas, Batangas (now City Court of Batangas City) against the accused-respondent Gregorio Santos by complainant, Juanito Limbo, . . . "2.Gregorio Santos was arrested to answer for the above charge, and upon his arrest, posted a bail bond for his provisional liberty. The accused was thereafter arraigned and he pleaded not guilty to the charge. Then, the case was heard on its merits. However, on September 16, 1964, the accused jumped bail. As a result, his bail bond was forfeited and the case against him archived by the municipal court of Batangas, Batangas. "3.It was not until September 14, 1973, about nine years later, when the accused was rearrested, and the trial of the said case resumed. "4.On October 21, 1974, while the said case was pending trial, private respondent Gregorio Santos filed a motion to dismiss the case on the ground that the Batangas court did not have territorial jurisdiction over the case, the evidence showing that the crime was committed in Manila. "5.Finding the motion meritorious, the Batangas City Court issued an order dated November 5, 1974, dismissing the case against Gregorio Santos for lack of territorial jurisdiction over the crime charged, . . . "6.On November 14, 1974, the complainant Juanito B. Limbo refiled the same case against Gregorio Santos in the Fiscal's Office of Manila. A preliminary investigation was conducted. On July 29, 1975, the corresponding information was filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila, docketed as Criminal Case No. 22397, . . . "7.On November 12, 1975 the accused Gregorio Santos filed a motion to dismiss Criminal Case No. 22397 on the grounds of prescription and double jeopardy.

"8.The prosecuting fiscal filed his opposition to said motion on December 2, 1975, to which the accused filed a rejoinder on December 5, 1975. "9.On December 8, 1975, the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XIII, presided over by the Honorable Ricardo D. Galano, issued an order dismissing Criminal Case No. 22397 on the ground that the offense charged had already prescribed, . . . The prosecution moved for the reconsideration of said order but this was denied by the lower court by order of January 7, 1976 . . . "10.From the said Order of dismissal, the City Fiscal of Manila interposed an appeal by certiorari to this Honorable Court on January 24, 1976. On March 3, 1976, this Honorable Court issued the Resolution of March 3, 1976 requiring the Solicitor General to file the required petition for review within fifteen days from receipt thereof. . . ." The People avers in the petition that respondent judge gravely erred "dismissing Criminal Case No. 22397 despite the provisional of Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, which clearly indicate that the offense charged has not prescribed" and "in not considering the prevailing jurisprudence indicating non-prescription of the offense charged, and in holding that the case of People v. Olarte, 19 SCRA 494, does not apply to the case at bar." The petition is patently meritorious and must be granted. I.The offense of estafa for which respondent accused stands charged clearly has not prescribed. Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code on prescription of offenses provides: "ARTICLE 91.Computation of prescription of offenses. The period of prescription shall commence to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or by their agents, and shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information, and shall commence to run again when the proceedings terminate without the accused being convicted or acquitted, or are unjustifiably stopped for any reason not imputable to him . . ." The offense was committed on or about September 16, 1962 when respondent failed to account for and instead misappropriated to his own use the sum of P8,704.00 representing the net proceeds (minus his commission) of 272 booklets of sweepstakes tickets that had been entrusted to him by the complainant, who promptly filed on October 2, 1962 plainly within the ten-year prescriptive period the criminal complaint against respondent accused in the Municipal Court of Batangas, Batangas. The prescriptive period was thereupon interrupted. After his plea of not guilty and during the trial, respondent accused jumped bail in September, 1964 and evaded rearrest for nine years until September, 1973 and the trial was resumed. When the Batangas court in its Order of November 5, 1974 upon respondent's motion dismissed the complaint "for lack of jurisdiction" since the evidence (of both prosecution and accused) showed that all elements of the crime were committed in Manila (and not in Batangas), the proceedings therein terminated without conviction or acquittal of respondent accused and it was only then that the prescriptive period (which was interrupted during the pendency of the case in the Batangas court) commenced to run again.

When the City Fiscal of Manila upon complainant's instance refiled on July 29, 1975 the same case against respondent accused in the Manila court of first instance, (after having conducted a preliminary investigation), it is clear that not even a year of the ten-year prescriptive period had been consumed. Respondent accused intent on thwarting his prosecution filed anew a motion to dismiss the information on grounds of prescription and double jeopardy. There is manifestly no jeopardy, because he was not acquitted by the Batangas court which on the basis of the evidence could neither convict him because it was thereby shown to have no jurisdiction over the offense. But respondent judge gravely erred in sustaining the ground of prescription, ruling that there was no interruption of the prescriptive period during the pendency of the case in the Batangas court because "(T)he proceedings contemplated by Article 91 are proceedings which are valid and before a competent court. If they are void from the beginning because the court has no territorial jurisdiction of the offense charged, it is as if no proceedings were held thereat. If this is so, then the warrant or order of arrest as well as the bail given by the accused for his provisional liberty is of no effect. Inevitably, there can be no jumping bail to speak of and there are no proceedings to be interrupted." This is plain error for "Settled is the rule . . . that the jurisdiction of a court is determined in criminal cases by the allegations of the complaint or information and not by the result of proof ." It follows clearly that the Batangas court was vested with lawful jurisdiction over the criminal complaint filed with it which expressly alleged that the offense was committed "in the Municipality of Batangas, province of Batangas" and that the proceedings therein were valid and before a competent court, (including the arrest warrant, the grant of bail and forfeiture thereof upon the accused's jumping of bail), until the same court issued its November, 1974 order dismissing the case and declaring itself without territorial jurisdiction on the basis of the evidence presented to it by both prosecution and the accused. It follows just as clearly that the prescriptive period was interrupted and tolled during the 12-year pendency of the proceedings before the Batangas Court (for nine years of which respondent accused had jumped bail and evaded rearrest). II.Respondent judge gravely erred in dismissing the information on the ground of prescription and disregarding the controlling case of People vs. Olarte. 5 In the second People vs. Olarte case, 6 the Court clarified precisely for the guidance of bench and bar that the true doctrine is that the filing of the complaint in the municipal court, even if it be merely for purposes of preliminary investigation (where the offense charged is beyond its jurisdiction to try the case on the merits) should, and does interrupt the period of prescription, as follows: "Analysis of the precedents on the issue of prescription discloses that there are two lines of decisions following differing criteria in determining whether prescription of crimes has been interrupted. One line of precedents holds that the filing of the complaint with the justice of the peace (or municipal judge) does interrupt the course of the prescriptive term. Another series of decisions declares that to produce interruption the complaint or information must have been filed in the proper court that has jurisdiction to try the case on its merits

"In view of this diversity of precedents, and in order to provide guidance for Bench and Bar, this Court has reexamined the question and, after mature consideration has arrived at the conclusion that the true doctrine is, and should be, the one established by the decision holding that the filing of the complaint in the Municipal Court, even if it be merely for purposes of preliminary examination or investigation, should, and does, interrupt the period of prescription of the criminal responsibility, even if the court where the complaint or information is filed can not try the case on its merits. Several reasons buttress this conclusion: first, the text of Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, in declaring that the period of prescription 'shall be interrupted by filing of the complaint or information' without distinguishing whether the complaint is filed in the court for preliminary examination or investigation merely, or for action on the merits. Second, even if the court where the complaint or information is filed may only proceed to investigate the case, its actuation already represents the initial step of the proceedings against the offender. Third, it is unjust to deprive the injured party of the right to obtain vindication on account of delays that are not under his control. All that the victim of the offense may do on his part to initiate the prosecution is to file the requisite complaint." Respondent judge in his dismissal order correctly cited the rationale for statutory prescriptions, inter alia, that "the delay in instituting the proceedings not only causes expenses to the State, but exposes public justice to peril, for it weakens oral evidence, due to the lapse of the natural period of duration of memory, if not to anything else. And it is the policy of the law that prosecutions should be prompt and that statutes enforcing that promptitude should be maintained, they being not merely acts of grace, but checks imposed by the State upon its subalterns, to exact vigilant activity and to secure for criminal trials the best evidence that can be obtained." But respondent judge fell into grave error in not applying the controlling case of Olarte on his misconception that there had been no valid complaint filed with a competent court in Batangas contrary to what has already been held hereinabove that the express allegations of the complaint that the offense was committed in Batangas vested the Batangas court with lawful jurisdiction until its dismissal order twelve years later for lack of jurisdiction as a result of the proof presented before it during the trial, (and in not taking into account that the delay was not at all due to the State but to respondent accused himself who jumped bail and escaped the law for nine [9] years and who apparently has made no effort all this time to make good the amount due to complainant or any part thereof). Since the record with transcript of the testimonial evidence in the Batangas court is complete (and shows that the trial was continued on August 2, 1974 to September 10, 1974 while respondent accused was testifying on the witness stand but that he instead filed his motion to dismiss of October 14, 1974 which was granted by the Batangas court for lack of territorial jurisdiction) and this case had already been pending for almost 15 years, all the evidence already taken by the Batangas court as recorded in the minutes and transcript shall be deemed reproduced upon remand of the case to the Manila court which is hereby ordered to receive only the remaining evidence of the respondent accused and such rebuttal evidence as the parties may have and thereafter resolve the case with the utmost dispatch. ACCORDINGLY, respondent judge's dismissal orders of December 8, 1975 and January 7, 1976 are hereby set aside, and the case is remanded to respondent judge or whoever

presides Branch XIII of the Manila court of first instance for continuation of the trial (with reproduction of the evidence in the Batangas city court in Criminal Case No. 532 thereof, entitled "People vs. Gregorio Santos") in line with the directives in the preceding paragraph. Respondent judge or the judge presiding his court is further ordered to report to this Court the action taken hereon within a period of ninety (90) days from promulgation of this decision. In view of the many years that the criminal case has been pending, this decision is declared immediately executory upon promulgation. SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 82146. January 22, 1990.] EULOGIO OCCENA, petitioner, vs. HON. PEDRO M. ICAMINA, Presiding Judge, Branch X of the Regional Trial Court, Sixth Judicial Region, San Jose, Antique; THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the Honorable Provincial Fiscal of Antique; and CRISTINA VEGAFRIA, respondents. 2.CRIMINAL LAW; PERSON CRIMINALLY LIABLE IS CIVILLY LIABLE; RATIONALE. Underlying the legal principle that a person who is criminally liable is also civilly liable is the view that from the standpoint of its effects, a crime has dual character: (1) as an offense against the state because of the disturbance of the social order; and (2) as an offense against the private person injured by the crime unless it involves the crime of treason, rebellion, espionage, contempt and others wherein no civil liability arises on the part of the offender either because there are no damages to be compensated or there is no private person injured by the crime. In the ultimate analysis, what gives rise to the civil liability is really the obligation of everyone to repair or to make whole the damage caused to another by reason of his act or omission, whether done intentionally or negligently and whether or not punishable by law. In the case at bar, private respondent was found guilty of slight oral defamation and sentenced to a fine of P50.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, but no civil liability arising from the felonious act of the accused was adjudged. This is erroneous. As a general rule, a person who is found to be criminally liable offends two (2) entities: the state or society in which he lives and the individual member of the society or private person who was injured or damaged by the punishable act or omission. The offense of which private respondent was found guilty is not one of those felonies where no civil liability results because either there is no offended party or no damage was caused to a private person. There is here an offended party, whose main contention precisely is that he suffered damages in view of the defamatory words and statements uttered by private respondent, in the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) as moral damages and the further sum of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000) as exemplary damages. FERNAN On May 31, 1979, herein petitioner Eulogio Occena instituted before the Second Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sibalom-San Remigio-Belison, Province of Antique, Criminal Case No. 1717, a criminal complaint for Grave Oral Defamation against herein private respondent Cristina Vegafria for allegedly openly, publicly and maliciously uttering the following insulting

words and statements: "Gago ikaw nga Barangay Captain, montisco, traidor, malugus, Hudas," which, freely translated, mean: "You are a foolish Barangay Captain, ignoramus, traitor, tyrant, Judas" and other words and statements of similar import which caused great and irreparable damage and injury to his person and honor. Private respondent as accused therein entered a plea of not guilty. Trial thereafter ensued, at which petitioner, without reserving his right to file a separate civil action for damages actively intervened thru a private prosecutor. After trial, private respondent was convicted of the offense of Slight Oral Defamation and was sentenced to pay a fine of Fifty Pesos (P50.00) with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs. No damages were awarded to petitioner in view of the trial court's opinion that "the facts and circumstances of the case as adduced by the evidence do not warrant the awarding of moral damages." 1 Disagreeing, petitioner sought relief from the Regional Trial Court, which in a decision dated March 16, 1987 disposed of petitioner's appeal as follows: "IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the civil aspect of the lower court's decision of April 20, 1981 subject of this appeal, for lack of merit, is hereby DENIED. "After the decision shall have become final, remand the records of this case to the court of origin, Second Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sibalom, San Remigio-Belison, Antique, for the execution of its decision on the criminal aspect. Petitioner is now before us by way of a petition for review on certiorari seeking to annul the RTC decision for being contrary to Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code providing that every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable, and Article 2219 of the New Civil Code providing that moral damages may be recovered in libel, slander or any other form of defamation. He submits that public respondent RTC erred in relying on the cases of Roa vs. de la Cruz, 107 Phil. 10 and Tan vs. Standard Vacuum Oil Co., et al., 91 Phil. 672 cited therein. He differentiates said cases from the case at bar by saying that in the case of Roa, the decision of the trial court had become final before Maria C. Roa instituted a civil action for damages; whereas in the instant case, the decision of the trial court has not yet become final by reason of the timely appeal interposed by him and no civil action for damages has been instituted by petitioner against private respondent for the same cause. Tan, on the other hand, contemplates of two actions, one criminal and one civil, and the prosecution of the criminal case had resulted in the acquittal of the accused, which is not the situation here where the civil aspect was impliedly instituted with the criminal action in accordance with Section 1, Rule 111, of the Rules of Court. Private respondent for her part argues that the decision of the trial court carries with it the final adjudication of her civil liability. Since petitioner chose to actively intervene in the criminal action without reserving his right to file a separate civil action for damages, he assumed the risk that in the event he failed to recover damages he cannot appeal from the decision of the lower court. We find merit in the petition. The issues confronting us in the instant petition is whether or not the decision of the Second Municipal Trial Court of Sibalom, San-Remigio-Belison, Province of Antique constitutes the final adjudication on the merits of private respondent's civil liability; and whether or not petitioner is entitled to an award of damages arising from the remarks uttered by private respondent and found by the trial court to be defamatory.

The decision of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court as affirmed by the Regional Trial Court in Criminal Case No. 1709 cannot be considered as a final adjudication on the civil liability of private respondent simply because said decision has not yet become final due to the timely appeal filed by petitioner with respect to the civil liability of the accused in said case. It was only the unappealed criminal aspect of the case which has become final. In the case of People vs. Coloma, 105 Phil. 1287, we categorically stated that from a judgment convicting the accused, two (2) appeals may, accordingly, be taken. The accused may seek a review of said judgment, as regards both civil and criminal actions; while the complainant may appeal with respect only to the civil action, either because the lower court has refused to award damages or because the award made is unsatisfactory to him. The right of either to appeal or not to appeal in the event of conviction of the accused is not dependent upon the other. Thus, private respondent's theory that in actively intervening in the criminal action, petitioner waived his right to appeal from the decision that may be rendered therein, is incorrect and inaccurate. Petitioner may, as he did, appeal from the decision on the civil aspect which is deemed instituted with the criminal action and such appeal, timely taken, prevents the decision on the civil liability from attaining finality. We tackle the second issue by determining the basis of civil liability arising from crime. Civil obligations arising from criminal offenses are governed by Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that "(E)very person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable," in relation to Article 2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-delict, the provisions for independent civil actions in the Chapter on Human Relations and the provisions regulating damages, also found in the Civil Code. Underlying the legal principle that a person who is criminally liable is also civilly liable is the view that from the standpoint of its effects, a crime has dual character: (1) as an offense against the state because of the disturbance of the social order; and (2) as an offense against the private person injured by the crime unless it involves the crime of treason, rebellion, espionage, contempt and others wherein no civil liability arises on the part of the offender either because there are no damages to be compensated or there is no private person injured by the crime. 3 In the ultimate analysis, what gives rise to the civil liability is really the obligation of everyone to repair or to make whole the damage caused to another by reason of his act or omission, whether done intentionally or negligently and whether or not punishable by law. 4 In the case at bar, private respondent was found guilty of slight oral defamation and sentenced to a fine of P50.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, but no civil liability arising from the felonious act of the accused was adjudged. This is erroneous. As a general rule, a person who is found to be criminally liable offends two (2) entities: the state or society in which he lives and the individual member of the society or private person who was injured or damaged by the punishable act or omission. The offense of which private respondent was found guilty is not one of those felonies where no civil liability results because either there is no offended party or no damage was caused to a private person. There is here an offended party, whose main contention precisely is that he suffered damages in view of the defamatory words and statements uttered by private respondent, in the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) as moral damages and the further sum of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000) as exemplary damages.

Article 2219, par. (7) of the Civil Code allows the recovery of moral damages in case of libel, slander or any other form of defamation. This provision of law establishes the right of an offended party in a case for oral defamation to recover from the guilty party damages for injury to his feelings and reputation. The offended party is likewise allowed to recover punitive or exemplary damages. It must be remembered that every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown. And malice may be inferred from the style and tone of publication subject to certain exceptions which are not present in the case at bar. Calling petitioner who was a barangay captain an ignoramus, traitor, tyrant and Judas is clearly an imputation of defects in petitioner's character sufficient to cause him embarrassment and social humiliation. Petitioner testified to the feelings of shame and anguish he suffered as a result of the incident complained of. It is patently error for the trial court to overlook this vital piece of evidence and to conclude that the "facts and circumstances of the case as adduced by the evidence do not warrant the awarding of moral damages." Having misapprehended the facts, the trial court's findings with respect thereto is not conclusive upon us. From the evidence presented, we rule that for the injury to his feelings and reputation, being a barangay captain, petitioner is entitled to moral damages in the sum of P5,000.00 and a further sum of P5,000.00 as exemplary damages. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the Regional Trial Court is hereby MODIFIED and private respondent is ordered to pay petitioner the amount of P5,000.00 as moral damages and another P5,000.00 as exemplary damages. Costs against private respondent. SO ORDERED.

"Art. 103.Subsidiary civil liability of other persons. The subsidiary liability established in the net preceding article shall apply to employers, teachers, persons, and corporations engaged in any kind of industry for felonies committed by their servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, or employees in the discharge of their duties." [G.R. No. 84516. December 5, 1989.] DIONISIO CARPIO, petitioner, vs. HON. SERGIO DOROJA, (Presiding Judge, MTC Branch IV, Zamboanga City) and EDWIN RAMIREZ Y WEE, respondents. PARAS Before Us is a petition to review by certiorari the decision of the Municipal Trial Court of Zamboanga City, Branch IV, which denied petitioner's motion for subsidiary writ of execution against the owner-operator of the vehicle which figured in the accident. FACTS: Sometime on October 23, 1985, accused-respondent Edwin Ramirez, while driving a passenger Fuso Jitney owned and operated by Eduardo Toribio, bumped Dionisio Carpio, a pedestrian crossing the street, as a consequence of which the latter suffered from a fractured left clavicle as reflected in the medico-legal certificate and sustained injuries which required medical attention for a period of (3) three months. An information for Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Serious Physical Injuries was filed against Edwin Ramirez with the Municipal Trial Court of Zamboanga City, Branch IV. On January 14, 1987, the accused voluntarily pleaded guilty to a lesser offense and was accordingly convicted for Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Less Serious Physical Injuries under an amended information punishable under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code. The dispositive portion of the decision handed down on May 27, 1987 reads as follows: "WHEREFORE, finding the accused EDWIN RAMIREZ y WEE guilty as a principal beyond reasonable doubt of the Amended Information to which he voluntarily pleaded guilty and appreciating this mitigating circumstance in his favor, hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of One (1) month and One (1) day to Two (2) months of Arresto Mayor in its minimum period. The accused is likewise ordered to indemnify the complainant Dionisio A. Carpio the amount of P45.00 representing the value of the 1/2 can of tomatoes lost; the amount of P200.00 which complainant paid to the Zamboanga General Hospital, to pay complainant the amount of P1,500.00 as attorney's fees and to pay the cost of this suit.

Thereafter, the accused filed an application for probation. At the early stage of the trial, the private prosecutor manifested his desire to present evidence to establish the civil liability of either the accused driver or the owner-operator of the vehicle. Accused's counsel moved that the court summon the owner of the vehicle to afford the latter a day in court, on the ground that the accused is not only indigent but also jobless and thus cannot answer any civil liability that may be imposed upon him by the court. The private prosecutor, however, did not move for the appearance of Eduardo Toribio. The civil aspect of the above-quoted decision was appealed by the private prosecutor to the Regional Trial Court Branch XVI, appellant praying for moral damages in the amount of P10,000.00, compensatory damages at P6,186.40, and attorney's fees of P5,000.00. The appellate court, on January 20, 1988, modified the trial court's decision, granting the appellant moral damages in the amount of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00), while affirming all other civil liabilities. Thereafter, a writ of execution dated March 10, 1988 was duly served upon the accused but was, however, returned unsatisfied due to the insolvency of the accused as shown by the sheriff's return. Thus, complainant moved for a subsidiary writ of execution against the subsidiary liability of the owner-operator of the vehicle. The same was denied by the trial court on two grounds, namely, the decision of the appellate court made no mention of the subsidiary liability of Eduardo Toribio, and the nature of the accident falls under "culpa-aquiliana" and not "culpa-contractual." A motion for reconsideration of the said order was disallowed for the reason that complainant having failed to raise the matter of subsidiary liability with the appellate court, said court rendered its decision which has become final and executory and the trial court has no power to alter or modify such decision. Hence, the instant petition. Petitioner relies heavily on the case of Pajarito v. Seeris, 87 SCRA 275, which enunciates that "the subsidiary liability of the owner-operator is fixed by the judgment, because if a case were to be filed against said operator, the court called upon to act thereto has no other function than to render a decision based on the indemnity award in the criminal case without power to amend or modify it even if in his opinion an error has been committed in the decision." Petitioner maintains that the tenor of the aforesaid decision implies that the subsidiary liability of the owner-operator may be enforced in the same proceeding and a separate action is no longer necessary in order to avoid undue delay, notwithstanding the fact that said employer was not made a party in the criminal action. It is the theory of respondent that the owner-operator cannot be validly held subsidiarily liable for the following reasons, namely: (a) the matter of subsidiary liability was not raised on appeal; (b) contrary to the case of Pajarito v. Seeris, the injuries sustained by the complainant did not arise from the so-called "culpa-contractual" but from "culpaaquiliana"; (c) the judgments of appellate courts may not be altered, modified, or changed by the court of origin; and (d) said owner was never made a party to the criminal proceedings. Thus, the underlying issue raised in this case is; whether or not the subsidiary liability of the owner-operator may be enforced in the same criminal proceeding against the driver where the award was given, or in a separate civil action. The law involved in the instant case is Article 103 in relation to Article 100, both of the Revised Penal Code, which reads thus:

"Art. 103.Subsidiary civil liability of other persons. The subsidiary liability established in the net preceding article shall apply to employers, teachers, persons, and corporations engaged in any kind of industry for felonies committed by their servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, or employees in the discharge of their duties." Respondent contends that the case of Pajarito v. Seeris cannot be applied to the present case, the former being an action involving culpa-contractual, while the latter being one of culpa-aquiliana. Such a declaration is erroneous. The subsidiary liability in Art. 103 should be distinguished from the primary liability of employers, which is quasi-delictual in character as provided in Art. 2180 of the New Civil Code. Under Art. 103, the liability emanated from a delict. On the other hand, the liability under Art. 2180 is founded on culpa- aquiliana. The present case is neither an action for culpa-contractual nor for culpa-aquiliana. This is basically an action to enforce the civil liability arising from crime under Art. 100 of the Revised Penal Code. In no case can this be regarded as a civil action for the primary liability of the employer under Art. 2180 of the New Civil Code, i.e., action for culpa aquiliana. In order that an employer may be held subsidiarily liable for the employee's civil liability in the criminal action, it should be shown (1) that the employer, etc. is engaged in any kind of industry, (2) that the employee committed the offense in the discharge of his duties and (3) that he is insolvent (Basa Marketing Corp. v. Bolinao, 117 SCRA 156). The subsidiary liability of the employer, however, arises only after conviction of the employee in the criminal action. All these requisites present, the employer becomes ipso facto subsidiarily liable upon the employee's conviction and upon proof of the latter's insolvency. Needless to say, the case at bar satisfies all these requirements. Furthermore, we are not convinced that the owner-operator has been deprived of his day in court, because the case before us is not one wherein the operator is sued for a primary liability under the Civil Code but one in which the subsidiary civil liability incident to and dependent upon his employee's criminal negligence is sought to be enforced. Considering the subsidiary liability imposed upon the employer by law, he is in substance and in effect a party to the criminal case. Ergo, the employer's subsidiary liability may be determined and enforced in the criminal case as part of the execution proceedings against the employee. This Court held in the earlier case of Pajarito v. Seeris, supra, that "The proceeding for the enforcement of the subsidiary civil liability may be considered as part of the proceeding for the execution of the judgment. A case in which an execution has been issued is regarded as still pending so that all proceedings on the execution are proceedings in the suit. There is no question that the court which rendered the judgment has a general supervisory control over its process of execution, and this power carries with it the right to determine every question of fact and law which may be involved in the execution." The argument that the owner-operator cannot be held subsidiarily liable because the matter of subsidiary liability was not raised on appeal and in like manner, the appellate court's decision made no mention of such subsidiary liability is of no moment. As already discussed, the filing of a separate complaint against the operator for recovery of subsidiary liability is not necessary since his liability is clear from the decision against the accused. Such being the case, it is not indispensable for the question of subsidiary liability to be passed upon by the appellate court. Such subsidiary liability is already implied from the appellate court's decision. In the recent case of Vda. de Paman v. Seeris, 115 SCRA 709, this Court reiterated the

following pronouncement: "A judgment of conviction sentencing a defendant employer to pay an indemnity in the absence of any collusion between the defendant and the offended party, is conclusive upon the employer in an action for the enforcement of the latter's subsidiary liability not only with regard to the civil liability, but also with regard to its amount." This being the case, this Court stated in Rotea v. Halili, 109 Phil. 495, that the court has no other function than to render decision based upon the indemnity awarded in the criminal case and has no power to amend or modify it even if in its opinion an error has been committed in the decision. A separate and independent action is, therefore, unnecessary and would only unduly prolong the agony of the heirs of the victim." Finally, the position taken by the respondent appellate court that to grant the motion for subsidiary writ of execution would in effect be to amend its decision which has already become final and executory cannot be sustained. Compelling the owner-operator to pay on the basis of his subsidiary liability does not constitute an amendment of the judgment because in an action under Art. 103 of the Revised Penal Code, once all the requisites as earlier discussed are met, the employer becomes ipso facto subsidiarily liable, without need of a separate action. Such being the case, the subsidiary liability can be enforced in the same case where the award was given, and this does not constitute an act of amending the decision. It becomes incumbent upon the court to grant a motion for subsidiary writ of execution (but only after the employer has been heard), upon conviction of the employee and after execution is returned unsatisfied due to the employee's insolvency. WHEREFORE, the order of respondent court disallowing the motion for subsidiary writ of execution is hereby SET ASIDE. The Court a quo is directed to hear and decide in the same proceeding the subsidiary liability of the alleged owner-operator of the passenger jitney.

SECOND DIVISION [G.R. No. 113433. March 17, 2000] LUISITO P. BASILIO, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. JESUS G. BERSAMIRA, and FE ADVINCULA, respondents. Sc DECISION QUISUMBING, J.:

This is a petition for review1[1] under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court which seeks to annul and set aside the Decision2[2] and Resolution3[3] of the Court of Appeals dated October 27, 1992 and January 5, 1994, respectively. The decision sustained the Order dated April 7, 1992 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 166, denying due course to petitioners appeal from the Judgment in Criminal Case No. 70278 and allowing execution against the petitioner of the subsidiary indemnity arising from the offense committed by his truck driver. The relevant facts as gleaned from the records are as follows: On July 23, 1987, Simplicio Pronebo was charged by the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal with the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property with double homicide and double physical injuries.4[4] The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 70278. The information against him reads: Scmis "The undersigned Assistant Fiscal accused Simplicio Pronebo y Cruz of the crime of Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with Double Homicide and Double Physical Injuries, committed as follows: "That on or about the 15th day of July, 1987 in the municipality of Marikina, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, being then the driver and person in charge of a dump truck with plate no. NMW-609 owned and registered in the name of Luisito Basilio, without due regard to traffic laws, rules and regulations and without taking the necessary care and precaution to prevent damage to property and avoid injuries to persons, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously drive, manage and operate said dump truck in a careless, reckless, negligent and imprudent manner as a result of which said dump truck being then driven by him hit/bumped and sideswiped the following vehicles, to wit: a) a motorized tricycle with plate no. NF-2457 driven by Benedicto Abuel thereby causing damage in the amount of P1,100.00; b) an automobile Toyota Corona with plate no. NAL -138 driven by Virgilio Hipolito thereby causing damage in the amount of P2,190.50 c) a motorized tricycle with plate no. NW-9018 driven by Ricardo Sese y Julian thereby causing damage of an undetermined amount d) an automobile Mitsubishi Lancer with plate no. PHE-283 driven by Angelito Carranto thereby causing damage of an undetermined amount and 3) a Ford Econo Van with plate no. NFR898 driven by Ernesto Aseron thereby causing damage of an undetermined amount; that due to the strong impact caused by the collision, the driver Ricardo Sese y Julian and his 3 passengers including Danilo Advincula y Poblete were hit/bumped which directly caused their death; while the other 2 passengers,
1 2 3 4

namely; Cirilo Bangot sustained serious physical injuries which required medical attendance for a period of more than 30 days which incapacitated him from performing his customary labor for the same period of time and Dominador Legaspi Jr. sustained physical injuries which required medical attendance for a period of less than nine days and incapacitated him from performing his customary labor for the same period of time. Contrary to law." Mis sc After arraignment and trial, the court rendered its judgment dated February 4, 1991, which reads: "WHEREFORE, the court finds accused Simplicio Pronebo y Cruz guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Reckless Imrpudence resulting in the death of Danilo Advincula and is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of two (2) years and four (4) months, as minimum to six (6) years of prision correccional, as maximum, and to indemnify the heirs of danilo Advincula P30,000.00 for the latters death, P31,614.00, as actual and compensatory damages. P2,000,000.00 for the loss of his earning capacity. P150,000.00, as moral damages, and P30,000.00 as attorneys fees, plus the costs of suit."5[5] Thereafter, the accused filed an application for probation, so that the above judgment became final and executory. Pertinently, the trial court also found that at the time of the vehicular accident accused Simplicio Pronebo was employed as the driver of the dump truck owned by petitioner Luisito Basilio. On March 27, 1991, petitioner Luisito Basilio filed with the trial court a "Special Appearance and Motion for Reconsideration"6[6] praying that the judgment dated February 4, 1991, be reconsidered and set aside insofar as it affected him and subjected him to a subsidiary liability for the civil aspect of the criminal case. The motion was denied for lack of merit on September 16, 1991.7[7] Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal8[8] on September 25, 1991. Mis spped On September 23, 1991, private respondent filed a Motion for Execution of the subsidiary civil liability9[9] of petitioner Basilio. On April 7, 1992, the trial court issued two separate Orders. One denied due course and dismissed Basilios appeal for having been filed beyond the reglementary period.10[10] The other
5 6 7 8 9

directed the issuance of a writ of execution against him for the enforcement and satisfaction of the award of civil indemnity decreed in judgment on February 4, 1991.11[11] Aggrieved, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari12[12] under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court with the Court of Appeals, alleging that respondent judge acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in issuing: (1) the Order dated September 16, 1991, denying the petitioners motion for reconsideration of the judgment dated February 4, 1991 insofar as the subsidiary liability of the petitioner was concerned, and (2) the Order dated April 7, 1992, directing the issuance of a writ of execution against the petitioner. Before the appellate court, petitioner claimed he was not afforded due process when he was found subsidiarily liable for the civil liability of the accused Pronebo in the criminal case. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition in its Decision dated October 27, 1992, disposing as follows: Spped "ACCORDINGLY, in view of the foregoing disquisitions, the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction is DENIED DUE COURSE and should be, as it is hereby, DISMISSED for lack of persuasive force and effect."13[13] A motion for reconsideration14[14] was filed by the petitioner on November 24, 1992. This was denied in a Resolution15[15] dated January 5, 1994. Hence this petition for review. Now, petitioner, in his assignment of errors, avers that respondent Court of Appeals erred: I. ... IN SUSTAINING THE RULING OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT THE JUDGMENT OF 4 FEBRUARY 1991 HAD BECOME FINAL AND EXECUTORY AS REGARDS BOTH THE CIVIL AND CRIMINAL ASPECTS WHEN THE ACCUSED APPLIED FOR PROBATION AT THE PROMULGATION. II. ... IN HOLDING THAT AS PETITIONER IS NEITHER AN ACCUSED OR A PARTY IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. 70278, HE IS NOT ENTITLED TO FILE A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE JUDGMENT OF SUBSIDIARY CIVIL LIABILITY AGAINST HIM.
10 11 12 13 14 15

III. ... IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER WAS NOT DEPRIVED OF HIS DAY IN COURT IN VIOLATION OF PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS. Jo spped IV. ... IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER WAS NOT ENTITLED TO THE AUXILIARY RELIEF OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION BECAUSE THE JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION "IS CONCLUSIVE UPON THE EMPLOYER". V. IN RULING THAT THE RESPONDENT JUDGE DID NOT ACT IN ABUSE OF AND/OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION.16[16] The issue before us is whether respondent Court of Appeals erred and committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the special civil action under Rule 65 filed by petitioner against the trial court. To resolve it, we must, however, also pass upon the following: (1) Had the judgment of February 4, 1991 of the trial court become final and executory when accused applied for probation at the promulgation? (2) May the petitioner as employer file a Motion for Reconsideration concerning civil liability decreed in the judgment if he is not a party to the criminal case? (3) May petitioner, as employer, be granted relief by way of a writ of preliminary injunction? Spped jo Petitioner asserts that he was not given the opportunity to be heard by the trial court to prove the absence of an employer-employee relationship between him and accused. Nor that, alternatively, the accused was not lawfully discharging duties as an employee at the time of the incident. While these assertions are not moved, we shall give them due consideration. The statutory basis for an employers subsidiary liability is found in Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code.17[17] This liability is enforceable in the same criminal proceeding where the award is made.18[18] However, before execution against an employer ensues, there must be a determination, in a hearing set for the purpose of 1) the existence of an employer-employee relationship; 2) that the employer is engaged in some kind of industry; 3) that the employee is adjudged guilty of the wrongful act and found to have committed the offense in the discharge of his duties (not necessarily any offense he commits "while" in the discharge of such duties; and 4) that said employee is insolvent.19[19] In Vda. De Paman vs. Seeris, 115 SCRA 709, 714 (1982), the Court observed that the drawback in the enforcement of the subsidiary liability in the same criminal proceeding is that the alleged
16 17 18 19

employer is not afforded due process. Not being a party to the case, he is not heard as to whether he is indeed the employer. Hence, we held: Miso "To remedy the situation and thereby afford due process to the alleged employer, this Court directed the court a quo in Pajarito vs. Seeris (supra) to hear and decide in the same proceeding the subsidiary liability of the alleged owner and operator of the passenger bus. It was explained therein that the proceeding for the enforcement of the subsidiary liability may be considered as part of the proceeding for the execution of the judgment. A case in which an execution has been issued is regarded as still pending so that all proceedings on the execution are proceedings in the suit."20[20] There are two instances when the existence of an employer-employee relationship of an accused driver and the alleged vehicle owner may be determined. One during the criminal proceeding, and the other, during the proceeding for the execution of the judgment. In both instances, petitioner should be given the opportunity to be heard, which is the essence of due process.21[21] Petitioner knew of the criminal case that was filed against accused because it was his truck that was involved in the incident.22[22] Further, it was the insurance company, with which his truck was insured, that provided the counsel for the accused, pursuant to the stipulations in their contract.23[23] Petitioner did not intervene in the criminal proceedings, despite knowledge, through counsel, that the prosecution adduced evidence to show employer-employee relationship.24[24] With the convicts application for probation, the trial courts judgment became final and executory. All told, it is our view that the lower court did not err when it found that petitioner was not denied due process. He had all his chances to intervene in the criminal proceedings, and prove that he was not the employer of the accused, but he chooses not to intervene at the appropriate time. Nex old Petitioner was also given the opportunity during the proceedings for the enforcement of judgment. Even assuming that he was not properly notified of the hearing on the motion for execution of subsidiary liability, he was asked by the trial court to make an opposition thereto, which he did on October 17, 1991, where he properly alleged that there was no employeremployee relationship between him and accused and that the latter was not discharging any function in relation to his work at the time of the incident.25[25] In addition, counsel for private respondent filed and duly served on December 3, 1991, and December 9, 1991, respectively, a
20 21 22 23 24 25

manifestation praying for the grant of the motion for execution.26[26] This was set for hearing on December 13, 1991. However, counsel for petitioner did not appear. Consequently, the court ordered in open court that the matter be submitted for resolution. It was only on January 6, 1992, that the petitioners counsel filed a counter-manifestation27[27] that belatedly attempted to contest the move of the private prosecutor for the execution of the civil liability. Thus, on April 7, 1992, the trial court issued the Order granting the motion for execution of the subsidiary liability. Given the foregoing circumstances, we cannot agree with petitioner that the trial court denied him due process of law. Neither can we fault respondent appellant court for sustaining the judgment and orders of the trial court. Mani kx Accordingly, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 27, 1992, in CA-G.R. SP No. 27850 is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED.

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