SUPREME COURT EN BANC

A.C. No. 8390

July 2, 2010 [Formerly CBD 06-1641]

A-1 FINANCIAL SERVICES, INC., Complainant, vs. ATTY. LAARNI N. VALERIO, Respondent. PERALTA, J.: Before us is a Complaint dated January 18, 2006 for disciplinary action against respondent Atty. Laarni N. Valerio filed by A-1 Financial Services, Inc., represented by Diego S. Reunilla, its account officer, with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD), docketed as CBD Case No. 06-1642, now A.C. No. 8390, for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (B.P. 22) and non-payment of debt. On November 13, 2001, A-1 Financial Services, Inc., a financing corporation, granted the loan application of Atty. Valerio amounting to P50,000.00. To secure the payment of the loan obligation, Atty. Valerio issued a postdated 2 check, to wit: Check No. 0000012725; dated April 1, 2002, in the amount: P50,000.00. However, upon presentation at the bank for payment on its maturity date, the check was dishonored due to insufficient funds. As of the filing of the instant case, despite repeated demands to pay her obligation, Atty. Valerio failed to pay the whole amount of her obligation. Thus, on November 10, 2003, complainant filed a B.P. 22 case against Atty. Valerio, docketed as Criminal Case No. 124779. Atty. Valerios arraignment was scheduled for August 31, 2004; however, she failed to appear despite due 3 4 notice. Subsequently, a Warrant of Arrest was issued but Atty. Valerio posted no bail. On November 22, 2004, 5 complainant sent a letter to Atty. Valerio calling her attention to the issuance of the Warrant of Arrest against her and requested her to submit to the jurisdiction of the court by posting bail. The said letter was received by Atty. Valerio, as 6 evidenced by the postal registry return cards. Despite court orders and notices, Atty. Valerio refused to abide. On January 18, 2006, complainant filed an administrative complaint against Atty. Valerio before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). On January 26, 2006, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) required Atty. Valerio to 7 file an answer, but she did not file any responsive pleading at all. However, in a letter dated March 16, 2006, respondents mother, Gorgonia N. Valerio (Mrs. Valerio), explained that her daughter had been diagnosed with schizophrenia; thus, could not properly respond to the complaint against her. Futhermore, Mrs. Valerio undertook to personally settle her daughters obligation. On September 13, 2007, the IBP-CBD directed Atty. Valerio to appear before the mandatory conference. Atty. Valerio, again, failed to attend the conference. Subsequently, in an Order dated November 15, 2007, the IBP ordered the parties to submit their position papers. No position paper was submitted by Atty. Valerio. Thus, in its Report and Recommendation dated September 16, 2008, the IBP-CBD recommended that Atty. Valerio be suspended from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years, having found her guilty of gross misconduct. The IBP-CBD gave no credence to the medical certificate submitted by Atty. Valerios mother, in view of the latters failure to appear before the IBP-CBD hearings to affirm the truthfulness thereof or present the physician who issued the same. The IBP-CBD, further, pointed out that Atty. Valerios failure to obey court processes, more particularly her failure to appear at her arraignment despite due notice and to surrender to the Court despite the issuance of a warrant 8 of arrest, showed her lack of respect for authority and, thus, rendered her morally unfit to be a member of the bar. On December 11, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved with modification the report and recommendation of the IBP-CBD. Atty. Valerio was instead ordered suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year. Nevertheless, to provide Atty. Valerio further opportunity to explain her side, the Court, in a Resolution dated December 15, 2010, directed Atty. Valerio and/or her mother, to submit a duly notarized medical certificate issued by a duly licensed physician and/or certified copies of medical records to support the claim of schizophrenia on the part of Atty. Valerio within a non-extendible period of ten (10) days from receipt hereof. However, despite the lapse of considerable time after the receipt of notice to comply with the said Resolution, no medical certificate or medical records were submitted to this Court by either respondent and/or her mother. Thus, this resolution. We sustain the findings and recommendations of the IBP-CBD. In Barrientos v. Libiran-Meteoro,
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we held that:

x x x [the] deliberate failure to pay just debts and the issuance of worthless checks constitute gross misconduct, for which a lawyer may be sanctioned with suspension from the practice of law. Lawyers are instruments for the administration of justice and vanguards of our legal system. They are expected to maintain not only legal proficiency but also a high standard of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing so that the peoples faith and confidence in the judicial system is ensured. They must at all times faithfully perform their duties to society, to the bar, the courts and to their clients, which include prompt payment of financial obligations. They must conduct themselves in a manner that

reflects the values and norms of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility. Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 explicitly states that: Canon 1 A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and for legal processes. Rule 1.01A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. In the instant case, there is no denial of the existence of the loan obligation despite respondents failure to cooperate before any proceedings in relation to the complaint. Prior to the filing of the complaint against her, Atty. Valerios act of making partial payments of the loan and interest suffices as proof that indeed there is an obligation to pay on her part. Respondents mother, Mrs. Valerio, likewise, acknowledged her daughters obligation. The Court, likewise, finds unmeritorious Mrs. Valerios justification that her daughter, Atty. Valerio, is suffering from a health condition, i.e. schizophrenia, which has prevented her from properly answering the complaint against her. Indeed, we cannot take the "medical certificate" on its face, considering Mrs. Valerios failure to prove the contents of the certificate or present the physician who issued it. Atty. Valerios conduct in the course of the IBP and court proceedings is also a matter of serious concern. She failed to answer the complaint against her. Despite due notice, she failed to attend the disciplinary hearings set by the IBP. She also ignored the proceedings before the court as she likewise failed to both answer the complaint against her and appear during her arraignment, despite orders and notices from the court. Clearly, this conduct runs counter to the precepts of the Code of Professional Responsibility and violates the lawyers oath which imposes upon every member of the Bar the duty to delay no man for money or malice. Atty. Valerio has failed to live up to the values and norms of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility.1avvphil In Ngayan v. Tugade, we ruled that "[a lawyers] failure to answer the complaint against him and his failure to appear at the investigation are evidence of his flouting resistance to lawful orders of the court and illustrate his despiciency for his oath of office in violation of Section 3, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. We come to the penalty imposable in this case. In Lao v. Medel, we held that the deliberate failure to pay just debts and the issuance of worthless checks constitute gross misconduct for which a lawyer may be sanctioned with one-year suspension from the practice of law. The same 13 sanction was imposed on the respondent-lawyer in Rangwani v. Dino, having found guilty of gross misconduct for issuing bad checks in payment of a piece of property, the title to which was only entrusted to him by the complainant. However, in this case, we deem it reasonable to affirm the sanction imposed by the IBP-CBD, i.e., Atty. Valerio was 14 ordered suspended from the practice of law for two (2) years, because, aside from issuing worthless checks and failing to pay her debts, she has also shown wanton disregard of the IBPs and Court Orders in the course of the proceedings. WHEREFORE, Resolution No. XVIII-2008-647 dated December 11, 2008 of the IBP, which found respondent Atty. Laarni N. Valerio guilty of gross misconduct and violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. She is hereby SUSPENDED for two (2) years from the practice of law, effective upon the receipt of this Decision. She is warned that a repetition of the same or a similar act will be dealt with more severely. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to the personal record of Atty. Valerio as a member of the Bar; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country for their information and guidance. This Decision shall be immediately executory. SO ORDERED.
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SUPREME COURT

SECOND DIVISION

A.C. No. 9081

October 12, 2011

RODOLFO A. ESPINOSA and MAXIMO A. GLINDO, Complainants, vs. ATTY. JULIETA A. OMAA, Respondent. CARPIO, J.: Before the Court is a complaint for disbarment filed by Rodolfo A. Espinosa (Espinosa) and Maximo A. Glindo (Glindo) against Atty. Julieta A. Omaa (Omaa). The Antecedent Facts Complainants Espinosa and Glindo charged Omaa with violation of her oath as a lawyer, malpractice, and gross misconduct in office. Complainants alleged that on 17 November 1997, Espinosa and his wife Elena Marantal (Marantal) sought Omaas legal advice on whether they could legally live separately and dissolve their marriage solemnized on 23 July 1983. Omaa then prepared a document entitled "Kasunduan Ng Paghihiwalay" (contract) which reads:
REPUBLIKA NG PILIPINAS BAYAN NG GUMACA LALAWIGAN NG QUEZON KASUNDUAN NG PAGHIHIWALAY KAMI, ELENA MARANTAL AT RODOLFO ESPINOSA, mga Filipino, may sapat na gulang, dating legal na mag-asawa, kasalukuyang naninirahan at may pahatirang sulat sa Brgy. Buensoceso, Gumaca, Quezon, at COMELEC, Intramuros, Manila ayon sa pagkakasunod-sunod, matapos makapanumpa ng naaayon sa batas ay nagpapatunay ng nagkasundo ng mga sumusunod: 1. Na nais na naming maghiwalay at magkanya-kanya ng aming mga buhay ng walang pakialaman, kung kayat bawat isa sa amin ay maaari ng humanap ng makakasama sa buhay; 2. Na ang aming mga anak na sina Ariel John Espinosa, 14 na taong gulang; Aiza Espinosa, 11 taong gulang at Aldrin Espinosa, 10 taong gulang ay namili na kung kanino sasama sa aming dalawa. Si Ariel John at Aiza Espinosa ay sasama sa kanilang ama, Rodolfo Espinosa, at ang bunso, Aldrin Espinosa at sasama naman sa ina na si Elena; 3. Na dahil sina Ariel John at Aiza ay nagsisipag-aral sa kasalukuyan sila ay pansamantalang mananatili sa kanilang ina, habang tinatapos ang kanilang pag-aaral. Sa pasukan sila ay maaari ng isama ng ama, sa lugar kung saan siya ay naninirahan; 4. Na ang mga bata ay maaaring dalawin ng sino man sa aming dalawa tuwing may pagkakataon; 5. Na magbibigay ng buwanang gastusin o suporta ang ama kay Aldrin at ang kakulangan sa mga pangangailangan nito ay pupunan ng ina; 6. Na lahat ng mga kasangkapan sa bahay tulad ng T.V., gas stove, mga kagamitan sa kusina ay aking (Rodolfo) ipinagkakaloob kay Elena at hindi na ako interesado dito; 7. Na lahat ng maaaring maipundar ng sino man sa amin dalawa sa mga panahong darating ay aming mga sari-sariling pag-aari na at hindi na pinagsamahan o conjugal. BILANG PATUNAY ng lahat ng ito, nilagdaan namin ito ngayong ika-17 ng Nobyembre, 1997, dito sa Gumaca, Quezon. (Sgd) ELENA MARANTAL Nagkasundo (Sgd) RODOLFO ESPINOSA Nagkasundo

PINATUNAYAN AT PINANUMPAAN dito sa harap ko ngayong ika-17 ng Nobyembre, 1997, dito sa Gumaca, Quezon ATTY. JULIETA A. OMAA Notary Public PTR No. 3728169; 1-10-97 Gumaca, Quezon Doc. No. 482; Page No. 97; Book No. XI; Series of 1997.

Complainants alleged that Marantal and Espinosa, fully convinced of the validity of the contract dissolving their marriage, started implementing its terms and conditions. However, Marantal eventually took custody of all their children and took possession of most of the property they acquired during their union.

Espinosa sought the advice of his fellow employee, complainant Glindo, a law graduate, who informed him that the contract executed by Omaa was not valid. Espinosa and Glindo then hired the services of a lawyer to file a complaint against Omaa before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD). Omaa alleged that she knows Glindo but she does not personally know Espinosa. She denied that she prepared the contract. She admitted that Espinosa went to see her and requested for the notarization of the contract but she told him that it was illegal. Omaa alleged that Espinosa returned the next day while she was out of the office and managed to persuade her part-time office staff to notarize the document. Her office staff forged her signature and notarized the contract. Omaa presented Marantals "Sinumpaang Salaysay" (affidavit) to support her allegations and to show that the complaint was instigated by Glindo. Omaa further presented a letter of apology from her staff, Arlene Dela Pea, acknowledging that she notarized the document without Omaas knowledge, consent, and authority. Espinosa later submitted a "Karagdagang Salaysay" stating that Omaa arrived at his residence together with a girl whom he later recognized as the person who notarized the contract. He further stated that Omaa was not in her office when the contract was notarized.

The Decision of the Commission on Bar Discipline In its Report and Recommendation dated 6 February 2007, the IBP-CBD stated that Espinosas desistance did not put an end to the proceedings. The IBP-CBD found that Omaa violated Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. The IBP-CBD stated that Omaa had failed to exercise due diligence in the performance of her function as a notary public and to comply with the requirements of the law. The IBP-CBD noted the inconsistencies in the defense of Omaa who first claimed that it was her part-time staff who notarized the contract but then later claimed that it was her former maid who notarized it. The IBP-CBD found: Respondent truly signed the questioned document, yet she still disclaimed its authorship, thereby revealing much more her propensity to lie and make deceit, which she is deserving [of] disciplinary sanction or disbarment. The IBP-CBD recommended that Omaa be suspended for one year from the practice of law and for two years as a notary public. In a Resolution dated 19 September 2007, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the recommendation of the IBP-CBD. Omaa filed a motion for reconsideration. In a Resolution dated 26 June 2011, the IBP Board of Governors denied Omaas motion for reconsideration. The Issue The sole issue in this case is whether Omaa violated the Canon of Professional Responsibility in the notarization of Marantal and Espinosas "Kasunduan Ng Paghihiwalay." The Ruling of this Court We adopt the findings and recommendation of the IBP-CBD. This case is not novel. This Court has ruled that the extrajudicial dissolution of the conjugal partnership without judicial 2 approval is void. The Court has also ruled that a notary public should not facilitate the disintegration of a marriage and 3 the family by encouraging the separation of the spouses and extrajudicially dissolving the conjugal partnership, which is exactly what Omaa did in this case.1avvphi1 In Selanova v. Judge Mendoza, the Court cited a number of cases where the lawyer was sanctioned for notarizing similar documents as the contract in this case, such as: notarizing a document between the spouses which permitted 5 the husband to take a concubine and allowed the wife to live with another man, without opposition from each other; ratifying a document entitled "Legal Separation" where the couple agreed to be separated from each other mutually and voluntarily, renouncing their rights and obligations, authorizing each other to remarry, and renouncing any action 6 that they might have against each other; preparing a document authorizing a married couple who had been separated 7 for nine years to marry again, renouncing the right of action which each may have against the other; and preparing a 8 document declaring the conjugal partnership dissolved. We cannot accept Omaas allegation that it was her part-time office staff who notarized the contract. We agree with the IBP-CBD that Omaa herself notarized the contract. Even if it were true that it was her part-time staff who notarized the contract, it only showed Omaas negligence in doing her notarial duties. We reiterate that a notary public is personally responsible for the entries in his notarial register and he could not relieve himself of this 9 responsibility by passing the blame on his secretaries or any member of his staff.
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We likewise agree with the IBP-CBD that in preparing and notarizing a void document, Omaa violated Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that "[a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct." Omaa knew fully well that the "Kasunduan Ng Paghihiwalay" has no legal effect and is against public policy. Therefore, Omaa may be suspended from office as an attorney for breach of the 10 ethics of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility. WHEREFORE, we SUSPEND Atty. Julieta A. Omaa from the practice of law for ONE YEAR. We REVOKE Atty. Omaas notarial commission, if still existing, and SUSPEND her as a notary public for TWO YEARS. Let a copy of this Decision be attached to Atty. Omaas personal record in the Office of the Bar Confidant. Let a copy of this Decision be also furnished to all chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and to all courts in the land. SO ORDERED.

SUPREME COURT

SECOND DIVISION A.C. No. 7430

February 15, 2012

MARTIN LAHM III and JAMES P. CONCEPCION, Comp., vs. LABOR ARBITER JOVENCIO Ll. MAYOR, JR., Resp. REYES, J.: Before us is a verified complaint filed by Martin Lahm III and James P. Concepcion (complainants) praying for the disbarment of Labor Arbiter Jovencio Ll. Mayor, Jr. (respondent) for alleged gross misconduct and violation of lawyers oath. On June 27, 2007, the respondent filed his Comment to the complaint. In a Resolution dated July 18, 2007, the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. The antecedent facts, as summarized in the Report and Recommendation dated September 19, 2008 of Commissioner Romualdo A. Din, Jr. of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, are as follows: On September 5, 2006 a certain David Edward Toze filed a complaint for illegal dismissal before the Labor Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations Commission against the members of the Board of Trustees of the International School, Manila. The same was docketed as NLRC-NCR Case No. 00-07381-06 and raffled to the sala of the respondent. Impleaded as among the party-respondents are the complainants in the instant case. On September 7, 2006, David Edward Toze filed a Verified Motion for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction Against the Respondents. The said Motion was set for hearing on September 12, 2006 at 10:00 in the morning. A day after, on September 8, 2006, the counsel for the complainants herein entered its appearance and asked for additional time to oppose and make a comment to the Verified Motion for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction Against the Respondents of David Edward Toze. Thereafter, the respondent issued an Order dated September 14, 2006 that directs the parties in the said case to maintain the status quo ante. The complainants herein sought the reconsideration of the Order dated September 14, 200[6] x x x. xxxx On account of the Order dated September 14, 2006, David Edward Toze was immediately reinstated and assumed his former position as superintendent of the International School Manila. The pending incidents with the above-mentioned illegal dismissal case were not resolved, however, the scheduled hearing for the issuance of a preliminary injunction on September 20, 2006 and September 27, 2006 was postponed. On January 19, 2007, the co-respondents of the complainants herein in the said illegal dismissal case filed a motion for an early resolution of their motion to dismiss the said case, but the respondent instead issued an Order dated February 6, 2007 requiring the parties to appear in his Office on February 27, 2007 at 10:00 in the morning in order to thresh out David Edward Toze claim of moral and exemplary damages. xxxx The respondent on the other maintains that the Order dated September 14, 2006 was issued by him on account of [the] Verified Motion for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction Against the Respondents that was filed by David Edward Toze, and of the Entry of Appearance with Motion for Additional Time to File Comment that was thereafter filed by the counsel for the herein complainants in the illegal dismissal case pending before the respondent. The respondent maintains that in order to prevent irreparable damage on the person of David Edward Toze, and on account of the urgency of [the] Verified Motion for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction Against the Respondents of David Edward Toze, and that the counsel for respondents in the illegal dismissal case have asked for a relatively long period of fifteen days for a resetting, he (respondent) found merit in issuing the Order dated September 14, 2006 that requires the parties to maintain the status quo ante. xxx The respondent argues that [the] instant case should be dismissed for being premature since the aforementioned illegal dismissal case is still pending before the Labor Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations Commission, that the instant case is a subterfuge in order to compel the respondent to inhibit himself in resolving the said illegal
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dismissal case because the complainants did not assail the Order dated September 14, 2006 before the Court of 5 Appeals under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Based on the foregoing, the Investigating Commissioner concluded that: (1) the grounds cited by the respondent to justify his issuance of the status quo ante order lacks factual basis and is speculative; (2) the respondent does not have the authority to issue a temporary restraining order and/or a preliminary injunction; and (3) the inordinate delay in the resolution of the motion for reconsideration directed against the September 14, 2006 Order showed an orchestrated effort to keep the status quo ante until the expiration of David Edward Tozes employment contract. Accordingly, the Investigating Commissioner recommended that: WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that the respondent be SUSPENDED for a period of six (6) months with 6 a warning that a repetition of the same or similar incident will be dealt with more severe penalty. On December 11, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XVIII-2008-644 which adopted and approved the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner. The said resolution further pointed out that the Board of Governors had previously recommended the respondents suspension from the practice of law for three years in Administrative Case (A.C.) No. 7314 entitled "Mary Ann T. Flores v. Atty. Jovencio Ll. Mayor, Jr.". The respondent sought to reconsider the foregoing disposition, but it was denied by the IBP Board of Governors in its Resolution No. XIX-2011-476 dated June 26, 2011. The case is now before us for confirmation. We agree with the IBP Board of Governors that the respondent should be sanctioned. Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides that a lawyer may be removed or suspended from the practice of law, inter alia, for gross misconduct and violation of the lawyers oath. Thus: Section 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by Supreme Court on what grounds. A member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or wilful appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. (emphasis supplied) A lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct showing any fault or deficiency in his moral character, 9 honesty, probity or good demeanor. Gross misconduct is any inexcusable, shameful or flagrant unlawful conduct on the part of a person concerned with the administration of justice; i.e., conduct prejudicial to the rights of the parties or to the right determination of the cause. The motive behind this conduct is generally a premeditated, obstinate or 10 intentional purpose. Intrinsically, the instant petition wants this Court to impose disciplinary sanction against the respondent as a member of the bar. However, the grounds asserted by the complainants in support of the administrative charges against the respondent are intrinsically connected with the discharge of the respondents quasi-judicial functions. Nonetheless, it cannot be discounted that the respondent, as a labor arbiter, is a public officer entrusted to resolve labor controversies. It is well settled that the Court may suspend or disbar a lawyer for any conduct on his part showing his unfitness for the confidence and trust which characterize the attorney and client relations, and the practice of law before the courts, or showing such a lack of personal honesty or of good moral character as to render him unworthy of 11 public confidence. Thus, the fact that the charges against the respondent were based on his acts committed in the discharge of his functions as a labor arbiter would not hinder this Court from imposing disciplinary sanctions against him. The Code of Professional Responsibility does not cease to apply to a lawyer simply because he has joined the government service. In fact, by the express provision of Canon 6 thereof, the rules governing the conduct of lawyers "shall apply to lawyers in government service in the discharge of their official tasks." Thus, where a lawyers misconduct as a government official is of such nature as to affect his qualification as a lawyer or to show moral 12 delinquency, then he may be disciplined as a member of the bar on such grounds. In Atty. Vitriolo v. Atty. Dasig,
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we stressed that:

Generally speaking, a lawyer who holds a government office may not be disciplined as a member of the Bar for misconduct in the discharge of his duties as a government official. However, if said misconduct as a government official also constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer, then he may be disciplined by this Court as a member of the Bar.

In this case, the record shows that the respondent, on various occasions, during her tenure as OIC, Legal Services, CHED, attempted to extort from Betty C. Mangohon, Rosalie B. Dela Torre, Rocella G. Eje, and Jacqueline N. Ng sums of money as consideration for her favorable action on their pending applications or requests before her office. The evidence remains unrefuted, given the respondents failure, despite the opportunities afforded her by this Court and the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline to comment on the charges. We find that respondents misconduct as a lawyer of the CHED is of such a character as to affect her qualification as a member of the Bar, for as a lawyer, she ought to have known that it was patently unethical and illegal for her to demand sums of money as consideration for the approval of applications and requests awaiting action by her office. xxx A member of the Bar who assumes public office does not shed his professional obligations. Hence, the Code of Professional Responsibility, promulgated on June 21, 1988, was not meant to govern the conduct of private practitioners alone, but of all lawyers including those in government service. This is clear from Canon 6 of said Code. Lawyers in government are public servants who owe the utmost fidelity to the public service. Thus, they should be more sensitive in the performance of their professional obligations, as their conduct is subject to the ever-constant scrutiny of the public. For a lawyer in public office is expected not only to refrain from any act or omission which might tend to lessen the trust and confidence of the citizenry in government, she must also uphold the dignity of the legal profession at all times and observe a high standard of honesty and fair dealing. Otherwise said, a lawyer in government service is a keeper of the public faith and is burdened with high degree of social responsibility, perhaps higher than her brethren in private 14 practice. (emphasis supplied and citations omitted) In Tadlip v. Atty. Borres, Jr., we ruled that an administrative case against a lawyer for acts committed in his capacity as provincial adjudicator of the Department of Agrarian Reform Regional Arbitration Board may be likened to administrative cases against judges considering that he is part of the quasi-judicial system of our government. This Court made a similar pronouncement in Buehs v. Bacatan where the respondent-lawyer was suspended from the practice of law for acts he committed in his capacity as an accredited Voluntary Arbitrator of the National Conciliation and Mediation Board. Here, the respondent, being part of the quasi-judicial system of our government, performs official functions that are akin to those of judges. Accordingly, the present controversy may be approximated to administrative cases of judges whose decisions, including the manner of rendering the same, were made subject of administrative cases. As a matter of public policy, not every error or mistake of a judge in the performance of his official duties renders him liable. In the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a judge in his official capacity do not always constitute misconduct although the same acts may be erroneous. True, a judge may not be disciplined for error of 17 judgment absent proof that such error was made with a conscious and deliberate intent to cause an injustice. While a judge may not always be held liable for ignorance of the law for every erroneous order that he renders, it is also axiomatic that when the legal principle involved is sufficiently basic, lack of conversance with it constitutes gross ignorance of the law. Indeed, even though a judge may not always be subjected to disciplinary action for every erroneous order or decision he renders, that relative immunity is not a license to be negligent or abusive and arbitrary 18 in performing his adjudicatory prerogatives. When the law is sufficiently basic, a judge owes it to his office to know and to simply apply it. Anything less would be 19 constitutive of gross ignorance of the law. In the case at bench, we find the respondent guilty of gross ignorance of the law. Acting on the motion for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction, the respondent issued the September 14, 2006 Order requiring the parties to maintain the status quo ante until the said motion had been resolved. It should be stressed, however, that at the time the said motion was filed, the 2005 Rules of Procedure of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) is already in effect. Admittedly, under the 1990 Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, the labor arbiter has, in proper cases, the authority to issue writs of preliminary injunction and/or restraining orders. Section 1, Rule XI of the 1990 Rules of Procedure of the NLRC provides that: Section 1. Injunction in Ordinary Labor Disputes. A preliminary injunction or restraining order may be granted by the Commission through its Divisions pursuant to the provisions of paragraph (e) of Article 218 of the Labor Code, as amended, when it is established on the basis of the sworn allegations in the petition that the acts complained of involving or arising from any labor dispute before the Commission, which, if not restrained or performed forthwith, may cause grave or irreparable damage to any party or render ineffectual any decision in favor of such party.
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If necessary, the Commission may require the petitioner to post a bond and writ of preliminary injunction or restraining order shall become effective only upon the approval of the bond which shall answer for any damage that may be suffered by the party enjoined, if it is finally determined that the petitioner is not entitled thereto. The foregoing ancillary power may be exercised by the Labor Arbiters only as an incident to the cases pending before them in order to preserve the rights of the parties during the pendency of the case, but excluding labor disputes involving strike or lockout. (emphasis supplied) Nevertheless, under the 2005 Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, the labor arbiters no longer has the authority to issue writs of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining orders. Under Section 1, Rule X of the 2005 Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, only the NLRC, through its Divisions, may issue writs of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining orders. Thus: Section 1. Injunction in Ordinary Labor Disputes. - A preliminary injunction or restraining order may be granted by the Commission through its Divisions pursuant to the provisions of paragraph (e) of Article 218 of the Labor Code, as amended, when it is established on the basis of the sworn allegations in the petition that the acts complained of involving or arising from any labor dispute before the Commission, which, if not restrained or performed forthwith, may cause grave or irreparable damage to any party or render ineffectual any decision in favor of such party. (emphasis supplied) The role of the labor arbiters, with regard to the issuance of writs of preliminary injunctions and/or writ of preliminary injunction, at present, is limited to reception of evidence as may be delegated by the NLRC. Thus, Section 4, Rule X of the 2005 Rules of Procedure of the NLRC provides that: Section 4. Reception of Evidence; Delegation. - The reception of evidence for the application of a writ of injunction may be delegated by the Commission to any of its Labor Arbiters who shall conduct such hearings in such places as he may determine to be accessible to the parties and their witnesses, and shall thereafter submit his report and recommendation to the Commission within fifteen (15) days from such delegation. (emphasis supplied) The foregoing rule is clear and leaves no room for interpretation. However, the respondent, in violation of the said rule, vehemently insist that he has the authority to issue writs of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order. On this point, the Investigating Commissioner aptly ruled that: The respondent should, in the first place, not entertained Edward Tozes Verified Motion for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction Against the Respondents. He should have denied it outright on the basis of Section 1, Rule X of the 2005 Revised Rules of Procedure of the National Labor Relations Commission. xxxx The respondent, being a Labor Arbiter of the Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations Commission, should have been familiar with Sections 1 and 4 of the 2005 Revised Rules of procedure of the National Labor Relations Commission. The first, states that it is the Commission of the [NLRC] that may grant a preliminary injunction or restraining order. While the second, states [that] Labor Arbiters [may] conduct hearings on the application of 20 preliminary injunction or restraining order only in a delegated capacity. What made matters worse is the unnecessary delay on the part of the respondent in resolving the motion for reconsideration of the September 14, 2006 Order. The unfounded insistence of the respondent on his supposed authority to issue writs of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order, taken together with the delay in the resolution of the said motion for reconsideration, would clearly show that the respondent deliberately intended to cause prejudice to the complainants. On this score, the Investigating Commissioner keenly observed that: The Commission is very much disturbed with the effect of the Order dated September 14, 2006 and the delay in the resolution of the pending incidents in the illegal dismissal case before the respondent. Conspicuously, Section 3 (Term of Contract) of the Employment Contract between David Edward Toze and International School Manila provides that David Edward Toze will render work as a superintendent for the school years August 2005-July 2006 and August 2006-July 2007. The Order dated September 14, 2006 in effect reinstates David Edward Toze as superintendent of International School of Manila until the resolution of the formers Verified Motion for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction Against the Respondents. Since the Employment Contract between David Edward Toze and International School Manila is about to expire or end on August 2007, prudence dictates that the respondent expediently resolved [sic] the merits of David Edward Tozes Verified Motion for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction Against the

Respondents because any delay in the resolution thereof would result to undue benefit in favor of David Edward Toze and unwarranted prejudice to International School Manila. xxxx At the time the respondent inhibited himself from resolving the illegal dismissal case before him, there are barely four (4) months left with the Employment Contract between David Edward Toze and International School Manila. From the foregoing, there is an inordinate delay in the resolution of the reconsideration of the Order dated September 14, 2006 that does not escape the attention of this Commission. There appears an orchestrated effort to delay the resolution of the reconsideration of the Order dated September 14, 2006 and keep status quo ante until expiration of David Edward Tozes Employment Contract with International School Manila come August 2007, thereby rendering the illegal dismissal case moot and academic. xxxx Furthermore, the procrastination exhibited by the respondent in the resolution of [the] assailed Order x x x should not be countenanced, specially, under the circumstance that is attendant with the term of the Employment Contract between David Edward Toze and International School Manila. The respondents lackadaisical attitude in sitting over the pending incident before him for more than five (5) months only to thereafter inhibit himself therefrom, shows the respondents disregard to settled rules and jurisprudence.1wphi1 Failure to decide a case or resolve a motion within the reglementary period constitutes gross inefficiency and warrants the imposition of administrative sanction against the erring magistrate x x x. The respondent, being a Labor Arbiter, is akin to judges, and enjoined to decide a case with dispatch. Any delay, no matter how short, in the disposition of cases undermine the peoples faith and confidence 21 in the judiciary x x x. Indubitably, the respondent failed to live up to his duties as a lawyer in consonance with the strictures of the lawyers oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility, thereby occasioning sanction from this Court. In stubbornly insisting that he has the authority to issue writs of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order contrary to the clear import of the 2005 Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, the respondent violated Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which mandates lawyers to "obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal processes". All told, we find the respondent to have committed gross ignorance of the law, his acts as a labor arbiter in the case below being inexcusable thus unquestionably resulting into prejudice to the rights of the parties therein. Having established the foregoing, we now proceed to determine the appropriate penalty to be imposed. Under Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, gross ignorance of the law is a serious 23 charge, punishable by a fine of more than P20,000.00, but not exceeding P40,000.00, suspension from office without 24 salary and other benefits for more than three but not exceeding six months, or dismissal from the service. In Tadlip v. Atty. Borres, Jr., the respondent-lawyer and provincial adjudicator, found guilty of gross ignorance of the 25 law, was suspended from the practice of law for six months. Additionally, in parallel cases, a judge found guilty of gross ignorance of the law was meted the penalty of suspension for six months. Here, the IBP Board of Governors recommended that the respondent be suspended from the practice of law for six months with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar incident would be dealt with more severe penalty. We adopt the foregoing recommendation. This Court notes that the IBP Board of Governors had previously recommended the respondents suspension from the practice of law for three years in A.C. No. 7314, entitled "Mary Ann T. Flores v. Atty. Jovencio Ll. Mayor, Jr.". This case, however, is still pending. It cannot be gainsaid that since public office is a public trust, the ethical conduct demanded upon lawyers in the government service is more exacting than the standards for those in private practice. Lawyers in the government service are subject to constant public scrutiny under norms of public accountability. They also bear the heavy burden of having to put aside their private interest in favor of the interest of the public; their private activities should not 26 interfere with the discharge of their official functions. At this point, the respondent should be reminded of our exhortation in Republic of the Philippines v. Judge Caguioa, thus:
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Ignorance of the law is the mainspring of injustice. Judges are called upon to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules. Basic rules should be at the palm of their hands. Their inexcusable failure to observe basic laws and rules will render them administratively liable.1wphi1 Where the law involved is

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simple and elementary, lack of conversance with it constitutes gross ignorance of the law. "Verily, for transgressing the elementary jurisdictional limits of his court, respondent should be administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law." "When the inefficiency springs from a failure to consider so basic and elemental a rule, a law or a principle in the discharge of his functions, a judge is either too incompetent and undeserving of the position and title he holds or he is 28 too vicious that the oversight or omission was deliberately done in bad faith and in grave abuse of judicial authority." (citations omitted) WHEREFORE, finding respondent Atty. Jovencio Ll. Mayor, Jr. guilty of gross ignorance of the law in violation of his lawyers oath and of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Court resolved to SUSPEND respondent from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months, with a WARNING that commission of the same or similar offense in the future will result in the imposition of a more severe penalty. Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the IBP, as well as the Office of the Bar Confidant and the Court Administrator who shall circulate it to all courts for their information and guidance and likewise be entered in the record of the respondent as attorney. SO ORDERED.

11

SUPREME COURT EN BANC

A.M. No. 10-5-7-SC

December 7, 2010

JOVITO S. OLAZO, Complainant, vs. JUSTICE DANTE O. TINGA (Ret.), Respondent. BRION, J.: Before us is the disbarment case against retired Supreme Court Associate Justice Dante O. Tinga (respondent) filed 1 2 3 by Mr. Jovito S. Olazo (complainant). The respondent is charged of violating Rule 6.02, Rule 6.03 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for representing conflicting interests. Factual Background In March 1990, the complainant filed a sales application covering a parcel of land situated in Barangay Lower Bicutan in the Municipality of Taguig. The land (subject land) was previously part of Fort Andres Bonifacio that was segregated 4 and declared open for disposition pursuant to Proclamation No. 2476, issued on January 7, 1986, and Proclamation 5 No. 172, issued on October 16, 1987. To implement Proclamation No. 172, Memorandum No. 119 was issued by then Executive Secretary Catalino Macaraig, creating a Committee on Awards whose duty was to study, evaluate, and make a recommendation on the applications to purchase the lands declared open for disposition. The Committee on Awards was headed by the Director of Lands and the respondent was one of the Committee members, in his official capacity as the Congressman of Taguig and Pateros (from 1987 to 1998); the respondents district includes the areas covered by the proclamations. The First Charge: Violation of Rule 6.02 In the complaint, the complainant claimed that the respondent abused his position as Congressman and as a member of the Committee on Awards when he unduly interfered with the complainants sales application because of his personal interest over the subject land. The complainant alleged that the respondent exerted undue pressure and influence over the complainants father, Miguel P. Olazo, for the latter to contest the complainants sales application and claim the subject land for himself. The complainant also alleged that the respondent prevailed upon Miguel Olazo to accept, on various dates, sums of money as payment of the latters alleged rights over the subject land. The complainant further claimed that the respondent brokered the transfer of rights of the subject land between Miguel Olazo and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez, who is the nephew of the respondents deceased wife. As a result of the respondents abuse of his official functions, the complainants sales application was denied. The conveyance of rights to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez and his sales application were subsequently given due course by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). The Second Charge: Violation of Rule 6.03 The second charge involves another parcel of land within the proclaimed areas belonging to Manuel Olazo, the complainants brother. The complainant alleged that the respondent persuaded Miguel Olazo to direct Manuel to convey his rights over the land to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez. As a result of the respondents promptings, the rights to the land were transferred to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez. In addition, the complainant alleged that in May 1999, the respondent met with Manuel for the purpose of nullifying the conveyance of rights over the land to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez. The complainant claimed that the respondent wanted the rights over the land transferred to one Rolando Olazo, the Barangay Chairman of Hagonoy, Taguig. The respondent in this regard executed an "Assurance" where he stated that he was the lawyer of Ramon Lee and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez. The Third Charge: Violation of Rule 1.01 The complainant alleged that the respondent engaged in unlawful conduct considering his knowledge that Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez was not a qualified beneficiary under Memorandum No. 119. The complainant averred that Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez is not a bona fide resident of the proclaimed areas and does not qualify for an award. Thus, the approval of his sales application by the Committee on Awards amounted to a violation of the objectives of Proclamation No. 172 and Memorandum No. 119. The complainant also alleged that the respondent violated Section 7(b)(2) of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees or Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6713 since he engaged in the practice of law, within the one-year prohibition period, when he appeared as a lawyer for Ramon Lee and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez before the Committee on Awards. In his Comment, the respondent claimed that the present complaint is the third malicious charge filed against him by the complainant. The first one was submitted before the Judicial and Bar Council when he was nominated as an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court; the second complaint is now pending with the Office of the Ombudsman, for alleged violation of Section 3(e) and (i) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended.
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With his own supporting documents, the respondent presented a different version of the antecedent events. The respondent asserted that Miguel Olazo owned the rights over the subject land and he later conveyed these rights to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez. Miguel Olazos rights over the subject land and the transfer of his rights to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez were duly recognized by the Secretary of the DENR before whom the conflict of rights over the subject land (between Miguel Olazo and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez, on one hand, and the complainant on the other hand) was brought. In its decision, the DENR found Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez a qualified applicant, and his application over the subject land was given due course. The respondent emphasized that the DENR decision is now final and executory. It was affirmed by the Office of the President, by the Court of Appeals and by the Supreme Court. The respondent also advanced the following defenses: (1) He denied the complainants allegation that Miguel Olazo told him (complainant) that the respondent had been orchestrating to get the subject land. The respondent argued that this allegation was without corroboration and was debunked by the affidavits of Miguel Olazo and Francisca Olazo, the complainants sister. (2) He denied the complainants allegation that he offered the complainant P50,000.00 for the subject land and that he (the respondent) had exerted undue pressure and influence on Miguel Olazo to claim the rights over the subject land. The respondent also denied that he had an inordinate interest in the subject land. (3) He claimed that there was nothing wrong in signing as a witness in Miguel Olazos affidavit where the latter asserted his rights over the subject land. The affidavit merely attested to the truth. (4) He asserted that he and Miguel Olazo were cousins and that the latter decided to sell his rights over the subject land for the medical treatment of his heart condition and the illness of his daughter, Francisca Olazo. The respondent insisted that the money he extended to them was a form of loan. (5) The respondents participation in the transaction between Miguel Olazo and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez involved the payment of the loan that the respondent extended to Miguel Olazo. (6) Manuels belated and secondhand allegation in his Sinumpaang Salaysay, dated January 20, 2000, regarding what his father told him, cannot prevail over his earlier Sinumpaang Salaysay with Francisca Olazo, dated August 2, 1997. In the said Sinumpaang Salaysay, Manuel categorically asserted that his father Miguel Olazo, not the complainant, was the farmer-beneficiary. Manuel also expressed his agreement to the transfer of rights (Pagpapatibay Sa Paglilipat Ng Karapatan) in favor of Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez, and the withdrawal of his fathers application to give way to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguezs application. (7) The complainants allegation that the respondent had pressured and influenced Miguel Olazo to sell the subject land was not sufficient as it was lacking in specificity and corroboration. The DENR decision was clear that the complainant had no rights over the subject land. The respondent additionally denied violating Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He alleged that during his third term as Congressman from 1995 to 1997, the conflicting applications of the complainant, Miguel Olazo and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez were not included in the agenda for deliberation of the Committee on Awards. Rather, their conflicting claims and their respective supporting documents were before the Office of the Regional Director, NCR of the DENR. This office ruled over the conflicting claims only on August 2, 2000. This ruling became the basis of the decision of the Secretary of the DENR. Similarly, the respondent cannot be held liable under Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility since the provision applies to lawyers in the government service who are allowed by law to engage in private law practice and to those who, though prohibited from engaging in the practice of law, have friends, former associates and relatives who 8 are in the active practice of law. In this regard, the respondent had already completed his third term in Congress and his stint in the Committee on Awards when he represented Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez on May 24, 1999. Lastly, the respondent claimed that he cannot be held liable under Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility since he did not intervene in the disposition of the conflicting applications of the complainant and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez because the applications were not submitted to the Committee on Awards when he was still a member.

The Courts Ruling Generally, a lawyer who holds a government office may not be disciplined as a member of the Bar for misconduct in 9 the discharge of his duties as a government official. He may be disciplined by this Court as a member of the Bar only 10 when his misconduct also constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer.

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The issue in this case calls for a determination of whether the respondents actions constitute a breach of the standard ethical conduct first, while the respondent was still an elective public official and a member of the Committee on Awards; and second, when he was no longer a public official, but a private lawyer who represented a client before the office he was previously connected with. After a careful evaluation of the pleadings filed by both parties and their respective pieces of evidence, we resolve to dismiss the administrative complaint. Accountability of a government lawyer in public office Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility highlights the continuing standard of ethical conduct to be observed by government lawyers in the discharge of their official tasks. In addition to the standard of conduct laid down under R.A. No. 6713 for government employees, a lawyer in the government service is obliged to observe the standard of conduct under the Code of Professional Responsibility. Since public office is a public trust, the ethical conduct demanded upon lawyers in the government service is more exacting than the standards for those in private practice. Lawyers in the government service are subject to constant public scrutiny under norms of public accountability. They also bear the heavy burden of having to put aside their private interest in favor of the interest of the public; their private activities should not interfere with the discharge of their 11 official functions. The first charge involves a violation of Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. It imposes the following restrictions in the conduct of a government lawyer: A lawyer in the government service shall not use his public position to promote or advance his private interests, nor allow the latter to interfere with his public duties. The above provision prohibits a lawyer from using his or her public position to: (1) promote private interests; (2) advance private interests; or (3) allow private interest to interfere with his or her public duties. We previously held that 12 the restriction extends to all government lawyers who use their public offices to promote their private interests. In Huyssen v. Gutierrez, we defined promotion of private interest to include soliciting gifts or anything of monetary value in any transaction requiring the approval of his or her office, or may be affected by the functions of his or her 14 office. In Ali v. Bubong, we recognized that private interest is not limited to direct interest, but extends to advancing the interest of relatives. We also ruled that private interest interferes with public duty when the respondent uses the 15 office and his or her knowledge of the intricacies of the law to benefit relatives. In Vitriolo v. Dasig, we found the act of the respondent (an official of the Commission on Higher Education) of extorting money from persons with applications or requests pending before her office to be a serious breach of Rule 17 6.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. We reached the same conclusion in Huyssen, where we found the respondent (an employee of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation) liable under Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, based on the evidence showing that he demanded money from the complainant who had 18 a pending application for visas before his office. Similarly, in Igoy v. Soriano we found the respondent (a Court Attorney of this Court) liable for violating Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, after considering the evidence showing that he demanded and received money from the complainant who had a pending case before this Court. Applying these legal precepts to the facts of the case, we find the absence of any concrete proof that the respondent abused his position as a Congressman and as a member of the Committee on Awards in the manner defined under Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. First, the records do not clearly show if the complainants sales application was ever brought before the Committee on Awards. By the complaints own account, the complainant filed a sales application in March 1990 before the Land Management Bureau. By 1996, the complainants sales application was pending before the Office of the Regional Director, NCR of the DENR due to the conflicting claims of Miguel Olazo, and, subsequently, of Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez. The records show that it was only on August 2, 2000 that the Office of the Regional Director, NCR of the DENR rendered its decision, or after the term of the respondents elective public office and membership to the Committee on Awards, which expired in 1997. These circumstances do not show that the respondent did in any way promote, advance or use his private interests in the discharge of his official duties. To repeat, since the sales application was not brought before the Committee on Awards when the respondent was still a member, no sufficient basis exists to conclude that he used his position to obtain personal benefits. We note in this regard that the denial of the complainants sales application over the subject land was made by the DENR, not by the Committee on Awards. Second, the complainants allegation that the respondent "orchestrated" the efforts to get the subject land does not specify how the orchestration was undertaken. What appears clear in the records is the uncorroborated Sinumpaang 20 Salaysay of Miguel Olazo, dated May 25, 2003, categorically stating that the respondent had no interest in the
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subject land, and neither was he a contracting party in the transfer of his rights over the subject land. In the absence of any specific charge, Olazos disclaimer is the nearest relevant statement on the respondents alleged participation, and we find it to be in the respondents favor. Third, the other documents executed by Miguel Olazo, that the complainant presented to support his claim that the respondent exerted undue pressure and influence over his father (namely: the letter, dated June 22, 1996, to the 21 22 DENR Regional Director-NCR; the Sinumpaang Salaysay dated July 12, 1996; and the Sinumpaang Salaysay 23 dated July 17, 1996 ), do not contain any reference to the alleged pressure or force exerted by the respondent over Miguel Olazo. The documents merely showed that the respondent helped Miguel Olazo in having his farm lots (covered by the proclaimed areas) surveyed. They also showed that the respondent merely acted as a witness in the Sinumpaang Salaysay dated July 17, 1996. To our mind, there are neutral acts that may be rendered by one relative to another, and do not show how the respondent could have influenced the decision of Miguel Olazo to contest the complainants sales application. At the same time, we cannot give any credit to the Sinumpaang Salaysay, dated January 20, 2000, of Manuel. They are not only hearsay but are contrary to what Miguel Olazo states on the record. We note that Manuel had no personal knowledge, other than what Miguel Olazo told him, of the force allegedly exerted by the respondent against Miguel Olazo. In turn, the respondent was able to provide a satisfactory explanation - backed by corroborating evidence - of the nature of the transaction in which he gave the various sums of money to Miguel Olazo and Francisca Olazo in the year 24 25 1995. In her affidavits dated May 25, 2003 and July 21, 2010, Francisca Olazo corroborated the respondents claim that the sums of money he extended to her and Miguel Olazo were loans used for their medical treatment. Miguel Olazo, in his Sinumpaang Salaysay dated May 25, 2003, asserted that some of the money borrowed from the respondent was used for his medical treatment and hospitalization expenses. The affidavit of Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez further corroborated the respondents claim that the latters involvement was limited to being paid the loans he gave to Miguel Olazo and Francisca Olazo. According to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez, he and Miguel Olazo agreed that a portion of the loan would be directly paid by Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez to the 26 respondent and the amount paid would be considered as part of the purchase price of the subject land. It also bears stressing that a facial comparison of the documentary evidence, specifically the dates when the sums of money were extended by the respondent on February 21, 1995, September 2, 1995 and October 17, 1995, and the 27 date when the Deed of Conveyance over the subject land was executed or on October 25, 1995, showed that the sums of money were extended prior to the transfer of rights over the subject land. These pieces of evidence are consistent with the respondents allegation that Miguel Olazo decided to sell his rights over the subject land to pay the loans he obtained from the respondent and, also, to finance his continuing medical treatment. Private practice of law after separation from public office As proof that the respondent was engaged in an unauthorized practice of law after his separation from the government service, the complainant presented the Sinumpaang Salaysay, dated January 20, 2000, of Manuel and the document entitled "Assurance" where the respondent legally represented Ramon Lee and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez. Nevertheless, the foregoing pieces of evidence fail to persuade us to conclude that there was a violation of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. In Cayetano v. Monsod, we defined the practice of law as any activity, in and out of court, that requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. Moreover, we ruled that to engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristics of the profession; to practice law is to give notice or render any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill. Under the circumstances, the foregoing definition should be correlated with R.A. No. 6713 and Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which impose certain restrictions on government lawyers to engage in private practice after their separation from the service. Section 7(b)(2) of R.A. No. 6713 reads: Section 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. In addition to acts and omissions of public officials and employees now prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the following shall constitute prohibited acts and transactions of any public official and employee and are hereby declared to be unlawful: xxxx (b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto. Public officials and employees during their incumbency shall not: xxxx
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(2) Engage in the private practice of their profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law, provided, that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with their official functions; x x x These prohibitions shall continue to apply for a period of one (1) year after resignation, retirement, or separation from public office, except in the case of subparagraph (b) (2) above, but the professional concerned cannot practice his profession in connection with any matter before the office he used to be with, in which case the one-year prohibition shall likewise apply. As a rule, government lawyers are not allowed to engage in the private practice of their profession during their 29 incumbency. By way of exception, a government lawyer can engage in the practice of his or her profession under the following conditions: first, the private practice is authorized by the Constitution or by the law; and second, the practice 30 will not conflict or tend to conflict with his or her official functions. The last paragraph of Section 7 provides an exception to the exception. In case of lawyers separated from the government service who are covered under subparagraph (b) (2) of Section 7 of R.A. No. 6713, a one-year prohibition is imposed to practice law in connection with any matter before the office he used to be with. Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility echoes this restriction and prohibits lawyers, after leaving the government service, to accept engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in the said service. The keyword in Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility is the term "intervene" 31 which we previously interpreted to include an act of a person who has the power to influence the proceedings. Otherwise stated, to fall within the ambit of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the respondent must have accepted engagement or employment in a matter which, by virtue of his public office, he had previously exercised power to influence the outcome of the proceedings.1avvphi1 As the records show, no evidence exists showing that the respondent previously interfered with the sales application covering Manuels land when the former was still a member of the Committee on Awards. The complainant, too, failed to sufficiently establish that the respondent was engaged in the practice of law. At face value, the legal service 32 rendered by the respondent was limited only in the preparation of a single document. In Borja, Sr. v. Sulyap, Inc., we specifically described private practice of law as one that contemplates a succession of acts of the same nature habitually or customarily holding ones self to the public as a lawyer. In any event, even granting that respondents act fell within the definition of practice of law, the available pieces of evidence are insufficient to show that the legal representation was made before the Committee on Awards, or that the Assurance was intended to be presented before it. These are matters for the complainant to prove and we cannot consider any uncertainty in this regard against the respondents favor. Violation of Rule 1.01 Rule 1.01 prohibits a lawyer from engaging in unlawful, immoral or deceitful conduct. From the above discussion, we already struck down the complainants allegation that respondent engaged in an unauthorized practice of law when he appeared as a lawyer for Ramon Lee and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez before the Committee on Awards. We find that a similar treatment should be given to the complainants claim that the respondent violated paragraph 33 4(1) of Memorandum No. 119 when he encouraged the sales application of Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez despite his knowledge that his nephew was not a qualified applicant. The matter of Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguezs qualifications to apply for a sales application over lots covered by the proclaimed areas has been resolved in the affirmative by the 34 Secretary of the DENR in the decision dated April 3, 2004, when the DENR gave due course to his sales application over the subject land. We are, at this point, bound by this finding. As pointed out by the respondent, the DENR decision was affirmed by the Office of the President, the Court of 35 Appeals and, finally, the Court, per our Minute Resolution, dated October 11, 2006, in G.R. No. 173453. In our Resolution, we dismissed the petition for review on certiorari filed by the complainant after finding, among others, that 36 no reversible error was committed by the Court of Appeals in its decision. All told, considering the serious consequences of the penalty of disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar, the burden rests on the complainant to present clear, convincing and satisfactory proof for the Court to exercise its 37 38 disciplinary powers. The respondent generally is under no obligation to prove his/her defense, until the burden shifts to him/her because of what the complainant has proven. Where no case has in the first place been proven, 39 nothing has to be rebutted in defense. With this in mind, we resolve to dismiss the administrative case against the respondent for the complainants failure to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the former committed unethical infractions warranting the exercise of the Courts disciplinary power. WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DISMISS the administrative case for violation of Rule 6.02, Rule 6.03 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, filed against retired Supreme Court Associate Justice Dante O. Tinga, for lack of merit. SO ORDERED.

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SUPREME COURT EN BANC

A.C. No. 6683

June 21, 2011

RE: RESOLUTION OF THE COURT DATED 1 JUNE 2004 IN G.R. NO. 72954 AGAINST, ATTY. VICTOR C. AVECILLA, Resp.

PEREZ, J.: The present administrative case is based on the following facts: Prelude Sometime in 1985, respondent Atty. Victor C. Avecilla (Atty. Avecilla) and a certain Mr. Louis C. Biraogo (Mr. Biraogo) filed a petition before this Court impugning the constitutionality of Batas Pambansa Blg. 883, i.e., the law that called for the holding of a presidential snap election on 7 February 1986. The petition was docketed as G.R. No. 72954 and was 1 consolidated with nine (9) other petitions voicing a similar concern. On 19 December 1985, the Court En banc issued a Resolution dismissing the consolidated petitions, effectively 2 upholding the validity of Batas Pambansa Blg. 883. On 8 January 1986, after the aforesaid resolution became final, the rollo of G.R. No. 72954 was entrusted to the 4 Courts Judicial Records Office (JRO) for safekeeping. The Present Case On 14 July 2003, the respondent and Mr. Biraogo sent a letter to the Honorable Hilario G. Davide, Jr., then Chief 6 Justice of the Supreme Court (Chief Justice Davide), requesting that they be furnished several documents relative to the expenditure of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF). In order to show that they have interest in the JDF enough to be informed of how it was being spent, the respondent and Mr. Biraogo claimed that they made contributions to the 7 said fund by way of the docket and legal fees they paid as petitioners in G.R No. 72954. On 28 July 2003, Chief Justice Davide instructed Atty. Teresita Dimaisip (Atty. Dimaisip), then Chief of the JRO, to forward the rollo of G.R. No. 72954 for the purpose of verifying the claim of the respondent and Mr. Biraogo. On 30 July 2003, following a diligent search for the rollo of G.R. No. 72954, Atty. Dimaisip apprised Chief Justice 10 Davide that the subject rollo could not be found in the archives. Resorting to the tracer card of G.R. No. 72954, Atty. Dimaisip discovered that the subject rollo had been borrowed from the JRO on 13 September 1991 but, unfortunately, 11 was never since returned. The tracer card named the respondent, although acting through a certain Atty. Salvador 12 Banzon (Atty. Banzon), as the borrower of the subject rollo. The next day, or on 31 July 2003, Chief Justice Davide took prompt action by directing Atty. Dimaisip to supply information about how the respondent was able to borrow the rollo of G.R. No. 72954 and also to take necessary measures to secure the return of the said rollo. Reporting her compliance with the foregoing directives, Atty. Dimaisip sent to Chief Justice Davide a Memorandum on 13 August 2003. In substance, the Memorandum relates that:
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1. At the time the rollo of G.R. No. 72954 was borrowed from the JRO, the respondent was employed with the Supreme Court as a member of the legal staff of retired Justice Emilio A. Gancayco (Justice Gancayco). Ostensibly, it was by virtue of his confidential employment that the respondent was able to gain access to the 15 rollo of G.R. No. 72954. 2. Atty. Dimaisip had already contacted the respondent about the possible return of the subject rollo. Atty. Dimaisip said that the respondent acknowledged having borrowed the rollo of G.R. No. 72954 through Atty. 17 Banzon, who is a colleague of his in the office of Justice Gancayco. On 18 August 2003, almost twelve (12) years after it was borrowed, the rollo of G.R. No. 72954 was finally turned over 18 by Atty. Avecilla to the JRO. On 22 September 2003, Chief Justice Davide directed the Office of the Chief Attorney (OCAT) of this Court, to make 20 a study, report and recommendation on the incident. On 20 November 2003, the OCAT submitted a Memorandum to the Chief Justice opining that the respondent may be administratively charged, as a lawyer and member of the bar, for taking out the rollo of G.R. No. 72954. The OCAT made the following significant observations: 1. Justice Gancayco compulsorily retired from the Supreme Court on 20 August 1991. However, as is customary, the coterminous employees of Justice Gancayco were given an extension of until 18 September 1991 to remain as employees of the court for the limited purpose of winding up their remaining affairs. Hence, the respondent was already nearing the expiration of his "extended tenure" when he borrowed the rollo of G.R. 22 No. 72954 on 13 September 1991.
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2. The above circumstance indicates that the respondent borrowed the subject rollo not for any official business related to his duties as a legal researcher for Justice Gancayco, but merely to fulfill a personal 23 agenda. By doing so, the respondent clearly abused his confidential position for which he may be 24 administratively sanctioned. 3. It must be clarified, however, that since the respondent is presently no longer in the employ of the Supreme 25 Court, he can no longer be sanctioned as such employee. Nevertheless, an administrative action against the 26 respondent as a lawyer and officer of the court remains feasible. Accepting the findings of the OCAT, the Court En banc issued a Resolution on 9 December 2003 directing the respondent to show cause why he should not be held administratively liable for borrowing the rollo of G.R. No. 72954 and for failing to return the same for a period of almost twelve (12) years. The respondent conformed to this Courts directive by submitting his Respectful Explanation (Explanation) January 2004. In the said explanation, the respondent gave the following defenses:
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1. The respondent maintained that he neither borrowed nor authorized anyone to borrow the rollo of G.R. No. 29 72954. Instead, the respondent shifts the blame on the person whose signature actually appears on the 30 tracer card of G.R. No. 72954 and who, without authority, took the subject rollo in his name. Hesitant to pinpoint anyone in particular as the author of such signature, the respondent, however, intimated that the 31 same might have belonged to Atty. Banzon. 2. The respondent asserted that, for some unknown reason, the subject rollo just ended up in his box of 32 personal papers and effects, which he brought home following the retirement of Justice Gancayco. The respondent can only speculate that the one who actually borrowed the rollo might have been a colleague in 33 the office of Justice Gancayco and that through inadvertence, the same was misplaced in his personal box. 3. The respondent also denounced any ill-motive for failing to return the rollo, professing that he had never exerted effort to examine his box of personal papers and effects up until that time when he was contacted by 34 Atty. Dimaisip inquiring about the missing rollo. The respondent claimed that after finding out that the missing rollo was, indeed, in his personal box, he immediately extended his cooperation to the JRO and wasted no 35 time in arranging for its return. On 24 February 2004, this Court referred the respondents Explanation to the OCAT for initial study. In its Report dated 12 April 2004, the OCAT found the respondents Explanation to be unsatisfactory.
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On 1 June 2004, this Court tapped the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) to conduct a formal investigation on the matter and to prepare a final report and recommendation. A series of hearings were thus held by the OBC wherein the 38 39 40 41 testimonies of the respondent, Atty. Banzon, Atty. Dimaisip and one Atty. Pablo Gancayco were taken. On 6 42 August 2007, the respondent submitted his Memorandum to the OBC reiterating the defenses in his Explanation. On 13 October 2009, the OBC submitted its Report and Recommendation to this Court. Like the OCAT, the OBC dismissed the defenses of the respondent and found the latter to be fully accountable for taking out the rollo of G.R. 44 No. 72954 and failing to return it timely. The OBC, thus, recommended that the respondent be suspended from the 45 practice of law for one (1) year. Our Ruling We agree with the findings of the OBC. However, owing to the peculiar circumstances in this case, we find it fitting to reduce the recommended penalty. The Respondent Borrowed The Rollo After reviewing the records of this case, particularly the circumstances surrounding the retrieval of the rollo of G.R. No. 72954, this Court is convinced that it was the respondent, and no one else, who is responsible for taking out the subject rollo. The tracer card of G.R. No. 72954 bears the following information: 1. The name of the respondent, who was identified as borrower of the rollo,
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and
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2. The signature of Atty. Banzon who, on behalf of the respondent, actually received the rollo from the JRO.

The respondent sought to discredit the foregoing entries by insisting that he never authorized Atty. Banzon to borrow 48 the subject rollo on his behalf. We are, however, not convinced. First. Despite the denial of the respondent, the undisputed fact remains that it was from his possession that the missing rollo was retrieved about twelve (12) years after it was borrowed from the JRO. This fact, in the absence of

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any plausible explanation to the contrary, is sufficient affirmation that, true to what the tracer card states, it was the respondent who borrowed the rollo of G.R. No. 72954. Second. The respondent offered no convincing explanation how the subject rollo found its way into his box of personal papers and effects. The respondent can only surmise that the subject rollo may have been inadvertently placed in his 49 personal box by another member of the staff of Justice Gancayco. However, the respondents convenient surmise remained just thata speculation incapable of being verified definitively. Third. If anything, the respondents exceptional stature as a lawyer and former confidante of a Justice of this Court only made his excuse unacceptable, if not totally unbelievable. As adequately rebuffed by the OCAT in its Report dated 12 April 2004: x x x However, the excuse that the rollo "inadvertently or accidentally" found its way to his personal box through his officemates rings hollow in the face of the fact that he was no less than the confidential legal assistance of a Member of this Court. With this responsible position, Avecilla is expected to exercise extraordinary diligence with respect to all matters, including seeing to it that only his personal belongings were in that box for taking home after his term of office 50 in this Court has expired. Verily, the tracer card of G.R. No. 72954 was never adequately controverted. We, therefore, sustain its entry and hold the respondent responsible for borrowing the rollo of G.R. No. 72954. Respondents Administrative Liability Having settled that the respondent was the one who borrowed the rollo of G.R. No. 72954, We next determine his administrative culpability. We begin by laying the premises: 1. The respondent is presently no longer in the employ of this Court and as such, can no longer be held 51 administratively sanctioned as an employee. However, the respondent, as a lawyer and a member of the bar, 52 remains under the supervisory and disciplinary aegis of this Court. 2. The respondent was already nearing the expiration of his "extended tenure" when he borrowed the rollo of 53 G.R. No. 72954 on 13 September 1991. We must recall that Justice Gancayco already retired as of 20 April 1991. Hence, it may be concluded that for whatever reason the respondent borrowed the subject rollo, it was 54 not for any official reason related to the adjudication of pending cases. 3. The respondents unjustified retention of the subject rollo for a considerable length of time all but confirms his illicit motive in borrowing the same. It must be pointed out that the subject rollo had been in the clandestine possession of the respondent for almost twelve (12) years until it was finally discovered and recovered by the JRO. Given the foregoing, We find that there are sufficient grounds to hold respondent administratively liable. First. Taking judicial records, such as a rollo, outside court premises, without the courts consent, is an administratively 55 punishable act. In Fabiculana, Sr. v. Gadon, this Court previously sanctioned a sheriff for the wrongful act of bringing court records home, thus: Likewise Ciriaco Y. Forlales, although not a respondent in complainant's letter-complaint, should be meted the proper penalty, having admitted taking the records of the case home and forgetting about them. Court employees are, in the first place, not allowed to take any court records, papers or documents outside the court premises. It is clear that Forlales was not only negligent in his duty of transmitting promptly the records of an appealed case to the appellate court but he also failed in his duty not to take the records of the case outside of the court and to subsequently forget 56 about them. (Emphasis supplied) Second. The act of the respondent in borrowing a rollo for unofficial business entails the employment of deceit not becoming a member of the bar.1awphi1 It presupposes the use of misrepresentation and, to a certain extent, even abuse of position on the part of the respondent because the lending of rollos are, as a matter of policy, only limited to official purposes. As a lawyer then employed with the government, the respondent clearly violated Rule 6.02, Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, to wit: Rule 6.02 - A lawyer in the government service shall not use his public position to promote or advance his private interests, nor allow the latter to interfere with his public duties. (Emphasis supplied). Third. However, We find the recommended penalty of suspension from the practice of law for one (1) year as too harsh for the present case. We consider the following circumstances in favor of the respondent:

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1. G.R. No. 72954 was already finally resolved when its rollo was borrowed on 13 September 1991. Thus, the act of respondent in keeping the subject rollo worked no prejudice insofar as deciding G.R. No. 72954 is concerned. 2. It was never established that the contents of the rollo, which remained confidential despite the finality of the resolution in G.R. No. 72954, were disclosed by the respondent. 3. After his possession of the subject rollo was discovered, the respondent cooperated with the JRO for the return of the rollo. We, therefore, temper the period of suspension to only six (6) months. WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing premises, the respondent is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months. The respondent is also STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of a similar offense in the future will be dealt with more severely. SO ORDERED.

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SUPREME COURT EN BANC

A.C. No. 8392

June 29, 2010

[ Formerly CBD Case No. 08-2175 ]

ROSARIO T. MECARAL, Complainant, vs. ATTY. DANILO S. VELASQUEZ, Respondent. Per Curiam: Rosario T. Mecaral (complainant) charged Atty. Danilo S. Velasquez (respondent) before the Integrated Bar of the 1 Philippines (IBP) Committee on Bar Discipline (CBD) with Gross Misconduct and Gross Immoral Conduct which she 2 detailed in her Position Paper as follows: After respondent hired her as his secretary in 2002, she became his lover and common-law wife. In October 2007, respondent brought her to the mountainous Upper San Agustin in Caibiran, Biliran where he left her with a religious group known as the Faith Healers Association of the Philippines, of which he was the leader. Although he visited her daily, his visits became scarce in November to December 2007, prompting her to return home to Naval, Biliran. Furious, respondent brought her back to San Agustin where, on his instruction, his followers tortured, brainwashed and injected her with drugs. When she tried to escape on December 24, 2007, the members of the group tied her spreadeagled to a bed. Made to wear only a T-shirt and diapers and fed stale food, she was guarded 24 hours a day by the women members including a certain Bernardita Tadeo. Her mother, Delia Tambis Vda. De Mecaral (Delia), having received information that she was weak, pale and walking barefoot along the streets in the mountainous area of Caibiran, sought the help of the Provincial Social Welfare Department which immediately dispatched two women volunteers to rescue her. The religious group refused to release her, however, without the instruction of respondent. It took PO3 Delan G. Lee (PO3 Lee) and PO1 Arnel S. Robedillo (PO1 Robedillo) to rescue and reunite her with her mother. Hence, the present disbarment complaint against respondent. Additionally, complainant charges respondent with bigamy for contracting a second marriage to Leny H. Azur on August 2, 1996, despite the subsistence of his marriage to his first wife, Ma. Shirley G. Yunzal. In support of her charges, complainant submitted documents including the following: Affidavit of Delia dated February 4 5 5, 2008; Affidavit of PO3 Lee and PO1 Robedillo dated February 14, 2008; photocopy of the Certificate of Marriage 6 between respondent and Leny H. Azur; photocopy of the Marriage Contract between respondent and Shirley G. 7 Yunzal; National Statistics Office Certification dated April 23, 2008 showing the marriage of Ma. Shirley G. Yunzal to respondent on April 27, 1990 in Quezon City and the marriage of Leny H. Azur to respondent on August 2, 1996 in 8 Mandaue City, Cebu; and certified machine copy of the Resolution of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Naval, 9 Biliran and the Information lodged with the RTC-Branch 37-Caibiran, Naval, Biliran, for Serious Illegal Detention against respondent and Bernardita Tadeo on complaint of herein complainant. Despite respondents receipt of the February 22, 2008 Order of the Director for Bar Discipline for him to submit his Answer within 15 days from receipt thereof, and his expressed intent to "properly make [his] defense in a verified 11 pleading," he did not file any Answer.1avvphi1 On the scheduled Mandatory Conference set on September 2, 2008 of which the parties were duly notified, only complainants counsel was present. Respondent and his counsel failed to appear. Investigating Commissioner Felimon C. Abelita III of the CBD, in his Report and Recommendation 29, 2008, found that:
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dated September

[respondents] acts of converting his secretary into a mistress; contracting two marriages with Shirley and Leny, are grossly immoral which no civilized society in the world can countenance. The subsequent detention and torture of the complainant is gross misconduct [which] only a beast may be able to do. Certainly, the respondent had violated Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which reads: CANON 1 A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal processes. xxxx In the long line of cases, the Supreme Court has consistently imposed severe penalty for grossly immoral conduct of a lawyer like the case at bar. In the celebrated case of Joselano Guevarra vs. Atty. Jose Manuel Eala, the [Court] ordered the disbarment of the respondent for maintaining extra-marital relations with a married woman, and having a child with her. In the instant case, not only did the respondent commit bigamy for contracting marriages with Shirley Yunzal in 1990 and Leny Azur in 1996, but the respondent also made his secretary (complainant) his mistress and subsequently, tortured her to the point of death. All these circumstances showed the moral fiber respondent is made 13 of, which [leave] the undersigned with no choice but to recommend the disbarment of Atty. Danilo S. Velasquez. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

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The IBP Board of Governors of Pasig City, by Resolution dated December 11, 2008, ADOPTED the Investigating Commissioners findings and APPROVED the recommendation for the disbarment of respondent. As did the IBP Board of Governors, the Court finds the IBP Commissioners evaluation and recommendation well taken. The practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the state upon those who show that they possess, and 15 continue to possess, the qualifications required by law for the conferment of such privilege. When a lawyers moral character is assailed, such that his right to continue practicing his cherished profession is imperiled, it behooves him to meet the charges squarely and present evidence, to the satisfaction of the investigating body and this Court, that he is morally fit to keep his name in the Roll of 16 Attorneys. Respondent has not discharged the burden. He never attended the hearings before the IBP to rebut the charges 17 brought against him, suggesting that they are true. Despite his letter dated March 28, 2008 manifesting that he would come up with his defense "in a verified pleading," he never did. Aside then from the IBPs finding that respondent violated Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, he also violated the Lawyers Oath reading: I _________, having been permitted to continue in the practice of law in the Philippines, do solemnly swear that I recognize the supreme authority of the Republic of the Philippines; I will support its Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same; I will delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well as to the courts as to my clients; and I impose upon myself this voluntary obligation without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me God, (underscoring supplied), and Rule 7.03, Canon 7 of the same Code reading: Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession. The April 30, 2008 Resolution of the Provincial Prosecutor on complainants charge against respondent and Bernardita Tadeo for Serious Illegal Detention bears special noting, viz: [T]he counter-affidavit of x x x Bernardita C. Tadeo (co-accused in the complaint) has the effect of strengthening the allegations against Atty. Danilo Velasquez. Indeed, it is clear now that there was really physical restraint employed by Atty. Velasquez upon the person of Rosario Mecaral. Even as he claimed that on the day private complainant was fetched by the two women and police officers, complainant was already freely roaming around the place and thus, could not have been physically detained. However, it is not really necessary that Rosario be physically kept within an enclosure to restrict her freedom of locomotion. In fact, she was always accompanied wherever she would wander, that it could be impossible for her to escape especially considering the remoteness and the distance between Upper San Agustin, Caibiran, Biliran to Naval, Biliran where she is a resident. The people from the Faith Healers Association had the express and implied orders coming from respondent Atty. Danilo Velasquez to keep guarding Rosario Mecaral and not to let her go freely. That can be gleaned from the affidavit of co-respondent Bernardita Tadeo. The latter being reprimanded whenever Atty. Velasquez would learn that complainant had untangled the cloth tied on her wrists and 19 feet. (emphasis and underscoring supplied) That, as reflected in the immediately-quoted Resolution in the criminal complaint against respondent, his therein corespondent corroborated the testimonies of complainants witnesses, and that the allegations against him remain unrebutted, sufficiently prove the charges against him by clearly preponderant evidence, the quantum of evidence 20 needed in an administrative case against a lawyer. In fine, by engaging himself in acts which are grossly immoral and acts which constitute gross misconduct, respondent 21 has ceased to possess the qualifications of a lawyer. WHEREFORE, respondent, Atty. Danilo S. Velasquez, is DISBARRED, and his name ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. This Decision is immediately executory and ordered to be part of the records of respondent in the Office of the Bar Confidant, Supreme Court of the Philippines. Let copies of the Decision be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and circulated to all courts. SO ORDERED.
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SUPREME COURT

FIRST DIVISION

A.C. No. 9000

October 5, 2011

TOMAS P. TAN, JR., Complainant, vs. ATTY. HAIDE V. GUMBA, Respondent. RESOLUTION VILLARAMA, JR., J.: Before us is an administrative complaint for disbarment filed by complainant Tomas P. Tan, Jr. against respondent Atty. Haide B. Vista-Gumba for gross unethical conduct. The facts are as follows. Complainant, a self-made businessman with a tailoring shop in Naga City, filed a verified Complaint against respondent, also a resident of Naga City, before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)-Camarines Sur Chapter. 2 Pursuant to Section 1, Paragraph 3, Rule 139-B of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended, the said Chapter forwarded the complaint to the IBP Board of Governors for proper disposition. Complainant narrated that sometime in August 2000, respondent asked to be lent P 350,000.00. Respondent assured him that she would pay the principal plus 12% interest per annum after one year. She likewise offered by way of security a 105-square-meter parcel of land located in Naga City, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 3 4 2055 and registered in her fathers name. Respondent showed complainant a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) executed by respondents parents, and verbally assured complainant that she was authorized to sell or encumber the entire property. Complainant consulted one Atty. Raquel Payte and was assured that the documents provided by respondent were valid. Thus, complainant agreed to lend money to respondent. With the help of Atty. Payte, respondent executed in complainants favor an "open" Deed of Absolute Sale over the said parcel of land, attaching thereto the SPA. Complainant was made to believe that if respondent fails to pay the full amount of the loan with interest on due date, the deed of sale may be registered. Accordingly, he gave the amount of P 350,000.00 to respondent. Respondent, however, defaulted on her loan obligation and failed to pay the same despite complainants repeated demands. Left with no recourse, complainant went to the Register of Deeds to register the sale, only to find out that respondent deceived him since the SPA did not give respondent the power to sell the property but only empowered respondent to mortgage the property solely to banks. Complainant manifested that he had lent money before to other people albeit for insignificant amounts, but this was the first time that he extended a loan to a lawyer and it bore disastrous results. He submitted that respondent committed fraud and deceit or conduct unbecoming of a lawyer. Upon being ordered by the IBP to answer the above allegations, respondent filed a Motion for Extension of Time to 5 File a Responsive Pleading but no answer or comment was ever filed by her before the IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD). Likewise, the IBP-CBD allowed respondent to answer the Amended Complaint subsequently filed by 6 complainant but she did not file any answer thereto. She also chose not to attend the mandatory conference hearings set on July 18, 2006, June 13, 2007 and January 25, 2008 despite due notice. Thus, she was deemed to have waived her right to participate in the proceedings. On February 9, 2009, IBP Commissioner Jose I. De La Rama, Jr. rendered his report finding respondent guilty of 8 9 10 violating Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and recommending that she be suspended from the practice of law for one year. Commissioner De La Rama opined that while respondent appears to be a co-owner of the property as evidenced by an annotation on the back of TCT No. 2055 showing that half of the property has been sold to her, it was evident that she employed deceit and dishonest means to make complainant believe, by virtue of the SPA, that she was duly authorized to sell the entire property. On August 28, 2010, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the report and recommendation of Commissioner De La Rama, Jr. in its Resolution No. XIX-2010-446: RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering Respondents violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and for her failure to submit verified Answer and did not even participate in the mandatory conference, 11 Atty. Haide V. Gumba is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year. We agree with the findings and conclusion of the IBP, but find that a reduction of the recommended penalty is called for, pursuant to the principle that the appropriate penalty for an errant lawyer depends on the exercise of sound judicial 12 discretion based on the surrounding facts. 1avvphi1 Well entrenched in this jurisdiction is the rule that a lawyer may be disciplined for misconduct committed either in his professional or private capacity. The test is whether his conduct shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, 13 probity, and good demeanor, or whether it renders him unworthy to continue as an officer of the court. Verily, Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates all lawyers to uphold at all times the dignity and integrity of the
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legal profession. Lawyers are similarly required, under Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the same Code, not to engage in any unlawful, dishonest and immoral or deceitful conduct. Here, respondents actions clearly show that she deceived complainant into lending money to her through the use of documents and false representations and taking advantage of her education and complainants ignorance in legal matters. As manifested by complainant, he would have never granted the loan to respondent were it not for respondents misrepresentation that she was authorized to sell the property and if respondent had not led him to 14 believe that he could register the "open" deed of sale if she fails to pay the loan. By her misdeed, respondent has eroded not only complainants perception of the legal profession but the publics perception as well. Her actions constitute gross misconduct for which she may be disciplined, following Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended, which provides: SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. xxxx We further note that after filing a Motion for Extension of Time to File a Responsive Pleading, respondent wantonly disregarded the lawful orders of the IBP-CBD to file her answer and to appear for the mandatory conferences despite due notice. Respondent should bear in mind that she must acknowledge the orders of the IBP-CBD in deference to its 15 authority over her as a member of the IBP. Complainant now asks that respondent be disbarred. We find, however, that suspension from the practice of law is sufficient to discipline respondent. It is worth stressing that the power to disbar must be exercised with great caution. Disbarment will be imposed as a penalty only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and the character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and a member of the bar. Where any lesser penalty can accomplish 16 the end desired, disbarment should not be decreed. In this case, the Court finds the penalty of suspension more appropriate but finds the recommended penalty of suspension for one year too severe. Considering the circumstances of this case, the Court believes that a suspension of six months is sufficient. After all, suspension is not primarily 17 intended as a punishment, but as a means to protect the public and the legal profession. WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Haide B. Vista-Gumba is found administratively liable for grave misconduct. She is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for SIX (6) MONTHS, effective immediately, with a warning that a repetition of the same or a similar act will be dealt with more severely. Let notice of this Resolution be spread in respondents record as an attorney in this Court, and notice thereof be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and on the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all the courts concerned. SO ORDERED.

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SUPREME COURT

EN BANC

Adm. Case No. 2655

July 9, 1987

In re: Complaint against ATTY. PATRICIO A. ASOY, LEONARD W. RICHARDS, comp, vs. ATTY. PATRICIO A. ASOY, resp.

RESOLUTION PER CURIAM: In a Complaint formalized by the Bar Confident on April 29, 1986, pursuant to the Resolution of this Court, dated February 10, 1986, Respondent Atty. Patricio A. Asoy as retained counsel of Complainant, Leonard W. Richards, an Australian, was charged with Malpractice for non-attendance at Court hearings, negligence and lack of zeal in prosecuting a civil case for damages, resulting in its dismissal for lack of interest and/or failure to prosecute. Prior to the aforesaid formal Complaint, Leonard W. Richards had filed a letter-complaint on June 29, 1984 with the Chief Legal Officer, Tourist Division, Department of Tourism followed up with another letter dated July 13, 1984 to the Chief Justice denouncing Respondent's actuations. Required to comment in a Resolution, dated August 8, 1984, Respondent failed to do so despite service of the Resolution together with a copy of the letter-complaint. The Court (First Division) required Respondent to show cause why he should not be disciplinary dealt with or held in contempt for such failure, but all efforts to serve copy of the show-cause Resolution on Respondent at his six (6) available addresses as well as through the national and the Tacloban Chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines proved futile. Since, unquestionably, respondent had gone into hiding and was evading service of pleadings/orders/processes of this Court, we suspended him from the practice of law in a Resolution dated November 11, 1985. Copies of the Resolution were circularized to all Courts nationwide with the directive that should Respondent appear before any lower Court, the latter shall serve upon him a copy of the show-cause Resolution and require him to appear within five (5) days thereafter before the Deputy Clerk of Court and Bar Confidant. Flushed out, on December 2, 1985, Respondent filed a Manifestation/Motion for Reconsideration "submitting himself voluntarily to the jurisdiction of the Court," denying any violation of his oath as an attorney, which would warrant his suspension, and praying that in the interest of due process and on broader grounds of substantial justice, the order of suspension be lifted and that he be excused from appearing before the Bar Confidant by reason of distance and financial constraints. Respondent gave his address as "Room 302 Abalos Bldg., Aguinaldo St., Iligan City." In a resolution dated February 10, 1986, the Court denied the lifting of the order of suspension but excused Respondent from appearing before the Deputy Clerk of Court and Bar Confidant. In the same Resolution, and as stated initially, the Bar Confidant was directed to formulate the administrative complaint and respondent to answer the same within five (5) days from receipt of notice. The background facts disclose that on April 23, 1982, Complainant retained Respondent as counsel in CC No. 0181-P before the Regional Trial Court, Branch CX, Pasay City, entitled "Spouses Anita M. Richards & Leonard Richards vs. Danilo A. Felindario, et al." It was a suit for damages allegedly due to faulty workmanship and non-compliance with specifications in the construction of the RICHARDS house and swimming pool at Johann Menzi St., Phase III, BF Homes, Paranaque, Metro Manila. Among the terms and conditions in their contract for legal services were the payment by Complainant to Respondent of an acceptance fee of Fifteen Thousand Pesos (P15,000.00) payable upon the signing of the agreement, and a fee of P300.00 for each Court appearance. The acceptance fee was fully paid by Complainant on April 30, 1982, the initial 1 2 payment having been made on April 26, 1982. On October 21, 1982, Complainant and his family left permanently for Australia after selling their house to a third party. On June 20, 1983, Civil Case No. 0181-P was dismissed by the Trial Court without prejudice "for lack of interest on the 3 part of plaintiffs as shown by the absence of their counsel despite due notice." On August 15, 1983, the case was reinstated after the reconsideration sought by Respondent on July 13, 1983 was granted by the Trial Court. According to Complainant, reconsideration must have been sought by Respondent only because in Complainant's letter, dated June 7, 1983, he had already sought the assistance of Major Fred de Vera of the Bureau of Tourism Services regarding his complaint against Respondent.1avvphi1 In an Order dated October 20, 1983, the Trial Court again dismissed the case for "lack of interest and/or failure to prosecute," "it appearing that plaintiffs' counsel was duly notified as indicated by his signature appearing on the record, it appearing further that notwithstanding said notice, said counsel for the plaintiffs is not in Court today." The Trial Court further observed that "this is the second time that this case was dismissed for failure of plaintiffs' counsel to appear 4 despite notice." In his Answer, Respondent states that he was delayed in filing the same as he had to temporarily reside and hold office at Tubod, Lanao del Norte, by reason of his temporary appointment as Provincial Administrator of Lanao del Norte effective March 11, 1986; that his inability to prosecute the case was because Complainant left for Australia without furnishing Respondent his address and that he was unable to shoulder the burden of paving the fees required

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for the services of expert witnesses besides the fact that his daughter was stricken with cerebral palsy; that he had no intention to delay Complainant for money, that the Administrative Complaint does not comply with the requirements of Section 1, Rule 139 of the Rules of Court; and that he was deprived of due process of law inasmuch as Section 30, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court requires that an attorney be heard before he is removed or suspended. Respondent then prayed that, pending investigation, his suspension be lifted and that after due hearing the Complaint be dismissed and Complainant held liable for payment of all damages suffered by Respondent during the investigation of this case. In his letter-reply, dated February 13, 1987, addressed to the First Division Clerk of Court, Complainant stated that he 5 had paid P15,000.00 to Respondent to handle the case for him conditioned upon Respondent's prosecuting the case to completion, attending all scheduled hearings and keeping Complainant posted on the progress of the case; that at the time he engaged Respondent's services, the latter was the Manager of Personnel and Legal Affairs of Asia International Builders Corporation in Makati, which had connections with an Australian counterpart in Melbourne; that he had paid Civil Engineer Mendoza P5,000.00 for the inspection of the house and that the latter was to be the only expert witness so that Respondent's excuse that he (Respondent) had no funds with which to pay for expert witnesses is "entirely untrue"; that he paid an additional P1,300.00 to Respondent for other expenses like filing fee and other 6 miscellaneous items and that his total expenses relevant to the case aggregate P34,300.00; that he had informed Respondent of his address in Australia in letters dated November 26, 1982. February 1, 1983 and June 5, 1983; that Respondent has the financial means to reimburse Complainant considering his present and former position; and that he is prepared to withdraw his complaint if reimbursed by Respondent in the amount of P34,300.00. The facts, as disclosed, require no further evidentiary hearing, and speak for themselves. Res ipsa loquitur. The Orders of the 'Trial Court dismissing Civil Case No. 181-P are of record and Respondent's excuse that he can no longer recall them is feeble. Respondent's side has been fully heard in the pleadings he has filed before this Court. A trial-type hearing is not de riqueur. The requirement of due process has been duly satisfied. What due process abhors 7 is absolute lack of opportunity to be heard. Contrary to Respondent's claim, the lack of verification in the Complaint formulated by the Bar Confident, as required by Sec. 1, Rule 139 of the Rules of Court, is not a fatal defect since the original letter-complaint, which was forwarded to this Court by the Chief Legal Officer, Ministry of Tourism, had been sworn and subscribed to by Complainant before the Bar Confidant. Respondent is guilty of grave professional misconduct. He received from Complainant, his client, compensation to handle his case in the Trial Court, but the same was dismissed for lack of interest and failure to prosecute. He had 8 abandoned his client in violation of his contract ignoring the most elementary principles of professional ethics. That Respondent had ignored the processes of this Court and it was only after he was suspended from the practice of law that he surfaced, is highly indicative of his disregard of an attorney's duties to the Court. All the facts and circumstances taken into consideration, Respondent has proven himself unworthy of the trust reposed in him by law as an officer of the Court. Consistent with the policy to maintain the high traditions and standards of the legal profession, insure the observance of legal ethics, protect the interests of clients and help keep their faith in attorney's-at-law, the Supreme Court is constrained to disbar a member of the bar who violates his lawyer's oath for failure to properly attend to a client's case not only once, but on two occasions, with results highly prejudicial to the 9 interest of the latter. Furthermore, since Complainant's rights as Respondent's client have been prejudiced by the latter's failure to take the steps necessary for the prosecution of the case Complainant may recover as a result of such gross negligence and 10 grave professional misconduct. If a judgment is obtained against a party upon a complaint which is radically defective, and he desires to appeal, and procedures bondsmen, but his attorney neglects to do so until the time for appeal expires, the 11 attorney is guilty of gross negligence, and is liable for the loss sustained by the client. ACCORDINGLY, for malpractice and violation of his oath as a lawyer, 1) respondent Atty. Patricio A. Asoy is hereby ordered DISBARRED; and 2) he is hereby ordered to reimburse complainant, Leonard W. Richards, in the sum of 12 P16,300.00 (P15,000.00 + P1,300.00), the only sums substantiated by the evidence on record, within thirty (30) days from notice hereof. Copies of this Resolution shall be circulated to all Courts of the country and spread on the personal record of respondent Atty. Patricio A. Asoy. Copy of this Resolution shall likewise be furnished Complainant Leonard W. Richards, via airmail, at his address of record, 4/169 Avoca Street, Randwick NSW 2031, Australia, with copy furnished the Department of Foreign Affairs for onward transmittal to the Philippine Consulate General, Sydney, Australia. SO ORDERED.

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SUPREME COURT

FIRST DIVISION A.M. No. 2655 November 11, 1985

LEONARD W. RICHARDS, complainant, vs. ATTY. PATRICIO A. ASOY, respondent. MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.: As retained counsel of complainant W. Richards, an Australian, in Civil Case No. 0181-P, Regional Trial Court, Pasay City, Branch CX, an action for damages entitled Richards vs. Danilo Felindario, et al., due to faulty construction and non-compliance with specifications and plans of their house and swimming pool at Johann Menzi St., Phase III, B.F. Homes, Paraaque, M.M., respondent Atty. Patricio A. Asoy stands charged with Malpractice for alleged non2 attendance at hearings, negligence and lack of zeal in handling the aforesaid case resulting in its dismissal for lack of 3 interest and/or failure to prosecute. Required to comment, within ten (10) days from notice, through our Resolution, dated August 8, 1984, respondent failed to do so despite service together with a copy a of the letter-complaint at his residence at 13 President's Ave., Teoville Subdivision, Sucat Road, Paraaque, Metro Manila. For failure to file said Comment within the period which expired on September 9, 1984 we resolved to require him "a) to SHOW CAUSE why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt for such failure and b) to COMPLY 5 with the resolution of August 8, 1984 requiring him to file said comment, both within 10 days from notice hereof." Copy of the aforesaid Resolution not having been served at respondent's other address at 117 Ramon Tirona St., BF Homes, Paraaque, M.M., with the process server's notation: "no longer residing at such address, not known in the forwarding address" we required complainant to "INFORM this Court of the correct and present address of Atty. 6 Patricio Asoy within five (5) days form notice hereof." Though the Philippine Consulate General in Sydney, Australia, complainant has manifested that he is unaware of respondent's present whereabouts. In the meanwhile, other copies of our February 25, 1985 Resolution were served at respondent's known office addresses at the Central Bank, Legal Department, Manila, and at Suite 306, Filman Bank bldg., Plaza Sta. Cruz, 7 Manila, which were both returned unserved. Service was tried, next, at Asia International Builders Corp., 5th Floor, ADC Bldg., Ayala Avenue, Makati M.M., the address given in respondent's calling card, but the 1st Division Clerk of Court was informed that respondent had ceased working that office as of June 16, 1984. Respondent's provincial address at the Bar Office of this Court was nest tried through the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Tacloban Chapter, with the request that this Court be informed of the whereabouts of respondent. In a telegram, dated October 10, 1985, the IBP has informed the Court that respondent is not a member of the Leyte Chapter. Unquestionably, respondent has gone into hiding and is evading service of pleadings/orders/processes of this Court. ACCORDINGLY, respondent, Atty. Patricio A. Asoy, is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law until further Orders of this Court. Let copies of this Resolution be circularized to all Courts. Should respondent appear before any lower Court, the latter shall serve upon him a copy of this Resolution and require him to appear, within five (5) days, before the Deputy Clerk of Court and Bar Confidant, who shall furnish him with a copy of the Administrative Complaint and require him to file an Answer thereto, within five (5) days thereafter. The lower Court concerned shall furnish this Court with copy of its Order immediately. Copy of this Resolution shall likewise be furnished complainant, via airmail at his address of record, 4/169 Avoca Street, Randwick NSW 2031, Australia, with copy furnished the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for onward transmittal to the Philippine Consulate General, Sydney, as requested in the Ministry's 1st Indorsement dated 4 September 1985. SO ORDERED.
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SUPREME COURT

EN BANC

A.C. No. 5355

December 13, 2011

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, Petitioner, vs. ATTY. DANIEL B. LIANGCO, Respondent. Per Curiam: This is an administrative Complaint for Disbarment filed by the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) against respondent Atty. Daniel B. Liangco. In a per curiam En Banc Resolution in Gozun v. Hon. Liangco, dated 30 August 2000, this Court ordered the dismissal from service of respondent as judge of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of San Fernando, Pampanga and as acting judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Mexico-San Luis, Pampanga. His dismissal was with forfeiture of all his retirement benefits and accumulated leave credits; and with prejudice to his reinstatement or reemployment in any branch, instrumentality or agency of the government, including government-owned or -controlled corporations. The Court further directed the OCA to initiate disbarment proceedings against him for misconduct as a member of the bar. Hence, this present case for resolution by the Court. THE FACTS. We quote the facts as stated in A. M. No. MTJ-97-1136, as follows: Complainant Hermogenes T. Gozun (hereinafter referred to as "Gozun") was in open and adverse possession of subject land for a period of more than thirty years. His familys house was erected on the land. The house was made of old vintage lumber, cement, hollow blocks, G. I. sheet roofing and other strong materials. Gozun inherited the house and lot from his parents. The municipality of San Luis, Pampanga claimed to own the same lot. On January 12, 1996, the Sangguniang Bayan of San Luis, Pampanga issued Resolution No. 26-96, stating:
"RESOLVED AS IT IS HEREBY RESOLVED that the Sangguniang Bayan of San Luis, Pampanga do hereby consider (sic) the lot under Tax Dec. No. 114 owned by the Municipal Government of San Luis, Pampanga, specifically the lot where Mr. Hermogenes Gozun and family were squatting (sic) as the new site of the Rural Health Center will rise (sic). On May 17, 1996, the Sangguniang Bayan issued Resolution No. 34-96 to amend the correct Resolution No. 26-96. On May 24, 1996, Romulo M. Batu, Vice Mayor, on behalf of the Sangguniang Bayan, filed with the MTC, San Luis, Pampanga, a petition for declaratory relief. We quote the petition: "PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF "THE HONORABLE JUDGE DANIEL LIANGCO "In behalf of the Sangguniang Bayan of San Luis, Pampanga, We would like to petition your good office to render legal opinion on the following matters, to wit: "1. The validity of the attached Resolution. "2. The powers of the Municipal Mayor to enforce said Resolution. "3. To issue an order to the PNP to assist the Municipal Mayor in implementing said Resolution. "These request are (sic) in connection with our plan to construct a new site for the Rural Health Center of San Luis, Pampanga. However, the designated place thereof is presently being squatted (sic) by a certain Mr. Hermogenes Gozun and inspite of the official notice of Atty. Benlfre S. Galang, our Provincial Legal Officer, and personal request of our Municipal Mayor Jovito C. Bondoc to Mr. Gozun to vacate his (sic) premises, he continues to defy such notices and request to the detriment of the proposed project. "WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that this petition will merit your favorable consideration and appropriate action for the sake of public interest."
2 1

On the very same day, May 24, 1996, respondent judge issued a resolution, reasoning: First, the municipality of San Luis, Pampanga through its Sangguniang Bayan may enact resolutions and ordinances to regulate the use of property within its jurisdiction. Second, Resolution No. 34-96 is not contrary to law, morals and public policy. Third, the municipal mayor through an executive order may order the Philippine National Police or any government law enforcement agency to enforce or implement the resolution, using reasonable force if necessary and justified. Fourth, squatting in government property is considered a "nuisance per se". Respondent judge ruled: "With the issuance by the Municipal Mayor of an executive order, the municipality of San Luis may order the Philippine National Police (PNP) stationed in San Luis, Pampanga to effect the eviction of Hermogenes Gozun and all other persons who may be claiming any right under him from Lot No. 114 covered by tax Declaration No. 6030 (underscoring ours)."

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Again, on the same day, March 24, 1996, the municipal mayor, Jovito C. Bondoc, pursuant to the aforequoted resolution, issued Executive Order No. 1, series of 1996, ordering the PNP to implement Resolution No. 34-96. Note that complainant Gozun was not served with summons or given notice of the petition for declaratory relief. On June 2, 1996, complainant Gozun learned about the resolution. On June 3, 1996, complainant Gozuns wife together with other public school teachers went to the office of the respondent judge. When asked about the resolution, respondent judge answered, "Ing Apung Guinu yu y Mayor Bondoc at kaya ko makisabi" ("Your God is Mayor Bondoc and you should talk to him"). On August 8, 1996, agents of the municipal government demolished complainant Gozuns house, using respondent judges resolution and the mayors executive order as basis. On December 18, 1996, complainant Gozun filed this administrative complaint with the Office of the Court Administrator. He averred that respondent judges issuance of the resolution amounts to "gross misconduct, gross inefficiency and incompetence." Complainant Gozun further accused the municipal mayor of having bribed respondent judge. Mayor Bondoc told complainant Gozun that "the respondent judge is in his pocketbecause he (Mayor Bondoc) has given him (respondent judge) a lot of things ("dacal naku a regalo kaya"). On January 20, 1997, the Office of the Court Administrator submitted the petition to this Court for its consideration, recommending that the complaint be given due course. On March 21, 1997, the Court resolved to require respondent judge to comment thereon, within ten (10) days from notice. On May 15, 1997, respondent judge submitted his comment, denying the charges and urging that the case be dismissed. On June 23, 1997, we referred the case back to the Office of the Court Administrator for evaluation, report and recommendation. On April 13, 2000, after investigation, Court Administrator Alfredo L. Benipayo submitted a memorandum, 3 recommending the dismissal from office of respondent judge.
A.M. No. MTJ-97-1136 Dismissal of Respondent from the Bench The OCA Resolution was forwarded to this Court for evaluation and action and docketed as A.M. No. MTJ-97-1136. On 30 August, 2000, the Court En Banc promulgated a per curiam Resolution adopting the report and recommendation of the Court Administrator. It ruled that respondent had blatantly ignored the basic rules of fair play, in addition to acting without jurisdiction in entertaining a 4 Petition for Declaratory Relief despite his being a judge of a first-level court. The Court also pointed out that his ruling on the said 5 Petition resulted in the demolition of the house of complainant Gozun, thus rendering his family homeless. It described 6 respondents acts as biased and "maleficent" and ruled that those acts merited the punishment of dismissal from the service, viz: IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court hereby orders the DISMISSAL of respondent Judge Daniel B. Liangco, Municipal Trial Judge, Municipal Trial Court, San Fernando, Pampanga, and Acting Judge Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC), Mexico-San Luis, Pampanga, from the service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and accumulated leave credits, if any, and with prejudice to reinstatement or reemployment in any branch, instrumentality or agency of the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations. The Court directs the Court Administrator to initiate disbarment proceedings against respondent Judge for misconduct as a member of the bar within thirty (30) days from finality of his decision. This decision is immediately executory. SO ORDERED.
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A.C. No. 5355 Disbarment On 10 November 2000, the OCA filed a Complaint for Disbarment against respondent. In its Complaint dated 06 November 2000, docketed as Administrative Case No. (A.C.) 5355, the OCA charged him with gross misconduct for acting with manifest bias and partiality towards a party, as well as for inexcusable ignorance of well-established rules of procedure that challenged his competence to remain a member of the legal profession. Thus, it prayed that he be 9 disbarred, and that his name be stricken off the Roll of Attorneys. On 28 November 2000, the Court En Banc promulgated a Resolution requiring respondent to file his Comment on the 10 Complaint for Disbarment against him. On 01 June 2001, he filed his Comment on/Answer to Complaint for 11 Disbarment, appealing for understanding and asking that the Court allow him to continue practicing as a lawyer. He reasoned that when he acted on the Petition for Declaratory Relief filed by the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality
8

29

of San Luis, Pampanga, he was merely rendering a legal opinion "honestly and in good faith"; and that his actions 13 were not attended by malice, bad faith or any other ulterior motive. He further pleads for compassion from this Court and for permission to remain a member of the bar, because the practice of law is his only means of livelihood to 14 support his family. On 07 August 2001, the Court En Banc noted the submission of respondent and referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation within ninety (90) days from receipt of the 15 records of the case. IBPs Report and Recommendation The IBP held a series of hearings on the disbarment case with respondents participation. On 03 October 2003, the 16 investigating commissioner issued her Report and Recommendation finding justification for the disbarment of respondent and recommending that his name be struck off the Roll of Attorneys. The investigating commissioner found that, based on the facts of the case, there was clear, convincing and satisfactory evidence to warrant the disbarment of 17 respondent. She observed that he had exhibited lapses, as well as ignorance of well-established rules and procedures. She also observed that the present Complaint was not the first of its kind to be filed against him. She further noted that before his dismissal from the judiciary, respondent was suspended for six (6) months when he assigned to his court, without a raffle, fifty-four (54) cases for violation of Presidential Decree No. 1602 a violation of Supreme Court Circular No. 7 dated 23 September 1974. Also, pending with the Supreme Court were three (3) administrative cases filed against him for dishonesty, gross ignorance of the law, and direct bribery. In the bribery 18 case, he was caught by the National Bureau of Investigation in an entrapment operation. On 30 January 2009, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Report and Recommendation of the IBP. He alleged that the evidence presented in the proceedings for his dismissal as judge was the same as that which was used in the disbarment case against him. Thus, because he did not have the chance to cross-examine the witnesses, 20 he claimed to have been deprived of due process. In addition, respondent emphasized the submission by Gozun of an Affidavit of Desistance from the Complaint the latter had originally filed against him and contended that the case 21 should have been dismissed. Lastly, respondent averred that he had endeavored to improve himself as a devout Catholic by joining religious organizations. He also impressed upon the IBP his effort to improve on his knowledge of 22 the law by attending Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE). On 12 May 2009, respondent filed a Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration wherein he implored the IBP to take a second look at his case. He emphasized the submission by Gozun of an Affidavit of Desistance and the fact that the 24 former had already suffered the supreme penalty of dismissal as MTC judge. Respondent also reiterated the grounds already stated in his first Motion for Reconsideration. On 09 October 2008, the IBP board of governors passed Resolution No. XVIII-2008-525, which adopted the Report and Recommendation of the investigating commissioner, who found that respondent had acted with manifest bias and partiality in favor of a party-litigant and shown inexcusable ignorance of the Rules of Procedure. The Resolution likewise adopted the recommendation to disbar respondent. On 30 June 2011, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline transmitted the case records of A. C. No. 5355 to this Court, 26 which noted it on 16 August 2011. The Courts Ruling The Court affirms in toto the findings and recommendations of the IBP. The evidence on record overwhelmingly supports the finding that respondent is guilty of gross misconduct and inexcusable ignorance of well-established rules of procedures. Gross Misconduct In Sps. Donato v. Atty. Asuncion, Jr. citing Yap v. Judge Aquilino A. Inopiquez, Jr., this Court explained the concept of gross misconduct as any inexcusable, shameful or flagrant unlawful conduct on the part of a person concerned with the administration of justice; i.e., conduct prejudicial to the rights of the parties or to the right determination of the cause. The motive behind this conduct is generally a premeditated, obstinate or intentional purpose. In the case at bar, respondent acted upon the Petition for Declaratory Relief filed by the Sangguniang Bayan of San Luis, Pampanga, without the mandatory notice to Gozun who would be affected by the action. The records show that respondent, upon receipt of the Petition, had it docketed in his court, designated Gozun as respondent in the case title, and quickly disposed of the matter by issuing a Resolution all on the same day that the Petition was filed without notice and hearing. Respondent admitted that, to his mind, he was merely rendering a legal opinion at the local governments behest, which he gladly and expeditiously obliged. Without denying this fact in his Comment, he admitted that he had erred in acting upon the Petition, but emphasized that his actions were not attended by malice or 29 bad faith. We find his statements hard to believe.
27 28 25 23 19

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The undue haste with which respondent acted on the Petition negates good faith on his part. Moreover, the testimonial evidence on record indicates that he maintained close relations with the municipal vice-mayor of San Luis, Pampanga, a party-litigant who had an obvious interest in the outcome of the case. The testimony of Romulo A. Batu, former vicemayor of San Luis, Pampanga, showed that respondent denigrated his impartiality as a judge is as follows:

COMM. SANSANO: You dont remember therefore that at any time at all you were with the mayor in going to see the respondent? WITNESS: (Mr. Batu) I do not know any instance that the mayor visited the respondent, Your Honor. I do not know any instance that I was with him. COMM. SANSANO: But other than the occasion of the filing of this request there were times when you went to see the respondent also in his office? WITNESS: There was no other visit, Your Honor. COMM. SANSANO: So May 24, 1996 was the first time you went to see him in his office? WITNESS: Before that, Your Honor, nagpupunta na kami doon kung minsan may nagpapatulong na mga may kaso. COMM. SANSANO: Yon ang tanong ko kanina sa iyo kung bago May 24 pumupunta ka na sa opisina niyang datihan? WITNESS: Yes, Your Honor. 30
The testimony of respondents own witness clearly showed his wanton disregard of Canon 1, Sections 4 and 5 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, which requires the observance of judicial independence and 31 its protection from undue influence, whether from private or from public interests. In Edao v. Judge Asdala,
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we explained the rationale behind this imposition:

As the visible representation of the law and justice, judges, such as the respondent, are expected to conduct themselves in a manner that would enhance the respect and confidence of the people in the judicial system. The New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary mandates that judges must not only maintain their independence, integrity and impartiality; but they must also avoid any appearance of impropriety or partiality, which may erode the peoples faith in the judiciary. Integrity and impartiality, as well as the appearance thereof, are deemed essential not just in the proper discharge of judicial office, but also to the personal demeanor of judges. This standard applies not only to the decision itself, but also to the process by which the decision is made. Section 1, Canon 2, specifically mandates judges to "ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but that it is perceived to be so in the view of reasonable observers." Clearly, it is of vital importance not only that independence, integrity and impartiality have been observed by judges and reflected in their decisions, but that these must also appear to have been so observed in the eyes of the people, so as to avoid any erosion of faith in the justice system. Thus, judges must be circumspect in their actions in order to avoid doubt and suspicion in the dispensation of justice. To further emphasize its importance, Section 2, Canon 2 states: Sec. 2. The behavior and conduct of judges must reaffirm the peoples faith in the integrity of the judiciary. Justice must not merely be done but must also be seen to be done. As early as June 6, 2003, OCA Circular No. 70-2003 has directed judges as follows: In view of the increasing number of reports reaching the Office of the Court Administrator that judges have been meeting with party litigants inside their chambers, judges are hereby cautioned to avoid in-chambers sessions without the other party and his counsel present, and to observe prudence at all times in their conduct to the end that they only act impartially and with propriety but are also perceived to be impartial and proper. Impartiality is essential to the proper discharge of the judicial office. It applies not only to "the decision itself but also to the process by which the decision is made." As such, judges must ensure that their "conduct, both in and out of the court, maintains and enhances the confidence of the public, the legal profession and litigants in the impartiality of the judge and of the judiciary." In the same vein, the Code of Judicial Conduct behooves all judges to avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all their activities, as such is essential to the performance of all the activities of a judge in order to maintain the trust and respect of the people in the judiciary. Also relevant is Canon 3, particularly Section 2 of the new code, which exhorts judges not only to be impartial in 33 deciding the cases before them, but also to project the image of impartiality. Unfortunately, as shown by the facts of the case, these rules were not properly observed by respondent as a judge of a first-level court. Inexcusable Ignorance of the Law

31

We are appalled by respondents ignorance of the basic rules of procedure. His wanton use of court processes in this case without regard for the repercussions on the rights and property of others clearly shows his unfitness to remain a member of the bar. A cursory look at the Resolution dated 24 May 1996 issued by respondent would prompt an ordinary person to conclude that an action in the form of a Petition for Declaratory Relief was indeed filed, because it bears the name and the branch of the court of law that issued it. It had a docket number and the names of the parties involved. The Resolution even states the justiciable question to be resolved and accordingly makes a judicial determination thereof. In reality, though, there was no notice sent to Gozun, the named respondent in the Petition; nor was a hearing held to thresh out the issues involved. As far as respondent was concerned, he simply issued a "legal opinion," but one with all the hallmarks of a valid issuance by a court of law, despite the absence of mandatory processes such as notice especially to Gozun and hearing. Even this excuse is unacceptable. Judges do not, and are not allowed, to issue legal opinions. Their opinions are always in the context of judicial decisions, or concurring and dissenting opinions in the case of collegiate courts, and always in the context of contested proceedings. What is most unfortunate is that the Sanguniang Bayan, relying on the Resolution respondent issued, caused the demolition of the house of Gozun and his family, who were thus ejected from the property they had been occupying for decades. In effect, Gozun was deprived of his property without due process. To us, this is precisely the injustice that members of the bench and the bar are sworn to guard against. Regrettably, respondent as judge was even instrumental in its commission. When his liability for his act was invoked, he casually justifies them as honest mistakes not attended by malice or bad faith. His justification is unacceptable to us. As a member of the bar and former judge, respondent is expected to be well-versed in the Rules of Procedure. This expectation is imposed upon members of the legal profession, because membership in the bar is in the category of a mandate for public service of the highest order. Lawyers are oath-bound servants of society whose conduct is clearly circumscribed by inflexible norms of law and ethics, and whose primary duty is the advancement of the quest for truth 34 and justice, for which they have sworn to be fearless crusaders. As judge of a first-level court, respondent is expected to know that he has no jurisdiction to entertain a petition for declaratory relief. Moreover, he is presumed to know that in his capacity as judge, he cannot render a legal opinion in the absence of a justiciable question. Displaying an utter lack of familiarity with the rules, he in effect erodes the publics confidence in the competence of our courts. Moreover, he demonstrates his ignorance of the power and responsibility that attach to the processes and issuances of a judge, and that he as a member of the bar should know. Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that a lawyer must uphold the Constitution and promote 35 respect for the legal processes. Contrary to this edict, respondent malevolently violated the basic constitutional right of Gozun not to be deprived of a right or property without due process of law. Under Canon 10, Rule 10.03, respondent as lawyer is mandated to observe the Rules of Procedure and not to misuse 36 them to defeat the ends of justice. In this case, however, the opposite happened. Respondent recklessly used the powers of the court to inflict injustice. Should the misconduct of respondent as judge also warrant his disbarment from the legal profession? We answer in the affirmative. In Collantes v. Renomeron, we ruled therein that the misconduct of the respondent therein as a public official also constituted a violation of his oath as a lawyer: As the late Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro said: "A person takes an oath when he is admitted to the Bar which is designed to impress upon him his responsibilities. He thereby becomes an officer of the court on whose shoulders rest the grave responsibility of assisting the courts in the proper, fair, speedy and efficient administration of justice. As an officer of the court he is subject to a rigid discipline that demands that in his every exertion the only criterion be that truth and justice triumph. This discipline is what has given the law profession its nobility, its prestige, its exalted place. From a lawyer, to paraphrase Justice Felix Frankfurter, are expected those qualities of truth-speaking, a high sense of honor, full candor, intellectual honesty, and the strictest observance of fiduciary responsibility - all of which, throughout the centuries, have been compendiously described as 'moral character.' xxx xxx xxx
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"A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession." (Rule 7.03, Code of Professional Responsibility.) This Court has ordered that only those who are "competent, honorable, and reliable" may practice the profession of law (Noriega vs. Sison, 125 SCRA 293) for every lawyer must pursue "only the highest standards in the practice of his calling" (Court Administrator vs. Hermoso, 150 SCRA 269, 278).

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Recently, in Samson v. Judge Caballero, we ruled that because membership in the bar is an integral qualification for membership in the bench, the moral fitness of a judge also reflects the latters moral fitness as a lawyer. A judge who disobeys the basic rules of judicial conduct also violates the lawyers oath. We note that on 25 August 2011, respondent filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing Resolution No. XVIII2008-525 dated 09 October 2008 promulgated by the IBP board of governors, which adopted and approved the findings of the investigating commissioner recommending his disbarment. Respondent alleged therein that he had served as assistant provincial prosecutor in the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga for thirteen (13) years prior to his dismissal as MTC judge of San Luis, Pampanga and as acting MCTC judge of Mexico-San Luis, Pampanga. He also complains that he was deprived of due process by the IBP board of governors when it approved and adopted the findings of the investigating commissioner recommending his disbarment; and he prays for a second look at his case, considering the withdrawal of the Complaint originally filed by Gozun. In the light of our ruling in this case, we can no longer consider the undocketed Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by respondent. In the first place, such kind of petition is not available to assail the resolution of the IBP in an administrative case. His remedies from an adverse resolution is to seek a reconsideration of the same, and when denied, to raise the same defenses against administrative liability before this Court. He has availed of both remedies in this case. Disbarment proceedings are sui generis. As such, they render the underlying motives of complainant unimportant and of little relevance. The purpose of disbarment proceedings is mainly to determine the fitness of a lawyer to continue acting as an officer of the court and as participant in the dispensation of justice an issue which the complainants personal motives have little relevance. For this reason, upon information of an alleged wrongdoing, the Court may 39 initiate the disbarment proceedings motu proprio. lavvphil Recently in Garrido v. Atty. Garrido, purpose in this wise:
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38

we reiterated the unique characteristic of disbarment proceedings and their

Laws dealing with double jeopardy or with procedure such as the verification of pleadings and prejudicial questions, or in this case, prescription of offenses or the filing of affidavits of desistance by the complainant do not apply in the determination of a lawyers qualifications and fitness for membership in the Bar. We have so ruled in the past and we see no reason to depart from this ruling. First, admission to the practice of law is a component of the administration of justice and is a matter of public interest because it involves service to the public. The admission qualifications are also qualifications for the continued enjoyment of the privilege to practice law. Second, lack of qualifications or the violation of the standards for the practice of law, like criminal cases, is a matter of public concern that the State may inquire into through this Court. In this sense, the complainant in a disbarment case is not a direct party whose interest in the outcome of the charge is wholly his or her own; effectively, his or her participation is that of a witness who brought the matter to the attention of the Court.lawphi1 Thus, despite Gozuns desistance in A.M. No. MTJ-97-1136, from whence this case originated, respondent is not exonerated. WHEREFORE, this Court resolves to DISBAR Atty. Daniel B. Liangco for the following offenses: 1. GROSS MISCONDUCT in violation of Canon 1, Sections 4 and 5 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary 2. INEXCUSABLE IGNORANCE OF THE LAW in violation of Canons 1 and 10, Rule 10.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility Let a copy of this Decision be attached to the personal records of Atty. Daniel B. Liangco in the Office of the Bar Confidant and another copy furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. The Bar Confidant is hereby directed to strike out the name of Daniel B. Liangco from the Roll of Attorneys. SO ORDERED.

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SUPREME COURT

EN BANC

A.M. No. 10-10-4-SC

June 7, 2011

Re: Letter of the UP Law Faculty entitled Restoring Integrity: A Statement by the Faculty of the University of the Philippines College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism and Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court RESOLUTION LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.: For disposition of the Court are the following: (a) the Motion for Reconsideration dated April 1, 2011 filed by respondent University of the Philippines (UP) law professors Tristan A. Catindig and Carina C. Laforteza; and (b) the Manifestation dated April 1, 2011 filed by respondents Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen and Prof. Theodore O. Te. In support of their Motion for Reconsideration, Professors Catindig and Laforteza relied on the following grounds:
GROUNDS A. THIS PROCEEDING, WHILE OSTENSIBLY DOCKETED AS AN ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER, IS PREMISED ON A FINDING OF INDIRECT CONTEMPT. ACCORDINGLY, WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE RESPONDENTS BREACHED THEIR ETHICAL OBLIGATIONS WITHOUT OBSERVANCE OF THE DUE PROCESS SAFEGUARDS GUARANTEED IN AN INDIRECT CONTEMPT PROCEEDING. B. WITH DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT (1) THE PLAGIARISM AND MISREPRESENTATION ISSUES IN THE VINUYA CASE AND IN A.M. NO. 10-7-17-SC HAVE NO RELATION TO THE RESTORING INTEGRITY STATEMENT AND THE SHOW CAUSE RESOLUTION, AND THEREFORE (2) THE RESPONDENTS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO ACCESS AND ADDRESS THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED IN A.M. NO. 10-717-SC, TO PRESENT THEIR OWN EVIDENCE IN RESPECT OF THE PLAGIARISM AND MISREPRESENTATION ISSUES, AND TO SUPPORT THEIR RESPONSE TO THE SHOW CAUSE RESOLUTION WITH SUCH EVIDENCE. C. WITH DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE RESPONDENTS ARE IN 3 BREACH OF THEIR ETHICAL OBLIGATIONS FOR HAVING ISSUED THE RESTORING INTEGRITY STATEMENT.
2 1

In their Motion for Reconsideration, respondents pray that (a) the Courts Decision dated March 8, 2011 be reconsidered and set aside and the respondents Compliance dated November 18, 2010 be deemed satisfactory, and (b) the Court expunge the reference in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC to the respondents (i.e., "joined by some faculty members of the University of the Philippines school of law") effectively finding them guilty of making false charges against Associate Justice Mariano C. del Castillo (Justice Del Castillo). In the alternative, they pray that they be afforded their full rights to due process and provided the full opportunity to present evidence on the matters subject of the Show 4 Cause Resolution dated October 19, 2010. Anent the first ground, Professors Catindig and Laforteza insist that, notwithstanding the docketing of this matter as an administrative case, there was purportedly a finding that respondents were guilty of indirect contempt in view of (1) the 5 mention made in the Show Cause Resolution dated October 19, 2010 of In re Kelly, a case involving a contempt charge; and (2) the references to respondents "contumacious language" or "contumacious speech and conduct" and to several authorities which dealt with contempt proceedings in the Decision dated March 8, 2011. The shallowness of such argument is all too easily revealed. It is true that contumacious speech and conduct directed against the courts done by any person, whether or not a member of the Bar, may be considered as indirect contempt under Rule 71, Section 3 of the Rules of Court, to wit: Sec. 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing. After a charge in writing has been filed, and an opportunity given to the respondent to comment thereon within such period as may be fixed by the court and to be heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of the following acts may be punished for indirect contempt: xxxx (d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice. A charge of indirect contempt, if proven in due proceedings, carry with it penal sanctions such as imprisonment or a 6 fine or both. The very same contumacious speech or conduct directed against a court or judicial officer, if committed by a member of the Bar, may likewise subject the offender to disciplinary proceedings under the Code of Professional Responsibility, 7 which prescribes that lawyers observe and promote due respect for the courts. In such disciplinary cases, the sanctions are not penal but administrative such as, disbarment, suspension, reprimand or admonition.

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Contrary to Professors Catindig and Lafortezas theory, what established jurisprudence tells us is that the same incident of contumacious speech and/or behavior directed against the Court on the part of a lawyer may be punishable either as contempt or an ethical violation, or both in the discretion of the Court. In Salcedo v. Hernandez, for the same act of filing in court a pleading with intemperate and offensive statements, the concerned lawyer was found guilty of contempt and liable administratively. For this reason, two separate penalties were imposed upon him, a fine (for the contempt charge) and reprimand (for his failure to observe his lawyerly duty to give due respect to the Court). The full case title of In re: Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen and the sanction imposed indubitably show that the proceeding involved therein was disciplinary. Notwithstanding the fact that the Court in Almacen adverted to a few principles and authorities involving contempt proceedings aside from jurisprudence on ethical responsibilities of lawyers, Atty. Almacen was only meted out an administrative sanction (indefinite suspension from the practice of law) and no penal sanction was imposed upon him. Indeed, in Almacen, the Court explicitly stated that whether or not respondent lawyer could be held liable for contempt for his utterances and actuations was immaterial as the sole issue in his disciplinary case concerns his professional identity, his sworn duty as a lawyer and his fitness as an officer of the 11 Court. Conversely, In re Vicente Sotto remind Atty. Sotto that:
12 9 10 8

was purely a contempt proceeding. Nonetheless, the Court in that case saw fit to

As a member of the bar and an officer of the courts Atty. Vicente Sotto, like any other, is in duty bound to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court, to which he owes fidelity according to the oath he has taken as such attorney, and not to promote distrust in the administration of justice. Respect to the courts guarantees the stability of other 13 institutions, which without such guaranty would be resting on a very shaky foundation. Atty. Sotto was expressly found liable only for contempt and accordingly fined the amount of P1,000.00 payable within 15 days from promulgation of judgment. The unmistakable reference to Atty. Sottos failure to observe his ethical duties as a lawyer did not convert the action against him into a disciplinary proceeding. In fact, part of the disposition of the case was to require Atty. Sotto to show cause, within the same period given for the payment of the fine, why he should not be disbarred for his contemptuous statements against the Court published in a newspaper. Similar to Salcedo, Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan involved both contempt and disciplinary proceedings for the lawyers act of making public statements to the media that were offensive and disrespectful of the Court and its members relating to matters that were sub judice. This was evident in the May 2, 1988 Resolution of the Court which required respondent lawyer to "explain in writing within ten (10) days from notice hereof, why he should not be punished for 15 contempt of court and/or subjected to administrative sanctions." In Zaldivar, however, although the Court found that respondents act constituted both contempt and gross misconduct as a member of the Bar, he was only administratively sanctioned with an indefinite suspension from the practice of law. The lesson imparted by the foregoing authorities is that, when the Court initiates contempt proceedings and/or disciplinary proceedings against lawyers for intemperate and discourteous language and behavior directed at the courts, the evil sought to be prevented is the same the degradation of the courts and the loss of trust in the administration of justice. For this reason, it is not unusual for the Court to cite authorities on bar discipline (involving the duty to give due respect to the courts) in contempt cases against lawyers and vice versa. Thus, when the Court chooses to institute an administrative case against a respondent lawyer, the mere citation or discussion in the orders or decision in the administrative case of jurisprudence involving contempt proceedings does not transform the action from a disciplinary proceeding to one for contempt. Respondents contrary position in their motion for reconsideration is bereft of any rational merit. Had this Court opted to cite respondents for contempt of court, which is punishable by imprisonment or fine, this Court would have initiated contempt proceedings in accordance with the Rules of Court. Clearly, the Court did not opt to do so. We cannot see why respondents would stubbornly cling to the notion that they were being cited for indirect contempt under the Show Cause Resolution when there is no basis for such belief other than their own apparent misreading of the same.1avvphi1 With respect to the second ground offered for reconsideration of the Decision dated March 8, 2011, respondents continue to insist on their theory, previously expounded in their Compliance, that the evidence and proceedings in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC was relevant to their own administrative case and thus, it was necessary for them to be granted access to the evidence and records of that case in order to prove their own defenses in the present case. The Decision already debunked at length the theory that if respondents are able to prove the bases for their "well founded" concerns regarding the plagiarism charge against Justice Del Castillo, then they would be exonerated of the administrative charges against them. It bears repeating here that what respondents have been required to explain was their contumacious, intemperate and irresponsible language and/or conduct in the issuance of the Restoring Integrity Statement, which most certainly cannot be justified by a belief, well-founded or not, that Justice Del Castillo and/or his legal researcher committed plagiarism. To dispel respondents misconception once and for all, it should be stressed that this Court did not call the attention of respondents for having an opinion contrary to that of the Court in the plagiarism case against Justice Del Castillo. Notably, even their co-respondent Prof. Raul T. Vasquez stood fast on his opinion regarding the plagiarism issue. Still, he was able to simply relate to this Court how he came to sign the Restoring Integrity Statement and candidly
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conceded that he may have failed to assess the effect of the language of the Statement. This straightforward and honest explanation was found satisfactory despite the lack of reference to the evidence in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC or the holding of any formal trial-type evidentiary hearing, which respondents know fully well was not mandatory in administrative proceedings. This circumstance belied respondents justification for seeking access to the evidence and records of A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC and their assertion that they have in any way been denied their due process rights. For the same reason that A.M. 10-7-17-SC and the present case are independent of each other, a passing mention of respondent law professors in the Resolution dated February 8, 2011 in A.M. 10-7-17-SC is not proof that this Court has found respondents guilty of falsely accusing Justice Del Castillo of plagiarism nor is it any prejudgment of the present case. For if so, no one would be exonerated or none of the compliances would be found satisfactory in this administrative case. Again, the case of Prof. Vasquez confirms that this Court duly considered respondents submissions in this case before coming to a decision. To buttress their third ground for reconsideration, respondents mainly contend that the Court erred in taking the "emphatic language" in the Statement in isolation from the other statements evidencing the good intentions of respondents and calling for constructive action. Again, these arguments have been substantially addressed in the Decision dated March 8, 2011 and there is no need to belabor these points here. Suffice it to say that respondents avowed noble motives have been given due weight and factored in the determination of the action taken with respect to submissions of respondents. In all, the Court finds that respondent Professors Catindig and Laforteza have offered no substantial arguments to warrant a reconsideration of the Decision dated March 8, 2011 nor to justify the grant of the reliefs prayed for in their motion. As for the Manifestation dated April 1, 2011, Dean Leonen and Professor Te alleged that "they support the Motion for Reconsideration which was filed by Respondents Professors Tristan Catindig and Caren Laforteza on April 1, 2011." The rest of the assertions therein are mere restatements of arguments previously proffered in respondents compliances and have been extensively taken up in the Decision dated March 8, 2011. Since the Manifestation, apart from being an expression of support for Professors Catindig and Lafortezas motion for reconsideration, did not raise any new matter nor pray for any affirmative relief, the Court resolves to merely note the same. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby RESOLVES to (a) DENY the Motion for Reconsideration dated April 1, 2011 filed by respondent Professors Tristan A. Catindig and Carina C. Laforteza; and (b) NOTE the Manifestation dated April 1, 2011 filed by Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen and Professor Theodore O. Te. SO ORDERED.

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SUPREME COURT

EN BANC

A.C. No. 8253

March 15, 2011 (Formerly CBD Case No. 03-1067)

ERLINDA R. TAROG, Complainant, vs. ATTY. ROMULO L. RICAFORT, Respondent. PER CURIAM: We resolve a complaint for disbarment for alleged grave misconduct brought against Atty. Romulo L. Ricafort for his failure to account for and to return the sums of money received from his clients for purposes of the civil action to recover their property from a foreclosing banking institution he was handling for them. The original complainant was Arnulfo A. Tarog, but his wife, Erlinda R. Tarog, substituted him upon his intervening death. Antecedents In 1992, the Tarogs sought the advice of Atty. Jaime L. Miralles regarding their bank-foreclosed property located in the Bicol Region. Atty. Miralles advised them to engage a Bicol-based attorney for that purpose. Thus, they went to see 1 Atty. Ricafort accompanied by Vidal Miralles, their friend who was a brother of Atty. Miralles. They ultimately engaged Atty. Ricafort as their attorney on account of his being well-known in the community, and being also the Dean of the College of Law of Aquinas University where their son was then studying. Having willingly accepted the engagement, Atty. Ricafort required the Tarogs to pay P7,000.00 as filing fee, which they 2 gave to him. He explained the importance of depositing P65,000.00 in court to counter the P60,000.00 deposited by Antonio Tee, the buyer of the foreclosed property. After they informed him that they had only P60,000.00, he required 3 them to add some more amount (dagdagan niyo ng konti). To raise the P65,000.00 for the Tarogs, therefore, Vidal solicited a loan from one Sia with the guarantee of his brother Atty. Miralles. Sia issued a check in that amount in the 4 name of Arnulfo. On November 7, 1992, the Tarogs and Vidal went to the office of Atty. Ricafort to deliver the P65,000.00. When Arnulfo said that he had first to encash the check at the bank, Atty. Ricafort persuaded him to entrust the check to him instead so that he (Atty. Ricafort) would be the one to encash it and then deposit the amount in court. On that 5 representation, Arnulfo handed the check to Atty. Ricafort. After some time, the Tarogs visited Atty. Ricafort to verify the status of the consignation. Atty. Ricafort informed them that he had not deposited the amount in court, but in his own account. He promised to return the money, plus interest. Despite several inquiries about when the amount would be returned, however, the Tarogs received mere assurances from Atty. Ricafort that the money was in good hands. The Tarogs further claimed that the Regional Trial Court, Branch 52, in Sorsogon (RTC), where their complaint for annulment of sale was being heard, had required the parties to file their memoranda. Accordingly, they delivered 6 P15,000.00 to Atty. Ricafort for that purpose, but he did not file the memorandum. When it became apparent to the Tarogs that Atty. Ricafort would not make good his promise of returning the P65,000.00, plus interest, Arnulfo demanded by his letter dated December 3, 2002 that Atty. Ricafort return the 7 P65,000.00, plus interest, and the P15,000.00 paid for the filing of the memorandum. Yet, they did not receive any reply from Atty. Ricafort. In his defense, Atty. Ricafort denied that the P65,000.00 was intended to be deposited in court, insisting that the amount was payment for his legal services under a "package deal," that is, the amount included his acceptance fee, attorneys fee, and appearance fees from the filing of the complaint for annulment of sale until judgment, but excluding appeal. He claimed that the fees were agreed upon after considering the value of the property, his skill and experience as a lawyer, the labor, time, and trouble involved, and his professional character and social standing; that at the time he delivered the check, Arnulfo read, understood, and agreed to the contents of the complaint, which did not mention 8 anything about any consignation; and that Arnulfo, being a retired school principal, was a learned person who would not have easily fallen for any scheme like the one they depicted against him. Findings of the IBP Commissioner Following his investigation, Commissioner Wilfredo E.J.E. Reyes of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Commission 9 on Bar Discipline rendered his Report and Recommendation dated October 7, 2004, in which he concluded that: It is respectfully recommended that respondent, Atty. Romulo L. Ricafort be DISBARRED and be ordered to return the amount of P65,000 and P15,000 which he got from his client. RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED. Commissioner Reyes regarded the testimonies of Erlinda and Vidal more credible than the testimony of Atty. Ricafort, observing:

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Based on the said testimony, statements and actuations of complainant Erlinda Tarog and his collaborating witness, we find their statements to be credible. Atty. Ricafort in his testimony attempted to show that the amount of P65,000.00 was paid to him by the complainant as acceptance fee on a package deal basis and under said deal, he will answer the filing fee, attorneys fees and other expenses incurred up to the time the judgment is rendered. He presented a transcript of stenographic notes wherein it was stated that complainant himself did not consign the money in court. The respondent admitted in his testimony that he did not have any retainer agreement nor any memorandum signed or any receipt which would prove that the amount of P65,000.00 was received as an acceptance fee for the handling of the case. Atty. Romulo Ricafort stated that there was no retainer agreement and that he issued only receipt because the late Arnulfo Tarog will not pay unless a receipt is issued. The Undersigned Commissioner asked the respondent "Basically you describe that thing that will happen in the litigation related to the payment of fees. But when you received that P65,000.00 did you not put anything there that you will describe the nature of legal work which you will undertake considering that you have considered this P65,000.00 as your attorneys fees? And Atty. Ricafort stated: Yes I did. I do not know why they were not showing the receipt. That is a big amount, Your Honor. They demanded for me the receipt of P30,000.00 how much more with that P65,000.00. They demanded for the receipt of that P65,000.00 but I cannot explain the reason why During the clarificatory questioning, the Undersigned Commissioner also asked Atty. Ricafort why he did not answer the demand letter sent by Arnulfo Tarog and the proof of service of the said letter was presented by the complainant. Conveniently, Atty. Ricafort stated that he did not receive the letter and it was received by their helper who did not forward the letter to him. He also adopted the position that the complainant was demanding the P65,000.00 wherefore this case was filed. When confronted by the testimony of Mr. Vidal Miralles, the respondent Atty. Ricafort just denied the allegation that he received the P65,000.00 for deposit to the court. He also denied that Mr. Miralles has visited his residence for follow-up the reimbursement. The Undersigned Commissioner asked the respondent if he has personal animosity with Arnuldo Tarog, Erlinda Tarog and Vidal Miralles and if there are any reason why this case was filed against him. In his answer the respondent stated that we have been very good friends for the past ten (10) years and he said that in fact he was surprised when the complaint was filed against him and they even attached the decision of the Supreme Court for his suspension and maybe they are using this case to be able to collect from him. The main defense of the respondent is that the complainant in this case testified that the total amount to redeem his property is P240,000.00 and when asked whether he consigned the money to the court to redeem the property he answered in the negative. The alleged payment of P65,000.00 was made prior to the said testimony sometime in 1992. Hence, it was stated on complainants affidavit that on November 7, 1992, prior to filing said complaint I had given him the sum of Sixty Five Thousand Pesos to be deposited to the Regional Trial Court representing redemption money of the Real Estate Mortgage. The amount of P65,000.00 is very much close to the amount of the principal obligation of the complainant and it is not surprising for a non-lawyer to hold on to the belief that with the filing of the case for annulment of foreclosure his case would be strengthened by making a deposit in court hence, the motivation to produce the deposit was logical and natural insofar as the complainant is concerned. The testimony of the complainant in court that the bank needed P240,000.00 for the redemption of the property will have no bearing on the actuation of the complainant who has been required to deposit P65,000.00 by his lawyer. The Undersigned Commission has no alternative but to 10 believe in the credibility and truthfulness of complainants narration that of Mrs. Erlinda Tarog and Vidal Miralles. Commissioner Reyes concluded that Atty. Ricafort violated Canon 15, and Rules 16.01, 16.02 and 16.03 of Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility by taking advantage of the vulnerability of his clients and by being dishonest in his dealings with them by refusing to return the amount of P65,000.00 to them. On November 4, 2004, the IBP Board of Governors adopted Resolution No. XVI-2004-473, resolving to return the matter to Commissioner Reyes for a clarification of whether or not there was evidence to support the claim that the P65,000.00 had been in payment of attorneys fees and other expenses. On October 11, 2005, Commissioner Reyes issued a second Report and Recommendation, in which he declared that Atty. Ricafort did not present any retainer agreement or receipt to prove that the amount of P65,000.00 had been part of his attorneys fees; that Atty. Ricafort had willfully ignored the demand of Arnulfo by not replying to the demand letter; that, instead, Atty. Ricafort had insisted that the househelp who had received the demand letter had not given it to him; and that in his (Commissioner Reyes) presence, Atty. Ricafort had also promised to the complainant that he would settle his liability, but Atty. Ricafort did not make good his promise despite several resettings to allow him to settle his obligation. Action of IBP Board of Governors
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Through Resolution No. XVII-2006-569, therefore, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Report and Recommendation of Commissioner Reyes and recommended the disbarment of Atty. Ricafort and the order for him to return the amounts of P65,000.00 and P15,000.00 to Erlinda, viz: RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A" and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering that Respondent has taken advantage of his client [sic] vulnerability and has been dishonest with his dealings to his client, Atty. Romulo L. Ricafort is hereby DISBARRED and Ordered to Return the amount of P65,000 and P15,000 to complainant. Atty. Ricafort moved for reconsideration, maintaining that a retainer agreement was immaterial because he had affirmed having received the P65,000.00 and having issued a receipt for the amount; that he had not kept the receipt because "the practice of lawyers in most instances is that receipt is issued without duplicate as it behooves upon the 15 client to demand for a receipt;" that considering that the Tarogs had produced a photocopy of the receipt he had issued for the P30,000.00 in connection with their appeal, it followed that a similar receipt for attorneys fees had been made at the time when the case had been about to be filed in the RTC; that the testimonies of Erlinda and Vidal were inconsistent with Arnulfos affidavit; and that he did not receive Arnulfos demand letter, which was received by one Gemma Agnote (the name printed on the registry receipt), whom he did not at all know. Acting on Atty. Ricaforts motion for reconsideration, the IBP Board of Governors downgraded the penalty from 16 disbarment to indefinite suspension, thus: RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED the Recommendation of the Board of Governors First Division of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED with modification of Resolution No. XVII-2006-509 of the Board of Governors dated 18 November 2006, that in lieu of the Disbarment of Atty. Romulo Ricafort, he is INDEFINITELY SUSPENDED from the practice of law and Ordered to return the amount of P65,000 and P15,000 to complainant. Atty. Ricafort filed a second motion for reconsideration, assailing the resolution of the IBP Board of Governors for violating Section 12, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court requiring the decision of the IBP Board of Governors to be in writing and to clearly and distinctly state the facts and reasons on which the decision was based. Hence, the administrative case is now before the Court for resolution. Ruling We affirm the findings of the Commissioner Reyes, because they were supported by substantial evidence. However, we impose the penalty of disbarment instead of the recommended penalty of indefinite suspension, considering that Atty. Ricafort committed a very serious offense that was aggravated by his having been previously administratively sanctioned for a similar offense on the occasion of which he was warned against committing a similar offense. A. Version of the complainants was more credible than version of Atty. Ricafort Atty. Ricafort admitted receiving the P65,000.00 from the Tarogs. Even so, we have two versions about the transaction. On the one hand, the Tarogs insisted that the amount was to be consigned in court for purposes of their civil case; on the other hand, Atty. Ricafort claimed that the amount was for his fees under a "package deal" arrangement. Commissioner Reyes considered the Tarogs version more credible. We hold that Commissioner Reyes appreciation of the facts was correct and in accord with human experience. Firstly, it is easier to believe that Atty. Ricafort persuaded the Tarogs on the need for that amount to be deposited in court for purposes of their civil case. Being non-lawyers, they had no idea about the requirement for them to consign any amount in court, due to the substantive and procedural implications of such requirement being ordinarily known only to lawyers. Their ready and full reliance on Atty. Ricaforts representations about the requirement to consign that amount in court was entirely understandable in view of their awareness of Atty. Ricaforts standing in the legal community of the place. Besides, as Commissioner Reyes observed, it was not far-fetched for the Tarogs to believe that an amount close in value to their original obligation was necessary to be deposited in court to boost their chances of recovering their property. Secondly, Atty. Ricaforts denial of receipt of Arnulfos demand letter was incredible. He already initially admitted 18 receiving the letter through a househelp. His denial came only subsequently and for the first time through his motion 19 for reconsideration dated December 30, 2006, in which he completely turned about to declare that the Gemma 20 Agnote who had received the letter was unknown to him. Expectedly, Commissioner Reyes disregarded his denial, because not only was the denial an apparently belated afterthought, it was even contradicted by his earlier admission
17 14

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of receipt. In any event, the fact that Gemma Agnote was even the househelp whom Atty. Ricafort had adverted to becomes very plausible under the established circumstances. Thirdly, Atty. Ricafort explained that he had no copies of the receipts for the P65,000.00 and P15,000.00 issued to the Tarogs because "the practice of lawyers in most instances is that receipt is issued without duplicate as it behooves 21 upon the client to demand for a receipt." But such explanation does not persuade us. Ethical and practical considerations made it both natural and imperative for him to issue receipts, even if not demanded, and to keep copies of the receipts for his own records. He was all too aware that he was accountable for the moneys entrusted to him by the clients, and that his only means of ensuring accountability was by issuing and keeping receipts. Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility expressly enjoins such accountability, viz: Rule 16.01 - A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client. Definitely, Atty. Ricafort had a highly fiduciary and confidential relation with the Tarogs. As such, he was burdened with 22 the legal duty to promptly account for all the funds received from or held by him for them. And, fourthly, to buttress his denial that the P65,000.00 was not intended for deposit in court, Atty. Ricafort insisted that Arnulfo did not object to the omission from the complaint in the civil action of any mention of consignation. However, the complaint that he himself had written and filed for the Tarogs contradicted his insistence, specifically in its paragraph 16, which averred the plaintiffs (i.e., Tarogs) readiness and willingness to deposit the amount of P69,345.00 (inclusive of the redemption price and interest) in court, thus: 16. And to show willingness and sincerity of the plaintiffs, they are ready and willing to deposit the amount of 23 P69,345.00 as redemption price plus reasonable accrued interests, if there are any; Nor could the Tarogs have conjured or invented the need for consignation. The consignation was a notion that could have emanated only from him as their lawyer. In fact, Erlinda recalled while testifying before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline that they had brought to their meeting with Atty. Ricafort only P60,000.00 for the consignation, but that Atty. Ricafort had to instruct them to raise the amount. The excerpt of her pertinent testimony follows: Comm. Reyes: Madam Witness, in this affidavit you stated that your late husband and Mr. Vidal Miralles went to the office of Atty. Ricafort to advise the latter that we already had the sum of P65,000.00 in the form of check, how did you come to know this fact?

Witness: Paano po ba sabi nya na magdeposit ng P65,000.00 tapos may P60,000.00 kami sabi niya dagdagan niyo ng konti. Comm. Reyes: Kinausap ba niya kayo? Witness: Nandoon po ako. Comm. Reyes: Where you present when the check was given? Witness: Yes. Comm. Reyes: So, alam niyo, nakita niyo na binigay yong P65,000.00 na tseke? Witness: Opo. Comm. Reyes: Alam niyo ba kung ano ang nangyari doon sa tseke na idiniposit? Witness: Noong una sinabi niya sa amin na ididiposit niya sa court. Comm. Reyes: Nalaman niyo ba na hindi naman pala idiniposit sa court? Witness: Opo. Comm. Reyes: Kailan niyo nalaman? Witness: Nagsabi siya tapos sinabi pa niya na yong interest sa bank ay ibinigay niya sa amin ang sabi naming salamat.24
B. Atty. Ricaforts acts and actuations constituted serious breach of his fiduciary duties as an attorney The Code of Professional Responsibility demands the utmost degree of fidelity and good faith in dealing with the 25 moneys entrusted to lawyers because of their fiduciary relationship. In particular, Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states: Rule 16.01 - A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client. Undoubtedly, Atty. Ricafort was required to hold in trust any money and property of his clients that came into his 26 27 possession, and he needed to be always mindful of the trust and confidence his clients reposed in him. Thus, having obtained the funds from the Tarogs in the course of his professional employment, he had the obligation to 28 deliver such funds to his clients (a) when they became due, or (b) upon demand. 1avvphi1 Furthermore, Rule 16.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, imposes on an attorney the positive obligation to keep all funds of his client separate and apart from his own and from those of others kept by him, to wit:

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Rule 16.02 - A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart from his own and those of others kept by him. Atty. Ricaforts act of obtaining P65,000.00 and P15,000.00 from the Tarogs under the respective pretexts that the amount would be deposited in court and that he would prepare and file the memorandum for the Tarogs erected a responsibility to account for and to use the amounts in accordance with the particular purposes intended. For him to deposit the amount of P65,000.00 in his personal account without the consent of the Tarogs and not return it upon demand, and for him to fail to file the memorandum and yet not return the amount of P15,000.00 upon demand constituted a serious breach of his fiduciary duties as their attorney. He reneged on his duty to render an accounting to 29 his clients showing that he had spent the amounts for the particular purposes intended. He was thereby presumed to have misappropriated the moneys for his own use to the prejudice of his clients and in violation of the clients trust 30 reposed in him. He could not escape liability, for upon failing to use the moneys for the purposes intended, he should 31 have immediately returned the moneys to his clients. Atty. Ricaforts plain abuse of the confidence reposed in him by his clients rendered him liable for violation of Canon 32 33 16, particularly Rule 16.01, supra, and Canon 17, all of the Code of Professional Responsibility. His acts and actuations constituted a gross violation of general morality and of professional ethics that impaired public confidence in 34 the legal profession and deserved punishment. Without hesitation, therefore, we consider Atty. Ricaforts acts and conduct as gross misconduct, a serious charge under Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, to wit: Section 8. Serious charges. Serious charges include: xxx 3. Gross misconduct constituting violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct; xxx That this offense was not the first charged and decided against Atty. Ricafort aggravated his liability. In Nuez v. 35 36 37 Ricafort, decided in 2002, the Court found him to have violated Rules 1.01 of Canon 1 and Rule 12.03 and Rule 38 12.04 of Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility in relation to his failure to turn over the proceeds of the sale of realty to the complainant (who had authorized him to sell the realty in her behalf). His failure to turn over the proceeds compelled the complainant to commence in the RTC a civil action to recover the proceeds against him and his wife. The Court meted on him the penalty of indefinite suspension, and warned him against the commission of similar acts, stating: We concur with the findings of the Investigating Commissioner, as adopted and approved by the Board of Governors of the IBP, that respondent Atty. Romulo Ricafort is guilty of grave misconduct in his dealings with complainant. Indeed, the record shows respondents grave misconduct and notorious dishonesty. There is no need to stretch ones imagination to arrive at an inevitable conclusion that respondent gravely abused the confidence that complainant reposed in him and committed dishonesty when he did not turn over the proceeds of the sale of her property. Worse, with palpable bad faith, he compelled the complainant to go to court for the recovery of the proceeds of the sale and, in the process, to spend money, time and energy therefor. Then, despite his deliberate failure to answer the complaint resulting in his having been declared in default, he appealed from the judgment to the Court of Appeals. Again, bad faith attended such a step because he did not pay the docket fee despite notice. Needless to state, respondent wanted to prolong the travails and agony of the complainant and to enjoy the fruits of what rightfully belongs to the latter. Unsatisfied with what he had already unjustly and unlawfully done to complainant, respondent issued checks to satisfy the alias writ of execution. But, remaining unrepentant of what he had done and in continued pursuit of a clearly malicious plan not to pay complainant of what had been validly and lawfully adjudged by the court against him, respondent closed the account against which the checks were drawn. There was deceit in this. Respondent never had the intention of paying his obligation as proved by the fact that despite the criminal cases for violation of B.P. Blg. 22, he did not pay the obligation. All the foregoing constituted grave and gross misconduct in blatant violation of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides: A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest and immoral or deceitful conduct. Respondents claim of good faith in closing his account because he thought complainant has already encashed all checks is preposterous. The account was closed on or before 26 February 1996. He knew that there were still other checks due on 29 February 1996 and 15 March 1996 which could not be encashed before their maturity dates.

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By violating Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, respondent diminished public confidence in the law and the lawyers (Busios v. Ricafort, 283 SCRA 407 [1997]; Ducat v. Villalon, 337 SCRA 622 [2000]). Instead of promoting such confidence and respect, he miserably failed to live up to the standards of the legal profession (Gonato v. Adaza, 328 SCRA 694 [2000]; Ducat v. Villalon, supra). Respondents act of issuing bad checks in satisfaction of the alias writ of execution for money judgment rendered by the trial court was a clear attempt to defeat the ends of justice. His failure to make good the checks despite demands and the criminal cases for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 showed his continued defiance of judicial processes, which he, as 39 an officer of the court, was under continuing duty to uphold. Bearing in mind his administrative record, and considering that the penalty for violation of Canon 16 ranges from 40 41 42 suspension for six months, to suspension for one year, to suspension for two years, depending on the amount involved and the severity of the lawyers misconduct, we rule that disbarment is the commensurate punishment for Atty. Ricafort, who has shown no reformation in his handling of trust funds for his clients. WHEREFORE, we find and declare Atty. Romulo L. Ricafort guilty of a violation of Canon 16, Rule 16.01 and Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and, accordingly, disbar him. The Bar Confidant is directed to strike out his name from the Roll of Attorneys. Atty. Ricafort is ordered to return to Erlinda R. Tarog the sums of P65,000.00 and P15,000.00, plus interest of six percent per annum reckoned from the demand made on December 3, 2002, within twenty days from notice. This decision is effective immediately. Let a copy of this decision be furnished to the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts, and to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, for its reference. SO ORDERED.

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SUPREME COURT

FIRST DIVISION

A.C. No. 7771

April 6, 2011 PEREZ, J.:

PATRICIO GONE, Complainant, vs.ATTY. MACARIO GA, Respondent. R E S O L U T I O N

This case stemmed from the complaint for disciplinary action dated 23 October 1989 filed by Patricio Gone against Atty. Macario Ga before the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). The complaint was due to Atty. Gas failure to reconstitute or turn over the records of the case in his possession. Complainant Gone reported that Atty. Ga is his counsel in NLRC Case No. RB-IV-2Q281-78 entitled "Patricio Gone v. Solid Mills, Inc." The case was dismissed by the Labor Arbiter and was elevated to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). Complainant alleged that on 13 December 1983, the NLRC building in Intramuros, Manila was burned and among the records destroyed was his appealed case. Complainant Gone further reported that as early as 8 March 1984, Atty. Ga had obtained a certification from the NLRC that the records of NLRC Case No. RB-IV-2Q281-78 were burned. Despite knowledge of the destruction of the records, Atty. Ga allegedly did not do anything to reconstitute the records of the appealed case. On 9 September 1989, complainant allegedly sent a letter to Atty. Ga requesting him to return the records of the case in his possession. As of date of complaint, Atty. Ga has yet to turn over the records. Complainant submits that his 1 counsels continued refusal has caused great injustice to him and his family. On 16 February 1999, Commissioner Gonzales-delos Reyes, IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, issued an Order 2 directing respondent Ga to file his answer on the complaint. In a letter dated 22 November 1999, Atty. Ga explained that as far as he could recall, during the pendency of their motion for reconsideration, the NLRC Office in Manila caught fire. Although worried of the records of their case, he was relieved when he received summons from the NLRC setting the case for hearing. It was unfortunate, however, that in the two scheduled hearings set by the NLRC herein complainant failed to appear. For such absence, the NLRC 3 allegedly shelved their case. Atty. Ga averred that had it not been for the instant complaint, he would not have, as he never, heard from complainant Gone since 1984. What he was aware of was the latters abandonment of his family way back in 1978. Complainants 4 wife is the relative of Atty. Ga, being the daughter of his first cousin. The instant case was set for presentation of evidence on 17 January 2000. On said date, complainant appeared 5 without counsel while respondent failed to appear. Several hearings were set for the case but these were reset for 6 failure of one or both of the parties to appear. In the hearing held on 19 June 2000, complainant appeared with counsel but respondent failed to appear despite notice. During that hearing, the Commissioner asked complainant if there was a possibility for the case to be settled amicably considering that respondent is a relative of his wife. The complainant answered in the affirmative and the case was reset to 24 July 2000. The two succeeding hearings scheduled by the Commissioner were again reset. On 10 November 2000, a hearing was conducted wherein respondent Ga appeared while complainant was absent despite 7 notice. In view of the latters absence, respondent Ga prayed for time to file a Motion to Dismiss. In his Motion to Dismiss dated 8 December 2000, respondent Ga alleged that he had a heart to heart talk with complainant about his labor case and the latter may have already understood that it was not respondents fault that the case was shelved by the NLRC. He averred that complainant may have already been dissuaded from pursuing the case, thus his absence in the hearing held on 10 November 2000. Nevertheless, if there is still hope for the case, he commits to help complainant by whatever means he can. On 14 February 2007, Commissioner Marilyn S. Guzman, IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, submitted her report recommending that respondent Atty. Ga be censured for violation of Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional 9 Responsibility. On 19 September 2007, the Board of Governors of the IBP adopted and approved with modification, the report and 10 recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner. Respondent Atty. Ga was censured for violation of Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and was directed to reconstitute and turn over the records of the case to complainant, with stern warning that failure to do so would merit a stiffer penalty. In a resolution dated 2 June 2008, the Office of the Bar Confidant and the IBP were directed to inform the Court if any motion for reconsideration was filed in the case. The IBP was further directed to confirm if respondent has complied with Resolution No. XVIII-2007-94 dated 19 September 2007 directing him to reconstitute and turn over the records of 11 the case to complainant. In compliance with the resolution, the Office of the Bar Confidant reported that no motion for reconsideration or petition 12 for review was filed by either party.
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The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, for its part, reported that no motion for reconsideration was filed by either party 13 and that respondent failed to comply with IBP Resolution No. XVIII-2007-94 dated 19 September 2007. Thus, on 2 September 2009, the Court issued a resolution requiring Atty. Ga to explain his failure to comply with IBP 14 Resolution No. XVIII-2007-94. Record of the instant case reveals that the resolution dated 2 September 2009 was received by Atty. Ga on 15 October 2009. To date, Atty. Ga has yet to comply with the resolution. We agree with the findings and recommendation of the IBP. The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates lawyers to serve their clients with competence and diligence. Rule 18.03 and Rule 18.04 state: Rule 18.03. A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable. Rule 18.04. A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable time to the clients request for information. Respondent Atty. Ga breached these duties when he failed to reconstitute or turn over the records of the case to his client, herein complainant Gone. His negligence manifests lack of competence and diligence required of every lawyer. His failure to comply with the request of his client was a gross betrayal of his fiduciary duty and a breach of the trust 15 reposed upon him by his client. In the case of Navarro v. Meneses, the Court held: It is settled that a lawyer is not obliged to act as counsel for every person who may wish to become his client. He has the right to decline employment subject however, to the provision of Canon 14 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Once he agrees to take up the cause of a client, he owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed to him. Respondent Meneses, as counsel, had the obligation to inform his client of the status of the case and to respond within a reasonable time to his clients request for information. Respondents failure to communicate with his client deliberately disregarding its request for an audience or conference is an unjustifiable denial of its right to be fully informed of the developments in and the status of its case. Respondents sentiments against complainant Gone is not a valid reason for him to renege on his obligation as a lawyer. The moment he agreed to handle the case, he was bound to give it his utmost attention, skill and competence. Public interest requires that he exerts his best efforts and all his learning and ability in defense of his clients cause. Those who perform that duty with diligence and candor not only safeguard the interests of the client, but also serve the 16 17 ends of justice. They do honor to the bar and help maintain the communitys respect for the legal profession. If respondent believed that he will not be able to represent complainant effectively because of what the latter has done to his family, then he should have withdrawn his services as a lawyer. Had it not been for complainants insistence, his labor case would have forever remained dormant. The fact that respondent is retained as the lawyer of the complainant, he was duty bound to give his best service. His failure to do so constitutes an infringement of his oath.1avvphi1 In addition, We note respondents disregard of the IBP Commission on Bar Disciplines directive for him to reconstitute and turn over the records of the case to complainant. Likewise, respondent unjustifiably ignored the directive of the Court for him to explain his failure to comply with IBP Resolution No. XVIII-2007-94. Respondents unjustified disregard of the lawful orders of this Court and the IBP is not only irresponsible, but also 18 constitutes utter disrespect for the Judiciary and his fellow lawyers. His conduct is unbecoming of a lawyer, for lawyers are particularly called upon to obey Court orders and processes and are expected to stand foremost in 19 complying with Court directives being themselves officers of the Court. As an officer of the Court, respondent is expected to know that a resolution of this Court is not a mere request but an 20 order which should be complied with promptly and completely. This is also true of the orders of the IBP as the 21 investigating arm of the Court in administrative cases against lawyers. Respondent should strive harder to live up to his duties of observing and maintaining the respect due to the Courts, 23 24 respect for law and for legal processes, and of upholding the integrity and dignity of the legal profession in order to perform his responsibilities as a lawyer effectively. All told, We could suspend respondent for his transgressions. Considering, however, that he is already in the twilight of his career and considering further that he was not entirely to be blamed for the archiving of the labor case, complainants absence during the hearings being contributory therein, We deem the penalty of fine in the amount of P5,000.00 sufficient sanction under the circumstances. Such consideration would be more in line with the very purpose of administrative cases against lawyers, that is, not so much to punish but to instill discipline in them, as well as, protect the integrity of the Court and shelter the public from the misconduct and inefficiency of lawyers. Wherefore, respondent Macario Ga is hereby fined in the amount of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) for his failure to comply with the directive in Resolution No. XVIII-2007-94 dated 19 September 2007 of the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. Atty. Ga is given a final warning that a more drastic punishment shall be imposed
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upon him should he fail to comply with the directive for him to reconstitute and turn over the records of the case to complainant. SO ORDERED.

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