Lecture: Was the Vietnam War Winnable?

MILS 521: Strategy, Tactics, and the Operational Art American Military University Martin S. Catino, Ph.D.

Summary: The subject of the Vietnam War, and all its related parts, remains among the most controversial topics in modern military history/studies, evoking strong emotions among Americans, particularly those who lived through that generation. In this short lecture, I will argue that the Vietnam War was winnable, but a series of strategic errors accrued over the course of decades created a problem that had grown much larger, deeper, and more complex by the 1970s. Granted this is an after-the-fact assessment (armchair strategy), the lessons of the era should be studied nonetheless. 1. Insurgencies do not often succeed. Contrary to popular belief, insurgencies do not often succeed, or become serious threats. Few insurgencies succeed or move past the early stages of development. During the Cold War, insurgencies in Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand all failed. And these are just the insurgencies in East Asia. Vietnam could have been the same, a failed war of national liberation (Leninist revolution), if immediate, decisive, and persistent strategy had been applied. This

is not my opinion alone; several Southeast Asian leaders of the era argued the same, as did many American strategists. LACKING CONFIDENCE IN STRATEGY AND CAPABILITIES IS A SURE ROAD TO DEFEAT.

2. Failure to address the roots and beginnings of the Vietnam War. The Vietnam War (war against the United States) began in 1927. Some think that date is absurd. But if you look at the organizational period of Ho Chi Minhs Youth League (and later Indochinese Communist Party) you will not only find adroit leadership, organizational skills, regional and international support structures created, and more, but also an animosity, design, and targeting of the United States as its strategic enemy. If this fact had been clearly understood, our policymakers would have acted even more decisively than they had. Modern studies of Ho Chi Minh have fallen for the MILDEC (military deception) that Ho Chi Minh practiced with excellence, and I would add, unparalleled skill among Communists. To this day, many histories of the period hang on one line from one speech that Ho Chi Minh gave where he quoted the Declaration of Independence favorably. Using this proof these histories argue that Ho was not a hardcore Communist. Yet, in that very period, he was conducting an extermination campaign against Vietnamese nationalists for one simple reason: they rivaled Communist Party control. In short, Ho Chi Minh was not just the most skilled Communist revolutionary of the age, but Americas most misunderstood foe. FAILING TO ADDRESS INSURGENCIES IN THE EARLY STAGE ALLOWS THE INSURGENCY TO DEVELOP UNIMPEDED AND WITH MUCH HIGHER COST TO FIGHT IT LATER. 3. Failure to immediately support the French with decisive force during the period of Dien Bien Phu.

US policy under Truman and Eisenhower did much to support French reforms in Indochina, including a French plan to grant autonomy and independence. But the decision not to provide air support or tactical weapons support at Dien Bien Phu was a tactical mistake with strategic consequences. Next to failing to support Chiang Kai Shek more energetically, this was one of the missed opportunities of the Cold War. HESTITATION TO USE AMERICAS TECHNOLOGICAL AND FIREPOWER ADVANTAGES DURING A CONFLICT OFTEN LEADS TO SECURITY FAILURES 4. Failure to support Ngo Dinh Diem. The US policy decision of President John F. Kennedy tacitly allowed the removal of President Diem of South Vietnam. This was not a conspiracy, or target assassination (JFK was not aware of the plan to kill Diem). The removal of Diem by a coup of South Vietnamese generals created a vacuum of leadership and decade of instability. FAILING TO PROPERLY BALANCE SECURITY AND REFORM LEADS TO INSTABILITY.

Ngo Dinh Diem, President of South Vietnam

5. President Lyndon Johnson and strategic failure. President Johnsons Vietnam policies--gradual escalation, unilateral limits on the war, overly strict rules of engagement (RoE)and acknowledgement of neutral Cambodia and Laos (where the enemy operated in strength and mass) remain among the more serious strategic errors in modern military history. Much has been written on this subject. Simply stated, President Johnson underestimated the

enemy and tied the hands of his commanders, including GEN William Westmoreland, who advocated large military operations to neutralize Cambodia and Laos. As importantly, US Presidential leaders failed to mobilize the American public regarding the war (Nixon did a better job of communicating). Ngo Dinh Diem, Ky, and later Thieu should have all campaigned in the United States to solicit support and inform the American people about North Vietnams agenda. FAILING TO UNDERSTAND THE HISTORY, CULTURE AND RESOLVE OF AN ENEMY LEADS TO INADEQUATE RESPONSES AND STRATEGIC FAILURE

6. Failure to support South Vietnam to the end. The decision of the US Congress to in effect abandon South Vietnam sealed its fate. The US Congress after Nixons resignation limited and ended US over-watch power (in range and funding), cut funding to South Vietnam to the point where it could no longer even maintain its forces, and that scenario in the face of a massive military buildup by North Vietnam using unprecedented amounts of increasingly sophisticated Russian and Chinese military aid. Vietnamization, the policies of President Richard M. Nixon, had helped to further stabilize South Vietnam and more importantly, create a viable internal defense capable of defeating the North Vietnamese aggression (with US air support and material aid). This was no puppet regime, as the South Vietnamese remained markedly anti-Communist and willing to defend their interests like South Korea had. Had South Vietnam been given a fighting chance, US support commensurate to Soviet and Chinese Communist support of North Vietnam, I believe South Vietnam could have maintained its independence. ALLOWING POLITICS TO DICTATE STRATEGY CREATES FAILIURES IN SECURITY AND LOSS OF INTERNATIONAL CREDIBILITY AMONG ALLIES AND OPPONENTS ALIKE Bibliography Catino, Martin Scott. The Aggressors: Ho Chi Minh, North Vietnam, and the Communist Bloc (Indianapolis: Dog Ear Publishers, 2010). Central Intelligence Agency. "Cold War Era Hard Target Analysis of Soviet and Chinese Policy and Decision Making, 1953-1973," http://www.foia.cia.gov/cpe.asp (accessed August 2007). Documents released May 2007.

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