Poetics Chapter 20: The Elements of Language

Texts, Translations, and Commentaries

Bart A. Mazzetti

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 TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. Poetics ch. 20 complete.

II. The division of vocal sound into two and three.

III. The syllable as an intelligible vocal sound.

IV. On Ptosis or Case.

V. The principal and secondary parts of lexis: the forms of their definitions.

VI. Some observations on the name and speech.

VII. The name, the verb, and the participle with respect to signifying ‘time’,

VIII. The several accounts of ‘speech’ in relation to names, verbs, the definition, and the
syllable

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I. POETICS CH. 20 COMPLETE.
1. Text and translation:
Cf. Aristotle, Poetics ch. 20 (1456b 20-1457a 37) (ed. R. Kassel1 unchanged; tr. B.A.M.):
[20] th=j de\ le/cewj a(pa/shj ta/d’ e)sti\ ta\
me/rh, stoixei=on sullabh\ su/ndesmoj o)/noma
r(h=ma a)/rqron ptw=sij lo/goj.
stoixei=on me\n ou)=n e)stin fwnh\ a)diai/retoj,
ou) pa=sa de\ a)ll’ e)c h(=j pe/fuke sunqeth\
gi/gnesqai fwnh/:
kai\ ga\r tw=n qhri/wn ei)si\n a)diai/retoi fwnai/,
w(=n ou)demi/an le/gw [25] stoixei=on.
tau/thj de\ me/rh to/ te fwnh=en kai\ to\
h(mi/fwnon kai\ a)/fwnon.
e)/stin de\ tau=ta fwnh=en me\n <to\> a)/neu
prosbolh=j e)/xon fwnh\n a)kousth/n,
h(mi/fwnon de\ to\ meta\ prosbolh=j e)/xon fwnh\n
a)kousth/n, oi(=on to\ S kai\ to\ R,
a)/fwnon de\ to\ meta\ prosbolh=j kaq’ au(to\
me\n ou)demi/an e)/xon fwnh/n, meta\ de\ [30] tw=n
e)xo/ntwn tina\ fwnh\n gino/menon a)kousto/n,
oi(=on to\ G kai\ to\ D.
tau=ta de\ diafe/rei sxh/masi/n te tou=
sto/matoj kai\ to/poij kai\ dasu/thti kai\
yilo/thti kai\ mh/kei kai\ braxu/thti e)/ti de\
o)cu/thti kai\ baru/thti kai\ tw=? me/sw?: peri\ w(=n
kaq’ e(/kaston e)n toi=j metrikoi=j prosh/kei
qewrei=n.
sullabh\ [35] de/ e)stin fwnh\ a)/shmoj
sunqeth\ e)c a)fw/nou kai\ fwnh\n e)/xontoj:
kai\ ga\r to\ GR a)/neu tou= A ¤sullabh\ kai\¤
meta\ tou= A, oi(=on to\ GRA.
1
Aristotelis. De Arte Poetica Liber (Oxford Classical Texts). Rudolph Kassel (Editor) (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1965).
2
As I shall argue hereafter, this ordering is incorrect: I will give the corrected version below.
3
For the vexed question of the wording of this definition, see my discussion below.
3
[20] But of language as a whole these are the
parts: ‘element’, ‘syllable’, ‘conjunction’,
‘name’, ‘verb’, ‘article’, ‘case’, ‘speech’.2
An element, therefore, is an indivisible vocal
sound, but not every one from which an intelli-
gible vocal sound is naturally apt to result
(for there are indivisible vocal sounds belonging
to the beasts none of which I call [25] an ele-
ment),
but the parts of these are vowel and semi-vowel
and mute [= consonant].
But a vowel is [an indivisible vocal sound]
having an audible sound without an addition, <
such as ‘a’ and ‘o’>;
but a semi-vowel one having an audible sound
with an addition, such as ‘s’ and ‘b’ <‘r’>;
but a mute is that which with an addition has no
sound, but has some sound when [30] made
audible, like ‘g’ and ‘d’.
But these differ by both the shape and location
of the mouth, and by roughness or smoothness
[sc. of the breathing], and by length and short-
ness, but besides by acuteness, lowness and
[what is] intermediate [between these]; each of
which it is appropriate for those learned in
metrics to consider.
But a syllable [35] is a non-significative vocal
sound composed from a mute and one having
sound;
for ‘gr’ itself without ‘a’ itself is a syllable, and
also with ‘a’, for example, ‘gra’.3
a)lla\ kai\ tou/twn qewrh=sai ta\j diafora\j
th=j metrikh=j e)stin.
su/ndesmoj de/ e)stin fwnh\ a)/shmoj [1457a] h(\
ou)/te kwlu/ei ou)/te poiei= fwnh\n mi/an
shmantikh\n e)k pleio/nwn fwnw=n pefukui=a
sunti/qesqai kai\ e)pi\ tw=n a)/krwn kai\ e)pi\ tou=
me/sou
h(\n mh\ a(rmo/ttei e)n a)rxh=? lo/gou tiqe/nai kaq’
au(th/n, oi(=on me/n h)/toi de/.
h)\ fwnh\ a)/shmoj h(\ e)k pleio/nwn me\n [5]
fwnw=n mia=j shmantikw=n de\ poiei=n pe/fuken
mi/an shmantikh\n fwnh/n.
a)/rqron d’ e)sti\ fwnh\ a)/shmoj h(\ lo/gou a)rxh\n
h)\ te/loj h)\ diorismo\n dhloi=. oi(=on to\ a)mfi/ kai\
to\ peri/ kai\ ta\ a)/lla.
h)\ fwnh\ a)/shmoj h(\ ou)/te kwlu/ei ou)/te poiei=
fwnh\n mi/an shmantikh\n e)k pleio/nwn fwnw=n
pefukui=a ti/qesqai kai\ [10] e)pi\ tw=n a)/krwn
kai\ e)pi\ tou= me/sou.
o)/noma de/ e)sti fwnh\ sunqeth\ shmantikh\
a)/neu xro/nou h(=j me/roj ou)de/n e)sti kaq’ au(to\
shmantiko/n:
e)n ga\r toi=j diploi=j ou) xrw/meqa w(j kai\
au)to\ kaq’ au(to\ shmai=non, oi(=on e)n tw=?
Qeo/dwroj to\ dwroj ou) shmai/nei.
r(h=ma de\ fwnh\ sunqeth\ shmantikh\ meta\ [15]
xro/nou h(=j ou)de\n me/roj shmai/nei kaq’ au(to/,
w(/sper kai\ e)pi\ tw=n o)noma/twn:
to\ me\n ga\r a)/nqrwpoj h)\ leuko/n ou) shmai/nei
to\ po/te, to\ de\ badi/zei h)\ beba/diken
prosshmai/nei to\ me\n to\n paro/nta xro/non to\
de\ to\n parelhluqo/ta.
ptw=sij d’ e)sti\n o)no/matoj h)\ r(h/matoj h( me\n
kata\ to\ tou/tou h)\ tou/tw? [20] shmai=non kai\
o(/sa toiau=ta,
1
As I argue below, the definitions of the connectives should come after the account of the unity of speech.
4
But the differences belonging to these things
pertain to the metrical art.
But a conjunction1 is a non-significative [1457a]
vocal sound which neither impedes nor pro-
duces one significative vocal sound out of many
vocal sounds naturally apt to be composed at the
extremes as well as in the middle,
which it does not suit to place at the beginning
of speech by itself, such as me/n [‘on the one
hand’] or de/ [‘on the other hand’].
Or else a non-significative vocal sound which
[5] out of more than one significative vocal
sound is naturally apt to produce one significant
vocal sound.
But an article is a non-significative vocal sound
which makes clear the beginning or end or
dividing-point of speech, such as a)mfi/ [‘about’]
and peri/ [‘concerning’] and the rest.
Or else a non-significative vocal sound which
neither impedes nor produces one significative
vocal sound out of many vocal sounds naturally
apt to be placed at the extremes as well as [10]
in the middle.
But a name is a [simple or] composite vocal
sound significative without time, no part of
which is significative by itself;
for in double names we do not use [a part] as if
it signifies by itself, for example, in ‘Theodore’
‘doron’ [i.e. ‘gift’] does not signify.
But a verb is a [simple or] composite vocal
sound significative [15] with time no part of
which signifies by itself, as is the case in names;
For ‘man’, in fact, or ‘white’ do not signify
‘when’, but ‘[he] walks’ or ‘[he] has walked’
consignify, the one present, the other, past time.
But case belongs to name or verb, the one
signifying according to ‘of this’ [20] or ‘to that’
and whatever others [are] such,
h( de\ kata\ to\ e(ni\ h)\ polloi=j, oi(=on a)/nqrwpoi but the other according to ‘one’ or ‘many’, for
h)\ a)/nqrwpoj, example, ‘men’ or ‘man’,

h( de\ kata\ ta\ u(pokritika/, oi(=on kat’ but this according to delivery, for example,
e)rw/thsin e)pi/tacin: to\ ga\r e)ba/disen; according to questioning, commanding.

h)\ ba/dize ptw=sij r(h/matoj kata\ tau=ta ta\ For ‘[he] has walked’ or ‘[he] walked’ are cases
ei)/dh e)sti/n. of the verb according to these species.

lo/goj de\ fwnh\ sunqeth\ shmantikh\ h(=j e)/nia But speech is composite significative vocal
me/rh kaq’ au(ta\ shmai/nei ti sound some of whose parts signify something
by themselves;

žou) ga\r [25] a(/paj lo/goj e)k r(hma/twn kai\
o)noma/twn su/gkeitai, oi(=on o( tou= a)nqrw/pou
o(rismo/j, a)ll’ e)nde/xetai a)/neu r(hma/twn
ei)=nai lo/gon, me/roj me/ntoi a)ei/ ti shmai=non
e(/ceiŸ
(for not [25] every speech is composed from
names and verbs; for example, the definition of
man, but there is speech which happens to be
without verbs,)

oi(=on e)n tw=? badi/zei Kle/wn o( Kle/wn. Yet a part [of speech] will always have signifi-
cance, for example, in ‘Cleon walks’, ‘Cleon’.

ei(=j de/ e)sti lo/goj dixw=j, h)\ ga\r o( e(\n But speech is one in two ways, for it is either
shmai/nwn, h)\ o( e)k pleio/nwn sunde/smw?, that which signifies one thing or that which is
one from many conjunctions,

oi(=on h( )Ilia\j me\n [30] sunde/smw? ei(=j, o( de\ for example, the Iliad is one by conjunctions,
tou= a)nqrw/pou tw=? e(\n shmai/nein. but the definition of man one by signifying one
thing.

2. The definition of the syllable:

As presently constituted, the treatment of the syllable is highly problematic. Could

Aristotle have truly considered the combination of a semi-vowel like R and a mute like G
as constituting a syllable, rather than a mute OR a semi-vowel combined with a true
vowel? A fact that tells against accepting this reading is the following: In every other case
where he defines the parts of language, Aristotle makes known their definitions by setting
out the oppositions between them, as, for example, he defines ‘element’ as an indivisible
vocal sound, but the syllable as composed, since the latter can be divided into one or more
of the three species of elementary vocal sound he enumerates. Again, some parts of langu-
age signify by themselves (e.g. the name and the verb), but some do not (e.g. the syllable
and the conjunction). Again, of those which signify by themselves one, the verb, signifies
with time, but the other, the noun, does not; and so on with the rest. But if the received text
concerning the syllable is let stand, then this pattern would be broken, and for no apparent
reason. Simply put, one expects Aristotle to have explained not only what constitutes a
syllable (whether there is one case only, or more than one), but also what is NOT a
syllable. Yet unless one amends the text to read “G R without an A is NOT a syllable, but
G R A is…”, one is left with no such opposition, and in this case only. Why should that
be? And did any other Greek author from the classical period ever hold such a position?

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 Strangely, the treatment of this question by Tarán & Gutas,1 in the chapters Notes
to the Text for the Greek, and Graeco-Arabic critical apparatus and commentary / D.
Gutas for the latter tradition, while citing evidence which supports the emended reading,
nevertheless argues against accepting it. In both places, the authors found their rejection on
the claim that the Arabic text here is “contaminated by glosses” (Notes, p. 283; cf. Graeco-
Arabic critical apparatus, p. 416), but do not (so far as I can tell) cite any evidence in its
support. In fact, Gutas quotes the Arabic witness as having the very reading they reject:

“…becaue G and R without A are not a syllable, since a syllable comes about only with A,
but G and R and A are a syllable….” (p. 414, emphasis in the original)

The key piece of evidence they depend on is furnished by the preceding text allowing a
syllable to be composed of a mute with either a (true) vowel or a semi-vowel. Now it is the
latter case which must be rejected, not only because it is inconsistent with the commonly
held view that a true vowel is necessary for there to be a syllable, properly speaking, but
also because it is inconsistent with Aristsotle’s example of a syllable at De Int. 4 (16b 28-
33):

I mean that animal, for instance, signifies something, but not that it is or is not [30] (though
it will be an affirmation or negation if something is added); the single syllables of ‘animal’,
on the other hand, signify nothing. Nor is the ‘ice’ in ‘mice’ significant; here it is simply a
spoken sound. In double words, as we said, a part does signify, but not in its own right.2
(Ackrill translation; my emphasis)

“Nor is the ‘ice’ in ‘mice’” significant, Aristotle explains. Elsewhere in this paper, I cite
the following translation by Jean T. Oesterle to the same effect:

16b 30 But one syllable of “animal” does not signify anything; similarly, in the word “fowl,”
“owl” does not signify anything in itself, but is only a vocal sound. In composite names,
how-ever, the part does signify something, but not in itself, as has been said.

Here, the English examples of ‘fowl’ and ‘owl’ express the same notion: what counts as a
syllable for Aristotle is a part of a word that can stand as a word in its own right when
separated from a larger whole. Inescapably, any combination of a mute and a semi-vowel
(like GR) fails on this score and so cannot represent Aristotle’s understanding of the
syllable.

3. The definition of speech emended:

Cf. Aristotle, Poet. 20 (1457a 24-27) (tr. B.A.M.):

But speech is composite significative vocal But speech is composite significative vocal
sound some of whose parts signify something sound some of whose parts signify something
by themselves; by themselves;

1
Leonardo Tarán & Dimitri Gutas, Aristotle Poetics: Editio Maior of the Greek text with Historical
Introductions and Philological Commentaries. Mnemosyne supplements. Monographs on Greek and Latin
language and literature, 338. Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2012.
2
Note that Aristotle’s word in Greek here is ‘mouse’: ἀλλ' οὐχ ἡ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου συλλαβὴ μία· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐν τῷ μῦς
τὸ υς σημαντικόν, ἀλλὰ φωνή ἐστι νῦν μόνον. ἐν δὲ τοῖς διπλοῖς σημαίνει μέν, ἀλλ' οὐ καθ' αὑτό, ὥσπερ
εἴρηται.

6
 < I mean “as words but not as an affirmation or
a negation” (supplied by me from De Int. 16b
27)>

(for not [25] every speech is composed from (for not [25] every speech is composed from
names and verbs; names and verbs <in which something is said of
something else>;

for example, the definition of man, …but there is speech which happens to be
without verbs,)

but there is speech which happens to be without |for example, the definition of man,|
verbs,)

Yet a part [of speech] will always have signifi- Yet a part [of speech] will always have signifi-
cance, for example, in ‘Cleon walks’, ‘Cleon’. cance, for example, in ‘Cleon walks’, ‘Cleon’.

Note that the reason for moving the clause on definition is evident, since it comprises the
explanation of Aristotle’s claim that “there is speech which happens to be without verbs”,
but the justification for the words I have inserted in angular braces will be evident from the
following side-by-side comparison with the Philosopher’s account of speech in his work
On Interpretation:

Aristotle, Poet. 20 (1457a 24-28) Aristotle, De Int. I, 4 (16b 26-31)

(tr. B.A.M.) (tr. Jean T. Oesterle, rev.)

But speech is composite significative vocal 16b 26 Speech” is significative vocal sound,
sound some of whose parts signify something some parts of which are significative separately,
by themselves;

for not [25] every speech is composed from i.e., as words but not as an affirmation or a
names and verbs <in which something is said of negation. [i.e. as an affirmation or a negation]
something else>; but there is speech which
happens to be without verbs, |for example, the
definition of man|;

Yet a part [of speech] will always have signifi- 16b 28 Let me explain. The word “animal” sig-
cance, for example, in ‘Cleon walks’, ‘Cleon’. nifies something, but it does not signify that it is
or that it is not; it will be an affirmation or nega-
tion, however, if something is added.

16b 30 But one syllable of “animal” does not

signify anything; similarly, in the word “fowl,”
“owl” does not signify anything in itself, but is
only a vocal sound. In composite names, how-
ever, the part does signify something, but not in
itself, as has been said.

4. On the order of treatment of the parts of lexis.

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 As many commentators note, the order given for the parts of language does not
agree with the order found in the text which follows, the article being out of place. In this
regard, compare the following from Boethius’1 second edition of his commentary on the
Peri Hermeneias (tr. B.A.M.): “But in the work about the poetic art he did not divide lan-
guage in the same way, but he laid down all the parts of language in their entirety, affirm-
ing them to be elements, syllables, conjunctions, articles, names, cases, verbs, speeches”.2

My view is that the parts of lexis ought to have been treated in the following order:
First, its composing parts, the elements and the syllables they enter into, then the parts
which are themselves composed of the elements. Hence, right after element and syllable,
the name and the verb should have been treated; then case, as being common to the two;
then speech, as being composed of them; then what makes speech one which, inasmuch as
it introduces the word conjunction, calls for that term to be defined next, after which the
article would have been treated as agreeing with the conjuction, inasmuch as these two
parts of language only signify as being conjoined with a vocal sound that is significative by
itself (albeit they do so in different ways), a subject to which I return in Section V below.

I now proceed to treat more closely the division of vocal sound and the definition of ptosis
or case.

1
Anicius Manlius Severinus Boethius (ca. 475–7 C.E., died: 526?), Roman philosopher, theologian, and
logician. For other crucial excerpts from his work, see further below.
2
In opere uero de poetica non eodem modo diuidit locutionem sed omnes omnino locutionis partes apposuit
confirmans esse locutionis partes elementa, syllabas, coniunctiones, articulos, nomina, casus, uerba,
orations.

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II. THE DIVISION OF VOCAL SOUND INTO TWO AND THREE.

1. On the division of voiced sound:

Cf. Aristotle, Poetics ch. 20 (1456b 34-37) (tr. B.A.M.):

e)/stin de\ tau=ta fwnh=en me\n <to\> a)/neu Now a vowel indeed is [an indivisible vocal
prosbolh=j e)/xon fwnh\n a)kousth/n, sound] having an audible sound without appli-
cation1 <, such as a and o>;

h(mi/fwnon de\ to\ meta\ prosbolh=j e)/xon fwnh\n but a semi-vowel one having an audible sound
a)kousth/n, oi(=on to\ S kai\ to\ R, with application, such as ‘s’ and ‘r’;

a)/fwnon de\ to\ meta\ prosbolh=j kaq’ au(to\ but a mute is that which, even with application,
me\n ou)demi/an e)/xon fwnh/n, meta\ de\ [30] tw=n has of itself no sound, but is made audible
e)xo/ntwn tina\ fwnh\n gino/menon a)kousto/n, [when sounded together] with things having
oi(=on to\ G kai\ to\ D. sound [i.e. vowels], like ‘g’ and ‘d’.

In sum, an indivisible vocal sound either

(a) has an audible sound per se or not

(b) involves prosbole or an ‘application’ or not
(c) needs to be sounded with a vowel in order to be made audible or not

• has an audible sound per se without prosbole: the vowel

• has an audible sound with prosbole: the semi-vowel
• has no audible sound without prosbole, but needs to be sounded with a vowel in
order to be made audible: the mute or consonant

Cf. the article “Evidence for the pronunciation of Ancient Greek Β (beta) as [b]”:2

Greek grammarians (e.g., Dionysius Thrax) divide consonants into two primary categories:
the aphona (beta, gamma, delta, kappa, pi, tau, theta, phi, and chi), and the hemiphona
(zeta, ksi, psi, lambda, mu, nu, rho, sigma). In Aristotle’s Poetics (1456b) the aphona (of
which beta is a member) are described as “having contact” (= “meta prosboles”), but not
being pronounceable without a vowel. In modern parlance we would say that aphona are the
plosives, pronounced instantaneously, while hemiphona are fricatives, and those other con-
sonants that can be pronounced continuously, without the need for a following vowel. If beta
were fricative, it would be classified as one of the hemiphona.

2. The division of consonants in sum:

• the aphona (beta, gamma, delta, kappa, pi, tau, theta, phi, and chi): “having
contact”: the plosives, which require a following vowel
• the hemiphona (zeta, ksi, psi, lambda, mu, nu, rho, sigma): “not having contact”:
the fricatives, which do not require a following vowel

1
Sc. “of the tongue, and closure of the lips”, as Aristotle makes clear elsewhere; cf. De Part. Animal., II. 16
(660a 3-10). I have treated this subject at length in my preceding paper, “On Sound and Voice”.
2
(http://www.foundalis.com/lan/betapro.htm [11/23/07])

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3. The Poetics on the element or ‘letter’ and the syllable as parts of language:

Cf. Aristotle. Poetics ch. 20 (1456b 20-37) (tr. Theodore Buckley):

[20] th=j de\ le/cewj a(pa/shj ta/d’ e)sti\ ta\ Of all diction, however, the following are the
me/rh, stoixei=on sullabh\ su/ndesmoj o)/noma parts; viz. the letter [i.e. ‘element’], the syllable,
r(h=ma a)/rqron ptw=sij lo/goj. the conjunction, the name, the verb, the article,
the case, and the sentence [i.e. ‘speech’].

The letter, therefore, indeed, is an indivisible

stoixei=on me\n ou)=n e)stin fwnh\ a)diai/retoj,
[vocal] sound; yet not every such sound, but that
ou) pa=sa de\ a)ll’ e)c h(=j pe/fuke sunqeth\ from which an intelligible sound is adapted to
gi/gnesqai fwnh/: be produced.

kai\ ga\r tw=n qhri/wn ei)si\n a)diai/retoi fwnai/, For there are indivisible vocal sounds of brutes,
w(=n ou)demi/an le/gw [25] stoixei=on. no one of which I call a letter.

tau/thj de\ me/rh to/ te fwnh=en kai\ to\ But the parts of this indivisible sound are,
h(mi/fwnon kai\ a)/fwnon. vowel, semi-vowel, and mute.

e)/stin de\ tau=ta fwnh=en me\n <to\> a)/neu And a vowel, indeed, is that which has an
prosbolh=j e)/xon fwnh\n a)kousth/n, audible sound, without percussion; such as a
and o.

h(mi/fwnon de\ to\ meta\ prosbolh=j e)/xon fwnh\n But a semiivowel is that which has an audible
a)kousth/n, oi(=on to\ S kai\ to\ R, sound, with percussion; as s and r.

a)/fwnon de\ to\ meta\ prosbolh=j kaq’ au(to\
me\n ou)demi/an e)/xon fwnh/n, meta\ de\ [30] tw=n
e)xo/ntwn tina\ fwnh\n gino/menon a)kousto/n,
oi(=on to\ G kai\ to\ D.
And a mute is that which, even with the
concurrence of the tongue, has of itself, indeed,
no sound, but becomes audible in conjunction
with the things which have a certain sound; as g
and d.

tau=ta de\ diafe/rei sxh/masi/n te tou=
sto/matoj kai\ to/poij kai\ dasu/thti kai\
yilo/thti kai\ mh/kei kai\ braxu/thti e)/ti de\
o)cu/thti kai\ baru/thti kai\ tw=? me/sw?: peri\ w(=n
kaq’ e(/kaston e)n toi=j metrikoi=j prosh/kei
qewrei=n.
But these differ by the configurations of the
mouth, in the parts [of the mouth] by density
and tenuity of aspiration, by length and
shortness; and further still, they differ by acute-
ness and gravity, and the medium between both
these; the theory respecting each of which
pertains to the metrical art.

sullabh\ [35] de/ e)stin fwnh\ a)/shmoj But a syllable is a sound without signification,
sunqeth\ e)c a)fw/nou kai\ fwnh\n e)/xontoj: composed from a mute, and an element which
has sound [i.e. from a vowel, or semi-vowel].

kai\ ga\r to\ GR a)/neu tou= A ¤sullabh\ kai\¤ For g r without a is a syllable, and also with a,
meta\ tou= A, oi(=on to\ GRA. as g r a.1

1
N.B. As noted above, I believe the text should read “For g r without a is not a syllable, but with the a, as
gra, it is”, as it is translated by Ronald Zirin in his article “Aristotle’s Biology of Language” (in: TAPhA,
110, 325–47, p. 331), where he accepts Gudeman’s emendation of the text, in order to avoid the
contradiction.

10
a)lla\ kai\ tou/twn qewrh=sai ta\j diafora\j The study, however, of the differences of these,
th=j metrikh=j e)stin. pertains also to the metrical art.

Cf. Aristotle, Poetics ch. 20 (1456b 20-37) (Lat. William of Moerbeke; tr. B.A.M.):

Locutionis autem omnis hee sunt partes: But of language as a whole these are the parts:

elementum, sillaba, coniunctio, nomen, verbum, ‘element’, ‘syllable’, ‘conjunction’, ‘name’,

articulus, casus, oratio. ‘verb’, ‘article’, ‘case’, ‘speech’.

Elementum quidem igitur vox indivisibilis, non An element, therefore, is an indivisible vocal
omnis autem sed ex qua nata est fieri intelligi- sound, but not every one from which an intelli-
bilis vox gible vocal sound is naturally apt to result

(et enim bestiarum sunt indivisibiles voces, (for there are indivisible vocal sounds belonging
quarum nullam dico elementum), to the beasts none of which I call an ‘element’),

huius autem partes vocalis et semivocalis et but the parts of these are vowel and semi-vowel
muta. and mute [= ‘consonant’].

Est autem vocalis quidem sine adiectione Now a vowel is [an indivisible vocal sound]
habens vocem audibilem; having an audible sound without an addition;

semivocalis autem cum adiectione habens but a semi-vowel one having an audible sound
vocem audibilem, velut ‘s’ et ‘b’; with an addition, such as ‘s’ and ‘b’ <‘r’?>;

muta autem que cum adiectione secundum but a mute is that which with an addition has no
quidem nullam habet vocem, cum habentibus sound, but has some sound when made audible,
autem aliquam vocem facta audibilis, velut ‘g’ like ‘g’ and ‘d’.
et ‘d’.

Hec autem differunt figurisque oris et locis, et
asperitate et lenitate, et longitudine et brevitate,
adhuc autem acuitate et grauitate et medio;
quibus per singula in metricis congruit
speculari.
But these differ by both the shape and location
of the mouth, and by roughness or smoothness
[sc. of the breathing], and by length and short-
ness, but besides by acuteness, lowness and
[what is] intermediate [between these]; each of
which it is appropriate for those learned in
metrics to consider.

Sillaba autem est vox non significativa But a syllable is a non-significant vocal sound
composita ex non vocali et vocem habente; composed from a non-vowel [i.e. a mute] and
[an element] having sound;

et enim ipsius ‘gr’ sine ipso ‘a’ sillaba et cum for ‘gr’ itself without ‘a’ itself <is not> a syl-
‘a’, puta ‘gra’. lable, and (is a syllable) with ‘a’, for example,
‘gra’.

Sed horum considerare differentias metrice est. But it pertains to the metrical art to consider the
differences of these things.

11
III. THE SYLLABLE AS AN INTELLIGIBLE VOCAL SOUND.

1. Texts and translations:

Cf. Aristotle, Poetics ch. 20 (1456a 34-38) (tr. William of Moerbeke; Eng. tr. B.A.M.):

Elementum quidem igitur vox indivisibilis, non An element, therefore, is an indivisible vocal
omnis autem sed ex qua nata est fieri sound, but not every one from which an intel-
intelligibilis vox ligible vocal sound is naturally apt to result

(et enim bestiarum sunt indivisibiles voces, (for there are indivisible vocal sounds belonging
quarum nullam dico elementum), to the brutes none of which I call an ‘element’),

huius autem partes vocalis et semivocalis et but the parts of these are vowel and semi-vowel
muta. and mute [i.e. ‘consonant’].

Cf. idem, (ed & tr. Ingram Bywater):

stoixei=on me\n ou)=n e)stin fwnh\ a)diai/retoj, The Letter is also an indivisible sound of a
ou) pa=sa de\ a)ll’ e)c h(=j pe/fuke suneth\ particular kind, one that may become a factor in
gi/gnesqai fwnh/: an intelligible sound.

kai\ ga\r tw=n qhri/wn ei)si\n a)diai/retoi fwnai/, Indivisible sounds are uttered by the brutes also,
w(=n ou)demi/an le/gw [25] stoixei=on. but no one of these is a Letter in our sense of the
term.

tau/thj de\ me/rh to/ te fwnh=en kai\ to\ These elementary sounds are either vowels,
h(mi/fwnon kai\ a)/fwnon. semivowels, or mutes.

Cf. Ingram Bywater, Aristotle on the Art of Poetry, Commentary, pp. 262-263:

b23 suneth\ The alternative reading sunqeth\ has been accepted by several editors, as also
by Steinthal (Gesch. d. Sprachwissenschaft2 I, p. 253) and Diels (Elementum p. 33). The
main argument in favour of sunqeth\ is that, as defined in b 34, the syllable is a fwnh/
sunqeth\, and that the syllable is viewed in sundry Aristotelian passages (Bon. Ind. 702 b 39)
as a synthesis of stoixei=a. This is true enough. But it has to be remembered on the other
side that Aristotle often speaks of the stoixei=a fwnh=j (Bon. Ind. 702 b 35)—where fwnh/
means the same thing as fwnh/ suneth\ of the present passage. And if we assume sunqeth\ to
be the original reading, the excepting clause (ou) pa=sa de\ kte(), which puts the ‘indivisible
sounds’ of the brutes in a different category, is irrelevant. Aristotle’s argument here seems to
be something like this: In the utterances of the brutes there are indivisible sounds, but these
‘noises’ of theirs are directly significant in themselves (De interpr. 2, 16 a 29) [and see also
Pol. I. 2, 1253a 7-19 (B.A.M.)]; they are not stoixei=a fwnh=j, because they do not combine
as elements to form a fwnh/ suneth\. The indivisible sounds, on the other hand, in human
speech exist as elements of speech, and they have no meaning in themselves; the meaning in
human speech is in the words and propositions—not in the ‘elements’ which analysis reveals
in them (comp. Vahlen, Beitr. 3 p. 220). fwnh/ suneth\ is perhaps the nearest Aristotelian
equivalent for our term ‘word’. It may be taken as including not only the fwnh/ a)/shmoj—
words like a)mfi, peri/ me/n, de/, etc. (Aristotle’s a(/qra and su/ndesmoi), which stand for
nothing by themselves, though they have a certain significance in their place in intelligible
human speech.

12
Cf. ibid., pp. 269-270:

At this point Aristotle passes from the constituents of words (letters and syllables) to actual
words; and he begins by noting this distinction: some words are fwnh\ a)/shmoj, and others
fwnai\ shmantikai/; these latter being nouns and verbs in language, which have a meaning
of their own and stand for something even when uttered by themselves. The su/ndesmoi and
a)/rqra, however, are said to be fwnai\ a)/shmoi; i.e. they convey no meaning when uttered by
themselves.

3. Note on the foregoing:

The glosses just cited are so full of matter essential to our treatment of the whole
question of the connective parts of speech in Aristotle that we must go through them part
by part in order to apply their conclusions to those subjects where they provide confir-
mation or illumination. In the first of these passages, the essential point Bywater makes is
that one should read suneth\ instead of sunqeth\ at b23;1 the argument he makes being
comprised of the following points: (1) That to read fwnh/ sunqeth\ (“composed vocal
sound”) instead of fwnh/ suneth\ (“intelligible vocal sound”) makes the exception of the
brutes pointless, since they do not utter composed vocal sounds, for which reason indivis-
ible vocal sounds are to be understood as intelligible, in relation to which observation he
explains that, 2) while the indivisible vocal sounds in human speech that are as elements in
it have no meaning in themselves2—differing in this from the cries of beasts—they never-
theless have a certain significance in their place in intelligible human speech; but that 3)
some non-significative vocal sounds, as with the aforementioned particles, signify only in
relation to other, significative, vocal sounds. In sum, the elements composing human
speech are intelligible vocal sounds which signify nothing by themselves. Again, while
there are some vocal sounds, namely, names and verbs, which signify by themselves, there
are others, which we call ‘particles’, into which such sounds enter, and which signify only
in relation to other, significative, vocal sounds. And note that the difference between the
cries of the beasts, which signify immediately and by themselves, and the indivisible vocal
sounds of men, which (apart from certain interjections) signify only as entering into words,
lies at the root of Aristotle’s understanding of language, being the principal doctrine con-
cerning its elements. But, as we shall see from texts to be cited further below, at its upper
limit lies the observation of Plato that speech consists of a verb intertwined with a name or
noun by virtue of which a complete thought is expressed and the true or the false
conveyed.

1
And note that William of Moerbeke’s reading intelligibilis supports suneth\.
2
Excepting, of course, interjections.

13
IV. ON PTOSIS OR ‘CASE’.

1. According to Aristotle: Texts and Translations.

Cf. Aristotle, Poetics ch. 20 (1457a 19-23) (ed. R. Kassel; tr. B.A.M.):

ptw=sij d’ e)sti\n o)no/matoj h)\ r(h/matoj h( me\n
kata\ to\ tou/tou h)\ tou/tw? [20] shmai=non kai\
o(/sa toiau=ta, h( de\ kata\ to\ e(ni\ h)\ polloi=j,
oi(=on a)/nqrwpoi h)\ a)/nqrwpoj,
h( de\ kata\ ta\ u(pokritika/, oi(=on kat’
e)rw/thsin e)pi/tacin: to\ ga\r e)ba/disen;
h)\ ba/dize ptw=sij r(h/matoj kata\ tau=ta ta\
ei)/dh e)sti/n.
But case belongs to name or verb, the one
signifying according to ‘of this’ [20] or ‘to that’
and whatever others [are] such, but the other
according to ‘one’ or ‘many’, for example,
‘men’ or ‘man’,
but this according to delivery, for example,
according to questioning, commanding.
For ‘[he] has walked’ or ‘[he] walked’ are cases
of the verb according to these species.

Cf. Aristotle, Poetics ch. 20 (1457a 19-23) (ed. R. Kassel; tr. Theodore Buckley):

ptôsis d’ estin onomatos ê rhêmatos But case pertains to noun or verb.

hê men kata to toutou ê toutôi [20] sêmainon kai And one case, indeed, [in nouns] signifies that
hosa toiauta, something is said of this thing, or is attributed to
this thing, and the like;

hê de kata to heni ê pollois, hoion anthrôpoi ê but another is that which pertains to one thing or
anthrôpos, many things; as men or man.

hê de kata ta hupokritika, hoion kat’ erôtêsin And another case pertains to acting, such as
epitaxin: what relates to interrogation or demand.

to gar ebadisen; ê badize ptôsis rhêmatos kata For did he walk? Or walk is a case of a verb
tauta ta eidê estin. according to these species.

Cf. Aristotle, Poetics ch. 20 (1457a 19-23):

(tr. Ingram Bywater) (tr. S. H. Butcher)

(7) A Case of a Noun or Verb is when the word Inflection belongs both to the noun and verb,
means ‘of’ or ‘to’ a thing, and so forth, and expresses either the relation ‘of,’ ‘to,’ or the
like;

or for one or many (e.g. ‘man’ and ‘men’); or that of number, whether one or many, as
‘man’ or ‘men’;

or it may consist merely in the mode of an or the modes or tones in actual delivery, e.g., a
utterance, e.g. in question, command, etc. question or a command.

‘Walked?’ and ‘Walk!’ are cases of the Verb ‘to ‘Did he go?’ and ‘go’ are verbal inflections of
walk’ of this last kind. this kind.

14
Cf. Aristotle, Poetics ch. 20 (1457a 19-23) (tr. W. H. Fyfe).

A case (or inflection) of a noun or verb is that which signifies either “of” or “to” a thing and
the like; [20] or gives the sense of “one or many” e.g. men and man; or else it may depend
on the delivery, for example, question and command. “Walked?” and “Walk!” are verbal
“cases” of this kind.

Note that ptosis is defined as a sign; cf. the definitions cited below.

2. The species of what grammarians call ‘inflection’ comprising Aristotle’s examples.

• case, either genitive or dative (proper to the name)

• number, either plural or singular (common to the name and the verb, but
exemplified by the name)
• mood, either interrogative or imperative (proper to the verb)

3. Familiar species that are not found in the definition.

• person, either first, second, or third (common to the name and the verb)
• voice, either active, passive, or middle (proper to the verb)
• tense, either past, present, or future, etc. (proper to the verb)

Tense, of course, has already been exemplified in the definition of the verb, to which in-
stances we may add the following:

Cf. Aristotle, De Int. I. 7 (17a 5-10) (Lat. tr. Boethius; Eng. tr. Jean T. Oesterle):

Et caeterae quidem relinquantur (rhetoricae 17a 5 Let us therefore consider enunciative

enim vel poeticae convenientior consideratio speech, which belongs to our present inquiry,
est; enuntiativa vero praesentis considerationis and omit the other kinds, for the study of these
est). belongs rather to rhetoric and poetics.

[05] Est autem una prima oratio enuntiativa 17a 8 First affirmation, then negation, is enun-
affirmatio, deinde negatio; aliae vero coniunc- ciative speech that is one; the others are one by
tione unae. conjunction.

Necesse est autem omnem orationem enuntia- 17a 9 Every enunciative speech, however, must
tivam ex verbo esse vel casu; contain a verb or a mode of the verb [lit. or a
case, where ‘case’ clearly means a tense];

et enim, hominis rationi si non aut ‘est’ aut ‘erit’ for the definition of man, if “is” or “was” or
aut ‘fuit’ aut aliquid huiusmodi addatur, “will be” or something of the kind is not added,
nondum est oratio enuntiativa. is not yet enunciative speech....

According to this passage, the ptosis or ‘case’ of a verb is exemplified by the past
or the future, which differences we are accustomed to call ‘tenses’.1

Cf. Aristotle, De Int. I. 3 (16b 5-17) (tr. Jean T. Oesterle):

1
On these matters, cf. also St. Thomas on the adverbs tantum and solus, treated elsewhere in my papers.

15
 LESSON 5

On the Nature of the Verb and Its Conformity with the Name

16b 5 The verb is that which signifies with time; no part of it signifies separately, and it is a
sign of something said of something else.

16b 8 1 mean by “signifies with time” that “maturity,” for example, is a name, but “matures”
is a verb, for it connotes the present existence of maturity.

16b 10 Moreover, a verb is always a sign of something that belongs to something, i.e., of
something present in a subject.

16b 12 “Non-matures” and “non-declines” I do not call verbs. They signify with time and
always belong to something but they differ from the verb and no name has been established
for the difference. Let us call them infinite verbs, since they belong equally to anything
whatever, to both what is and what is not.

16b 16 Likewise, “has matured” and “will mature” are not verbs but modes of the verb. They
differ from the verb in that the verb signifies with present time, whereas the modes signify
time outside of the present.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Aristotle: On Interpretation. Commentary by St. Thomas and Ca-
jetan. Translated from the Latin with an Introduction by Jean T. Oesterle (Milwaukee
1962) (nn. 12-14):

12. When he says, Likewise, “has matured” and “will mature” are not verbs, but modes of
verbs, etc., he excludes verbs of past and future time from the definition. For just as infinite
verbs are not verbs absolutely, so “will mature,” which is of future time, and “has matured,”
of past time, are not verbs. They are cases of the verb and differ from the verb—which
signifies with present time—by signifying time before and after the present. Aristotle
expressly says “present time” and not just “present” because he does not mean here the
indivisible present which is the instant; for in the instant there is neither movement, nor
action, nor passion. Present time is to be taken as the time that measures action which has
begun and has not yet been terminated in act. Accordingly, verbs that signify with past or
future time are not verbs in the proper sense of the term, for the verb is that which signifies
to act or to be acted upon and therefore strictly speaking signifies to act or to be acted upon
in act, which is to act or to be acted upon simply, whereas to act or to be acted upon in past
or future time is relative.1

13. It is with reason that verbs of past or future time are called cases of the verb signifying
with present time, for past or future are said with respect to the present, the past being that
which was present, the future, that which will be present.

1
deinde cum dicit: similiter autem curret etc., excludit a verbo verba praeteriti et futuri temporis; et dicit
quod sicut verba infinita non sunt simpliciter verba, ita etiam curret, quod est futuri temporis, vel currebat,
quod est praeteriti temporis, non sunt verba, sed sunt casus verbi. et differunt in hoc a verbo, quia verbum
consignificat praesens tempus, illa vero significant tempus hinc et inde circumstans. dicit autem signanter
praesens tempus, et non simpliciter praesens, ne intelligatur praesens indivisibile, quod est instans: quia in
instanti non est motus, nec actio aut passio; sed oportet accipere praesens tempus quod mensurat actionem,
quae incepit, et nondum est determinata per actum. recte autem ea quae consignificant tempus praeteritum
vel futurum, non sunt verba proprie dicta: cum enim verbum proprie sit quod significat agere vel pati, hoc
est proprie verbum quod significat agere vel pati in actu, quod est agere vel pati simpliciter: sed agere vel
pati in praeterito vel futuro est secundum quid.

16
 14. Although the inflection of the verb is varied by mode, time, number, and person, the
variations that are made in number and person do not constitute cases of the verb, the reason
being that such variation is on the part of the subject, not on the part of the action. But
variation in mode and time refers to the action itself and hence both of these constitute cases
of the verb. For verbs of the imperative or optative modes are called cases as well as verbs of
past or future time. Verbs of the indicative mode in present time, however, are not called
cases, whatever their person and number.1

4. In sum.

• the inflection of the verb is varied by mode [= mood], time, number, and person
• but the variations that are made in number and person do not constitute cases of the
verb, the reason being that such variation is on the part of the subject, not on the
part of the action

5. ‘Case’ with respect to names.

Cf. Aristotle, De Int. I. 4 (16a 19-21; 32) (tr. Jean T. Oesterle):

16a 19 A name, then, is a vocal sound significant by convention, without time, no part of
which is significant separately;
16a 21 for in the name “Campbell” the part “bell,” as such signifies nothing, although in the
expression “camp bell” it does. <…>
16a 32 “Of Philo” and “to Philo” and all such expressions are not names but modes of
names.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Aristotle: On Interpretation, lect. 4, n. 12 (tr. J. Oesterle, slightly
rev. B.A.M.):

14. When he says, “Of Philo” and “to Philo” and all such expressions are not names but
modes of names, he excludes the cases of names from the nature of the name. The nomin-
ative alone is principally called a name, for the imposition of a name was made in order to
signify something. Oblique expressions of the kind cited are called cases of the name be-
cause they fall away from the nominative as a kind of source of their declension. On the
other hand, the nominative, because it does not fall away, is said to be erect [upright]. The
Stoics held that even the nominatives were cases (with which the grammarians agree),
because they fall, i.e., proceed from the interior conception of the mind; and they said they
were also called erect [upright] because nothing prevents a thing from falling in such a way
that it stands erect, as when a pen falls and is fixed in wood.2

1
dicuntur etiam verba praeteriti vel futuri temporis rationabiliter casus verbi, quod consignificat praesens
tempus; quia praeteritum vel futurum dicitur per respectum ad praesens. est enim praeteritum quod fuit
praesens, futurum autem quod erit praesens. cum autem declinatio verbi varietur per modos, tempora,
numeros et personas, variatio quae fit per numerum et personam non constituit casus verbi: quia talis
variatio non est ex parte actionis, sed ex parte subiecti; sed variatio quae est per modos et tempora respicit
ipsam actionem, et ideo utraque constituit casus verbi. nam verba imperativi vel optativi modi casus
dicuntur, sicut et verba praeteriti vel futuri temporis. sed verba indicativi modi praesentis temporis non
dicuntur casus, cuiuscumque sint personae vel numeri.
2
deinde cum dicit: catonis autem vel catoni etc., excludit casus nominis; et dicit quod catonis vel catoni et
alia huiusmodi non sunt nomina, sed solus nominatives dicitur principaliter nomen, per quem facta est im-
positio nominis ad aliquid significandum. huiusmodi autem obliqui vocantur casus nominis: quia quasi
cadunt per quamdam declinationis originem a nominativo, qui dicitur rectus eo quod non cadit. stoici autem
dixerunt etiam nominativos dici casus: quos grammatici sequuntur, eo quod cadunt, idest procedunt ab

17
6. Cf. A. A. Long & D. N. Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers. Vol. 1. Translations of
the Principal Sources with Philosophical Commentary (Cambridge, 1987), pp. 197-198:

K Ammonius, On Aristotle’s De interpretatione 43.9-15

The Stoics reply that the nominative case itself has fallen from the thought which is in the
soul. For when we wish to exhibit the thought of Socrates which we have within ourselves,
we utter the name Socrates [i.e. Socrates in the nominative case]. Just as a pen is said both to
have fallen and to have its fall upright if it is released from above and sticks upright, so we
claim that the nominative case [literally ‘the direct case’] [197-198] falls from the thought, but
is upright because it is the archetype of linguistic utterance.

L Scholia on Dionysius Thrax, 230,24-8

If the nominative is upright, why is it a case? Because it has fallen from what is incorporeal
and generic into what is specific. But it is upright because it has not yet been altered into an
oblique [case], or because it is the foundation of what the Stoics call upright, that is active,
verbs, e.g. ‘Socrates strikes’.

Notes by Long and Sedley. p. 199:

Lekta are explained in various ways. Linguistically, they are the meanings of ‘finished’
sentences like ‘Socrates writes’ (F3), or of verbs without a specified subject (and/or object,
in the case of transitive verbs), e.g. ‘writes’ with no indication of whom. The former type is
called ‘complete’, the latter ‘incomplete’. What completes a sayable is its being attached to
‘a nominative case’ (G) (or a dative of the person, with impersonal verbs) and, in the usage
of transitive verbs, the further addition of the oblique case (cf. q in vol. 2). ‘Case’ (ptôsis)
picks out the syntactical relation of a noun to the other constituents of a sentence. In the
‘complete sayable’ this syntactical relation seems to have been regarded as a component of
the sentence’s meaning.
p. 201:

A word of warning must added about ‘case’. Its most familiar modern meaning is the
inflection of a noun or other substantival form, e.g. nominative, genitive. In its standard
usage, however, it designates not the inflection itself but the inflected word. A ‘nominative
case’ is a word inflected in the nominative. A consequence of this is that, when not specified
as e.g. nominative, ‘a case’ simply means ‘a word in some case’, or ‘a substantival form’ – a
generic term for those grammatical items, such as nouns (O; 30A e; 37Q 4), pronouns, and
even noun-clauses (55C), which in Greek decline through the cases. When subjects are
called ‘name-bearers’ (B), the Greek word thus translated (tunchanonta) strictly stands for
‘case-bearers’, indicating that they are the items standardly designated by nouns and pro-
nouns.

Aristotle had excluded the nominative from the ‘cases’ of nouns (De interpretatione 1632
ff.). In his usage all the cases are oblique, inflections of the nominative form. The Stoics
extended the term ‘case’ (literally ‘falling’) to the nominative, and fanciful explanations
were given to justify this terminology (K, L). Behind them probably lies the notion that
predication is most fundamentally exemplified by attributing an activity to a subject, e.g.
‘Socrates writes’.

interiori conceptione mentis. et dicitur rectus, eo quod nihil prohibit aliquid cadens sic cadere, ut rectum
stet, sicut stilus qui cadens ligno infigitur. St. Thomas’ dependence on Ammonius here will be clear from an
excerpt given below.

18
7. The ‘case’ of a noun in Aristotle’s usage.

Cf. Alfred Mollin and Robert Williamson, An Introduction to Ancient Greek, Vol. I: Gram-
mar (Annapolis, MD: St. John’s College, 1994), p. 16:

Note. We have followed general practice in referring to the nominative form as a “case”
among four other cases. However, some modern grammarians have developed an account
which goes back to Aristotle (On Interpretation, 2) and according to which the term “noun”
(o)/noma) should be reserved for the nominative form, which names (o)noma/zein) simply, with
no indication of a relation to other elements in the sentence. From its base (or “upright” or
“straight” -or)qh/, eu)qei=a) form and function, a noun may undergo a “fall” (ptw=sij, Latin
casus, from whence English case) or “inclination” (kli/sij, from kli/nw) toward other
elements within the sentence. The roster of such fallings off is called a declension. Although
it is convenient to include the nominative form among the “cases”, we shall occasionally
refer to the other four as the oblique cases.

8. Mollin and Williamson on case in sum.

• the nominative form of the name is called a ‘noun’

• the noun is the ‘upright’ or ‘straight’ form from which a name may undergo a
‘fall’1
• the ‘fall’ or ‘inclination’ which a name may undergo (sc. from its ‘upright’ or
‘straight’ form) is called is its ‘case’ (hence the ‘nominative’ is not a ‘case’)
• its ‘declension’ is the ‘roster’ of such ‘fallings off’

In light of the foregoing observations, the ‘case’ of a name could be defined as the way in
which it ‘falls’ or ‘leans toward’ another word or words in the construction of a sentence
allowing it to perform its function therein.

9. According to certain Greek grammarians.

Cf. C.H.M. Versteegh, Greek Elements in Arabic Linguistic Thinking (Leiden: Brill, 1977),
p. 23:

…and a text in the scholia on Dionysios Thrax where a grammatical case is defined as ‘a
movement that occurs at the end of a noun’ (onômatos kata tô têlos ginomênê kinêsis).28
28
Scholia D.T. 383, 3-4; cf. also praefatio, XLI, 2, and Grammatici Graeci, IV, XXII, 12…. 2

N.B. Ptosis or ‘case’, then, means ‘the change that happens at the end of a noun’ (tr.
B.A.M.), as the ‘s’ in the following example:

1
Compare St. Thomas’ remarks excerpted above: “The nominative alone is principally called a name, for the
imposition of a name was made in order to signify something. Oblique expressions of the kind cited are
called cases of the name because they fall away from the nominative as a kind of source of their declen-
sion.” In other words, the form of name in question here, being that which has been imposed upon a thing in
order to signify it, is that which is called (the) nominative or ‘naming’ word par excellence.
2
Versteegh goes on to remark (p. 24): “The Greek word kineisthai is used in the sense of ‘to be declined,’
and the word akinētos sometimes has the meaning of ‘undeclined’.”. Hence, we may translate the scholion as
follows: “Case is a declining (or declension) that occurs at the end of a noun.”

19
‘The dog is barking.’ (sg.); ‘The dogs are barking.’ (pl.) Note how the change from singu-
lar to plural in the verb alters the construction of the sentence; such change being an ex-
ample of what we call an ‘inflection’. Compare the following accounts:

Cf. Merriam Webster Online Dictionary, s.v. “inflection”.

3 a : the change of form that words undergo to mark such distinctions as those of case,
gender, number, tense, person, mood, or voice b : a form, suffix, or element involved in such
variation.

Cf. Historical Prelude, p. 2.1

0.2. Plato and Aristotle.

...Second, all morphological differences between basic and inflected word shapes, irres-
pective of whether it was an ‘onoma-noun’ or a ‘rheme-verb’, were covered by the same
category of ‘ptosis’. Thus, the notion of ‘ptosis’ applied to oblique nominal cases, com-
parative and superlative forms of adjectives,2 deadjectival adverbs,3 non-present verbal
tenses and other verbal inflections.....4

0.3. The Stoics

The inflectional criterion for deriving word class distinctions was brought into play by the
Stoic grammarians. Their major theoretical achievement was to restrict the meaning of the
term ‘ptosis’ to that of English case. By restricting ptosis to case and case to nouns, the
Stoics made case the fundamental distinction between nouns and verbs and between, on the
one hand, the group of case inflected pronouns and articles and, on the other, the group of
invariant prepositions and conjunctions.5 Stoic case covered all the forms of case-inflected
words (basic non-inflected and inflected) and so a division was made between nominative
and oblique cases.6 One consequence of taking case to be the basis for distinguishing nouns
from verbs was that adjectives in Greek (and, later, Latin) were treated as a subclass of
nouns (and continued to be treated so until the eighteenth century).7 In grouping adjectives
together with nouns the Stoics differed from Plato and Aristotle who grouped adjectives
together with verbs.8
After ptosis was restricted to nominal words, verbal categories required separate termin-
ology. Interestingly, the divisions in the verbal domain were also case-motivated: active,
transitive, passive and intransitive verbs were recognized and their different syntax was
taken to be closely linked with differences of case with which they constructed.

1
(http://www.lotpublications.nl/publish/articles/001178/bookpart.pdf. [02/05/06]) (no author given) “This
section is a synopsis based mostly on Robins (1966; 1990) and, in addition, Lyons (1968) and Kodukhov
(1974).” Cf. R. H. Robins (1966), “The Development of the Word Class System of the European Gram-
matical Tradition”. In: Foundations of Language 2: 3 .19. The reader will note that this outline is indebted to
R. H. Robins (1966), “The Development of the Word Class System of the European Grammatical Tradition”.
In: Foundations of Language 2: 3 .19.
2
E.g. ‘swifter, swiftest’.
3
E.g. ‘swiftly’ as said from ‘swift’.
4
Cf. the examples of the cases of a verb, such as ‘matures’ etc. cited above.
5
For an argument that this is actually Aristotle’s division, see further below.
6
On the treatment of the ‘nominative’ as a ‘case’, cf. the passages to be cited infra from Long and Sedley,
and from Mollin and Williamson on Aristotle’s (divergent) practice in this regard.
7
E.g. the distinction between the substantival and the adjectival name.
8
Cf. Aristotle’s treatment of adjectives like ‘pale’ or ‘white’ as predicates, and hence rhemata.

20
10. Some grammatical terms pertaining to case.

Cf. Miriam Webster Online Dictionary:

accidence. Etymology: Middle English, from Middle French, from Latin accidentia
inflections of words, nonessential qualities, plural of accident-, accidens, n. : a part of
grammar that deals with inflections.

inflection. 3 a : the change of form that words undergo to mark such distinctions as those of
case, gender, number, tense, person, mood, or voice b : a form, suffix, or element involved in
such variation c : ACCIDENCE

case. a : an inflectional form of a noun, pronoun, or adjective indicating its grammatical

relation to other words b : such a relation whether indicated by inflection or not.

conjugation. 1 a : a schematic arrangement of the inflectional forms of a verb b : verb

inflection c : a class of verbs having the same type of inflectional forms <the weak
conjugation> d : a set of the simple or derivative inflectional forms of a verb especially in
Sanskrit or the Semitic languages <the causative conjugation>

2 : the act of conjugating : the state of being conjugated

declension. 1 a : noun, adjective, or pronoun inflection especially in some prescribed order

of the forms b : a class of nouns or adjectives having the same type of inflectional forms

Cf. Encyclopedia (Columbia University Press):

inflection, in grammar. In many languages, words or parts of words are arranged in formally
similar sets consisting of a root, or base, and various affixes. Thus walking, walks, walker
have in common the root walk and the affixes -ing, -s, and -er. An inflectional affix carries
certain grammatical restrictions with it; for example, with the plural inflection -s, a change
from singular to plural in the noun tree/trees requires a concomitant change in the verb form
from singular to plural: “the tree is green,” “the trees are green.” Other examples of English
inflectional suffixes are the verb tenses. Many languages have far more extensive inflection
than English, e.g., Latin, Eskimo, Arabic. In Latin grammar the typical noun and adjective
are inflected for case and number, and the adjective is additionally inflected for the gender of
the noun. Latin verbs have overlapping categories of inflection: mood, voice, tense, person,
and number. Noun inflection is called declension, and the inflection of verbs is called
conjugation.
To be distinguished from inflectional affixes are those of derivation. Derivation is the
process of forming words from other words or roots by the addition of affixes that in
themselves either have meaning or denote word function.1 Derivational affixes in English
may be either prefixes—e.g., de-press, un-common—or suffixes—e.g., work-er, retire-ment,
happi-ness. The name stem is given to a root together with its derivational affixes; thus in
racket-eer-s, racket is the root, racketeer the stem, and -s the plural inflection. Beginning in
the 19th cent., the modification of a root or base by the amount of inflection or derivation in
a language was used as a basis for classification. An isolating language is one in which there
are only roots, with no derivation or inflection, such as Chinese.

1
Cf. Aristotle on ‘composite’ names: the process under discussion giving rise to such names. Also, for the
classical foundation of the distinction between inflectional and derivational morphology, cf. Marcus Varro,
De Lingua Latina, Book X, which I give next.

21
 On the other hand, inflected languages, e.g., English and Latin, use roots, stems, and affixes,
but the amount of inflection is not as great as in agglutinative languages where roots and
affixes are readily identifiable, e.g., Turkish baba “father,” babam “my father,” babama “to
my father.” The old belief that agglutinative languages were the most primitive and isolating
languages the most civilized is no longer held, it being recognized that every language is just
as expressive as any other and can develop new vocabulary to fit new situations. See ablaut;
grammar; umlaut; English language.

11. Some definitions.

CASE (PTOSIS, CASUS): In logic, according to Aristotle, (1) that which “belongs
to name or verb, the one signifying according to ‘of this’ [20] or ‘to that’ and whatever
others [are] such, but the other according to ‘one’ or ‘many’, for example, ‘men’ or ‘man’,
but this according to delivery, for example, according to questioning, commanding. For
‘[he] has walked’ or ‘[he] walked’ are cases of the verb according to these species” (Aris-
totle, Poet. 20, 1457a 19-23); or again, in grammar, in a more restricted sense, (2) “‘a
movement (or declining or declension) that occurs at the end of a noun’ (onômatos kata tô
têlos ginomênê kinêsis). (Scholia D.T. 383, 3-4; cf. also praefatio, XLI, 2, and Grammatici
Graeci, IV, XXII, 12); that is to say, (3) “the way in which a noun or name ‘falls’ or ‘leans
toward’ another word or words in the construction of a sentence, allowing it to performs its
function therein” (worded by B.A.M. after Mollin and Williamson, supra); hence, (4) gen-
erally speaking, inflection in grammar may be defined as “3 a : the change of form that
words undergo to mark such distinctions as those of case, gender, number, tense, person,
mood, or voice b : a form, suffix, or element involved in such variation” (Merriam Webster
Online Dictionary, s.v. “inflection”).

12. Additional remarks on case:

• the case of a name or verb is the modification or change it undergoes allowing it to

perform a given function in speech

• in Greek and Latin, the change occurs in one or more letters at the end of the word

• The notion of ‘case’ presupposes an understanding that there is a ‘basic form’ of a

name or verb of which the several ‘cases’ are variations governed by the function
they are meant to perform in a phrase or sentence.

name and verb:

• the basic form

• the variation (or variations) of that form

• the basic form of the name: the nominative

• the basic form of the verb

Cf. Dale A. Grote, Latin Grammar and Syntax. (Commentary on Wheelock, Chapter 1).
“First and Second Conjugation Verbs: Indicative, Imperative, and Infinitive”:

VERBS: THE BASICS OF CONJUGATION

22
 …You can see that the verb “to see” has a basic form, which is being modified slightly to
show that the verb is being used in a different way. This modification of a verb to show
different aspects or conditions of the action is called “conjugation” (kahn juh GAY
shun), and a verb is said to “conjugate” (KAHN juh gate) when it’s modified to exhibit
these different conditions. A verb, therefore, has a basic form or set of forms, which then
conjugate in order to change the way its meaning is to be understood in a particular context.
These basic forms contain the core meaning of the verb, but the way the action is being
applied and the circumstances under which the action is changing. (emphasis added)

On root and stem:

The root is the basic form; the stem is a principal part:

see, saw, seen = three stems comprising the principal parts of the verb “to see”

23
9. A morphological division of Latin words according to Varro.

Cf. Varro: De Lingua Latina X. I. § 11 [In: Daniel J. Taylor, Varro – De Lingua Latina X
(John Benjamins, 1996), p. 63 (tr. slightly rev. B.A.M.; N.B.: the Latin has been taken
from The Latin Library but it is identical to Taylor’s text):

Quarum similitudinum si esset origo recte capta 11. If the basis of these grammatical similarities
et inde orsa ratio, minus erraretur in had been correctly understood and if their syste-
declinationibus verborum. matic arrangement had originated from there,
there would now be fewer misconceptions in the
declensions of words.

Quarum ego principia prima duum generum I maintain that insofar as declensions are con-
sola arbitror esse, ad quae similitudines exigi cerned there are only two types of essential ele-
oporteat: ments involved in the determination of simil-
arities:

e quis unum positum in verborum materia, one of these is represented in the morphological
alterum ut in materiae figura, quae ex declin- substance of words, the other, as it were, in the
atione fit. phonological configuration of that substance,
which is a product of declentional variation.1

Cf. Varro: De Lingua Latina X. I. (§ 14-16 tr. B.A.M.; the remainder tr. Daniel J. Taylor):

Prima divisio in oratione, quod alia verba 14. The first division in speech is that that some
nusquam declinantur, ut haec vix mox, alia words are never declined, like vix, mox, but
declinantur, ut ab lima limae, a fero ferebam, others are declined, like from lima limae, from
fero ferebam,

et cum nisi in his verbis quae declinantur non
possit esse analogia, qui dicit simile esse mox et
nox errat, quod non est eiusdem generis
utrumque verbum, cum nox succedere debeat
sub casuum rationem, mox neque debeat neque
possit.
and since there cannot be analogy except in
those words which are declined, whoever says
mox is similar to nox goes astray, both words
not being of the same genus, since nox ought to
come under the notion of cases, but mox neither
ought to nor can.

Secunda divisio est de his verbis quae declinari 15. The second division is among those words
possunt, quod alia sunt a voluntate, alia a natura. which can be declined, that there are some
(declined) by an act of will, others by nature.

Voluntatem appello, cum unus quivis a nomine I name it ‘by will’ when one imposes on a thing
aliae rei imponit nomen, ut Romulus Romae; a name from another name, as Romulus on
Rome.

naturam dico, cum universi acceptum nomen ab
eo qui imposuit non requirimus quemadmodum
is velit declinari, sed ipsi declinamus, ut huius
Romae, hanc Romam, hac Roma.
But I call it ‘by nature’ when the name, being
universally received from the one who imposed
it, we do not require from him how he wishes it
to be declined, but we decline it ourselves, as
this example of Romae, Romam, Roma.

1
That is, one in the matter of the words (i.e. ‘case’ or ‘tense’, and the like), another in the figure or form of
the matter (as with case endings or inflections, which are signaled by differences in letters).

24
De his duabus partibus voluntaria declinatio But of these two parts of voluntary declension,
refertur ad consuetudinem, naturalis ad one is referred to custom [or usage (Taylor)],
rationem. the other to natural reason.

Quare proinde ac simile conferre non oportet ac
dicere, ut sit ab Roma Romanus, sic ex Capua
dici oportere Capuanus, quod in consuetudine
vehementer natat, quod declinantes imperite
rebus nomina imponunt,
16. For that reason, accordingly, one ought not
to even posit a comparative similarity and claim
that Capuanus ought to be derived from Capua
just as Romanus is from Roma, because in usage
things are very much in flux inasmuch as these
neologists who impose names on things do so
without any skill:

a quibus cum accepit consuetudo, turbulenta when custom has received the names from
necesse est dicere. them, disorderly speech necessarily obtains.

Itaque neque Aristarchei neque alii in analogiis
defendendam eius susceperunt causam, sed, ut
dixi, hoc genere declinatio in communi
consuetudine verborum aegrotat, quod oritur e
populo multiplici et imperito:
Therefore neither the followers of Aristarchus
nor any of the others have seen fit to defend the
cause of derivational morphology in analogies.
but rather as I have said, morphological vari-
ation of this kind in the popular usage of words
is weakly motivated, because it has its source in
the arbitrary determination of the speech com-
munity:

itaque in hoc genere in loquendo magis therefore in this process in speaking there is
anomalia quam analogia. more anomaly than analogy.

Tertia divisio est: quae verba declinata natura; 17 .The third division consists of those words
ea dividuntur in partis quattuor: which are declined by nature; and it is divided
into four parts:

in unam quae habet casus neque tempora, ut 1) that which has cases but not tenses, as docilis
docilis et facilis; and facilis;

in alteram quae tempora neque casus, ut docet 2) another which has tenses but not cases, as
facit; docet facit;

in tertiam quae utraque, ut docens faciens; 3) into a third which has both, as docens
faciens;

in quartam quae neutra, ut docte et facete. 4) into a fourth which has neither, as docte and
facete.

Ex hac divisione singulis partibus tres reliquae By virtue of this division the individual parts are
dissimiles. unlike the remaining three.

Quare nisi in sua parte inter se collata erunt Wherefore unless words are compared among
verba, si conveniunt, non erit ita simile, ut themselves in their own part, even if they do
debeat facere idem. agree, they will not be so far similar as would
make them the same.

25
Cf. Historical Prelude, p. 5:

0.5. Latin grammarians: Varro....

Varro proposed a quadripartite morphological classification of Latin inflected words based

on the categories of case and tense. The four inflectionally contrasting classes were:

Those with case inflection Nouns (including adjectives)

Those with tense inflection Verbs
Those with [both] case and tense inflection Participles
Those with neither Adverbs

The inflectional abilities correlated with particular syntactic and semantic functions: nouns
named, verbs made statements, adverbs supported and participles joined.

10. In sum.

• having case but not tense: nouns (including adjectives and articles)
• having tense but not case: verbs
• having both case and tense: participles
• having neither case nor tense: adverbs [= the uninflected parts of language]

N.B. On the uninflected parts of the Latin language, cf. Charles E. Bennet, New Latin
Grammar (New York, 1908):

139. Particles are the four Parts of Speech that do not admit of inflection; viz. Adverbs,
Prepositions, Conjunctions, Interjections.

But the particles which do admit of inflection are (in Greek) the articles.

11. On Varro’s originality.

Cf. Daniel J. Taylor, Varro – De Lingua Latina X (John Benjamins, 1996), Prolegomena,
p. 17:

[I]n the next chapter [sc. 11], Varro makes it clear that two and only two criteria are neces-
sary and sufficient for the purpose of comparing the inflectional affiliations of inflected
words. These criteria are materia and figura, by which Varro means grammatical substance
(e.g. case, tense, number, etc.) and phonological form.

Cf. ibid. Prolegomena, pp. 20-21:

In general, the assumptions about language that constitute a structural approach to linguistic
science and the principles that direct the formal observation, description, and explanation of
grammatical phenomenon are much the same for us as Varro. To be sure, there are many dif-
ferences; naturally between the 1st century B.C. and the late 20th century A.D., there are also
vast differences in the climate of opinion; and of course Varro discusses issues in terms of
the prevailing intellectual atmosphere of our time. Nonetheless Varro is able to relate suc-
cessfully sound and meaning formally, and this is the basis of language science in any age.
As Hill (1958:59-60 [= Introduction to Linguistic Structures]), explains:

26
 Language is a predominantly regular structure on all its levels. If it were not, it would be so cha-
otic that we could not master it.... Language is also characterized by irregularity on all its levels. If
it were not, language would be so rigid that its patterns could not be applied to new situations...but
in the overall pattern, as elsewhere in language, the regularities must outnumber the irregularities.

The passage reads almost as if it were a translation of some no longer extant Varronian text,
for that is Varro, Varro in LL IX.35, and in sec.51 and elsewhere in X. These broad, general
issues of linguistic theory are as fundamental to [20-21] Varro as they are to us, but with one
significant exception. For Varro, those issues are not assumptions as they are for us but are,
instead, conclusions which he reaches as a result of a lifetime devoted to the study of langu-
age. Consequently it is Varro’s major task in LL X to demonstrate that the nature of language
is indeed characterized predominantly by regularity but is also characterized by irregularity
and to show where each obtains in language.
Yet it is also an axiom of modern linguistics that words, like the other meaningful utter-
ances of a language, can be analyzed into a limited number of recurrent patterns. As Hill
(1958:5) puts it, “As in any system, language entities are arranged in recurrent designs, so
that if a part of the design is seen, predictions can be made about the whole of it....” That too
is Varro, and the simplest way of describing more explicitly what Varro intends to do in
book 10 is to describe it as an attempt to formulate formally the linguistic principles and
procedures by means of which the grammarian can classify Latin words into sets of
paradigmatically identical and related members, that is, into declensions and conjugations.

I next treat of the principal part of speech, the name and verb, as well as speech itself.

27
V. THE PRINCIPAL AND SECONDARY PARTS OF LEXIS: THE FORMS OF THEIR
DEFINITIONS.

1. An argument for re-ordering of the text of Poetics Chapter 20 on the parts of lexis.

As noted above (cf. sec. II, n. 5), I hold that the elements of language ought to have been
treated in the following order: element, syllable, noun, verb, case, speech, conjunction,
article. That is, the definitions of the onoma and the rhema, together with ptosis and logos,
should come before those of the sundesmos and the arthron, inasmuch as the former are
the principal parts of speech, the latter its bonds, as is explained at length in the successor
to this paper. If this change is made, the text reveals an otherwise hidden continuity:

[1456b 29-30] But speech is one in two ways; for it is either that which signifies one thing or
that which (is one) from many conjunctions; for example, the Iliad is one by [30] con-
junctions, but the definition of man (one) by signifying one thing.

[1456b 37-1457a 1] But a conjunction is a non-significative [1457a] vocal sound..., etc.

In explaining the two ways in which speech is one, Aristotle introduces the notion of ‘con-
junction’, making it natural for him to proceed to explain in the next place what he means
by that term. But when one puts the definitions in their proper order, it becomes obvious
that those given for the conjunction (and likewise the article) as found in the received text
do not have the same form as the others, as one may observe by laying out the definitions
with their explanations and examples in parallel columns:

Definitions: Explanations and examples:

But a name is a [simple or]* composite vocal for in double names we do not use [a part] as if
sound significative without time, no part of it signifies by itself, for example, in ‘Theodore’
which is significative by itself; ‘doron’ [i.e. ‘gift’] does not signify.

But a verb is a [simple or]* composite vocal for ‘man’, in fact, or ‘white’ do not signify
sound significative [15] with time no part of ‘when’, but ‘[he] walks’ or ‘[he] has walked’
which signifies by itself, as is the case in consignify, the one present, the other, past time.
names;

But case belongs to name or verb, the one for example, ‘men’ or ‘man’; but another
signifying according to ‘of this’ [20] or ‘to that’ according to delivery, for example, according to
and whatever others [are] such, but the other questioning, commanding.
according to ‘one’ or ‘many’,
For ‘[he] has walked’ or ‘[he] walked’ are cases
of the verb according to these species.

But speech is composite significative vocal for not [25] every speech is composed from
sound some of whose parts signify something names and verbs <in which something is said of
by themselves; something else>; but there is speech which
happens to be without verbs,)

< I mean “as words but not as an affirmation or for example, the definition of man,
a negation” (cf. De Int. 16b 27)>
Yet a part [of speech] will always have signifi-
cance, for example, in ‘Cleon walks’, ‘Cleon’.

28
But speech is one in two ways; for it is either for example, the Iliad is one by [30] conjunc-
that which signifies one thing or that which (is tions, but the definition of man (one) by signi-
one) from many conjunctions; fying one thing.

The definition of the conjunction:

But a conjunction is a vocal sound which.... for [not].... [missing]

[remainder of definition garbled];
for example, .... [missing]

* As Aristotle explains in the De Interpretatione, as with bird and blackbird in English, names may
be either simple or composite, necessitating a further emendation of the text here.

Now inasmuch as the surviving definitions of the sundesmos and arthron mani-
festly do not conform to this template, there is a need to restore their definitions to a
comparable form. In support of my approach, let us consider the elements out of which the
surviving definitions are composed:

1. The elements of the definitions.

(a) The principal parts of the foregoing definitions:

(1) significative without time, no part of which is significative by itself: the name
(2) significative with time no part of which signifies by itself: the verb
(3) some of whose parts signify something by themselves: speech
(4) which is not significative by itself, [but (missing)]:1 the conjunction

(b) The differences determining the foregoing parts of lexis taken in order:

(1) Either significative without time or with it:

(a) significative without time: the name

(b) significative with time: the verb

(2) Either no part of which is significative by itself or a part of which is:

(a) no part of which is significative by itself: the name and the verb
(b) part of which is significative by itself: speech

(3) Either significative by itself or not significative by itself:

(a) significative by itself (as a whole or in part): the name, the verb, and speech
(b) not significative by itself, but which signifies
(1) [when conjoined to names or verbs]: the conjunction
(2) secundum quid as part of a ‘double’ or ‘composite’ name: the syllable

1
Inasmuch as it is an objective of this paper to show that, while the generic part of the definition is manifest,
its difference has been lost from the text and so must be restored, I will proceed to argue that the missing
clause is “which signifies when conjoined to the others”, for which, see my Appendix to this paper, The
Peripatetic Tradition on the Place of the Conjunction among the Parts of Speech (Papers in Poetics).

29
5. Supplement: On the two ways in which a logos may be one.

By signifying one thing: By conjunctions:

Aristotle, De Int. 5 (17a 13-14) Version on the conjunction

(tr. Jean T. Oesterle): (assembled by B.A.M.)2

17a 13 (but then the question arises as to why
the definition “terrestrial biped animal” is some-
thing one and not many—for clearly it will
not be one by reason of the words being said
in juxtaposition—but this belongs to another
subject of inquiry).1
But then the question arises as to why the
speech, “Cleon walks, but Socrates sits”, is
something one and not many—for clearly it
will not be one by signifying one thing, but by
reason of the words being said in juxtapose-
ition.

Cf. Aristotle, On the Parts of Animals, I. 3 (643b 13-26):

(tr. William Ogle) (tr. E. S. Forster)

The method of dichotomy is either impossible By dichotomy (a) either these groups cannot be
(for it would put a single group under different arrived at all (because the same group falls
divisions or contrary groups under the same [15] under several divisions and contrary groups
division), under the same division)

or it only furnishes a single ultimate differentia or else there will be one differentia only, and
for each species, which either alone or with its this either singly or in combination will consti-
series of antecedents has to constitute the tute the ultimate species.
ultimate species.

If, again, a new differential character be intro-
duced at any stage into the division, the neces-
sary result is that the continuity of the division
becomes merely a unity and continuity of
agglomeration, like the unity and continuity of a
series of sentences coupled together by con-
junctive particles.
But (b) if they do take the differentia of the
differentia, they are forced to follow the exam-
ple of those people who try to give unity to their
prose by a free use of conjunctions: there is little
continuity about their division.

For instance, suppose we have the bifurcation Here is an example to show what happens.
[20] Feathered and Featherless, and then divide Suppose they make the division into “wingless”
Feathered into Wild and Tame, or into White and “winged,” and then divide “winged” into
and Black. “tame” and “wild” or into “pale” and “dark”;

Tame and White are not a differentiation of neither “tame” nor “pale” is a differentiation of
Feathered, but are the commencement of an “winged,” but the beginning of another line of
independent bifurcation, and are foreign to the differentiation, and can come in here only by
series at the end of which they are introduced. accident.

As we said then, we must define at the outset by Therefore, as I say, in dividing we must disting-
a multiplicity of [25] differentia. uish the one original group forthwith by numer-
ous differentiae;

1
Cf. the following text.
2
While it may not be possible to determine whether such an explanation originally belonged to the Poetics,
my proposed supplement is nevertheless consistent with it.

30
If we do so, privative terms will be available, and then too the privative terms will make valid
which are unavailable to the dichotomist. differentiae, which they will never do in the sys-
tem of dichotomy.

Cf. Aristotle, On the Parts of Animals, I. 3 (643b 16-19) (ed. Loeb; tr. B.A.M.):

e)a\n de\ mh\ diafora=j lamba/n$ tij diafora/n, But if they do take the differentia of the dif-
a)nagkai=on, w(/sper sunde/sm% to\n lo/gon e(/na ferentia, they must, like those persons who,
poiou=ntaj, ou(/tw kai\ th\n diai/resin sunexh= making their discourse one by means of connec-
poie=n. tives, make their division without continuity.

[N.B. On this subject see also my separate paper on Sundesmos and Arthron.]

Note that, in the foregoing text, Aristotle says that if the adherents of the method of
dichotomy take the differentia of the differentia, they must make their division without
continuity, like those persons who make their discourse one by means of connective
particles. Now a division is continuous when it is made according to the same principle
(for which reason it is per se), and this when it is taken with respect to the differences of
things insofar as they are such things, but discontinuous when it is not. For example, if one
were to take a group of persons and first divide them into ‘male’ and ‘female’, then into
‘old’ and ‘young’, then into ‘Conservative’ and ‘Liberal’, his division would have only an
accidental unity insofar as he would be saying “they are this, and this, and this”; there
being no essential connection between the members of the division. But the same is true of
a nominal definition, in-asmuch as one composes names for a thing which have no
essential connection to one another in order to make it known in the absence of, or prior to,
arriving at its real definition. (On this point, see further below.) Speech, conversely, is
made continuous by the use of conjunctions, the unity of which, however, is per accidens
rather than per se. Hence, the foregoing text is saying that the unity given to discourse by
the use of connective particles is something other than the essential unity manifested by a
definition. But as Aristotle explains, this point must not be understood to mean that such
discourse lacks any unity at all, but only a certain kind. Cf. the following accounts:

Cf. Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics by Thomas Aquinas (translated by John P.

Rowan. Chicago, 1961 [slightly rev. B.A.M.]), nn. 1339-1341:

1339. Now it is evident (584). Second he proves the solution which was given. He says that
it is evident that definition and essence belong primarily and unqualifiedly to substances, yet
not to substances alone since in a sense accidents also have a definition and essence, though
not in the first way. This is made clear as follows: not every logos by which a word is
explained is the same as a definition, nor is the word explained by each logos always
something defined; but it is proper that there should be a definition of any determinate
logos, namely, of one that signifies one thing. For if I say that Socrates is white and
musical and curly-headed, this logos does not signify one thing, except perhaps acci-
dentally, but signifies many; and therefore such a logos is not a definition.1

1
deinde cum dicit illud autem probat secundo positam solutionem dicens, illud palam esse quod definitio et
quod quid erat esse, primo et simpliciter est substantiarum, non tamen solum et substantiarum, cum etiam
accidentia aliquo modo habeant definitionem et quod quid erat esse, non tamen primum. et hoc sic patet. non
enim omnis ratio, qua nomen per rationem exponitur, idem est quod definitio; nec nomen expositum per
quamcumque rationem, semper est definitum; sed alicui determinatae rationi competit quod sit definitio; illi

31
 1340. However, it is not enough that the thing signified by a logos should be one thing from
the viewpoint of continuity in order that there may be a definition of it; for then the “Iliad,”
i.e., the poem about the Trojan war, would be a definition, because that war was waged over
a continuous period of time.1 Nor again is it enough that the thing should be one by connec-
tion; for example, if I were to say that a house is stones and mortar and wood, this logos
would not be a definition of a house. But a logos that signifies one thing will be a defini-
tion if it signifies in some one of those senses in which the term one is predicated ess-
entially; for the term one is used in as many senses as being is. And in one sense being
signifies this particular thing, and in another, quantity, and in another, quality, and so on for
the other categories. Yet it is predicated primarily of substance and secondarily of the other
categories. Therefore the term one in an unqualified sense will apply primarily to substance
and secondarily to the other categories.2

1341. If, then, it is characteristic of the notion of definition that it should signify one thing, it
follows that there will be a definition of white man, because white man is in a sense one
thing. But the logos of white will be a definition in a different sense than the logos of
substance, because the logos of substance will be a definition in a primary sense, and the
logos of white will be a definition in a secondary sense, just as the term one is predicated of
each in a primary and in a secondary sense.3

A. On the notion of ‘unity’.

Cf. Michael A. Augros, Unpublished Paper:

35) CAUSE OF UNITY. “Si enim diversa in aliquo uniantur, necesse est huius unionis
causam esse aliquam: non enim diversa secundum se uniuntur.”4 Summa I Q65 A1 C.

36) UNITY OF MANY. From De Anima (Q1 A11 C, p 323 De Potentia): “Ex pluribus
enim actu existentibus non fit unum simpliciter, nisi sit aliquid uniens et aliquo modo ligans
ea ad invicem.”5

This is an important principle for understanding how the soul and the body are one, like the
wax candle and its shape. It is also important for understanding how a number is one
number, and not a bundle of units.

scilicet quae significat unum. si enim dicam quod socrates est albus et musicus et crispus, ista ratio non
significat unum, sed multa, nisi forte per accidens, et ideo talis ratio non est definitio.
1
In truth, the Iliad is one by the words of which it consists being joined by conjunctions.
2
non tamen sufficit quod sit unum in continuitate illud quod per rationem significatur, ad hoc quod sit
definitio. sic enim ilias, idest poema de bello troiano esset definitio, quia illud bellum in quadam continuitate
temporis est peractum. aut etiam non sufficit quod sit unum per colligationem; sicut haec ratio non esset
definitio domus, si dicerem, quod domus est lapides et cementum et ligna. sed tunc ratio significans unum
erit definitio, si significet unum aliquod illorum modorum, quorum quoties unum per se dicitur. unum enim
dicitur multipliciter sicut et ens. ens autem hoc quidem significat hoc aliquid, aliud quantitatem, aliud
qualitatem, et sic de aliis; et tamen per prius substantiam et consequenter alia. ergo simpliciter unum per
prius erit in substantia, et per posterius in aliis.
3
si igitur ad rationem definitionis pertinet quod significet unum, sequitur quod erit ratio albi hominis
definitio, quia albus homo est quodammodo unum. sed alio modo erit definitio ratio albi, et ratio substantiae;
quia ratio substantiae erit definitio per prius, ratio albi per posterius, sicut unum per prius et posterius de
utroque dicitur.
4
“For if diverse things be united in something, there must be some cause of this union: for diverse things are
not united by themselves.” (Summa Theol., Ia, q. 65, art. 1, c., tr. B.A.M.).
5
“For from many things existing in act one thing does not come to be simply, unless there be something
uniting and in some way binding them to each other.” (De Pot., q. 1, art. 11, c., tr. B.A.M.).

32
 Also, from SCG BK I, Ch 18: “In every composed thing there must be act and ability. For
several things cannot become one simply speaking unless among them something is act and
something is ability.”

B. On the two kinds of unity.

Cf. Michael A. Augros, Unpublished Paper:

Aristotle first lays down that definition is speech of what something is (93b29) (horismos
d’epeide legetai einai logos tou ti esti), although there is another meaning of “definition”, i.e.
the nominal sort, which gives the meaning of the name and does not say what the thing is.
(Note: the definition of definition makes “definition” both a defining thing and a thing
defined.)

P 194 There are two kinds of unity to speech. 1) Accidental connection, e.g. the Iliad is
one speech in this way, and this is the type of unity in the nominal definition (name all kinds
of things that happen to be in one subject, none of which is found with the other of necessity
or which perfects the others). E.g. although “risible” and “tool-making” both belong to the
same thing and each of necessity, yet they do not make something one per se, but through
the thing to which they belong—“risible” is not a way of being “tool-making”, nor vice
versa. 2) Non-accidental connection. This is the unity found in a real definition. But there is
a third way of defining, i.e. through manifesting the propter quid.
The nominal definition signifies but does not demonstrate the quod quid. E.g. “parallels”
are “coplanar nonmeeting straight lines”. This definition signifies not just an accidents of
parallels, but in some way what they are, though without manifesting the causes of parallels
which make them possible, i.e. “coplanar straight lines not meeting because they make equal
angles with a third cutting line”. The real definition demonstrates the quid est, and differs
from the propter quid demonstration by position only (p 194).

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Concerning the Union of the Word Incarnate, art. 3, obj. 10, c.
(excerpt) (tr. Jason West):

Objection 10: Further, according to the Philosopher in 10 Metaphys. 15-6, from many things,
one of which is in potency and the other is not, does not come one thing, but many things.
Hence when I say “man is a two-footed animal”, something one is predicated of man; but not
when it is said “Socrates is a white musician”. But humanity and divinity are not related as
potency and act. Therefore, when it is said Christ is God and man there is not one thing
posited, but many things. And thus Christ is not one but two.

c. ...However, a two-footed animal, which is predicated of Socrates, is one and not many,
since one of them is compared to the other as potency is to act, as is said in VIII Metaphys.
[text. 15-6]1 Now white and musical are not related to each other in this way; and thus
Socrates insofar as he is white and musical is many, indeed not simply, but in a certain
respect.2 This is because it is according to accidents that something is said to be in a certain
respect, and not simply. But something that is a being is called one or many simply,
according to substance.1

1
Praeterea, secundum Philosophum, in viii Metaph., ex pluribus quorum unum est in potentia et aliud non,
non fit aliquid unum, sed multa. Unde cum dico: homo est animal bipes, praedicatur de homine aliquid
unum; non autem cum dicitur, Socrates est albus musicus. Sed humanitas et divinitas non se habent ut
potentia et actus. Ergo cum dicitur, Christus est Deus et homo, non ponitur unum, sed multa; et ita Christus
non est unum, sed duo.

33
 1
(i.e. being two-footed is a way of being an animal, whereas being white is not a way of
being musical. Cf. Aquinas, In Metaph. Marietti, 8, lect. 5, 1755 A. Cf. obj. 10.ys).
2
(Cf. obj. 10).

In sum:

For two things to be one simply, one must be related to the other as potency to act,
as in the definition “two-footed animal” as applied to man, ‘animal’ is in potency to the de-
termination ‘two-footed’, with the result that their composition produces one thing; such a
definition being a unity per se. But when it is said of Socrates that he is “white and musi-
cal” no such unity arises inasmuch as ‘white’ is not a way of being ‘musical’, nor is one
perfective of the other. Hence, we observe the root of the distinction Aristotle makes be-
tween speech that is one “by conjunctions” and speech that is one by signifying one thing:
For to take the differentia of the differentia, rather than founding a division on the way in
which things differ precisely insofar as they are such things, results in an accidental com-
bination of names having no more unity than a string of words joined by nothing more than
connectives; such things being “one by conjunctions”. And note that the unity of a verb
intertwined or combined with a name is like that of the genus and differentia com-posing a
definition; for, as a passage we have met with above explains,

“[j]ust as there are ships made of one piece of wood only, …similarly there are [speeches]
which need no binding, e.g. Swkra/thj peripatei=, Swkra/thj u(giai/nei ‘Socrates [walks]’,
‘Socrates flourishes’ (GG I.3, 515, 28-29). There is a certain natural union between the noun
and the verb, it is claimed, comparable to that between form and matter; this is why they do
not need binding”.1

Quod enim animal bipes, quod praedicatur de Socrate, sit unum et non multa, ex hoc contingit, quia unum
eorum comparatur ad alterum ut potentia ad actum, ut dicitur in viii Metaph. Album autem et musicum non
sic se habent ad invicem; et ideo Socrates, in quantum est albus et musicus, est multa, non quidem
simpliciter, sed secundum quid. Sicut et secundum accidentia dicitur aliquid esse secundum quid, et non
simpliciter. Secundum substantiam autem dicitur aliquid unum et multa simpliciter sicut ens. Sed secundum
Philosophum, in v Metaph., substantia secundum duos modos dicitur, scilicet: suppositum, quod de alio non
praedicatur; et forma, vel natura speciei, quae de supposito praedicatur. Et haec quidem in creaturis puris
non sunt simul unum et multa. Non est enim una numero essentia diversorum suppositorum, nec iterum
invenitur in creaturis puris aliquod unum suppositum habens duas naturales substantias. Sed hoc singulare
est in Christo; primum autem est singulare in tribus personis divinis. Manifestum est ergo quod Christus
potest dici aliqualiter unum, quia est unum supposito; et aliqualiter multa, vel duo, quia est habens duas
naturas. Multo amplius quam Socrates, de quo praedicatur unum, in quantum est unum subiecto; multa, in
quantum est album et musicum.
1
Anneli Luhtala, Grammar and Philosophy in Late Antiquity (Amsterdam & Philadelphia: John Benjamins
Publishing Co., 2004), p. 134. Note how I have had to change Luhtala’s “is walking” to “walks” in order to
avoid the inconsistency of including the copula, since it conjoins in a manner similar to a conjunction.

34
VI. SOME OBSERVATIONS ON THE NAME AND SPEECH.

1. Comparison of texts:

(Poet. 20. 1457a 11-13) (tr. B.A.M.) (De Int. 2 16b 19-25) (tr. Jean T. Oesterle, rev.)

But a name is a [simple or] composite vocal 16a 19 A name, then, is a vocal sound signifi-
sound significative without time, no part of cative by convention [kata\ sunth/khn], with-
which is significative by itself; out time, no part of which is significative separ-
ately;

<…>

for in double names we do not use [a part] as if 16a 22 However the case is not exactly the same
it signifies by itself, for example, in ‘Theodore’ in simple names and composite names; for in
‘doron’ [i.e. ‘gift’] does not signify. the former the part is in no way significant, but
in the latter the part has meaning but of nothing
apart from the word, as “fast” in “breakfast.”
[following text moved from above:]

[N.B. See the next text cited for a parallel to this 16a 21 for in the name “Campbell” the part
exception.] “bell,” as such signifies nothing, although in the
expression “camp bell” it does.

Cf. Aristotle, Poetics ch. 21 (1457a 32—1457b 36) (tr. B.A.M.):

But of the forms of ‘name’ [onomatos eide], some in fact are single [haploun]—and by
‘single’ I mean what is not composed from things signifying, like ge [= ‘earth’, cp. Engl.
‘dirt’]—but some double [diploun]. Of the latter, however, some are either composed of
things signifying and things not signifying (although within the name there is no ‘signifying’
and ‘not signifying’),1 or of both signifying.2 But there may be a triple [triploun] and a
quadruple [tetraploun] name, and [35] a multiple [pollaploun], like many Massalian
expressions,3 e.g., ‘Hermo-caico-xanthus’.

Cf. Aristotle, De Int. ch. 2 (16b 19-25):

(tr. E. M. Edghill) (tr. Jean T. Oesterle)

By a noun we mean a sound significant by 16a 19 A name, then, is a vocal sound signifi-
convention, which has [20] no reference to time, cant by convention, without time, no part of
and of which no part is significant apart from which is significant separately;
the rest.

1
That is, as parts of the name they are not significant since the name as a whole has been imposed in order to
signify that upon which the name has been placed.
2
Note that in a text to be cited below, Averroes’ description of the name and the verb as being “composed
from many vocal sounds, whether two or three or four”, etc. anticipates Aristotle’s, “But there may be a
triple and a quadruple name, and a multiple,” etc. in the present text.
3
The translation follows Kassel’s reading, but the text may be corrupt here. Twining proposes tw=n me/galA
DiwKONtwn, “i.e. those who affect, aim at, are fond of, grandeur and pomp of expression; who love hard
words, as we say”. He goes on to remark that if the capitalized letters are omitted, one is left with the reading
of the manuscripts: me/gal**iw***twn.

35
In the noun ‘Fairsteed,’ the part ‘steed’ has no 16a 21 for in the name “Campbell” the part
significance in and by itself, as in the phrase “bell,” as such signifies nothing, although in the
‘fair steed.’ expression “camp bell” it does.

Yet there is a difference between simple and 16a 22 However the case is not exactly the same
composite nouns; in simple names and composite names;

for in the former the part is in no way signifi- for in the former the part is in no way signifi-
cant, in the latter it contributes to the meaning cant, but in the latter the part has meaning but of
of the whole, although it has not an independent nothing apart from the word,
meaning.

Thus in the word ‘pirate-boat’ the word ‘boat’ as “fast” in “breakfast.”

has no meaning except as part of the whole
word.

Cf. Aristotle, De Int. ch. 4 (16b 26-32):

(tr. E. M. Edghill) (tr. Jean T. Oesterle)

A sentence is a significant portion of speech,
some parts of which have an independent mean-
ing, that is to say, as an utterance, though not as
the expression of any positive judgement.
Let me explain.
16b 26 Speech” is significant vocal sound, some
parts of which are significant separately, i.e., as
words but not as an affirmation.1
16b 28 Let me explain.

The word ‘human’ has meaning, but does not
constitute a proposition, either positive or
negative. It is only when other words are added
that the whole will form an affirmation or
denial.
The word “animal” signifies something, but it
does not signify that it is or that it is not; it will
be an affirmation or negation, however, if
something is added.

But if we separate one syllable of the word 16b 30 But one syllable of “animal” does not
‘human’ from the other, it has no meaning; signify anything; similarly, in the word “fowl,”
similarly in the word ‘mouse’, the part ‘ouse’ “owl” does not signify anything in itself, but is
has no meaning in itself, but is merely a sound. only a vocal sound [and so is a simple name].

In composite words, indeed, the parts contribute In composite names, however, the part does sig-
to the meaning of the whole; yet, as has been nify something, but not in itself, as has been
pointed out, they have not an independent said.
meaning.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In I Peri Herm., lect. 4, nn. 8-10 (tr. Jean T. Oesterle):

8. The fifth part is the fourth difference, no part of which is significant separately, that is,
separated from the whole name; but it is related to the signification of the name according as
it is in the whole. The reason for this is that signification is a quasi-form of the name. But no
separated part has the form of the whole; just as the hand separated from the man does not
have the human form. This difference distinguishes the name from speech, some parts of
which signify separately, as for example in “just man.”

1
Cf. here our additions to the definition of speech in the text of the Poetics given above.

36
 9. When he says, for in the name “Campbell” the part “bell” as such signifies nothing, etc.,
he explains the definition. First he explains the last part of the definition; secondly, the third
part, by convention. The first two parts were explained in what preceded, and the fourth part,
without time, will be explained later in the section on the verb. And first he explains the last
part by means of a composite name; then he shows what the difference is between simple
and composite names where he says, However the case is not exactly the same in simple
names and composite names, etc.

First, then, he shows that a part separated from a name signifies nothing. To do this he uses a
composite name because the point is more striking there. For in the name “Campbell” the
part “bell” per se signifies nothing, although it does signify something in the phrase “camp
bell.” The reason for this is that one name is imposed to signify one simple conception; but
that from which a name is imposed to signify is different from that which a name signifies.
For example, the name “pedigree”, is imposed from pedis and grus [crane’s foot] which it
does not signify, to signify the concept of a certain thing. Hence, a part of the composite
name—which composite name is imposed to signify a simple concept—does not signify a
part of the composite conception from which the name is imposed to signify.1 Speech, on the
other hand, does signify a composite conception. Hence, a part of speech signifies a part of
the composite conception.2

10. When he says, However, the case is not exactly the same in simple names and composite
names, etc., he shows that there is a difference between simple and composite names in
regard to their parts not signifying separately. Simple names are not the same as composite
names in this respect because in simple names a part is in no way significant, either accord-
ing to truth or according to appearance, but in composite names the part has meaning, i.e.,
has the appearance of signifying; yet a part of it signifies nothing, as is said of the name
“breakfast.”

The reason for this difference is that the simple name is imposed to signify a simple concept
and is also imposed from a simple concept; but the composite name is imposed from a
composite conception, and hence has the appearance that a part of it signifies.3

1
Note that these arguments leave untouched the fact that parts of words are nonetheless meaningful, as being
indicative of something, as certain sounds of voice as parts of names signify the plural, or the genitive or
accusative cases, and the like. See further below.
2
quinto, ponit quartam differentiam cum subdit: cuius nulla pars est significativa separata, scilicet a toto
nomine; comparatur tamen ad significationem nominis secundum quod est in toto. quod ideo est, quia signif-
icatio est quasi forma nominis; nulla autem pars separata habet formam totius, sicut manus separata ab
homine non habet formam humanam. et per hoc distinguitur nomen ab oratione, cuius pars significat
separata; ut cum dicitur, homo iustus. deinde cum dicit: in nomine enim quod est etc., manifestat praemissam
definitionem. et primo, quantum ad ultimam particulam; secundo, quantum ad tertiam; ibi: secundum vero
placitum etc.. nam primae duae particulae manifestae sunt ex praemissis; tertia autem particula, scilicet sine
tempore, manifestabitur in sequentibus in tractatu de verbo. circa primum duo facit: primo, manifestat
propositum per nomina composita; secundo, ostendit circa hoc differentiam inter nomina simplicia et
composita; ibi: at vero non quemadmodum etc.. manifestat ergo primo quod pars nominis separata nihil
significat, per nomina composita, in quibus hoc magis videtur. in hoc enim nomine quod est equiferus, haec
pars ferus, per se nihil significat sicut significat in hac oratione, quae est equus ferus. cuius ratio est quod
unum nomen imponitur ad significandum unum simplicem intellectum; aliud autem est id a quo imponitur
nomen ad significandum, ab eo quod nomen significat; sicut hoc nomen lapis imponitur a laesione pedis,
quam non significat: quod tamen imponitur ad significandum conceptum cuiusdam rei. et inde est quod pars
nominis compositi, quod imponitur ad significandum conceptum simplicem, non significat partem
conceptionis compositae, a qua imponitur nomen ad significandum. sed oratio significat ipsam conceptionem
compositam: unde pars orationis significat partem conceptionis compositae.
3
deinde cum dicit: at vero non etc., ostendit quantum ad hoc differentiam inter nomina simplicia et
composita, et dicit quod non ita se habet in nominibus simplicibus, sicut et in compositis: quia in simplicibus

37
Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas (In I Peri Herm., lect. 6, n. 3, tr. B.A.M.):

But second, he puts down that in which speech differs from the name [or ‘noun’] and the
verb, when he says, some parts of which are significative separately. For he said above that a
part of a name does not signify something separate by itself, but only that it [i.e. such a
name] is conjoined from two parts. But he significantly does not say: whose part when
separated is significative of something, but of which some part is significative, on account of
negations and other syncategorematic terms, which in and of themselves do not signify
something absolute, but only the relationship of one thing to another.1

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In I Peri. Herm., lect. 6, n. 6 (tr. B.A.M.).

Afterward when he says, But one syllable of ‘hominis [anthropos]’, etc., he excludes a false
understanding. And this can be referred to what he has just said, so that the sense is that a
name is an affirmation or a denial if something is added to it, but not if one syllable of a
name is added to it. But since this sense does not fit with the following words, one must refer
it to that which was said before in the definition of speech, namely, that some part of it be
significative separately. But because that is properly called a part of some whole which
immediately enters into the constitution of the whole, but not the part of a part; therefore,
this must be understood about the parts from which speech is immediately constituted,
namely, from the name and the verb, but not about the parts of the name or the verb, which
are syllables or ‘letters’.

And therefore he says that a part of speech is significative when separate, not, nevertheless,
such a part which is one syllable of a name. And he manifests this in syllables which some-
times can be expressions [dictiones] signifying per se: just as this word I say, rex, which
sometimes is one expression signifying per se. But inasmuch as it is taken as one certain
syllable of this name sorex, soricis, it does not signify something per se, but is only a vocal
sound. For a certain expression [quaedam dictio] is composed from many vocal sounds,
nevertheless it has a simplicity in signifying, inasmuch, namely, as it signifies a simple
understanding. And therefore, inasmuch as vocal sound is composed, it can have a part
which is a vocal sound; however, inasmuch as this is simple in signifying, it cannot have a
significative part. And so syllables are vocal sounds, but they are not vocal sounds signifying
per se.

Nevertheless, one must know that in composed names, syllables which can be expressions,
coming to the composition of a name, signify something, namely, the composed thing in
itself, and according to this they are expressions; but they do not signify something
according to themselves, inasmuch as they are parts of this kind of name, but in another way,
as was said above.2

pars nullo modo est significativa, neque secundum veritatem, neque secundum apparentiam; sed in
compositis vult quidem, idest apparentiam habet significandi; nihil tamen pars eius significat, ut dictum est
de nomine equiferus. haec autem ratio differentiae est, quia nomen simplex sicut imponitur ad significandum
conceptum simplicem, ita etiam imponitur ad significandum ab aliquo simplici conceptu; nomen vero
compositum imponitur a composita conceptione, ex qua habet apparentiam quod pars eius significet.
1
secundo autem ponit id, in quo oratio differt a nomine et verbo, cum dicit: cuius partium aliquid
significativum est separatim. supra enim dictum est quod pars nominis non significat aliquid per se
separatum, sed solum quod est coniunctum ex duabus partibus. signanter autem non dicit: cuius pars est
significativa aliquid separata, sed cuius aliquid partium est significativum, propter negationes et alia
syncategoremata, quae secundum se non significant aliquid absolutum, sed solum habitudinem unius ad
alterum.
2
deinde cum dicit: sed non una hominis etc., excludit falsum intellectum. Et posset hoc referri ad immediate
dictum, ut sit sensus quod nomen erit affirmatio vel negatio, si quid ei addatur, sed non si addatur ei una

38
VII. THE NAME, THE VERB, AND THE PARTICIPLE WITH RESPECT TO
SIGNIFYING ‘TIME’.

Cf. Aristotle, Poet. ch. 20 (1457a 20) (tr. B.A.M.):

For ‘man’, in fact, or ‘white’ do not signify ‘when’, but ‘[he] walks’ or ‘[he] has walked’
consignify, the one present, the other, past time.

Cf. Priscian, Inst. gramm. GL II, 549, 21-550, 3 (In: Anneli Luhtala, Grammar and Philos-
ophy in Late Antiquity. Amsterdam & Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Co., 2004),
p. 131:

They (i.e., the participles) are in turn prevented from being nouns by the fact that they show
tense distinctions by means of similar forms such as verbs have. But if someone should say
that even many nouns signify time, we will answer that the difference between the participle
and the temporal noun is such that the latter signifies nothing but time by itself, e.g., ‘year’,
‘month’, ‘day’, ‘noon’, (...) and that it does not signify time through its declensional forms.
In contrast, participles do not express time as such but rather action or undergoing action as
occurring at different times; and they are [131-132] construed with the same cases as verbs,
from which they derive. They have the significations of verbs and are used instead of verbs,
none of which is a property of the noun.1

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In I Peri Herm. (= Book I, Lesson 4) (tr. Jean T. Oesterle):

7. The fourth part is the third difference, i.e., without time, which differentiates the name
from the verb. This, however, seems to be false, for the name “day” or “year” signifies time.

nominis syllaba. sed quia huic sensui non conveniunt verba sequentia, oportet quod referatur ad id, quod
supra dictum est in definitione orationis, scilicet quod aliquid partium eius sit significativum separatim. sed
quia pars alicuius totius dicitur proprie illud, quod immediate venit ad constitutionem totius, non autem pars
partis; ideo hoc intelligendum est de partibus ex quibus immediate constituitur oratio, scilicet de nomine et
verbo, non autem de partibus nominis vel verbi, quae sunt syllabae vel litterae. et ideo dicitur quod pars
orationis est significativa separata, non tamen talis pars, quae est una nominis syllaba. et hoc manifestat in
syllabis, quae quandoque possunt esse dictiones per se significantes: sicut hoc quod dico rex, quandoque est
una dictio per se significans; in quantum vero accipitur ut una quaedam syllaba huius nominis sorex, soricis,
non significat aliquid per se, sed est vox sola. dictio enim quaedam est composita ex pluribus vocibus, tamen
in significando habet simplicitatem, in quantum scilicet significat simplicem intellectum. et ideo in quantum
est vox composita, potest habere partem quae sit vox, inquantum autem est simplex in significando, non
potest habere partem significantem. Unde syllabae quidem sunt voces, sed non sunt voces per se
significantes. sciendum tamen quod in nominibus compositis, quae imponuntur ad significandum rem
simplicem ex aliquo intellectu composito, partes secundum apparentiam aliquid significant, licet non
secundum veritatem. et ideo subdit quod in duplicibus, idest in nominibus compositis, syllabae quae possunt
esse dictiones, in compositione nominis venientes, significant aliquid, scilicet in ipso composito et secundum
quod sunt dictiones; non autem significant aliquid secundum se, prout sunt huiusmodi nominis partes, sed eo
modo, sicut supra dictum est.
1
Sed rursus prohibet ea esse nomina temporum diversorum assumptio, quae fit in propriis transfigurationi-
bus ad similitudinem verborum. Sed si quid dicat, quod nomina qupque multa inveniuntur tempus
significantia, respondebimus, quod hoc interest inter participia et nomina temporalia, quod nomina illa nihil
aliud significant nisi ipsum tempus per se, ut ‘annus’, mensis’, ‘dies’, ‘meridies’, ‘hodiernus’ ‘hesternus’,
‘crastinus’, nec in propriis sunt transfigurationibus, principia vero actionem vel passionem aliquam in
diverso fieri tempore demonstrant, non tempus ipsum per se, et quod eos, sequuntur casus, quos et verba, ex
quibus nascuntur, et quod verborum significationes habent et quod pro verbo ponuntur, quorum nihil est
suum nominis.

39
 But there are three things that can be considered with respect to time; first, time itself, as it is
a certain kind of thing or reality, and then it can be signified by a name just like any other
thing; secondly, that which is measured by time, insofar as it is measured by time. Motion,
which consists of action and passion, is what is measured first and principally by time, and
therefore the verb, which signifies action and passion, signifies with time. Substance
considered in itself, which a name or a pronoun signify, is not as such measured by time, but
only insofar as it is subjected to motion, and this the participle signifies. The verb and the
participle, therefore, signify with time, but not the name and pronoun. The third thing that
can be considered is the very relationship of time as it measures. This is signified by adverbs
of time such as “tomorrow,” “yesterday,” and others of this kind.1

[Note here that St. Thomas’ examples are much more informative than Aristotle’s, and that
his explanation much more detailed than Priscian’s.]

Supplement: Peter of Spain on the mode of signifying of the participle.

Cf. Peter of Spain, Tractatus Syncategorematum (ap. Peter of Spain, Tractatus Syncate-
gorematum and Selected Anonymous Treatises. Translated by Joseph P. Mullaley, Ph.D, p.
20):

Similarly in the case of a participle there is a composition of a united act with a united
substance, as for example, “reading” only signifies the same as “who reads.” Whence “who”
affirms substance; it affirms indefinite substance and “reads” affirms a determinate act. From
this it is clear that a verb and a participle do not differ so far as the signified is concerned
because each signifies an act conjoined with an intrinsic substance. Therefore Priscian 3 says
that a participle has reference to that which is signified by a verb under the accidents of a
noun. However, verb and participle differ in the mode of signifying. A verb signifies an act
or movement in the manner of going out of a substance in the case of action or in the manner
of going into a substance in the case of passion, by virtue of which it signifies in the mode of
predicable of another and it implies an act in a mode of being distinct from an exterior
substance and for this reason it implies the composition which belongs to a proposition. A
participle signifies an act in a mode implying substance, but not in the sense of going into a
substance or of going out of a substance.
3
Priscian, Institutiones Grammaticae. Books I to xiii are edited by Henry Keil from an edition by
Martin Hertz (Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 1855), volume I. Books xiii to xviii are edited by Martin Hertz
(Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 1859), volume II. All references are to these editions of Priscian, ix, I. 9.

1
quarto, ponit tertiam differentiam, scilicet sine tempore, per quod differt nomen a verbo. sed videtur hoc
esse falsum: quia hoc nomen dies vel annus significat tempus. sed dicendum quod circa tempus tria possunt
considerari. primo quidem, ipsum tempus, secundum quod est res quaedam, et sic potest significari a
nomine, sicut quaelibet alia res. alio modo, potest considerari id, quod tempore mensuratur, in quantum
huiusmodi: et quia id quod primo et principaliter tempore mensuratur est motus, in quo consistit actio et
passio, ideo verbum quod significat actionem vel passionem, significat cum tempore. substantia autem
secundum se considerata, prout significatur per nomen et pronomen, non habet in quantum huiusmodi ut
tempore mensuretur, sed solum secundum quod subiicitur motui, prout per participium significatur. et ideo
verbum et participium significant cum tempore, non autem nomen et pronomen. tertio modo, potest
considerari ipsa habitudo temporis mensurantis; quod significatur per adverbia temporis, ut cras, heri et
huiusmodi.

40
VIII. THE SEVERAL ACCOUNTS OF ‘SPEECH’ IN RELATION TO NAMES, VERBS,
THE DEFINITION, AND THE SYLLABLE.

1. Speech in relation to names and verbs, manifesting that it does not necessarily involve a
verb, as with a definition,1 although it may, as with a statement:

…(for not [25] every speech is composed from names and verbs; for example, the definition
of man, but there is speech which happens to be without verbs,) Yet a part [of speech] will
always have significance, for example, in ‘Cleon walks’, ‘Cleon’. (Poet. 20 1457a 24-28)

I.e. the definition of man—let us say it is “terrestrial biped animal” (cf. De Int. 4, 17a 13)
—is ‘speech’, but it has no verb, as when one says, “A terrestrial biped animal is” (or “ex-
ists”).

2. The name in relation to a larger whole: ‘speech’ in the form of an enunciation.

The word “animal” signifies something, but it does not signify that it is or that it is not; it
will be an affirmation or negation, however, if something is added. (De Int. 4, 16b 29)

I.e. to say “animal” is to say something significant, but it is not the same as saying “An
animal is”; the latter being an affirmation in virtue of the verb being added. Likewise the
verb uttered by itself does not say anything of anything. It then remains to distinguish the
name as word from a smaller whole, namely, the syllable, which Aristotle does next.

3. The name in relation to a smaller whole: the syllable.

But one syllable of “animal” does not signify anything; similarly, in the word “fowl,” “owl”
does not signify anything in itself, but is only a vocal sound. (De Int. 16b 30)

I.e. some names are like ‘animal’ (in English), such that no part, were it to occur by itself,
is found to be a word by itself. But some names are like ‘fowl’ where a part of it, namely,
‘owl’, is significant when it occurs by itself; but as part of the bigger word it does not sig-
nify, as the next excerpt explains.

But of the forms of ‘name’ [onomatos eide], some in fact are single [haploun]—and by
‘single’ I mean what is not composed from things signifying, like ge [= ‘earth’, cp. Engl.
‘dirt’]—but some double [diploun]. Of the latter, however, some are either composed of
things signifying and things not signifying (although within the name there is no ‘signifying’
and ‘not signifying’), or of both signifying. (Poet. 21 1457a 32-35)

I.e. in a name like ‘blackbird’, its parts are ‘things signifying’, namely, ‘black’ and ‘bird’;
but they do not signify anything as parts of the name. And note that such parts are syllab-
les, which are therefore seen to be non-significative vocal sounds. Hence, like conjunc-
tions, certain syllables are found to signify in a certain respect, albeit not in the same re-
spect as conjunctions, as we shall hereafter see.2

1
Which is also distinguished from speech as being what we call a ‘phrase’.
2
And cf. Bywater’s observation that the indivisible vocal sounds of the beasts signify by themselves, where-
as those of men signify only insofar as they enter into words understood as names. And note that “things
signifying” are what contemporary linguists call ‘morphemes’; but whole words, ‘lexemes’.

41
4. Things which signify something:

• ‘animal’ (a [simple] name)1

• ‘an animal is’ (a statement)
• ‘fowl’ (a [simple] name)
• ‘owl’ (a [simple] name)
• ‘terrestrial biped animal’ (a definition)
• ‘Cleon walks’ (a statement)
• ‘Cleon’ (a [simple] name)

5. Things which do not signify something:

• the parts of a word like ‘dirt’

• a part of the name ‘fowl’, i.e. ‘owl’, although that part could signify were it to
occur by itself; still, as a part of that word (i.e. the elements or syllables composing
such a name) it does not signify

6. Things which signify something, but not by themselves:

• the syllable [or syllables] : e.g. ‘owl’ in fowl’, or, in ‘double’ names, ‘black’ and
‘bird’, in ‘blackbird’: the part signifies, but not by itself
• the conjunction: it does not signify by itself, but [in some other way: according to
Peripatetic tradition, it signifies when conjoined to the others]

7. The syllable in comparison to the conjunction:

not significative by itself

(a) the syllable (either not at all, or else secundum quid as part of certain names, called
‘composite’)
(b) the conjunction (signifies [when conjoined to the other parts of speech])

Hence, since syllables agree with conjunctions in this, that neither signifies by
itself, Aristotle would have brought them together; but inasmuch as they differ in the way
in which they (dependently) signify, he would, perforce, have distinguished them, a
doctrine which we know to have once belonged to the text of the Poetics, as the following
passage from the Latin writer Boethius makes clear:

For interpretation is articulate vocal sound signifying by itself. But not every vocal sound is
‘interpretation’; for there are vocal sounds belonging to the rest of the animals which are not
included under the word ‘interpretation’. Neither is every locution interpretation because, as
has been said, there are certain utterances which lack signification and, although they do not
signify anything by themselves, nevertheless when they are joined with the others do
signify, like conjunctions. Interpretation, however, consists solely in articulate vocal sounds
signifying by themselves.

1
Names that are not simple being composed of two or more parts, as with ‘husbandman’, out of which one
could distinguish the significant words husband, man, us, and band.

42
 Wherefore the following conversion of statements holds good, that whatever is an
interpretation, that signifies, and whatever signifies is named by the word ‘interpretation’.
That is why Aristotle in the books he wrote about the poetic art also taught that
syllables and conjunctions are parts of language [cf. Poetics ch. 20, 1456b 20ff.], of
which the syllables as syllables signify nothing at all. But conjunctions in fact can
consignify, but signify nothing by themselves. In this book, however, he has established the
name and verb as parts of an interpretation, which, of course, signify by themselves. And
nevertheless it cannot be denied that speech is interpretation which, since it is vocal sound
joined from parts which are significative, does not lack signification. Wherefore not of
speech alone, but also of the name and the verb, and not of locution alone, but also of
significative locution, which is interpretation, are treated by Aristotle in this book, and as the
name ‘interpretation’ designates verbs, names, and significative utterances as well, this book
is entitled On Interpretation from the common name of the things which are treated in this
book; that is, interpretation….1 (In Librum Aristotelis De Interpretatione Libri Sex Editio
Secunda, Seu Majora Commentaria [ed. Migne, PL 64, tr. B.A.M.])

Evidently Boethius knew the Poetics in a version which taught the following: that
whereas the syllable agrees with the conjunction in being a non-signicative component of
language, the latter differs from the former by signifying when joined to the other, signifi-
cative parts of speech, the name and verb. We may therefore conclude with a fair degree of
confidence that a definition of the conjunction along the following lines once belonged to
the text:

“But a conjunction is a vocal sound which is not significative by itself, but signifies when
conjoined to the others”.2

As for the definitions of sundesmos and arthron which are thereby supplanted, I
believe those which survive in the text to be (garbled) versions of definitions treated in a
subsequent section of the Poetics. I have accordingly reserved their treatment for a separate
paper,3 but the Peripatetic tradition preserving Aristotle’s teaching on the conjunction in
relation to the other so-called parts of speech will be given as an Appendix to this one.

8. The definition of the conjunction: a conjectural reconstruction.

Cf. our schematization of the text:

1
Interpretatio namque est vox articulata per seipsam signifcans. Quocirca non omnis vox interpretatio est,
sunt enim caeterorum animalium voces, quae interpretationis vocabulo non tenentur. Nec omnis locutio
interpretatio est, idcirco quia (ut dictum est) sunt locutiones quaedam, quae significatione carent et cum per
se quaedam non significent, juncta tamen cum aliis significant, ut conjunctiones. Interpretatio autem in solis
per se significativis et articulatis vocibus permanent (?). Quare convertitur, ut quidquid sit intepretatio, illud
significet. Et quidquid significat, interpretationis vocabulo nuncupetur. Unde etiam ipse quoque Aristoteles
in libris quos de Arte poetica scripsit, locutionis partes esse syllabas et conjunctiones etiam tradit, quarum
syllabae, in eo quod sunt syllabae, nihil omnino significant. Conjunctiones vero consignificare quidem
possunt, per se vero nihil designant. Interpretationis vero partes hoc libro constituit nomen et verbum, quae
scilicet per seipsa significant. Nihilominus quoque orationem interpretationem esse constat, quae et ipsa cum
vox sit et significativis partibus juncta, significatione non caret. Quare quoniam non de oratione sola, sed
etiam de nomine et verbo, nec vero de sola locutione, sed etiam de significativa locutione, quae est interpre-
tatio, in hoc libro ab Aristotele tractatur, idcirco quoniam verbis atque nominibus, et significativis locut-
ionibus nomen interpretationis aptatur, a communi nomine eorum de quibus in hoc libro tractatur, id est
interpretatione, ipse quoque de Interpretatione liber inscriptus est….
2
For a suggestion of the what the missing explanation might have looked like, see the next section.
3
‘Sundesmos and Arthron’: Aristotle on the Connective Parts of Speech (Papers In Poetics)

43
Definitions: Explanations and examples:

But a name is a [simple or] composite vocal for in double names we do not use [a part] as if
sound significative without time, no part of it signifies by itself, for example, in ‘Theodore’
which is significative by itself; ‘doron’ [i.e. ‘gift’] does not signify.

But a verb is a [simple or] composite vocal for ‘man’, in fact, or ‘white’ do not signify
sound significative [15] with time no part of ‘when’, but ‘[he] walks’ or ‘[he] has walked’
which signifies by itself, as is the case in consignify, the one present, the other, past time.
names;

But case belongs to name or verb, the one for example, ‘men’ or ‘man’; but another
signifying according to ‘of this’ [20] or ‘to that’ according to delivery, for example, according to
and whatever others [are] such, but the other questioning, commanding.
according to ‘one’ or ‘many’,
For ‘[he] has walked’ or ‘[he] walked’ are cases
of the verb according to these species.

But speech is composite significative vocal for not [25] every speech is composed from
sound some of whose parts signify something names and verbs <in which something is said of
by themselves; something else>; but there is speech which
happens to be without verbs,

for example, the definition of man,

Yet a part [of speech] will always have signifi-

cance, for example, in ‘Cleon walks’, ‘Cleon’.

But speech is one in two ways; for it is either For example, the Iliad is one by [30] conjunc-
that which signifies one thing or that which (is tions, but the definition of man (one) by signi-
one) from many conjunctions; fying one thing;

But a conjunction is a [simple or composite] for < if one were to pronounce kai and te or
vocal sound < which signifies when conjoined men and de2 and nothing more, nothing will be
to the others, but is not significative by itself understood by the hearer unless they be con-
>;1 joined to names or verbs.3 >

1
While the greater part of this definition is taken from both the existing account of sundesmos as well as the
preceding definitions, the part stating the way in which it signifies, which is the species-making difference, is
recoverable from the witnesses furnished by Boethius, Priscian, and Averroes, as I endeavor to establish in
the Appendix to this paper.
2
Note that I have taken the third, and fourth examples from the definition of sundesmos in this chapter.
3
Cf. Plutarch. Platonic Questions X (tr. William Watson Goodwin):

For speech is not composed of these; yet by their means, and not without them, speech must be
composed. As, if a man says BEATS or IS BEATEN, and adds Socrates and Pythagoras to the same,
he gives us something to conceive and understand. But if a man pronounce INDEED <me/n> or FOR
<ga/r> or ABOUT <peri/> and no more, none can conceive any notion of a body or matter; and unless
such words as these be uttered with verbs and nouns, they are but empty noise and chattering. For
neither alone nor joined one with another do they signify anything. And join and confound together
conjunctions, articles, and prepositions, supposing you would make something of them; yet you will
be taken to babble, and not to speak sense. (emphasis added) (See the following section.)

44
 For example, < “Cleon and Alcibiades were
walking and talking together”.1 >

In justification of the foregoing reconstruction, consider the evidence of the following:

(Aristotle, De Int. I. 3 (16b 19-26) (The definition of the conjunction)

(tr. B.A.M.)

But in themselves, said by themselves, verbs are <for not every speech is composed of parts
names and signify something; which signify something by themselves;>7

for the one who speaks2 [20] establishes the
understanding [sc. of the hearer] and he who
hears [sc. what is said] rests [sc. in what is
said].
[for example,] if a man pronounce indeed or for
or about and nothing more, [nothing is under-
stood by the hearer unless they are joined to
names and verbs];8 for neither alone nor con-
joined to one another do they signify anything.9

But whether it is or is not (the case), it does not

yet signify;3 for neither is ‘to be’ or ‘not to be’4
a sign of [the present existence of] a thing (nor
if you say simply5 ‘that which is’). [By] itself, in
fact, it is nothing;6

it consignifies, [25] however, a certain composi- Now just as bonds are useless if there are no
tion, which cannot be understood without the things to conjoin, so conjunctions cannot con-
things composed. vey any meaning without the substance of these
words.10

N.B. I have added the last statement in order to show the correspondence of the Peripatetic
doctrine on conjunctions (for which, see the aforementioned Appendix) and the Philo-
sopher’s teaching on the verb.

1
The foregoing sentence, exemplifying both possibilities, is of my own devising.
2
That is, the one who utters a verb by itself ‘says something’; in the present case, a name.
3
That is, when a verb is uttered by itself, it does not yet signify whether the action or passion it signifies is
“the case” or not; for this, the saying of something of something is required: e.g., to say “walks” does not yet
signify that anyone walks; for this, one must form an enunciation such as “Socrates walks” or “A man
walks”, or something of the sort.
4
Rather than the participles ‘being’ and ‘not-being’, one would have expected “‘is’ or ‘is not’” to be repeated
here, as the occurrence of the latter would make the argument more unified.
5
That is, ‘by itself’ or ‘without intertwining’.
6
For this statement to be intelligible, ‘nothing’ here must mean something like “not the sign of the existence
of a thing”. But a better reading would be ‘By itself the verb does not signify that something is so”.
7
Cf. Poet. 20 (1447a 24-26) (tr. B.A.M.): “...for not [25] every speech is composed from names and verbs,
...but there is speech which happens to be without verbs, |for example, the definition of man|....”
8
Note that I have reworded this part of Plutarch in view of this very text, making their agreement here patent.
9
Plutarch, Quaest. plat. X, p. 1009 E – 1010 A (tr. William Watson Goodwin, slightly rev. B.A.M.).
10
Worded by me after Apollonius Dyscolus, On Syntax (tr. Householder), Bk. I, n. 28, p. 28. Cf. Priscian,
Inst. gramm. xvi 1. 93 (pp. 2-3) (ed. Hertz, tr. B.A.M.): “A conjunction is an indeclinable part of speech,
conjunctive of the other parts of speech, which [conjunction] it consignifies, displaying a force or an order”.

45
NOTE ON THE DEFINITION OF THE ARTICLE.

As we have seen, the definition of the conjuction has been restored to read:

a simple or composite vocal sound which signifies when conjoined to the others, but is not
significative by itself , etc.

But what of the article? Due to the wealth of witnesses in the Peripatetic tradition that treat the
conjunction, the foregoing definition proved easy to restore; not so when it comes to the article.
But cf. Ammonius Hermeias, Commentary On the Peri Hermeneias (= Ammonius: On
Aristotle’s On Interpretation 1-8, tr. David Blank, pp. 19-20).

<Distinction of name and verb from simple vocal sounds>

One might think there is a problem as to why, when he treated of simple vocal sounds
[phonai] at length in the book of the Predicaments he here again undertakes to speak about
the name and the verb, each of which is obviously a simple vocal sound. The answer is that a
simple vocal sound, a name, a verb, a thing said [phasis], and a term [horos]50 are the same
in subject [toi hupokeimenôi] and differ only in relation [tei skhesei],51 like [an apple
considered as] the seed and the fruit, or the ascent and the descent.52For when we consider
that simple vocal sounds are significant [sêmantikai] of the things [pragmata] to which they
have been assigned [tisthesthai], this is all we call them, ‘simple vocal sounds’, since we do
not in this distinguish names from verbs. But when we have seen some lack of
correspondence [diploe] among these, and find that some of them are combined with
articles and others are not, or also that some signify a certain time in addition, while
others do not, we distinguish them from one another and call those which are combined
with articles and do not consignify time ‘names’, and those which cannot be combined
with articles but are said according to a certain time we call ‘verbs’. But when, on the
other hand, we do not take each of these kinds of vocal sound by and for itself but rather
insofar as it is part of an affirmation and denial, then we call it a ‘thing said’ [phasis], as
Aristotle will clearly teach us in what follows [cfr. 16b 26]. And when he examines vocal
sounds insofar as they are used in a syllogism, we call them ‘terms’ [horoi], as will be said
in the proem of the Analytics.53 This is also how Plato spoke in the ninth book of the Laws
[878b]54….
50
These represent the four stages of Porphyry’s semantic theory.... [remainder omitted]
51
The difference in relation (skhesis) is a favorite device of Porphyry and later Neoplatonists
in general.
52
[footnote omitted]
53
An. Post. 1.1, 24b16.
54
Laws 9.878B. (emphasis added)

Here the name is distinguished from the verb because it is seen to combine with articles,
something not true of the conjunction. And cf. also Apollonius Dyscolus, On Syntax, (=
The Syntax or Peri Suntaxeōs (De Constructione) of Apollonius Dyscolus, translated, and
with commentary by Fred W. Householder), Bk. I, n. 43, p. 33-4:

43. (VI) The special function of the article, as we have explained elsewhere, is anaphora
(reference), that is, the presentation of a person [i.e. the referent of an NP] previously
identified [i.e. known to speaker and hearer]. Anaphora of nouns may be (1) par excellence,
…(“This is the grammarian.”)…. Or else (2) it marks unique possession …(“Your slave did
this.”)…. Or else (3) it may be mere anaphora, …(“The man came looking for you.”)….

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Semantically speaking, the specific difference belonging to the article appears to be that it
combines with names or nouns in order to indicate reference (anaphora) in the manner
stated. Accordingly, when considered together, we may take the conjunction and article to
mean

a non-significative vocal sound which either (a) signifies when conjoined to names and
verbs (the conjunction) or (b) only when combined with names or nouns (in order to show
reference) (the article).

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9. Supplement: On “things signifying” and “things not signifying” in the perspective of
contemporary linguistics.

Cf. The Maven’s Word of the Day, by Wendalyn. “Understand”:

A morpheme is a single unit of meaning. It can be a root1 or a whole word, as in date; a

letter, as in the plural -s that carries the meaning ‘more than one date’; or an affix of two or
more letters that changes the part of speech (the -ing in dating) or that changes the meaning
altogether (the ante- in antedating). Most prefixes are unbound morphemes, with meanings
that are independent of their context. Most suffixes are bound morphemes, that do not mean
anything on their own when separated from the root they are modifying. Under is an un-
bound morpheme, because it carries meaning on its own.

9. In sum:

morpheme (a single unit of meaning) (if a word is like ge, its parts are unmeaning)
a root or a whole word (conveying its “basic unit of meaning”), (‘date’)
a letter (‘s’) (carries a meaning like ‘more than one x’ = plural)
two or more letters that
change the part of speech (the suffix ‘-ing’ in ‘dating’)
change the meaning altogether (the prefix ‘ante-’ in ‘antedating’)

morphemes
unbound (with independent meaning, like ‘under’, = most prefixes)
bound (without independent meaning, like ‘-ing’, = most suffixes)

affixes
prefixes
suffixes

Cf. Morpheme. From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia:2

In morpheme-based morphology, a morpheme is the smallest language unit that carries a

semantic interpretation. Morphemes are, generally, a distinctive collocation of phonemes (as
the free form pin or [a single phoneme, such as] the bound form -s of pins) having no smaller
meaningful members.3

English example: The word “unbelievable” has three morphemes “un-“, (negatory) a bound
morpheme, “-believe-“ a free morpheme, and “-able”. “un-“ is also a prefix, “-able” is a
suffix. Both are affixes.

Types of morphemes [either ‘free’ or ‘bound’]

1
“Each word contains at least one morpheme that denotes its basic meaning or function—that morpheme is
called the root.” (“Classification of Signs/Morphology: Day One” by Edward Vajda) ) Hence the morpheme
(or morphemes) every word contains denoting its basic meaning or function is its ‘root’.
2
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Morphology_(linguistics) [12/21/07])
3
That is to say, a morpheme is the smallest unit of language that carries meaning—in other words, that indi-
cates something meaningful, as with Aristotle’s examples of a single letter or a syllable signifying a relation
such as ‘of’ or ‘to’ something, and hence the ptosis or case of noun or name. (B.A.M.)

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 • Free morphemes like town, dog can appear with other lexemes (as in town-hall or dog-
house) or they can stand alone, or “free”. Allomorphs are variants of a morpheme, e.g.
the plural marker in English is sometimes realized as /-z/, /-s/ or /-ɪz/. [‘free’ morphemes
are ‘lexemes’]
• Bound morphemes like “un-” appear only together with other morphemes to form a
lexeme. Bound morphemes in general tend to be prefixes and suffixes. Morphemes
existing in only one bound form are known as “cranberry” ones, from the “cran” in that
very word. [a ‘bound’ morpheme is a constituent of a lexeme]
• Inflectional morphemes modify a word’s tense, number, aspect, and so on. (as in the dog
morpheme if written with the plural marker morpheme s becomes dogs).
• Derivational morphemes can be added to a word to create (derive) another word: the
addition of “-ness” to “happy”, for example, to give “happiness”.

N.B Hence morphemes may be ‘inflectional’ or ‘derivational’; cf. The Columbia Uni-
versity Press Encyclopedia, s.v. “inflection, in grammar”:

To be distinguished from inflectional affixes are those of derivation. Derivation is the pro-
cess of forming words from other words or roots by the addition of affixes that in themselves
either have meaning or denote word function. Derivational affixes in English may be either
prefixes—e.g., de-press, un-common—or suffixes—e.g., work-er, retire-ment, happi-ness.
The name stem is given to a root together with its derivational affixes; thus in racket-eer-s,
racket is the root, racketeer the stem, and -s the plural inflection.

Hence to the foregoing list we must add the term stem as meaning “a root together with its
derivational affixes”; a root being the basic meaning or function a word possesses, whereas
a morpheme is the smallest segment of language conveying a meaning—that is to say, no
part of which conveys a meaning apart from the word to which it belongs. And note here
how Aristotle’s account of composite names relates to the foregoing distinctions (cf. Poet.
21 1457a 32-35):

composite name (words consisting of a ‘lexeme’ and one or more ‘parts’):

parts that are ‘things signifying’: ‘bound’ and ‘unbound’ morphemes
parts that are ‘things not signifying’: like the parts of the word ge, that are neither mor-
phemes nor lexemes (the English translation of which, ‘earth’, does not work here since its
part ‘ear’ is found meaningful separately, for which reason I prefer ‘dirt’)

One must therefore distinguish the parts of simple and composite words as exemplified in
the following words or parts of words:

• sing (-ing not a morpheme and hence unmeaning)

• singing (-ing a morpheme and hence meaningful, but bound)
• Downtown (-town a morpheme and hence meaningful, but unbound)
• town (a lexeme, of which the part –own is unmeaning as part)
• own (a lexeme, whose parts, like the parts of ge, are unmeaning simply)

As the reader will observe, Aristotle’s principles are compatible with, and hence open to,
the further specifications brought to light by advances in the modern study of language.

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 §

(c) 2013; 2019; 2024 Bart A. Mazzetti

See also my Appendix to this paper:

The Peripatetic Tradition on the Place of the Conjunction among the Parts of Speech
(Papers in Poetics)

And its continuation and completion:

‘Sundesmos and Arthron’: Aristotle on the Connective Parts of Speech (Papers In Poetics)

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