Westfall, William C., Jr. (1 April 1984). Mozambique-Insurgency Against Portugal, 19631975.

Retrieved on 15 February 2007

Mozambique-Insurgency Against Portugal, 1963-1975 CSC 1984 SUBJECT AREA History Author: Westfall, William C., Jr., Major, United States Marine Corps Title: Mozambique - Insurgency Against Portugal, 1963-1975 Publisher: Marine Corps Command and Staff College Date: 1 April 1984 The object of this study is to review the insurgent movement in Mozambique from the perspective of why it occured, how it was conducted, and what caused the results. The study is divided into areas of historical background, colonial issues relevant to the insurgency, organization of the insurgent movement, conduct of the insurgency, and Portuguese counterinsurgent efforts. Mozambique is a strategically located, resource rich, African nation which remains embroiled in turmoil despite almost a decade of self-rule since achieving independence from Portugal. The global importance of the Horn of Africa and the continuing struggle between East and West to establish influence in that critical area necessitates a sound understanding of regional issues and their international ramifications. The entire situation is an open invitation for involvement of United States forces and is almost as predictable, in that regard, as was the Pacific prior to World War II. Mozambique is of particular significance to the Marine officer because it offers over twelve hundred miles of coastline to an amphibious force and retains several of the finest port facilities and natural harbors on the East African littoral. The conclusions drawn in the final section of this study attempt to define the reasons for the success of the insurgency and the failure of the counterinsurgency. If United States forces are committed to action in Mozambique sometime in the future, then the lessons learned from this conflict will be very applicable. The enemy will probably be the same that defeated the Portuguese; and it would serve us well to understand their thought process and mode of operation. WAR SINCE 1945 SEMINAR Mozambique - Insurgency Against Portugal

1963-1975 Major William C. Westfall, Jr., USMC 2 April 1984 Marine Corps Command and Staff College Marine Corps Development and Education Command Quantico, Virginia 22134 Table of Contents Explanation 1 Mozambique - A Background 4 Mozambique - The Colonial Era 13 Development of the Insurgency 26 Frelimo - Purpose, Strategy, External Support and Unity 38 Frelimo - Conduct of the Insurgency 67 Portugal - Conduct of the Counterinsurgency 77 Conclusions 87 Bibliography 92 Explanation On June 25, 1975, Mozambique became an independent African nation under the rule of the Frente de Libertacao de Mozambique (Frelimo). This marked an end to over five centuries of Portuguese colonialization and, simultaneously, the end of an insurgency which had endured for greater than ten years. Strategically located and resource rich, Mozambique remains embroiled in turmoil despite almost a decade of self-rule since achieving independence from Portugal. That golden coast just west of Madagascar, so inviting to the Portuguese, so luring to sea traders of ages past, now beckons to the military strategist and geopolitician. A painful abscess in the foreign policy of the United States, Mozambique has become a creaking door for penetration by Soviet pawns prying into the treasures of Southern Africa. The entire situation is an open invitation for the involvement of United States forces. In that regard, a sound understanding of the insurgency which culminated in Mozambican independence is imperative. The intent of this study is not to recount the chronological chain of events which transpired, but to analyze the insurgency in a broad framework suitable for comparison with other insurgencies which have taken place since the end of World War II. The tool which provides this framework is Insurgency in the Modern World (1), a publication utilized at the National War College in a subcourse analyzing insurgencies. The 1-Bard E. Oneil, William R. Heaton, Donald J. Alberts, Insurgency in the Modern World, (A Westview Special Study:

Westview Press, 1980), p. 1-42. questions which were pursued in researching the insurgency in Mozambique are provided at this juncture to orient the reader to the sections that follow (2) 1. What type of insurgency occurred? Was it revolutionary, reformist, secessionist, reactionary, conservative, restorationist or a combination of several? 2. What strategy did the insurgents follow - Leninist, Maoist, Cuban, or Urban Terrorist? 3. How much popular support did the insurgents have? What was the role of the educated classes in the population? Which techniques did the insurgents rely on to gain support? Was popular support at tected by societal divisions or geography? 4. What was the nature of the insurgent organization? 5. Were the insurgents united? What were the effects of unity or disunity? 6. Was the physical environment conducive to terrorism and/or guerrilla warfare? How did the human environment affect the insurgency? 7. What kind of external support did the insurgents receive and from whom? How important was it? 8. How effective was the government response? Did the government have a coherent program for countering the 2- See Unit V, U. S. Defense Policy, Military Strategy and Force Planning, Part 4, Insurgency, Syllabus and Readings, The National War College, Academic Year 1982-83, p. 1-7. insurgency? Was the government administrative apparatus competent and did it control affairs in all sectors of the country? Was the government military response carefully tailored to different kinds of threats or was it indiscriminate and what were the consequences? These are the questions which formed the common threads in this analysis of the insurgency in Mozambique. The answers to these questions form a foundation for a comparison with any other insurgency that has taken place in modern times or any that may take place in the future. The prospect is to learn lessons from events that have transpired and apply them to events of the future to prevent repeating mistakes of the past. To that extent, this study has illuminated broad themes of insurgency in an area where vital interests of the United States are increasingly accumulating - that part of Africa called by Brezhnev "the West's Treasure Box."

Mozambique - A Background Portuguese involvement in Mozambique began in the late fifteenth century as a result of the search for a sea route to India avoiding the dangerous overland route through what is today's Middle East. In 1498, Vasco de Gama's small fleet, en route to India, touched at Inhambane, just north of Delagoa Bay (See figure 1.), and stopped at Quelimana, Mocambique Island, Click here to view image Kilwa Island, Mombasa and Malindi before proceeding east across the ocean. De Gama encountered a sophisticated trading society. Ports were filled with ships, often as large as his own, navigational charts and instruments were more refined than those he possessed, and the settlements were impressive with stone, multi-storied structures commonplace. From as early as the ninth century Mozambique had been a center of economic exploitation for Arab and Arab-influenced African traders. Mozambican ivory and gold were highly sought trade items throughout the Arabic and Oriental world; and the Arabs had developed a sophisticated trading network which extended as far south along the African coast as the Limpopo River by the time of de Gama's arrival. Though Arab development was limited to the coastal regions almost exclusively, they had penetrated the interior along the Zambezi River and inland from Sofala to regions of present day Zimbabwe establishing trade fairs where great quantities of gold and ivory were brought to single locations for purchase by the Arab traders. The result of de Gama's visit was a determination by the Portuguese to win control of the Indian Ocean by establishing coastal strongpoints along the African littoral, the entrances to the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea, and the coast of India. Control of the Indian Ocean in the Portuguese scheme included complete seizure of seaborne trade from the Arabs; and they accomplished this endeavor with astounding swiftness. Motivated by religious ardor as well as commercial profit, the Portguese expanded their influence in the Indian Ocean to the point of becoming virtual masters of commerce by 1509 and remained unthreatened throughout the region until the arrival of the Dutch in the East Indies nearly a century later. Before narrowing to the specifics of the Portuguese involvement in Mozambique it is important to consider a global perspective at this point in history. It relates directly to the methods of Portuguese colonialization, the rationale for Portuguese treatment of Muslim peoples and natives who had been converted to the Islamic faith, and resurfaces in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as justification for Portuguese claims to Mozambique and other African territories.

The period from the early fifteenth century to the early sixteenth century is venerated in Portuguese literature and history as "The Marvelous Century."( 3) Portugal had secured independence from Spain in 1139 through the efforts and permission of Pope Alexander III ( 4 )as a reward to Afronso Henrique, the first King of Portugal, for driving the Moors from the Iberian Peninsula. The expansionist policies of Spain and Portugal received papal encouragement throughout the period of time thus far discussed as a method of extending the crusades, 3- Thomas H. Henriksen, Mozambique: A History, (The Camelot Press, Southampton, England, 1978), p. 23. 4- Edgar Prestage, Portugal: A Pioneer of Christianity, (Watford: Voss and Michael, Ltd., 1945), p. 5-6. freeing the world for Christianity, and destroying the Islamic faith. Indeed, the Papal Line of Demarkation, drawn in 1494, divided the earth in half for subsequent conquest and subjugation by Spain and Portugal. The theory evolving in this discussion is that Portuguese expansion was driven as much by religious principle as it was by the search for increased prosperity, and more so than any of the other European colonial powers that followed. This question has long been debated by historians with no satisfactory advantage to either argument in the judgement of this author.( 5 ) Suffice it to say, that by the end of "The Marvelous Century" Portugal had linked the continents of the world by sea, monopolized the Asian trade routes, introduced Western civilization into Africa and the East, and conquered a global seaborne empire. If religious fervor had provided the motivation for Portugal's bold strategy, then certainly commercial profit was a beneficial offshoot. The problem that began arising in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in Portugal's African colonies was that commercial profit had quickly evolved into commercial exploitation and the benefits of spreading Christianity to the indigenous populations were hardly sufficient to overcome five centuries of grievances. The exasperation of this feeling is summed up in an African saying which was popular throughout the Portuguese colonies in Africa in the mid-twentieth century. It is quoted from a book 5- For an excellent summary see Luis B. Serapiao and Mohamed A. El-Khawas, Mozambique in the Twentieth Century: From Colonialism to Independence, (Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, Inc., 1979), p. 1-32. written by Eduardo Mondlane, the first president of Frelimo (6) "When the whites came to our country we had the land, and they had the bible; now we have

the bible and they have the land." Portuguese claims to the territory of Mozambique date from de Gama's voyage in the late fifteenth century, although they were not able to achieve true control of the interior of the country until the late nineteenth century. They fought their way into a position of control along the coastal region, taking advantage of rivalries which existed among the sheiks of the city states of Pate, Malindi, Kilwa, Zanzibar, Mozambique and Sofala; and succeeded in monopolizing the rich trade in ivory, gold and precious stones, as mentioned earlier. They enslaved or killed the Muslim merchants under orders of King Manuel in the early sixteenth century, "because they are enemies of our Holy Catholic Faith and we have a continual war with them ( 7); and took advantage of the native princes," since they are like animals, and satisfied with gaining a handful of maize; nor can they harm us, and can be used for any kind of work and treated like slaves (8). 6--Eduardo Mondlane, The Struggle for Mozambique, Middlesex:Penguin Books, Ltd., 1969), p. 23. 7--James Duffy, Portugal in Africa, (Middlesex: Penguin Books,Ltd., 1962), p. 75. 8--Ibid; quoted in a letter from Duarte de Lemos to the crown. In all essence this was the extent of Portuguese control for overthree hundred years. Though they exploited the situation to gain tremendous commercial profit, they were never able to gain lasting political control, except on a very thin coastal strip from Cabo Delgado to Sofala. For the purpose of this study, it is not necessary to recount the events of the ensuing three centuries. It is sufficient to note that the time period encompassed a complex struggle in which five main contenders took part at various times - the Mwene Mutapa Kingdom, the Changamire Kingdom, Portugal, Muslim merchants, and the Malawi Kingdom. Three hundred years of warfare, revolts, ambushes, massacres, seiges and isolated murders produced no clear victor and changed the political control picture very little. There are, however, two issues which surface during this period that are key elements to understanding the background to rising African nationalism in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the "prazo" system was introduced in Mozambique. It emerged from the chaotic environment surrounding the breakup of the Mwene Mutapa empire. "Prazeiros" were Portuguese settlers, often felons, ex-soldiers and destitute officials, who seized the opportunity to establish vast estates and surround themselves with natives in search of security and sustenance.9 The fate of these Africans was worse 9For extensive readings on the prazos see Thomas H.

Henriksen, Mozambique: A History, (The Camelot Press, Southampton, England, 1978), p. 55-74. than that of slaves. The prazeiros often controlled entire districts as personal properties and recognized no law but their own, only occasionally paying vassalage to the King of Portugal. They relied on the natives for defense, trade, food, women, labor and ultimately as a commodity for the slave market. Jesuit and Dominican missionaries of the time also came to own vast tracts of land, administering them like any prazeiro and dealing in slaves when slavery became more profitable. The prazo system has been used as an example of Lusotropicalism", a term developed by Gilberto Freyre, a Brazilian sociologist, to describe a new civilization created in the Portuguese colonies through miscegenation and Christian conversion.10 This does not appear to be the case in Mozambique since the prazeiros were small in number and if anything assimilated intp the native culture, using their Portuguese affiliation when it was convenient and their African background if advantageous to the situation. In any case, corruption in the prazo system was so rampant that by the mid-nineteenth century the Portuguese government felt compelled to outlaw it. Its disregard for persons and property was notorious and the slaving manor lords drove an excessive number of Africans away from the area altogether. Slavery is the second issue which deserves discussion as background information during this time period, for the slave 10Thomas H. Henriksen, Mozambique: A History, (The Camelot Press, Southampton, England, 1978), p. 59. trade reached its peak during the mid-nineteenth century. Under pressure from the British and French to cease the flow of slaves to the New World at the turn of the nineteenth century, Portugal had prohibited slave commerce north of the equator in 1815, and banned it entirely in 1836. By then, however, the slave market provided such tremendous profits and Portugal exercised so little control over activites in the interior of Mozambique that their attempts to control the slave trade were virtually ineffective. Quelimane and Ibo Island ranked among leading African slave ports with an estimated 15,000 Africans per year being carried away from Mozambique during the 1820's and 1830's.11 Portuguese officials in Mozambique were bought off by the slave traders, to include, at times, even the Governor-General; and in 1839, Mozambican slave interests plotted an unsuccessful independence from Portugal to get out from under their crimping rule.12 Portugal took no effective measures to cease the slave trade until it appeared imminent that it would lead to territorial losses in Mozambique to other European powers. The background provided to this point begins to establish a clear history of commercial exploitation. For nearly four

hundred years the Portuguese profited from Mozambican resources with little attempt at effectively occupying the territory or controlling it politically. It is also clear that although the 11Ibid; p. 65. 12P. R. Warhurst, "The Scramble and African Politics in Gazaland", The Zambesian Past: Studies in Central African History, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1966), p.61. idea of spreading Christianity was a lofty goal of Portuguese expansion, it took second place to commerce when push came to shove in the slavery issue. The treatment of the Africans during this period is a theme that arises strongly in later movements of Mozambican nationalism and is used by rebels and insurgents throughout the twentieth century to unite the African population. It is a theme for which this author can find no rebuttal and is important for the reader to understand. Mozambique - The Colonial Era It is from the proverbial "scramble for Africa" in the late nineteenth century, that the true Portuguese conquest of Mozambique must be dated. Faced with the rising ambitions of other European nations and the decline of its own power and influence throughout the world, Portugal was roused from a centuries-long slumber in Africa by what has come to be known in Portuguese history as the "generation of 1895.13" The Berlin Conference of 1884-1885 partitioned Africa for development by the European powers, specifically France, Germany, Belgium, Britain and Portugal. Though losing rights to almost all of the territory north of the Congo River due to the conference's governing principle of "effective control", Portuguese claims in Mozambique were recognized by all participants with the exception of Great Britain. Compelled to capture and control the Mozambican territories assigned to her or lose them to the British, a wave of ultra-nationalism reflective of "The Marvelous Century" swept through Portugal forging an emotional link to African lands that had been non-existant before. Capitulating, initially, to British territorial ultimatums due to international weakness, the Portuguese monarchy was beseiged by a population demanding a hard line toward the British. Demonstrations throughout Portugal charged the government with cowardice and 13James Duffey, Portuguese Africa, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959), p. 232. betrayal, and mobs stoned British consulates in several Portuguese cities. Public reaction reached such a fervor that it was classified by one British observer as "driving the Portuguese national character to a level of heroic madness, away from sound judgement and prudence.14" A national fund was established to send a cruiser and soldiers to Mozambique, and Portugal's focus was riveted on occupation campaigns and colonial activities for

the next twenty years. This public focus proved determinelta to the monarchy which toppled in 1911, but beneficial to colonial Mozambique whose territorial boundaries were finalized and remain as such today. The "generation of 1895" produced many heroes who were to dominate Portuguese political life for the next fifty years and determine the policies that would govern the African colonies. The occupational campaigns used any possible technique to subjugate and pacify the native population, from outright military conquest where possible, to establishing diplomatic relations with important traditional rulers, exploring the internal strengths and weaknesses of the native government, then attacking, claiming protection of white settlers and missionaries. The latter was the case in the war with the Gaza Kingdom, the last traditional Mozambican empire, which ended with the death of Maguiguana, the leading Gazan general and the capture of Gungunyane, the tribal emperor. Gungunyane was humiliated in front of his followers, transported to Lisbon as a 14F.C.C. Egerton, Angola in Perspective, (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1957), p. 27-28. prisoner and "paraded through the streets in Roman fashion.15" Both names resurfaced in the early 1960's in insurgent military communiques and were used to rally the population to the Mozambican nationalist cause. From the end of conquest and pacification until the beginning of World War II, Portuguese leaders enshrined their mystical nationalism, dedication to the colonial empire and a belief in Portugal's imperial destiny to shape a colonial mentality. They worked for a new order dominated by concerns for an effective colonial administration, the profitable exploitation of Mozambique's resources and the formation of a comprehensive native policy. Chief among their goals was a multi-continental lusitanian community of "one state, one race, one faith, and one civilization.16" As a conclusion to the background for the insurgency it is necessary to view the administrative, commercial and native policies as they evolved through the twentieth century. The keystone to the administrative structure was the Governor-General who ruled first from the capital in the city ot Mozambique and later from Lourenco Marques as the capital was moved south. Under him were various provincial governors and below these were the district administrators. Each district was subdivided into numerous posts, with a "chefo de posto" having 15Thomas H. Henriksen, Mozambique: A History, (The Camelot Press, Southampton, England, 1978), p. 89. 16Antonio Leite de Magalhaes, O Mundo Portuguese (Lisbon, 1937), p. 363.

direct control over the daily lives of thousands of indigenous natives. Acting as a white chief, the chefo de posto supervised the collection of taxes, presided over disputes, dispensed punishment and oversaw village agriculture. Underpaid and poorly trained, most abused their power to attain as much personal wealth as possible to take with them upon return to Portugal. To assist the chefo de posto, the Portuguese government re-established a limited traditional authority for some of the African chieftains, but made certain they could never acquire any significant power by splitting the various chiefdoms into small territories, each with only a few thousand people. All African chiefs were made directly responsible to the chefo de posto with the end result that the chief was no longer the leader of his community but the representative within his community of a hierarchical colonial authority. The old political ties between the various African communities were finally severed and its place taken by Portuguese power. The corrupt, often cruel, and normally incompetent chefo de posto was, as a result, the only direct link with the native population and served as a poor representative of Portuguese rule, no matter how honorable the intentions. Later colonial authorities recognized the damage done by this system and tried to increase the requisite skills for the position with changes enacted in 1965. By then, however, no amount of change could satisfy the growing nationalism. The local administrative apparatus was different for Europeans and "civilized" Africans in urban environments. "Concelhos" or townships modeled on Portuguese municipalities were authorized with limited self-government. Whenever possible, the Portuguese created Iberian townships with outdoor cafes and red-tiled roofs resulting in a city core that was strictly urban Portuguese, ringed with shanty towns where the African workers and servants lived. The entire system magnified the demarkation between Portuguese and African; and although the social system, to be discussed later, encouraged the idea of one race and one nation, the administrative apparatus worked against it. Throughout the twentieth century and until the outbreak of open warfare in the 1960's, the administrative system remained essentially unchanged. Portuguese governments came and went, and official policies changed from time to time, but the administration at the African level changed very little. As far as developing colonial commerce, the Portuguese had little capacity to organize a profitable system and chose, instead, to enter into contractual agreements with private companies which would share a portion of their revenue with the government in Lisbon. Three principle companies came to dominate nearly two-third's of the colony to their own benefit and the benefit of Portugal, but once again to the detriment of the

Mozambicans. The Mozambique Company was granted a fifty year charter to the lands within the Manica and Sofala regions (See figure 2) with extensive governing powers and a twenty-five Click here to view image year tax holiday in return for a percent of profits and shares sold. They had exclusive control over mining, fishing, public works, African taxation and communication services. Their only tasks were to settle one thousand Portuguese families, establish schools and maintain public order. The British financed Niassa Company was given a similar charter in the regions of Cabo Delgado and Niassa (See figure 2) for a thirty-five year period. The Zambezi Company, the largest and most successful of the three, was granted rights in the Tete and Zambezia districts (See figure 2). Without recounting the commercial endeavors of the three companies, it is clear from research that revenues were paid to Portugal and profits were made by the companies, but the intended development of Mozambican commerce and a more structured society were sacrificed17. The companies abused their privileges at the expense of the indigenous population with little interference by the Portuguese government. Slave labor continued under the new name of "forced labor" and was actually encouraged by Lisbon. The 1899 Labor Code embodied a new regulation which stated: "All natives of Portuguese overseas provinces are subject to the obligation, moral and legal, of attempting to gain through work the means that they lack to subsist and to better their social condition. They have full liberty to choose the method of fulfilling this obligation, but if they do not fulfill it, public authority may force a fulfillment.18" 17For an excellent summary of the effects of the chartered companies see Thomas H. Henriksen, Mozambique: A History, (The Camelot Press, Southampton, England, 1978), p. 103-122. 18Ibid, p. 116. Poetic license was taken with the labor code in Mozambique where various district administrators increased head taxes, increased fines for vagrancy, reduced work exemption for farmers and made work compulsory for women. For the most part, the only means of paying taxes for the African was labor and their payment was not in money but quantified in "months of labor". The continually increasing taxes and resulting "forced labor" drove a mass exodus of the native population from Mozambique. This was compounded by an exodus of migrant labor to the gold mines of South Africa, where, although conditions were almost as deplorable, the Africans could at least earn a small wage. It has been estimated that the flood of laborers reached 250,00019 per year by 1960,

however, colonial authorities managed to capitalize on this aspect also. Entering into an agreement with the South Africans in 1928, Portugal was guaranteed 47.5 percent of all seabound rail traffic from Johannesburg, Pretoria and Kurgersdorp in return for recruiting privileges in Mozambique. They also received payment for each worker recruited, customs duties on goods of returning workers, and deferred wages at the mines given to the Portuguese in gold - the laborer, once back in Mozambique, was paid his wages in provincial "escudos."20. Again, although, intentions may have been good initially, and even that is highly questionable, Portuguese commercial endeavors during the colonial 19Ibid, p. 120. 20Ibid, p. 120. era drew harsh lines between Africans and Portuguese. Efforts to undo the damage were undertaken in the late 1950's, but once again they were far too late and far too feeble. The final aspect of colonial Mozambique that is necessary to establish a background for the insurgency is the social system that developed in the colony. As alluded to in earlier discussion, many historians have cited the spread of Christianity as one of the principle motivations for Portuguese expansion. Portuguese authorities used this rationale to defend treatment of the Africans throughout the twentieth century, citing the fact that all inhabitants of the colonies were brothers under Catholicism and racial disharmony was non-existant. Unlike other Portuguese colonies, there was never a widespread immigration of Portuguese settlers to Mozambique. The cultural and racial synthesis that has been claimed in other colonies never reached the same magnitude in Mozambique, in fact if anything, the distance from Portugal, isolation from the Atlantic triangle of Brazil, Angola and Portugal, and nearness to South Africa and Rhodesia had an opposite effect. The "mestico" population in Mozambique, those of mixed Portuguese and African heritage, was listed as 31,465 in the 1960 census. In a total population estimated between eight and ten million, that is a far cry from complete mixing of the races. Racial awareness was more sharply defined in Mozambique because of the small number of Portuguese immigrants, and though policy on several occasions approached encouragement of inter-racial relationships, social conditions discouraged it. What did exist, more often than not, was Portuguese men taking advantage of African women, then not acknowledging the offspring. White men co-habiting with African women were regarded more or less as social outcasts. To the African male this was another form of exploitation. Officially, until 1961, the Africans were relegated to two social classes the "indigena" and the "assimilados". Indigena were native Africans officially defined as "individuals of the black race, or

their descendants, who having been born and usually living in the colonies, did not yet possess the education and the individual and social habits assumed for the integral application of the public and private law of Portuguese citizens.21" These were the ones that fell victim to head taxes, forced labor and vagrancy laws. Assimilado was a status that the indigena could apply for upon meeting the conditions stated below.22 1. They must read, write and speak fluent Portuguese. 2. They must have sufficient means to support their family. 3. They must be of good conduct. 4. They must have the necessary education and individual and social habits to make it possible to apply the public and private law of Portugal to them. 21Ibid. p. 127. 22Eduardo Mondlane, The Struggle for Mozambique, (Middlesex: Penguin Books, Ltd., 1969), p. 48. 5. They must make a request to the administrative authority of the area, who will pass it on to the governor of the district for approval. Considering that in 1960, Portugal's rate of illiteracy was forty percent23, the Africans had to make themselves notably more qualified to be considered for citizenship in their own country than the Portuguese ever had to attain. Compounding this situation was the lack of opportunity for any African to pursue a meaningful education. Even those who could, and did, found the administrative process to attain assimilado status almost impossible to overcome. The assimilado population of Mozambique never reached more than one percent of the total population. Those who became assimilados still found themselves one rung down the ladder from equality with the Portuguese citizenry. This again, was an ingredient for the spreading Mozambican nationalist movement that grew stronger throughout the 1950's. As with the commercial and administrative systems, the Portuguese government took steps in the early 1960's to correct the social injustices. Faced with a serious rebellion in Angola, Portuguese authorities made provisions for greater participation in the local government by the Africans and abolished the class distinctions between the indigena, assimilados, and Portuguese in an attempt to halt the rising nationalism in Mozambique. Again they were too little and too late. Organizations were already at work within the national 23Area Handbook for Portugal - 1977, American University, p. 175. boundaries of Mozambique and in neighboring countries which were actively campaigning for the overthrow of Portuguese rule. These organizations would come together in June of 1962 to form Frelimo and will be discussed in detail in the following sections. This concludes the background for the insurgency in

Mozambique. Though it is far more detailed than when originally conceived, it is done so for a purpose. Too often, Americans react to any insurgency as something contentious and in contradiction to the interests of the United States. We tend to forget that the foundations for our country were established by a revolutionary "insurgency" throwing off the "oppressive rule" of a colonial power. While not trying to make a parallel between Mozambique and the colonial United States or Frelimo and the Continental Congress, it is important to set a stage for analyzing the insurgency in Mozambique where the reader enters with the appropriate background knowledge and no erroneous preconceptions. Too often the United States government is forced to choose sides in an insurgent movement and too often the choice is made on the basis of a poor understanding of the struggles which are taking place within an affected nation. Examples of this occur successively throughout the twentieth century and can be typified by viewing Nicaragua in the first half of this century, Viet Nam in the 1950's, 60's, and 70's, Nicaragua and Central America in this decade, as well as Lebanon and the Middle East today. In trying to preserve and defend the paramount position enjoyed by America within the present world system, we have often found ourselves on the short end of popular support and on the receiving end of insurgent propaganda. While not directly involved in the insurgency in Mozambique we indirectly became a target of propaganda and may have contributed to Frelimo's hard turn to the ideological "left" in the late 1960's. After reviewing the development of the insurgency, such conclusions may be derived from de facto capitulation of U.S. decision-makers too distracted by competing international pressures to play a bolder part in the Mozambican crisis. Development of the Insurgency Rising nationalist sentiments began to become more strident in the late 1940's and early 1950's with pressure coming from several sources. As Africans were pushed to assimilate Portuguese culture and social standards the reaction provoked a search for genuine African-ness among black Mozambicans. Particularly affected were those who had achieved a higher level of education. Not surprisingly, Mozambican artists and writers living in urban areas were in the best position to observe the stark contrast between Portuguese claims for equality and assimilation of races, and the gulfs of inequality and lack of opportunity that actually existed for black Mozambicans. In poems, short stories and paintings these intellectuals cried out against colonialism and the suffering of their people. Though few in number, their endeavors stirred African pride. They were watched suspiciously by Portuguese authorities and as the turmoil in neighboring Angola heightened during the late 1950's, were

actively suppressed. Portuguese censorship had increased throughout the period from World War II to the emergence of the Angolan and Mozambican insurgencies because of increased tensions in all of colonial Africa. As one European power after another was forced to divest itself of African possessions, Portugal became increasingly determined to maintain control of her colonies. Writers and artists were arrested or deported. Censorship rose to the point where only Portuguese publications or broadcasting stations were permitted within Mozambique.24 As with any such attempt to control the intellectual aspect of a society, these attempts only served to increase the cries of oppression and further stimulate nationalism. Those who were deported continued to write from exile and made contact with other Mozambicans who had left the country for other reasons. Though the "artistic" revolution in Mozambique never reached the same level as Angola's, it was important because it awoke aspirations in certain areas of Mozambican society. It influenced the young intellectuals who carried their opposition into political movements. Another form of protest involved labor turmoil on the docks of the capital city, Lourenco Marques (now Maputo). Long known by sailors for the gruelling working conditions imposed on the black stevedores, labor unrest broke out on the docks and spread to the surrounding agricultural communities just outside of the city in 1947.25 Again in 1948, violent disturbances were reported with several deaths and up to two hundred arrests. In 1956, another riot errupted in Lourenco Marques which reportedly claimed the lives of forty-nine dock workers. 1963 saw widespread rioting in the ports of Beira and Nacala as well as 24Thomas H. Henriksen, Mozambique: A History, (The Camelot Press, Southampton, England, 1978), p. 163. 25A. T. Steele, "On the Edge of Africa's Racial Troubles", New York Herald Tribune, November 26, 1952. the capital city. Though all of these events cannot be recounted specifically because Portuguese censorship precluded any widespread reporting or investigation, they indicated a growing dissatisfaction with Portuguese rule and fed popular support to the expanding nationalist movement. Both the agitation of intellectuals and the strikes of the urban labor force had an impact on the nationalist movement, but both were the results of small isolated groups of individuals in an urban environment and had little effect on the vast population in the countryside. Events in the northern provinces among the Maconde people would have a more profound impact, however. The Maconde were among the last ethnic group to be "pacified" in Mozambique. They suffered the exploitation of the Niassa Company, but upon its demise endured less administrative and

social repression from the Portuguese than southern provinces and peoples because of a "remoteness" from Portuguese rule. Located in the northern corner of Mozambique (See figure 3) and more or less isolated due to terrain and road networks, the Maconde were able to maintain more of a degree of tribal unity than other ethnic clusters. Spanning the Mozambican-Tanzanian border, the Maconde had shown growing signs of restiveness under Portuguese rule, especially as Tanzanian independence came closer to reality. During 1959 and early 1960, a number of local African leaders had been working for liberalization of Portuguese rule and higher pay for laborers. The Portuguese had arrested several of the spokesman and the local Portuguese administrator Click here to view image had invited nearby villagers to air their grievances at Mueda in the Cabo Delgado district. An account of the ensuing meeting at Mueda is provided in the following paragraphs.26 26Eduardo Mondlane, The Struggle for Mozambique, (Middlesex: Penguin Books, Ltd., 1969) p. 117. "Certain leaders worked amongst us. Some of them were taken by the Portuguese - Tiago Muller, Faustino Vanomba, Kibiriti Diwane - in the massacre at Mueda on 16 June 1960. How did that happen? Well, some of these men had made contact with the authorities and asked for more liberty and more pay .... After a while, when people were giving support to these leaders, the Portuguese sent police through the villages inviting people to a meeting at Mueda. Several thousand people came to hear what the Portuguese would say. As it turned out, the administrator had asked the governor of Delgado Province to come from Porto Amelia and to bring a company of troops. But these troops were hidden when they got to Mueda. We didn't see them at first. Then the governor invited our leaders into the administrator's office. I was waiting outside. They were in there for four hours. When they came out on the verandah, the governor asked the crowd who wanted to speak. Many wanted to speak, and the governor told them all to stand on one side. Then without another word he ordered the police to bind the hands of those who had stood on one side, and the police began beating them. I was close by. I saw it all. When the people saw what was happening, they began to demonstrate against the Portuguese, and the Portuguese simply ordered the police trucks to come and collect these arrested

persons. So there were more demonstrations against this. At that moment the troops were still hidden, and the people went up close to the police to stop the arrested persons from being taken away. So the governor called the troops, and when they appeared he told them to open fire. They killed about 600 people. Now the Portuguese say they have punished that governor, but of course they have only sent him somewhere else. I myself escaped because I was close to a graveyard where I could take cover, and then I ran away." This account of the "Massacre of Mueda" comes from AlburtoJoaquim Chipande, then 22, and later a leader in Frelimo. Though the accuracy of it has to be questioned because of his later involvement with Frelimo, other reports by other African sources put the death toll between four hundred and five hundred people. Portuguese accounts hold that the troops, untrained in crowd control, panicked and fired into the crowd, killing between sixty and eighty people.27 The exact numbers will never be known 27--Thomas H. Henriksen, Revolution and Counterrevolution, (London: Greenwood Press, 1983), p. 19. because there were no outside observers. The fact that the incident took place is not disputed, however, and it had a wide ranging impact on the burgeoning nationalist movement in Mozambique. Many, who up to that point had not considered the use of violence, now denounced peaceful resistance as futile. The ruthlessness of the Portuguese response to African aspirations was underlined and nationalist leaders concluded that the only resort was to form parties in neighboring countries and use armed rebellion to gain independence. Maconde leaders went on to establish the Mozambican African National Union (MANU) at Mombasa, Kenya, in 1961; and the Maconde regions of Mozambique would prove to be prime havens for guerilla forces in the future conflict. Mueda did not, in itself, cause instant rebellion; but it hardened the nationalist movement to a new form of resistance. MANU, mentioned in the last paragraph, bore obvious resemblence to the Tanzanian African National Union (TANU) and the Kenyan African National Union (KANU). Formed by an alliance of several smaller groups that were already in existence, including the Mozambique Maconde Union, and led by Mozambicans who had fled to Tanzania (then Tanganyika) and Kenya to escape the Portuguese, MANU was one of the three major organizations which later merged to become Frelimo. Many of MANU'S leaders had been active in the independence movements of Tanzania and Kenya, including the President, Matthew Mmole (sometimes seen as Mwole),

and the Secretary-General, Lawrence M. Millinga. The other organizations which were to eventually come together with MANU to form Frelimo were the National Democratic Union of Mozambique (Uniad Democratica Nacional de Mocambique UDENAMO) and the National African Union of Independent Mozambique (Unian Nacional Africans de Mocambique Independente - UNAMI). UDENAMO was an organization created by mostly migrant workers and disgruntled students who had fled the central and southern regions of Mozambique and gathered together in southern Rhodesia. UNAMI, the smallest of the three groups, was formed by Mozambicans who had fled the Tete district to neighboring Malawi. In 1961, the Portuguese intensified efforts to control the nationalist tendencies in Mozambique due to the outbreak of open revolution in Angola, causing an increase in the number of refugees into neighboring countries. The new exiles from Mozambique, many of whom had no affiliation with any existing organization, strongly urged the formation of a single united organization. External conditions also favored unity. The Conference of the Nationalist Organizations of the Portuguese Territories (CONCP) held in Casablanca in 1961, and attended by representatives of UDENAMO, made a strong call for the unity of nationalist movements against Portuguese colonialism. Marcelino dos Santos, one of the poets who had led the literary movement in Mozambique discussed earlier, was the Secretary-General of CONCP and would soon be a key figure in the hierarchy of Frelimo. Tanzanian independence in December 1961, influenced all three organizations to move their headquarters to Dar es Salaam (Tanzania) and by the end of June 1962, Frelimo had emerged as the single Mozambican nationalist movement. It was an alignment of MANU, UDENAMO, and UNAMI with former leaders of those organizations occupying key positions, and was recognized by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) as the sole recipient for aid to Mozambican groups. The man chosen as president of Frelimo was Eduardo Chivambo Mondlane. Mondlane had no affiliation with any of the groups which merged to form Frelimo. Born in the Gaza district of southern Mozambique in 1920, he was a member of the Thonga tribe and spent his early years, as most African children, herding livestock and absorbing the traditions of his tribe.28 It should be noted that "Gazaland" had only been pacified twenty-five years prior to Mondlane's birth and the stories of the death of Maguiguana and the humiliation of Gungunyane, detailed in prior sections, left bitter memories in the region. To make a rough analogy, those events probably had at least the impact that is felt today in looking back on the assassination of an American president twenty-one years ago. Pushed by his mother, Mondlane finished primary schooling and, when frustrated in efforts to attend

secondary school in Mozambique, went to South Africa where he continued studying to the college level on scholarships. Dismissed from Witwatersrand University in Johannesburg for being a "foreign native"29, he returned to Lourenco Marques where he 28Eduardo Mondlane, The Struggle for Mozambique, (Middlesex: Penguin Books, Ltd., 1969), p. 120. 29Thomas H. Henriksen, Mozambique: A History, (Southampton: Thee Camelot Press, 1978), p. 172. was instrumental in founding the Nucleo dos Estudantes Africanos Secundarios de Mocambique (NESAM). NESAM was one of the student nationalist organizations discussed in an earlier section and Mondlane quickly ran afoul of Portuguese authorities. Either because NESAM was not viewed as much of a threat in the late 1940's or because Mondlane was viewed redeemable under the assimilado process, he was sent to Lisbon to continue his studies. While there he met Agostinho Neto, later the president of the Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola (MPLA) and Amilcar Cabral, later assassinated while Secretary-General of the Partido Africando da Independencia da Guine e Cabo Verde (PAIGC). PAIGC was the movement which succeeded in gaining independence for Guinea-Bissau. Mondlane left Lisbon to study in the United States, citing constant police harassment in Portugal.30 He graduated from Oberlin College in 1953 with a B.A., and later Northwestern University with a Ph.D. After spending a year in research at Harvard, he took a position as a research officer with the United Nations where he remained until 1961. In September, 1961, he accepted an assistant professorship at Syracuse University to detach himself from the United Nations and allow more time to write articles and speak out against Portuguese policies in Mozambique. Throughout all this time, he had remained in contact with the various nationalist movements in Mozambique and had toured the country on several occasions as a representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations to 30Eduardo Mondlane, The Struggle for Mozambique, (Middlesex: Penguin Books, Ltd., 1969), p. 120. report on existing conditions. Mondlane was highly regarded by African leaders outside of Mozambique and respected by the leaders of MANU, UDENAMO and UNAMI. He seemed the perfect choice to head Frelimo and references have been made to his having been "hand-picked" by Tanzanian President Nyerere "for the tightrope walking job as head of a faction-formed movement."31 In all probability, he was the best qualified to lead Frelimo, for although there existed many ideological differences within the organization, there was never the open split that developed in other revolutionary movements, notably the MPLA in Angola. The importance of understanding Mondlane's background, however, lies in comprehending what he was not. Eduardo Mondlane was not the

typical third-world, Communist trained, guerrilla leader that Americans are used to seeing in any insurgency that arises. He had strong ties to the United States, having been educated in American universities, employed by the United Nations in New York City, a professor at Syracuse University and married to a caucasion American woman. He was certainly exposed to the Communist philosophy, particularly through his associates while studying in Lisbon, and the Portuguese Communist Party which was very active in Lisbon in the early 1950's. There is nothing in his background, however, to indicate any preference for ties to the ideological East or West. What did exist in Eduardo Mondlane in the early 1960's, in the opinion of this author, was a 31Richard Gibson, African Liberation Movements: Contemporary Struggles Against White Minority Rule, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1972), p. 277. dedicated desire to see Mozambique released from Portuguese authority and free to pursue self-determination. He had also decided that the only way this would come about was by revolution. Though Frelimo took on more of the appearances of the "typical" front for a Soviet, Cuban or Chinese inspired insurgency through the mid and late 1960's, particularly after Mondlane's assassination in February, 1969; circumstances might have been different. Frelimo needed support to succeed against the Portuguese and sought it wherever possible. Committed to a NATO alliance with Portugal and requiring rights to the Azores, particularly with the escalation of involvement in Southeast Asia ,the United States offered very little. The "other side" could offer much more - and did. Though it may seem a poor comparison to once again refer to our own revolution, it might be noted that a fledgling government in the American colonies sought aid and recognition from any source in a rebellion against Great Britain and received it, not from Britain's allies but from her greatest rival - France. History notes that French assistance was readily accepted. Frelimo - Purpose, Strategy, External Support and Unity The point has now been reached in this discussion of Mozambique's insurgency where one may begin to address the questions posed at the outset. The first and by far the simplest to deal with is the type of insurgency. "Revolutionary insurgents seek to impose a new regime based on egalitarian values and centrally controlled structures designed to mobilize the people and radically transform the social structure within an existing political community.32" Based on this definition, the insurgency in Mozambique was clearly revolutionary. There was no attempt to form a separate, autonomous political community as in a secessionist insurgency. Nor was there any desire to

reconstitute a former system of government as in a reformist or reactionary insurgency. Portuguese colonial rule was the only government Mozambicans, collectively, had ever known. Conservative and reformist insurgencies both seek to alter policies within a particular political regime without necessarily replacing those in power; and differ only in the type of policies they seek to change. Frelimo's goals were clearly to replace Portuguese rule by whatever means were required and to restructure their society to end "the exploitation of man by 32Bard E. Oneil, William R. Heaton, Donald J. Alberts, Insurgency in the Modern World, (A Westview Special Study: Westview Press, 1980), p. 3. man."33 The first Congress of Frelimo in September 1962, set forth the following goals:34 1. To develop and consolidate the organizational structure of Frelimo; 2. To further the unity of Mozambicans; 3. To achieve maximum utilization of the energies and capacities of each and every member of Frelimo; 4. To promote and accelerate training of cadres; 5. To employ directly every effort to promote the rapid access of Mozambique to independence; 6. To promote by every method the social and cultural development of the Mozambican woman; 7. To promote at once the literacy of the Mozambican people, creating schools wherever possible; 8. To take the necessary measures towards supplying the needs of the organs of different levels of Frelimo; 9. To encourage and support the formation and consolidation of trade union, student, youth and women's organizations; 10. To cooperate with the nationalist organizations of the other Portuguese colonies; 11. To cooperate with African nationalist organizations; 33Thomas H. Henriksen, Mozambique: A History, (Southampton: The Camelot Press, 1978), p. 174. 34Eduardo Mondlane, The Struggle for Mozambique, (Middlesex: Penguin Books, Ltd., 1969), p. 122-123. 12. To cooperate with the nationalist movements of all countries; 13. To obtain funds from organizations which sympathize with the cause of the people of Mozambique, making public appeals; 14. To procure all requirements for self defense and resistance of the Mozambican people; 15. To organize permanent propaganda by all methods in order to mobilize world public opinion in favour of the cause of the Mozambican people;

16. To send delegations to all countries in order to undertake campaigns and public demonstrations of protest against the atrocities committed by the Portuguese colonial administration, as well as to press for the immediate liberation of all nationalists who are inside the Portuguese colonialist prisons; 17. To procure diplomatic, moral and material help for the cause of the Mozambican people from the African states and from all peace and freedom loving people. They also realized the difficulties they would encounter in militarily defeating the Portuguese forces on the battlefield and for this reason Frelimo's strategy took on an aspect that was relatively unique. With no real working class or Mozambican military to isolate from the Portuguese regime and ultimately from which to gain support as in the case of a typical MarxistLeninist strategy, Frelimo leaders adopted a Maoist strategy with one major change. The Maoist insurgency is typically threestaged. The first or organizational stage is to create networks of guerrilla political/progaganda groups to win popular support and to train terrorist teams to intimidate sections of the population which may be hesitant to support the insurgency or which support the targeted government outright. The intent is to neutralize any area of the population which will not support the insurgency at the outset and to organize the areas of the population which will provide support. The second stage, or open guerrilla warfare, begins with armed resistance by small bands of guerrillas operating in rural areas where terrain is rugged and government control is weak. Initially, this stage is characterized by low level hit and run tactics designed to highlight the strength and organization of the insurgent movement and expose the weaknesses of the government. As more of the population is won over to the insurgency the magnitude of the armed resistance and guerrilla warfare is increased to include greater segments of the countryside and more lucrative targets. The rate of increase in the guerrilla effort is dictated solely by the response of the government. If the government responds in a forceful, well-organized fashion, the insurgency may remain in an early stage two mode of operation for a prolonged period of time or may even revert to stage one. The intent of stage two, however, is to continue to gather popular support and gain control of the countryside, isolating government forces in small areas, mainly urban, and making them pay a heavy price when they venture into guerrilla controlled areas. The third stage of a Maoist insurgency is an evolution into open civil war, where the guerrilla forces take on the appearance of a regular army and conventional warfare is more predominant. The intent here is to openly defeat and displace the existing government authority if

it has not already come apart from within. This was the strategy Frelimo adopted from the outset with a notable exception. Frelimo never intended to move to the third stage of the Maoist strategy. Their strategy from the outset was attrition35 and they intended to drive the Portuguese to the conference table, not by controlling the countryside but by embroiling it in insurgency and stretching the limited resources of the Portuguese government to the point where it would be less expensive for them to acquiesce and grant independence to Mozambique than it would be to remain engaged in a protracted guerrilla war in Southern Africa. This strategy was adopted because of the relative weakness of the Portuguese economy to support prolonged warfare in Southern Africa and the fact that they were already involved in guerrilla wars in Angola and Guinea-Bissau which were proving unpopular back home. It also meant that Frelimo would not have to rely on the massive external support characteristic of open civil war and could keep their losses at a minimum while 35Thomas H. Henriksen, Revolution and Counterrevolution, (London: Greenwood Press, 1983), p. 31. continually chipping away at the Portuguese will through ambushes and terrorist activity. The morale of the guerrilla movement would be easier kept at a high level and the resolve of the Portuguese would continually deteriorate. This, in fact, is exactly what transpired. Frelimo set no timetable for their eventual independence and Portugal ultimately came apart from within, with the overthrow of the government in Lisbon in 1974, by a military regime tired of being bled year-in and year-out by a war that apparently could not be won. From September 1962, until September 1964, when armed guerrilla resistance began, Frelimo concentrated on establishing a network of insurgent teams in the rural sections of Mozambique which could be easily infiltrated. As is evident in Figure 4, the geography of Mozambique created some natural divisions that became advantageous for the insurgents and resultingly disadvantageous to the Portuguese. The Zambezi Valley divides the country into northern and southern regions with vast differences in geography. North of the Zambezi River and east of the Malawi border a very narrow coastal area gives way gradually to hills and low plateaus to the west, eventually rising to the Great Rhodesian Highlands, as does all of western Mozambique. The highest and most rugged features of the country are found in the Livingstone-Nyasa Highland of Niassa province, the Namuli Highlands of the western Zambezia province, and the Angonian Highlands of northeastern Tete province. Climatic conditions in all of the northern areas are essentially tropical with Click here to view image characteristic monsoon seasonal conditions. Development of road,

rail, and other lines of communication in the northern areas has been inhibited by all of these conditions; and Portuguese domination was resultingly less than in other regions of Mozambique. Population density in the northern provinces is particularly low, especially the first one hundred to one hundred fifty miles below the Tanzanian border with a density of fewer than two people per square kilometer.36 It might also be recalled that this was the area of the Maconde people and the "Mueda Massacre"; therefore, in addition to having suitable geographical conditions for conducting insurgent operations, Frelimo already had the support of most of the population. The border with Tanzania stretches for almost five hundred miles across the region and allowed ideal access for Frelimo insurgents whose base of power originated from Dar es Salaam (Tanzania). The northern provinces were the areas from which Frelimo launched the insurgent effort and the Portuguese were never to seriously challenge their control. They operated freely from sanctuaries in Tanzania and could come and go at will. The first cadres of Frelimo insurgents were trained in Algeria. Having recently won independence from France, the Algerian government was already conducting guerrilla training for African nationalist movements in other Portuguese colonies. During 1963, approximately two hundred Frelimo guerrillas were trained and returned to Mozambique to begin building a network of popular support37. Arms and ammunition were stockpiled in 36Area Handbook for Mozambique - 1977, American University, p. 72. 37Eduardo Mondlane, The Struggle for Mozambique, (Middlesex: Penguin Books Ltd., 1969), p. 128. Tanzania and distributed to small guerrilla bands in northern Mozambique. On September 25, 1964, Frelimo entered the second phase of their insurgency with attacks on several Portuguese outposts in northern Mozambique. Though Frelimo tactical endeavors remained at a rather low level of intensity throughout the insurgency, with the exception of operations against the Cabora Bassa Dam project which will be addressed later in the analysis, their methods, in terms of brutality, treatment of the population, propaganda, and even stated objectives took on a noticeable swing to the ideological "left" during the late 1960's. A reference to thin has been made in previous sections and it is felt that an explanation is pertinent at this juncture. It became clear during the research for this analysis that what little has been written about the insurgency in Mozambique is presented from either a pro-Portuguese or pro-Frelimo perspective. The Portuguese contended from the outset that Mozambique was an integral part of Portugal much like California is an integral part of the United States and that

Frelimo was just one more Communist-inspired revolution designed to undermine the western world. In fact, the Portuguese claimed that after the American withdrawal from Viet Nam, they alone were the only Western power actively engaged against the spread of world Communism.38 Early pro-Frelimo writers contend, on the 38F. X. Maier, Revolution and Terrorism in Mozambique, (New York: American Affairs Association, Inc., 1974), p. 43. other hand, that the insurgency in Mozambique was strictly a liberation from colonial domination. It is only during the late 1960's that pro-Frelimo publications and propaganda take on the obvious appendages of a strict Communist-backed insurgency. Newspaper and magazine articles on events in Mozambique during the insurgency do not assist in clarification because of the strict censorship Portugal applied to any reports coming out of its colonies. Those that were written are vague, by nature, and for the most part recount propaganda bulletins released by either side with the admission of no first hand information. While Henriksen's publications, noted on numerous occasions throughout this analysis, give an objective treatment of Mozambique and the revolution, they stop short of addressing the specifics of Frelimo's pro-left swing in the late 1960's. In short, it is only through a synthesis of all the research leading to this analysis that one is left with the "nagging feeling" that Frelimo's swing to the left in the late 1960's was not a planned evolution but was caused by external events. A discussion of unity within Frelimo and the external support provided to the revolution provides the basis for the causative hypothesis. Unity within Frelimo and external support for the objectives of the nationalist movement appear to be inextricably related. To understand this statement one must look from three separate perspectives: 1. The position of United States foreign policy in regard to Portugual, a NATO ally, and the movement toward independence of all Portuguese African colonies. 2. The Soviet, Chinese, and Cuban involvement in Portuguese Africa, specifically Mozambique. 3. The events which transpired within Frelimo which went hand-in-glove with the amount of support, tangible or intangible, received from either of the above. Prior to 1960, American foreign policy in regard to Portuguese Africa was non-descript. Essentially, we recognized the African colonies as being an integral part of Portugal and conducted any economic or political business through Lisbon. The introduction of the Kennedy administration, however, brought with it a change in policy regarding the Portuguese colonies. With civil rights an issue at home, and other European powers in the process of removing themselves, willingly or unwillingly from Africa, the

new administration did not support Portugal's contention that the African colonies were part of a "greater Portugal" and would remain so. The Kennedy administration voiced a more liberal point of view that "the people should be given the right to choose between alternatives - to continue present ties with Portugal, to join a Portuguese commonwealth, or to strike out completely independently.39" The new United States administration urged Portugal, formally and informally, to "set up a reasonable timetable for moving the territories toward self39For an excellent summary see Luis B. Serapiao and Mohamed A. El-Khawas, Mozambique in the Twentieth Century: From Colonialism to Independence, (Washington, D.C.: University Press of America Inc., 1979), p. 174. determination.40" The United States voted for several United Nations resolutions favorable to African liberation movements in 1961, including a resolution condemning Portugal's repressive measures in the African territories. President Kennedy imposed an arms embargo on all weapons that could be used in Africa by parties involved in the conflict and required that Lisbon give formal assurance that American weapons would only be used in the area defined by NATO, which by most interpretations did not include Africa. Portugal signed the agreements, but had a slightly different interpretation of the NATO area. Once again defining the African colonies as part of a "greater Portugal", Lisbon's contentions were that NATO arms would be used within the territorial boundaries of Portugal, which included the African territories, complying with all NATO requirements. The Portugese were openly critical of the Kennedy administration and furious with the anti-colonial stance taken within NATO and the United Nations, to the extreme of threatening a withdrawal from NATO. Prime Minister Salazar could not understand a policy that would "inevitably wrest away its (Portugal) overseas territories and leave it economically bankrupt."41 Portugal took subsequent actions to blunt the American policy including the hiring of an American public relations firm to play up the image of a Communist invasion of southern Africa and lobbying Congressional 40George W. Ball, The Discipline of Power: Essential of a Modern World Structure, (Boston: Little Brown & Co., 1968), p. 245. 41Ibid., p. 245-252; An excellent discussion of this situation is presented. foreign affairs committees. These measures worked to a degree, creating a split between the administration and Congress over African policy42, but the biggest bargaining chip turned out to be an American leased naval base. With the lease of naval facilities in the Azores expiring in December 1962, the Kennedy administration was forced into a softer stand on Portuguese

colonialism. Theodore Sorenson summarized very appropriately when he stated that "Lisbon tried every form of diplomatic blackmail to alter our (U.S.) position on Angola, using as a wedge our country's expiring lease on a key military base on the Portuguese Azores. The President finally felt that, if necessary, he was prepared to forego the base entirely rather than permit Portugual to dictate his African policy.43" It might be noted at this point that Angola was the front page issue in Portuguese Africa at the time and Mozambique was secondary, as it would remain throughout the 1960's and early 1970's. This was unfortunate in regard to American policy toward Frelimo, for all Portuguese colonies were lumped into the same policy, even though there were differences in the liberation movements themselves. Frelimo was decidedly more non-aligned in the early 1960's than the MPLA in Angola, and Eduardo Mondlane had met and won the 42For an excellent summary see Luis B. Serapiao and Mohamed A. El-Khawas, Mozambique in the Twentieth Century: From Colonialism to Independence, (Washington, D.C.: University Press of America Inc., 1979), p. 176-177. 43Theodore C. Sorenson, Kennedy, (New York: Harper & Row, 1965), p. 538. support of Robert Kennedy early in the Kennedy administration.44 With continued pressure by Portugal and the increased strategic importance of the Azores, particularly, after the Cuban missile crisis in October 1962, the administration position became more neutral. Though still supporting the eventual liberation of the African colonies, public rhetoric was softened and the arms control restrictions became less of a focal point. A new lease of the Azores was negotiated, however, Portugal attached some strings this time - American use of the Azores could be terminated at any time with only six months notice.45 Initially, the Johnson administration brought an extension of the policy which had developed during the last year of the Kennedy presidency. Though uncommitted to either side of the African liberation situation, criticism of Portugal's policies in Africa subsided and a sympathy toward Portuguese problems began to develop. This became even more pronounced as American involvement in Southeast Asia heightened. The Azores became an increasingly strategic location for the United States, the NATO alliance took on added importance, and the plight of the African liberation movements was relegated to the back burner. By the end of the Johnson administration, American policy in Africa had taken on a decidedly pro-Portuguese tilt. The administration continued the sale of arms to Portugal, continued to train 44Arthur M. Schlesinger, Robert Kennedy and His Times, (Boston, Houghton Mifflin Co., 1978), p. 562. 45Luis B. Serapiao and Mohamed A. El-Khawas, Mozambique in

the Twentieth Century, (Washington: University of American Press, 1979), p. 179. Portuguese military personnel and paid little attention to the claims of Portuguese use of NATO arms and material in Mozambique and other colonies. With the coming of the Nixon administration in 1969, American foreign policy again moved to more of a pro-Portuguese position. Under the guidance of Henry Kissinger, the National Security Study Memorandum 39 (NSSM 39) was prepared, laying out the options for American policy in Africa as follows: Option One: Closer association with the white regimes to protect and enhance our economic, strategic and scientific interests. Option Two: Broader association with both black and white states in an effort to encourage moderation in the white states, to enlist cooperation of the black states in reducing tensions and the likelihood of increasing cross-border violence, and to encourage improved relations among states in the area. Option Three: Limited association with the white states and continuing association with blacks in an effort to retain some economic, scientific, and strategic interest in the white states while maintaining a posture on the racial issue which the blacks will accept, though opposing violent solutions to the problems of the region. Option Four: Dissociation from the white regimes with closer relations with the black states in an effort to enhance our standing on the racial issue in Africa and internationally. Option Five: Dissociation from both black and white states in an effort to limit our involvement in the problems of the area.46 The administration settled on option two under the beliefs that the "rebels cannot oust the Portuguese and the Portuguese can contain but not eliminate the rebels," that there "is no hope for blacks to gain the political rights they seek through violence, which will only lead to chaos and increased opportunities for the Communists," and that "substantial change is only likely to come from decisions made in Portugal.47" Thus, this option was adopted under the total awareness that the stated policy of Portugal's new prime minister, Caetano, was "limited to achieving some degree of administrative autonomy in territories which are to remain a part of Portugal.48" This policy was pursued throughout the Nixon administration, with United States support for Portugal becoming more evident in the United Nations,

more evident in arms transfers, and more evident as the Azores reached new heights of strategic significance in the early 1970's. 46Ibid., p. 182-183. 47Ibid, p. 183, noted from NSSM 39, 1969, p. 56. 48Ibid, p. 184, noted from NSSM 39, 1969, p. 56. Over the course of a decade, the policy of the United States changed from open support of African liberation movements and open pressure applied to the Portuguese government for selfdetermination in the African colonies to almost the reverse. Though the "words" still supported self-determination, the "actions" did not. The changing policy was felt by the leadership of Frelimo and caused changes in the policies which they pursued. Mondlane stated in May of 1963 that "the U.S. should be among the strongest supporters of freedom and independence in the world and that it would be tragic for the U.S. to sacrifice its long range African interest by continuing to allow its short-sighted need for the Azores to form the basis of African policy.49" By the end of 1967, he commented that "when John F. Kennedy was President, the U.S. went through a period of equivocation and seemed to be moving toward support for us. After the death of President Kennedy, the policy became one of equivocation without direction. More recently, U.S. policy has become one of support for the status quo.50" By the middle of 1969, Mondlane was dead, the victim of a letter bomb, and Frelimo was in the hands of a Communist supported insurgency. 49Ibid, p. 171. 50Helen Kitchen, "Conversation with Eduardo Mondlane", African Report, 12:8, 1967, p. 51. If a graph of Frelimo's support from western nations would depict a downward sloping curve during the 1960's and 1970's, as indicated in the previous discussion, then a similar graph depicting support from the Soviet Union and China would show the opposite. Frelimo's early support, both financially and in terms of recognition came from other African nations and nationalist movements. As western support eroded in the face of Portuguese pressure, reliance on the OAU and bordering countries became critical. Algeria and Egypt provided the early training bases for Mozambican nationalists and Tanzania the safe shelter from Portuguese forces. As the insurgency progressed, however, it became apparent that more international support would be required to sustain operations. Tanzania provided the link for that support. The Chinese were heavily backing President Nyerere's Tanzanian government both militarily and economically; and the construction of the Tan-Zam railway afforded a convenient cover for a heavy concentration of Chinese in Tanzania. Nyerere's own philosophy bore the imprint of the Communist Chinese with their

emphasis on self-reliance. These events were not lost on the leadership of Frelimo. The relationship of a host country and its revolutionary guests has been described as one where the host projects its own political personality into the attitude and habits of the guest.51 This became the case with Frelimo as the "protege became more thoroughly revolutionized than the Tanzanian 51John A. Marcum, "Three Revolutions", Africa Report 12, No. 8 (November 1967), p. 21. mentor52", eventually. Requiring assistance in its struggle against Portugal, Frelimo leaders had initially maintained a policy of non-alignment with East and West, preferring to obtain the aid and recognition of both in the struggle for independence. With the assistance from the West drying up under Portuguese pressure, the turn toward the East was inevitable. Chinese support was readily available and more acceptable to Frelimo than Soviet support, for it came with no strings attached. The Soviets, though offering any support necessary, generally required a strict alignment with Soviet practices. As ties with the Chinese became closer, however, the rivalry between the two Communist powers forced the Soviets into a more tolerant position toward Frelimo, and by the end of the 1960's Soviet and Chinese military aid sustained the insurgency. As important as the military assistance, however, was the moral courage provided to Frelimo by association with the world Marxist crusade. While Western powers moved closer to an alignment with the Portuguese throughout the 1960's, the Communist ideology, which came free with the weapons, gave justification to Frelimo's struggle for freedom. The comforting feeling of being part of a world struggle which could be explained historically and of having a recipe for success provided by the Communist party, had to have an impact on the leadership of Frelimo, particularly with dwindling support from the West. Indeed it did, as can be evidenced by the turmoil within Frelimo during the late 1960's 52Roger Mann, "A Troubled Celebration in Zanzibar", Washington Post, Feb. 6, 1977. and the rhetoric which characterized their propaganda. The goals of the first Congress of Frelimo in September 1962, recounted earlier, are clear, direct, and bear no striking resemblance to the typical rhetoric which accompanies a Communist inspired insurgency. The goals of the Second Congress of Frelimo in June 1968, however, are not the same.53 Though too numerous to recount in detail, an examination of a selected few should provide the general flavor: 1. "The Portuguese government is a colonialist, fascist government that still maintains the myth that Mozambique is a Portuguese Province, and consequently, part and parcel of Portugal".

2. "Our struggle is a people's struggle. It requires the total participation of all the masses of the people". 3. "Many comrades are engaged in the struggle because..." 4. "The Mozambican people are engaged in an armed struggle against Portuguese colonialism and imperialism for their national independence and for the establishment of a social, democratic order in Mozambique. This struggle is part of the world's movement for the emancipation of the peoples, which aims at the total liquidation of colonialism and imperialism, and at the construction of a new society free from exploitation of man by man." 53Eduardo Mondlane, The Struggle for Mozambique, (Middlesex: Penguin Books, Ltd., 1969), p. 189-195. The ring of Marxist doctrine is evident in these statements. After Mondlane's assassination in 1969, there was little doubt that Frelimo had made the full transition to a Communist inspired insurgency. Weapons, money and training to back the insurgency were clearly provided by the Soviets and the Chinese. Cuba, though providing minimal assistance during the actual insurgency, stepped in with massive assistance once independence was achieved. Mozambique, upon independence, became just one more Communist bloc nation. Events may have turned out the same in any circumstance, but it is interesting to wonder "what might have happened" had United States policy been consistent. The remainder of this section requires only a recounting of the events which took place within the leadership of Frelimo during the late 1960's and early 1970's. Armed with the background of the United States, Soviet Union, and Chinese policy toward the insurgency in Mozambique, the significance of these events is more clearly understood. Factionalism existed within Frelimo, as with nearly every organization, though it never reached such large scale splits and open warfare that were characteristic of other African nationalist movements. The fragile nature of Frelimo following the first Congress created a natural tendency toward the formation of competing groups. The lack of experience of most of the members, combined with the fact that all came from different parts of Mozambique with differing intellectual and political views, added to a basic distrust of one another when crises arose. The first signs of a rift were instigated by Leo Clinton Aldridge, alias "Leo Milas", who had been introduced into the organization by Adelino Gwambe, a former leader of UDENAMO. Milas, reportedly in the employment of a foreign intelligence agency54, had graduated from the University of Southern California, passed himself off as a Mozambican, and was in charge of military training in 1962 and 1963. While Mondlane was in the United States completing obligations to

Syracuse University and attempting to raise support for Frelimo, Milas was instrumental in provoking the expulsion of David Mabunda, the first Secretary-General of Frelimo, and many of his associates. This caused a split within Frelimo, with many members calling for the expulsion of Milas. Mondlane was reluctant to take action and permitted further widening of the rift citing that "a movement cannot afford to become too paranoiac, or it will alienate potential support and fail to reconcile those real differences that somehow must be reconciled if its broad basis is to survive and develop. On the other hand, it must guard against the more dangerous type of infiltration organized by its enemies, inevitably expending time and energy in the process.55" It was not until 1964 when Mondlane received irrefutable information which proved Milas an imposter that he had him expelled from Frelimo. This brought charges that Mondlane 54John A. Marcum, "Three Revolutions", Africa Report 12, No. 8 (November 1967), p. 18-19. 55Eduardo Mondlane, The Struggle for Mozambique, (Middlesex: Penguin Books, Ltd., 1969), p. 133. was too pro-American from rivals within Frelimo and as the years went by and American support deteriorated this accusation would resurface. Mabunda and Paulo Gumane, an associate expelled by Milas, went on to reform UDENAMO. Other desertions and expulsions from Frelimo in the early years, due more to personal rivalries than ideological differences, resulted in the formation of several splinter groups, however few had any real impact on Frelimo other than a deterioration of the international perception of unity which Mondlane was attempting to foster. The only group which would have any longevity was the Comite Revolucionario de Mocambique (COREMO). COREMO was an amalgamation of the new UDENAMO and several of the other splinter groups which finally came together in 1965, basing out of Lusaka, Zambia. Discontented with Mondlane and the slowness of Frelimo's actions, COREMO initiated their own guerrilla war against the Portuguese and remained in existance until Mozambican independence, hoping to have a say in the future government. They were never afforded recognition or support by any substantial external agencies, including the OAU who recognized Frelimo as the only Mozambican nationalist movement, and by war's end had ceased to be serious contender for power. As the decade of the 1960's progressed, factions within Frelimo crystalized into three separate internal power struggles with distinct perceptions of how the revolution should be conducted and how Mozambique should be run after independence Mondlane and his followers; those who felt that Mondlane's approach was becoming too radical; and those who felt he was not radical enough. During the mid 1960's, the political ideas of

Mondlane had radicalized. He began identifying the efforts of Frelimo with those of similar liberation movements around the world. This carried over into his conception of society in an independent Mozambique after the revolution. He became intent on restructuring society to insure political and economic equality, using the solidarity of the revolutionary struggle to create a state free from foreign exploitation. The radicalization of his ideas may have been assisted by the deaths of some of his more moderate supporters and the ensuing rise of younger, more aggressive members of the organization. Jaime Sigauke, Secretary of the Department of Interior Organization, was assassinated by a Portuguese "friend" on July 14, 1966. In October 1966, Filipe Magaia, head of the Department of Defense and Security was killed in action56. His subsequent replacement was Samora Machel, later President of Frelimo after Mondlane's death and decidedly pro-Chinese. While Mondlane's ideas of the revolution were undergoing a radicalization, his basic premise that the struggle would be waged by the people and built on their continued support was unchanged. His emphasis remained on mobilizing the population at the expense of military or terrorist action to win ultimate victory for the people - no matter how long the duration. For this reason, he accepted more support from the 56Brendan F. Jundanian, The Mozambique Liberation Front, (Library of Congress: Institut Universitaire De Hautes Etupes Internacionales, 1970), p. 62; sites an unpublished paper which charges Magaia was killed by a member of Frelimo. Communists as the war continued, but would not grasp their ideas in totality. This middle of the road position made Mondlane the target of any discontent within the organization and it emanated from both factions previously mentioned. The insurgency in the Cabo Delgado district had been easily prosecuted in 1964 and 1965. Portuguese control was marginal and guerrilla successes were numerous. Lazaro Kavandame, the Frelimo leader in Cabo Delgado, urged Mondlane to concentrate all efforts to expel the Portuguese completely. This did not fit into the overall strategy of the Frelimo heirarchy, which was to create popular support in all the northern regions, eventually expanding the network southward. Kavandame argued that too much effort and funding were being wasted on the population and that the effort should be redirected to a military victory over the Portuguese where it was possible. Though future events would prove the overall strategy was certainly the best path to eventual success, Kavandame was adamant that Mondlane was not aggressive enough in pursuing the revolution and openly defied directions from Frelimo headquarters. The split between Kavandame and Mondlane continued to widen through the Second Congress of Frelimo in 1968, where debate centered on the prosecution of the war as proposed by both

factions. Kavandame's arguments had been further magnified by events at the Mozambique Institute in Dar es Salaam earlier in the year. Students, disgruntled with the slow moving guerrilla efforts, led riots against Mrs. Mondlane, the Director of the Institute, and denounced the leadership of Frelimo. The school had to be closed in March, 1968, due to the volatility of the situation. On May 9, 1968, Frelimo headquarters in Dar es Salaam was attacked by a group of Mozambicans, led by Kavandame's son and Mateus Gwenjere, a Mozambican priest who had led the riots at the Institute of Mozambique. Mateus Muthemba, a member of Frelimo's Central Committee and a Mondlane supporter, was murdered.58 Kavandame refused to attend the Second Congress of Frelimo but the debate over revolutionary strategy took place with others arguing his philosophy. The ideological split was not resolved; however, Mondlane's strategy was endorsed by the Second Congress and prosecution of the war was to continue under the plans that he had set out. Kavandame continued to be an antagonist and his supporters assassinated Paulo Kankhomba, a supporter of Mondlane when he visited Cabo Delgado operations in December, 1968.59 Kavandame was suspended from Frelimo on January 3, 1969, pending a final decision by Frelimo leaders; however, his fate was overtaken by events. Eduardo Mondlane was assassinated on February 3, 1969. Kavandame represented the faction that thought Mondlane too conservative. They had accused Mondlane and his wife at one time or another of working for the CIA and being too pro-American, or of being too soft on the Portuguese. Kavandame, himself, 58Brendan F. Jundanian, The Mozamblique Liberation Front, (Library of Congress: Institut Universitaire De Hautes Etupes Internacionales, 1970), p. 87. 59Ibid., p. 88. surrendered to the Portuguese in April 1969, and was used by Portuguese propagandists to advertise the collapse of Frelimo. Other factions felt that Mondlane was too radical. COREMO leaders charged throughout the war that Frelimo killed more Africans than Portuguese and voiced specific resentment against Mondlane. A splinter group formed in 1968, the Uniao Nacional Africana de Rumberia (UNAR) referred to Frelimo as the "lynching" front and urged a secession of Northern Mozambique, the area between the Rovuma and Zambezia Rivers, with possible annexation into Malawi. Maconde leaders felt that their tribe bore the brunt of Frelimo guerrilla efforts throughout Mozambique and were dissatisfied with the radical ideas of Frelimo's leadership, desiring to concentrate their efforts in the northern regions.60 Assailed from within Frelimo as being too radical and too conservative, Mondlane continued to hold to the original long range strategy and pressed for more party unity. He was

undoubtably more successful than any other potential president could have been, managing to keep Frelimo on a steady course despite the internal conflict and managing to present a relatively united front to the rest of the world. There is little doubt that the Portuguese Secret Police (PIDE) played an important part in aggravating the internal disputes, with paid agents, informers, and assassins (Jaime Sigauke's death was 60Brendan F. Jundanian, The Mozambique Liberation Front, (Library of Congress: Institut Universitaire De Hautes Etupes Internacionales, 1970), - an excellent summary of all of these events is presented from pages 60-94. attributed to PIDE); and there is much speculation that the Soviets and Chinese played an active role in stirring resentment against Mondlane within Frelimo because of his neutral stance on the East/West issue. However, all things considered, Frelimo managed unrivaled advances and growth in comparison with other movements in the Portuguese territories or Southern Africa during the period. The political mobilization of the population within guerrilla dominated zones and Frelimo's growing sympathy throughout the country and the world appears to have gone on unimpaired by discord at the top. The events surrounding the assassination of Eduardo Mondlane on February 3, 1969, will probably never be known for sure. He was killed by a letter-bomb delivered to the Dar es Salaam home of an American friend where he was working. Frelimo accused Kavandame, who later defected to the Portuguese, and Silverio Nungo, who was subsequently executed. The Tanzanian police investigation pointed the finger at Kavandame with the assistance of PIDE. The letter-bomb, itself, was postmarked in Moscow. No matter the culprit, the results had an important impact on Frelimo. After a brief power struggle, the pro-Communist Samora Machel assumed the Presidency. The former Vice-President, Uria Simango, was expelled and the former Secretary of External Relations, Miguel Murupa, deserted the party. Murupa, a personal appointee of Mondlane, later claimed that Frelimo had fallen under a Communist takeover.61 61Thomas H. Henriksen, Mozambique: A History, (The Camelot Press, Southampton, England, 1978), p. 181. Machel moved the party to the ideological left, consolidating power and increasing ties with the Chinese and Soviets. After numerous expulsions and defections internal dissent within Frelimo subsided for the remainder of the insurgency. Machel advocated the military approach to more of a degree than Mondlane and stepped up the guerrilla war and urban terrorism. Though the unity of Frelimo would no longer be in question, the organization had made a definite mid-course correction. Communist support, in terms of military and financial assistance, increased

substantially after Machel took over. Propaganda was decidedly that of the typical Communist supported insurgency. There was not too much doubt that Mondlane's neutrality had fallen by the wayside. Frelimo - Conduct of the Insurgency As indicated in earlier sections, actual combat remained at a low level of intensity throughout the insurgency. Frelimo's focus from the beginning was on mobilizing the population and demoralizing the Portuguese through protracted conflict. They had chosen not to follow the Cuban theory of emphasizing military forces and military confrontation as practiced in Angola, and were decidedly unimpressed with the visit of "Che" Guevara in 1965. This probably led to the coolness of relations with Cuba through the 1960's and very early 1970's.62 From the commencement of operations against the Portuguese on September 25, 1964, through 1966, operations were characterized by ten to fifteen man hit and run groups operating against minor installations and administrative posts in the Tete, Zambezia, Niassa and Cabo Delgado districts. The latter two districts were much stronger positions for the guerrillas and mobilization of the population was attained much more easily. The guerrillas were armed at this point with rifles, light machineguns, and automatic pistols, conducting most of their attacks at night and taking advantage of the rainy season (November through March) to conceal their movements effectively. Their objectives in the early years were to disperse the Portuguese forces by conducting operations in widely separated areas and to prevent counter62Thomas H. Henriksen, Revolution and Counterrevolution, (London: Greenwood Press, 1983), p. 187. attacks. In both regards they were successful. Guerrilla lines of communication from havens in Tanzania and Malawi were primarily created by the use of dugout canoes across the Rovuma River, Lake Malawi, and down the extreme northern coastal region in Cabo Delgado. By late 1965, new recruits were expanding the size of guerrilla units, particuarly in the extreme northern regions, and attacks on Portuguese forces were extended to the southern areas of Niassa and Cabo Delgado as Frelimo control of the northern regions became apparent. Utilization of land mines by the guerrilla units entered into insurgent tactics and it became commonplace to find indiscriminate planting of these devices near any Portuguese outpost. The use of land mines by guerrilla forces would increase extensively through the rest of the insurgency and had tremendous impact on the morale of the Portuguese. In the early years, the mines were used strictly to harass Portuguese forces and rarely were covered by fire. As the insurgency progressed, however, use of the devices became much

more calculated. Frelimo also continued to place heavy emphasis on winning the support of the population. Agencies were established to provide support to Mozambicans who had fled to Tanzania and Malawi to avoid the conflict, and to encourage them to return to Mozambique to take part in the revolution. Education, medical, and social systems were created in the areas controlled by Frelimo, and though rudimentary, they were an improvement over conditions under the Portuguese and helped build faith in the nationalist organization.63 By 1966, Portuguese forces in the northern regions were confined to several small outposts and rarely ventured into the countryside. Frelimo units continued to expand with occasional company size attacks (65-150 men) during the closing months of year; and a reorganization of the military structure was undertaken to facilitate centralized control of guerrilla operations. Prior to 1966, there existed no centralized command structure within the Frelimo military; regional commanders conducted operations as they saw fit. In late 1966, a mobile central command was created just north of the Tanzanian border to coordinate all guerrilla operations. This proved to be very advantageous for Frelimo, allowing them to strike the Portuguese at key locations, evaporate into the jungle as Portuguese forces pursued, and strike again in a coordinated effort at another critical location. It also proved extremely frustrating to the Portuguese, who still contended that Frelimo was an unorganized group of bandits. 1966 also saw the introduction of women detachments into Frelimo's guerrilla units. These detachments were concentrated in the defense of liberated areas, freeing the men for offensive actions in other zones. 63Brendan F. Jundanian, The Mozambique Liberation Front, (Library of Congress: Institut Universitaire De Hautes Etupes Internacionales, 1970), p. 76-80. By 1967 Frelimo had gained control of approximately one fifth of Mozambique and one seventh of the population.64 Tactics had remained the same, small-scale hit and run operations. The guerrilla force had grown to approximately eight thousand personnel, however, allowing the frequency of operations to increase substantially. This was a year of decision for the leadership of Frelimo. Occupying a large portion of the northern provinces was expensive in terms of funds to establish the social programs necessary for continued popular support; and as the strength of the military forces increased, the cost of food, clothing and equipment rose proportionately. Monetary support from the OAU could not cover the costs of expanded operations and support from the West had all but dried up. It might also be recalled that the years from 1966 through 1968 were full of dissent within the leadership of Frelimo. Mondlane wanted to

retain the same scale of guerrilla operations but urged projection of forces to other areas of Mozambique in a widening arc of insurgent actions. To accomplish this he sought more external support. Thus, 1967 and particularly 1968, saw the beginning of big-power involvement in Frelimo policies specifically the Soviet Union and Chinese.65 Weapons were upgraded to a standard armament of AK-47 and AK-50 rifles. The Soviet RPD light machine gun as well as the Goryunov M1943 7.62 64Brendan F. Jundanian, The Mozambique Liberation Front, (Library of Congress: Institut Universitaire De Hautes Etupes Internacionales, 1970), p. 70. 65F. X. Maier, Revolution and Terrorism in Mozambique, (New York: American Affairs Association, Inc., 1974), p. 11. calibre heavy machine gun began appearing in guerrilla attacks. By late 1969 and early 1970 Soviet anti-aircraft weapons, mortars, and Chinese 75mm recoiless rifles and 122mm rockets also began appearing.66 1968 was a good year for Frelimo in terms of propaganda, additionally. Action in the Tete district which had met with early success in the beginning of the insurgency, but which had been dormant for several years, was reopened and the Cabora Bassa Dam project was the main target. One of the projects undertaken by the Portuguese in the late 1950's as a belated attempt to improve economic conditions in Mozambique was the building of the Cabora Bassa Dam on the Zambezi River. After the outbreak of hostilities, work was stepped up in an effort to complete the project as quickly as possible for both economic and military reasons. Economically, the project would open eight million acres of land to agriculture and provide four million kilowatts of electrical power to southern Africa. As the fifth largest hydro-electric project in the world and the largest on the African continent, its construction was beneficial to Portugal in convincing the rest of the world of Portuguese good intentions in Mozambique. Militarily, it would create the largest man-made lake in the world and simultaneously isolate a large portion of the frontier from guerrilla penetration. Frelimo was opposed to the construction of the dam for obvious military reasons and also because of the political victory Portugal would achieve in world opinion upon its completion. 66F. X. Maier, Revolution and Terrorism in Mozambique, (New York: American Affairs Association, Inc., 1974), p. 12. 1968 marked the beginning of guerrilla operations against the project which would increase in intensity until 1974, when it became apparent that Mozambican independence would be forthcoming and the Cabora Bassa Dam would be an economic asset for the new government. The Portuguese committed three thousand troops and three concentric, defensive circles of over one million land mines to the defense of the Cabora Bassa project.67 Frelimo was

seldom successful in direct attacks upon the dam, but was highly successful in interdicting convoys en route to the project site and intimidating workers. Their propaganda victory lay in the fact that the Portuguese forces could not stop the guerrillas from interrupting work on the project which eventually led to a withdrawal of most foreign financial support. Additionally, Frelimo forced a United Nations Resolution condemning the project in 1972. The other major propaganda victory in 1968 was the convention of the Second Congress of Frelimo on guerrilla held territory within Mozambique. Even with unchallenged air superiority, Portuguese forces could not locate the site of the convention until late on the last evening. Their bombing missions, conducted the next morning, were futile. It was an open demonstration of territorial control and Frelimo made the most of it. Propaganda was a strength of Frelimo throughout the insurgency. Frelimo leaders were able to maneuver the consortium 67F. X. Maier, Revolution and Terrorism in Mozambique, (New York: American Affairs Association, Inc., 1974), p. 41. of third world countries in the United Nations to condemn Portugal at almost every turn; particularly after Mondlane's death and Machel's swing to the "left". The identification with other world liberation movements and association with the Communist powers afforded increased sympathy for the cause in every international forum. For Frelimo, the years 1970 through 1974 contained no unique and signficant operations, but were characterized by an intensification of all guerrilla activities, a widening of the conflict into the Manica and Sofala districts, a tremendous increase in urban terrorism, and a marked increase in the brutality and psychological warfare directed at the Portuguese forces. The indiscriminate use of land mines by guerrilla forces probably had more impact on the Portuguese than any other single point of the conflict. A passage from Henriksen's Revolution and Counterrevoltion68 summarizes perfectly: "According to Frelimo, it used mines against the Forces Armadas for military, political, economic and psychological goals. The mine is a weapon of the semi-skilled and as such fitted into Frelimo's reliance on village youth to conduct its campaign. Its effectiveness was great, however. Two out of every three troops, or 70 percent, struck down by the guerrillas were mine victims. Yet the highest 68Thomas H. Henriksen, Revolution and Counterrevolution, (London: Greenwood Press, 1983), p. 44. casualty was Portuguese morale. Understandably, troops feared treading on an anti-personnel device.

This led to a mine psychosis and contributed to a static defense mentality in some colonial units. Riders in ambushed convoys in many instances stayed frozen in their vehicles or on the roadside to avoid stepping on anti-personnel mines which were often sown near the anti-vehicular variety of mines. Mined vehicles twisted like licorice and mine craters along roadways conjured up grim reflections of previous tragedies. Sometimes, the colonial forces towed away the derelicts, not for spare parts but to remove telltale reminders. But many a convoy was spared heavy damage, aside from the stricken vehicle and its crew, by the all-too-quick getaway of the guerrillas who fired and ran. Generally, Frelimo abstained from prolonged assault on well-escorted convoys. Still another Frelimo objective was attained by mine wounds. When two or three soldiers left the combat zone to carry a mined comrade, their leavetaking, however brief, diminished the size of the patrol. Helicopters, when used for evacuation, also reduced the forces flying combat missions which could have inflicted losses on the guerrilla army. Transportation and other facilities were more tied up for a wounded man than a dead one. Thus, the insurgents' goal took more into account than raising the casualty list when burying the lethal canisters in the ground." Mining with the intention of inflicting Portuguese casualities was only one aspect of the grisly campaign. By 1973, guerrilla forces were laying mines near civilian population centers just as indiscriminately. The number of civilian casualties was tremendous and is one of the saddest aspects of the conflict; but it contributed to the psychological war against the Portuguese. The anger of the civilian population was directed at the Portuguese soldiers because they could not protect the innocent. Not only were the Portuguese engaged with a guerrilla force which they could not defeat, but they became the target of increasing abuse by even the friendly part of the native population as the conflict wore on. Frelimo used this tactic to turn European against European as well. When Mondlane had been President of Frelimo, he had advocated a non-violent attitude toward Portuguese settlers and other Europeans in Mozambique and concentrated efforts against the Portuguese government and military. Machel reversed this policy in 1973, and white settlers again became targets of guerrilla attacks. "Panic, demoralization, adandonment, and a sense of futility all were reactions among whites in Mozambique".69 The settlers

demonstrated against the Portuguese in Vila de Manica and Vila 69Thomas H. Henriksen, Revolution and Counterrevolution, (London: Greenwood Press, 1983), p. 37. Pery, and stoned military installations and soldiers in Beira. The morale of the army again was undermined and a sense of utter hopelessness became pervasive. A tense stage was well set in both Mozambique and Portugal. Frelimo's hit and run strategy continued in the early months of 1974, wresting away every initiative. Portuguese forces could not effectively respond. Soldiers, tired of serving repeated cycles of two years in Africa, one year at home, questioned their own long term prospects, lives and careers. On April 25, 1974, a military coup took control of the government in Lisbon. Though no announcement of Mozambique's liberation was immediately forthcoming, Frelimo's strategy had finally prevailed. Portugal - Conduct of the Counterinsurgency The Portuguese had taken political and social steps in the late 1950's and early 1960's to defuse the rising nationalism in Mozambique, as discussed in earlier sections. In 1961 the "Indigena Laws" were repealed, making all native born Mozambicans citizens of Portugal. In 1962, the labor laws were overhauled to create minimum wages, establish maximum working hours and improve working conditions. The 1963 "Overseas Organic Law" was designed to give some autonomy to the Mozambican colony. Although none were successful in heading off the outbreak of open conflict, Portuguese authorities felt that if they could contain the guerrilla forces long enough without alienating the total population, then the social and political reforms would work to undercut the goals of the guerrilla movement with the insurgency dying a natural death. As a result, the initial Portuguese response to guerrilla attacks by Frelimo was limited and the initial strategy played into the hands of Frelimo. Lisbon's counterinsurgent strategy, in the early years, was to contain the guerrillas in remote, underpopulated and economically expendable lands; but at the same time keep Portuguese expenditures at a minimum until the guerrillas quit in frustration or dissolved into rival factions in the face of improved social and economic conditions.70 If Frelimo's strategy had been to seek a quick victory this may have been effective, but since Frelimo was 70Thomas H. Henriksen, Revolution and Counterrevolution, (London: Greenwood Press, 1983), p. 39. preparing for a protracted conflict, the Portuguese strategy actually assisted. The Portuguese actions in response to the outbreak of hostilities in September 1964, kept in line with their strategy. Having already been at war in Angola for nearly four years and Guinea for two years they had made some preparations in the

northern provinces to contain the insurgency. Communications were improved and several airfields were constructed to assist in containing the guerrillas. Military forces were increased and surveillance by military intelligence units and PIDE (the Portuguese Secret Police) was stepped up. By 1965, the Portuguese had broken the structure of the underground movement in Lourenco Marques and had arrested the leaders. PIDE had successfully infiltrated Frelimo and would prove instrumental in causing turmoil within the insurgent organization. Basically, everything was going as planned, however, the guerrillas were not cooperating. The Portuguese found themselves falling into a situation which would haunt them for the rest of the conflict. The guerrilla forces had stolen the initiative and would dictate the location and tempo of operations to the Portuguese. Portuguese forces would almost always be reacting to the guerrilla strategy. This was roughly the same situation in which United States forces found themselves later in South Viet Nam. By trying to simply contain the guerrillas, the Portuguese were giving them time to expand, train, and organize. As guerrilla operations increased in intensity, the Portuguese found they no longer had enough forces to successfully cover the expanded area to successfully cover the expanded area of operations. A build-up of troops and equipment began and would continue until the last months of the conflict; always, it seemed, one step behind the guerrillas. 1968 and 1969 saw Portuguese force levels grow to sixty thousand with an additional forty thousand native soldiers active in the southern provinces away from the general conflict. The Portuguese military budget for Mozambique had increased thirty percent per year and total defense spending had reached fourty-four percent of the overall Portuguese budget. The draft age had been lowered to eighteen with obligatory service extended to three or four years depending on the draft category.71 These policies, collectively, combined with minimal good news from any of the three African colonies were beginning to have an impact in Portugal. Far from one of the richest nations in Europe, any increased defense spending came at the expense of an already low standard of living for the Portuguese. It was becoming apparent that the colonial wars would have to be won, not just waited out; and the victory would have to come quickly. The Portuguese had purchased several B-26's from the United States and forty Fiat G-91 fighter bombers from West Germany to step up the air war against the guerrillas.72 Though no 71Facts presented in this paragraph come from Jundanian's analysis, pgs. 50-60. 72Brendan F. Jundanian, The Mozambique Liberation Front, (Library of Congress; Institut Universitaire de Hautes Etupes

Internacionales, 1970), p. 66. The number of B-26's was between seven and twenty, purchased through the CIA. accurate figures are available as to the quantity of these aircraft which arrived in Mozambique, many did, because part of the increased counterinsurgent operations included napalm strikes against suspected Frelimo villages. The G-91 could operate from very short runways carrying a good ordnance load, and as a result was an excellent aircraft for counterinsurgency operations. It is interesting to note that West Germany sold the aircraft to Portugal under the stipulation that they be used only in NATO areas. A Portuguese Foreign Ministry official clarified this: "The transaction was agreed within the spirit of the North Atlantic Pact ... the planes would be used only for defensive purposes within Portuguese territory, which extends to Africa Angola, Mozambique, and Portuguese Guinea."73 Another part of the increased counterinsurgent operations was the creation of strategic hamlets in the northern provinces. The Portuguese forces resettled over two hundred and fifty thousand natives in the provinces along the southern border of Tanzania hoping that the larger hamlets could refuse to aid Frelimo guerrillas where isolated Africans could not. The rest of the region south of the Tanzanian border, exclusive of the strategic hamlets, fell victim to a "scorched earth policy." The Portuguese attempted to clear the entire border region, napalming villages and using herbicides on the jungle.74 73Basil Davidson, "Arms and Nationalists", Africa Report, Vol. 15, No. 5, May 1970, p. 10. 74Brendan F. Jundanian, The Mozambique Liberation Front, (Library of Congress: Institut Universitaire de Hautes Etudes Internacionales, 1970), p. 73. In addition to the stepped up military operations, Portuguese forces increased civil action efforts and propaganda campaigns; unfortunately one tended to off set the other. Special medical and social benefits were made available to natives who would support the Portuguese administration. Efforts were made to intensify old tribal enmities and to play up the Maconde dissatisfaction with Frelimo in an attempt to divide the population and reduce the potential support for Frelimo. These actions, however, much like the resettlement campaign, were often carried out with a vengeance, and did not inspire long term loyalty. Old animosities against the Portuguese were difficult to overcome and often one unfortunate act would negate any potential benefits from a particular program. As the level of frustration built with the seemingly enless war, the "unfortunate acts" became all too commonplace. One incident, similar to the experience at, My Lai, South View Nam, will be covered in a later discussion.

In March 1970, a new commander for Portuguese forces in Mozambique was appointed. Brigadier General Kaulza de Arriaga had studied the Mozambican theater from a position on the staff of the Institute of Higher Military Studies in Lisbon and had served as commander of ground forces in Mozambique for eight months prior to assignment as overall commander. He possessed definite ideas on the conduct of the war in Mozambique which were reinforced by a visit to the United States for consultations with General William Westmoreland concerning American tactics in Viet Nam.75 Arriaga insisted on the deployment of aircraft to support ground operations, particularly helicopter gunships; and initiated large scale "search-and-destroy" missions. He also requested a further increase of troops and material. Bolstered with three thousand additional Portuguese soldiers, Arriaga launched the largest offensive campaign of the war Operation "Gordion Knot". The objectives of the campaign were to seal off the infiltration routes across the Tanzanian border and to destroy permanent guerrilla bases. "Gordion Knot" was a seven month campaign employing, ultimately thirty-five thousand men, and was almost successful. The brunt of the effort was in the Cabo Delgado district. Tactics consisted of lightning quick airborne assaults on small camps. Continual artillery and aviation bombardment rained down on larger sites while bulldozer guided, motorized armies converged. These tactics were effective and Arriaga pursued the guerrillas relentlessly; however, the exertions of "Gordion Knot" could not be continued indefinitely. As the number of guerrilla killed and captured increased, so did the number of Portuguese casualties. The politicians in Lisbon, though dissatisfied with the success of the counterinsurgency until Arriaga's assumption of command, had been content with the relatively low casualty figures. As casualty rates continued to climb during "Gordion Knot" their early pleasure with the improving tactical operations diminished. Political meddling in the conduct of the war appeared with increasing frequency. 75Thomas H. Henriksen, Revolution and Counterrevolution, (London: Greenwood Press, 1983), p. 49. Though "Gordion Knot" had been the most successful campaign of the counterinsurgency it had not delivered the ultimate victory desired by Arriaga - for several reasons. The first, noted above, was political "queasiness" with the increased casualty rates and subsequent meddling in the operation itself. The second was the onset of the rainy season in November which proved to be longer than usual and subsequently gave the guerrillas more than enough time to recover. The third was the simple fact that Arriaga had to mass all of the Portuguese forces in Mozambique to pursue the campaign in the extreme northern provinces in hopes of a relatively quick but decisive victory.

Frelimo realized this and as any good guerrilla force, continually dispersed into the jungle, prolonging the campaign and consuming Portuguese resources. Simultaneously, they increased operations in other provinces, sparsely guarded by Portuguese troops. A Portuguese communique issued in late January, 1971, acknowledged that in spite of the massive operation, not all military objectives had been realized. Arriaga, whether disillusioned by "Gordion Knot" or restrained by Lisbon, shifted from extended conventional sweeps to small unit actions deploying black and white shock troops. By 1972, the situation had deteriorated again with Portuguese forces operating out of traditional secluded strongholds in guerrilla dominated territory. 1972 could probably be described as "the beginning of the end" of the insurgency, for the frustrations of the Portuguese soldiers were becoming evident. The violence and brutality of campaign actions against the population were increasing on both sides. The Portuguese stepped up violent tactics, trying to make the natives afraid to support Frelimo. Forced resettlements and reprisals became more frequent and on a larger scale after mid-1972. Frustration and suspicion mounted, and in this atmosphere elements of the Portuguese army massacred the inhabitants of the village of Wiriyamu. The incident, itself, was not brought to the attention of the rest of the world until nearly a year later, in July 1973, by a Dominican priest. It was at first denied, then contested, then rationalized as a response in-kind by Portuguese authorities. Though details of the entire episode will never be known, best estimates are that four hundred to five hundred natives were slaughtered by Portuguese soldiers, black and white, in a spontaneous outburst of frustration during a small scale search and destroy mission.76 The exposure of Wiriyamu brought with it the exposure of numerous other incidents on a smaller scale and increased world-wide (particularly third-world) condemnation of Portugal. During 1973 and early 1974, the situation continued to worsen for the Portuguese. Frelimo forces began advancing southward. Portuguese forces were apparently unable to halt them. The civilian authorities in Lisbon, embarrassed by the atrocities exposed in July, 1973, had lost a great amount of confidence in military solutions and were encouraging the expansion of 76Adrian Hastings, Wiriyamu, (London: Search Press, 1974), Recounts the incident at Wiriyamu as described by the Dominican priest. operations by PIDE. PIDE's paramilitary endeavors were viewed as excessively brutal and counterproductive by the leaders of the military, and disagreement on the proper role of the secret police in combating the insurgency widened the rift between the central government and the military leadership. A veteran

Portuguese journalist described the deteriorating situation quite accurately: "In Mozambique we say there are three wars: the war against Frelimo, the war between the army and the secret police, and the war between the army and the secret police, and the central government."77 When the Movimento de Forcas Armadas (MFA) seized control of the government in Lisbon on April 25, 1974, the Portuguese position in Mozambique all but collapsed. General Antonio de Spinola, head of the new government and former commander of counterrevolutionary forces in Guinea-Bissau, maneuvered to maintain some control over the destiny of Mozambique by calling for a cease-fire and Portuguese sponsored elections; but Frelimo, sensing victory, would not comply. Frelimo announced the opening of a new front in Zambezia and poured guerrillas into the middle regions of the country "like fleas through a rug", as described by one Portuguese officer.78 The Spinola government countered by ordering northern outposts abandoned and the concentration of troops in the southern regions, by handing out arms to rural settlers, and by ordering 77F. X. Maier, Revolution and Terrorism in Mozambique, (New York: American Affairs Association Inc., 1974), p. 24. 78Thomas H. Henriksen, Revolution and Counterrevolution, (London: Greenwood Press, 1983), p. 57. an increase in bombing attacks on guerrilla controlled territories. These measures were intended to support the Portuguese position at the negotiating table, but proved futile. The troops fighting in Mozambique realized that the coup in Lisbon and the opening of negotiations with Frelimo were a prelude to withdrawal. Instead of engaging the guerrillas, many refused to continue risking their lives in a war that could not be won. By mid-summer an undeclared truce prevailed since the bulk of the Portuguese army would not leave their barracks; and on September 8, 1974, an accord was signed formalizing the cease-fire. The agreement called for a transitional government with full independence for Mozambique to be granted on June 25, 1975 - the thirteenth anniversary of Frelimo. The war had ended. Conclusions As noted at the beginning of this study, Mozambique remains a tinderbox in Southern Africa despite almost a decade of self-rule since achieving independence. The government of Samora Machel, which came to power after the final withdrawal of Portuguese forces in 1975, aligned solidly with the Communist world and severed most relations with the West. Machel's goal of achieving greater prosperity in Mozambique and raising the general standard of living by using the Communist system has been largely a failure. Despite tremendous assistance from Cuba, the Soviet Union, and China, Mozambique remains steeped in poverty and ripe for internal conflict. The situation has been further aggravated

by actions of the government of South Africa. Fearful of the Communist penetration into Southern Africa through Angola and Mozambique and very aware of the tenuous position their own government would occupy if Western support became critical, the South Africans have actively promoted guerrilla activity in both of the aforementioned countries. Mozambique has been hard hit, particularly economically. Recently, the Machel government has made overtures to the South Africans indicating a desire to normalize relations and enter into reciprocal agreements aimed at easing the fears of South Africans and gaining a respite for the Mozambican economy. At the same time, Machel has indicated "somewhat" of a desire for better relations with the United States. Once again, Mozambique appears to be moving toward center ground in a potential East-West confrontation. The Communist powers have invested considerable time and money in gaining a toehold in Southern Africa and cannot be expected to remain idle as Machel warms up to the West. For this reason, if no other, the lessons learned from analyzing the insurgency against Portugal are critical. Mozambique, in all probability, has not seen the last of guerrilla warfare. The basic strength of Frelimo, particularly in the early stages of the insurgency, was the fact that it came into existence following five hundred years of inflexible, colonial domination. This strength fed on the mirrored acts of European powers hastily divesting themselves of costly African colonies. Portugal's stubborn reluctance to follow suit created the amalgam for insurgency. The strategy of Frelimo, in accepting a protracted conflict with all of the inherent pitfalls of a long term insurgency, almost guaranteed eventual success particularly against Portugal, undoubtedly the poorest of European colonial powers and the only one to see long term profit in maintaining African colonies. Frelimo's tactics were supurb throughout the insurgency. Conducting classic guerrilla hit and run operations, they rarely engaged Portuguese forces head-on and then, only with clearly superior strength. From the outset, the guerrillas dictated the tempo and location of operations, forcing the Portuguese to react and never allowing them the initiative. Much like the weary fighter, who finds punches raining down from every direction and is too busy ducking to land a well-aimed blow of his own, so too, do the Portuguese eventually succumb. Frelimo's knockout punch came in the form of terrorism, specifically the indiscriminate use of landmines in the final years of the insurgency. Portuguese morale was devastated beyond their capacity to recover. The basic failure of the Portuguese was an underestimation of their enemy. This characteristic is inherent to almost every unsuccessful counterinsurgency. Because of their initial

estimation of Frelimo's capabilities, the Portuguese never settled on a strategy which would eventually end the conflict. Their strategy, from the beginning, was containment and was designed around the idea of employing minimum forces and minimum assets to hold Frelimo in check. At some time in the near future, it was hoped, Frelimo would cease to exist as an organization due to internal conflict. As was discussed in previous sections, this allowed Frelimo the time to gather strength and committed Portugal to a spiraling force buildup which they could not afford. The most unfortunate aspect of this point is that Portuguese forces had sufficient strength to easily overpower the guerrillas in the early years of the insurgency had they employed a better strategy. Even as late as 1970, General Arriaga's "Gordion Knot" came within easy distance of complete victory but was cut short by vacillating policy within the Portuguese government. Inability to agree on any particular strategy and follow through to success or failure highlighted the disunity of policy-makers and underlined the lack of a plan to eventually end the conflict. The result was a generation of Portuguese soldiers who felt they were being sacrificed aimlessly in the African colonies with no hope for extrication. This is a critical point, but one that should be easily understood by any United States Marine. The situation in which we found ourselves during the recent Lebanon crisis, if extended over a few more years, could very easily have caused similar misgivings. If Mozambique should become the scene of confrontation in the future, there are critical elements in the make-up of the country which bear understanding before committment of forces. The people have lived, unhappily for the most part, under the rule of white men for nearly five hundred years, and should not be expected to arise in support of an external power intervening to free them from Communism. Civil affairs programs, therefore, should be well planned and genuine or their impact will be negligible. Tribal loyalties and animosities are extremely significant, particularly in rural areas, and can prove advantageous if properly understood. Mozambique offers extreme variations in terrain, with areas that are ideal for the conduct of guerrilla operations. Infiltration routes from the north and west are almost unlimited with nearly two thousand miles of contiguity to nations which would provide haven for guerrilla units in all probability. Tremendous rivers cross Mozambique, entering virtually all regions of the country, and can be formidable obstacles, avenues of approach or lines of communication depending upon the structure of the force. Politically, guerrillas in Mozambique have already displayed a propensity for terrorism. This is probably the greatest single problem confronting any force introduced into the area. The

widespread, indiscriminate use of landmines was relatively unique to the insurgency in Mozambique, and had frightful impact on both the opposing force and the native population. Any force being committed to action or presence in Mozambique should have a well defined answer to this problem in advance. The insurgency in Mozambique is extremely important for one final reason. Like it or not, the United States stands as a strong reservoir of optimism in the face of a powerful challenge pledged to our destruction. Part of that pledge was paid by Portugal in Mozambique. A NATO ally was "bled" in a collapsing colonial situation which we could not shepherd. Our confrontations will be in the "third world" for at least the remainder of the twentieth century. The lessons learned in Mozambique apply across the board. BIBLIOGRAPHY Primary Sources Hastings, Adrian. Wiriyamu, London: Search Press, 1974. Written by the Dominican priest who first exposed the massacre, this volume accurately establishes the atmosphere of frustration which led to the events at Wiriyamu and portrays his struggle to convince the world of the atrocities taking place in Mozambique. Machel, Samora. The Tasks Ahead, New York: A.S.I., 1975. The author presents his views on the condition of Mozambique following the conclusion of the insurgency and the tasks that lie ahead in developing the nation. Provides excellent insight into the leader of Frelimo. Machel, Samora. Mozambique, Sowing the Seeds of Revolution, London: Committee for Freedom in Mozambique, 1975. Provides transcripts of important speeches made by Machel since becoming President of Frelimo. Again, it provides insight into Machel's reasoning and priorities. Mondlane, Eduardo. The Struggle for Mozambique, Middlesex: Penguin Books, Ltd., 1969. Excellent volume for insight into Mondlane, the first President of Frelimo, and his views of the revolution and conduct of the insurgency. The best source for an understanding of Frelimo's goals in the early years. Santos, Manuel Pimentel Pereira dos. Mozambique is Not Only Cabora Bassa, Lisbon, 1973. An interview with the Portuguese governor of Mozambique. It reflects Portuguese views of Mozambique prior to the military takeover in 1974. Gives Portuguese justification to the idea that Mozambique is an actual "part" of Portugal, not just a colony. Secondary Sources Duffy, James. Portuguese Africa, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959. Excellent background information on Portuguese

involvement in Africa prior to the outbreak of insurgency in the colonies. Gibson, Richard. African Liberation Movements: Contemporary Struggles Against White Minority Rule, New York: Oxford Univesity Press, 1972. Good account of all the liberation movements in Africa. Gives an excellent summary of the Portuguese dilemma in all of her colonies. Henriksen, Thomas H. Mozambique: A History, Southampton: The Camelot Press, 1978. The most thorough volume found covering the history of Mozambique. Written by the foremost expert on the area, this publication is an absolute necessity for a sound understanding of the situation in Mozambique. Henriksen, Thomas H. Revolution and Counterrevolution, London: Greenwood Press, 1983. Continues the excellent analysis of the Mozambican struggle started in his first volume. The author attempts to provide an impartial view of the events which transpired during the insurgency. The only publication found that appears to present the facts without a biased opinion. Jundanian, Brendan F. The Mozambique Liberation Front, Library of Congress: Institut Universitaire de Hautes Etupes Internacionales, 1970. An excellent summary of Frelimo as it changed throughout the insurgency. Describes the organization as it grows through four distinct phases of the conflict and the perceived reason for the changes. Maier, F. X. Revolution and Terrorism in Mozambique. New York: American African Affairs Association, Inc., 1974. Provides good information on areas of the insurgency not covered in detail in other publications, particularly the Cabora Bassa Dam project. Also provides additional information on utilization of landmines during the insurgency. An excellent reference, but somewhat pro-Portuguese. Serapiao, Luis B. and El-Khawas, Mohamed A. Mozambique in the Twentieth Century: From Colonialism to Independence. Washington: University Press of America, Inc., 1979. Presents another view of the events which led to the insurgency and the direction in which Mozambique is moving. Though obviously pro-Frelimo, it balances other publications and provides the reader with many thoughts to ponder. Periodicals Kitchen, Helen. Africa Report, 12:8, 1967, "Conversation with Eduardo Mondlane." Marcum, John A. Africa Report, 12:8, 1967, "Three Revolutions." Davidson, Basil. Africa Report, 15:5, 1970, "Arms and Nationalists." Mann, Roger. Washington Post Magazine, February 6, 1977, "A Troubled Celebration in Zanzibar."

Newspapers Times (New York), 23 January 1969, P. C2, "Mozambique Rebel Says Forces Aim to Block Dam" Times (New York), 15 March 1971, P. C3, "Lisbon General Reports Gains in Mozambique War" The Christian Science Monitor, 5 July 1973, P. 2, "Showdown Nears in Mozambique" Times (New York), 12 July 1973, P. C2, "Priests Comments on Slaying Report" Times (New York), 14 July 1973, P. C4, "New Charges of Mass Executions in Mozambique" Post (Washington), 4 September 1973, P. A-17, "Guerrillas Step Up Raids in Mozambique" The Christian Science Monitor, 11 January 1974, P. 3C, "Guerrilla Upsurge Shakes Mozambique" Post (Washington), 30 May 1974, P. A-11, "Mozambique: A Study in Terror" Post (Washington), 18 August 1974, P. A-16, "Guerrillas Winning Control of Mozambique" Post (Washington), 12 September 1974, P. A-30, "Rioting Kills at least 47 in Mozambique" Times (New York), 25 June 1975, P. C3, "Mozambique Gains Independence After 470 Years" Post (Washington), 26 June 1975, P. A-13, "Independent Mozambique seen as Marxist, Cautious"