I.

Legal Philosophy
Case Studies

• Functionalist Perspective
• Modern Legal Realist Perspective
• Critical Legal Analysis
• Policy Science

Esplana, Maria Carla

Octaviano, Clarence
Yu, Benjamin

3/1/2009
 II. Functionalist Perspective
a. Teresita Arobang v. Mayor Vicente Bermejo
b. Hon. Jejomar Binay and the Municipality of Makati v.
Hon. Eufemio Domingo and the Commission of Audit

III. Modern Legal Realist Perspective

a. Alejandro Estrada v. Soledad Escritor
b. Ferdinand Marcos v. Hon. Raul Manglapus

IV. Critical Legal Analysis

a. International School Alliance of Educators (ISAE) v.
Hon. Leonardo A. Quisumbing

V. Policy Science Perspective

a. In the matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus:
Laurente C. Ilagan vs. Hon Juan Ponce Enrile
b. Florentino Joya and Juan Tahimic and Domingo Joya
v. Pedro Pareja

VI. Scandinavian legal realism

a. Primitivo Ansay, et al v. The Board of Directors of the
National Development Company et al.
Cases for functional perspective

Arrobang v. Martinez
G.R. No. 153974 August 7, 2006
Austria- Martinez, J.

Before this Court is a petition for review questioning the Decision of the
Court of Appeals (CA) dated March 20, 2002 in CA-G.R. SP No. 47052, as well
the Resolution dated June 11, 2002 denying petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration thereof.

Facts:
Petitioners are owners of parcels of land with a total area of about 20,424
square meters, covered by Free Patent Nos. 7265, 7266, 7267, 7268, 7269,
and 7270. On November 8, 1995, the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality
of Panay issued Resolution No. 95-29 authorizing the municipal government
through the mayor to initiate expropriation proceedings. A petition for
expropriation was thereafter filed on April 14, 1997 by the Municipality of
Panay (respondent) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 18 of Roxas
City, docketed as Civil Case No. V-6958.
Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss alleging that the taking is not for
public use but only for the benefit of certain individuals; that it is politically
motivated because petitioners voted against the incumbent mayor and vice-
mayor; and that some of the supposed beneficiaries of the land sought to be
expropriated have not actually signed a petition asking for the property but
their signatures were forged or they were misled into signing the same.
On July 31, 1997, the trial court denied petitioners Motion to Dismiss and
declared that the expropriation in this case is for "public use" and the
respondent has the lawful right to take the property upon payment of just
compensation. Petitioners filed an Answer on August 12, 1997 reasserting
the issues they raised in their Motion to Dismiss.
 On October 1, 1997, the trial court issued an Order appointing three
persons as Commissioners to ascertain the amount of just compensation for
the property. Petitioners filed a "Motion to Hold in Abeyance the Hearing of
the Court Appointed Commissioners to Determine Just Compensation and for
Clarification of the Courts Order dated October 1, 1997" which was denied by
the trial court on November 3, 1997. Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration
was also denied on December 9, 1997.
Petitioners then filed on March 2, 1998 a Petition for Certiorari before the
CA claiming that they were denied due process when the trial court declared
that the taking was for public purpose without receiving evidence on
petitioners claim that the Mayor of Panay was motivated by politics in
expropriating their property and in denying their Motion to Hold in Abeyance
the Hearing of the Court Appointed Commissioners; and that the trial court
also committed grave abuse of discretion when it disregarded the affidavits
of persons denying that they signed a petition addressed to the municipal
government of Panay. On January 17, 2001, petitioners filed a Motion to
Admit Attached Memorandum and the Memorandum itself where they
argued that based on the Petition for Expropriation filed by respondent, such
expropriation was based only on a resolution and not on an ordinance
contrary to Sec. 19 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7160; there was also no valid
and definite offer to buy the property as the price offered by respondent to
the petitioners was very low.
On March 20, 2002, the CA rendered its Decision dismissing the Petition
for Certiorari. Thus, the present petition claiming that:

Issue:
Petitioners were utterly denied procefural due process of law by the court,
when it PETITIONERS WERE UTTERLY DENIED PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
OF LAW BY THE COURT A QUO, WHEN IT SIMPLY DECLARED IN ITS ORDER
DATED 31 JULY 1997 THAT THE TAKING BY RESPONDENT OF PETITIONERS
PROPERTIES IS PURPORTEDLY FOR PUBLIC PURPOSE WITHOUT RECEIVING
EVIDENCE ON THEIR ASSERTED CLAIM THAT RESPONDENTS MUNICIPAL
MAYOR WAS POLITICALLY MOTIVATED IN SEEKING THE EXPROPRIATION OF
THEIR PROPERTIES AND NOT FOR PUBLIC PURPOSE.

Ruling:
Petitioners argue that: contrary to Sec. 19 of R.A. No. 7160 of the Local
Government Code, which provides that a local government may exercise the
power of eminent domain only by "ordinance," respondents expropriation in
this case is based merely on a "resolution"; while objection on this ground
was neither raised by petitioners in their Motion to Dismiss nor in their
Answer, such objection may still be considered by this Court since the fact
upon which it is based is apparent from the petition for expropriation itself; a
defense may be favorably considered even if not raised in an appropriate
pleading so long as the facts upon which it is based are undisputed; courts
have also adopted a more censorious attitude in resolving questions
involving the proper exercise of local bodies of the delegated power of
expropriation, as compared to instances when it is directly exercised by the
national legislature; respondent failed to give, prior to the petition for
expropriation, a previous valid and definite offer to petitioners as the amount
offered in this case was only P10.00 per square meter, when the properties
are residential in nature and command a much higher price; the CA failed to
discuss and rule upon the arguments raised by petitioners in their
Memorandum; attached to the Motion to Dismiss were affidavits and death
certificates showing that there were people whose names were in the
supposed petition asking respondent for land, but who did not actually sign
the same, thus showing that the present expropriation was not for a public
purpose but was merely politically motivated; considering the conflicting
claims regarding the purpose for which the properties are being expropriated
and inasmuch as said issue may not be rightfully ruled upon merely on the
basis of petitioners Motion to Dismiss and Answer as well as respondents
Petition for Expropriation, what should have been done was for the RTC to
conduct hearing where each party is given ample opportunity to prove its
claim.
Respondent for its part contends that its power to acquire private property
for public use upon payment of just compensation was correctly upheld by
the trial court; that the CA was correct in finding that the petitioners were not
denied due process, even though no hearing was conducted in the trial court,
as petitioners were still able to adduce their objections and defenses therein;
and that petitioners arguments have been passed upon by both the trial
court and the CA and were all denied for lack of substantial merit.
Respondent filed a Memorandum quoting at length the decision of the CA
to support its position. Petitioners meanwhile opted to have the case
resolved based on the pleadings already filed. Petition is impressed with
merit.
Eminent domain, which is the power of a sovereign state to appropriate
private property to particular uses to promote public welfare, is essentially
lodged in the legislature. While such power may be validly delegated to local
government units (LGUs), other public entities and public utilities the
exercise of such power by the delegated entities is not absolute. In fact, the
scope of delegated legislative power is narrower than that of the delegating
authority and such entities may exercise the power to expropriate private
property only when authorized by Congress and subject to its control and
restraints imposed through the law conferring the power or in other
legislations. Indeed, LGUs by themselves have no inherent power of eminent
domain. Thus, strictly speaking, the power of eminent domain delegated to
an LGU is in reality not eminent but "inferior" since it must conform to the
limits imposed by the delegation and thus partakes only of a share in
eminent domain. The national legislature is still the principal of the LGUs and
the latter cannot go against the principals will or modify the same.
The exercise of the power of eminent domain necessarily involves a
derogation of a fundamental right. It greatly affects a land owners right to
private property which is a constitutionally protected right necessary for the
preservation and enhancement of personal dignity and is intimately
connected with the rights to life and liberty. Thus, whether such power is
exercised directly by the State or by its authorized agents, the exercise of
such power must undergo painstaking scrutiny.
Indeed, despite the existence of legislative grant in favor of local
governments, it is still the duty of the courts to determine whether the power
of eminent domain is being exercised in accordance with the delegating law.
The Court in no uncertain terms have pronounced that a local government
unit cannot authorize an expropriation of private property through a mere
resolution of its lawmaking body. R.A. No. 7160 otherwise known as the Local
Government Code expressly requires an ordinance for the purpose and a
resolution that merely expresses the sentiment of the municipal council will
not suffice.
A resolution will not suffice for an LGU to be able to expropriate private
property; and the reason for this is settled:
x x x A municipal ordinance is different from a resolution. An ordinance is
a law, but a resolution is merely a declaration of the sentiment or opinion of
a lawmaking body on a specific matter. An ordinance possesses a general
and permanent character, but a resolution is temporary in nature.
Additionally, the two are enacted differently -- a third reading is necessary
for an ordinance, but not for a resolution, unless decided otherwise by a
majority of all the Sanggunian members.
As respondents expropriation in this case was based merely on a
resolution, such expropriation is clearly defective. While the Court is aware of
the constitutional policy promoting local autonomy, the court cannot grant
judicial sanction to an LGUs exercise of its delegated power of eminent
domain in contravention of the very law giving it such power.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 47052 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Complaint
in Civil Action No. V-6958 is DISMISSED without prejudice.
 Hon. Jejomar Binay and the Municipality of Makati v.
Hon. Eufemio Domingo and the Commission of Audit
G.R. No. 92389 September 11, 1991
Paras, J.

The only pivotal issue before us is whether or not Resolution No. 60, re-
enacted under Resolution No. 243, of the Municipality of Makati is a valid
exercise of police power under the general welfare clause.
Facts:
On September 27, 1988, petitioner Municipality, through its Council,
approved Resolution No. 60 which reads:
A RESOLUTION TO CONFIRM AND/OR RATIFY THE ONGOING BURIAL
ASSISTANCE PROGRAM INITIATED BY THE OFFICE OF THE MAYOR, OF
EXTENDING FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE OF FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (P500.00) TO
A BEREAVED FAMILY, FUNDS TO BE TAKEN OUT OF UNAPPROPRIATED
AVAILABLE FUNDS EXISTING IN THE MUNICIPAL TREASURY.
Qualified beneficiaries, under the Burial Assistance Program, are bereaved
families of Makati whose gross family income does not exceed two thousand
pesos (P2,000.00) a month. The beneficiaries, upon fulfillment of other
requirements, would receive the amount of five hundred pesos (P500.00)
cash relief from the Municipality of Makati.
Metro Manila Commission approved Resolution No. 60. Thereafter, the
municipal secretary certified a disbursement fired of four hundred thousand
pesos (P400,000.00) for the implementation of the Burial Assistance
Program.
Resolution No. 60 was referred to respondent Commission on Audit (COA)
for its expected allowance in audit. Based on its preliminary findings,
respondent COA disapproved Resolution No. 60 and disallowed in audit the
disbursement of finds for the implementation thereof.
Two letters for reconsideration filed by petitioners were denied by
respondent in its Decision No. 1159.
However, the Burial Assistance Program has been stayed by COA Decision
No. 1159. Petitioner, through its Mayor, was constrained to file this special
civil action of certiorari praying that COA Decision No. 1159 be set aside as
null and void.
Issue: Whether or not Subject Resolution No. 60, s. 1988, of the Municipal
Council of Makati and the intended disbursements fall within the twin
principles of police power and parens patriae.
The police power is a governmental function, an inherent attribute of
sovereignty, which was born with civilized government. It is founded largely
on the maxims, "Sic utere tuo et ahenum non laedas and "Salus populi est
suprema lex Its fundamental purpose is securing the general welfare,
comfort and convenience of the people.
Police power is inherent in the state but not in municipal corporations
(Balacuit v. CFI of Agusan del Norte, 163 SCRA 182). Before a municipal
corporation may exercise such power, there must be a valid delegation of
such power by the legislature which is the repository of the inherent powers
of the State. A valid delegation of police power may arise from express
delegation, or be inferred from the mere fact of the creation of the municipal
corporation; and as a general rule, municipal corporations may exercise
police powers within the fair intent and purpose of their creation which are
reasonably proper to give effect to the powers expressly granted, and
statutes conferring powers on public corporations have been construed as
empowering them to do the things essential to the enjoyment of life and
desirable for the safety of the people. The so-called inferred police powers of
such corporations are as much delegated powers as are those conferred in
express terms, the inference of their delegation growing out of the fact of the
creation of the municipal corporation and the additional fact that the
corporation can only fully accomplish the objects of its creation by exercising
such powers. (Crawfordsville vs. Braden, 28 N.E. 849). Furthermore,
municipal corporations, as governmental agencies, must have such
measures of the power as are necessary to enable them to perform their
governmental functions. The power is a continuing one, founded on public
necessity. Thus, not only does the State effectuate its purposes through the
exercise of the police power but the municipality does also. (U.S. v. Salaveria,
39 Phil. 102).
Municipal governments exercise this power under the general welfare
clause: pursuant thereto they are clothed with authority to "enact such
ordinances and issue such regulations as may be necessary to carry out and
discharge the responsibilities conferred upon it by law, and such as shall be
necessary and proper to provide for the health, safety, comfort and
convenience, maintain peace and order, improve public morals, promote the
prosperity and general welfare of the municipality and the inhabitants
thereof, and insure the protection of property therein." And under Section 7
of BP 337, "every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly
granted, those necessarily implied therefore, as well as powers necessary
and proper for governance such as to promote health and safety, enhance
prosperity, improve morals, and maintain peace and order in the local
government unit, and preserve the comfort and convenience of the
inhabitants therein."
Police power is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health,
morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of the
people. It is the most essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers. In a sense
it is the greatest and most powerful attribute of the government. It is elastic
and must be responsive to various social conditions. (Sangalang, et al. vs.
IAC, 176 SCRA 719). On it depends the security of social order, the life and
health of the citizen, the comfort of an existence in a thickly populated
community, the enjoyment of private and social life, and the beneficial use of
property, and it has been said to be the very foundation on which our social
system rests. (16 C.J.S.) However, it is not confined within narrow
circumstances of precedents resting on past conditions; it must follow the
legal progress of a democratic way of life. (Sangalang, et al. vs. IAC, supra).
In the case at bar, COA is of the position that there is "no perceptible
connection or relation between the objective sought to be attained under
Resolution No. 60, s. 1988, supra, and the alleged public safety, general
welfare. etc. of the inhabitants of Makati."
Apparently, COA tries to re-define the scope of police power by
circumscribing its exercise to "public safety, general welfare, etc. of the
inhabitants of Makati."
In the case of Sangalang vs. IAC, supra, We ruled that police power is not
capable of an exact definition but has been, purposely, veiled in general
terms to underscore its all comprehensiveness. Its scope, over-expanding to
meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future where it could
be done, provides enough room for an efficient and flexible response to
conditions and circumstances thus assuring the greatest benefits.
The police power of a municipal corporation is broad, and has been said to
be commensurate with, but not to exceed, the duty to provide for the real
needs of the people in their health, safety, comfort, and convenience as
consistently as may be with private rights. It extends to all the great public
needs, and, in a broad sense includes all legislation and almost every
function of the municipal government. It covers a wide scope of subjects,
and, while it is especially occupied with whatever affects the peace, security,
health, morals, and general welfare of the community, it is not limited
thereto, but is broadened to deal with conditions which exists so as to bring
out of them the greatest welfare of the people by promoting public
convenience or general prosperity, and to everything worthwhile for the
preservation of comfort of the inhabitants of the corporation (62 C.J.S. Sec.
128). Thus, it is deemed inadvisable to attempt to frame any definition which
shall absolutely indicate the limits of police power.
COA's additional objection is based on its contention that "Resolution No.
60 is still subject to the limitation that the expenditure covered thereby
should be for a public purpose, ... should be for the benefit of the whole, if
not the majority, of the inhabitants of the Municipality and not for the benefit
of only a few individuals as in the present case."
COA is not attuned to the changing of the times. Public purpose is not
unconstitutional merely because it incidentally benefits a limited number of
persons. As correctly pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General, "The
drift is towards social welfare legislation geared towards state policies to
provide adequate social services, the promotion of the general welfare social
justice (Section 10, Ibid) as well as human dignity and respect for human
rights
The care for the poor is generally recognized as a public duty. The support
for the poor has long been an accepted exercise of police power in the
promotion of the common good.
There is no violation of the equal protection clause in classifying paupers
as subject of legislation. Paupers may be reasonably classified. Different
groups may receive varying treatment. Precious to the hearts of our
legislators, down to our local councilors, is the welfare of the paupers. Thus,
statutes have been passed giving rights and benefits to the disabled,
emancipating the tenant-farmer from the bondage of the soil, housing the
urban poor, etc.
Resolution No. 60, re-enacted under Resolution No. 243, of the
Municipality of Makati is a paragon of the continuing program of our
government towards social justice. The Burial Assistance Program is a relief
of pauperism, though not complete. The loss of a member of a family is a
painful experience, and it is more painful for the poor to be financially
burdened by such death. Resolution No. 60 vivifies the very words of the late
President Ramon Magsaysay 'those who have less in life, should have more
in law." This decision, however must not be taken as a precedent, or as an
official go-signal for municipal governments to embark on a philanthropic
orgy of inordinate dole-outs for motives political or otherwise.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, and with the afore-mentioned caveat, this
petition is hereby GRANTED and the Commission on Audit's Decision No.
1159 is hereby SET ASIDE.
Functional Perspectives case analysis

The social interest therefore in the preservation of human personality and

dignity emphasizes personal security from abusive application of power by
private individual or groups of individual and from unreasonable application
of authority by the government, namely, police power, power of taxation,
power of eminent domain. The essence of this social interest is two-fold. The
first is the right of the people without discrimination among individuals, to
have a voice and to participate in the formation of government policies and
functions. Of this right there is no doubt since the people are called upon to
support these policies morally, physically and financially. The second is the
reasonable expectation of the people that their optimum social requirements
will be met.
The two cases above were historical expression of the social interest
context in our country that properly displays the functional perspective view
of law. The court in ruling these cases expressly applies the maxim of salus
populi est suprema lex. It is thus based on the title and concern of the entire
social group against those forms and acts and practices which adversely
affect the stability of existence and happiness of the people. There is an
abundance of historical illustrations where national decay has been the result
with the wanting of the esteem fro personality and dignity. Paradoxically, the
preservation of this social interest is a continuous fight and endeavor.
Case for Modern Legal Realist Perspective

Alejandro Estrada v. Escritor

A.M. No. P-02-1651
August 4, 2003

Facts:
Soledad Escritor works as a Clerk of Court in the Regional Trial Court of
Las Pinas. In July 27, 2000, complainant Estrada, requested for an
investigation in relation to rumors that respondent was engaged in a
relationship with a man who is not her husband. Respondent testified that
when she entered the judiciary in 1999, she was already a widow, her
husband having died in 1998. She admitted that she started living with
Luciano Quilapio, Jr. without the benefit of marriage more than twenty years
ago when her husband was still alive but living with another woman. She also
admitted that she and Quilapio have a son. But as a member of the religious
sect known as the Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Watch Tower and Bible Tract
Society, respondent asserted that their conjugal arrangement is in
conformity with their religious beliefs and has the approval of her
congregation. In fact, after ten years of living together, she executed on July
28, 1991, a “Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness.”
 For Jehovah’s Witnesses, the Declaration allows members of the
congregation who have been abandoned by their spouses to enter into
marital relations. The Declaration thus makes the resulting union moral and
binding within the congregation all over the world except in countries where
divorce is allowed. As laid out by the tenets of their faith, the Jehovah’s
congregation requires that at the time the declarations are executed, the
couple cannot secure the civil authorities’ approval of the marital relationship
because of legal impediments. Only those couples which have been baptized
and in good standing may execute the Declaration. The declaration requires
the approval of the elders of the congregation. As a matter of practice, the
marital status of the declarants and their respective spouses’ commission of
adultery are investigated before the declarations are executed. Escritor and
Quilapio’s declarations were executed in the usual and approved form
prescribed by the Jehovah’s Witnesses, approved by elders of the
congregation where the declarations were executed, and recorded in the
Watch Tower Central Office.
Moreover, the Jehovah’s congregation believes that once all legal
impediments for the couple are lifted, the validity of the declarations ceases,
and the couple should legalize their union. In Escritor’s case, although she
was widowed in 1998, thereby lifting the legal impediment to marry on her
part, her mate was still not capacitated to remarry. Thus, their declarations
remained valid. In sum, therefore, insofar as the congregation is concerned,
there is nothing immoral about the conjugal arrangement between Escritor
and Quilapio and they remain members in good standing in the
congregation.
By invoking the religious beliefs, practices and moral standards of her
congregation, in asserting that her conjugal arrangement does not constitute
disgraceful and immoral conduct for which she should be held
administratively liable.

Issue:
 Whether or not respondent should be reprimanded for her alleged extra-
marital affairs.

Held:
No. Our Constitution adheres to the benevolent neutrality approach that
gives room for accommodation of religious exercises as required by the Free
Exercise Clause. Thus, in arguing that respondent should be held
administratively liable as the arrangement she had was “illegal per se
because, by universally recognized standards, it is inherently or by its very
nature bad, improper, immoral and contrary to good conscience,” the
Solicitor General failed to appreciate that benevolent neutrality could allow
for accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does not offend
compelling state interests
Respondent Escritor’s conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized as she
has made out a case for exemption from the law based on her fundamental
right to freedom of religion. The Court recognizes that state interests must
be upheld in order that freedoms - including religious freedom - may be
enjoyed. In the area of religious exercise as a preferred freedom, however,
man stands accountable to an authority higher than the state, and so the
state interest sought to be upheld must be so compelling that its violation
will erode the very fabric of the state that will also protect the freedom. In
the absence of a showing that such state interest exists, man must be
allowed to subscribe to the Infinite.
In this case, the government’s conduct may appear innocent and
nondiscriminatory but in effect, it is oppressive to the minority. In the
interpretation of a document, such as the Bill of Rights, designed to protect
the minority from the majority, the question of which perspective is
appropriate would seem easy to answer. Moreover, the text, history,
structure and values implicated in the interpretation of the clauses, all point
toward this perspective. Thus, substantive equality—a reading of the religion
clauses which leaves both politically dominant and the politically weak
religious groups equal in their inability to use the government (law) to assist
their own religion or burden others, makes the most sense in the
interpretation of the Bill of Rights, a document designed to protect minorities
and individuals from mobocracy in a democracy.

Case Analysis for Modern Legal Realist Perspective

Estrada v. Escritor

The Modern Legal Realist Perspective’s American Legal Realism states

that “the law is an instrument of social control entrusted to the Courts with
regard to experience and prevailing moral and political theories and
policies”. Law is what the Court says it is. The Courts are affected by certain
Metalegal Factors. These are the elements which stimulate a Judge either
against or for a specific matter or controversy. The Metalegal Factor of the
Stimuli Set Up by the Judges’ Predilections and Preconceptions may be
applied in the case at bar. The leading case of Estrada v. Escritor was penned
by Chief Justice Reynato Puno, a known religious and virtuous man.
The Metalegal stimulus that is present in the case is the Judge’s or Justice’
Legal Sympathies. Legal Sympathies arise from a judge’s community of
experience, education, interests, and even temperament. Chief Justice
Puno’s disposition towards fairness and equality are well known in the
Philippines. It is an area in which he is forthright, clearly reflecting his legal
sympathies towards the protection of equal rights as well as religious rights.
In the Estrada case, Chief Justice Puno of the Supreme Court ruled in favor
of the respondent. The Chief Justice, who penned the opinion, characterized
the acts of the respondent to be well in the realm of the free exercise of her
religious beliefs. Furthermore, it was held that there was no compelling state
interest to warrant a punishment against the respondent.
The mind of a Judge or Justice is a store of legal sympathies and legal
antipathies which is acquired in the process of maturing and education. The
metalegal stimuli come into operation only because certain issues strike
familiar notes which may set a judicial tone.

Marcos vs. Manglapus,

GR no. 88211 September 15, 1989
August 2, 2008

Facts:
 The petitioners are Ferdinand E. Marcos and his immediate family, while
Raul Manglapus, Secretary of Foreign Affairs, the respondent. The call is
about the request of Marcos family to the court to order the respondents to
issue travel documents to Mr. Marcos and the immediate members of his
family and to enjoin the implementation of the president’s decision to bar
their return to the Philippines.

Issue:
Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the constitution,
the President may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.

Ruling:
Petition was dismissed. President did not arbitrarily or with grave of
discretion in determining that return of former president Marcos and his
family at the present time and under present circumstances poses a serious
threat to national interest and welfare and in prohibiting their return to the
Philippines.

Case Analysis for Modern Legal Realist:

Marcos v. Manglapus
 The Metalegal Factor of the Stimuli Set Up by Historical or Political Events
and Precedents may be applied in the case at bar. As was held in the case:
“The duties of the President under the Constitution, in compliance with his
(or her) oath of office, is to protect and promote the interest and welfare of
the people. Her decision to bar the return of the Marcoses and subsequently,
the remains of Mr. Marcos at the present time and under present
circumstances is in compliance with this bounden duty. In the absence of a
clear showing that she had acted with arbitrariness or with grave abuse of
discretion in arriving at this decision, the Court will not enjoin the
implementation of this decision.”
The petitioners in the case at bar raise their inherent right as citizens of
the Philippines to return to their country of birth but also the protection of
the Constitution and all of the rights guaranteed to Filipinos under the
Constitution. However, if the Marcoses were allowed to return, it may provide
a catalytic effect which, instead of erasing fears of destabilization, might
even cause the opposite.
The historic-political setting of the case shows that it was barely four
years after the dramatic EDSA Revolution and that strong political feelings
were still at its height. The Supreme Court ruled against the petitioners not
because of existing prejudices against the family, but because the Motion
was filed during a time when emotions were still high and a strong possibility
of government destabilization was apparent.
Case for Critical Legal Studies

International School Alliance of Educators v. Hon. Leonardo A.

Quisumbing
G.R. No. 128845. June 1, 2000
Kapunan, J.

Facts:
Private respondent, International School Inc. is a domestic educational
institution established primarily for dependents of foreign diplomatic
personnel and other temporary residents. The school hires both foreign and
local teachers as members of its faculty, classifying them as foreign-hires
and local-hires. The local-hire faculty members of said International School,
mostly Filipinos, complained against the better treatment of their colleagues
who have been hired abroad. These foreign-hires enjoy certain benefits not
accorded the local-hires which include housing, transportation, shipping
costs, taxes, home leave travel allowance and a salary rate 25% higher than
that of the local-hires. Petitioner claims that the point-of-hire classification
employed by the school is discriminatory to Filipinos and that the grant of
higher salaries to foreign-hires constitutes racial discrimination.

Issue:
Whether or not the classification employed by the respondent school
constitutes racial discrimination.

Held:
YES. The Constitution in the Article on Social Justice and Human Rights
exhorts Congress to "give highest priority to the enactment of measures that
protect and enhance the right of all people to human dignity, reduce social,
economic, and political inequalities." The very broad Article 19 of the Civil
Code requires every person, "in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, [to] act with justice, give everyone his due, and
observe honesty and good faith."
The Constitution also directs the State to promote "equality of
employment opportunities for all." Similarly, the Labor Code provides that
the State shall "ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race or
creed." It would be an affront to both the spirit and letter of these provisions
if the State, in spite of its primordial obligation to promote and ensure equal
employment opportunities, closes its eyes to unequal and discriminatory
terms and conditions of employment.
In this case, the point-of-hire classification employed by respondent
school to justify the distinction in the salary rates of foreign-hires and local
hires is an invalid classification. There is no reasonable distinction between
the services rendered by foreign-hires and local-hires. The practice of the
School of according higher salaries to foreign-hires contravenes public policy
and, certainly, does not deserve the sympathy of this Court.
The foregoing provisions impregnably institutionalize in this jurisdiction
the long honored legal truism of "equal pay for equal work." Persons who
work with substantially equal qualifications, skill, effort and responsibility,
under similar conditions, should be paid similar salaries. This rule applies to
the School, its "international character" notwithstanding. If an employer
accords employees the same position and rank, the presumption is that
these employees perform equal work. This presumption is borne by logic and
human experience. If the employer pays one employee less than the rest, it
is not for that employee to explain why he receives less or why the others
receive more. That would be adding insult to injury. The employer has
discriminated against that employee; it is for the employer to explain why
the employee is treated unfairly.
Case Analysis for Critical Legal Studies

Critical legal studies views the law as an instrument to redeem the people
from social divisions and hierarchies. It is an advocacy of the law as a neutral
and objective means of social control with emphasis on its liberating
function. In the case cited, there exists a duality which is often called by the
realist theorists as paired opposite. This is the classification made by the
international school categorizing the members of the faculty of the
International School as foreign-hires and local-hires. Dualities, such as this
one, are being eradicated by the critical legal realism theorists to show how
they create an ideology that furthers the interest of the ruling class. They
envisioned a future in which the categories that currently divide and
separate people—including sexual, racial, political, and class categories—are
broken down, allowing people to share more values and to create a more
harmonious society. It is only when the law is neutral and maintains its
neutrality in the inevitable conflict of claims, demands, and expectations can
everyone in society accept it as a means of social control and feel safe and
secure from illegitimate divisions and hierarchies.
Critical Legal Studies pushes the liberal premises about state and society,
about freedom from dependence and governance of social relations by the
will, to the point at which they merge into a larger ambition: the building of a
social world less alien to a self that can always violate the generative rules of
its own mental or social constructs and put other rules and other constructs
in their place. It therefore seeks to reform the law and society in such a way
as to liberate and empower every individual.

Case for Policy Science

In the matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus: Laurente C.

Ilagan
v. Hon Juan Ponce Enrile
October 21, 1985

Facts:
A petition for Habeas Corpus was filed by the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and Free Legal Assistance Group on behalf of Attorneys Laurente
Ilagan, Antonio Arellano, and Marcos Risonar.
The three lawyers were arrested and detained in Camp Catitipan solely on
the basis of a Mission Order signed by General Echavarria, Regional Unified
Commander of the Ministry of National Defense. The petition for habeas
corpus was then filed on the ground that the arrests were illegal and violative
of the Constitution, because arrests cannot be made on the basis of Mission
Orders and there appears to be a military campaign to harass lawyers who
are involved in national security cases.
 The respondents contended that the attorneys were arrested on the basis
of a Decree issued by the President. Respondents further allege that the
detained attorneys played active roles in organizing mass actions of the
Communist Party of the Philippines and the National Democratic Front.
The Court resolved to order the temporary release of the detained
attorneys on the recognizance of the principal counsel of petitioners, namely
retired Chief Justice Concepcion and retires Associate Justice J.B.L. Reyes.
However, despite the Order of the Court, the detained attorneys were not
released. Respondents field an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration stating
that the suspension of the Writ of Habeas Corpus has the effect of ousting
the Court of its jurisdiction to hear the case.
Furthermore, the respondents alleged that an Information for Rebellion
was filed against the detained attorneys and thus making the petition for
Habeas Corpus moot and academic. Petitioners opined, saying that the
detained attorneys were not given the benefit of preliminary investigation,
ant that they were denied their constitutional right to due process.
Issue:
Whether or not the subsequent filing of an Information is a bar to a
petition for Habeas Corpus.

Held:
Case was dismissed for having become moot and academic. Petitioners
were detained by virtue of a Warrant of Arrest issued by the Regional Trial
Court of Davao City in relation to the criminal case for Rebellion filed against
them before said Court.
Case Analysis for Policy Science:
Ilagan v. Enrile

The concept of Habeas Corpus as presented in this case is the

materialization of the concept of “Liberty” as a social value. The social value
of “liberty” moves towards the ability of people to act or to do things which
are crucial to his way of life.
In the famous case of Calalang v. Williams, the Supreme Court stated that
liberty is a blessing without which life is a misery, but liberty should not be
made to prevail over authority because then society will fall into anarchy and
neither should authority be made to prevail over liberty because then the
individual will fall into slavery.
In the present case, the social value of “liberty” was apparent. Liberty
means security from restraint, it is deemed to embrace the right of a man to
enjoy the faculties with which he has been endowed by his creator subject
only to restraints necessary for the public welfare. The Social Value of
“Liberty” may take an active or passive mode. In the case, it took an active
form. The active form of “liberty” is that which may be the basis of legal
claims or legal powers. The exercise of the right to Petition the Court for
Habeas Corpus is an example of an active form of “liberty” based on a legal
claim.
But whether “liberty” is in its active or passive form, it is an area of
human endeavor which the government should not encroach upon or permit
undue restriction to. In the case at bar, a conflict arose between the claim of
the government to national security and individual rights. The government
applied unrestricted and unreasonable interference which may be
detrimental to social values.
The social value of “Power” was also evident in the case at bar. The first
aspect of “Power” as a social value is the capacity to secure and maintain
fundamental Human Rights. These rights cannot exist under a benevolent
despot. In Ilagan v. Enrile, the captives were arrested under the authority of
the then dictator Ferdinand Marcos. It can be gainsaid that the arbitrary
authority exercised over the lawyers were unnatural and undesirable.

Florentino Joya, Juan Tahimic and Domingo Joya v. Pedro Pareja

G.R. No. L-13258; November 28, 1959

Florentino Joya is the owner of a parcel of land with an area of 11 hectares

(lot No. 1171), situated in Sanja Mayor, Tanza, Cavite, which had been under
lease to one Maximina Bondad for 16 years. For the duration of said period,
the land was tenanted and worked on for the lessee by Pedro Pareja.
In April, 1954, upon termination of the lease agreement, the property was
returned to the landowner, with the lessee recommending that the same be
leased to Pareja. The said tenant and the landowner, however, failed to
agree on the terms under which the former could work on the lands,
specifically on the matter of rental, as Joya demanded 120 cavanes as
annual rental therefore. Notwithstanding such lack of understanding between
them, Pareja continued on his cultivation of the property.
On May 24, 1954, the tenant filed with the Court of Industrial Relations
(before the creation of the Court of Agrarian Relations) Tenancy Case No.
5281-R against Florentino Joya for the purpose of securing a reduction of the
rental allegedly being imposed upon him by the respondent. The landowner
resisted the complaint disclaiming that Pareja had ever his tenant.
Two days thereafter or on May 26, Florentino Joya leased the land to
Domingo Joya at an annual rent of 120 cavanes. As the aforesaid lessee
found Pareja already working on the land, the former agreed to allow him
(Pareja) to continue with his cultivation on condition that they would equally
share its produce after deducting the rental for the land. In view of this
development, Pareja moved for the dismissal of his complaint against the
landowner, then pending in the Court of Industrial Relations, on the ground
that the parties therein had already reached an agreement on the matter in
controversy.
One year later, or on April 10, 1055, Florentino Joya renewed the lease in
favor of Domingo Joya but included as co-lessee one Juan Tahimic. The rent
was reduced to 105 cavanes a year. Pareja, with whom Domingo had worked
during the previous year, refused to surrender the land to Tahimic.
Thereupon, Florentino filed with the Justice of the Peace Court of Tanza,
Cavite, a complaint for usurpation against Pareja who, consequently, was
arrested and stayed in jail for a week. When finally released on Bail, Pareja
filed a counter-charge with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal, against
Florentino Joya, Juan Tahimic, and Domingo Joya, for alleged violation of
Republic Act 1199.
However, threatened to be imprisoned again or fined in the usurpation
case if he did not desist and surrender the land, he withdrew his complaint
manifesting that he was surrendering the property to its owner but "leaving
to the Court of Industrial Relations or Agrarian Court the determination of
whatever right he may have in the said land." Thereafter, at the instance of
Florentino Joya, the criminal case for usurpation was also dismissed.
On January 31, 1956, Pareja filed in the Court of Agrarian Relations a
complaint against Florentino Joya and Juan Tahimic for alleged violation of
Republic Act 1199 (Tenancy Case No. CAR-6, Cavite), consisting of his
allegedly unlawful ejectment from the land he was working on for 16 years
and the appointment by Florentino Joya of his co-defendant Juan Tahimic as
tenant in his (Pareja's) stead; of the landowner's filing a criminal action when
he refused to vacate the property and making it a condition for its dismissal
his (Pareja's) surrender of the same. And contending that he unwillingly
vacated the land for fear of being again indicted in court, Pareja prayed for
his reinstatement to the landholding; payment to him of his share of the
crops for the agricultural year 1955-56 which he failed to receive; for
damages and attorney's fees.
In their answer with counterclaim, defendants Florentino and Juan denied
the existence of tenancy relationship between plaintiff and defendant
Florentino; and claimed that the complaint stated no cause of action and that
the case had already been passed upon the competent authorities
(apparently referring to the dismissal by the Court of Industrial Relations and
the Provincial Fiscal's Office of the previous complaint of Pareja against the
same defendants.) Domingo Joya also filed an answer in intervention praying
for the recognition of his and Tahimic's superior right to work on and cultivate
the land.
After due hearing, the Court rendered judgment holding that upon
termination of the civil lease in favor of Maximina Bondad, Pedro Pareja, the
lessee's tenant, automatically became the tenant of the landowner, pursuant
to Section 264 of Act 4054; that said tenant, on the other hand, in agreeing
to share equally with Domingo Joya the produce of the land for the
agricultural year 1954-55 in effect waived his right over an undetermined 1/2
of the landholding; that the subsequent contract of lease entered into
between the landowner and Domingo Joya and Juan Tahimic as lessees could
not prejudice the right of Pareja to work on the same land and, accordingly,
was declared valid only insofar as that portion given up by the latter in favor
of Domingo Joya was concerned. Consequently, Pedro Pareja was ordered
reinstated to 1/2 of the 11 hectare landholding, while Domingo Joya and Juan
Tahimic were recognized as joint tenants over the other half. As the rental for
the lease of the land was fixed at 53.75 cavanes per agricultural year after
taking into consideration its nature and productivity, the court also directed
Florentino Joya to return to plaintiff Pareja and intervenor Domingo Joya
21.25 cavanes of palay or their value, which were overpaid to him (the
landowner) for the agricultural year 1954-55; and to Domingo Joya and Juan
Tahimic 55 cavanes or their corresponding value which were overpaid to him
for the year 1955-56 and 1956-57. The court, however, finding that plaintiff's
failure to continue on the cultivation of the land its return to the owner could
not be imputed to the latter, exonerated Florentino Joya from the charge of
violation of Republic Act 1199. Not satisfied with this decision, therein
defendants and intervenor filed this petition for review.
Admittedly, the respondent-tenant cultivated the land for the lessee for
16 years or for the entire duration of the tenancy relationship existed
between Maximina Bondad, the lessee, and Pareja, the tenant. The question
now interposed in this petition is whether the tenant of a lessee retains the
right to work on the land despite the termination of the lease, or said in other
words, whether his being a tenant of the lessee makes him, upon the
expiration of the contract, a tenant of the lessor.
The question thus presented must be answered in the affirmative, not so
must because of Act 4054 relied upon by the Agrarian Court, but pursuant to
Section 9 of Republic Act 1199, as amended by Section 3 of Republic Act
2263, which reads in part:
SEC 9. Severance of Relations. The tenancy relationship is extinguished
by the voluntary surrender or abandonment of the land by, or the death or
incapacity of, the tenant:
 xxx xxx xxx
The expiration of the period of the contract as fixed by the parties, or the
sale, alienation or transfer of legal possession of the land does not of itself
extinguish the relationship. In the latter case, the purchaser or transferee
shall assume the rights and obligations of the former landholder in relation to
the tenant. In case of death of the landholder, his heir shall likewise assume
his rights and obligations. (Emphasis supplied.)
It is clear from the foregoing that tenancy relationship is not extinguished
by (1) the expiration of the contract(of tenancy); (2) sale; (3) alienation; or
(4) transfer of legal possession of the land.
In a contract of lease, the lessee, for the duration of the contract subject
of the agreement.1 The return by the lessee of the property to the lessor,
upon expiration of the lease contract, naturally involves again a transfer of
possession from one lawful holder to another. But it may be asked, is this
transfer of possession included in or comprehended by the aforequoted
Section 9 of Republic Act 1199, as amended?
Prior to the enactment of Republic Act 2263, amending Republic Act 1199,
our tenancy legislations, while providing for the tenant's right in case of sale
or alienation of the property, is silent where there is only a transfer of legal
possession of the land. With amendment of the Agriculture Tenancy Act (Rep.
Act 1199) on June 19, 1959, the tenure even in cases of transfer of legal
possession. Petitioner-landowner, however, claims that to hold that the
lessee's tenant, with whom he had no dealing whatsoever, automatically
become his tenant upon the return of the property to him would constitute a
restraint on his right to enter into contract and deprive him of his liberty (to
contract) and property without due process of law.
This same contention was raised during the deliberations of the then
Senate Bill No. 119, but Congress, decided to implement its policy and
objective in adopting the Agricultural Tenancy Law and passed the bill in its
present form. The following is quoted from the Congressional Record:
 SENATOR PRIMICIAS. On the severance of relationship of tenant and
landowner, it seems that there is an intention on the part of Your Honor to
amend Section 9 of the Act so as to include the transfer of legal possession
of land in one or two cases which do not extinguish the relationship . . . .
SENATOR PELAEZ. I would say that this afternoon, in the committee on
Revision of Law, we were considering amendments to the effect that the
present tenants must have the priority right, and I think we should give
priority to those tenants who are there and that any transfer of lands should
not affect them the least.
SENATOR PRIMICIAS . . . Does Your Honor think that the landowner is not
entitled to transfer the lease to another person even if the police offered is
better?
SENADOR PELAEZ. Under the present law, he cannot do it.
SENATOR PRIMICIAS. Would that not constitute a deprivation of property
without due process of law.
SENATOR PELAEZ. It is deprivation of property without due process of law.
It is in the present law. But we have to remember here social values and
human values against material values. Precisely, the agricultural tenancy act
remedied an existing evil because before the agricultural tenancy act
provided for security of these poor tenants, they were pushed out of the land
by the landlords . . . (Senate Congressional Record, Vol. I, No. 54, April
21,1958, p. 905-906.)
It is our considered judgement, since the return by the lessee of the
leased property to the lessor upon the expiration of the contract involves
also a transfer of legal possssion and taking into account the manifest intent
of the lawmaking body in amending the law, i.e., to provide the tenant with
security of tenure in call case of transfer of legal possession, that the instant
case falls within and is governed by the provisions of Section 9 of Republic
Act 1199, as amended by Republic Act 2263. The termination of the lease,
therefore, did not divest the tenant of the right to remain and continue on his
cultivation of the land. Furthermore, should any doubt exist as to the
applicability of the aforementioned provision of law to the case at bar, such
doubt must be resolved in favor of the tenant.3
Petitioner landowner likewise assails the legality of the judgment of the
court a quo prescribing the rental that must be paid by the tenants, it being
claimed that such question was never raised in the pleadings filed in said
court. This is not exactly the case, because it must be remembered that the
main reason for the refusal of the landowner to let petitioner continue in the
cultivation of the landholding in 1954 was precisely the question of the rental
to be paid, the tenant claiming that the 120 cavanes being asked by the
landowner was excessive. This therefore, is a matter of dispute between the
parties and the action taken by the Agrarian Court is sanctioned by Section
11 of Republic Act No. 1267 which provides:
SEC. 11. Character of Order or Decision. In issuing an order or decision,
the Court shall not be restricted to the specific relief claimed or demands
made by the parties to the dispute, but may include in the order or decision
any matter or determination which may be deemed necessary and expedient
for the purpose of settling the dispute or of preventing further disputes,
provided that said matter for determination has been established by
competent evidence during the hearing.
Contrary to petitioners' contention that no proof was adduced during the
trial to support the lower court's finding that the entire landholding has an
average annual yield of 215 cavanes, we have the testimony of Florentino
Joya himself that "the land normally produces more than 300 cavanes per
year" (pp. 207 & 225, Records). There is also the statement of Pareja that in
1954-55, he harvested 133 cavanes, in spite of poor crop. (p.45, Record.)
Hence, we find no reason to disturb the finding of fact of the lower court.
Petitioner also allege that the tenant voluntarily surrendered the property
to the landowner, as evidence by an affidavit executed by Pareja on July 16,
1955 and subscribed before the Justice of the Peace of Tanza, Cavite, the
translation of which reads:
 I, PEDRO PAREJA, of legal age, and residing in the municipality of Tanza,
Cavite, under oath state the following:
That in accordance with what I have declared before the provincial Fiscal
of Cavite during the investigation (July 6, 1955), I will not interfere with or
continue the cultivation in the land of Mr. Florentino Joya in Balite, Tanza,
Cavite, Lot No. 1171, and which I am voluntarily returning to him,
nevertheless I am leaving to the C.I.R. or Agrarian Court the determination of
whatever right I may have in said land.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I hereby sign this document, in the Municipal
building of Tanza, Cavite, this 16th day of July, 1955.
(Sgd.) PEDRO PAREJA
This statement notwithstanding, the lower court found that "petitioner's
fear after his incarceration was ordered by the Justice of the Peace was such
that his freedom of choice was impaired, or at least restricted. Under such
circumstances, he was not acting voluntarily."
This conclusion is fully supported by the record of the case. The
explanation of the tenant is sufficiently borne out by the circumstances
attending the execution of the document. At the time he made the statement
both in the office of the Provincial Fiscal and the Justice of the Peace of Tanza
(who ordered his previous arrest), petitioner Florentino against him was then
pending in the justice of the peace court. The facts that immediately after
the execution of the affidavit the landowner moved for the dismissal of the
aforementioned criminal case corroborates Pareja's testimony that he had to
do as he did out of fear of further harassment.
Significantly too, it may be observed from a reading of the document that
the affiant did not over the property to the owner unconditionally. On the
contrary, he made a reservation of his right to secure from the property court
a judicial declaration of whatever interest he may have in the land. This
indeed contradicts the supposed "voluntaries" of the tenant's act in giving up
the land.
 With respect to the charge that a portion of the land was utilized by the
tenant as a "tilapia" fish pond, we agree with the lower court that there is no
evidence that it resulted in material injury to the land (Sec. 51, Rep. Act
1199). The uncontradicted testimony is that the fishpond was made on
requirement of the Bureau of Agricultural Extension that every farmer in the
vicinity should have a small fishpond, and that this particular fishpond was
on the portion ("balot") not used for planting rice (pp. 81-82, Record.)
Wherefore, finding no reason to review the decision appealed from, the
same is hereby affirmed, with costs against petitioner Florentino Joya. So
ordered.

Case Analysis for Policy Science

Joya v. Pareha

The policy science jurisprudence is an advocacy of the social value. In

this advocacy, the policy science school deplores the failure of the
ontological schools, for all their legal craftsmanship, in supplying the
empirical basis for the legal ordering of the society, especially in the solution
of problems involving the relation of the individual to the state and the
conflict between individual rights and national security. In this advocacy, the
policy science school also underscores the thesis that if legal philosophy is to
succeed in providing norms for the criticism or evaluation of the rules of
positive law, whether national or international, it must take into account the
social values. In the instant case, the enactment of the Agricultural Tenancy
Law upholds the social value and human value against material value
remedied an existing evil because before the agricultural tenancy act
provided for security of these poor tenants, they were pushed out of the land
by the landlords.

Case for Scandinavian Legal Realism

Primitivo Ansay et al, v.

The Board of Directors of the Natioanal Development et al.
 G.R. No. L-13667 April 29, 1960
Paras, C. J.:

On July 25, 1956, appellants filed against appellees in the Court of First
Instance of Manila a complaint praying for a 20% Christmas bonus for the
years 1954 and 1955. The court a quo on appellees' motion to dismiss,
issued the following order:
Considering the motion to dismiss filed on 15 August, 1956, set for this
morning; considering that at the hearing thereof, only respondents appeared
thru counsel and there was no appearance for the plaintiffs although the
court waited for sometime for them; considering, however, that petitioners
have submitted an opposition which the court will consider together with the
arguments presented by respondents and the Exhibits marked and
presented, namely, Exhibits 1 to 5, at the hearing of the motion to dismiss;
considering that the action in brief is one to compel respondents to declare a
Christmas bonus for petitioners workers in the National Development
Company; considering that the Court does not see how petitioners may have
a cause of action to secure such bonus because:
(a) A bonus is an act of liberality and the court takes it that it is not within
its judicial powers to command respondents to be liberal;
(b) Petitioners admit that respondents are not under legal duty to give
such bonus but that they had only ask that such bonus be given to them
because it is a moral obligation of respondents to give that but as this Court
understands, it has no power to compel a party to comply with a moral
obligation (Art. 142, New Civil Code.).
IN VIEW WHEREOF, dismissed. No pronouncement as to costs.
A motion for reconsideration of the afore-quoted order was denied. Hence
this appeal.
Appellants contend that there exists a cause of action in their complaint
because their claim rests on moral grounds or what in brief is defined by law
as a natural obligation.
 Since appellants admit that appellees are not under legal obligation to
give such claimed bonus; that the grant arises only from a moral obligation
or the natural obligation that they discussed in their brief, this Court feels it
urgent to reproduce at this point, the definition and meaning of natural
obligation.
Article 1423 of the New Civil Code classifies obligations into civil or
natural. "Civil obligations are a right of action to compel their performance.
Natural obligations, not being based on positive law but on equity and
natural law, do not grant a right of action to enforce their performance, but
after voluntary fulfillment by the obligor, they authorize the retention of what
has been delivered or rendered by reason thereof".
It is thus readily seen that an element of natural obligation before it can
be cognizable by the court is voluntary fulfillment by the obligor. Certainly
retention can be ordered but only after there has been voluntary
performance. But here there has been no voluntary performance. In fact, the
court cannot order the performance.
At this point, we would like to reiterate what we said in the case of
Philippine Education Co. vs. CIR and the Union of Philippine Education Co.,
Employees (NUL) (92 Phil., 381; 48 Off. Gaz., 5278)
xxx xxx xxx
From the legal point of view a bonus is not a demandable and enforceable
obligation. It is so when it is made a part of the wage or salary
compensation.
And while it is true that the subsequent case of H. E. Heacock vs. National
Labor Union, et al., 95 Phil., 553; 50 Off. Gaz., 4253, we stated that:
Even if a bonus is not demandable for not forming part of the wage, salary
or compensation of an employee, the same may nevertheless, be granted on
equitable consideration as when it was given in the past, though withheld in
succeeding two years from low salaried employees due to salary increases.
 still the facts in said Heacock case are not the same as in the instant one,
and hence the ruling applied in said case cannot be considered in the
present action.
Premises considered, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed, without
pronouncement as to costs.

Case Analysis for Scandinavian Legal Realism

The Scandinavian legal realists believe that legal ideology has no place
in the conception of the law and its component jural relations. Characterizing
statutes as just or unjust whether the evaluation is in terms of the natural
law or the will of the supreme political superior is meaningless. The reason
behind is that the interpreter is only expressing a personal preference or
statement that he or she likes or dislikes a particular statute or rule without
any conscious reference to any known quality of the statute or rule. They
believe that the legal ordering of society is based on the feeling for justice
prevalent and current within the society. It is this feeling for societal good
that gives substance and meaning to the legal ordering of society. To them,
the law is the means of regulating human behavior based on the feeling for
what is best for the social welfare. Therefore, its binding force is no longer on
the illusory idea of the consent of the governed.

For the Scandinavian legal realist, the conventional concepts of “right”

and “obligation” are verbal magic. It is pointed out that this is word magic for
there can be rights and obligations even without legal rules and sanctions. In
the case cited, the Board of Directors of the National Development Company,
in performing the obligation of paying the Christmas bonus, feels that in
good conscience should comply with the undertaking which is based on
moral grounds.