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Answer any two questions from this section : 2x20=40 What do you mean by a social welfare function ? If you assume that such a function exists, what properties of social optima would be considered by you ? Discuss such properties. How the efficiency wage theory can explain the presence of unemployment and wage determination ?
3.
Suppose that there is a pure exchange economy with 2 consumers and 2 goods. The endowments are w 1 = (2, 4), w 2 = (4, 3). Consumers are otherwise identical and they have utility function 11
u(x,y)
=x3y3.
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Construct an Edgeworth Box for this economy. Give a definition of a Pareto Optimal Allocation in this economy. Find all Pareto optimal allocations and graph them in the Edgeworth Box. (c) How would you define a competitive Equilibrium for this economy. Solve for the equilibrium and check if the competitive equilibrium is Pareto Optimal.
4.
A monopolist has a cost function of c(y) =y so that its marginal cost is constant at Re. 1 per unit. It faces the following demand curve : for P > 20 L0 D (P) = L 100 for P 20 P
Find the profit maximising output. If the government could set a price ceiling on this monopolist to force it to act as a competitor, whet price should they set ? What output it will produce in such a situation ?
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SECTION - B
4x12=48
t) 5.
A consumer's utility function from consumption in two-period horizon is u = C1C20 h. His income stream is given as y1 =1000 and y2 = 648. If the market rate of interest is 8% per annum, find the values for consumption in two periods which maximises his utility.
6.
earns no other income. There is 0.5 probability that he will need a surgery in connection with a health problem. In case the surgery is done, it will cost Rs. 20,000. He is thinking of going for a health insurance presently which costs Rs. 10,000. Find his expected wealth with and without insurance. Show how much he would be willing to pay for buying the insurance.
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7.
Two players first simultaneously declare Yes or No. If any of the players declares No, then each player gets 80. If both players declare Yes, then they play the following game :
2nd Player Invest Consume Invest 100, 100 60, 0 Consume 0, 60 60, 60
1st Player
Find all the subgame-perfect equilibria of the entire game involving pure strategies only. Suppose that consumer's preferences are given by the utility function 1 u( x1 , x2 ) =( xf +x12" ) P Find its indirect utility function and expenditure function. What is the theory of Second Best ? Prove the theorem with the help of a diagram.
10.
Let the optimal incentive plan be given as s (x)=wx+k where s(x) = incentive scheme x= output, w= wage and k = constant A worker can produce x units of output at a cost of C(x)
x2 = 2 and
of II =0 working elsewhere. What is the optimal wage-labour incentive scheme s(x) 1 for this worker ?
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SECTION - C
2x6=12
Production possibility frontier. Second welfare theorem. (c) Third degree price discrimination.
12. Differentiate between (any two) :
Homogenous and homothetic production functions. Basing point price and limit price. (c) Pooling and separating equilibria.
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10.
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