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AURORA ALCANTARA-DAUS, vs. Sps. HERMOSO and SOCORRO DE LEON GR No. 149750, June 16, 2003
FACTS: The respondents alleged that they are the owners of a parcel of land situated in the Municipality of San Manuel which Hermoso de Leon inherited from his father Marcelino de Leon by virtue of a Deed of Extra-judicial Partition. In the early 1960s, respondents engaged the services of the late Atty. Florencio Juan to take care of the documents of the properties of his parents. Atty. Juan let them sign voluminous documents. After the death of Atty. Juan, some documents surfaced and most revealed that their properties had been conveyed by sale or quitclaim to Hermosos brothers and sisters, to Atty. Juan and his sisters, when in truth and in fact, no such conveyances were ever intended by them. His signature in the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition with Quitclaim made in favor of Rodolfo de Leon was forged. They discovered that the land in question was sold by Rodolfo de Leon to Aurora Alcantara. They demanded annulment of the document and reconveyance but defendants refused Aurora Alcantara-Daus that she bought the land in question in good faith and for value. Aurora has been in continuous, public, peaceful, open possession over the same and has been appropriating the produce thereof without objection from anyone. ISSUE: 1. Whether or not the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Rodolfo de Leon over the land in question in favor of petitioner was perfected and binding upon the parties therein? 2. Whether or not the possession of petitioner including her predecessor-ininterest Rodolfo de Leon over the land in question was in good faith? HELD: The contract of sale is consensual because of its perfection by mere consent, upon a meeting of the minds on the offer and the acceptance thereof based on subject matter, price and terms of payment. At this stage, the sellers ownership of the thing sold is not an element in the perfection of the contract of sale. The contract, however, creates an obligation on the part of the seller to transfer ownership and to deliver the subject matter of the contract. It is during the delivery that the law requires the seller to have the right to transfer ownership of the thing sold. In general, a perfected contract of sale cannot be challenged on the ground of the sellers non-ownership of the thing sold at the time of the perfection of the contract. It is well-settled that no title to registered land in derogation of that of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or possession. Neither can prescription be allowed against the hereditary successors of the registered owner, because they merely step into the shoes of the decedent and are merely the Submitted to: ATTY. KARL FRANCIS S. MARTIN
continuation of the personality of their predecessor in interest. Consequently, since a certificate of registration covers it, the disputed land cannot be acquired by prescription regardless of petitioners good faith.
FACTS:
AGUIRRE vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 122249, January 29, 2004
Medrano and his first wife Emilia owned a piece of land. After the death of Emilia, the former married Miguela. When Medrano died, all his heirs agreed that Sixto Medrano, a child of the first marriage, should manage and administer the said property. After Sixto died, his heirs learned that he had executed an Affidavit of Transfer of Real Property in which he falsely stated that he was only heirs of Medrano. Sixto, then living, was able to sell the property to Maria Bacong a portion of the property, and another portion to Tiburcio Balitaan. Maria Bacong later sold the said portion to Rosendo Bacong. Petitioners, all heirs of Medrano who were affected by the sale demanded reconveyance of the portions sold by Sixto but the 3vendees refused. So, petitioners sued them seeking the nullity of the documents and partition. The vendees contended that they acquired the property under the valid deed of sale and petitioners cause of action was bared by laches and prescription. Tiburcio also contended that he is an innocent purchaser for value. ISSUE: Whether there was a valid sale made by a co-owner Sixto without the consent of the other co-owners. HELD: A sale by a co-owner of the whole property as his will affect only his own share but not those of the other co-owners who did not consent to the sale (Art. 493, NCC).It clearly provides that the sale or other disposition affects only the sellers share, and the transferee gets only what corresponds to his grantors share in the partition of the property owned in common. The respondents failed to show that the Affidavit executed by Sixto to the effect that he is the sole owner of the subject property was known or made known to the other co-heirs of Medrano.
PALOMO vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 95608, Jan. 21, 1997
FACTS: William Cameron Forbes issued an Executive Order No. 40 which reserved for provincial park square meters of land situated in Barrio Naga, Municipality of Tiwi, Province of Albay. The Court ordered the registration of 15 parcels of land covered by Executive Order No. 40 in the name of Diego Palomo. Palomo donated these parcels of land to his heirs, herein petitioners, Ignacio and Carmen Palomo two months before his death. Claiming that the aforesaid original certificates of title were lost during the Japanese occupation, Ignacio Palomo filed a petition for reconstitution with the Court of First Instance of Albay. Then, President Ramon Magsaysay issued Proclamation No. 47 converting the area embraced by Executive Order No. 40 into the Tiwi Hot Spring National Park, under the control, management, protection and administration of the defunct Commission of Parks and Wildlife, now a division of the Bureau of Forest Development. The area was never released as alienable and disposable portion of the public domain and, therefore, is neither susceptible to disposition. The Palomos continued in possession of the property, paid real estate taxes thereon and introduced improvements . Carmen Vda. de Buenaventura and spouses Ignacio Palomo and Trinidad Pascual mortgaged the parcels of land to guarantee a loan from the Bank of the Philippine Islands. ISSUE: Whether or not the alleged original certificate of titles issued pursuant to the order of the Court of First Instance in 1916-1917 and the subsequent TCTs issued in 1953 pursuant to the petition for reconstitution are valid. HELD: The land sought to be registered was in fact and in law, unregisterable since it is a reserved provincial park. The adverse possession which may be the basis of a grant of title in confirmation of imperfect title cases applies only to alienable lands of the public domain. It is elementary in the law governing natural resources that forest land cannot be owned by private persons. There is no question that the lots here forming part of the forest zone were not alienable lands of the public domain.
CHAVEZ vs. PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY G.R. No. 133250, July 9, 2002
FACTS: The Comissioner on Public Highways entered into a contract to reclaim areas of Manila Bay with the Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP). Public Estates Authority (PEA) was created by President Marcos under P.D. 1084, tasked with developing and leasing reclaimed lands. These lands were transferred to the care of PEA under P.D. 1085 as part of the Manila Cavite Road and Reclamation Project (MCRRP). CDCP and PEA entered into an agreement that all future projects under the MCRRP would be funded and owned by PEA. Thereafter, President Aquino issued Special Patent No. 3517 transferring the lands to PEA. It was followed by the transfer of three Titles by the Register of Deeds of Paranaque to PEA covering the three reclaimed islands known as the Freedom Islands. Afterwards, PEA entered into a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) with Amari, a Thai-Philippine corporation to develop the Freedom Islands. Along with another 250 hectares, PEA and Amari entered the JVA which would later transfer said lands to Amari. This caused a stir especially when Senator Maceda assailed the agreement, claiming that such lands were part of public domain. Frank Chavez filed case as a taxpayer praying for mandamus, a writ of preliminary injunction and a TRO against the sale of reclaimed lands by PEA to Amari and from implementing the JVA. Then, under President Estradas admin, PEA and Amari entered into an Amended JVA and Mr. Chavez claim that the contract is null and void. ISSUE: 1. Whether or not the transfer to Amari lands reclaimed or to be reclaimed as part of the stipulations in the (Amended) JVA between Amari and PEA violate Sec. 3 Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution. 2. Whether or not the court is the proper forum for raising the issue of whether the amended joint venture agreement is grossly disadvantageous to the government. HELD: On the issue of Amended JVA as violating the constitution: 1. The hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now covered by certificates of title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public domain. PEA may lease these lands to private corporations but may not sell or transfer ownership of these lands to private corporations. PEA may only sell these lands to Philippine citizens, subject to the ownership limitations in the 1987 Constitution and existing laws.
2. The hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable natural resources of the public domain until classified as alienable or disposable lands open to disposition and declared no longer needed for public service. The government can make such classification and declaration only after PEA has reclaimed these submerged areas. Only then can these lands qualify as agricultural lands of the public domain, which are the only natural resources the government can alienate. In their present state, the hectares of submerged areas are inalienable and outside the commerce of man. 3. Since the Amended JVA seeks to transfer to Amari, a private corporation, ownership of hectares of the Freedom Islands, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. 4. Since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to Amari ownership of hectares of still submerged areas of Manila Bay, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits the alienation of natural resources other than agricultural lands of the public domain. The government can classify the reclaimed lands as alienable or disposable, and further declare them no longer needed for public service. Still, the transfer of such reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain to Amari will be void in view of Section 3, Article XII of the 1987Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.
DIRECTOR OF LANDS vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 83609, October 26, 1989
FACTS: Ibarra and Amelia Bisnar claimed to the owners in fee simple of Lots 860 and 870. They alleged that they inherited these parcels of land and have been paying taxes thereon. The respondents filed a joint application for registration of title to the aforementioned parcels of land. Director of Lands opposed the application on the ground that the private respondents did not meet the requirements laid down in Commonwealth Act. No. 141, Section 48. The law states that for a citizen residing in lands of public domain to register said lands in his own name, he must: Have applied for the purchase of the land prior to the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the U.S.; Have (either by himself or through his predecessors in interest) been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership for at least 30 years; or be a member of a cultural minority who has been in possession and occupation of lands of public domain suitable to agriculture. The trial court disagreed with this argument, holding that the private respondents that they had filled (b) of CA 141, Sec. 48. Director of Lands elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, arguing that the land was more valuable as forest land rather than agricultural. As such, it must be recognized as forest land. But the Court of Appeals denied said appeal because there was no proof to the aforementioned claim. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners had fulfilled the requirement for the registry of land within public domain as stated in Commonwealth Act 141, Sec. 48, (b) HELD: No. The Court cited the case of Bureau Forestry v. Court of Appeals, where it was held that the classification or reclassification of public land into alienable mineral or forest land is a prerogative of the Executive Department and not of the courts. The Executive Department reserves the sole right to determine the public or alienable character of the lands in question. CA 141, Sec. 48 (b) applies only to forest land. Director of Lands recognizes the subject lands as public, rather than forest land. As such, the requirement stated in CA 141, Sec. 48 cannot be invoked in the registration of the subject lands. Hence, it cannot be said that they have fulfilled this requirement.
DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY vs. VILLAREAL G.R. No. L-32266, February 27, 1989
FACTS: Ruperto Villareal applied for its registration on 25 January 1949, a land consisting of 178,113 sq. m. of mangrove swamps located in the municipality of Sapian, Capiz, alleging that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the land for more than 40 years. He was opposed by several persons, including the Director of Foresty on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines. After trial, the application was approved by the CFI Capiz. The decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The Director of Forestry then came to the Supreme Court in a petition for review on certiorari. ISSUE: Whether or not the land in dispute was forestall in nature and not subject to private appropriation? HELD: The Supreme Court set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals and dismissed the application for registration of title of Villareal, Administrative Code of 1917; Mangrove swamps form part of the public forests of the country. Subsequently, the Philippine Legislature categorically declared that mangrove swamps form part of the public forests of this country. This it did in the Administrative Code of 1917, which became effective on 1 October 1917, providing in Section 1820 of said code that for the purpose of this chapter 'public forest' includes, except as otherwise specially indicated, all unreserved public land, including nipa and mangrove swamps, and all forest reserves of whatever character." The legislative definition embodied in Section 1820 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917, remains unamended up to now, provides that mangrove swamps or manglares form part of the public forests of the Philippines. As such, they are not alienable under the Constitution and may not be the subject of private ownership until and unless they are first released as forest land and classified as alienable agricultural land.
ATOK-BIG WEDGE MINING CO., INC. vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 88883, January 18, 1991
FACTS: The Fredia Mineral claim of 9 hectares situated in Tuding, Itogon, Benguet was located sometime between December 25 and 31, 1930 by A.I. Reynolds in accordance with the provisions of Congress Act known as Philippine Bill of 1902 in a so-called Declaration of Location. The Declaration of Location of the mineral claim has been duly recorded in the Office of the Mining Recorder sometime January 2, 1931. Fredia mineral claim was sold by A.I. Reynolds to Big Wedge Mining Co., which was the earlier name of Atok Big Wedge Mining Company, Inc. in a Deed of Sale executed November 2, 1931. Ever since, Atok has been in continuous and exclusive ownership and possession of said claim up to present. Atok has paid the realty taxes and occupation fees for the Fredia mineral claim as well as other mineral claims owned by them as declared under Tax Declaration 9535. Liwan Consi owns a lot below the land of Mr. Acay at Tuding Slide, Itogon, Benguet, where he constructed a house thereon in 1964. Said lot is covered by Tax Declaration 9462. When he first constructed his house below the lot of Mr. Acay, he was told that it was not necessary for him to obtain a building permit as it was only a nipa hut and no one prohibited him from entering the land as well as constructing a house thereon. In January 1984, Consi had the house repaired and people came to take pictures and told him that the lot belongs to Atok. However, Consi has been paying taxes on the said land, which his father before him had occupied. Atok filed a complaint for forcible entry and detainer against Liwan Consi on March 1, 1984. The Municipal Trial Court of Itogon, presided over by Judge Irving rendered a decision on January 29, 1987 dismissing the case against Consi. Atok appealed the decision to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baguio and Benguet, presided over by Judge Ruben Ayson and on December 5, 1987, the RTC rendered decision stating that the decision of the Municipal Trial Court of Itogon is reversed and set aside. Liwan Consi is ordered to vacate the premises of the Fredia Mineral claim at Tuding, Itogon, Benguet immediately, demolish the house, and to restore possession to Atok Big Wedge Mining Company. The Court of Appeals dismissed the complaint regarding forcible entry action. There is a chance that the subject property may be classified as alienable agricultural land. At any rate, the mining company may not so readily describe Liwan Consi as a "squatter" he also has possessory rights over the property. Such rights may mature into ownership on the basis of long-term possession under the Public Land Law, thus, both Consi and Atok are of equal legal footing with regards the subject lot. But it was established that the petitioner has been in actual and beneficial possession of the subject lot since before the Second World War in the concept of owner and in good faith. ISSUE:
Whether or not an individual's long term occupation of land of the public domain vests him with such rights over the same as to defeat the rights of the owner of that claim? HELD: Yes. The Court enunciated that the petitioner, Atok, has the exclusive right to the property in question. The court grants the petition. The decision of the RTC is upheld and the decision of CA is reversed and set aside. The record shows that the lot in question was acquired through a Deed of Sale. The legal effect of a valid location of a mining claim is not only to segregate the area from the public domain, but to grant to the locator the beneficial ownership of the claim and the right to a patent therefore upon compliance with the terms and conditions prescribed by law. Where there is a valid location of mining claim, the area becomes segregated from the public and the property of the locator. Atok has been in continuous and exclusive possession since 1931. Consi started only sometime in 1964 when he constructed a house thereon. Atok has, indeed, superior possessory rights than Consi. Atok has the right to sue for ejectment being in actual possession of the land and for the deprivation of his rights.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. VDA. DE CASTILLO G.R. No. L-69002 June 30, 1988
FACTS: Modesto Castillo applied for the registration of two parcels of land located in Batangas. Modesto Castillo married to Amanda Lat was declared the true and absolute owner of the land with the improvements. The OCT 0-665 was issued to him by the Register of Deeds at Batangas. By virtue of an instrument, the two parcels of land covered by OCT 0-665 together with two other lots were consolidated and sub-divided into Lots 1-9. After Modestos death, Amanda Lat Vda. De Castillo executed a deed of partition and assumption of mortgage in favor of Florencio Castillo. As a result, Original Certificate of Title No. D-665 was cancelled, and in lieu thereof, new transfer cerfificates of title were issued to Florencio Castillo. The Republic of the Philippines filed Civil Case No. 2044 with the lower court for the annulment of the certificates of title issued to Amanda Lat Vda. de Castillo, et al., as heirs/successors of Modesto Castillo, and for the reversion of the lands covered thereby (Lots 1 and 2, Psu-119166) to the State. It was alleged that said lands had always formed part of the Taal Lake, washed and inundated by the waters thereof, and being of public ownership, it could not be the subject of registration as private property. They alleged in their answer that the Government's action was already barred by the decision of the registration court; that the action has prescribed; and that the government was estopped from questioning the ownership and possession of appellants. The Court of First Instance of Batangas, presided over by Honorable Benjamin Relova, ruled in favor of the petitioner. The decision orders the Register of Deeds of Batangas to cancel Original Certificate of Title No. 0-665 in the name of Modesto Castillo and the subsequent Transfer of Certificates of Title issued over the property in the names of the defendants. Lots Nos. 1 and 2 are declared public lands belonging to the state. The Court of Appeals in a decision reversed and set aside the appealed decision, and dismissed the complaint. ISSUE: Whether or not the decision of the Land Registration Court involving shore lands constitutes res adjudicata? HELD: Long possession of a land is not available as a defense for this case because the Court has already ruled that mere possession of land does not by itself automatically divest the land of its public character. The Supreme Court held that the decision of then Intermediate Appellate Court is set aside and reversed. The decision of the Court of First Instance of Batangas is affirmed and reinstated. Submitted to: ATTY. KARL FRANCIS S. MARTIN
MANECLANG vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT G.R. No. L-66575, September 30, 1986
FACTS: Adriano Maneclang, et.al., petitioners, filed before the then CFI Pangasinan a complaint for quieting of title over a certain fishpond located within 4 parcels of land belonging to them situated in Barrio Salomague, Bugallon, Pangasinan. On August 15, 1975, the trial court dismissed the complaint upon a finding that the body of water traversing the titled properties is a creek constituting a tributary of the Agno; and held that Resolution 38, ordering an ocular inspection of the Cayangan Creek situated between Barrios Salomague Sur and Salomague Norte, and Resolution 95 authorizing public bidding for the lease of all municipal ferries and fisheries were passed by the members of the Municipal Council of Bugallon, Pangasinan in the exercise of their legislative powers. Maneclang appealed said decision to the IAC, which affirmed the same on 29 April 1983. Hence, the petition for review on certiorari. Before the IAC were able to comment on the petition, the petitioners manifested that for lack of interest on the part of respondent Alfredo Maza, the awardee in the public bidding of the fishpond, as the parties desire to amicably settle the case by submitting to the Court a Compromise Agreement praying that judgment be rendered recognizing the ownership of the petitioners over the land the body of water found within their titled properties. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for lack of merit, and set aside the Compromise Agreement and declare the same null and void for being contrary to law and public policy. ISSUE: Whether or not the stipulations mentioned in the Compromise Agreement is null and void. HELD: The stipulations is null and void for being contrary to law and public policy. The stipulations contained in the Compromise Agreement partake of the nature of an adjudication of ownership of the fishpond in dispute, which was originally a creek forming a tributary of the Agno River. A creek, defined as a recess or arm extending from a river and participating in the ebb and flow of the sea, is a property belonging to the public domain which is not susceptible to private appropriation and acquisitive, and as a public water, it cannot be registered under the Torrens System in the name of any individual and considering further that neither the mere construction of irrigation dikes by the National Irrigation Administration which prevented the water from flowing in and out of the subject fishpond, nor its conversion into a fishpond, alter or change the nature of the creek as a property of the public domain. The Compromise Agreement, thus, is null and void and of no legal effect, the same being contrary to law and public policy.
There is no question that the Court acquired jurisdiction over Eusebio and Lara as adduced from the evidence that personal service was made on them. Jurisdiction over a person of a defendant is acquired when he actually receives the summons. A judgment whether correct or not becomes final when the plaintiff did not appeal said judgment and courts are without jurisdiction over the case once judgment has become final. Doctrine of non-interference: judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction may not be opened,modified, or vacated by any court of concurrent jurisdiction. Any title issued on non-disposable lots even in the hands of an alleged innocent purchaser shall be cancelled. The disputed area forms part of Laguna de Bay, neither agricultural nor disposable. Any false statement in an application for public land shall ipso facto produce the cancellation of the title granted. A certificate of title cannot be used as a shield to perpetuate fraud, and the documents of indefeasibility of torrens title does not apply to free patent secured through fraud.
DIRECTOR OF LANDS vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. L-45061 November 20, 1989
FACTS: A large tract of agricultural land situated in Barrio Kapok, Orion, Bataan, containing 233.6883 hectares, alleged to have been occupied since 1913 by the grandfather of applicant Arturo Rodriguez, the late Vicente Rodriguez, who, during his lifetime filed Lease Application with the Bureau of Lands, but which application was rejected upon investigation and ascertainment that the land was classified as within the U.S. Military Reservation under Executive Order of the President of the United States of America. Upon the death of Vicente Rodriguez in 1924, possession of the property was taken over by his sons, Victorino Rodriguez and Pablo Rodriguez. Both Victorino and Pablo Rodriguez waived their rights as heirs of the late Vicente Rodriguez over the subject property ceding all their participation, ownership and possession thereon in favor of Arturo Rodriguez, who sold two-thirds undivided portion of the land to Guillermo Reyes and Francisco S. Alcantara. In 1953, the land in question was deemed reverted to the public domain as it was excluded from the US-Philippine Military Bases Agreement. Arturo Rodriguez together with Guillermo Reyes and Francisco S. Alcantara filed a verified petition for registration of their title, alleging that they, by themselves and through their predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, exclusive and adverse possession thereof in the concept of owners for more than thirty (30) years immediately preceding the filing of their application. Thirty-nine (39) persons headed by Rosauro Canaria filed their Opposition to the petition for registration contending, among others, that they have been in actual, peaceful, adverse and continuous possession of the land for more than thirty (30) years and have introduced improvements thereon consisting of fruit-bearing trees; that the applicants have never been in possession of the property; and that applicant Arturo Rodriguez could not have inherited the land from his grandfather, because the children of Vicente Rodriguez are still living The lower court ruled in favor of the applicants confirming their title to the land, Orion Cadastre, Bataan and ordering its registration in the names of said applicants in the following proportion: 2/3 undivided portion to Arturo Rodriguez and 1/3 undivided portion to Guillermo Reyes. The Court of Appeals promulgated its decision reversing and setting aside the decision of the lower court on the ground that the land in question had been decreed in 1938 to be part of the public domain by the cadastral court, which had become final thereby constituting a bar to the subsequent application for registration on the principle of res judicata. Applicants-appellees filed a motion for the reconsideration. Court of Appeals thru a division of five and by a vote of four to one reversed its decision and ruled that the prior decision of the cadastral court declaring the lot in question as public land way back in 1930. Submitted to: ATTY. KARL FRANCIS S. MARTIN
ISSUE: Whether or not the land was declared public domain and would, thus, be registrable. HELD: Registrable even though the cadastral court declared the land as public domain. The land in question had been declared public land in a decision rendered by the cadastral court. Factually, however, there is no prior final judgment at all to speak of because in a cadastral proceedings declaring a lot public land is not the final decree contemplated in Sections 38 and 40 of the Land Registration Act. Thus, a judicial declaration that a parcel of land is public, does not preclude the same applicant from subsequently seeking a judicial confirmation of his title to the same land, provided he thereafter complies with the provisions of Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, and as long as said public land remains alienable and disposable.
REPUBLIC vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. L-40912 September 30, 1976
FACTS: On January 22, 1921, Eugenio de Jesus, the father of respondent Alejandro de Jesus, applied with the Bureau of Lands for Sales Patent (Sales Application No. 5436) of a 33-hectare situated in barrio Libaron, Municipality of Davao (now Davao City). The property applied for was a portion of what was then known as Lot 522 of the Davao Cadastre. On January 23, 1934, the Bureau of Lands, through its Davao District Land Officer, accepted sealed bids for the purchase of the subject land. One Irineo Jose bidded for P20.00 per hectare, while a certain Dr. Josc Ebro submitted a bid of P100.50 per hectare The Director of Lands, however, annulled the auction sale for the reason that the sales applicant, Eugenio de Jesus, failed to participate in the bidding for non-service of notice on him of the scheduled bidding. In lieu of that sale, another bidding was held on October 4, 1934. Sales applicant Eugenio de Jesus was the lone bidder. He equalled the bid previously submitted by Dr. Jose Ebro and made a deposit of P221.00 representing 10% of the price of the land at P100.50 per hectare. On November 23, 1934, the Director of Lands issued to Eugenio de Jesus an Order of Award. On August 28, 1936, the Director of Lands ordered an amendment of the Sales Application of Eugenio de Jesus stating that a portion of the land covered by Sales Application No. 5436 (E-3231) of Eugenio de Jesus is needed by the Philippine Army for military camp site purposes. On September 7, 1936, President Manuel L. Quezon issued Proclaimation No. 85 withdrawing Lot No. 1176-B-2 from sale and settlement and reserving the same for military purposes, under the administration of the Chief of Staff, Philippine Army. On August 11, 1956, President Ramon Magsaysay revoked Proclamation No. 85 and declared the disputed Lot 1176-B-2 open to disposition under the provisions of the Public land Act for resettlement of the squatters in the Piapi Beach, Davao City. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners appeal is meritorious. HELD: It find petitioner's appeal to be meritorious. Mindanao Medical Center has registerable title. Proclamation No. 350 is free of any legal infirmity. It proceeds from the recognized competence of the president to reserve by executive proclamation alienable lands of the public domain for a specific public use or service. Appellate Court erroneously ruled that Alejandro's father, Eugenio de Jesus, had acquired ownership over the whole 12.8081-hectare Lot 1176-B-2 because the Submitted to: ATTY. KARL FRANCIS S. MARTIN
Sales Award issued to him on November 23, 1934 by then Director of Lands Simeon Ramos covered the 33 hectares applied for, including the 12.8081 hectares.
claim for her application. In the absence of these evidences, her application shall fail. Hence the petition was granted and her application was denied.
of the motion to dismiss Civil Case No. Q-92-12645. As this Court has always stressed, the Rules of Court must be liberally construed.
Commissioners report as the respondent failed to establish proprietary right over the excluded areas.
LUCENA vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. L-77468, August 31, 1999
FACTS: The petitioners alleged they are the registered owners of a parcel of land located at the barrio of Mag-asawang Tubig, Municipality of Naujan, Oriental Mindoro. On October 29, 1969, petitioner Eduardo Lucena obtained a loan from the private respondent Rural Bank of Naujan, Inc. in the amount of three-thousand pesos secured by a real estate mortgage constituted on said parcel of land. On October 1, 1970, after the loan had matured, petitioners paid to the Rural Bank of Naujan, Inc., the sum of two-thousand six pesos and ninety centavos (P2,006.90) in partial satisfaction of their debt, thereby leaving a balance of one-thousand pesos (P1,000.00) in its favor. An affidavit of consolidation of ownership was executed by the Rural Bank of Naujan through its manager, private respondent Rogelio P. Pineda. The affidavit of consolidation was subsequently registered by private respondent Reynaldo Mambil in his capacity as acting Register of Deeds on July 8, 1975, under Entry No. 134351. Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-41512 in the name of the petitioners was thus cancelled and Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-68547 of the Registry of Deeds of Oriental Mindoro was then issued in favor of the rural bank also on July 8, 1975. Thereafter, on July 14, 1975, a deed of sale was executed by the rural bank through its manager whereby the subject property was sold to private respondent spouses Marianito Baja and Patricia Araja, resulting in the cancellation of TCT No. T-68547 and the subsequent issuance of TCT No. T-68680 in the name of said respondents. Said deed of sale dated July 14, 1975 was accepted and registered by private respondent Ramon G. Garcia. ISSUE: 1. Whether or not reconveyance and damages is the proper remedy available to petitioners. 2. Whether or not a valid foreclosure sale of the subject property was conducted. HELD: 1. With respect to the first issue, this Court has ruled that failure to comply with statutory requirements as to publication of notice of auction sale constitutes a jurisdictional defect which invalidates the sale. In the case at bar, the affidavit of posting executed by the sheriff states that notices of the public auction sale were posted in three (3) conspicuous public places in the municipality such as (1) the bulletin board of the Municipal Building (2) the Public Market and (3) the Bus Station. There is no indication that notices were posted in the barrio where the subject property lies. Clearly, there was a failure to publish the notices of auction sale as required by law. 2. What Baja should have noticed, if we follow his own chronological estimates, was that the title was still in the petitioners name when he verified the status of the land in question. Hence, at the time the property in question was Submitted to: ATTY. KARL FRANCIS S. MARTIN
being sold to him by the rural bank, possession thereof was with the petitioners, exercised through their tenant Victor Atienza.