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Impact Calc Prefer Extinction ..........................................................................................................3 Realism Solves .................................................................................................................................4 Pragmatism - Rorty .........................................................................................................................5 Pragmatism - Rorty .........................................................................................................................6 Pragmatism - Rorty ......................................................................................................................... 7 Pragmatism Consequentialism........................................................................................................... 8 Biopower Good Welfare State ..........................................................................................................9 Biopower Good Solves Holocaust ..................................................................................................... 10 Biopower Impact Takeouts ............................................................................................................. 11 Biopower Alt Fails/Impact Takeout ................................................................................................. 12 Biopower Alt Fails ....................................................................................................................... 13 Biopower Alt Fails ....................................................................................................................... 14 Biopower - XT: No action ............................................................................................................... 15 Biopower Perm Solvency ............................................................................................................... 16 Biopower - 2AC 1/5 ........................................................................................................................ 17 2AC 2/5.......................................................................................................................................18 2AC 3/5...................................................................................................................................... 19 2AC 4/5 ..................................................................................................................................... 20 2AC 5/5...................................................................................................................................... 21 Poverty K Plan Key .................................................................................................................... 22 Poverty K Undermines Justice ...................................................................................................... 23 CLS Alt Fails ............................................................................................................................. 24 Capitalism Solves Tech ................................................................................................................. 25 Capitalism Solves Everything ......................................................................................................... 26 Capitalism Solves Overpop Lx ........................................................................................................ 27 Capitalism - Overop Impact ............................................................................................................. 28 Capitalism Solves Disease .............................................................................................................. 29 Capitalism Solves Rights/Trade ...................................................................................................... 30 Capitalism - Socialism Totalitarian ................................................................................................. 31 Capitalism - Cede the Political ......................................................................................................... 32 Capitalism Alt Fails ..................................................................................................................... 33 Capitalism - Patriarchy is Prerequisite ............................................................................................... 34 Cap Bad 2AC 1/4........................................................................................................................ 35 Cap Bad 2AC 2/4 ....................................................................................................................... 36 Cap Bad 2AC 3/4 ....................................................................................................................... 37 Cap Bad 2AC 4/4 ....................................................................................................................... 38 K Alt Fails ................................................................................................................................ 39

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Zizek Alt No Solvency ................................................................................................................. 40 Zizek Alt No Value to Life ......................................................................................................... 41 Zizek - Alt Fails ........................................................................................................................... 42 Zizek Alt Laclau Nihilism ............................................................................................................. 44 Zizek Alt - Perm Solvency .............................................................................................................. 45 Neg Capitalism Alt - Withdraw ........................................................................................................ 46 Neg Capitalism Etho-poltical Obligation ........................................................................................... 47 Neg Cap =/= Inevitable ................................................................................................................... 48 Neg Cap =/= Inevitable ................................................................................................................... 49 Coercion State Key ..................................................................................................................... 50 Nietzsche AT: Better off Dead ...................................................................................................... 51 Nietzsche AT: Better off Dead ...................................................................................................... 52 Nietzsche AT: Better off Dead ...................................................................................................... 53 Nietzsche Impact Takeouts ........................................................................................................... 54 Nietzsche Government Domination ................................................................................................. 55 Nietzsche Government Domination ................................................................................................. 56

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Impact Calc Prefer Extinction

The only moral act is the affirmative Extinction causes thousands of generations to die. Matheny 07 [Jason G. Matheny Research Associate, Future of Humanity Institute, Oxford University, PhD student, Bloomberg School of Public Health, Johns Hopkins University "Reducing the Risk of Human Extinction" Risk Analysis. Volume 27, Number 5, 2007 http://www.upmc-biosecurity.org/website/resources/publications/2007_orig-articles/2007-10-15-reducingrisk.html

An extinction event today could cause the loss of thousands of generations. This matters to the extent we value
future lives. Society places some value on future lives when it accepts the costs of long-term environmental policies or hazardous waste storage. Individuals place some value on future lives when they adopt measures, such as screening for genetic diseases, to ensure the health of children who do not yet exist. Disagreement, then, does not center on whether future lives matter, but on how much they matter. 6 Valuing future lives less than current ones (intergenerational discounting) has been justified by arguments about time preference, growth in consumption, uncertainty about future existence, and opportunity costs. I will argue that none of these justifications applies to the benefits of delaying human extinction.

The typical justification for time preference is descriptivemost people make decisions that suggest that they value current goods more than future ones. However, it may be that peoples time preference applies only to instrumental goods, like money, whose value predictably decreases in time. In fact, it would be difficult to design an experiment in which time
Under time preference, a good enjoyed in the future is worth less, intrinsically, than a good enjoyed now.
preference for an intrinsic good (like happiness), rather than an instrumental good (like money), is separated from the other forms of discounting discussed below. But even supposing individuals exhibit time preference within their own lives, it is not clear how this would ethically justify discounting across different lives and generations (Frederick, 2006; Schelling, 2000). In practice, discounting the value of future lives would lead to results few of us would accept as being ethical. For instance, if we discounted lives at a 5% annual rate, a life today would have greater intrinsic value than a billion lives 400 years hence (Cowen & Parfit, 1992). Broome (1994) suggests most economists and

that this preference for ourselves over our descendents is unjustifiable and agree that ethical impartiality requires setting the intergenerational discount rate to zero. After all, if we reject spatial discounting and assign equal value to contemporary human lives, whatever their physical distance from us, we have similar reasons to reject temporal discounting, and assign equal value to human lives, whatever their temporal distance from us. I Parfit (1984), Cowen (1992), and Blackorby et al. (1995) have similarly argued
philosophers recognize that time preference across generations is not ethically defensible. 7 There could still be other reasons to discount future generations. A common justification for discounting economic goods is that their abundance generally increases with time. Because there is diminishing marginal utility from consumption, future generations may gain less satisfaction from a dollar than we will (Schelling, 2000). This principle makes sense for intergenerational transfers of most economic goods but not for intergenerational

There is no reason to believe existence matters less to a person 1,000 years hence than it does to a person 10 years hence. Discounting could be justified by our uncertainty about future generations existence. If we knew for certain that we would all die in 10 years, it would not make sense for us
transfers of existence. There is no diminishing marginal utility from having ever existed. to spend money on asteroid defense. It would make more sense to live it up, until we become extinct. A discount scheme would be justified that devalued (to zero) anything beyond 10 years. Dasgupta and Heal (1979, pp. 261262) defend discounting on these groundswe are uncertain about humanitys long-term survival, so planning too far

an analysis of extinction risk should equate the value of averting extinction at any given time with the expected value of humanitys future from that moment forward, which includes the probabilities of extinction in all subsequent periods (Ng, 2005). If we discounted the expected value of humanitys future, we would count future extinction risks twiceonce in the discount rate
ahead is imprudent.8 Discounting is an approximate way to account for our uncertainty about survival (Ponthiere, 2003). But it is unnecessary and once in the undiscounted expected valueand underestimate the value of reducing current risks. In any case, Dasgupta and Heals argument does not jus tify traditional discounting at a constant rate, as the probability of human extinction is unlikely to be uniform in time. 9 Because of nuclear and biological weapons, the probability of human extinction could be higher today than it was a century ago; and if humanity colonizes other planets, the probability of human extinction could be lower then than it is today. Even Reess (2003) pessimistic 50-50 odds on human extinction by 2100 would be equivalent to an annual discount rate under 1% for this century. (If we are 100% certain of a goods existence in 2007 but only 50% certain of a goods existence in 2100, then the expected value of the good decreases by 50% over 94 years, which corresponds to an annual discount rate of 0.75%.) As Ng (1989) has pointed out, a constant annual discount rate of 1% implies that we are more than 99.99% certain of not surviving the next 1,000 years. Such pessimism seems unwarranted. A last argument for intergenerational discounting is from opportunity costs: without discounting, we would always invest our money rather than spend it now on important projects (Broome, 1994). For instance, if we invest our money now in a stock market with an average 5% real annual return, in a century we will have 130 times more money to spend on extinction countermeasures (assuming we survive the century). This reasoning could be extended indefinitely (as long as we survive). This could be an argument for investing in stocks rather than extinction countermeasures if: the rate of return on capital is exogenous to the rate of social savings, the average rate of return on capital is higher than the rate of technological change in extinction countermeasures, and the marginal cost effectiveness of extinction countermeasures does not decrease at a rate equal to or greater than the return on capital. First, the assumption of exogeneity can be rejected. Funding extinction countermeasures would require spending large sums; if, instead, we invested those sums in the stock market, they would affect the average market rate of return (Cowen & Parfit, 1992). Second, some spending on countermeasures, such as research on biodefense, has its own rate of return, since learning tends to accelerate as a knowledge base expands. This rate could be higher than the average rate of return on capital. Third, if the probability of human extinction significantly decreases after space colonization, there may be a small window of reducible risk: the period of maximum marginal cost effectiveness may be limited to the next few centuries. Discounting would be a crude way of accounting for opportunity costs, as cost effectiveness is probably not constant. A

more precise approach would identify the

optimal invest-

and-spend path based on estimates of current and future extinction risks, the cost effectiveness of countermeasures, and market returns. In summary, there are good reasons not to discount the benefits of extinction countermeasures. Time preference is not justifiable in intergenerational problems, there is no diminishing marginal utility from having ever existed, and uncertainties about human existence should be represented by expected values. I thus assume that the value of future lives controversial, I later show how acceptance of discounting would affect our conclusions.

cannot be discounted.

Since this position is

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Realism Solves
Rejecting realism makes it more dangerous we have to use it strategically
Guzzini 98 [Stefano Guzzini, Assis. Prof @ Central European U, Realism in Intl Relations, 1998, p. 212 Therefore, in a third step, this chapter also claims that it is impossible just to heap realism onto the dustbin of history and start anew. This is a non-option. Although realism as a strictly causal theory has been a disappointment, various realist assumptions are well alive in the minds of many practitioners and observers of international affairs. Although it does not correspond to a theory which helps us to understand a real world with objective laws, it is a world-view which suggests thoughts about it, and which permeates our daily language for making sense of it. Realism has been a rich, albeit very contestable, reservoir of lessons of the past, of metaphors and historical analogies, which, in the hands of its most gifted representatives, have been proposed, at times imposed, and reproduced as guides to a common understanding of international affairs. Realism is alive in the collective memory and self-understanding of our (i.e. Western) foreign policy elite and public whether educated or not. Hence, we cannot but deal with it. For this reason, forgetting realism is also questionable. Of course, academic observers should not bow to the whims of daily politics. But staying at distance, or being critical, does not mean that they should lose the capacity to understand the languages of those who make significant decisions not only in government, but also in firms, NGOs, and other institutions. To the contrary, this understanding, as increasingly varied as it may be, is a prerequisite for their very profession. More particularly, it is a prerequisite for opposing the more irresponsible claims made in the name although not always necessarily in the spirit, of realism.

Perm solves we can support both realism and critical theory to enable a transition Murray 97 [Alastair J.H. Murray, Politics @ Wales, Reconstructing Realism, 1997, p. 178-9]
In Wendts constructivism, the argument appears in its most basic version, presenting an analysis of realist assumptions which associate it with a conservative account of hu man nature. In Linklaters critical theory it moves a stage further, presenting an analysis of realist theory which locates it within a conservative discourse of state-centrism. In Ashleys poststructuralism it reaches its highest form, presenting an analysis of realist strategy which locates it not merely within a conservative statist order, but, moreover, within an active conspiracy of silence to reproduce it. Finally, in Tickners feminism, realism becomes all three simultaneously and more besides, a vital player in a greater, overarching, masculine conspiracy against femininity. Realism thus appears, first, as a doctrine providing the grounds for a relentless pessimism, second, as a theory which provides an active justification for such pessimism, and, third, as a strategy which proactively seeks to enforce this pessimism, before it becomes the vital foundation underlying all such pessimism in international theory. Yet, an examination of the arguments put forward from each of these perspectives suggests not only that the effort to locate realism within a conservative, rationalist camp is untenable but, beyond this, that realism is able to provide reformist strategies which are superior to those that they can generate themselves. The progressive purpose which motivates the critique of realism in these perspectives ultimately generates a bias which undermines their own ability to generate effective strategies of transition. In constructivism, this bias appears in its most limited version, producing strategies so divorced from the obstacles presented by the current structure of international politics that they threaten to become counterproductive. In critical theory it moves a stage further, producing strategies so abstract that one is at a loss to determine what they actually imply in terms of the current structure of international politics. And, in post-modernism, it reaches its highest form producing an absence of such strategies altogether, until we reach the point at which we are left with nothing but critique. Against this failure, realism contains the potential to act as the basis of a more constructive approach to international relations, incorporating many of the strengths of reflectivism and yet avoiding its weaknesses. It appears, in the final analysis, as an opening within which some synthesis of rationalism and reflectivism, of conservatism and progressivism, might be built.

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Pragmatism - Rorty
The State is inevitable- the alts ivory tower criticism fails and kills the left and any chance for chan geonly the plan can help elevate the actual suffering of the poor Rorty 98 (Richard Rorty, Professor of Philosophy at Princeton and the University of Virginia, Professor of Comparative Literature
at Stanford, Achieving our country, 1998, p. 98-99)
The cultural Left often seems convinced that the nation-state is obsolete, and that there is therefore no point in attempting to revive national politics. The trouble with this claim is that the government of our nation-state will be, for the foreseeable future, the only agent capable of making any real difference in the amount of selfishness and sadism inflicted on Americans. It is no comfort to those in danger of being immiserated by globalization to be told that, since national governments are now irrelevant, we must think up a replacement for such governments. The cosmopolitan super-rich do not think any replacements are needed, and they are likely to prevail. Bill Readings was right to say that the nation-state [has ceased] to be the elemental unit of capitalism, but it remains the entity which makes decisions about social benefits, and thus about social justice. The current leftist habit of taking the long view and looking beyond nationhood to a global polity is as useless as was faith in Marxs philo sophy of history, for which it has become a substitute. Both are equally irrelevant to the question of how to prevent the reemergence of hereditary castes, or of how to prevent right-wing populists from taking advantage of resentment at that reemergence. When we think about these latter questions, we begin to realize that one of the essential transformations which the cultural Left will have to undergo is the shedding of its semi- conscious anti-Americanism, which it carried over from the rage of the late Sixties. This Left will have to stop thinking up ever more abstract and abusive names for "the system" and start trying to construct inspiring images of the country. Only by doing so can it begin to form alliances with people outside the academyand, specifically, with the labor unions. Outside the academy, Americans still want to feel patriotic. They still want to feel part of a nation which can take control of its destiny and make itself a better place. If the Left forms no such alliances, it will never have any effect on the laws of the United States. To form them will require the cultural Left to forget about Baudrillard's account of America as Disneylandas a country of simulacraand to start proposing changes in the laws of a real country, inhabited by real people who are enduring unnecessary suffering, much of which can be cured by governmental action. Nothing would do more to resurrect the American Left than agreement on a concrete political platform, a People's Charter, a list of specific reforms. The existence of such a list endlessly reprinted and debated, equally familiar to professors and production workers, imprinted on the memory both of professional people and of those who clean the professionals' toiletsmight revitalize leftist politics.

With the left destroyed, facism is inevitable Rorty 98 (Richard Rorty, Professor of Philosophy at Princeton and the University of Virginia, Professor of Comparative Literature
at Stanford, Achieving our country, 1998, pp. 87-94)
Many writers on socioeconomic policy have warned that the old industrialized democracies are heading into a Weimar-like period, one in which populist movements are likely to overturn constitutional governments. Edward Luttwak, for example, has suggested that fascism may be the American future. The point of his book The Endangered American Dream is that members of labor unions, and unorganized unskilled workers, will sooner or later realize that their government is not even trying to prevent wages from sinking or to prevent jobs from being exported. Around the same time, they will realize that suburban white-collar workersthemselves desperately afraid of being downsizedare not going to let themselves be taxed to provide social benefits for anyone else. At that point, something will crack. The nonsuburban electorate will decide that the system has failed and start looking around for a strongman to vote forsomeone will assure them that, once he is elected, the smug bureaucrats, tricky lawyers, overpaid bond salemen, and postmodernist professors will no longer be calling the shots. A scenario like that of Sinclair Lewis novel It Cant Happen Here may then be played out. For once such a strongman takes office, nobody can predict what will happen. In 1932, most of the predictions made about what would happen if Hindenburg named Hitler chancellor were wildly overoptimistic. One thing that is very likely to happen is that the gains made in the past forty years by black and brown Americans, and by homosexuals, will be wiped out. Jocular contempt for women will come back into fashion. The words nigger and kike will once again be heard in the workplace. All the sadism which the academic Left has tried to make unacceptable to its students will come flooding back. All the resentment which badly educated Americans feel about having their manners dictated to them by college graduates will find an outlet. But such a renewal of sadism will not alter the effects of selfishness. For after my imagined strongman takes charge, he will quickly make peace with the international superrich, just as Hitler made with the German industrialists. He will invoke the glorious memory of the Gulf War to provoke military adventures which will generate shortterm prosperity. He will be a disaster for the country and the world. People will wonder why there was so little resistance to his evitable rise. Where, they will ask, was the American Left? Why was it only rightists like Buchanan who spoke to the workers about the consequences of globalization? Why could not the Left channel the mounting rage of the newly dispossesed?

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Pragmatism - Rorty
Pragmatism sees the true good of certain actions Rorty 82 (Richard Rorty, Professor of Philosophy at Princeton and the University of Virginia, Professor of Comparative Literature
and Philosophy at Stanford, 1982,Consequences of Pragmatism Pg. xiii) The essays in this book are attempts to draw consequences from a pragmatist theory about truth. This theory says that truth is not the sort of thing one should expect to have a philosophically interesting theory about. For pragmatists, "truth" is just the name of a property which all true statements share. It is what is common to "Bacon did not write Shakespeare," "It rained yesterday," "E equals mc2" "Love is better than hate," "The Allegory of Painting was Vermeer's best work," "2 plus 2 is 4," and "There are nondenumerable infinities." Pragmatists doubt that there is much to be said about this common feature. They doubt this for the same reason they doubt that there is much to be said about the common feature shared by such morally praiseworthy actions as Susan leaving her husband, America joining the war against the Nazis, America pulling out of Vietnam, Socrates not escaping from jail, Roger picking up litter from the trail, and the suicide of the Jews at Masada. They see certain acts as good ones to perform, under the circumstances, but doubt that there is anything general and useful to say about what makes them all good. The assertion of a given sentence -or the adoption of a disposition to assert the sentence, the conscious acquisition of a belief -is a justifiable, praiseworthy act in certain circumstances. But, a fortiori, it is not likely that there is something general and useful to be said about what makes All such actions good-about the common feature of all the sentences which one should acquire a disposition to assert.

Only pragmatism takes into account ethics and science Rorty 82 (Richard Rorty, Professor of Philosophy at Princeton and the University of Virginia, Professor of Comparative Literature
and Philosophy at Stanford, 1982,Consequences of Pragmatism Pgs. xlii-xliii) A post-Philosophical culture, then, would be one in which men and women felt themselves alone, merely finite, with no links to something Beyond. On the pragmatist's account, position was only a halfway stage in the development of such a culture-the progress toward, as Sartre puts it, doing without God. For positivism preserved a god in its notion of Science (and in its notion of "scientific philosophy"), the notion of a portion of culture where we touched something not ourselves, where we found Truth naked, relative to no description. The culture of positivism thus produced endless swings of the pendulum between the view that "values are merely 'relative' (or 'emotive,' or 'subjective')" and the view that bringing the "scientific method" to bear on questions of political and moral choice was the solution to all our problems. Pragmatism, by contrast, does not erect Science as an idol to fill the place once held by God. It views science as one genre of literature-or, put the other way around, literature and the arts as inquiries, on the same footing as scientific inquiries. Thus it sees ethics as neither more "relative" or "subjective" than scientific theory, nor as needing to be made "scientific." Physics is a way of trying to cope with various bits of the universe; ethics is a matter of trying to cope with other bits. Mathematics helps physics do its job; literature and the arts help ethics do its. Some of these inquiries come up with propositions, some with narratives, some with paintings. The question of what propositions to assert, which pictures to look at, what narratives to listen to and comment on and retell, are all questions about what will help us get what we want (or about what we should want).

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Pragmatism - Rorty
The concept of Truth is ambiguous the affs harms are reason enough to act Rorty 82 (Richard Rorty, Professor of Philosophy at Princeton, the University of Virginia and Stanford, Professor of Comparative
Liturature at Stanford Consequences of Pragmatism 1982) http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/us/rorty.htm

Pragmatists think that the history of attempts to isolate the True or the Good, or to define the word true or good, supports their suspicion that there is no interesting work to be done in this area. It
might, of course, have turned out otherwise. People have, oddly enough, found something interesting to say about the essence of Force and the definition of number. They might have found something interesting to say about the essence of Truth. But in fact they havent. The his tory of attempts to do so, and of criticisms of such attempts, is roughly coextensive with the history of that l iterary genre we call philosophy a genre founded by Plato. So

pragmatists see the Platonic tradition as having outlived its usefulness. This does not mean that they have a new, nonPlatonic set of answers to Platonic questions to offer, but rather that they do not think we should ask those questions any more. When they suggest that we not ask questions about the nature of Truth and Goodness, they do not invoke a theory about the nature of reality or knowledge or man which says that there is no such thing as Truth or Goodness. Nor do they have a relativistic or subjectivist theory of Truth or Goodness. They would simply like to change the subject. They are in a position analogous to that of secularists who urge that research concerning the Nature, or
the Will, of God does not get us anywhere. Such secularists are not saying that God does not exist, exactly; they feel unclear about what it would mean to affirm His existence, and thus about the point of denying it. Nor do they have some special, funny, heretical view about God. They just doubt that the vocabulary of theology is one we ought to be using. Similarly, pragmatists keep trying to find ways of making anti-philosophical points in nonphilosophical language. For they face a dilemma if their language is too unphilosophical, too literary, they will be accused of changing the subject; if it is too philosophical it will embody Platonic assumptions which will make it impossible for the pragmatist to state the conclusion he wants to reach. All

this is complicated by the fact that philosophy, like truth and goodness, is ambiguous. Uncapitalised, truth and goodness name properties of sentences, or of actions and situations. Capitalised, they are the proper names of objects goals or standards which can be loved with all ones heart and soul and mind, objects of ultimate concern. Similarly, Philosophy can mean simply what Sellars calls an attempt to see how things, in the broadest possible sense of the term, hang together, in the broadest possible sense of the term. Pericles, for example, was using this sense of the term when he praised the
Athenians for philosophising without unmanliness (philosophein aneu malakias). In this sense, Blake is as much a philosophe r as Fichte, Henry Adams

No one would be dubious about philosophy, taken in this sense. But the word can also denote something more specialised, and very dubious indeed. In this second sense, it can mean following Platos and Kants lead, asking questions about the nature of certain normative notions (e.g., truth, rationality, goodness) in the hope of better obeying such norms. The idea is to believe more truths or do more good or be more rational by knowing more about Truth or Goodness or Rationality. I
more of a philosopher than Frege. shall capitalise the term philosophy when used in this second sense, in order to help make the point that Philosophy, Truth , Goodness, and Rationality are interlocked Platonic notions.

Pragmatists are saying that the best hope for philosophy is not to practise Philosophy. They think it will not help to say something true to think about Truth, nor will it help to act well to think about Goodness, nor will it help to be rational to think about Rationality.

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Pragmatism Consequentialism
Consequences outweigh representations or justification Rorty 82 (Richard Rorty, Professor of Philosophy at Princeton and the University of Virginia, Professor of Comparative Literature
and Philosophy at Stanford, 1982,Consequences of Pragmatism Pg Pgs. 162-163)

it is the vocabulary of practise rather than theory, of action rather than contemplation, in which one can say something useful about truth. Nobody engages in epistemology or semantics because he wants to know how This is red pictures the world. Rather, we want to know in what sense Pasteurs views of
Rather, the pragmists tell us, disease picture the world accurately and Paracelsus inaccurately, or what exactly it is that Marx pictured more accurately t han Machiavelli.

But just

here the vocabulary of picturing fails us. When we turn from individual sentences to vocabularies and theories, critical terminology naturally shifts from metaphors of isomorphism, symbolism, and mapping to talk of utility, convenience, and likelihood of getting what we want. To say that the parts if
properly analyzed true sentences are arranged in a way isomorphic to the parts of the world paired with them sounds plausible if one thinks of a sentence like Jupiter has moons. It sounds slightly less plausible for The earth goe s round the sun, less still for There is no such thing as natural motion, and not plausible at all for The universe is infinite. Whe n we want to praise of blame assertions of the latter sort of sentence, we show how the decision to assert them fits into a whole complex of decisions about what terminology to use, what books to read, what projects to engage in, what life to live. In this respect they resemble such sentences as Love is the only law and History is the story of class struggle. The whole vocabulary of isomorphism, picturing, and mapping is out of place here, as indeed is the notion of

being true of objects. If we ask what objects these sentences claim to be true of, we get only unhelpful repetitions of the subject termsthe universe, the law, history. Or, even less helpfully, we get talk about the facts, or the way the world is. The natural approach to such sentences , Dewey tells us, is not Do they get it right?, but more like What would it be like to believe that? What would happen if I did? What would it be like to believe that? What would happen if I did? What would I be committing myself to? The vocabulary of contemplation, looking, theoria, deserts us just when we deal with theory rather than observation, with programming rather than input. When the contemplative mind, isolated from the stimuli of the moment, takes larger views, its activity is more like deciding what to do than deciding that a representation is accurate. Jamess dictum about truth says that the vocabulary of practice is uneliminable, that no distinction of kind
separates the sciences from the crafts, from moral reflection, of from art.

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Biopower Good Welfare State

The modern democratic welfare state doesnt trigger their impact the negs shallow analysis fails to understand structural differences Dickinson 2004 (Edward Ross. Biopolitics, Fascism, Democracy: Some Reflections on Our Discourse About Modernity.
Central European History, vol. 37, no. 1, 148)

continuities between early twentieth-century biopolitical discourse and the practices of the welfare state in our own time are unmistakable. Both are instances of the disciplinary society and of biopolitical,
In short, the regulatory, social-engineering modernity, and they share that genealogy with more authoritarian states, including the National Socialist state, but also fascist Italy, for example. And it is certainly fruitful to view them from this very broad perspective. But that analysis can easily become superficial and misleading, because it obfuscates the profoundly different strategic and local dynamics of power in the two kinds of regimes. Clearly the

democratic welfare state is not only formally but also substantively quite different from totalitarianism. Above all, again, it has nowhere developed the fateful, radicalizing dynamic that characterized National Socialism (or for that matter Stalinism), the psychotic logic that leads from economistic population management to mass murder. Again, there is always the potential for such a discursive regime to generate coercive
policies. In those cases in which the regime of rights does not successfully produce health, such a system can and historically does create compulsory programs to enforce it. But again, there are political and policy potentials and constraints in such a structuring of biopolitics that are very different from those of National Socialist Germany. Democratic biopolitical regimes require, enable, and incite a degree of self-direction and participation that is functionally incompatible with authoritarian or totalitarian structures. And this pursuit of biopolitical ends through a regime of democratic citizenship does appear, historically, to have imposed increasingly narrow limits on coercive policies, and to have generated a logic or imperative of increasing liberalization. Despite limitations imposed by political context and the slow pace of discursive change, I think this is the unmistakable message of the really very impressive waves of legislative and welfare reforms in the 1920s or the 1970s in Germany.

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Biopower Good Solves Holocaust

Biopolitics are good the Holocaust was a product of the sovereign right to kill OJAKANGAS 5 (2005, MIKA, HELSINKI COLLEGIUM FOR ADVANCED STUDIES, FINLAND; IMPOSSIBLE
DIALOGUE ON BIO-POWER: AGAMBEN AND FOUCAULT FOUCAULT STUDIES, NO 2, MAY, PP. 5 -28; P.20-22TN) Admittedly, in the era of biopolitics, as Foucault writes, even massacres have become vital.82 This is not the case, however, because violence is hidden in the foundation of biopolitics, as Agamben believes. Although the twentieth century thanatopolitics is the reverse of biopolitics,83 it should not be understood, according to Foucault, as the effect, the result, or the logical consequence of biopolitical rationality.84 Rather, it should be understood, as he suggests, as an outcome of the demonic combination of the sovereign power and bio power, of the citycitizen game and the shepherdflock game85 or as I would like to put it, of patria potestas (fathers unconditional power of life and death over his son) and cura materna (mothers unconditional duty to take care of her children). Although massacres can be carried out in the name of care, they do not follow from the logic of biopower for which death is the object of taboo.86 They follow from the logic of sovereign power, which legitimates killing by whatever arguments it chooses, be it God, Nature, or life. Indeed, the imperative to improve life, to prolong its duration, to improve its chances, to avoid accidents, and to compensate for failings,87 may also legitimate killing. According to Foucault, it may legitimate killing if it assumes the following logic of argumentation of racism: The more inferior species die out, the more abnormal individual are eliminated, the fewer degenerates there will be in the species as a whole, and the more I as species rather than individual can live, the stronger I will be, the more vigorous I will be. I will be able to proliferate.88 It is the logic of racism, according to Foucault, that makes killing acceptable in modern biopolitical societies. This is not to say, however, that bio political societies are necessarily more racist than other societies. It is to say that in the era of biopolitics, only racism, because it is a determination immanent to life, can justify the murderous function of the State.89 However, racism can only justify killing killing that does not follow from the logic of biopower but from the logic of the sovereign power. Racism is, in other words, the only way the sovereign power, the right to kill, can be maintained in bio political societies: Racism is bound up with workings of a State that is obliged to use race, the elimination of races and the purification of the race, to exercise its sovereign power.90 Racism is, in other words, a discourse quite compatible91 with biopolitics through which biopower can be most smoothly transformed into the form of sovereign power. Such transformation, however, changes everything. A biopolitical society that wishes to exercise the old sovereign right to kill,92 even in the name of race, ceases to be a mere biopolitical society, practicing merely biopolitics. It becomes a demonic combination of sovereign power and biopower, exercising sovereign means for bio political ends. In its most monstrous form, it becomes the Third Reich. For this reason, I cannot subscribe to Agambens thesis, according to which bio politics is absolutized in the Third Reich.93 To be sure, the Third Reich used biopolitical means it was a state in which insurance and reassurance were universal94 and aimed for biopolitical ends in order to improve the living conditions of the German people but so did many other nations in the 1930s. What distinguishes the Third Reich from those

other nations is the fact that, alongside its biopolitical apparatus, it erected a massive machinery of death. It became a society that unleashed murderous power, or in other words, the old sovereign right to take life throughout the entire social body, as Foucault puts it.95 It is not, therefore, biopolitics that was absolutized in the Third Reich as a matter of fact, biopolitical measures in the NaziGermany were, although harsh, relatively modest in scale compared to some presentday welfare states but rather the sovereign power: This power
to kill, which ran through the entire social body of Nazi society, was first manifested when the power to take life, the power of life and death, was granted not only to the State but to a whole series of individuals, to a considerable number of people (such as the SA, the SS, and so on). Ultimately, everyone in the Nazi State had the power of life and death over his or her neighbours, if only because of the practice of informing, which effectively meant doing away with the people next door, or having them done away with.96 The only thing that the Third Reich actually absolutizes is, in other words, the sovereignty of power and therefore, the nakedness of bare life at least if sovereignty is defined in the Agambenian manner: The sovereign is the one with respect to whom all men are potentially homines sacri, and homo sacer is the one with respect to whom all men act as sovereigns.97

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Biopower Impact Takeouts

No impact In a biopolitical world, peoples lives are controlled and directed not killed It needs a subject to stay in power.
Ojanakas 05 [Mika, " Impossible dialogue on bio-power: Agamben and Foucault" Helsinki Collegium for Advanced Studies, May 2005, Foucault Studies No. 2, http://www.foucault-studies.com/no2/index.html] In fact, the history of modern Western societies would be quite incomprehensible without taking into account that there exists a form of power which refrains from killing but which nevertheless is capable of directing peoples lives . The effectiveness of biopower can be seen lying precisely in that it refrains and withdraws before every demand of killing, even though these demands would derive from the demand of justice. In biopolitical societies, according to Foucault, capital punishment could not be maintained except by invoking less the enormity of the crime itself than the monstrosity of the criminal: One had the right to kill those who represented a kind of biological danger to others. However, given that the right to kill is precisely a sovereign right, it can be argued that the biopolitical societies analyzed by Foucault were no t entirely biopolitical. Perhaps, there neither has been nor can be a society that is entirely biopolitical. Nevertheless, the fact is that present-day European societies have abolished capital punishment. In them, there are no longer exceptions. It is the very right to kill that has been called into question. However, it is not called into question because of enlightened moral sentiments, but rather because of the deployment of biopolitical thinking and practice. For all these reasons, Agambens thesis, according to which the concentration camp is the fundamental biopolitical paradigm of the West, has to be corrected. The biopolitical paradigm of the West is not the concentration camp, but, rather, the present-day welfare society and, instead of homo sacer, the paradigmatic figure of the biopolitical society can be seen, for example, in the middle-class Swedish social democrat. Although this figure is an object and a product of the huge biopolitical machinery, it does not mean that he is permitted to kill without committing homicide. Actually, the fact that he eventually dies, seems to be his greatest crime against the machinery. (In biopolitical societies, death is not only something to be hidden away, but, also, as Foucault stresses, the most shameful thing of all.) Therefore, he is not exposed to an unconditional threat of death, but rather to an unconditional retreat of all dying. In fact, the biopolitical machinery does not want to threaten him, but to encourage him, with all its material and spiritual capacities, to live healthily, to live long and to live happily even when, in biological terms, he should have been dead long ago.115 This is because biopower is not bloody power over bare life for its own sake but pure power over all life for the sake of the living. It is not power but the living, the condition of all life individual as well as collective that is the measure of the success of biopower.

Root Cause Biopower isnt the cause of violence its the sovereign power.
Ojanakas 05 [Mika, " Impossible dialogue on bio-power: Agamben and Foucault" Helsinki Collegium for Advanced Studies, May 2005, Foucault Studies No. 2, http://www.foucault-studies.com/no2/index.html] For Foucault, the coexistence in political structures of large destructive mechanisms and institutions oriented toward the care of individual life was something puzzling: It is one of the central antinomies of our political reason. 110 However ,

it was an antinomy precisely because in principle the sovereign power and biopower are mutually exclusive. How is it possible that the care of individual life paves the way for mass slaughters? Although Foucault could never give a satisfactory answer to this question, he was convinced that mass slaughters are not the effect or the logical conclusion of biopolitical rationality. I am also convinced about that. To be sure, it can be argued that sovereign power and biopower are reconciled within the modern state, which legitimates killing by biopolitical arguments. Especially, it can be argued that these powers are reconciled in the Third Reich in which they
seemed to coincide exactly. 111 To my mind, however, neither the modern state nor the Third Reich in which the monstrosity of the modern state is crystallized are the syntheses of the sovereign power and biopower, but,

rather, the institutional loci of their irreconcilable tension. This is, I believe, what Foucault meant when he wrote about their demonic combination.

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Biopower Alt Fails/Impact Takeout

The negatives claim of Biopower being bad is ahistorical- there is no norm for its being bad, prefer our specificity AND There cant be an alt to biopower because there isnt agency to it Strout 95 (Cushing Strout, Professor of History at Cornell, 1995, The Poverty of Poststucturalism, Scholar)
Nevertheless for historians Foucault at least has the advantage of writing about actual institutions, such as hospitals, prisons, and asylums, and he affirmed the need to be empirically particular about "who is engaged in

struggle, what the struggle is about, and how, where, by what means and according to what rationality it evolves."12 These are genuine historical questions, and he had the historical merit of knowing that "what happens now is not necessarily better or more advanced, or better understood, than what happened in the past."13 Nor did he think, as campus leftists often do, that "everything derives from the market economy, or from capitalist exploitation, or simply from the rottenness of our society," or that "everyone is responsible for everything"all these recourses being "displacements that are glibly practiced today." He was, in fact, no friend of "the whole relentless theorization of writing which we saw in the 1960s," and he saw its use of linguistics, semiology, and psychoanalysis, for example, as proof that " the activity of the writer was no longer at the focus of things."14 This Foucault is congenial to historians, but his antihumanism, like that of the structuralists and poststructuralists, ultimately dismisses agency, for power in his view "is not built up out of 'wills' (individual or collective), nor is it derivable from interests."15 It then becomes as unhistorical as any other totalistic form of explanation, whether it be the Marxian dialectic or the feminist patriarchy, which explain everything in general and therefore nothing in particular. French
historians, inspired by Fernand Braudel as editor of Annales, have emphasized "the long dure" in a structural way, in contrast to a narrative of political events. They have done so to such an extent and for so long that the current editor of Annales, Bernard Lepetit, has been developing a revisionary reflection that is mplied in the title of the lecture he gave at Cornell University this past May: "Do French Historians Take Agency Seriously?"

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Biopower Alt Fails

Alternatives to biopower block critical thought Virno 05 [Paolo Virno 2005 "General Intellect, Exodus, Multitude" http://generation-online.org/p/fpagamben1.htm] Agamben is a thinker of great value but also, in my opinion, a thinker with no political vocation. Then,
when Agamben speaks of the biopolitical he has the tendency to transform it into an ontological category with value already since the archaic Roman right. And, in this, in my opinion, he is very wrong-headed. The problem is, I believe, that

the biopolitical is only an effect derived from the concept of labor-power. When there is a commodity that is called labor-power it is already implicitly government over life. Agamben says, on the other hand, that labor-power is only one of the aspects of the biopolitical; I say the contrary: over all because labor power is a paradoxical commodity, because it is not a real commodity like a book or a bottle of water, but rather is simply the potential to produce. As soon as this potential is transformed into a commodity, then, it is necessary to govern the living body that maintains this potential, that contains this potential. Toni (Negri)
and Michael (Hardt), on the other hand, use biopolitics in a historically determined sense, basing it on Foucault, but Foucault spoke in few pages of the biopolitical - in relation to the birth of liberalism - that Foucault is not a sufficient base for founding a discourse over the biopolitical and my apprehension, my fear, is that the biopolitical can be

transformed into a word that hides, covers problems instead of being an instrument for confronting them. A fetish word, an "open doors" word, a word with an exclamation point, a word that carries the risk of blocking critical thought instead of helping it. Then, my fear is of fetish words in politics because it seems like the
cries of a child that is afraid of the dark..., the child that says "mama, mama!", "biopolitics, biopolitics!". I don't negate that there can be a serious content in the term, however I see that the use of the term biopolitics sometimes is a consolatory use, like the cry of a child, when what serves us are, in all cases, instruments of work and not propaganda words.

Rejecting the paranoia of the neg is key to decisionmaking Faubian 94 (James D. Faubian, professor of anthro @ Rice University, Michel Foucault: Power, Essential Works of Foucault
1954-1984 Volume 3, 1994, p. xviii-xix) One of the key clarifying points Foucault makes is that what is most interesting about links between power and knowledge is not the detection of false or spurious knowledge at work in human affairs but, rather, the role of knowledges that are valued and effective because of their reliable instrumental efficacy. Foucault often uses the French word savoir a term for knowledge with connotations of know-how (a way to make a problem tractable or a material manageable)for this middle sort of knowledges, which may fall short of rigorous scientificity but command some degree of ratification within a social group and confer some recognized instrumental benefit. The reason the combining of power and knowledge in society is a redoubtable thing is not that power is apt to promote and exploit spurious knowledges (as the Marxist theory of ideology has argued) but, rather, that the rational exercise of power tends to make the fullest use of knowledges capable of the maximum instrumental efficacy. What is wrong or alarming about the use of power is not, for Foucault, primarily or especially the fact that a wrong or false knowledge is being used. Conversely, power and the use of knowledge by power are not guaranteed to be safe, legitimate, or salutory because (as an optimistic rationalist tradition extending from the Enlightenment to Marxism has inclined some to hope) the knowledge that guides or instrumentalizes the exercise of power is valid and scientific. Nothing, including the exercise of power, is evil in itselfbut everything is dangerous.

To be able to detect and diagnose real dangers, we need to avoid equally the twin seductions of paranoia and universal suspicion, on the one hand, and the compulsive quest for foundationalist certainties and guarantees, on the otherboth of which serve to impede or dispense us from the rational and responsible work of careful and specific investigation.

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Biopower Alt Fails

Foucaults alternative is all rhetoric cant solve Walzer 83 (Michael, Foundation Professor at Princeton School of Social Science, Dissent, Foucault: A Critical Reader vol. 30
page 65) As the conventional disciplines are generated and validated by the conventional uses of power, so Foucaults antidiscipline is generated by the resistance to those uses. But I dont see, on Foucaults terms, how it can be validated by resistance until the resistance is successful (and its not clear what success would mean). But perhaps, after all, the demand that Foucault show us the ground on which he stands, display his philosophical warrants, is beside the point. For he makes no demands on us that we adopt this or that critical principle or replace these disciplinary norms with some other set of norms. He is not an advocate. We are to withdraw our belief in, say, the truth of penology and then

support what? Not every prison revolt, for there may be some that we have good reason not to support. At this point, it seems to me, Foucaults position is simply incoherent. The powerful evocation of the disciplinary system gives way to an antidisciplinarian politics that is mostly rhetoric and posturing.

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Biopower - XT: No action

Broad, totalizing kritiks of biopower that their answers to the permutation will endorse leaves no scope for effective moral or political action Norris 94 (Christopher Norris, Professor of the History of Ideas, University of Wales, TRUTH AND THE ETHICS OF
CRITICISM, 1994, p.41-2. (PDNSS1457) New Historicism inherits this dead-end predicament without the least sign of acknowledging its problematic character. That is to say, it follows Foucault in reducing all questions of knowledge, judgment and ethics to the level of an intra-discursive force-field, an agonistic play of resistances or power/knowledge effects where the subject is just a ghost in the linguistic machine, an epiphenomenon of discourse. Nor is it in any way fortuitous that in drawing out the aporias of Foucault's position one is led to invoke these Cartesian metaphors and echoes of Gilbert Ryle on Descartes. For there is a similar problem with Foucault: how to overcome the deep-laid conflict that exists between a thoroughgoing determinism as applied to the body and its various disciplinary-discursive regimes, and

the necessary margin of free-will required to envisage any ethics or politics worth the name.

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Biopower Perm Solvency

Perm do the plan and acknowledge the importance of biopower Deranty 4 (Jean-Philippe, Macquarie University, Agambens challenge to normative theories of modern rights, borderlands ejournal, Vol. 3, No. 1, www.borderlandsejournal.adelaide.edu.au/vol3no1_2004/deranty_agambnschall.htm)

If, with Rancire, we define politics not through the institution of sovereignty, but as a continual struggle for the recognition of basic equality, and thereby strongly distinguish politics from the police order viewed as the functional management of communities (Rancire 1999), then it is possible to acknowledge the normative break introduced by the democratic revolutions of the modern age without falling into a one-sided view of modernity as a neat process of rationalisation. What should be stressed about modernity is not primarily the list of substantive inalienable and imprescriptible human rights, but the equal entitlement of all to claim any rights at all. This definition of politics must be accompanied by the parallel
47. acknowledgment that the times that saw the recognition of the fundamental equality of all also produced the total negation of this principle. But this parallel claim does not necessarily render the first invalid. Rather it points to a tension inherent in modern communities, between the political demands of equality and the systemic tendencies that structurally produce stigmatisation and exclusion. 48. One can acknowledge the descriptive appeal of the biopower hypothesis without renouncing the antagonistic definition of politics. As Rancire remarks, Foucaults late hypothesis is more about power than it is about politics (Rancire 2002). This is quite clear in the 1976 lectures (Society must be defended) where the term that is mostly used is that of "biopower". As Rancire suggests, when the "biopower" hypothesis is transformed into a "biopolitical" thesis, the very possibility of politics becomes problematic. There is a way of articulating modern disciplinary power and the imperative of politics that is not disjunctive. The power

that subjects and excludes socially can also empower politically simply because the exclusion is already a form of address which unwittingly provides implicit recognition. Power includes by excluding, but in a way that might be different from a ban. This insight is precisely the one that Foucault was
developing in his last writings, in his definition of freedom as "agonism" (Foucault 1983: 208-228): "Power is exercised only over free subjects, and only insofar as they are free" (221). The hierarchical, exclusionary essence of social structures demands as a condition of its possibility an equivalent implicit recognition of all, even in the mode of exclusion. It is on the basis of this recognition that politics can sometimes arise as the vindication of equality and the challenge to exclusion.

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Biopower - 2AC 1/5

1. Perm do the plan and acknowledge the importance of biopower Deranty 4 (Jean-Philippe, Macquarie University, Agambens challenge to normative theories of modern rights,
borderlands e-journal, Vol. 3, No. 1, www.borderlandsejournal.adelaide.edu.au/vol3no1_2004/deranty_agambnschall.htm)

If, with Rancire, we define politics not through the institution of sovereignty, but as a continual struggle for the recognition of basic equality, and thereby strongly distinguish politics from the police order viewed as the functional management of communities (Rancire 1999), then it is possible to acknowledge the normative break introduced by the democratic revolutions of the modern age without falling into a one-sided view of modernity as a neat process of rationalisation. What should be stressed about modernity is not primarily the list of substantive inalienable and imprescriptible human rights, but the equal entitlement of all to claim any rights at all. This definition of politics must be accompanied by the
47. parallel acknowledgment that the times that saw the recognition of the fundamental equality of all also produced the total negation of this principle. But this parallel claim does not necessarily render the first invalid. Rather it points to a tension inherent in modern communities, between the political demands of equality and the systemic tendencies that structurally produce stigmatisation and exclusion. 48. One can acknowledge the descriptive appeal of the biopower hypothesis without renouncing the antagonistic definition of politics. As Rancire remarks, Foucaults late hypothesis is more about power than it is about politics (Rancire 2002). This is quite clear in the 1976 lectures (Society must be defended) where the term that is mostly used is that of "biopower". As Rancire suggests, when the "biopower" hypothesis is transformed into a "biopolitical" thesis, the very possibility of politics becomes problematic. There is a way of articulating modern disciplinary power and the imperative of politics that is not disjunctive. The power that subjects and excludes socially can also empower politically

simply because the exclusion is already a form of address which unwittingly provides implicit recognition. Power includes by excluding, but in a way that might be different from a ban. This
insight is precisely the one that Foucault was developing in his last writings, in his definition of freedom as "agonism" (Foucault 1983: 208-228): "Power is exercised only over free subjects, and only insofar as they are free" (221). The hierarchical, exclusionary essence of social structures demands as a condition of its possibility an equivalent implicit recognition of all, even in the mode of exclusion. It is on the basis of this recognition that politics can sometimes arise as the vindication of equality and the challenge to exclusion.

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2AC 2/5
2. The modern democratic welfare state doesnt trigger their impact the negs shallow analysis fails to understand structural differences Dickinson 2004 (Edward Ross. Biopolitics, Fascism, Democracy: Some Reflections on Our Discourse About
Modernity. Central European History, vol. 37, no. 1, 148)

continuities between early twentieth-century biopolitical discourse and the practices of the welfare state in our own time are unmistakable. Both are instances of the disciplinary society and of
In short, the biopolitical, regulatory, social-engineering modernity, and they share that genealogy with more authoritarian states, including the National Socialist state, but also fascist Italy, for example. And it is certainly fruitful to view them from this very broad perspective. But that analysis can easily become superficial and misleading, because it

obfuscates the profoundly different strategic and local dynamics of power in the two kinds of regimes. Clearly the democratic welfare state is not only formally but also substantively quite different from totalitarianism. Above all, again, it has nowhere developed the fateful, radicalizing dynamic that characterized National Socialism (or for that matter Stalinism), the psychotic logic that leads from economistic population management to mass murder. Again, there is always the potential for
such a discursive regime to generate coercive policies. In those cases in which the regime of rights does not successfully produce health, such a system can and historically does create compulsory programs to enforce it. But again,

there are political and policy potentials and constraints in such a structuring of biopolitics that are very different from those of National Socialist Germany. Democratic biopolitical regimes require, enable, and incite a degree of self-direction and participation that is functionally incompatible with authoritarian or totalitarian structures. And this pursuit of biopolitical ends through a regime of democratic
citizenship does appear, historically, to have imposed increasingly narrow limits on coercive policies, and to have generated a logic or imperative of increasing liberalization. Despite limitations imposed by political context and the slow pace of discursive change, I think this is the unmistakable message of the really very impressive waves of legislative and welfare reforms in the 1920s or the 1970s in Germany.

3. External case impacts that the alt doesnt solve ____________________________________________________________________________________ ____________________________________________________________________________________ ____________________________________________________________________________________ ____________________________________________________________________________________ ____________________________________________________________________________________

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2AC 3/5
4. Biopolitics dont justify massacres the Holocaust was a product of the sovereign right to kill OJAKANGAS 5 (2005, MIKA, HELSINKI COLLEGIUM FOR ADVANCED STU DIES, FINLAND; IMPOSSIBLE
DIALOGUE ON BIO-POWER: AGAMBEN AND FOUCAULT FOUCAULT STUDIES, NO 2, MAY, PP. 5 -28; P.2022TN) Admittedly, in the era of biopolitics, as Foucault writes, even massacres have become vital.82 This is not the case, however, because violence is hidden in the foundation of biopolitics, as Agamben believes. Although the twentieth century thanatopolitics is the reverse of biopolitics,83 it should not be understood, according to Foucault, as the effect, the result, or the logical consequence of biopolitical rationality.84 Rather, it should be understood, as he suggests, as an outcome of the demonic combination of the sovereign power and biopower, of the citycitizen game and the shepherdflock game85 or as I would like to put it, of patria potestas (fathers unconditional power of life and death over his son) and cura materna (mothers unconditional duty to take care of her children). Although massacres can be carried out in the name of care, they do not follow from the logic of biopower for which death is the object of taboo.86 They follow from the logic of sovereign power, which legitimates killing by whatever arguments it chooses, be it God, Nature, or life. Indeed, the imperative to improve life, to prolong its duration, to improve its chances, to avoid accidents, and to compensate for failings,87 may also legitimate killing. According to Foucault, it may legitimate killing if it assumes the following logic of argumentation of racism: The more inferior species die out, the more abnormal individual are eliminated, the fewer degenerates there will be in the species as a whole, and the more I as species rather than individual can live, the stronger I will be, the more vigorous I will be. I will be able to proliferate.88 It is the logic of racism, according to Foucault, that makes killing acceptable in modern biopolitical societies. This is not to say, however, that biopolitical societies are necessarily more racist than other societies. It is to say that in the era of biopolitics, only racism, because it is a determination immanent to life, can justify the murderous function of the State.89 However, racism can only justify killing killing that does not follow from the logic of biopower but from the logic of the sovereign power. Racism is, in other words, the only way the sovereign power, the right to kill, can be maintained in biopolitical societies: Racism is bound up with workings of a State that is obliged to use race, the elimination of races and the purification of the race, to exercise its sovereign power.90 Racism is, in other words, a discourse quite compatible91 with biopolitics through which biopower can be most smoothly transformed into the form of sovereign power. Such transformation, however, changes everything. A biopolitical society that wishes to exercise the old sovereign right to kill,92 even in the name of race, ceases to be a mere biopolitical society, practicing merely biopolitics. It becomes a demonic combination of sovereign power and biopower, exercising sovereign means for bio political ends. In its most monstrous form, it becomes the Third Reich. For this reason, I cannot subscribe to Agambens thesis, according to which bio politics is absolutized in the Third Reich.93 To be sure, the Third Reich used biopolitical means it was a state in which insurance and reassurance were universal94 and aimed for biopolitical ends in order to improve the living conditions of the German people but so did many other nations in the 1930s. What distinguishes the Third Reich from

those other nations is the fact that, alongside its biopolitical apparatus, it erected a massive machinery of death. It became a society that unleashed murderous power, or in other words, the old sovereign right to take life throughout the entire social body, as Foucault puts it.95 It is not, therefore, biopolitics that was absolutized in the Third Reich as a matter of fact, biopolitical measures in the NaziGermany were, although harsh, relatively modest in scale compared to some present day welfare states but rather the sovereign power: This power to kill, which ran through the entire social body of Nazi society, was first
manifested when the power to take life, the power of life and death, was granted not only to the State but to a whole series of individuals, to a considerable number of people (such as the SA, the SS, and so on). Ultimately, everyone in the Nazi State had the power of life and death over his or her neighbours, if only because of the practice of informing, which effectively meant doing away with the people next door, or having them done away with.96 The only thing that the Third Reich actually absolutizes is, in other words, the sovereignty of power and therefore, the nakedness of bare life at least if sovereignty is defined in the Agambenian manner: The sovereign is the one with respect to whom all men are potentially homines sacri, and homo sacer is the one with respect to whom all men act as sovereigns.97
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2AC 4/5
5. Biopower isnt bad in the context of the aff the neg lacks the specificity Foucault demands Strout 95 (Cushing Strout, Professor of History at Cornell, 1995, The Poverty of Poststucturalism, Scholar)
Nevertheless for historians Foucault at least has the advantage of writing about actual institutions, such as hospitals, prisons, and asylums, and he affirmed the need to be empirically particular about "who is engaged in

struggle, what the struggle is about, and how, where, by what means and according to what rationality it evolves."12 These are genuine historical questions, and he had the historical merit of knowing that "what happens now is not necessarily better or more advanced, or better understood, than what happened in the past."13 Nor did he think, as campus leftists often do, that "everything derives from the market economy, or from capitalist exploitation, or simply from the rottenness of our society," or that "everyone is responsible for everything"all these recourses being "displacements that are glibly practiced today." He was, in fact, no friend of "the whole relentless theorization of writing which we saw in the 1960s," and he saw its use of linguistics, semiology, and psychoanalysis, for example, as proof that " the activity of the writer was no longer at the focus of things."14 This Foucault is congenial to historians, but his antihumanism, like that of the structuralists and poststructuralists, ultimately dismisses agency, for power in his view "is not built up out of 'wills' (individual or collective), nor is it derivable from interests."15 It then becomes as unhistorical as any other totalistic form of explanation, whether it be the Marxian dialectic or the feminist patriarchy, which explain everything in general and therefore nothing in particular. French
historians, inspired by Fernand Braudel as editor of Annales, have emphasized "the long dure" in a structural way, in contrast to a narrative of political events. They have done so to such an extent and for so long that the current editor of Annales, Bernard Lepetit, has been developing a revisionary reflection that is mplied in the title of the lecture he gave at Cornell University this past May: "Do French Historians Take Agency Seriously?"

6. TURN the paranoia of the neg precludes specific investigation and thus solvency Faubian 94 (James D. Faubian, professor of anthro @ Rice University, Michel Foucault: Power, Essential Works of
Foucault 1954-1984 Volume 3, 1994, p. xviii-xix) One of the key clarifying points Foucault makes is that what is most interesting about links between power and knowledge is not the detection of false or spurious knowledge at work in human affairs but, rather, the role of knowledges that are valued and effective because of their reliable instrumental efficacy. Foucault often uses the French word savoira term for knowledge with connotations of know-how (a way to make a problem tractable or a material manageable)for this middle sort of knowledges, which may fall short of rigorous scientificity but command some degree of ratification within a social group and confer some recognized instrumental benefit. The reason the combining of power and knowledge in society is a redoubtable thing is not that power is apt to promote and exploit spurious knowledges (as the Marxist theory of ideology has argued) but, rather, that the rational exercise of power tends to make the fullest use of knowledges capable of the maximum instrumental efficacy. What is wrong or alarming about the use of power is not, for Foucault, primarily or especially the fact that a wrong or false knowledge is being used. Conversely, power and the use of knowledge by power are not guaranteed to be safe, legitimate, or salutory because (as an optimistic rationalist tradition extending from the Enlightenment to Marxism has inclined some to hope) the knowledge that guides or instrumentalizes the exercise of power is valid and scientific. Nothing, including the exercise of power, is evil in itselfbut everything is dangerous. To be able to detect and diagnose real dangers, we need to avoid equally the twin seductions of paranoia and universal suspicion, on the one hand, and the compulsive quest for foundationalist certainties and guarantees, on the other both of which serve to impede or

dispense us from the rational and responsible work of careful and specific investigation.

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2AC 5/5
7. The alternative is all rhetoric cant solve Walzer 83 (Michael, Foundation Professor at Princeton School of Social Science, Dissent, Foucault: A Critical Reader
vol. 30 page 65) As the conventional disciplines are generated and validated by the conventional uses of power, so Foucaults antidiscipline is generated by the resistance to those uses. But I dont see, on Foucaults terms, how it can be validated by resistance until the resistance is successful (and its not clear what success would mean). But perhaps, after all, the demand that Foucault show us the ground on which he stands, display his philosophical warrants, is beside the point. For he makes no demands on us that we adopt this or that critical principle or replace these disciplinary norms with some other set of norms. He is not an advocate. We are to withdraw our belief in, say, the truth

of penology and then support what? Not every prison revolt, for there may be some that we have good reason not to support. At this point, it seems to me, Foucaults position is simply incoherent. The powerful evocation of the disciplinary system gives way to an antidisciplinarian politics that is mostly rhetoric and posturing. 8. TURN the alt blocks critical thought and prevent the engagement of problems Virno 5 [Paolo Virno 2005 "General Intellect, Exodus, Multitude" http://generation-online.org/p/fpagamben1.htm] Agamben is a thinker of great value but also, in my opinion, a thinker with no political vocation. Then,
when Agamben speaks of the biopolitical he has the tendency to transform it into an ontological category with value already since the archaic Roman right. And, in this, in my opinion, he is very wrong-headed. The problem is, I believe, that the biopolitical is only an effect derived from the concept of labor-power. When there is a commodity that is called labor-power it is already implicitly government over life. Agamben says, on the other hand, that labor-power is only one of the aspects of the biopolitical; I say the contrary: over all because

labor power is a paradoxical commodity, because it is not a real commodity like a book or a bottle of water, but rather is simply the potential to produce. As soon as this potential is transformed into a commodity, then, it is necessary to govern the living body that maintains this potential, that contains this potential. Toni (Negri) and Michael (Hardt), on the other hand, use biopolitics in a historically
determined sense, basing it on Foucault, but Foucault spoke in few pages of the biopolitical - in relation to the birth of liberalism - that Foucault is not a sufficient base for founding a discourse over the biopolitical and my apprehension, my fear, is that the biopolitical can be transformed into a word that hides, covers problems instead of being an instrument for confronting them. A fetish word, an "open doors" word, a word with an exclamation point, a word that carries the risk of blocking critical thought instead of helping it. Then, my fear is of fetish words in politics because it seems like the cries of a child that is afraid of the dark..., the child that says "mama, mama!", "biopolitics, biopolitics!". I don't negate that there can be a serious content in the term, however I see that the use of the term biopolitics sometimes is a consolatory use, like the cry of a child, when what serves us are, in all cases, instruments of work and not propaganda words.

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Poverty K Plan Key

The idea of poverty is key to social change The plans political struggle is crucial to solve the K Schram 2 (Sanford F. Schram, Professor of Sociology at Bryn Mawr, 2002 Praxis for the Poor)
While there is a role for writing that popularizes important ideas, the notion that welfare scholarship on its own can mobilize the mass public to support progressive change needs to be challenged as Skocpol would add that politically effective welfare scholarship is more likely to occur when it is not written simply for a general audience. Politically effective scholarship is more likely to occur when it is tied to ongoing political struggle by the oppressed. In other words, critical distance need not mean disconnectedness. A good example is the writing of Frances Fox Piven and Richard CIoward.4 They worked with low-income groups who already were struggling to resist oppression and offered new strategies
for helping make those struggles more effective. Yet they wrote no simple pamphlets or brochures to disseminate their view beyond their immediate activist com- munity. They used their theoretical writings in the 1960s and early 1970s to energize themselves and other activists and then work actively in face- to-face meetings and organized sessions to make the welfare rights move- ment a reality-one that almost resulted in the adoption of a guaranteed income Policy for the entire country. The political effectiveness of their scholarship was the result of its ongoing connection to the welfare rights movement. Their writing did not pander to the middle class with appeals that were bound to be co-opt lye. And with good reason. There are

thousands of ex- amples of how appeals to the middle clan to "leave no child behind," to "invest in the next generation," to "do it for the children," to "put families first," to think of "us all as family," and so on, never work. It is time to give up on this failed strategy, which, if it were ever to succeed, would only end up reinscrihing poor people's subordination for failing to measure up to middle-class standards. When it comes to poverty, the whole strategy of showing how "they" are like "us" goes nowhere that is good more often than not. A better approach is to

write about welfare and poverty as part of ongoing struggle. Writing disconnected from struggle is of limited political value and is always vulnerable to falling into the trap of thinking writing can mobilize a broad population on its own. Such conceit leads to the self-defeating strategies of trying to appeal to the middle class in ways that end up reinforcing the very obstacles to change that ought to be attacked. Conclusion There are dilemmas of accessibility that haunt welfare scholarship today in its quest for political effectiveness. Some seek to make their work more ac- cessible in the sense of appealing to the middle class so as to increase its political feasibility and heighten its chances of acceptance by the mass public. Others seek to achieve that same result by writing in ways that make their work easier to comprehend, often by limiting their analyses to a relatively straightforward presentation of facts. While the first sacrifices all the con- cerns that do not resonate with the middle class the second risks political ineffectiveness in spite of or even because of its simplicity. Strategies that will assuage the middle class will only take us so far. Clear factual presentations will not by themselves provide people with a reason to believe. In both cases, the push for more generous forms of social provision will not be sufficiently served by such writing. This will not give us an effective "praxis for the poor." Instead, what is most urgently needed is a counterdiscourse that can challenge the prevailing "assume the worst" discourse on welfare recipients. What is needed is a counterdiscourse that undermines the basic assumptions of the reigning discourse of suspicion and provides the basis for a credible alternative interpretive framework Welfare scholarship that can help disseminate an effective counterdiscourse will be attacking the problem at its roots and planting the seeds for a more tolerant political culture. Such work on discourse can help keep alive the capacity to dissent, and to do so effectively. And by standing outside the reigning structures of intelligibility, it creates the capacity to work more effectively within them. Work on a counterdiscourse more so than efforts that do not challenge the prevailing interpretive framework can end up creating a stronger basis for achieving the goals of more universal forms of social provision. The

potential for welfare scholarship to help facilitate social change is perhaps better realized

when such scholarship ironically seeks not to speak directly to the middle class in its accepted idiom. Rather than try to resolve the
dilemmas of accessibility, it might be better to learn to live with the dilemma of intelligibility. Critical theory, offering challenging vocabularies, can perhaps better serve the oppressed in their attempts to give voice to their marginalized concerns. Politically

engaged scholarship in this sense is neither moderate in its appeal nor simple in its presenta- tion. Instead, it is challenging in both senses by forcing all who come across it to rethink beyond the bounds of acceptable political discourse The real potential for
welfare scholarship lies in the process of changing conceptual resources available for thinking about social policy issues. Such work can make its contribution most forcefully at the very basic level of creating intellectual resources for changing the broader culture of society. It can help create new cultural resources for rethinking questions of social welfare in more critical terms. At this basic level, it can make its most effective contributions to inform other efforts geared toward political mobilization. Creating new vocabularies to give voice to marginalized concerns becomes the most important public

Working for social change involves many dimensions and must of necessity employ many different actors-some who give more emphasis to theory and some more to action. The role of welfare scholarship cannot be to do it all, at once, and for all, in writing. Welfare scholarship has its delimited
service of welfare scholarship. roles to play. One important role is attending to the prevailing modes of apprehension that are ascendant in the public sphere. Creating the space to critique those modes is important work that should not be passed over in the rush to make welfare scholarship immediately accessible to a broad audience. And doing such work in the context ongoing

political struggle is critical to ensuring its political effectiveness.

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Poverty K Undermines Justice

Critique of the welfare state empowers an alternative discourse undermines social justice and reentrenches poverty Leonard 97 (Peter Leonard. Postmodern Welfare, Reconstructing an Emancipatory Project. July 1997)
http://books.google.com/books?id=1NQDwHXSyTMC&pg=PP1&dq=postmodern+welfare&ei=xOJTSq-oI5WSyASkwJGNBw

postmodern emphasis on difference and its accompanying disillusionment with big state solutions to social problems leads to a focus on the libratory potential for local, small scale forms of welfarecommunity-based advocacy and consumer- controlled projects and agencies. These organizations of welfare, close to the people they serve,
Here the question is what to do about welfare as well as how to theorize about it. The are able, it is argued, to relate to the diverse needs and social identities of specific populations with their particular configurations of gender, class, culture, ethnicity and other social characteristics. It is a compelling argument, especially to those who are active in the identity politics of the new social movements. But such postmodern political solutionsmicro-political

resistance rather than the tired old mass politics of confronting and attempting to win state power- pose serious problems. In relinquishing the universalistic idea of welfare embodied, in however partial a form, in the Keynesian welfare state (now deceased), credence is given to the political discourse embraces by neoconservatism and by parties traditionally of the Centre, or Left of Centre, which have now adopted a similar political agenda. This new discourse on welfare aims to reduce drastically state social agenda. This new discourse on welfare aims to reduce drastically state social expenditures, establish residual lower cost forms of welfare, fragment opposition and divide sites of resistance, all in the name of local diversity and the control. The Higher Good espoused by this rightwing discourse is that leaner models of welfare using minimal state resources serve ultimately to improve a countrys competitiveness in the global market through reducing corporate taxation, increasing the rate of return on capitol, reducing labor costs and returning to the traditional virtues of family cohesiveness and hard work. How do I propose to address the questions and issues I have raised? Having a political and intellectual history
I approach postmodern critique with many doubts and reservations. At the same time, I acknowledge its profound impact and importance, especially in its challenge to Eurocentric assumptions about knowledge, science and culture, and its deep questioning of the narrative of emancipation.
rooted in Marxism, and subsequently strongly influenced by feminism, My perspective, therefore, must be seen, first as one, which attempts a critical engagement with and within the Marxist Tradition. It is not, therefore, must be seen, first, as one which attempts a critical engagement with and within the Marxist tradition. It is not; therefore, postmodern Marxist is the sense that the work of Laclau and Mouffe (1985) might be so described (if it is not called post - Marxist), a perspective, which appears to give priority to postmodern critique over the potential, which, I believe, remains powerful in the Marxist tradition. I

do not see postmodernism, in other words, as taking over the critical role of Marxism (or feminism, for that matter) but as providing a now
essential ingredient in revitalized Marxism. My view of the relationship between Marxism and postmodernism involves a deeply felt critique of some of the old Marxism which reflected the side of the project of modernity, which was rooted in domination. It is a perspective which engages with postmodernism alongside feminism and anti racism, and demands the acknowledgment and
celebration of diversity in cultures, sexualities, abilities, ages and other human characteristics which, within an unreconstructed modernity were excluded, suppressed or discriminated against. My view, unlike that of Laclau and Mouffe, is that we are not at the end of emancipation. The project continues, but under changed historical conditions- economic, cultural, social- and with a newly reflective ability (always existing at least as a potential in Marxism) to

A reconstructed project of emancipation, in this book seen as central to the future of human welfare, builds upon the libratory potential of the whole idea of emancipation still expressed, sometimes in muted form, within socialist, feminist, anti-racist and other struggles against domination.
understand the contradictions of the emancipatory projects of the past as well as that of the present.

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CLS Alt Fails

CLS little use for actual reform McClusky 7 (Martha T. McClusky (Faculty Scholar and Professor, State University of New York at Buffalo), Book Review:
Thinking with Wolves: Left Legal Theory After the Right's Rise, Buffalo Law Review. Pg. 447. Jan 2007) In the conventional wisdom, the critical legal studies (CLS) movement that stirred legal academics from the mid-1970s through the late 1980s is dead, n53 the victim, at least in part, of a self-inflicted overdose of high-flying theory. n54 Mainstream and right-wing critics of CLS have long condemned it (and its offshoots focusing on race and gender)

as nihilistic "trashing" of little practical use for the legal profession or for progressive reform movements. n55 Indeed, a number of prominent and prolific scholars associated with critical legal theory have accepted this accusation and now advocate a chastened approach to left legal theory that seeks to be less
contentious and ambitious and more content with the constraints of the day. n56

CLS is nothing more than a way to assert power McClusky 7 (Martha T. McClusky (Faculty Scholar and Professor, State University of New York at Buffalo), Book Review:
Thinking with Wolves: Left Legal Theory After the Right's Rise, Buffalo Law Review. Pg. 447. Jan 2007) According to this chastened strand of CLS, if what passes as principled reason in law is always beholden to partisan power, then rigorous critique is a delusional answer to problems of unjust power. If law's rational principles are indeterminate and incoherent, or if legal principles are as likely to constrain as to liberate, then why bother

engaging in more intellectual argument about how law is unprincipled, or based on the wrong principles? n57 Following this reasoning, theorizing about injustice may amount to little more than a way for some people in mostly elite law schools to earn a relatively privileged and pleasurable living within the cogs of an unjust machine of power. n58 Jack Schlegel explains that CLS died to avoid being "marginalized in
the act of being included" (like legal realism) as just another "of the possible perspectives ... in a law professor's kit bag ... that must be dragged out when it comes time for any topic to be looked at from all sides - in the name of fairness." n59

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Capitalism Solves Tech

Capitalism is key to growth and technological progress Gilpin 00 [Robert Gilpin, Professor of politics and international affairs, Princeton University, 2000, The challenge of global capitalism: the world economy in the 21st century, p. 3] Capitalism is the most successful wealth-creating economic system that the world has ever known; no
other system, as the distinguished economist Joseph Schumpeter pointed out, has benefited the common people as much. Capitalism, he observed, creates wealth through advancing continuously to ever higher levels of

productivity and technological sophistication; this process requires that the old be destroyed before the new can take over. Technological progress, the ultimate driving force of capitalism, requires the continuous discarding of obsolete factories, economic sectors, and even human skills. The system rewards the adaptable and the efficient; it punishes the redundant and the less productive. Solves Extinction Zey 98 [Michael Zey. Business Professor at Montclair State University. Seizing the Future: The Dawn of the Macroindustrial
Era. 1998. pp. 34]

Having reached its current lofty state of development, the species will not choose to regress. The fact that the species is forging its way en masse into the Macroindustrial Era proves that our need to grow is almost a genetically based predisposition. The species ultimately understands there can be no turning back on the road to progress. However, no outside force guarantees the continued progress of the human species, nor does anything mandate that the human species must even continue to exist. In fact, history is littered with races and civilizations that have disappeared without a trace. So, too, could the human species. There is no guarantee that the human species will survive even if we posit, as many have, a special purpose to the species existence. Therefore, the species innately comprehends that it must engage in purposive actions to maintain its level of growth and progress. Humanitys future is conditioned by what I call the Imperative of Growth, a principle I will herewith describe alone with its several correlates. The Imperative of Growth states that in order to survive, any nation, indeed, the human race, must grow, both materially and intellectually. The Macroindustrial Era represents growth in

the areas of both technology and human development, a natural stage in the evolution of the species continued extension of its control over itself and its environmental. Although 5 billion strong, our continued existence depends on our ability to continue the progress we have been making at higher and higher levels.

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Capitalism Solves Everything

Cap solves famine, economy, value to life and global warming. Boudreaux 06 [Donald J. Bourdreaux Sunday, August 13, 2006 chairman of the Department of Economics at George Mason University "The Case for Neglecting Global Warming" http://pittsburghlive.com/x/pittsburghtrib/opinion/columnists/boundreax/s_465727.html Capitalism produces so much food that we are never malnourished; it produces ample clothing and sturdy
homes to protect us from the elements; it produces the soaps, shampoos, toothpastes and detergents that we use every day to cleanse our bodies and living spaces of bacteria and other dirt. And by continually substituting machines for human labor, capitalism progressively makes our work less backbreaking and less perilous. These gains are significant and real. And they are continuing; no one knows where, or even if, they will stop. Those of us who

recognize these important benefits of capitalism -- those of us who understand that capitalism's true greatness lies not (as many critics insinuate) in producing oceans of pointless trinkets and baubles but in making the lives of ordinary people richer and fuller and longer -- are reluctant to yield power to governments to tackle global warming. We worry that this power will kill the goose that's laying this golden egg. If
you think that such a worry is exaggerated, recall the language Al Gore used in his book "Earth in the Balance." The former Vice President asserted that we are suffering an "environmental crisis" that can be avoided only if we "drastically change our civilization and our way of thinking." "Drastically change our civilization." Hmmm. This sounds like a call to significantly scale back markets, trade and industrial activities in order to lessen humankind's "footprint" on the Earth and its environment. We can, no doubt, make our environmental footprint smaller -- but how great a benefit will this achievement be if it returns us to the ages-old condition of high mortality and morbidity?

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Capitalism Solves Overpop Lx

Multiple countries prove that economic growth lowers birth rates.
Dandapani, 03 (Vijay, guest contributor to Rediff (an Indian news agency), Economic Growth is the Best Contraceptive, December 16, http://www.rediff.com/money/2003/dec/16guest.htm)
Rather than revive discredited 'Malthusianisms,' policy-makers in India ought to consider how economic growth in countries such as Thailand, Japan, Indonesia, Taiwan and South Korea among others has resulted in a dramatic lowering of the fertility bar, from very high levels in the 1950s and 1960s. Most of that was achieved with an emphatic focus on economic growth. The late development economist, Peter Bauer, an ardent advocate of the idea that aid in any form represented overwhelming condescension towards the Third World, went against the orthodoxy of his times by stressing that over-population was not the cause for poverty. He rightly noted that sub-Saharan Africa's population density was a tenth of Japan's. North Korea, a sparsely populated country, has a fertility rate of 1% that falls well below the replacement level. Its GDP growth rate is best left unmentioned. Instead of participating in discredited and possibly coercive population control incentives, a focus on global competitiveness is far more likely to achieve the much sought-after replacement fertility levels.

History proves that advanced capitalism lowers population growth.

Richman, 95 (Sheldon is Senior Editor @ Cato Institute, The International Population Stabilization and Reproductive Health Act (S. 1029), July 20, http://www.cato.org/testimony/ct-ps720.html, accessed 7/16/07) The population controllers will credit that to their efforts (while complaining that not enough is being done). But there is a simpler explanation: as economies develop and people become better off materially, they have fewer children. That phenomenon, known as the demographic transition, is well established in demography. It explains what happened in the West, where today the fertility rate is 2.0 or lower--below replacement rate. The demographic transition makes perfect sense. In preindustrial, agricultural economies, children provide farm labor and social security (sons care for their elderly parents); children are wealth. In a developed economy, parents invest

resources (for education and the like) in their children; they are an expense. As societies become Westernized, and as modern consumer goods and services become available, people find sources of satisfaction other than children. So they have fewer kids. A falling infant-mortality rate also reduces a society's fertility rate. Thus, a low fertility rate, writes Peter Bauer, is an effect, not a cause, of development.

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Capitalism - Overop Impact

Empirically population growth causes wars and genocide.
Geyer, 98 (Georgie Anne Geyer, journalist and columnist, Universal Features Syndicate, Malthusian Truths About Todays World May 22 http://npg.org/projects/malthus/geyer_story.htm)

Every country where bloody internecine civil wars have occurred in recent years had a huge population preceding the conflict." Could he be right? I went to U.N. population data. Rwanda, from 2.1 million in 1950 to 8
million today; Haiti, from 3.3 million then to 7.5 million today; Algeria, from 8.8 million to 30.2 million; Afghanistan, 9 million to 24.8 million; Zaire or Congo, 12.2 to 49 million; Nicaragua, 1.1 million to 4.8 million; Tajikistan, 1.5 million to 6.1 million; El Salvador, 2 million to 5.8 million; Ethiopia, 18.4 million to 58.4 million today. I was flabbergasted. "You must understand," Kaplan went on, " that in these conflicts the underlying causes come first and the beginning comes last. Take the civil war in Algeria. It all started with the '92 elections (when the military rescinded them because the Islamic fundamentalists were winning.) But actually that 'beginning' was the end of a

long culmination of events in the '60s when Algeria began to show one of the highest population growth rates in the world. That brought hordes of children into the cities where infrastructures were collapsing, and soon unemployed young men were roaming around with nothing to do. "1992 was merely the spark." In short, to cite two other examples, it is no accident that before the Rwandan genocide of 1995-96, Rwandan women were giving birth an average of eight times. It is also no accident that, in Haiti during these last years of implosion and civil war, Haitian women were giving birth an average of six times. These high population rates do not actually cause the slaughters, of course, but they exacerbate all the other problems and remove the possibilities of easier or quicker solutions. They also throw people too closely together and swiftly involve them in a fight for food and water and make genocide an acceptable alternative.

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Capitalism Solves Disease

Growth solves disease.
Zey, 98 (Michael G. Professor of management in the School of Business Administration at Montclair State University and executive director of the Expansionary Iznstitute. Seizing the Future: The Dawn of the Macroindustrial Era. Second Edition. Page 120)

medical and technological breahthroughs genetic therapy, superdrugs, fetal surgery, and cell and molecular repair that are helping society extend the life span and improve the quality of our physical existence. The advances are as striking as any of the Macroindustrial Era, and their implications are revolutionary. Assault on Disease Increasingly, we are discovering that our medical fate lies in our genes. Once we achieve the ability to diagnose medical problems at the genetic level and replace faulty genes with healthy ones, we will eradicate a great number of diseases before they ever start. The onset of what has been labeled the genetic age of medical research will revolutionize medicine and help us increase life expectancy and minimize human suffering.
In this chapter we will encounter Genetics and the

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Capitalism Solves Rights/Trade

Free trade spreads democracy and human rights.
Griswold, 04 (Daniel T., associate director of the Cato Institutes Center for Trade Policy Studies, Trading Tyranny for Freedom: How Open Markets Till the Soil for Democracy, Cato Institute, January 6, http://www.freetrade.org/pubs/pas/tpa-026es.html, Accessed 07-17-08) In the aftermath of September 11, the foreign policy dimension of trade has reasserted itself. Expanding trade, especially with and among less developed countries, is once again being recognized as a tool for encouraging democracy and respect for human rights in regions and countries of the world where those commodities have been the exception rather than the rule. Political scientists have long noted the connection between economic development, political reform, and democracy. Increased trade and economic integration promote civil and political freedoms directly by

opening a society to new technology, communications, and democratic ideas. Economic liberalization provides a counterweight to governmental power and creates space for civil society. And by promoting faster growth, trade promotes political freedom indirectly by creating an economically independent and politically aware middle class. The reality of the world today broadly reflects those theoretical links between trade, free markets, and political and civil freedom. As trade and globalization have spread to more and more countries in the past 30 years, so too have democracy and political and civil freedoms . In particular, the most economically open countries today are more than three times as likely to enjoy full political and civil freedoms as those that are relatively closed. Recent decades prove that free trade increase freedoms prefer history to vague theory.
Griswold, 04 (Daniel T., associate director of the Cato Institutes Center for Trade Policy Studies, Trading Tyranny for Freedom: How Open Markets Till the Soil for Democracy, Cato Institute, January 6, http://www.freetrade.org/pubs/pas/tpa-026es.html, Accessed 07-17-08)

The reality of the world today broadly reflects those theoretical links between trade, free markets, and political and civil freedom. As trade and globalization have spread to more and more countries in the last 30 years, so too have democracy and political and civil freedoms. In particular, people who live in countries that are relatively open to trade are much more likely to live in democracies and enjoy full civil and political freedoms than those who live in countries relatively closed to trade. Nations that have followed a path of trade reform in recent decades by progressively opening themselves to the global economy are significantly more likely to have expanded their citizens political and civil freedoms. The recent trend toward globalization has been accompanied by a trend toward greater political and civil liberty around the world. In the past 30 years, cross-border flows of trade, investment, and currency have increased dramatically, and far faster than output itself. Trade barriers have fallen unilaterally and through
multilateral and regional trade agreements in Latin America; the former Soviet bloc nations; East Asia, including China; and more developed nations as well. During that same period, political and civil liberties have been

spreading around the world.

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Capitalism - Socialism Totalitarian

Socialism is inherently totalitariantransitioning now would kill millions.
Rockwell, 08 [Llewellyn, president of the Ludwig von Mises Institute, Everything You Love You Owe to Capitalism, 5/17, http://mises.org/story/2982]

socialism always means overriding the free decisions of individuals and replacing that capacity for decision making with an overarching plan by the state. Taken far enough, this mode of thought won't just spell an end to opulent lunches. It will mean the end of what we all know as civilization itself. It would plunge us back to a primitive state of existence, living off hunting and gathering in a world with little art, music, leisure, or charity. Nor is any form of socialism capable of providing for the needs of the world's six billion people, so the population would shrink dramatically and quickly and in a manner that would make every human horror ever known seem mild by comparison. Nor is it possible to divorce socialism from totalitarianism, because if you are serious about ending private ownership of the means of production, you have to be serious about ending freedom and creativity too. You will have to make the whole of society, or what is left of it, into a prison. In short, the wish for socialism is a wish for unparalleled human evil. If we really understood this, no one would express casual support for it in polite company. It would be like saying, you know, there is really something to be said for malaria and typhoid and dropping atom bombs on millions of innocents.
Whatever the specifics of the case in question,

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Capitalism - Cede the Political

Apocalyptic predictions about the ills of capitalism will not motivate activismpractical reforms are the only hope for the left.
Wilson, 2000 Editor and Publisher of Illinois Academe 2000 (John K. Wilson, How the Left can Win Arguments and Influence People p. 14- 15) Leftists also need to abandon their tendency to make apocalyptic predictions. It's always tempting to predict that environmental destruction is imminent or the stock market is ready to crash in the coming second Great Depression. Arguments that the U.S. economy is in terrible shape fly in the face of reality. It's hard to claim that a middle-class American family with two cars, a big-screen TV, and a computer is oppressed. While the poor in America fell behind during the Reagan/Gingrich/Clinton era and the middle class did not receive its share of the wealth produced during this time, the economy itself is in excellent shape. Instead, the problem is the redistribution of wealth to the very rich under the resurgence of "free market" capitalism. Instead of warning that the economy will collapse without progressive policies, the left should emphasize that the progressive aspects of American capitalism have created the current success of the American economy after decades of heavy government investment in human capital. But the cutbacks in investment for education and the growing disparity between the haves and the have-notes are threatening the economys future success.

Capitalism is inevitable and can be turned into a force for liberation as long as progressives focus on practical reforms.
Wilson, 2000 Editor and Publisher of Illinois Academe 2000 (John K. Wilson, How the Left can Win Arguments and Influence People p. 12- 14) Progressive capitalism is not a contradiction in terms, for progressives support capitalism in many ways. Even nonprofit organizations and cooperatives are not antithetical to capitalism and the market; these groups simply use capitalism for aims different from the single-minded pursuit of profits. But the rules of supply and demand, the expenses and revenues, the idea of entrepreneurship and innovation, and the need to adapt to the market are essential. Any progressive magazine or institution that tries to defy the rules of capitalism won't be around for very long and certainly wont have the resources to mount a serious advocacy of progressive ideas. One of the most effective tactics of the environmental movement was encouraging consumers to consider environmental values when making capitalist choices about what products to buy. Today, a manufacturer who ignores environmental issues puts its profits at risk because so many people are looking for environmentally friendly products and packaging. Crusades against Coca-Cola for its massive output of non-recycled plastic bottles in America or against companies supporting foreign dictatorships are part of the continuing battle to force companies to pay attention to consumer demands. Of course, consumer protests and boycotts are only one part of making "capitalism for everyone." Many progressive groups are now buying stock in companies precisely to raise these issues at stockholder meetings and pressure the companies to adopt environmentally and socially responsible policies. Unfortunately, the legal system is structured against progressive ideas. In 2000, Ben and Jerry's Ice Cream was forced to sell out to a big corporation that might ignore its commitment to many progressive causes. The company didn't want to sell, but the law demanded that the company's duty to stockholders was to consider only the money involved. Imagine what would happen if our capitalist laws were designed to promote progressive ideas instead of impeding them. Instead of allowing a shareholder lawsuit against any company acting in a morally, socially, and environmentally conscious way, American laws should encourage these goals. The claim by some leftists that capitalism is inherently irresponsible or evil doesn't make sense. Capitalism is simply a system of markets. What makes capitalism so destructive isn't the basic foundation but the institutions that have been created in the worship of the "free market." Unfortunately, progressives spend most of their time attacking capitalism rather than taking credit for all the reforms that led to America's economic growth. If Americans were convinced that social programs and investment in people (rather than corporate welfare and investment in weaponry) helped create the current economic growth, they would be far more willing to pursue additional progressive policies.

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Capitalism Alt Fails

A clear alternative is key to mobilize and change the current system. Kassiola 90 [Joel Jay Kassiola, Dean of the College of Behavioral and Social Sciences, San Francisco State University, 1990, The
Death of Industrial Civilization, p. 159]

Transformational or revolutionary action will be difficult to mobilize let alone implementwithout a set of alternative social goals and practices implied by a different worldview and values informing such action. This is so, unless, of course, one wishes to be exclusively negative in ones critique by advocating the destruction of current social aims and arrangements and leaving it to others at a later, and presumably more propitious, time to create a new social order; for example, as with certain anarchists positions such as the nineteenth century, Russian anarchist Mikhail Bakunins creative destruction. The risk here is that the new yet to be determined society could be worse than the one changed. Furthermore, by omitting a vision of a supposedly superior, alternative society the achievement of social transformation is thwarted because the proposed theoretical structure or city coming into being in speech, as Plato formulates it in The Republic, can neither guide political action, so that people know what to strive for, nor provide the evaluative criteria with which to judge how successful their action has been in creating a newand supposedly bettercivilization.

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Capitalism - Patriarchy is Prerequisite

Patriarchy is the root of capitalism, solving the second advantage is the only internal link to the impacts and alternative. Gordon 96 (April A. Gordon, Transforming Capitalism and Patriarchy: Gender and Development in Africa. Publisher: Lynne
Rienner. Place of Publication: Boulder, CO. Publication Year: 1996. http://www.questia.com/read/96895144# Page Number: pg 22)
Much of the Western feminist theoretical analysis of women and development in Africa echoes the work of Marxist-socialist feminist scholars. For example, in Mies's influential work on women and global capitalism she argues that "capitalism cannot function without patriarchy." Capitalism requires never-ending capital accumulation; therefore, it requires patriarchal man-woman relations. Mies also believes that capitalism and patriarchy are not two separate systems, but intrinsically connected as capitalist patriarchy: Violence against women and extracting women's labour through coercive labour relations are, therefore, part and parcel of capitalism. They are necessary for the capitalist accumulation process and not peripheral to it. In other words, capitalism has to use, to strengthen, or even to invent, patriarchal men-women relations if it wants to maintain its accumulation model. If all women in the world had become "free" wage earners, "free" subjects, the extraction of surplus would, to say the least, be severely hampered.This is what women as housewives, workers, peasants, prostitutes, from the Third World and First World countries, have in common.

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1. No brink All of their evidence assumes a unique increase or brink of capitalism. Meaning even if they win a link to the plan make them prove why were not just another drop in the bucket of the other 100 policies passed. 2. Plan breaks down the ivory tower of the hyde amendment where only rich white class women get access to abortions in the status quo. 2. Pre-requisite Patriarchy upholds capitalism only through the plan can we start a transition away from the status quo policies. Gordon 96 (April A. Gordon, Transforming Capitalism and Patriarchy: Gender and Development in Africa. Publisher: Lynne
Rienner. Place of Publication: Boulder, CO. Publication Year: 1996. http://www.questia.com/read/96895144# Page Number: pg 22) Much of the Western feminist theoretical analysis of women and development in Africa echoes the work of Marxistsocialist feminist scholars. For example, in Mies's influential work on women and global capitalism she argues that "capitalism cannot function without patriarchy." Capitalism requires never-ending capital accumulation; therefore, it requires patriarchal man-woman relations. Mies also believes that capitalism and patriarchy are not two separate systems, but intrinsically connected as capitalist patriarchy: Violence against women and extracting women's labour through coercive labour relations are, therefore, part and parcel of capitalism. They are necessary for the capitalist accumulation process and not peripheral to it. In other words, capitalism has to use, to strengthen, or even to invent, patriarchal men-women relations if it wants to maintain its accumulation model . If all women in the world had become "free" wage earners, "free" subjects, the extraction of surplus would, to say the least, be severely hampered.This is what women as housewives, workers, peasants, prostitutes, from the Third World and First World countries, have in common.

3. Perm Withdraw and reject capitalistic ideologies while doing the plan We have to work with in the system to create safe space where the system will collapse upon itself.
J.K. Gibson-Graham, Professor of Human Geography at the Australian National University and Professor of Geosciences at the University of Massachusates, Amherst, 1996 (The End of Capitalism (As We Know It)) One of our goals as Marxists has been to produce a knowledge of capitalism. Yet as that which is known, Capitalism has become the intimate enemy. We have uncloaked the ideologically-clothed, obscure monster, but we have installed a naked and visible monster in its place. In return for our labors of creation, the monster has robbed us of all force. We hear and find it easy to believe that the left is in disarray. Part of what produces the disarray of the left is the vision of what the left is arrayed against. When capitalism is represented as a unified system coextensive with the nation or even the world, when it is portrayed as crowding out all other economic forms, when it is allowed to define entire societies, it becomes something that can only be defeated and replaced by a mass collective movement (or by a process of systemic dissolution that such a movement might assist). The revolutionary task of replacing capitalism now seems outmoded and unrealistic, yet we do not seem to have an alternative conception of class transformation to take its place . The old political economic systems and structures that call forth a vision of revolution as systemic replacement still se em to be dominant in the Marxist political imagination. The New World Order is often represented as political fragmentation founded upon economic unification. In this vision the economy appears as the last stronghold of unity and singularity in a world of diversity and plurality. But why cant the economy be fragmented too? If we theorized it as fragmented in the United States, we could being to see a huge state sector (incorporating a variety of forms of appropriation of surplus labor), a very large sector of self-employed and family-based producers (most noncapitalist), a huge household sector (again, quite various in terms of forms of exploitation, with some households moving towards communal or collective appropriation and others operating in a traditional mode in which one adult appropriates surplus labor from another). None of these things is easy to see. If capitalism takes up the available social space, theres no room for anything else. If capitalism cannot coexist, theres no possibility of anything else. If capitalism functions as a unity, it cannot be partially or locally replaced. My intent is to help create the discursive conception under which socialist or other noncapitalist construction becomes realistic present activity rather than a ludicrous or utopian goal. To achieve this I must smash Capitalism and see it in a thousand pieces. I must make its unity a fantasy, visible as a denial of diversity and change.

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4. No spillover Debate isnt real world no one outside of it cares you won a ballot for the cap K there will be no revolution, no broad change in personal activities. Only the permutation creates a signal that the government is willing to reject capitalism when given the chance. 5. Capitalism is inevitable. Even the groups that resist it are part and parcel of the system. Wilson 2000 [ coordinator of the Independent Press Associations Campus Journalism Project , 2000
(John K., coordinator of the Independent Press Associations Campus Journalism Project, How the Left can Win Arguments and Influence People, pg 12- 14)] Progressive capitalism is not a contradiction in terms, for progressives support capitalism in many ways. Even nonprofit organizations and cooperatives are not antithetical to capitalism and the market; these groups simply use capitalism for aims different from the single-minded pursuit of profits. But the rules of supply and demand, the expenses and revenues, the idea of entrepreneurship and innovation, and the need to adapt to the market are essential. Any progressive magazine or institution that tries to defy the rules of capitalism won't be around for very long and certainly wont have the resources to mount a serious advocacy of progressive ideas. One of the most effective tactics of the environmental movement was encouraging consumers to consider environmental values when making capitalist choices about what products to buy. Today, a manufacturer who ignores environmental issues puts its profits at risk because so many people are looking for environmentally friendly products and packaging. Crusades against Coca-Cola for its massive output of non-recycled plastic bottles in America or against companies supporting foreign dictatorships are part of the continuing battle to force companies to pay attention to consumer demands. Of course, consumer protests and boycotts are only one part of making "capitalism for everyone." Many progressive groups are now buying stock in companies precisely to raise these issues at stockholder meetings and pressure the companies to adopt environmentally and socially responsible policies. Unfortunately, the legal system is structured against progressive ideas. In 2000, Ben and Jerry's Ice Cream was forced to sell out to a big corporation that might ignore its commitment to many progressive causes. The company didn't want to sell, but the law demanded that the company's duty to stockholders was to consider only the money involved. Imagine what would happen if our capitalist laws were designed to promote progressive ideas instead of impeding them. Instead of allowing a shareholder lawsuit against any company acting in a morally, socially, and environmentally conscious way, American laws should encourage these goals. The claim by some leftists that capitalism is inherently irresponsible or evil doesn't make sense. Capitalism is simply a system of markets. What makes capitalism so destructive isn't the basic foundation but the institutions that have been created in the worship of the "free market." Unfortunately, progressives spend most of their time attacking capitalism rather than taking credit for all the reforms that led to America's economic growth.

6. Sustainability The mezarous evidence assumes a instance of resource war Capitalism would never go to war it would be too costly for a finite resource. Its going to play a conservative game so it doesnt drive itself into the ground. OR B. IP sites calculative logic as the cause of things like genocide or murder that just proves its inherent to human nature and the alternative cant solve for making it inevitable.

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7. Capitalism isnt the root of anything The alternative will create more violence. Aberdeen 3 [Richard Aberdeen 2003 THE WAY A Theory of Root Cause
http://freedomtracks.com/uncommonsense/theway.html] A view shared by many modern activists is that capitalism, free enterprise, multi-national corporations and globalization are the primary cause of the current global Human Rights problem and that by striving to change or eliminate these, the root problem of what ills the modern world is being addressed. This is a rather unfortunate and historically myopic view, reminiscent of early class struggle Marxists who soon resorted to violence as a means to achieve rather questionable ends. And like these often brutal early Marxists, modern anarchists who resort to violence to solve the problem are walking upside down and backwards, adding to rather than correcting, both the immediate and long-term Human Rights problem. Violent revolution, including our own American revolution, becomes a breeding ground for poverty, disease, starvation and often mass oppression leading to future violence. Large, publicly traded corporations are created by individuals or groups of individuals, operated by individuals and made up of individual and/or group investors. These business enterprises are deliberately structured to be empowered by individual (or group) investor greed. For example, a theorized need for offering salaries much higher than is necessary to secure competent leaders hip (often resulting in corrupt and entirely incompetent leadership), lowering wages more than is fair and equitable and scaling back of often hard fought for benefits, is sold to stockholders as being in the best interest of the bottom-line market value and thus, in the best economic interests of individual investors. Likewise, major political and corporate exploitation of third-world nations is rooted in the individual and joint greed of corporate investors and others who stand to profit from such exploitation. More than just investor greed, corporations are driven by the greed of all those involved, including individuals outside the enterprise itself who profit indirectly from it. If one examines the course of human events closely, it can correctly be surmised that the root cause of humanitys problems comes from individual human greed and similar negative individual motivation . The Marx/Engles view of history being a class struggle does not address the root problem and is thus fundamentally flawed from a true historical perspective (see Gallo Brothers for more details). So-called classes of people, unions, corporations and political groups are made up of individuals who support the particular group or organizational position based on their o wn individual needs, greed and desires and thus, an apparent class struggle in reality, is an extension of individual motivation. Likewise, nations engage in wars of aggression, not because capitalism or classes of society are at root cause, but because individual members of a society are individually convinced that it is in their own economic survival best interest. War, poverty, starvation and lack of Human and Civil Rights have existed on our planet since long before the rise of modern capitalism, free enterprise and multi-national corporation avarice, thus the root problem obviously goes deeper than this. Junior Bush and the neo-conservative genocidal maniacs of modern-day America could not have recently effectively gone to war against Iraq without the individual support of individual troops and a certain percentage of individual citizens within the U.S. population, each lending support for their own personal motives, whatever they individually may have been. While it is true that corrupt leaders often provoke war, using all manner of religious, social and political means to justify, often as not, entirely ludicrous ends, very rare indeed is a battle only engaged in by these same unscrupulous miscreants of power. And though a few iniquitous elitist powerbrokers may initiate nefarious policies of global genocidal oppression, it takes a very great many individuals operating from individual personal motivations of survival, desire and greed to develop these policies into a multi-national exploitive reality. No economic or political organization and no political or social cause exists unto itself but rather, individual members power a collective agenda. A workers strike has no hope of succeeding if individual workers do not perceive a personal benefit. And similarly, a corporation will not exploit workers if doing so is not believed to be in the economic best interest of those who run the corporation and who in turn, must answer (at least theoretically) to individuals who collectively through purchase or other allotment of shares, own the corporation. Companies have often been known to appear benevolent, offering both higher wages and improved benefits, if doing so is perceived to be in the overall economic best interest of the immediate company and/or larger corporate entity. Non-unionized business enterprises frequently offer carrots of appeasement to workers in order to discourage them from organizing and his torically in the United States, concessions such as the forty-hour workweek, minimum wage, workers compensation and proscribed holidays have been grudgingly capitulated to by greedy capitalist masters as necessary concessions to avoid profit-crippling strikes and outright revolution. and Solution

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8. Herod is a blogger His alternative comes from a blog where he complains about how much he hates his job. Prefer our professors who have historical and educational basis for why capitalistic rejection doesnt solve. 9. A clear alternative is key to mobilize and change the current system. Kassiola 90 [Joel Jay Kassiola, Dean of the College of Behavioral and Social Sciences, San Francisco State University, 1990, The
Death of Industrial Civilization, p. 159] Transformational or revolutionary action will be difficult to mobilize let alone implementwithout a set of alternative social goals and practices implied by a different worldview and values informing such action. This is so, unless, of course, one wishes to be exclusively negative in ones critique by advocating the destruction of cur rent social aims and arrangements and leaving it to others at a later, and presumably more propitious, time to create a new social order; for example, as with certain anarchists positions such as the nineteenth century, Russian anarchist Mikhail Bakunins creative destruction. The risk here is that the new yet to be determined society could be worse than the one changed. Furthermore, by omitting a vision of a supposedly superior, alternative society the achievement of social transformation is thwarted because the proposed theoretical structure or city coming into being in speech, as Plato formulates it in The Republic, can neither guide political action, so that people know what to strive for, nor provide the evaluative criteria with which to judge how successful their action has been in creating a newand supposedly bettercivilization.

10. Capitalism will sell this alternative Everyone wants to be apart of a movement capitalism will make it cool, feel like people are in the crowd, sell T shirts and bumper stickers.

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K Alt Fails
The Ks denial of social reality makes the NEG complicity with the worst atrocities in human history. MacKinnon 2000 [Catharine, Symposium On Unfinished Feminist Business: Points Against Postmodernism, Chicago-Kent Law
Review, Prof of Law at Univ of Mich and Prof of Law at Univ of Chicago, lexis]

It is the denial of their social reality that is complicated and raises difficult philosophical questions. Understand that the denial of the reality of such events has been a philosophical position about reality itself. Unless and until effectively challenged, only what power wants to see as real is granted reality status. Reality is a social status. Power's reality does not have to establish itself as real in order to exist, because it has the status as real that power gives it; only the reality of the powerless has to establish itself as real. Power can also establish unreality-like the harmlessness of pornography or smoking--as reality. That doesn't make it harmless. But until power is effectively challenged on these lies, and they are lies, only those harmed (and those harming them, who have every incentive to conceal) have access to knowing that that is what they are. So it has taken us all this time, and a movement that has
challenged male power, to figure out that women's reality is also a philosophical position: that women's reality exists, including women's denied violation, therefore social reality exists separate from its constitution by male power or its validation by male knowledge. This analysis raises some questions about postmodernism that [*706] are not simply a report on my current mental state. They are: Can postmodernism stop the rape of children when everyone has their story, and everyone is

presumably exercising sexual agency all the time? Can postmodernism identify fascism if power only exists in microcenters and never in systematic, fixed, and determinate hierarchical arrangements? How can you oppose something that is always only in play? How do you organize against something that isn't even really there except when you are thinking about it? Can postmodernism hold the perpetrators of genocide accountable? If the
subject is dead, and we are dealing with deeds without doers, 47 how do we hold perpetrators accountable for what they perpetrate? Can the Serbian cultural defense for the extermination of Croats, Bosnian Muslims, and Kosovar Albanians be far behind? If we can have a multicultural defense for the current genocide, because that's how the Serbs see it, why not a German cultural defense for the earlier one? Anti-Semitism was part of German culture. Finally, for another old question, if you only exist in opposition, if you are only full in opposition to the modern, 48 it has determined you. Don't you need an account of how you are not merely reiterating your determinations? From postmodernists, one is not yet forthcoming. The postmodernist reality corrosion, thus, not only

makes it incoherent and useless--the pragmatists' valid criticism 49 --but also regressive, disempowering, and collaborationist. Attempts to enact liberatory pedagogies fail and worsen racism, sexism, and banking education. Ellsworth 1994 [Elizabeth Why doesnt this feel empowering? Working through the repressive myths of critical pedagogy the
education feminism Reader ed. By Lynda] I want to argue, on the basis of my interpretation of C&I 607, that key assumptions, goals, and pedagogical practices fundamental to the literature on critical pedagogy namely, empowerment, student voice, dialogue, and even the term critical are repressive myths that perpetuate relations of domination. By this I mean that when participants in our class attempted to put into practice prescriptions offered in the literature concerning empowerment, student voice, and dialogue, we produced results that were not only unhelpful, but actually exacerbated the very conditions we were trying to work against, including Euro centrism, racism, sexism, classism, and banking education. To the extent that our efforts to put discourses of critical pedagogy into practice led us to reproduce relations of domination in our classroom, these discourses were working through us in repressive ways, and had themselves become vehicles of repressio n. To the extent that we disengaged ourselves from those aspects and moved in another direction, we worked through and out of the literatures highly abstract language (myths) of who we should be and what should be happening in our classroom; we mov ed into classroom practices that were context-specific and seemed to be much more responsive to our own understandings of our social identities and situations.

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Zizek Alt No Solvency

Zizeks alternative fails to accomplish fundamental changeit is merely therapeutic for individuals. Robinson 04 (Andrew, PhD, political theory, University of Nottingham, Introduction: The Basic Zizekian Model,
Theory Blog, http://andyrobinsontheoryblog.blogsp...ogress_15.html)

Why does Zizek support the Act? Although he connects the Act to 'radicalism', he does not state anywhere that

the Act accomplishes any fundamental change in the deep structure of existence; at best, it can temporarily suspend (for instance) exclusion. This is not an attempt to achieve a better world (still less a perfect one!) but a purely structural attempt to restore something which Zizek thinks is missing. In this sense, even in its 'radicalism', the Act is conservative. Zizek seems to be restoring to psychoanalysis a naive conception of psychological health: via the ex nihilo act, one can escape the logic of the symptom.

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Zizek Alt No Value to Life

Zizeks alt abandons all ethical responses to problems Condeming millions to death and denying the value to life. Robinson 04 [Andrew, PhD, political theory, University of Nottingham, Introduction: The Basic Zizekian Model, Theory
Blog, http://andyrobinsontheoryblog.blogsp...ogress_15.html]

Zizek's theory of the Act presupposes a belief that we are all basically worthless. "The ultimate level of the ethical experience" is found in the utterly broken victim of the Nazi or Stalinist camps (DSST 86), which means one "will be surprised to learn how even the darkest Stalinism harbours a redemptive dimension" (DSST 88). these people were not dehumanised by the Nazis, but rather, express an inhuman kernel of humanity (DSST 76-7). This kind of person is the " 'zero-level' of humanity" which makes human symbolic engagement possible by wiping the slate of animal instincts (DSST 77; NB the strong binary
operative here, which is totally flawed: dogs show similar modes of action when exposed to similar situations, such as Seligman's dogs in the 'learned helplessness' experiments). Zizek thinks we all have had to go through this experience (DSST 77-8). This experience also negates the concept of authenticity (though not enough to stop Zizek using it elsewhere): one can't say such victims are involved in an authentic existential project, but it would be cynical to say they are living an inauthentic existence since it is others, not themselves, who degrade them (DSST 78-9; I don't actually see why an external basis for subordination would affect the concept of authenticity in the slightest; perhaps it would affect the strongest versions which assume pure freedom, but it would not undermine, for instance, the later Sartre, since in this case the authenticity of the project has been defeated by the practico-inert, leading to a state of existence he terms "exis": a degraded existence without project). I think a Deleuzian analysis would be more appropriate here: the dehumanisation of these victims results from the (temporary) total victory of the Oedipal/authoritarian cage: flows and breaks are cut off or utterly contained within an order of power/knowledge, with the political conclusion being that freedom exists in a struggle with domination and that the struggle for freedom is necessary to prevent us being reduced to this level. But this would be partly a causal account, whereas Zizek seems to want a pure ethics. Where Zizek's account leads politically is far more sinister; Zizek cannot in all seriousness criticise the inhumanity of the concentration camps if they simply reveal our essence, and it is hard to see how one could oppose the Nazis if they did not dehumanise their victims or treat them inhumanely. Indeed, such an excremental reduction is something Zizek elsewhere praises, and his attempts to distance himself from Nazism have nothing to do with the inhumanity of the camps; rather, they revolve around nit-picking over whether the Nazis really traversed the fantasy or stopped short at a false act (see below). The

Act is a submission: revolutionaries should become "followers" of the truth-event and its call (TS 227; this reproduces with a reversed sign Vaneigem's concept of the Cause as a form of alienation accepting utter self-obliteration, and rejecting all compassion (TS 378). Zizeks alternative doesnt create a new system Just crowds ethics in the current system. Robinson 04 (Andrew, PhD, political theory, University of Nottingham, Introduction: The Basic Zizekian Model, Theory
Blog, http://andyrobinsontheoryblog.blogsp...ogress_15.html)

It is important to realise that the Act is not revolutionary in the sense of creating something new on the basis of an ideal, or an imaginary, or the restoration of an authentic pre-alienated state, or any other process which would allow one to create something on the basis of a project and praxis. The Act is radically nihilistic (see below). For Zizek, the subject can change nothing - all it can do is add itself to reality by an act of claiming responsibility for the given What seems completely missing here is any case for the
Act that in any way justifies ethically the terrible nature of the Act, both for its perpetrator and for others; one can only really accept Zizek's Act if one places at the core of one's belief-system the importance of resolving dilemmas in some supposed deep structure of existence, so what matters is not human or social consequences or any specific beliefs, but merely the adoption of a structural position which solves contradictions in and thereby overcomes the problems of a structure. Despite Zizek's repeated use of the term "ethics", therefore, this is in many ways not an ethical

system at all, but a kind of model of structural problem-solving - a "therapy" for society, passed off as ethics.

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Zizek - Alt Fails

The alternative doesnt create social change or any sort of transformation Zizeks philosophy fails to understand true revolutionary politics. Robinson & Tormey 2005 [Andrew, School of Politics, University of Nottingham & Simon, University of Nottingham, A ticklish subject? Zizek and the future of left Radicalism; Thesis Eleven n80 Feb 2005]
As useful as such a reading is, this is not, we would argue, the Zizek who emerges on closer examination. Regarding where rad icals should proceed from here and now, his work offers little to celebrate. The relevance of a politics based on formal structural categories instead of lived historical processes, which measures radicalism not by concrete achievements but by how abruptly one rejects the existing symbolic order, is questionable. The concept of the Act is, we think,

For Zizek, objections to official ideologies which stop short of an Act are the very form of ideology (Zizek, 1997a: 21), and the gap between complaint and Acts is insurmountable (Zizek, 1999: 361). So protest politics fits the existing power relations and carnivals are a false transgression which stabilizes the power edifice (Zizek, 1999: 230; 1997a: 73). This position misreads past revolutionary movements including the decades-long revolutionary process in Russia and offers little for the development of left strategies aiming to challenge the existing system. What Zizek establishes, we would argue, is a radical break between his own theory and any effective left politics, much of which as we have shown he peremptorily dismisses. The concept of the Act is a recipe for creating a desert around oneself while sitting in judgment on actual political movements which always fall short of ones ideal criteria. In our view, Zizek is justified in advocating a transformative stance given the structural causes of many of the issues he confronts, but he is wrong to posit such a stance as a radical break constituted ex nihilo. Far from being the disavowed supplement of capitalism, the space for thinking the not-real which is opened by imaginaries and petty resistances is,we think,a prerequisite to building a more active resistance and, ultimately, any substantial social transformation. As the cultural anthropologist James Scott shows in a series of case studies, political revolutions tend to emerge through the radicalization of existing demands and resistances not as pure Acts occurring out of nothing. Even when they are incomprehensible from the standpoint of normal, conformist bystanders, they are a product of the
metaphysical, not political, leading to a rejection of most forms of resistance. development of subterranean resistances and counterhegemonies among subaltern groups (see, for example, Scott, 1990: 179 82). This is to say that social change does not come from nothing,but

rather requires the pre-existence of a counter-culture involving nonconformist ideas and practices. As Gramsci puts it, before coming into existence a new society must be ideally active in the minds of th ose struggling for change (Gramsci, 1985: 39). The history of resistance thus gives little reason to support Zizeks politics of the Act. The ability to Act in the manner described
by Zizek is largely absent from the subaltern strata. Mary Kay Letourneau (let us recall) did not transform society; rather, her Act was repressed and she was jailed.

In another case discussed by Zizek(2001b: 745), a group of Siberian miners is said to accomplish an Act by getting massacred. Since Acts are not even on Zizeks terms socially effective, they cannot help the worst-off, let alone transform society. Zizeks assumption of the effectiveness of Acts thus rests on a confusion between individual and social levels of analysis an d
between clinical therapy and political action. Vaneigem eerily foresees Zizeks Act when he argues against active nihilism. The transition from this wasteland of the suicide and the solitary killer to revolutionary politics requires the repetition of negation in a different register, conne cted to a positive project to change the world and

Zizeks politics are not merely impossible but, as we have shown,potentially despotic, and also between support for a Master, acceptance of pain and alienation, militarism and the restoration of order tendentially conservative.Sucha politics, if adopted in practice, could only discredit progressive movements and further alienate those they seek to mobilize. We would
relying on the imaginaries Zizek denounces, the carnival spirit and the ability to dream (Vaneigem, 1967 [1994]: 111). argue that a transformative politics should be theorized instead as a process of transformation, an a-linear, rhizomatic, multiform plurality of resistances, initiatives and, indeed, acts which are sometimes spectacular and carnivalesque, sometimes prefigurative, sometimes subterranean, sometimesrooted in institutional change and reform and, under certain circumstances, directly transformative. Moreover, we would take issue with Zizeks model of the pledged gr oup bound together by the One who Acts as a step backwards from the decentred character of current left-radical politics. Nor need this decentring be seen as a weakness, as Zizek insists it should. It can be seen

In contrast with Zizeks stress on subordination, exclusivity, hierarchy and violence, the current emphasis on the adoption of anti-authoritarian, heterogeneous, inclusive and multiform types of activity offer a better chance of effectively overcoming the homogenizing logic of capitalism and of winning support among wider circles of those dissatisfied with it. Similarly, the stress on the centrality of direct action which includes ludic, carnivalesque and a variety of non-violent actions generates the possibility of empowerment through involvement in and support for the myriad causes which make up the anticapitalist resistance. This resistance stands in stark contrast to the desert of heroic isolation advocated by Zizek which, as Laclau puts it, is a
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prescription for political quietism and sterility (Butler et al., 2000: 293). Zizek is right that we should aim to overcome the impossibilities of
capitalism, but this overcoming should involve the active prefiguration and construction in actuality of alternative social forms, not a simple (and actually impossible) break with everything which exists of the kind imagined by Zizek. It is important that radicals invoke utopias, but in an active way, in the forms of organization, disorganization, and activity adopted in the spaces created for resistance and in the prefiguration of alternative economic, political and social forms. Utopian imaginaries express what is at stake in left radicalism: that what exists does not exist of necessity, and that the contingency of social institutions and practices makes

The most Zizek allows radicals is the ability to glimpse utopia while enacting the reconstruction of oppression. Radicals should go further and bring this imagined other place into actual existence. Through enacting utopia, we have the ability to bring the no-where into the now-here.
possible the transcendence of existing institutions and the construction or creation of different practices, social relations and conceptions of the world.

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Zizek Alt Laclau Nihilism

Lack of a clear alternative dooms it to failure Zizek doesnt write one line about what to do. This creates nihilism and co-opts any solvency.
Laclau 04 [Ernesto Laclau, Professor of Political Theory at the University of Essex and Visiting Professor of Comparative Literature at SUNY-Buffalo, 2004, Umbr(a): War, p. 33-34] Here we reach the crux of the difficulties to be found in Zizek. On the one hand, he is committed to a theory of the full revolutionary act that would operate in its own name, without being invested in any object outside itself. On the other hand, the capitalist system, as the dominating, underlying mechanism, is the reality with which the emancipatory act has to break. The conclusion from both premises is that there is no valid emancipatory struggle except one that is fully and directly anti-capitalist. In his words: I believe in the central structuring role of the anti capitalist struggle. The problem, however, is this: he gives no indication of what an anti-capitalist

struggle might be. Zizek quickly dismisses multicultural, anti-sexist, and anti-racist struggles as not being directly anti-capitalist. Nor does he sanction the traditional aims of the Left, linked more directly
to the economy: the demands for higher wages, for industrial democracy, for control of the labor process, for a progressive distribution of income, are not proposed as anti-capitalist either. Does he imagine that the Luddites proposal to destroy all the machines would bring an end to capitalism? Not a single line in Zizeks work gives

an example of what he considers an anti-capitalist struggle. One is left wondering whether he is anticipating an invasion of beings from another planet, or as he once suggested, some kind of ecological catastrophe that would not transform the world but cause it to fall apart. So where has the whole argument gone wrong? In its very premises. Since Zizek refuses to apply the hegemonic logic to strategico-political thought, he is stranded in a blind alley. He has to dismiss all partial struggles as internal to the system (whatever that means), and the Thing being unachievable, he is left without any concrete historical actor for his anti-capitalist struggle. Conclusion: Zizek cannot provide any theory of the emancipatory subject. At the same time, since his systemic totality,being a ground, is regulated exclusively by its own internal laws, the only option is to wait for these laws to produce the totality of its effects. Ergo: political nihilism.

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Zizek Alt - Perm Solvency

The neg approaches deconstructing capitalism wrong. They need to combine the particular struggles that already exist. This dissent from capitalism makes actual solvency impossible. Laclau, Professor of Comparative Literature at the University at Buffalo, 2001 [Ernesto, Can Immanence Explain Social Struggles? Diacritics 31.4, Project Muse] What are the difficulties with this rather triumphalist vision? There are several. In the first place, the assertion that "the will to be against does not seem to require much explanation" is mere wishful thinking. Here the alternative is clear: either resistance to oppression is some kind of natural and automatic mechanism which will spontaneously operate whatever the circumstances, or it is a complex social construction which has conditions of possibility external to itself. For me the second is the correct answer. The ability and the will to resist are not a gift from heaven but require a set of subjective transformations that are only the product of the struggles themselves and that can fail to take place. What is missing in Empire is any coherent theory of political subjectivitypsychoanalysis, for instance, is entirely absent. Largely for that reason, the whole notion of being-against does not resist the slightest examination. It is easy to see the role that it plays in the economy of Hardt and Negri's argumentation: if one is "against" without defining an enemy, the idea that struggles against Empire should take place everywhere finds its justification (and, a fortiori, we have the guarantee that vertical struggles would coalesce around a single target without any need for their horizontal articulation). Unfortunately social struggles do not follow this simplistic pattern. All struggle is the struggle of concrete social actors for particular objectives, and nothing guarantees that these objectives will not clash with each other. Now I would agree that no overall historical transformation is possible unless the particularism of the struggles is superseded and a wider "collective will" is constituted. But this requires the implementation of what in our work we have called the logic of equivalence, which involves acts of political articulationprecisely the horizontal linking that Hardt and Negri put aside. The "being-against" is, once more, a clear indicator of the antipolitical bias of Empire.

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Neg Capitalism Alt - Withdraw

Withdraw from capitalism. Rejecting the ideology causes the system to collapse upon itself. Johnston 2004 [ Adrain, Dude(tte?) Psychoanalysis, Culture & Society, December v9 i3 p259]
Perhaps

the absence of a detailed political roadmap in Zizek's recent writings isn't a major shortcoming. Maybe, at least for the time being, the most important task is simply the negativity of the critical struggle, the effort to cure an intellectual constipation resulting from capitalist ideology and thereby to truly open up the space for imagining authentic alternatives to the prevailing state of the situation.
Another definition of materialism offered by Zizek is that it amounts to accepting the internal inherence of what fantasmatically appears as an external deadlock or hindrance (Zizek, 2001d, pp 22-23) (with fantasy itself being defined as the false externalization of something within the subject, namely, the illusory projection of an inner obstacle, Zizek, 2000a, p 16). From this perspective, seeing through ideological fantasies by learning how to think again outside the confines of

current restrictions has, in and of itself, the potential to operate as a form of real revolutionary practice
(rather than remaining merely an instance of negative/critical intellectual reflection). Why is this the case? Recalling the analysis of commodity fetishism, the social efficacy of money as the universal medium of exchange (and the entire political economy grounded upon it) ultimately relies upon nothing more than a kind of "magic," that is, the belief in money's social efficacy by those using it in the processes of exchange. Since the value of currency is, at bottom, reducible to the belief that it has the value attributed to it (and that everyone believes that everyone else believes this as well), derailing capitalism by destroying its essential financial substance is, in a certain respect, as easy as dissolving the mere belief in this substance's powers. The "external" obstacle of the capitalist system exists exclusively on the condition that subjects, whether consciously or unconsciously, "internally" believe in it--capitalism's life-blood, money, is simply a fetishistic

crystallization of a belief in others' belief in the socio-performative force emanating from this same material. And yet, this point of capitalism's frail vulnerability is simultaneously the source of its enormous strength: its vampiric symbiosis with individual human desire, and the fact that the latecapitalist cynic's fetishism enables the disavowal of his/her de facto belief in capitalism, makes it highly unlikely that people can simply be persuaded to stop believing and start thinking (especially since, as
Zizek claims, many of these people are convinced that they already have ceased believing). Or, the more disquieting possibility to entertain is that some people today, even if one succeeds in exposing them to the underlying logic of their position, might respond in a manner resembling that of the Judas-like character Cypher in the film The Matrix (Cypher opts to embrace enslavement by illusion rather than cope with the discomfort of dwelling in the "desert of the real"): faced with the

choice between living the capitalist lie or wrestling with certain unpleasant truths, many individuals might very well deliberately decide to accept what they know full well to be a false pseudo-reality, a deceptively comforting fiction ("Capitalist commodity fetishism or the truth? I choose fetishism").

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Neg Capitalism Etho-poltical Obligation

We have an etho-political obligation to reject global capitalism.
Zizek and Daly2004 [Slavoj and Glyn, Conversations with Zizek, pg 14-16] For Zizek

it is imperative that we cut through this Gordian knot of postmodern protocol and recognize that our ethico-political responsibility is to confront the constitutive violence of today's global capitalism and its obscene naturalization/anonymization of the millions who are subjugated by it throughout the world. Against the standardized positions of postmodern culture - with all its pieties concerning
'multiculturalist' etiquette - Zizek is arguing for a politics that might be called 'radically incorrect' in the sense that it breaks with these types of positions and focuses instead on the very organizing principles of today's social reality: the

Marxism has been bedevilled by an almost fetishistic economism that has tended towards political morbidity. With the likes
principles of global liberal capitalism. This requires some care and subtlety. For too long, of Hilferding and Gramsci, and more recently Laclau and Mouffe, crucial theoretical advances have been made that enable the trascendence of all forms of economism. in this new context, however, Zizek argues that the problem that now presents itself is almost that of the opposite fetish. That is to say, the prohibitive anxieties surrounding the taboo of economism can function as a way of not engaging with the economic reality and as a way of implicitly accepting the latter as a basic horizon of existence. In an ironic Freudian-Lacanian twist, the fear of economism can end up reinforcing a de facto economic necessity in respect of contemporary capitalism (i.e. the initial prohibition conjures up the very thing it fears). This is not to endorse any retrograde return to economism. Zizek's point is rather that in rejecting economism we

should not lose sight of the systemic power of capital in shaping the lives and destinies of humanity and our very sense of the possible. In particular, we should not overlook Marx's central insight that in order to create a universal global system the forces of capitalism seek to conceal the politicodiscursive violence of its construction through a kind of gentrification of that system. What is persistently denied by neo-liberals such as Rorty (1989) and Fukuyama (1992) is that the gentrification of global liberal capitalism is one whose 'universalism' fundamentally reproduces and depends upon a disavowed violence that excludes vast sectors of the world's population. In this way, neo-liberal ideology attempts to naturalize capitalism by presenting its outcomes of winning and losing as if they were simply a matter of chance and sound judgement in a neutral marketplace. Capitalism does indeed create a space for a certain diversity, at least for the central capitalist regions, but it is neither neutral nor ideal and its price in terms of social exclusion is exorbitant. That is to say, the human cost in terms of inherent global poverty and degraded 'life-chances' cannot be calculated within the existing economic rationale and, in consequence, social exclusion remains mystified and nameless (viz. the patronizing reference to the developing world). And Zizek's point is that this mystification is magnified through capitalism's profound capacity to ingest its own excesses and negativity; to redirect (or misdirect) social antagonisms and to absorb them within a culture of differential affirmation. Instead of Bolshevism, the tendency of today is towards a kind of political boutiquism that is readily
sustained by postmodern forms of consumerism and lifestyle. Against this Zizek argues for a new universalism whose primary ethical directive is to confront the fact that our forms of social existence are founded on exclusion on a global scale. While it is perfectly true that universalism can never become Universal (it will always require a hegemonic-particular embodiment in order to have any meaning), what is novel about Zizek's universalism is that it would not attempt to conceal this fact or to reduce the status of the abject Other to that of a 'glitch' in an otherwise sound matrix.

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Neg Cap =/= Inevitable

Belief Capitalism can collapse just like a god can loose power.
Ainger 2004 [We Are Everywhere: The Irresistible Rise of Global Anticapitalism, http://artactivism.members.gn.apc.or...ay%5DPower.pdf] But all gods have a secret vulnerability: they cease to exist when people no longer believe in them. Trust is the fuel of power. As corporate collapses and financial scandals rock the markets, and the democratic deficit expands as people desert the charade of participation by voting, trust is in short supply. And failure of belief in a system spreads fast. A contagious whisper, it ripples through the multitude, rising to a roar. The roar was responded to by the World Economic Forum in 2003, when it chose Rebuilding Trust as the theme for the gathering. As preparation for the meeting it commissioned a massive public opinion survey representing the views of 1.4 billion people spanning every continent. The results, according to the WEF, revealed that trust in many key institutions has fallen to critical proportions. The least -trusted of the 17 institutions in the survey were national governments and corporations. Two-thirds of those surveyed worldwide disagreed that their country is governed by the will of the people and half distrusted the WTO and the IMF to operate in the best interest of society. The crisis of legitimacy has hit uncontainable proportions. According to a leaked email from a writer invited to Davos in 2003, the fear amongst the guests was palpable. These people are freaked out, she wrote, describing her dinner conversations with the elite. Despite their privilege and wealth, they know that their legitimacy is waning, that we have seen through them, that when trust has been eroded it becomes increasingly difficult to wield power. Refusing to Cooperate The tap root of power lies below the surface. It is obedie nce, cooperation, collusion: the social glue that ensures that each day proceeds much like the last. Every single one of us has the power to give or withhold our willing participation. To reproduce or reshape society. Alex Begg, Empowering the Earth: Strategies for Social Change, Green Books We are led to believe that the system of power is like a pyramid, similar to a food chain with the dominant species at the top maintaining its control over those at the bottom through superior strength and violence. But if an avalanche swept away all at Davos tomorrow, not much would really change because the power the Davos class accrues, through their ownership of capital, extends everywhere. There is a secret, however, that those on the mountaintop rarely reveal, which is that their power exists to some extent because we allow it to. They want us to believe that they wield power over us with their weapons and armies and police forces, and although their violence is highly effective in disrupting our movements, hurting our bodies and making us afraid, violence alone cant guarantee their continued existence. Ultimately, it depends upon us believing in their power, in their immutability, and failing to recognize our own. This was the substance of Shelleys furious ballad of 1819 when he wrote the famous lines to Manchesters working poor after troops fired on them in the Peterloo massacre: Rise, like lions after slumber / In unvanquishable number/ Shake your chains to earth like dew / Which in sleep had falln on you! / Ye are many, and they are few. In reality, the system is more like a huge wedding cake than a pyramid: multiple layers of dominance held up by many pillars pillars which are institutions and individuals, values and belief systems. Successful movement strategies, therefore, are those that identify the key pillars in society, and work to weaken their compliance until they break. As we take away one pillar, others begin to wobble and the system trembles.

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Neg Cap =/= Inevitable

Another Brick in the Wall Rejecting capitalism is like taking a cog out of the machine.
Roszak 92 (Theodore, History Professor @ CSU, The Voice of the Earth, pgs. 316-317)
Because those who join together in this congress of unauthorized identities speak for what they are, proudly and endlessly, they are (incorrectly) labeled self-indulgent and spoiled, and they are scolded by critics who are fortunate enough to need no such platform. Because they demand attention and concessions, they are (correctly) seen as an obstacle to the technocratic order and are badgered, hassled, beaten back as often as possible, though never for long. The powers that run the urban-industrial world are well advised to see the personalistic style of the times as threatening. No well-oiled,

efficient system can coexist with such a riot of personal improvisations. Self-discovery is the death of the industrial megamachine in the same way that democracy was the death of feudalism. But the disintegration we see impending is a creative disintegration, one
that opens a generous place for difference and diversity. Political equality was the beginning of this historical current; personal uniqueness is its destination. And both-the demand for equality, the demand for uniqueness-began inside, in the depths of the private psyche before either became a revolutionary movement in the world. Long before there was a political cause, there were people secretly hurting, needing, wanting. For the first time in human history, every odd and outcast member of our race will be able to step forward without shame and tell his or her story. If we are a culture of narcissists, we seem to find everybody's narcissism as fascinating as our own. Images of the outlandish and bizarre fill the media of modern times. The daily audience participation and talk shows on television probe every kink and twist of human nature. Pausing at the checkout counter of the supermarket, I come upon a small library of tawdry newspapers, each vying with the other to lay a more grotesque freak show before its readers. Yet even these exercises in tasteless sensationalism tell us something important. They reveal how very interested in one another we have become, how we crave to learn of the oddness and eccentricity of people everywhere. Simple animal curiosity may finally come to our rescue; there may be a saving wisdom hidden in this fascination with everyman's and everywoman's story. We will need all these personal histories to do even minimal justice to whatever the rerum natura is. Ecologically speaking, the music of the spheres is neither a solo nor a massed chorus carrying a single melody, but a jazz improvisation where each player has a rift. There is something more we can learn from basic ecology besides the value of variety. The urban revolution was the beginning of the interval of disequilibrium in whose latter days we now live. By human standards, the five thousand years of that interval may seem enormously long; but in the Gaian chronicles of the planet it is a minor, recent fluctuation still playing out its full implications. Now we begin to see with benefit of historical perspective how very ruthless this experiment has been in the regimentation of mental and physical energy. In the industrial period, machines of metal and chemical fuels have taken the place of muscle and animal metabolism, but the massification of people that began with the

pharaoh's work-gang continues in the form of the assembly line, the white collar office force, the consumer market, the conscript army. Industrialism demands massification for its extraordinary power over nature: mass production, mass media, mass marketing. Our complex global economy is built upon millions of small, private acts of psychological surrender, the willingness of people to acquiesce in playing their assigned parts as cogs in the great social machine that encompasses all other machines. They must shape themselves to the prefabricated identities that make efficient coordination possible. If Gaia is to moderate the planet-punishing thrust of world industrialism, that capacity for self-enslavement must be broken.
And the rock on which it founders is self-discovery, your conviction and mine that we are each a remarkable, unrepeatable event in the universe, a life shaped around an idea that happens only once and never again. The ecological ego is born of a narcissism that boldly asserts love and fascination with the self, not as a competitive agent, but as a freely created being demanding attention, recognition, respect .

Capitalism isnt inevitablethat is just an excuse to do nothing.

Martin, 01 (Brian, associate professor in Science, Technology & Society at the University of Wollongong, Australia, Nonviolence versus Capitalism, http://www.uow.edu.au/arts/sts/bmartin/pubs/01nvc/nvcall.html#ch7fns, Accessed 07-14-08) Actually, it is absurd to say that capitalism is inevitable. This is really just an excuse for doing nothing to examine and promote improvements and alternatives. The way society is organised is due to the actions of people, and these actions can change. History shows a tremendous range of possibilities for human patterns of interaction. Furthermore, technological development is creating new options for the structuring of work, communication and interaction. Considering that capitalism is only a few hundred years old and continues to change, and that there is nothing approaching agreement that the current system is ideal, the assumption of inevitability is very weak indeed. Defenders of capitalism assume that there are only two basic options: either capitalism or some sort of system based on authoritarian government, either state socialism or some other sort of dictatorship. (Capitalism is assumed to go hand in hand with representative government, but this ignores those countries with capitalist economies and authoritarian politics, including fascism and military dictatorship.) But of course there are more than these two options.

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Coercion State Key

Individual rights are dependent on state action, the private sector was created by public government action Holmes and Sunstein, 99 (Stephen and Cass, THE COST OF RIGHTS: WHY LIBERTY DEPENDS ON TAXES, 1999, p. 19.
(MHDRG/E592)) Public support for the kind of "safety net" that benefited the home owners of Westhampton is broad and deep, but at the same time, Americans seem easily to forget that individual rights and freedoms depend fundamentally on

vigorous state action. Without effective government, American citizens would not be able to enjoy private property in the way they do. Indeed, they would enjoy few or none of their constitutionally guaranteed individual rights. Personal liberty, as Americans values and experience it, presupposes social cooperation managed by government officials. The private realm we rightly prize is sustained, indeed created, by public action. Not even the most self-reliant citizen is asked to look after his or her material welfare autonomously, without any support from fellow citizens or public officials. Government coercion necessary to all rights Holmes and Sunstein, 99 (Stephen and Cass, THE COST OF RIGHTS: WHY LIBERTY DEPENDS ON TAXES, 1999, p. 19.
(MHDRG/E592))

Unenforced moral rights are aspirations binding on conscience, not powers binding on officials. They impose moral duties in all mankind, not legal obligations on the inhabitants of a territorially bounded nation-state. Because legally unrecognized moral rights are untainted by power, they can be advocated freely without much worry about malicious misuse, perverse incentives, and unintended side effects. Rights under law invariably raise much misgivings and concerns.
When they are not back by legal force, by contrast, moral rights are toothless by definition.

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Nietzsche AT: Better off Dead

Death cannot ever be judged as more preferable to life because it is radically uncertain
Paterson, 2003 [A Life Not Worth Living?, Craig, Studies in Christian Ethics, Vol. 16, No. 2, pgs. 1 -20, 2003, http://papers.ssrn.com/so13/papers.c...act_id=1029225]

By engaging in such comparisons of future lives, the conclusion is reached by deprivation theorists that death is only an evil for the person if the future lost is one that offers better prospects for the person than death itself. Death itself is typically conceived of as the destruction of the self; the non-existence of the self; the non-state of non-being.64 How can we respond to this assessment that death can be said to benefit a patient when the patients future prospects in life seem so grim? The non-state that death brings in its wake is seen as being preferable to the continuance of life. Yet, are persons who make and act upon such calculations objectively justified in opting for death? Can it truly be a rational act for a person to choose the destruction of self over the continuation of self, even a self racked by the severe impositions of pain and suffering?65 Philip Devine attempts to criticise the logicality of a decision to self-kill by stating what he considers to be the obscurity of what we can know about death. 66 He argues that if rational choice requires that a person knows what he or she is choosing (a leap in the dark not sufficing), then it cannot be rationally possible to intentionally choose death because of the opaqueness of death.67 As Devine says, . . . a precondition of rational choice is that one knows what one is choosing, either by experience or by the testimony of others who have experienced it or something very like it.68 Death cannot be rationally commensurated against, for we do not know what we are comparing life to. Life cannot simply be judged an overall evil and acted against by intentionally embracing death, for the overall evil of life cannot be rationally traded in for the opaqueness of death. For Devine, choosing death is simply akin to
leaping into the bowels of radical uncertainty that cannot function as a useful ground for objective rational choice.

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Nietzsche AT: Better off Dead

Abstract Concept - Argueing death is better than life is impossible
Paterson, 2003 [A Life Not Worth Living?, Craig, Studies in Christian Ethics, Vol. 16, No. 2, pgs. 1 -20, 2003, http://papers.ssrn.com/so13/papers.c...act_id=1029225] What we can know about death, based on natural human reason alone, is that it results in the destruction of the self. There will no longer be a human being in existence. There will be no carrier of value or disvalue. There will be no subject in

existence that is capable of bearing any of the kinds of predication typical of living human beings. Death is an event that results in the non-being of the human person that was.72 Unlike Devine, I would argue that an intention to bring about this non-state, given the relevant (if incomplete) knowledge we have about it, points to the incoherence behind the idea that death can really be said to be a benefit for the person who is dead, as argued for by contemporary deprivation authors.73 When we assert that a person is harmed or benefited by a state, this requires that there is actually a subject in existence who is capable of being the bearer of the value or disvalue. If a person must actually exist in order to be the subject bearer of harms
and benefits that happen, then how can there be said to be a subject who is capable of being benefited posthumously by his or her death? This line of argumentation against deprivation accounts (that death can be a benefit) is convincingly argued for by John Donnelly and J. L. A. Garcia. If a person succeeds in killing himself or herself, there can be no betterment ascribed to the person. For Donnelly, it is muddled to argue that a person can be said to be posthumously benefited or harmed if the person must first be destroyed as a prerequisite for the benefit. 74 The irrationality of thinking that death can be a benefit for a person is further addressed by Garcia. 75 If it is good to be without pain, as indeed it is under most circumstances, this presupposes the existence of the subject in order to instantiate that good (any good). If a person can

be better off dead, then the continued existence of the person must continue after death. Yet no one on the basis of reason alone can justifiably claim that death can allow for the continuation of the person qua person. To realise goods and to minimise evils requires the presence of that single constant, a live human being, who can possibly make sense of such value statements. For Garcia, therefore, it is quite illicit to
jump from the evaluation of means to minimise, or be free from, the evils of suffering and pain, to the conclusion that the destruction of the subject itself can make a person in any meaningful sense better off. Consequently, all that can reasonably be done is to seek to benefit persons in their present lives , that is to improve as best we can the extent of their flourishing within the framework of humanitarian means available at our disposal. 76

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Nietzsche AT: Better off Dead

It is impossible to judge when life of someone else has value because the value to life is subjective we must always avoid letting others die
Paterson, 2003 [A Life Not Worth Living?, Craig, Studies in Christian Ethics, Vol. 16, No. 2, pgs. 1 -20, 2003, http://papers.ssrn.com/so13/papers.c...act_id=1029225] Appeals to a thoroughgoing quality assessment of lifes worth can be further demonstrated by mentioning the work of Helga Kuhse and John Harris. Kuhse shares the direct rejection of the sanctity of life approach, which holds that innocent life must be valued such that it cannot be directly attacked by an act of intentional killing. She points out what she regards as the hypocrisy of allowing patients to die by the withdrawal of treatment, yet refusing to assist patien ts by positively reaching the same chosen outcome.9 In determining whether a life is worth living or not,

attention should be focused upon an array of interests of the person, and these, for the competent patient at least, are going to vary considerably, since they will be informed by the patients underlying dispositions, and, for the incompetent, by a minimal quality threshold. It follows that for competent patients,
a broad-ranging assessment of quality of life concerns is the trump card as to whether or not life continues to be worthwhile. Different patients may well decide differently. That is the prerogative of the patient, for the only unpalatable alternative is to force a patient to stay alive.10 For Harris, life can be judged valuable or not when the person assessing his or her own life determines it to be so. 11 If a person values his or her own life, then that life is

valuable, precisely to the extent that he or she values it. Without any real capacity to value, there can be no value. As Harris states, . . . the value of our lives is the value we give to our lives.12 It follows that the primary
injustice done to a person is to deprive the person of a life he or she may think valuable. Objectivity in the value of human life, for Harris, essentially becomes one of negative classification (ruling certain people out of consideration for value), allied positively to a broad range of critical interests; interests worthy of pursuing friendships, family, life goals, etc. which are subjected to de facto self-assessment for the further determination of meaningful value

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Nietzsche Impact Takeouts

Their impacts are lies empirical questions cannot be determined by philosophical reasoning
Brennan 08 PhD Philosophy [Thu January 3 2008 Andrew Brennan Professor in Philosophy, "Environmental Ethics" http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-environmental/#5]

that if we believe we have a duty to respect nature or believe that natural things are intrinsically valuable, then we really will act in ways that are more eco-friendly. This empirical question cannot be answered by purely a priori philosophical reasoning. In fact, the
Central to the psycho-behavioural thesis is a problematic assumption: other core premises in the four major philosophical theories on the origin of environmental crisis are also empirical claims about social and cultural reality. To be credible, they must be able to stand up to empirical testing. For

example, are people who think in dualistic and hierarchical ways -- as feminists describe -- in fact more likely to have anthropocentric attitudes and more likely to act harmfully towards the environment? Are people who believe in animism -- as panpsychists would like us to do -- in fact less likely to have
anthropocentric attitudes and also less likely to harm the environment? What about people who adopt some relational or holistic view of the world, as advocated by deep ecologists? How do they act toward nature compared to those who adopt a more individualistic and atomistic worldview? These questions about the relations among various belief

systems and behaviours look no different in kind from the sorts of questions that social scientists regularly ask.

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Nietzsche Government Domination

Their conception of power permits government domination, even when individuals are pursuing their own development this stamps individuality.
Hunt, 2001 [Lester, teach philosophy at the University of Wisconsin The Transformation of Nietzschean Ideas in The Fountain Head] http://philosophy.wisc.edu/hunt/niet...untainhead.htm]

the most important difference between Nietzsche's ideas about master morality and slave morality and Rand's use of those ideas in The Fountainhead is the one that is the most obvious, the one that is so to speak under our noses from the outset. Nietzsche's discussion of the two syndromes, after all, treats them in the context of the relationship between masters and slaves. As Rand, and of course many others, use these ideas, they are freed from their embededness in pre-liberal systems of social castes.
However, This seemingly simple fact is potentially problematic: Nietzsche, and the purists among his followers, might argue that there is a limit to the extent to which these ideas can be detached from their original context. The ideas are no doubt applicable, perhaps indeed without greatly distorting them, in situations that do not literally involve a caste structure. After all, Nietzsche himself wanted to argue that some of the same psychological strategies he found in the original master-slave relationship were at work in the comparatively liberal and democratic Europe of his day. But note that the original Nietzschean ideas were formulated in the context of relationships of unequal power, and for Nietzsche power includes hegemony. This may mean that these ideas may be inevitably and profoundly illiberal. Part of the point of Nietzsche's analysis is to provide a critique of certain aspects of what, in the analysis, is labeled "slave" morality. If the occupant of this position is necessarily someone who is rebelling against someone who has hegemony over them, then it would seem to be impossible to use Nietzsche's ideas without being committed to some profoundly illiberal implications. These ideas would inevitably tend to denigrate those who rebel against oppressive power in order to pursue their own self-development. This would seem to be incompatible with the individualism that, as everyone knows, is embodied in The Fountainhead. It may well commit one to the idea that

most people cannot, or should not, be individuals at all, but functionaries serving others.

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Nietzsche Government Domination

Allowing for the government to dominate us is bad it is a parasite that only survives because of its own weak and dependency
Hunt, 2001 [Lester, teach philosophy at the University of Wisconsin The Transformation o f Nietzschean Ideas in The Fountain Head] http://philosophy.wisc.edu/hunt/niet...untainhead.htm] Here Roark characterizes the positive pole of his distinction between the two ways of life first of all in terms of its power, and he characterizes the nature of this power as a process that, because its activity flows from its own

internal nature and not from external stimuli, presents itself to an external point of view as spontaneous. So far, the point of view is thoroughly Nietzschean. The anti-Nietzschean moment comes near the end of
the speech, when he says that the sphere of activity of the creator "includes the whole sphere of his creative faculty, his work," but "does not include the sphere of the gangster, the altruist and the dictator" (740-41). The reason he

immediately gives for this pronouncement is however strikingly Nietzschean: "Rulers of men ... create nothing. They exist entirely through the persons of others. Their goal is in their subjects, in the activity of enslaving. They are as dependent as the beggar, the social worker, the bandit. The form of dependence does not
matter." (741.) As a criticism of the "rulers of men," this line of thinking has two essential elements that are quite different and become explicit in different parts of his speech. On the one hand, he is alleging parasitism of a physical sort. Part of his concern, as he indicates earlier, is with the ways in which human beings manage to survive. As he says: "Nothing is given to man on earth. Everything he needs has to be produced. And here man faces his basic alternative: he can survive in only one of two ways - by the independent work of his own mind or as a parasite fed by the minds of others. The creator originates. The parasite borrows. The creator faces nature alone. The parasite faces nature through an intermediary." (738.)

Part of the criticism of "ruling" lies in the simple fact that, in so far as hegemony functions as a way of making one's way, of surviving, then what one is doing is getting others to provide one with the wherewithal to live. It is the original producers who are using their powers to make human life possible, the ruler is simply, in this respect, a parasite, physically dependent on others . As Roark puts it,
"the basic need of the second-hander is to secure his ties with men in order to be fed" (738). It is easy to see how someone could use this idea to argue that this way of life represents an low grade or quantity of power.

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