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European Planning Studies

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Barcelonafast forward? City entrepreneurialism in the 1980s and 1990s

Tim Marshalla a School of Planning, Oxford Brookes University, Oxford, UK

To cite this Article Marshall, Tim(1996) 'Barcelonafast forward? City entrepreneurialism in the 1980s and 1990s',

European Planning Studies, 4: 2, 147 165 To link to this Article: DOI: 10.1080/09654319608720337 URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09654319608720337

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European Planning Studies, Vol. 4, No. 2, 1996

147

Barcelona -- Fast Forward? City Entrepreneurialism in the 1980s and 1990s

TIM MARSHALL
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[Paperfirstreceived, July 1994; infinalform, January 1995]

ABSTRACT Since 1979 the city council of Barcelona has sought to guide the city's destiny by a variety of methods, most powerfully by securing the 1992 Olympic Games candidacy, but also by means of two strategic planning exercises, begun in 1988 and 1992. These strategies are examined within their political and economic contexts in order to understand how they relate to changes in Spanish and Catalan politics, in global/local economic shifts and in thinking on city guidance. Significant differences in the three phases of city promotion are identified. It is concluded that strategic planning within the context of the intense spatial economic competition of the late 1990s may be even more difficult for Barcelona than was its drive up to 1992.

1. Introduction
Many observers of the European urban scene regard Barcelona as a recent success story. The city has regularly scored well in the 'league tables' constructed for various promotional or more academic purposes. The transformation from a city with, in 1980, great services and infrastructure deficits, in the midst of a deep economic crisis, to the restructured, dynamic and outward-looking metropolis of the mid-1990s, is seen as testimony that some cities can indeed exercise an influence over their destiny. The intention here is to examine this generalized impression: to discuss in what senses Barcelona has been able to advance, using what strategies, within what political framing and historical circumstances. It should be stressed that the aim is only to make an initial attempt at assessing the nature and significance of the process; 4 years after the Olympics it is relatively early to identify some of the enduring effects of the efforts of the last 15 years. With greater confidence, an account can be presented of the stages and forms of the city's proactive stance and the political movements within and behind this stance. A number of authors have examined these issues, though these are mainly pre-1992 (de Forn, 1993; Garcia, 1991; Guell, 1993; Maragall, 1992; Marshall, 1992; Roldan, 1992; Sanchez, 1992; Varley, 1992). Unpublished work by Kodz (1993) has added to these treatments more recently. In Barcelona City Council itself some impact assessment preceded (Barcelona City Council, 1992) and followed (Barcelona City Council, 1994) the Games. Reflection has also taken place within the framework of a second Barcelona Plan 2000, via some evaluation exercises (Pla Estrategic, 1992a,b,c). Nevertheless, it is important to realize that the basis for discussion of these issues, from within Barcelona, is rather thin. Most of the Tim Marshall, School of Planning, Oxford Brookes University, Oxford OX3 0BP, UK. 0965-4313/96/020147-19 1996 Journals Oxford Ltd

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above material reflects more or less the 'official story' of the city's success, with the only more extended critiques coming from those outside the political mainstreamsfrom the left (Moreno & Vasquez Montalban, 1991) and the Greens (Martinez Alier, 1992; Barcelona Estalvia Energia, 1994). This reflects a genuinely dominant hegemonic view in the city, but does not help more distanced judgements. A debate is gathering momentum in Britain on the evaluation of this type of urban policy, whether focusing on 'mega-projects' such as the Olympics (Kodz, 1993), major public investments such as the Birmingham Convention Centre (Loftman & Nevin, 1992), public institutions such as British Urban Development Corporations (Imrie & Thomas, 1993) or, in the most extended treatment so far, British urban 'flagship' projects (Smyth, 1994). In all cases, one of the prime issues is seen to be 'who gains?', economically and socially. Many consider that such urban policy approaches privilege certain already dominant economic interests over those of the mass of city populations, and that the heavy public expenditure gives a poor return. This contribution on Barcelona may bring something to this debate, not so much in terms of precise evaluation, but by placing particular policies within particular conjunctural and ideological histories. As well as calculating specific economic and social returns, evaluation needs to understand the 'timing and spacing' of these European urban projects. Barcelona's case is of special interest because of its apparent tendency to be in the forefront of whatever policy directions become widespread among European cities. Hence, it may be that the examination of the latest initiative, the second Barcelona Plan 2000, will cast light on responses likely to be generalized in the later 1990s. The somewhat turbulent relationship with a dynamic region (Catalonia), and its government (the Generalitat), makes Barcelona city's example all the more interesting to those concerned with the shifting of urban and regional power balances within the 'new Europe' (Harvie, 1994; Parkinson, 1992). 2. The Global, the Local and Strategic Planning Barcelona's history can usefully be placed within two somewhat separate frames of theorizing. The first refers to the emerging interplay of the global and the local as 'glocalization' (Swyngedouw, 1992)an inelegant invention, but one which catches something of what appears to be occurring. This is a shift in the forms of capitalism, such that capital moves faster and with more spatial freedom. This, it is then argued, generates greater competition between places, because economies are less nationally or regionally contained. This then forms the basis for the 'rise of the local', with growth coalitions in cities or regions seeking to distinguish the attracting characteristics of their places. New economic forms such as strategic alliances between firms and subcontracting systems minimize the risks of long-term fixed investment in particular places. This can cause "hectic territorial switching of the process of over-accumulation/devaluation" (Swyngedouw, 1992, p. 55). Declining national and international regulation in the face of global capital encourages greater attempts at local regulation. But the increased importance of local/regional conditions is seen as paralleled by increased disempowerment and subordination to global forces. There is therefore a struggle over the scales of regulation, which is caught up with processes of "local-territorial reconfiguration" (Swyngedouw, 1992, p. 61). All of this is seen as intensified by the European Union Single Market. Much of this framework appears, at first sight, to fit the recent experience of such European cities as Barcelona. There is not space in this article to investigate fully the degree of fit, but the account will comment on the extent to which Barcelona appears to be within this process. The second framework for the discussion is that of strategic planning, as developed by authors such as Bryson (1987). This is in part due to the fact that Barcelona's leaders have

City Entrepreneurialism in Barcelona 149

used these ideas themselves, as the appropriate method or technique to guide their efforts. But it is also because strategic planning has, in the last decade, become a widely used intellectual approach to city governance, superseding to an extent earlier methods, such as regional planning or urban planning. Strategic planning emerged from the practice of large corporations, and involved a more plural approach by public authorities, based on public-private partnerships of many kinds. As in urban planning, many different types have been identified, but common to all are the attempts to clarify overall objectives, to set short-term, achievable programmes and to involve a wide range of stakeholders. Three different phases of the attempt to guide Barcelona's future will be examined, involving different conceptions of 'strategic planning' (whether or not the term itself was used). It is true that there is an element of trying to compare apples and oranges; the Olympics phase was fundamentally different, in many respects. Nevertheless, consideration within the same discussion does cast light on the determinants of effective city steering. Consideration of these two frameworks together suggests a further question: are certain forms of strategic planning the 'natural' political response to current forms of glocalization? The Barcelona case allows reflection on this issue. Such an argument would find support in Harvey's relation of the shift from "urban managerialism" to "urban entrepreneurialism" in the 1970s and 1980s, due to changes in capitalism's forms (Harvey, 1989).

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3. Phase 1Planning for the Olympics The decision to bid for the 1992 Olympics was taken in 1980, by the Socialist group which had recently emerged victorious in the Barcelona municipal elections (Enciclopedia Catalana, 1993). The political positioning of the Socialists was to remain key to the whole development of the three phases: they retained power in the city and, from 1982, in Madrid, but failed to win regional power, in the Generalitat, which from 1980 was controlled by the centre-right Catalan nationalists, Convergencia i Unio (CiU). Political competition between these two groupings remained a continuous factor from 1980, with the power balance always with the Socialists until 1993, when their minority government position in Madrid meant a dependence on CiU votes. This first phase may be seen as running to 1988, including all the preparatory work on programming and financing, even though a few key decisions were taken a little later. The phase may be analyzed under four headings.

3.1 Aims and Motivations

The prime drives were economic and social, but with the above political competition factor a significant extra incentive for the city council to retain the initiative: bidding for the Olympics was something done by cities, not regions. The economic urgency arose from the economic crisis faced by the city in the early 1980s, which involved massive industrial closures and very high unemployment (see Cheshire and Hay (1989) whose figure showing city "problem score changes" 1971-1984, page 76, shows Barcelona almost off the page, so bad was its position). But the major programmes which were argued to be necessary to stage the Olympics were seen as having social purposes within the city's planning strategyto upgrade inner and outer deprived districts and to massively extend and improve public spaces and facilities. The ring roads, the new drainage systems, the new telecommunications infrastructure, the new residential districts, the transformed old portall were seen as having both social gains and contributing to economic regeneration. At the same time, these aims were being pursued in other forms, through economic and social programmes run from Madrid

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Table 1. Investments for Barcelona Olympic Games (millions 1992 pesetas) Operations Areas and subcentres
Mont Juic Area Diagonal Area Vail Hebron Area Olympic Village (Total Areas) Subcentres with accommodation Other subcentres Other venues 45 269 5 539 21 733 161 888 234 430 30 933 15411 32 911 249 750 43 910 50 283 11449 30 427 136 071 22 894 90 785 61469 23 674 37 795 28 513 67 802 5 983 26 499 26 499 753 707 28 513 73 785

Investments

Totals
313 688

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Communications
Second Ring Road Coastal Ring Road Trinitat Junction and links Branch Roads (Total Ring Roads) links between ring roads Access to Areas

Hotels
Municipal Hotel Plan Other hotels Airport Telecommunications Telefonica Collserola Tower

Rest COOB Investments

Total Source: Barcelona City Council, 1994.

and by initiatives in local economic regeneration (workshops, training, etc.) and in social/ cultural action (community centres, sports and leisure programmes), run at city and citydistrict level (after decentralization in 1986).

3.2 Instruments

To a large extent, the Olympics phase can be seen as a classic urban planning strategy, led by and largely financed by the public sector (Table 1). The strategy was one based on the city's aspirations dating back many yearsto the extent that the post-1982 mayor, Pasqual Maragall, was often to refer to the Francoist mayor of 19571973, Porcioles, in supportive terms. Key elements such as the ring roads and the Olympic village dated essentially from the 1950s and 1960s. The vital link to finance the infrastructure was the Madrid-Barcelona axis: the 1992 project rested on the national state supporting, continuously, a local administration, with dependable, long-term promises of funding. The Generalitat was also brought into the project, to create a fully representative alliance, but this was always the weakest link, with tensions emerging in many programmes, and with the Generalitat funding and organizing a smaller part of the work. As the years passed, the public companies set up to implement the programmes had a

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somewhat more entrepreneurial look. This was most obvious in the Olympic Village, where Maragall's promise that a large proportion would be social housing was abandoned when it became clear that this clashed with private development of the housing areas. However, in most cases funding and control remained public, via companies controlled in varying proportions by the public administrations. 3.3 Processes and Participation During these years, the council was still in quite close touch with the residents' movements which had been a major political force in the 1970s, and which still had effective existence in the 1980s. This tended to ensure that the Olympic project remained, by and large, close to popular goals in the-citynot a statement which is easy to prove, but apparently supported by the Socialists' continuing electoral control and the enormous enthusiasm in the city following the successful bid in 1986. This does not mean that the project was one informed by 'popular planning' in the more participatory sense. Plans were prepared essentially by the Socialist leaders and implemented by small technical/political teams. Electoral democracy and rule by party has governed the city since 1979. On occasions pressure from local residents' groups, often represented by the few (ex) Communist councillors, was responsible for changes in planning, such as the reduction in commercial floorspace in the old port developments or the covering of some of those sections of the ring road which were nearest housing. This pressure was easier to exert as the Socialists retained control in some periods due to Communist support.

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3.4 Discourses The Olympics project was presented as a 'one city' exercise, in a sense beyond politics, offering something to everyone. It was a successful 'hegemonic project' (Hajer, 1989), bringing together the various movements and powers in the city, from the popular post-Franco forces to the normally ruling groups controlling the city's economy. The Socialists probably represented neither force very clearly, but they were the only group who could articulate a coherent discourse for a broad enough alliance to win elections.

3.5 Synthesis From the point of view of strategic planning, the Olympics constituted a fine example of practicebut without the terminology or methodology. Its effectiveness reveals in fact some of the key characteristics that strategic planning theory regards as essential. There were very effective motivations, economic and political, especially for the leaders (the Socialists). There were built-in deadlines (leading up to 1992), with tremendously public penalties for failure. The exercise had to be fairly comprehensive, to generate support, and therefore included quite a range of stakeholders. Goals and implementation were closely linked, through the understanding of an overall, simple project, and the (in any case normal) Spanish practice of putting politically sympathetic persons in 'technical' positions. It can be seen therefore that the Olympics had great advantages for politicians wishing to unite a city around a public project. This was especially the case for Barcelona because all sorts of accumulated services and infrastructure deficits could be quite easily linked to the overall goal. The project was also marked by the link to Madrid's funding, with a government sympathetic to publicly led exercises (as in the Seville World Exposicion)that is, there was a coherent approach 'within' the organization. The only disadvantage, not problematic for the strategic planning argument, but possibly

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for some citizens, was that if a scheme or programme could not be presented as part of the 1992 drive, then it was less easy to obtain funding. Thus, there were criticisms from certain more 'social' quarters that work to improve outer districts had fallen behind, given the council's determined focus on the Olympics. This view was presented in its sharpest form by Moreno and Vasquez Mbntalban (1991), who argued that the post-Franco movement's energy had been diverted by the Olympics project, at a time when it could have been incorporated into more progressive channels. This argument is certainly hard to evaluate, as it depends on judgements of the overall direction of Spanish and Barcelona politics in the 1980s. But it perhaps downplays the extent to which the Olympics project contained social goals, even if the pressures of deadlines and funding led later to the loss of some of these (as in the Olympic Village). Kodz (1993) notes that the GDP per capita increase in the city (24%) was substantially higher than that for Spain or Catalonia (both 17%) for the years 1987-1991. Equally, unemployment fell further in the city than in Spain in the years 1986-199250% as against 24%. It is reasonable to assume that most of these improvements resulted directly from the Games investment. It is noteworthy that in December 1993 the city's unemployment figure of 11.9% was somewhat below that of Catalonia (12.2%) and well below that of Spain (16.6%). This reversed the position of the early 1980s crisis, when Barcelona's rate had been higher. However, a more general problem was that the Olympics project set off a particularly fast inflation in prices in the city, especially of housing (a 235% increase in prices 1985-1990), lowering citizens' purchasing power (Barcelona City Council, 1994b). Many of the Olympic investments were genuine gains for the city's residents as a whole, even though one can then argue as to the value of the gains in terms of a long-term project for the city. The better physical environment of so many areas, the better telephone system, the ring roadsthese tended to benefit most residents. Other elements gave less clearly generalized gains. The sports facilities benefit the activenot a class division probably, simply a cultural split. The airport facilities benefit the most mobile. The Olympic Village, while providing new open spaces and a sea front open to all, will benefit mainly the richer residents who can afford the new flats. The tunnel under Collserola will benefit mainly the higher income residents living in that area, particularly given the high toll charged. On balance, an assessment of this kind suggests a mainly positive outcome for the majority of the city's residents. A challenge to such a judgement would come mainly from a Green perspective. This argues that the project was a wasteful and anti-ecological one, with too much emphasis on road and air transport, and too fast urbanization of a number of areas, which could better have been developed for more socially beneficial purposes, at a slower pace (Martinez Alier, 1992). The problem with this viewpoint is that it expresses a position which is almost certainly a small minority in the city, and one which has been given litde political voice.

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4. Phase 2Barcelona 2000 In 1988 a process of fully conscious 'strategic planning' was set in motion by the city council (see Marshall (1990) for an early account). Its title was 'Barcelona Economic and Social Plan 2000', and its aim was to look beyond 1992 and take full advantage of the Olympics investment. The plan was approved in 1990 and was then pushed forward until early 1993, when the decision was taken to produce a second plan. This decision led to a process of evaluation of the first plan, as a necessary initial step.

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Table 2. Major objectives of Barcelona 2000 Strategic Plan
Main objective

Consolidate Barcelona as an enterprising European metropolis, with influence over its macroregion and with a modern, socially balanced quality of life, deeply rooted in Mediterranean culture Strategic lines (a) Make Barcelona one of the key centres of the macroregion (b) Improve the quality of life and progress for people (c) Support for industry and for advanced services to business Objectives (a) 1. Insert Barcelona in the network of Eurocities and of metropolitan centres around the world 2. Improve communications within the metropolitan region (b) 3. Improve the environment 4. Improve, at all levels, training and research as a means of progress 5. Improve social opportunities for housing and training 6. Prioritise cultural infrastructures (c) 7. Create basic infrastructure for advanced services, in addition to those related to transport and telecommunications 8. Promote technological innovation for industrial progress 9. Develop sectors with potential within the metropolitan area Source: Pla Estrategic, 1990.

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4.1 Aims and Motivations

The explicit aim of the plan was to "consolidate Barcelona as an enterprising European metropolis, affecting the macroregion in which it is located, with a modern quality of life, socially balanced and strongly rooted in Mediterranean culture" (Pla Estrategic, 1990). In this aim, one can identify a more explicit effort to promote the city, an effort which becomes clearer if one examines the sub-objectives (Table 2). It may be imagined that the Olympics already constituted an exercise in 'place marketing' par excellence. But I would argue that this element followed the successful bidding, which had been motivated much more by a desire to obtain Madrid funding and to support local political goals. What the Barcelona 2000 exercise revealed was the understanding that the evident global public exposure could be transformed into a place marketing opportunity, in the changed circumstances of the late 1980s. In that sense the explicit adoption of strategic planning methods (with articles by Bryson cited in plan documents as sources) was symptomatic of a more 'entrepreneurial' approach. This is not to say that economic goals completely crowded out social aims. However, the objectives on more social housing and more employment remained unclear and weakly developed. It was not surprising that the evaluation of 1992 revealed that most more socially oriented aspects of the plan (along with most environmental goals) scored low on implementation (Pla Estrategic, 1992a).

4.2 Instruments

The plan represented an essentially partnership approach to city guidance, whereby public and private sectors concerted their investments to the overall gain of the city. Public investment was still seen as essential, above all for infrastructure purposes, and in this sense the presentation of the plan in Madrid was important. However, the search for international

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investment and consumption, whether by multinational firms, by international public agencies or by tourists, was seen as equally, if not more, important. Here, therefore, one can identify the outward turning tendency which can be seen as characteristic of 'glocalization'. While this looking outwards, towards Europe and the world, has long been identified with Catalan society, it seems clear that the search for outward links was intensified in the late 1980s. Barcelona City Council was a leading actor in the Eurocities grouping from 1986 onwards, linking at first several 'second cities', and later others. The Generalitat also linked up with three other 'Motors of Europe' regions, to seek to gain synergy from successful industrial areas. The model in all cases was a form of state-private sector partnership, one primarily oriented to meeting perceived private sector requirements.

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4.3 Processes and Participation

The plan had a pyramidal structure of participation. At the top was an executive council of the 10 leading institutional members (these were Barcelona City Council, the Chamber of Commerce, the Circle of Economy, two trade union federations, the Zona Franca Consortium, the Trade Fair, the Port Authority, the Employers Federation and the (central) university). These met regularly, every two weeks, from 1988 onwards. Their continuing contact and interaction was regarded as an important element of the process (Santacana, 1993), leading key actors to change their views of each other. Twice a year the general council of the plan met to review progress, and, in 1990, to approve the final version of the plan. This council was made up of over 200 organizations, mainly firms and public agencies. Another element of participation lay in the membership of commissions, including 550 individuals during the plan's preparation: many of these were academics, but there were also numerous company and agency representatives. Finally, a degree of public participation was provided by the exhibition in 1989 of the plan's proposals, when members of the public could note their views (if they wished, by video), and by the sessions of the general council, which were advertised as open to anyone. In reality the plan was managed by a quite small elite of institutions 'on speaking terms' with the city council, and especially with the Socialists. Although a genuine effort was made to maintain openness, this was not supported by any more intensive attempt to involve the unorganized. The structure of working commissions and regular meetings and the discourse of strategic guidance tended to attract certain types of participantand detract others. It would appear in addition that different sorts of participation delivered different results. It was noted that 25 of the proposals were not progressed effectively because these were either unclear, or too general, or 'not strategic'; they had only been brought in because the participatory process had obliged the planners to accept proposals from sectors who did not want to be left out (de Forn, 1993). Many of these proposals were of a social or environmental nature, regarded by some as 'not strategic', that is not about correcting Barcelona's (economic) weaknesses and promoting its strengths. Another feature of the plan process was its stately pace, taking over 2 years to initial approval, followed by the equally important 3 years of monitoring. This in itself encouraged a certain technical or bureaucratic form, giving the plan a rather professional air. The timescale reflects the aspiration of one of the plan's leaders that eventually strategic planning should become a part of Barcelona's City Council's normal operation (de Forn, 1993)that is a normal organizational tool, not a plan which might be 'owned' publicly by Barcelona society. This may be taken to be based either on a limited conception of democratic governance on the part of the council's leaders, or on a realistic understanding of the limited civic desires of Barcelona's citizensor both.

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4.4 Discourses

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Already in 1988 the council's leaders must have been aware that the project initiated by the PSOE at the start of the 1980s, nationally and in the city, was running out of direction and force. In Madrid, the divisions within the party between more Socialist and more centrist wings weakened attempts to form a new project. In Barcelona, the dominance of fairly pragmatic viewpoints in the party allowed some attempt to develop a fresh impetus, equipping the Socialists with new goals and if possible a broader electoral appeal. The Barcelona 2000 Plan can usefully be interpreted as part of such a project, building an on-going hegemonic consensus on the back of the Olympics enthusiasm. For this purpose, the party leaders considered that a 'moderate' discourse was needed, around above all goals of economic growth. This allowed a degree of incorporation of some business sectors, who trusted the council Socialists to respond to their needs. (Moreno & Vazquez Montalban, 1991, p. 101, refer to the "Associacio Empresarial Barcelona 92", in which each company in this association contributed 50 000 to propel the Games). This more centrist discourse is evident in the plan's objectives and style of operation. It had the disadvantage of alienating to some degree the trade unions and some other social groups, but this mattered little to the PSOE, as these forces had, at this date, (unlike in, say, 1980) no strong alternative to which they could defect. The inclusion of some social goals was enough to maintain the unions' participation, even if few of these were subsequently achieved. What the plan did, therefore, was to evolve a new set of formulas for governing the city in the 1990s, in concert with some of the city's economic powers. (Not all were involved: the Generalitat refused to participate and thus much of the more CiU inclined business sectors also steered clear of the process.) The plan sought to build a consensus of the 'elites' around its goals. This element of discourse coalition building (Hajer, 1992) may well have been as important as the substance of the plan, to the council's leadersand explains the Generalitat's decision to keep well clear of the process. The emphases on city promotion, infrastructure and publicprivate partnership were all evidence of a shift in discourse from the rather more populist Olympics drive, based as that had been on achieving many 'historic' demands of the 1960s or 1970s. However, the consensus around the Olympics did provide the foundation for establishing the new conception of an 'all city' project.

4.5 Synthesis

In many respects, the 1988-1993 strategic planning exercise was more difficult than, and less successful than, the preceding phasewhich had not been, consciously, 'strategic planning'. The plan's leaders admitted that they had benefited greatly from the Olympics drive and the economic boom, and had perhaps, in retrospect, not pushed for enough extra elements. They felt this in part because so many of the objectives had been achieved (de Forn, 1993; this does not square with the 1992 evaluationbut it shows, in part, how subjective evaluation must be). They had been too modest! However, as a learning exercise, the plan was felt to have been very valuable. It had provided a framework for advancing a number of proposals, which were henceforth seen as linked pieces of Barcelona's future: the TGV line from France via the city to Madrid, the doubling of the size of the trade fair site, the infrastructure plan for the Llobregat delta (port, airport, etc.), the promotion of training initiatives (de Forn, 1993).

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5. Phase 3The Second Barcelona 2000 Plan At the end of 1992, however, there was a feeling that a new and more ambitious plan was needed. The body representing the municipalities of the metropolitan region joined the executive council, reflecting the wish to broaden the plan's ambit to a wider area. On 30 November 1994 the second plan was approved by the General Council of the Plan Association. By this stage it seems that the city council had lost some of its enthusiasm for the project, and very little effort was made to obtain press coverage; the event was only noted, briefly, by one Barcelona newspaper. The 'glossy' version of the second plan was not in fact launched formally until December 1995.

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5.1 Aims and Motivations

The overall aim of the second plan was "to increase the integration of the Barcelona region into the international economy, in order to guarantee its growth in terms of economic progress, social progress and quality of life" (Pla Estrategic, 1994). The idea behind this general goal was that Barcelona, through the 1992 drive, had moved up the scales of activity, but that this had to be fully realized, through further developments. This stress on scale changes was common to a number of the working group reports, most interestingly in that of the one on the areas of influence of the city (Pla Estrategic, 'Ambits d'Influencia de Barcelona' 1993). This examined four scales at which the city needed to change its operation (Table 3). At the metropolitan scale it was argued that better spatial structuring was required, perhaps with a more polycentric form, via effective transport investment. At the regional level there should be more cooperation to secure complementary gains, for example via tourism planning, infrastructure coordination and educational links (the six cities network, of Barcelona, Zaragoza, Valencia, Parma, Toulouse and Montpelier, was seen as one element at this scale). At the continental scale it was argued that Barcelona could specialize in certain functions for Europe as a whole, with adequate air or land connections, convention centres, hotels, making it attractive to international institutions and investors. Then at the transcontinental level the importance of links with North Africa, America and the Far East was stressed, via educational, technological and migration policies. Here the motivation is evidently to respond to the perceived forces of globalization, and ensure that Barcelona fits in to these forces in a way that works to its advantage. The draft plan (Pla Estrategic, 1994) claims that an examination of the geopolitical and geoeconomic situation suggested that cities were faced with various options. One was that of decline, if remaining dependent on traditional sectors. Another was the world city route, with appropriate economic functions. A third was seeking the international specializations most suitable to the particular city, as a sort of second level international or semi-global city. The latter was the city competition form adopted by the second plan. This overall direction was then detailed via a number of general lines, objectives and measures, as in the first plan. Table 4 shows the overall objective, supported by an overall city aim for 'better quality management', and then the 5 lines and 20 objectives. It is clear that the main emphasis is on international economic competition. The social integration strategic line (No. 3) includes significant elements on support for immigrants and the old. But it appears to be 'stuck on' to the main structure, compared with the strategic lines for sectoral economic development (Nos 1, 4 and 5). Environmental elements are of lesser significance than in the first plan, with only a reference to open space protection within the metropolitan region. An earlier version of the overall aim had referred to "sustainable development, both ecologically and for social equilibrium" (de Forn, 1993); the language of sustainability and ecology was subsequently removed. In fact, the plan is heavily 'developmentalist', with a strong drive for

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Table 3. Framework for analyzing Barcelona's territorial relationships: this shows the levels and themes used to structure analysis. The strategic plan was then filled in, in considerable detail, (not included here) Urba Seals
Metropolitan Regional Catalonia Regional Macroregion RegionalWest Mediterranean Continental Spain Continental EU Continental Europe Transcontinental America Transcontinental N Africa Transcontinental East Asia Source: Pla Estrategic, 1993, 'Ambits d'Influencia de Barcelona'. Penetration Integration Articulation Promotion

Theme

Information Training Culture

and

regional planning

Infrastructure

Sectoral policies

Institutions

I
3.

r
a

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infrastructure creation (building a metropolitan ring road, expanding the airport further, creating a Barcelona city heliport). It appears to be assumed that social and environmental goals will best be achieved by vigorous pursuit of the dominant aim, or, possibly, by other 'non-strategic' policy instruments.

5.2 Instruments

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The plan's leaders stress that the second plan should have an even more 'strategic' nature, less oriented to particular projects and more focused on generalized policy directions (de Forn, 1993). This may respond to an understanding that state funding will in general be less easily secured than before 1992, and that therefore the plan's success will be more dependent on private and external investment. In that case one of the main instruments will be the use of the plan (or its spin-offs) as a marketing tool, in the same way as Barcelona City Council was mounting exhibitions on 'Barcelona New Projects' in 1994, in the city and around Europe (Barcelona City Council, 1994c). Most of the work on promotion of the sectoral strategy (under strategic line 4) has stressed the minority role of the city council and the leading responsibility of the producing bodieswhether in logistics, universities, health, tourism or industry.

5.3 Processes and Participation

The form of plan preparation has been heavily technical and limited to small groups of leading public and private sector actors. The differences from the first plan have included the presence of rather more non-Barcelona-city participants, and the lower public exposure of the plan; there has been no public exhibition, for example, and less discussion in the press. The evaluation stage in 1992 was followed by studies in technical commissions, involving more than 300 people, continuing debates on the executive committee and the general council (linked by questionnaires to all council members at key stages) and over 20 sectoral meetings with a range of selected actors, including for, example, economists' associations, multinationals, consulates based in Barcelona, the Generalitat's minister for industry, the press, Barcelona's residents' association federation and some young people's organizations. The selection reflects the general economic drive of the plan, in most cases. Some attempt has been made to place the plan more at arm's length from the city council, with the constitution of an association for the plan, whose general council is the body which finally approves the plan. The process remains, though, essentially the same.

5.4 Discourses

The prime aim described above points to an even more single-minded focus on competitiveness, even though this is presented in a language of 'integration'. Thus, while Barcelona clearly wishes to push itself forward at each of the relevant scales, it wishes to do this (or to appear to be doing this) in a cooperative way, working with the six cities network, the Eurocities club and through forms of complementary specialization at each level. This may be seen as the distinctively Spanish Socialist element within a discourse of globalizing forces: the hope that economic pressures do not necessarily have to lead to naked interurban and interregional competition, but can be civilized by the use of networks, and by EU or other higher level supports. But, as noted above, the classically social democratic early formulation of sustainable development has now been superseded. The

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Table 4. Second Barcelona 2000 Strategic Plangeneral objective, mission, strategic lines and objectives To increase the integration of the Barcelona region into the international economy, in order to guarantee its growth in terms of economic progress, social progress and quality of life
Management programme for quality and efficiency in the city.

General objective
Mission

Strategic Line
1. Facilitate the adaptation processes of the region's economic sectors into the international economy 2. 3. Secure the economic and social articulation of the Barcelona region Create a positive response to the new needs for social integration

Objective
Strengthen training and technological structures Improve the efficiency of private services Improve the effectiveness of public administration and public Simplify the region's administrative structure Implement programmes at the metropolitan region level Predict the risks of rising unemployment Create new forms of employment Gain from the process of ageing of the population Integrate young people's potential Anticipate a response to increasing immigration Activities and infrastructures related to mobility and logistics for goods transport Activities and infrastructures related to information superhighways University centre Tourism, fairs, congresses and conventions Health sectors Maintenance of the weight of industrial sectors Macroregion Europe Latin America North Africa

4.

Ensure the development of modern internationally appropriate economic activity

5.

Place the Barcelona region within the international economy

I
CO

Source: Pla Estrategic, 1994first draft (there were also 37 sub-objectives and 95 measures).

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impression is that, while the .social concern remains, this is now incorporated within a discourse which is essentially neo-liberal driven.

5.5 Synthesis

The second plan represents a further step along the path from the Olympics project to a 'Barcelona within the world' vision. The different elements of the process appear to link together in a coherent way: an attempt to broaden the scale, from the metropolitan up through the regional, European and beyond, an emphasis on private investments, and preparation mainly by elites within a public/private partnership discourse. Here the technique and methodology of strategic planning appears to interact comfortably with a genuinely entrepreneurial approach to city management. The second plan has perhaps less significance as a tool for changing the Socialists' political direction and discourse, compared to the first, as that task may be seen as in large part completed. It is noteworthy that the Generalitat, though still not directly involved, have taken a somewhat more sympathetic stance in regard to the second plan. Nevertheless the second plan could still be significant in giving a further twist to the positioning and ideas of the Barcelona Socialists, with social and environmental objectives relegated further below economic imperatives. The second plan appears to fit the 'glocalization' thesis. It is much less focused on traditional intra-state relations with Madrid, than the Olympics project or even than the first plan. The interurban competition is expressed primarily in the search for success in international production, consumption and command functions, rather than via state distribution mechanisms, to use Harvey's (1985) distinctions. This does not mean that either 'the global' or 'the local' is very precisely defined in one mode rather than another. 'The global' tends to be seen as a melange of forces, partly within trade, investment and migration processes, partly within international public institutions, above all the European Union. 'The local' is seen as a city region (more than the city of the Olympics phase), but with a reduced tension with the region/nation of Catalonia, given the greater degree of consensus being achieved with the Generalitat. One can perhaps see here a change in the "structured coherence of the urban region" (in Harvey's (1985) terms) and thus the appropriate forms of class alliance. The increase in scale of the second plan has meant an easier, less left versus right territorial politics, given the decline of the left forces within the region and the dominance of centrist or neo-liberal discourses. Nevertheless, some form of the city versus region conflict, as carrier of 'the local', remains alive in this part of Europe, as it will no doubt continue to do in some other regions, unless a conservative form, either neo-liberal or more corporatist, becomes dominant at all levels of governance.

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6. Concluding ReflectionThe Projects in Their Regional and Historical Contexts

6.1 The Relationship to Different Economic Models

All speculation on likely effects must depend on views about the appropriate overall socialeconomic project for the city. The strategic plan is pressing forward with some elements beyond the Olympics project, such as the trade fair expansion or the convention centre scheme, which reflect a certain economic model. This model has been criticized elsewhere (e.g. Loftman & Nevin, 1992) as providing a heavily polarized social pattern, with a few highly

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paid and many low paid jobs, mainly in the service sector. Criticisms of tourism promotion (boosted, for example, by the airport upgrading, and potentially by the TGV) make the same point. At this stage perhaps the most one can say is that Barcelona, through its 1992 project, has pushed along this road, of a high energy, potentially socially polarized, terciarized city; but that many of the gains made will endure for general social use at the same time. How far this double-sided set of long-term impacts will continue with the next round of strategic planning remains to be seen. The relationship to desired economic models can be pursued further by discussing Harvey's (1989) identification of four strategies for urban entrepreneurs: seeking gains from direct production, from consumption, from 'command and control' functions (from HQs, international organizations, financial centres) and from state redistribution programmes. In Barcelona, the second and third have been pushed particularly strongly, through each phase. Such elements as cultural, leisure, sporting and historical interest promotions stand out in the search for consumer spending, by tourists, business travellers and by local residents. The Plan 2000 was especially oriented to building up an HQ/finance role, partly overlapping with the second function, via the trade fair, the airport, the proposed congress centre, the drive for high-grade business and related education. Harvey points out that that role is especially suitable for cities with large agglomeration economies. The Barcelona region, with 4 million people, is seen as large enough to compete on the continental and global scale in these markets. The degree of competition on these two functions is brought out by a background paper by a professor at Barcelona's business school ESADE (Pla Estrategic, 1992b, J-F Vails). The paper discusses the Olympics and Barcelona 2000 projects in terms of creating a 'brand name' image for the city, for both internal and external consumption. Vails concludes that, inside the city at least, the projects were successful in boosting the idea of a valuable 'product', a city with which residents identified, as protagonists. Such local conviction appears to be an important complement to the external success apparent in the international 'league tables'. On the other two functions, there has been variation between the different phases. There was relatively little emphasis on attraction of industry in the first two phases, with an implicit assumption that the city's path lay inevitably towards a terciarized role; new industry would locate elsewhere in the region. In the second strategic plan this assumption has been challenged, and it is considered that it would on the contrary be valuable to retain existing industries, keeping at least the current 25% level of industrial employment in the city. With state redistribution this position has been reversed. While the Olympics were over 70% dependent on state funding, the second strategic plan downplays the search for Madrid funding, even though such funding is likely to remain essential for many projects. The sectoral drives in the fields of health, universities and logistics are obvious examples where private funding is almost certainly going to require large state funding to accompany it. The difficulty with obtaining success on the consumption and HQ, etc. functions is that it will depend very much on continuing attention, on the follow-up in each field. One Olympics or strategic plan drive is unlikely to deliver the business. It would appear, from the second plan documentation, that follow-up in some fields is being pushed vigorously (in tourism, in the trade fair, in the stock exchange and financial markets), but less so in others (seeking occupiers for office space, exploiting the 'surplus' telecommunications capacity of the city). Such longer-term dynamic must inevitably be more difficult, with funding drying up, 'fat' being consumed, political problems emerging, a generation of leaders tiring. This relates to the deeper problems of inter-urban competition: that there may be no respite in a world of increasing place pressures, and this will put great strains on almost any kind of urban governance, whether more elitist, more participatory, in whatever kind of left/right, capital/ labour, rich/poor urban alliance.

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6.2 Multi-tier Governmental Action

It is worth reflecting on the possible effects of multiple action by governmental levels over the last 10-15 years. Has this element of conflict, of somewhat cross-cutting efforts, tended to help or hinder Barcelona-Catalonia in the 'place race'? It seems quite possible that in fact the non-monolithic efforts may have helped, by linking in to different sorts of networks and forces. The Generalitat's search for internationally mobile investment has tapped some sources that would have been difficult for the city, or Madrid, to access. On the other hand, the Socialists were able to promote much urban and metropolitan infrastructure investment, effectively boosting the city's attractiveness, but to some extent in relation to other investing sectors property investors, perhaps international public institutions, hotel and urban tourism sectors. Some basic degree of inter-tier cooperation no doubt helpedand this in fact existed, imposed first by the Olympics and then, from mid-1993, by the ballot box. But the political/ideological configuration of government in the city/region since 1980 may have, against appearances, created an effective balance of public and private oriented policies. The element of inter-tier competition perhaps promoted greater effort on behalf of the administrations, and gave points of entry for outside investors. This may constitute a good example of the 'unintended consequences' of political actions. This is not to claim that Barcelona and Catalonia operated, by luck, the ideal place marketing strategies. There was no doubt also considerable waste of effort via such inter-tier competition. It is possible that, without anything like the efforts made, the city and region would have done relatively well in the hunt for investment. Catalonia has, in past booms, always tended to be a winner, and its aim had to be to confirm this tendency, rather than the much harder task facing normally 'losing' regions. In many respects the relative success of the area matches that of a region like South East England, which benefited in the same period from some massive infrastructure investmentsthe M25, new airport investment, the London water ring main, the Docklands project. In England, these investments were essentially due to central government, not to inter-tier competition or to other political forces. The South East emerged a winner in the late 1980s, just like Barcelona/Catalonia, and also only fell back relatively in the following depression. What these regions therefore represent, perhaps, is the capacity of 'winning' regions to secure the supporting investment they need to keep up in the race, via a variety of political configurations, depending on political and ideological conjunctures. They can draw on the 'fat' of previous periods, exploit their political and economic 'capital' to influence governments of all kinds, and use their international networks much more effectively than, say, Andalusia or North East England. What this generalization disregards is the specificity of the Barcelona case. As I have argued briefly before (Marshall, 1992), the Olympics effort was set in a quite unique historical context, and hence any imitation by other cities would have to be extremely careful, and would be more likely to lead to wrong conclusions than useful recipes. The same applies, but with decreasing force, to the two rounds of strategic planning. These are more standardized examples of city boosterism, but even here the particularities of city/region politics and economics are key to the forms of planning adopted and the degrees of success.

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6.3 The Olympics versus the Strategic Planning Exercises

The fact that the most successful (at least so far) of the 'strategic planning' exercises (the Olympics) was not framed in strategic planning terms, may carry several lessons. One is that the methodology is not so important, it is the project's political dynamic which is essential to success. Another is, perhaps, that 'glocalization' is making city strategic planning ever more difficult. The second plan's authors consider this to be the case (de Forn, 1993), and this would

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fit in with Swyngedouw's fears. He sees the ever faster movement of capital, the "hectic territorial switching" (p. 55) via both generalized and place specific devaluation, as meaning that success may be very short-lived. He argues that "a reduction in the scale of regulatoryinstitutional organisation increases the power of capital over space and constrains the command of territorially-organised interests to control territorial organisation" (p. 16). Part of the political struggle then becomes a struggle over the scale of regulation. These points fit the Barcelona and Catalonia case well. Barcelona city appears to have declining control over its destiny, after successfully exploiting its historic chance in the 1980s. It is now 'reduced' to seeking international investment via marketing, like any other European city. The Generalitat has been in the same position for some years, chasing Japanese, US and European capital via its network of 'sales offices' round the world. The feeling of limited powers in both institutions may be one factor encouraging some greater recent cooperation between these government tiers.

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6.4 The Continuing Power of the Central StateAgainst Glocalization?

Meanwhile, it is in some respects the much derided state level which appears to have taken the initiative in the early 1990s. The national infrastructure plan (Ministerio de Obras Publicas y Transportes, 1993) was prepared by the newly merged public works and transport ministry, to guide mainly road, rail and water investment. It constitutes an impressive piece of state investment planning, with a 15-year horizon, with for the first time some attempt to take environmental impacts into account. It contains plans for six areas of particular national significance, including that for the Iiobregat delta (port, airport, road and rail connections, wetland protection) next to Barcelona. The agreement signed in April 1994 by state, regional and local authorities, to implement an investment programme for this area, contains a major part of public spending in the region in the next 10-15 years (a full account is in Marshall, 1994). While Barcelona's strategic planning drive may well have had some influence over the Delta Plan, one must see the key actor here as the state. In this case the 'glocalization' logic is far from evident. It is true that, unlike in previous eras, the investment has been agreed between tiers ('concertation' being the key phrase), and all tiers are aspiring to EU cohesion funds to support the project. But the greater part of funds and power behind the project looks, at present, as likely to come from that traditional European actor, the central state. This plan may be fruit of the particular political (Socialists at centre and city, + agreement with regional CiU) and economic (crisis, need for public investment projects) conjunctures. It may fall victim to privatizations or to the search for public-private partnership ventures. But that does not make the Delta Plan any less real than the phases of urban policy making by Barcelona city, analyzed here. The state, in any case a core actor in the Olympics project, remains central to future local action. Its involvement remains a very powerful element within the recent play of the global and the local in Barcelona city and region.

6.5 Local and Regional InfluenceOn the Wane?

Nevertheless, it would be wrong to conclude by giving the impression that the Barcelona case suggests that nothing has changed. There has been one attempt, apparently partially successful, to guide the city from a local vision of the city's needs. The local scale of regulation has therefore been boosted, and supported by new localist, regionalist and partnership discourses. These have transformed the objectives and language of local politics, creating new, more centrist, political alliances. The relationship to broader movements of capital and to economic

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crises has meant that these local efforts have been in part responding to the increasingly powerful neo-liberal framing of politics, and in part reinforcing this political direction. Because Barcelona/Catalonia have the advantage of a 'good hand', a relatively strong economic position, this strategy has been moderately successful. But there are signs in the approach to the second strategic plan that the city's competitive advantage in this sense may be less than it was, given the ever increasing openness of the Spanish economy and the rapidity of capital movements. This may reduce the effectiveness of such proactive city boosterism, and make even powerful cities such as Barcelona more dependent on the 'old powers'the state, transnational corporationsas well as seeking help from the newEU and regional governments. There could then be a shift away from much effective democratic control over the city's destiny, at local level, accompanying the considerable element of disillusionment currendy present in Spanish politics. This would be a sad ending to the recent energies with which Barcelona has played the game to influence its future. But it would be a true reflection of the extraordinary difficulties faced by city governments in the current era of interurban competition.

Acknowledgements
I would like to acknowledge the help given by officials of the Barcelona 200 Strategic Plan, especially Joan Camprecios, who has kindly supplied documents and been happy to discuss progress. Angels Santigosa, of the city council's mayor's office, was also very helpful, in discussions of work on the impact of the Games. Other friends in Barcelona have kept me in touch with events over a long period. Thanks also to two referees.

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